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**Summary**: Organise citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00029 Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise](../../generated_pages/counters/C00029.md) | D03 |
| [C00030 Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00030.md) | D03 |
| [C00031 Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify](../../generated_pages/counters/C00031.md) | D03 |
| [C00082 Ground truthing as automated response to pollution](../../generated_pages/counters/C00082.md) | D03 |
| [C00084 Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them](../../generated_pages/counters/C00084.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda
**Summary**: Organise citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00029 Create fake website to issue counter narrative and counter narrative through physical merchandise](../../generated_pages/counters/C00029.md) | D03 |
| [C00030 Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00030.md) | D03 |
| [C00031 Dilute the core narrative - create multiple permutations, target / amplify](../../generated_pages/counters/C00031.md) | D03 |
| [C00082 Ground truthing as automated response to pollution](../../generated_pages/counters/C00082.md) | D03 |
| [C00084 Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them](../../generated_pages/counters/C00084.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda
**Summary**: Organise citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| [C00084 Modify disinformation narratives, and rebroadcast them](../../generated_pages/counters/C00084.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00080 Create competing narrative](../../generated_pages/counters/C00080.md) | D03 |
| [C00081 Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations](../../generated_pages/counters/C00081.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0003: Leverage Existing Narratives
**Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00080 Create competing narrative](../../generated_pages/counters/C00080.md) | D03 |
| [C00081 Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations](../../generated_pages/counters/C00081.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0003: Leverage Existing Narratives
**Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| [C00081 Highlight flooding and noise, and explain motivations](../../generated_pages/counters/C00081.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centred on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00042 Address truth contained in narratives](../../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0004: Develop Competing Narratives
**Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centred on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00042 Address truth contained in narratives](../../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0004: Develop Competing Narratives
**Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centred on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| [C00042 Address truth contained in narratives](../../generated_pages/counters/C00042.md) | D04 |
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**Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices](../../generated_pages/counters/C00009.md) | D02 |
| [C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist groups](../../generated_pages/counters/C00046.md) | D04 |
| [C00048 Name and Shame Influencers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00048.md) | D07 |
| [C00051 Counter social engineering training](../../generated_pages/counters/C00051.md) | D02 |
| [C00111 Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views](../../generated_pages/counters/C00111.md) | D04 |
| [C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00130.md) | D07 |
| [C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages](../../generated_pages/counters/C00162.md) | D03 |
| [C00169 develop a creative content hub](../../generated_pages/counters/C00169.md) | D03 |
| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0010: Cultivate Ignorant Agents
**Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00009 Educate high profile influencers on best practices](../../generated_pages/counters/C00009.md) | D02 |
| [C00046 Marginalise and discredit extremist groups](../../generated_pages/counters/C00046.md) | D04 |
| [C00048 Name and Shame Influencers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00048.md) | D07 |
| [C00051 Counter social engineering training](../../generated_pages/counters/C00051.md) | D02 |
| [C00111 Reduce polarisation by connecting and presenting sympathetic renditions of opposite views](../../generated_pages/counters/C00111.md) | D04 |
| [C00130 Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00130.md) | D07 |
| [C00162 Unravel/target the Potemkin villages](../../generated_pages/counters/C00162.md) | D03 |
| [C00169 develop a creative content hub](../../generated_pages/counters/C00169.md) | D03 |
| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0010: Cultivate Ignorant Agents
**Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0014.001: Raise Funds from Malign Actors
**Summary**: Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0014.001: Raise Funds from Malign Actors
**Summary**: Raising funds from malign actors may include contributions from foreign agents, cutouts or proxies, shell companies, dark money groups, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0014.002: Raise Funds from Ignorant Agents
**Summary**: Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets **Parent Technique:** T0014 Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0014.002: Raise Funds from Ignorant Agents
**Summary**: Raising funds from ignorant agents may include scams, donations intended for one stated purpose but then used for another, etc.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00059 Verification of project before posting fund requests](../../generated_pages/counters/C00059.md) | D02 |
| [C00155 Ban incident actors from funding sites](../../generated_pages/counters/C00155.md) | D02 |
| [C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors](../../generated_pages/counters/C00216.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0014: Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00059 Verification of project before posting fund requests](../../generated_pages/counters/C00059.md) | D02 |
| [C00155 Ban incident actors from funding sites](../../generated_pages/counters/C00155.md) | D02 |
| [C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors](../../generated_pages/counters/C00216.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0014: Prepare Fundraising Campaigns
**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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| [C00216 Use advertiser controls to stem flow of funds to bad actors](../../generated_pages/counters/C00216.md) | D02 |
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**Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.005: Use Hashtags, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0015.001: Use Existing Hashtag
**Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.005: Use Hashtags, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0015.001: Use Existing Hashtag
**Summary**: Use a dedicated, existing hashtag for the campaign/incident. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.005: Use Hashtags, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.006: Create Dedicated Hashtag, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0015.002: Create New Hashtag
**Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.006: Create Dedicated Hashtag, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0015 Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0015.002: Create New Hashtag
**Summary**: Create a campaign/incident specific hashtag. This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0104.006: Create Dedicated Hashtag, which has since been deprecated.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicise the story more widely through trending lists and search behaviour. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”, which posted hashtags alongside campaign content (T0015: Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts):<br><br><i>“The accounts post generic images to fill their account feed to make the account seem real. They then employ a hidden hashtag in their posts, consisting of a seemingly random string of numbers and letters.<br><br>“The hypothesis regarding this tactic is that the group orchestrating these accounts utilizes these hashtags as a means of indexing them. This system likely serves a dual purpose: firstly, to keep track of the network’s expansive network of accounts and unique posts, and secondly, to streamline the process of boosting engagement among these accounts. By searching for these specific, unique hashtags, the group can quickly locate posts from their network and engage with them using other fake accounts, thereby artificially inflating the visibility and perceived authenticity of the fake account.”</i> |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00066.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0015: Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
**Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicise the story more widely through trending lists and search behaviour. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”, which posted hashtags alongside campaign content (T0015: Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts):<br><br><i>“The accounts post generic images to fill their account feed to make the account seem real. They then employ a hidden hashtag in their posts, consisting of a seemingly random string of numbers and letters.<br><br>“The hypothesis regarding this tactic is that the group orchestrating these accounts utilizes these hashtags as a means of indexing them. This system likely serves a dual purpose: firstly, to keep track of the network’s expansive network of accounts and unique posts, and secondly, to streamline the process of boosting engagement among these accounts. By searching for these specific, unique hashtags, the group can quickly locate posts from their network and engage with them using other fake accounts, thereby artificially inflating the visibility and perceived authenticity of the fake account.”</i> |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00066.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0015: Create Hashtags and Search Artefacts
**Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicise the story more widely through trending lists and search behaviour. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
@ -21,4 +67,3 @@
| [C00066 Co-opt a hashtag and drown it out (hijack it back)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00066.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humour) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“On January 4 [2017], however, the Donbas News International (DNI) agency, based in Donetsk, Ukraine, and (since September 2016) an official state media outlet of the unrecognized separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, ran an article under the sensational headline, “US sends 3,600 tanks against Russia — massive NATO deployment under way.” DNI is run by Finnish exile Janus Putkonen, described by the Finnish national broadcaster, YLE, as a “Finnish info warrior”, and the first foreigner to be granted a Donetsk passport.<br><br>“The equally sensational opening paragraph ran, “The NATO war preparation against Russia, ‘Operation Atlantic Resolve’, is in full swing. 2,000 US tanks will be sent in coming days from Germany to Eastern Europe, and 1,600 US tanks is deployed to storage facilities in the Netherlands. At the same time, NATO countries are sending thousands of soldiers in to Russian borders.”<br><br>“The report is based around an obvious factual error, conflating the total number of vehicles with the actual number of tanks, and therefore multiplying the actual tank force 20 times over. For context, military website globalfirepower.com puts the total US tank force at 8,848. If the DNI story had been true, it would have meant sending 40% of all the US’ main battle tanks to Europe in one go.<br><br>“Could this have been an innocent mistake? The simple answer is “no”. The journalist who penned the story had a sufficient command of the details to be able to write, later in the same article, “In January, 26 tanks, 100 other vehicles and 120 containers will be transported by train to Lithuania. Germany will send the 122nd Infantry Battalion.” Yet the same author apparently believed, in the headline and first paragraph, that every single vehicle in Atlantic Resolve is a tank. To call this an innocent mistake is simply not plausible.<br><br>“The DNI story can only realistically be considered a deliberate fake designed to caricaturize and demonize NATO, the United States and Germany (tactfully referred to in the report as having “rolled over Eastern Europe in its war of extermination 75 years ago”) by grossly overstating the number of MBTs involved.”</i><br><br>This behaviour matches T0016: Create Clickbait because the person who wrote the story is shown to be aware of the fact that there were non-tank vehicles later in their story, but still chose to give the article a sensationalist headline claiming that all vehicles being sent were tanks. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training](../../generated_pages/counters/C00073.md) | D02 |
| [C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels](../../generated_pages/counters/C00076.md) | D02 |
| [C00105 Buy more advertising than misinformation creators](../../generated_pages/counters/C00105.md) | D03 |
| [C00106 Click-bait centrist content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00106.md) | D03 |
| [C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00178.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0016: Create Clickbait
**Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humour) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“On January 4 [2017], however, the Donbas News International (DNI) agency, based in Donetsk, Ukraine, and (since September 2016) an official state media outlet of the unrecognized separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, ran an article under the sensational headline, “US sends 3,600 tanks against Russia — massive NATO deployment under way.” DNI is run by Finnish exile Janus Putkonen, described by the Finnish national broadcaster, YLE, as a “Finnish info warrior”, and the first foreigner to be granted a Donetsk passport.<br><br>“The equally sensational opening paragraph ran, “The NATO war preparation against Russia, ‘Operation Atlantic Resolve’, is in full swing. 2,000 US tanks will be sent in coming days from Germany to Eastern Europe, and 1,600 US tanks is deployed to storage facilities in the Netherlands. At the same time, NATO countries are sending thousands of soldiers in to Russian borders.”<br><br>“The report is based around an obvious factual error, conflating the total number of vehicles with the actual number of tanks, and therefore multiplying the actual tank force 20 times over. For context, military website globalfirepower.com puts the total US tank force at 8,848. If the DNI story had been true, it would have meant sending 40% of all the US’ main battle tanks to Europe in one go.<br><br>“Could this have been an innocent mistake? The simple answer is “no”. The journalist who penned the story had a sufficient command of the details to be able to write, later in the same article, “In January, 26 tanks, 100 other vehicles and 120 containers will be transported by train to Lithuania. Germany will send the 122nd Infantry Battalion.” Yet the same author apparently believed, in the headline and first paragraph, that every single vehicle in Atlantic Resolve is a tank. To call this an innocent mistake is simply not plausible.<br><br>“The DNI story can only realistically be considered a deliberate fake designed to caricaturize and demonize NATO, the United States and Germany (tactfully referred to in the report as having “rolled over Eastern Europe in its war of extermination 75 years ago”) by grossly overstating the number of MBTs involved.”</i><br><br>This behaviour matches T0016: Create Clickbait because the person who wrote the story is shown to be aware of the fact that there were non-tank vehicles later in their story, but still chose to give the article a sensationalist headline claiming that all vehicles being sent were tanks. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00073 Inoculate populations through media literacy training](../../generated_pages/counters/C00073.md) | D02 |
| [C00076 Prohibit images in political discourse channels](../../generated_pages/counters/C00076.md) | D02 |
| [C00105 Buy more advertising than misinformation creators](../../generated_pages/counters/C00105.md) | D03 |
| [C00106 Click-bait centrist content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00106.md) | D03 |
| [C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00178.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0016: Create Clickbait
**Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humour) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
@ -25,4 +79,3 @@
| [C00178 Fill information voids with non-disinformation content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00178.md) | D04 |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0017.001: Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns
**Summary**: An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0017 Conduct Fundraising
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0017.001: Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns
**Summary**: An influence operation may Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns on platforms such as GoFundMe, GiveSendGo, Tipeee, Patreon, etc.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00110 How COVID-19 conspiracists and extremists use crowdfunding platforms to fund their activities](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00110.md) | The EU Disinfo Lab produced a report into disinformation published on crowdfunding platforms:<br><br><i>More worrisome is the direct monetisation of disinformation happening on crowdfunding platforms: on Kickstarter, we found a user openly raising money for a documentary project suggesting that COVID-19 is a conspiracy.</i><br><br>A Kickstarter user attempted to use the platform to fund production of a documentary (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0087: Develop Video-Based Content, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform).<br><br><i>On Patreon, we found several instances of direct monetisation of COVID-19 disinformation, including posts promoting a device allegedly protecting against COVID-19 and 5G, as well as posts related to the “Plandemic” conspiracy video, which gained attention on YouTube before being removed by the platform.<br><br>We also found an account called “Stranger than fiction” entirely dedicated to disinformation, which openly states that their content was “Banned by screwtube and fakebook, our videos have been viewed over a billion times.”</i><br><br>The “Stranger than fiction” user presented itself as an alternative news source which had been banned from other platforms (T0146: Account Asset, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona, T0121.001: Bypass Content Bocking, T0152.012: Subscription Service Platform).<br><br><i>On the US-based crowdfunding platform IndieGogo, EU DisinfoLab found a successful crowdfunding campaign of €133.903 for a book called Revolution Q. This book, now also available on Amazon, claims to be “Written for both newcomers and long-time QAnon fans alike, this book is a treasure-trove of information designed to help everyone weather The Storm.”</i><br><br>An IndieGogo account was used to gather funds to produce a book on QAnon (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0085.005: Develop Book, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform), with the book later sold on Amazon marketplace (T0148.007: eCommerce Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00058 Report crowdfunder as violator](../../generated_pages/counters/C00058.md) | D02 |
| [C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00067.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0017: Conduct Fundraising
**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00110 How COVID-19 conspiracists and extremists use crowdfunding platforms to fund their activities](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00110.md) | The EU Disinfo Lab produced a report into disinformation published on crowdfunding platforms:<br><br><i>More worrisome is the direct monetisation of disinformation happening on crowdfunding platforms: on Kickstarter, we found a user openly raising money for a documentary project suggesting that COVID-19 is a conspiracy.</i><br><br>A Kickstarter user attempted to use the platform to fund production of a documentary (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0087: Develop Video-Based Content, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform).<br><br><i>On Patreon, we found several instances of direct monetisation of COVID-19 disinformation, including posts promoting a device allegedly protecting against COVID-19 and 5G, as well as posts related to the “Plandemic” conspiracy video, which gained attention on YouTube before being removed by the platform.<br><br>We also found an account called “Stranger than fiction” entirely dedicated to disinformation, which openly states that their content was “Banned by screwtube and fakebook, our videos have been viewed over a billion times.”</i><br><br>The “Stranger than fiction” user presented itself as an alternative news source which had been banned from other platforms (T0146: Account Asset, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona, T0121.001: Bypass Content Bocking, T0152.012: Subscription Service Platform).<br><br><i>On the US-based crowdfunding platform IndieGogo, EU DisinfoLab found a successful crowdfunding campaign of €133.903 for a book called Revolution Q. This book, now also available on Amazon, claims to be “Written for both newcomers and long-time QAnon fans alike, this book is a treasure-trove of information designed to help everyone weather The Storm.”</i><br><br>An IndieGogo account was used to gather funds to produce a book on QAnon (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0085.005: Develop Book, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform), with the book later sold on Amazon marketplace (T0148.007: eCommerce Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00058 Report crowdfunder as violator](../../generated_pages/counters/C00058.md) | D02 |
| [C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00067.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0017: Conduct Fundraising
**Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
@ -22,4 +70,3 @@
| [C00067 Denigrate the recipient/ project (of online funding)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00067.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00097 Report: Not Just Algorithms](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00097.md) | <i>This report explores the role of four systems (recommender systems, content moderation systems, ad approval systems and ad management systems) in creating risks around eating disorders.<br><br>[...]<br><br>Ad approval systems can create risks. We created 12 ‘fake’ ads that promoted dangerous weight loss techniques and behaviours. We tested to see if these ads would be approved to run, and they were. This means dangerous behaviours can be promoted in paid-for advertising. (Requests to run ads were withdrawn after approval or rejection, so no dangerous advertising was published as a result of this experiment.)<br><br>Specifically: On TikTok, 100% of the ads were approved to run; On Facebook, 83% of the ads were approved to run; On Google, 75% of the ads were approved to run.<br><br>Ad management systems can create risks. We investigated how platforms allow advertisers to target users, and found that it is possible to target people who may be interested in pro-eating disorder content.<br><br>Specifically: On TikTok: End-users who interact with pro-eating disorder content on TikTok, download advertisers’ eating disorder apps or visit their websites can be targeted; On Meta: End-users who interact with pro-eating disorder content on Meta, download advertisers’ eating disorder apps or visit their websites can be targeted; On X: End-users who follow pro- eating disorder accounts, or ‘look’ like them, can be targeted; On Google: End-users who search specific words or combinations of words (including pro-eating disorder words), watch pro-eating disorder YouTube channels and probably those who download eating disorder and mental health apps can be targeted.</i><br><br>Advertising platforms managed by TikTok, Facebook, and Google approved adverts to be displayed on their platforms. These platforms enabled users to deliver targeted advertising to potentially vulnerable platform users (T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements, T0153.005: Online Advertising Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00065 Reduce political targeting](../../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements
**Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00097 Report: Not Just Algorithms](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00097.md) | <i>This report explores the role of four systems (recommender systems, content moderation systems, ad approval systems and ad management systems) in creating risks around eating disorders.<br><br>[...]<br><br>Ad approval systems can create risks. We created 12 ‘fake’ ads that promoted dangerous weight loss techniques and behaviours. We tested to see if these ads would be approved to run, and they were. This means dangerous behaviours can be promoted in paid-for advertising. (Requests to run ads were withdrawn after approval or rejection, so no dangerous advertising was published as a result of this experiment.)<br><br>Specifically: On TikTok, 100% of the ads were approved to run; On Facebook, 83% of the ads were approved to run; On Google, 75% of the ads were approved to run.<br><br>Ad management systems can create risks. We investigated how platforms allow advertisers to target users, and found that it is possible to target people who may be interested in pro-eating disorder content.<br><br>Specifically: On TikTok: End-users who interact with pro-eating disorder content on TikTok, download advertisers’ eating disorder apps or visit their websites can be targeted; On Meta: End-users who interact with pro-eating disorder content on Meta, download advertisers’ eating disorder apps or visit their websites can be targeted; On X: End-users who follow pro- eating disorder accounts, or ‘look’ like them, can be targeted; On Google: End-users who search specific words or combinations of words (including pro-eating disorder words), watch pro-eating disorder YouTube channels and probably those who download eating disorder and mental health apps can be targeted.</i><br><br>Advertising platforms managed by TikTok, Facebook, and Google approved adverts to be displayed on their platforms. These platforms enabled users to deliver targeted advertising to potentially vulnerable platform users (T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements, T0153.005: Online Advertising Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00065 Reduce political targeting](../../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0018: Purchase Targeted Advertisements
**Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
**Tactic**: TA05 Microtarget
@ -21,4 +67,3 @@
| [C00065 Reduce political targeting](../../generated_pages/counters/C00065.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00090 Fake engagement system](../../generated_pages/counters/C00090.md) | D05 |
# Technique T0020: Trial Content
**Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00090 Fake engagement system](../../generated_pages/counters/C00090.md) | D05 |
# Technique T0020: Trial Content
**Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
@ -20,4 +64,3 @@
| [C00090 Fake engagement system](../../generated_pages/counters/C00090.md) | D05 |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0022.001: Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0022.001: Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: An influence operation may amplify an existing conspiracy theory narrative that aligns with its incident or campaign goals. By amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, operators can leverage the power of the existing communities that support and propagate those theories without needing to expend resources creating new narratives or building momentum and buy in around new narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0022.002: Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives **Parent Technique:** T0022 Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0022.002: Develop Original Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: While this requires more resources than amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, an influence operation may develop original conspiracy theory narratives in order to achieve greater control and alignment over the narrative and their campaign goals. Prominent examples include the USSR's Operation INFEKTION disinformation campaign run by the KGB in the 1980s to plant the idea that the United States had invented HIV/AIDS as part of a biological weapons research project at Fort Detrick, Maryland. More recently, Fort Detrick featured prominently in a new conspiracy theory narratives around the origins of the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalised or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00096 Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00096.md) | D07 |
| [C00119 Engage payload and debunk.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00119.md) | D07 |
| [C00156 Better tell your country or organisation story](../../generated_pages/counters/C00156.md) | D03 |
| [C00161 Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements](../../generated_pages/counters/C00161.md) | D07 |
| [C00164 compatriot policy](../../generated_pages/counters/C00164.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0022: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalised or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00096 Strengthen institutions that are always truth tellers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00096.md) | D07 |
| [C00119 Engage payload and debunk.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00119.md) | D07 |
| [C00156 Better tell your country or organisation story](../../generated_pages/counters/C00156.md) | D03 |
| [C00161 Coalition Building with stakeholders and Third-Party Inducements](../../generated_pages/counters/C00161.md) | D07 |
| [C00164 compatriot policy](../../generated_pages/counters/C00164.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0022: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
**Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalised or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
@ -24,4 +76,3 @@
| [C00164 compatriot policy](../../generated_pages/counters/C00164.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023.001: Reframe Context
**Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023.001: Reframe Context
**Summary**: Reframing context refers to removing an event from its surrounding context to distort its intended meaning. Rather than deny that an event occurred, reframing context frames an event in a manner that may lead the target audience to draw a different conclusion about its intentions.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopaedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023.002: Edit Open-Source Content
**Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopaedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0023 Distort Facts
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023.002: Edit Open-Source Content
**Summary**: An influence operation may edit open-source content, such as collaborative blogs or encyclopaedias, to promote its narratives on outlets with existing credibility and audiences. Editing open-source content may allow an operation to post content on platforms without dedicating resources to the creation and maintenance of its own assets.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“On January 4 [2017], a little-known news site based in Donetsk, Ukraine published an article claiming that the United States was sending 3,600 tanks to Europe as part of “the NATO war preparation against Russia”.<br><br> “Like much fake news, this story started with a grain of truth: the US was about to reinforce its armored units in Europe. However, the article converted literally thousands of other vehicles — including hundreds of Humvees and trailers — into tanks, building the US force into something 20 times more powerful than it actually was.<br><br> “The story caught on online. Within three days it had been repeated by a dozen websites in the United States, Canada and Europe, and shared some 40,000 times. It was translated into Norwegian; quoted, unchallenged, by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti; and spread among Russian-language websites.<br><br> “It was also an obvious fake, as any Google news search would have revealed. Yet despite its evident falsehood, it spread widely, and not just in directly Kremlin-run media. Tracking the spread of this fake therefore shines a light on the wider question of how fake stories are dispersed.”</i><br><br> Russian state news agency RIA Novosti presents themselves as a news outlet (T0097.202: News Outlet Persona). RIO Novosti is a real news outlet (T0143.001: Authentic Persona), but it did not carry out a basic investigation into the veracity of the narrative they published implicitly expected of institutions presenting themselves as news outlets.<br><br> We can’t know how or why this narrative ended up being published by RIA Novosti, but we know that it presented a distorted reality as authentic information (T0023: Distort Facts), claiming that the US was sending 3,600 tanks, instead of 3,600 vehicles which included ~180 tanks. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023: Distort Facts
**Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“On January 4 [2017], a little-known news site based in Donetsk, Ukraine published an article claiming that the United States was sending 3,600 tanks to Europe as part of “the NATO war preparation against Russia”.<br><br> “Like much fake news, this story started with a grain of truth: the US was about to reinforce its armored units in Europe. However, the article converted literally thousands of other vehicles — including hundreds of Humvees and trailers — into tanks, building the US force into something 20 times more powerful than it actually was.<br><br> “The story caught on online. Within three days it had been repeated by a dozen websites in the United States, Canada and Europe, and shared some 40,000 times. It was translated into Norwegian; quoted, unchallenged, by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti; and spread among Russian-language websites.<br><br> “It was also an obvious fake, as any Google news search would have revealed. Yet despite its evident falsehood, it spread widely, and not just in directly Kremlin-run media. Tracking the spread of this fake therefore shines a light on the wider question of how fake stories are dispersed.”</i><br><br> Russian state news agency RIA Novosti presents themselves as a news outlet (T0097.202: News Outlet Persona). RIO Novosti is a real news outlet (T0143.001: Authentic Persona), but it did not carry out a basic investigation into the veracity of the narrative they published implicitly expected of institutions presenting themselves as news outlets.<br><br> We can’t know how or why this narrative ended up being published by RIA Novosti, but we know that it presented a distorted reality as authentic information (T0023: Distort Facts), claiming that the US was sending 3,600 tanks, instead of 3,600 vehicles which included ~180 tanks. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0023: Distort Facts
**Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
**Tactic**: TA07 Select Channels and Affordances
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately](../../generated_pages/counters/C00044.md) | D03 |
| [C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment](../../generated_pages/counters/C00097.md) | D02 |
| [C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement](../../generated_pages/counters/C00101.md) | D04 |
| [C00103 Create a bot that engages / distract trolls](../../generated_pages/counters/C00103.md) | D05 |
| [C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00123.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0029: Online Polls
**Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
**Tactic**: TA07 Select Channels and Affordances
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00044 Keep people from posting to social media immediately](../../generated_pages/counters/C00044.md) | D03 |
| [C00097 Require use of verified identities to contribute to poll or comment](../../generated_pages/counters/C00097.md) | D02 |
| [C00101 Create friction by rate-limiting engagement](../../generated_pages/counters/C00101.md) | D04 |
| [C00103 Create a bot that engages / distract trolls](../../generated_pages/counters/C00103.md) | D05 |
| [C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00123.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0029: Online Polls
**Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
**Tactic**: TA07 Select Channels and Affordances
@ -24,4 +76,3 @@
| [C00123 Remove or rate limit botnets](../../generated_pages/counters/C00123.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Influencers are people on social media platforms who have large audiences.<br /> <br />Threat Actors can try to trick Influencers such as celebrities, journalists, or local leaders who aren’t associated with their campaign into amplifying campaign content. This gives them access to the Influencer’s audience without having to go through the effort of building it themselves, and it helps legitimise their message by associating it with the Influencer, benefitting from their audience’s trust in them.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation](../../generated_pages/counters/C00087.md) | D04 |
| [C00114 Don't engage with payloads](../../generated_pages/counters/C00114.md) | D02 |
| [C00154 Ask media not to report false information](../../generated_pages/counters/C00154.md) | D02 |
| [C00160 find and train influencers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00160.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0039: Bait Influencer
**Summary**: Influencers are people on social media platforms who have large audiences.<br /> <br />Threat Actors can try to trick Influencers such as celebrities, journalists, or local leaders who aren’t associated with their campaign into amplifying campaign content. This gives them access to the Influencer’s audience without having to go through the effort of building it themselves, and it helps legitimise their message by associating it with the Influencer, benefitting from their audience’s trust in them.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00087 Make more noise than the disinformation](../../generated_pages/counters/C00087.md) | D04 |
| [C00114 Don't engage with payloads](../../generated_pages/counters/C00114.md) | D02 |
| [C00154 Ask media not to report false information](../../generated_pages/counters/C00154.md) | D02 |
| [C00160 find and train influencers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00160.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0039: Bait Influencer
**Summary**: Influencers are people on social media platforms who have large audiences.<br /> <br />Threat Actors can try to trick Influencers such as celebrities, journalists, or local leaders who aren’t associated with their campaign into amplifying campaign content. This gives them access to the Influencer’s audience without having to go through the effort of building it themselves, and it helps legitimise their message by associating it with the Influencer, benefitting from their audience’s trust in them.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
@ -23,4 +73,3 @@
| [C00160 find and train influencers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00160.md) | D02 |
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**Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00112 "Prove they are not an op!"](../../generated_pages/counters/C00112.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0040: Demand Insurmountable Proof
**Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00112 "Prove they are not an op!"](../../generated_pages/counters/C00112.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0040: Demand Insurmountable Proof
**Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
@ -20,4 +64,3 @@
| [C00112 "Prove they are not an op!"](../../generated_pages/counters/C00112.md) | D02 |
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**Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0042: Seed Kernel of Truth
**Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0042: Seed Kernel of Truth
**Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00086.md) | D04 |
| [C00118 Repurpose images with new text](../../generated_pages/counters/C00118.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0044: Seed Distortions
**Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00086 Distract from noise with addictive content](../../generated_pages/counters/C00086.md) | D04 |
| [C00118 Repurpose images with new text](../../generated_pages/counters/C00118.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0044: Seed Distortions
**Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
@ -21,4 +67,3 @@
| [C00118 Repurpose images with new text](../../generated_pages/counters/C00118.md) | D04 |
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**Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00113 Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00113.md) | D02 |
| [C00184 Media exposure](../../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0045: Use Fake Experts
**Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00113 Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials.](../../generated_pages/counters/C00113.md) | D02 |
| [C00184 Media exposure](../../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0045: Use Fake Experts
**Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
@ -21,4 +67,3 @@
| [C00184 Media exposure](../../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md) | D04 |
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**Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00117 Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people](../../generated_pages/counters/C00117.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0046: Use Search Engine Optimisation
**Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00117 Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people](../../generated_pages/counters/C00117.md) | D04 |
# Technique T0046: Use Search Engine Optimisation
**Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
**Tactic**: TA08 Conduct Pump Priming
@ -20,4 +64,3 @@
| [C00117 Downgrade / de-amplify so message is seen by fewer people](../../generated_pages/counters/C00117.md) | D04 |
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**Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes](../../generated_pages/counters/C00120.md) | D07 |
# Technique T0047: Censor Social Media as a Political Force
**Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes](../../generated_pages/counters/C00120.md) | D07 |
# Technique T0047: Censor Social Media as a Political Force
**Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
@ -20,4 +64,3 @@
| [C00120 Open dialogue about design of platforms to produce different outcomes](../../generated_pages/counters/C00120.md) | D07 |
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**Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organisation, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasising an adversary’s problematic or disputed behaviour and presenting its own content as an alternative.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.001: Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents
**Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organisation, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasising an adversary’s problematic or disputed behaviour and presenting its own content as an alternative.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.001: Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents
**Summary**: Cancel culture refers to the phenomenon in which individuals collectively refrain from supporting an individual, organisation, business, or other entity, usually following a real or falsified controversy. An influence operation may exploit cancel culture by emphasising an adversary’s problematic or disputed behaviour and presenting its own content as an alternative.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.002: Harass People Based on Identities
**Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.002: Harass People Based on Identities
**Summary**: Examples include social identities like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, religion, ability, nationality, etc. as well as roles and occupations like journalist or activist.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.003: Threaten to Dox
**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.003: Threaten to Dox
**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.004: Dox
**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms **Parent Technique:** T0048 Harass
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048.004: Dox
**Summary**: Doxing refers to online harassment in which individuals publicly release private information about another individual, including names, addresses, employment information, pictures, family members, and other sensitive information. An influence operation may dox its opposition to encourage individuals aligned with operation narratives to harass the doxed individuals themselves or otherwise discourage the doxed individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
@ -19,4 +61,3 @@
| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00122 The Extreme Right on Discord](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00122.md) | Discord is an example of a T0151.004: Chat Platform, which allows users to create their own T0151.005: Chat Community Server. The Institute for Strategic Dialog (ISD) conducted an investigation into the extreme right’s usage of Discord servers:<br><br><i>Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.<br><br>Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organisers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.</i><br><br>In this example a Discord server was used to organise the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right rally. Chat rooms such in the server were used to discuss different topics related to the rally (T0057: Organise Events, T0126.002: Facilitate Logistics or Support for Attendance, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server, T0151.006: Chat Room).<br><br><i>Another primary activity engaged in the servers analysed are raids against other servers associated with political opponents, and in particular those that appear to be pro-LGBTQ. Raids are a phenomenon in which a small group of users will join a Discord server with the sole purpose of spamming the host with offensive or incendiary messages and content with the aim of upsetting local users or having the host server banned by Discord. On two servers examined here, raiding was their primary function.<br><br>Among servers devoted to this activity, specific channels were often created to host links to servers that users were then encouraged to raid. Users are encouraged to be as offensive as possible with the aim of upsetting or angering users on the raided server, and channels often had content banks of offensive memes and content to be shared on raided servers.<br><br>The use of raids demonstrates the gamified nature of extremist activity on Discord, where use of the platform and harassment of political opponents is itself turned into a type of real-life video game designed to strengthen in-group affiliation. This combined with the broader extremist activity identified in these channels suggests that the combative activity of raiding could provide a pathway for younger people to become more engaged with extremist activity.</i><br><br>Discord servers were used by members of the extreme right to coordinate harassment of targeted communities (T0048: Harass, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048: Harass
**Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00122 The Extreme Right on Discord](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00122.md) | Discord is an example of a T0151.004: Chat Platform, which allows users to create their own T0151.005: Chat Community Server. The Institute for Strategic Dialog (ISD) conducted an investigation into the extreme right’s usage of Discord servers:<br><br><i>Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.<br><br>Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organisers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.</i><br><br>In this example a Discord server was used to organise the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right rally. Chat rooms such in the server were used to discuss different topics related to the rally (T0057: Organise Events, T0126.002: Facilitate Logistics or Support for Attendance, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server, T0151.006: Chat Room).<br><br><i>Another primary activity engaged in the servers analysed are raids against other servers associated with political opponents, and in particular those that appear to be pro-LGBTQ. Raids are a phenomenon in which a small group of users will join a Discord server with the sole purpose of spamming the host with offensive or incendiary messages and content with the aim of upsetting local users or having the host server banned by Discord. On two servers examined here, raiding was their primary function.<br><br>Among servers devoted to this activity, specific channels were often created to host links to servers that users were then encouraged to raid. Users are encouraged to be as offensive as possible with the aim of upsetting or angering users on the raided server, and channels often had content banks of offensive memes and content to be shared on raided servers.<br><br>The use of raids demonstrates the gamified nature of extremist activity on Discord, where use of the platform and harassment of political opponents is itself turned into a type of real-life video game designed to strengthen in-group affiliation. This combined with the broader extremist activity identified in these channels suggests that the combative activity of raiding could provide a pathway for younger people to become more engaged with extremist activity.</i><br><br>Discord servers were used by members of the extreme right to coordinate harassment of targeted communities (T0048: Harass, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server). |
| [I00123 The Extreme Right on Steam](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00123.md) | ISD conducted an investigation into the usage of social groups on Steam. Steam is an online platform used to buy and sell digital games, and includes the Steam community feature, which “allows users to find friends and join groups and discussion forums, while also offering in-game voice and text chat”. Actors have used Steam’s social capabilities to enable online harm campaigns:<br><br><i>One function of these Steam groups is the organisation of ‘raids’ – coordinated trolling activity against their political opponents. An example of this can be seen in a white power music group sharing a link to an Israeli Steam group, encouraging other members to “help me raid this juden [German word for Jew] group”. The comments section of said target group show that neo-Nazi and antisemitic comments were consistently posted in the group just two minutes after the instruction had been posted in the extremist group, highlighting the swiftness with which racially motivated harassment can be directed online.</i><br><br>Threat actors used social groups on Steam to organise harassment of targets (T0152.009: Software Delivery Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0048: Harass). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0048: Harass
**Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
**Tactic**: TA18 Drive Online Harms
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.001: Trolls Amplify and Manipulate
**Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.001: Trolls Amplify and Manipulate
**Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Hashtags can be used by communities to collate information they post about particular topics (such as their interests, or current events) and users can find communities to join by exploring hashtags they’re interested in.<br /> <br />Threat actors can flood an existing hashtag to try to ruin hashtag functionality, posting content unrelated to the hashtag alongside it, making it a less reliable source of relevant information. They may also try to flood existing hashtags with campaign content, with the intent of maximising exposure to users.<br /> <br />This Technique covers cases where threat actors flood existing hashtags with campaign content.<br /> <br />This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags, which has since been deprecated. This Technique was previously called Hijack Existing Hashtag.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.002: Flood Existing Hashtag
**Summary**: Hashtags can be used by communities to collate information they post about particular topics (such as their interests, or current events) and users can find communities to join by exploring hashtags they’re interested in.<br /> <br />Threat actors can flood an existing hashtag to try to ruin hashtag functionality, posting content unrelated to the hashtag alongside it, making it a less reliable source of relevant information. They may also try to flood existing hashtags with campaign content, with the intent of maximising exposure to users.<br /> <br />This Technique covers cases where threat actors flood existing hashtags with campaign content.<br /> <br />This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags, which has since been deprecated. This Technique was previously called Hijack Existing Hashtag.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.002: Flood Existing Hashtag
**Summary**: Hashtags can be used by communities to collate information they post about particular topics (such as their interests, or current events) and users can find communities to join by exploring hashtags they’re interested in.<br /> <br />Threat actors can flood an existing hashtag to try to ruin hashtag functionality, posting content unrelated to the hashtag alongside it, making it a less reliable source of relevant information. They may also try to flood existing hashtags with campaign content, with the intent of maximising exposure to users.<br /> <br />This Technique covers cases where threat actors flood existing hashtags with campaign content.<br /> <br />This Technique covers behaviours previously documented by T0019.002: Hijack Hashtags, which has since been deprecated. This Technique was previously called Hijack Existing Hashtag.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.003: Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting
**Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.003: Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting
**Summary**: Automated forwarding and reposting refer to the proliferation of operation content using automated means, such as artificial intelligence or social media bots. An influence operation may use automated activity to increase content exposure without dedicating the resources, including personnel and time, traditionally required to forward and repost content. Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.004: Utilise Spamoflauge
**Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.004: Utilise Spamoflauge
**Summary**: Spamoflauge refers to the practice of disguising spam messages as legitimate. Spam refers to the use of electronic messaging systems to send out unrequested or unwanted messages in bulk. Simple methods of spamoflauge include replacing letters with numbers to fool keyword-based email spam filters, for example, "you've w0n our jackp0t!". Spamoflauge may extend to more complex techniques such as modifying the grammar or word choice of the language, casting messages as images which spam detectors cannot automatically read, or encapsulating messages in password protected attachments, such as .pdf or .zip files. Influence operations may use spamoflauge to avoid spam filtering systems and increase the likelihood of the target audience receiving operation messaging.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centres exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00123 The Extreme Right on Steam](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00123.md) | ISD conducted an investigation into the usage of social groups on Steam. Steam is an online platform used to buy and sell digital games, and includes the Steam community feature, which “allows users to find friends and join groups and discussion forums, while also offering in-game voice and text chat”. Actors have used Steam’s social capabilities to enable online harm campaigns:<br><br><i>One function of these Steam groups is the organisation of ‘raids’ – coordinated trolling activity against their political opponents. An example of this can be seen in a white power music group sharing a link to an Israeli Steam group, encouraging other members to “help me raid this juden [German word for Jew] group”. The comments section of said target group show that neo-Nazi and antisemitic comments were consistently posted in the group just two minutes after the instruction had been posted in the extremist group, highlighting the swiftness with which racially motivated harassment can be directed online.</i><br><br>Threat actors used social groups on Steam to organise harassment of targets (T0152.009: Software Delivery Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0048: Harass). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.005: Conduct Swarming
**Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centres exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00122 The Extreme Right on Discord](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00122.md) | Discord is an example of a T0151.004: Chat Platform, which allows users to create their own T0151.005: Chat Community Server. The Institute for Strategic Dialog (ISD) conducted an investigation into the extreme right’s usage of Discord servers:<br><br><i>Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.<br><br>Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organisers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.</i><br><br>In this example a Discord server was used to organise the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right rally. Chat rooms such in the server were used to discuss different topics related to the rally (T0057: Organise Events, T0126.002: Facilitate Logistics or Support for Attendance, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server, T0151.006: Chat Room).<br><br><i>Another primary activity engaged in the servers analysed are raids against other servers associated with political opponents, and in particular those that appear to be pro-LGBTQ. Raids are a phenomenon in which a small group of users will join a Discord server with the sole purpose of spamming the host with offensive or incendiary messages and content with the aim of upsetting local users or having the host server banned by Discord. On two servers examined here, raiding was their primary function.<br><br>Among servers devoted to this activity, specific channels were often created to host links to servers that users were then encouraged to raid. Users are encouraged to be as offensive as possible with the aim of upsetting or angering users on the raided server, and channels often had content banks of offensive memes and content to be shared on raided servers.<br><br>The use of raids demonstrates the gamified nature of extremist activity on Discord, where use of the platform and harassment of political opponents is itself turned into a type of real-life video game designed to strengthen in-group affiliation. This combined with the broader extremist activity identified in these channels suggests that the combative activity of raiding could provide a pathway for younger people to become more engaged with extremist activity.</i><br><br>Discord servers were used by members of the extreme right to coordinate harassment of targeted communities (T0048: Harass, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server). |
| [I00123 The Extreme Right on Steam](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00123.md) | ISD conducted an investigation into the usage of social groups on Steam. Steam is an online platform used to buy and sell digital games, and includes the Steam community feature, which “allows users to find friends and join groups and discussion forums, while also offering in-game voice and text chat”. Actors have used Steam’s social capabilities to enable online harm campaigns:<br><br><i>One function of these Steam groups is the organisation of ‘raids’ – coordinated trolling activity against their political opponents. An example of this can be seen in a white power music group sharing a link to an Israeli Steam group, encouraging other members to “help me raid this juden [German word for Jew] group”. The comments section of said target group show that neo-Nazi and antisemitic comments were consistently posted in the group just two minutes after the instruction had been posted in the extremist group, highlighting the swiftness with which racially motivated harassment can be directed online.</i><br><br>Threat actors used social groups on Steam to organise harassment of targets (T0152.009: Software Delivery Platform, T0151.002: Online Community Group, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0048: Harass). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.005: Conduct Swarming
**Summary**: Swarming refers to the coordinated use of accounts to overwhelm the information space with operation content. Unlike information flooding, swarming centres exclusively around a specific event or actor rather than a general narrative. Swarming relies on “horizontal communication” between information assets rather than a top-down, vertical command-and-control approach.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.006: Conduct Keyword Squatting
**Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.006: Conduct Keyword Squatting
**Summary**: Keyword squatting refers to the creation of online content, such as websites, articles, or social media accounts, around a specific search engine-optimized term to overwhelm the search results of that term. An influence may keyword squat to increase content exposure to target audience members who query the exploited term in a search engine and manipulate the narrative around the term.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.007: Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives
**Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.007: Inauthentic Sites Amplify News and Narratives
**Summary**: Inauthentic sites circulate cross-post stories and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Information Pollution occurs when threat actors attempt to ruin a source of information by flooding it with lots of inauthentic or unreliable content, intending to make it harder for legitimate users to find the information they’re looking for.<br /> <br />This sub-technique’s objective is to reduce exposure to target information, rather than promoting exposure to campaign content, for which the parent Technique T0049 can be used.<br /> <br />Analysts will need to infer what the motive for flooding an information space was when deciding whether to use T0049 or T0049.008 to tag a case when an information space is flooded. If such inference is not possible, default to T0049.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.008: Generate Information Pollution
**Summary**: Information Pollution occurs when threat actors attempt to ruin a source of information by flooding it with lots of inauthentic or unreliable content, intending to make it harder for legitimate users to find the information they’re looking for.<br /> <br />This sub-technique’s objective is to reduce exposure to target information, rather than promoting exposure to campaign content, for which the parent Technique T0049 can be used.<br /> <br />Analysts will need to infer what the motive for flooding an information space was when deciding whether to use T0049 or T0049.008 to tag a case when an information space is flooded. If such inference is not possible, default to T0049.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure **Parent Technique:** T0049 Flood Information Space
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0049.008: Generate Information Pollution
**Summary**: Information Pollution occurs when threat actors attempt to ruin a source of information by flooding it with lots of inauthentic or unreliable content, intending to make it harder for legitimate users to find the information they’re looking for.<br /> <br />This sub-technique’s objective is to reduce exposure to target information, rather than promoting exposure to campaign content, for which the parent Technique T0049 can be used.<br /> <br />Analysts will need to infer what the motive for flooding an information space was when deciding whether to use T0049 or T0049.008 to tag a case when an information space is flooded. If such inference is not possible, default to T0049.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Flooding sources of information (e.g. Social Media feeds) with a high volume of inauthentic content.<br /> <br />This can be done to control/shape online conversations, drown out opposing points of view, or make it harder to find legitimate information.<br /> <br />Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the name Flooding the Information Space.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00131.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0049: Flood Information Space
**Summary**: Flooding sources of information (e.g. Social Media feeds) with a high volume of inauthentic content.<br /> <br />This can be done to control/shape online conversations, drown out opposing points of view, or make it harder to find legitimate information.<br /> <br />Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the name Flooding the Information Space.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00131.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0049: Flood Information Space
**Summary**: Flooding sources of information (e.g. Social Media feeds) with a high volume of inauthentic content.<br /> <br />This can be done to control/shape online conversations, drown out opposing points of view, or make it harder to find legitimate information.<br /> <br />Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to achieve this effect.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the name Flooding the Information Space.
**Tactic**: TA17 Maximise Exposure
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| [C00131 Seize and analyse botnet servers](../../generated_pages/counters/C00131.md) | D02 |
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**Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0057.001: Pay for Physical Action
**Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0057.001: Pay for Physical Action
**Summary**: Paying for physical action occurs when an influence operation pays individuals to act in the physical realm. An influence operation may pay for physical action to create specific situations and frame them in a way that supports operation narratives, for example, paying a group of people to burn a car to later post an image of the burning car and frame it as an act of protest.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signalling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0057.002: Conduct Symbolic Action
**Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signalling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity **Parent Technique:** T0057 Organise Events
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0057.002: Conduct Symbolic Action
**Summary**: Symbolic action refers to activities specifically intended to advance an operation’s narrative by signalling something to the audience, for example, a military parade supporting a state’s narrative of military superiority. An influence operation may use symbolic action to create falsified evidence supporting operation narratives in the physical information space.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00129 Use banking to cut off access](../../generated_pages/counters/C00129.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0057: Organise Events
**Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00122 The Extreme Right on Discord](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00122.md) | Discord is an example of a T0151.004: Chat Platform, which allows users to create their own T0151.005: Chat Community Server. The Institute for Strategic Dialog (ISD) conducted an investigation into the extreme right’s usage of Discord servers:<br><br><i>Discord is a free service accessible via phones and computers. It allows users to talk to each other in real time via voice, text or video chat and emerged in 2015 as a platform designed to assist gamers in communicating with each other while playing video games. The popularity of the platform has surged in recent years, and it is currently estimated to have 140 million monthly active users.<br><br>Chatrooms – known as servers - in the platform can be created by anyone, and they are used for a range of purposes that extend far beyond gaming. Such purposes include the discussion of extreme right-wing ideologies and the planning of offline extremist activity. Ahead of the far-right Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017, organisers used Discord to plan and promote events and posted swastikas and praised Hitler in chat rooms with names like “National Socialist Army” and “Führer’s Gas Chamber”.</i><br><br>In this example a Discord server was used to organise the 2017 Charlottesville Unite the Right rally. Chat rooms such in the server were used to discuss different topics related to the rally (T0057: Organise Events, T0126.002: Facilitate Logistics or Support for Attendance, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server, T0151.006: Chat Room).<br><br><i>Another primary activity engaged in the servers analysed are raids against other servers associated with political opponents, and in particular those that appear to be pro-LGBTQ. Raids are a phenomenon in which a small group of users will join a Discord server with the sole purpose of spamming the host with offensive or incendiary messages and content with the aim of upsetting local users or having the host server banned by Discord. On two servers examined here, raiding was their primary function.<br><br>Among servers devoted to this activity, specific channels were often created to host links to servers that users were then encouraged to raid. Users are encouraged to be as offensive as possible with the aim of upsetting or angering users on the raided server, and channels often had content banks of offensive memes and content to be shared on raided servers.<br><br>The use of raids demonstrates the gamified nature of extremist activity on Discord, where use of the platform and harassment of political opponents is itself turned into a type of real-life video game designed to strengthen in-group affiliation. This combined with the broader extremist activity identified in these channels suggests that the combative activity of raiding could provide a pathway for younger people to become more engaged with extremist activity.</i><br><br>Discord servers were used by members of the extreme right to coordinate harassment of targeted communities (T0048: Harass, T0049.005: Conduct Swarming, T0151.004: Chat Platform, T0151.005: Chat Community Server). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00129 Use banking to cut off access](../../generated_pages/counters/C00129.md) | D02 |
# Technique T0057: Organise Events
**Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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| [C00129 Use banking to cut off access](../../generated_pages/counters/C00129.md) | D02 |
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**Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0059: Play the Long Game
**Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0059: Play the Long Game
**Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00138 Spam domestic actors with lawsuits](../../generated_pages/counters/C00138.md) | D03 |
| [C00143 (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time](../../generated_pages/counters/C00143.md) | D04 |
| [C00147 Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00147.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0060: Continue to Amplify
**Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
| [C00138 Spam domestic actors with lawsuits](../../generated_pages/counters/C00138.md) | D03 |
| [C00143 (botnet) DMCA takedown requests to waste group time](../../generated_pages/counters/C00143.md) | D04 |
| [C00147 Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00147.md) | D03 |
# Technique T0060: Continue to Amplify
**Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
**Tactic**: TA11 Persist in the Information Environment
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| [C00147 Make amplification of social media posts expire (e.g. can't like/ retweet after n days)](../../generated_pages/counters/C00147.md) | D03 |
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**Summary**: Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00109 Coordinated Facebook Pages Designed to Fund a White Supremacist Agenda](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00109.md) | This report examines the white nationalist group Suavelos’ use of Facebook to draw visitors to its website without overtly revealing their racist ideology. This section of the report looks at technical indicators associated with the Suavelos website, and attributions which can be made as a consequence:<i><br><br>[The Google AdSense tag set up on Suavelos.eu was also found on the following domains, indicating that they are controlled by the same actor;] Alabastro.eu: an online shop to buy “white nationalists” t-shirts [and] ARPAC.eu: the website of a registered non-profit organisation advocating to lift regulation on gun control in France.<br><br>Other domains attributed to Suavelos (T0149.001: Domain Asset) reveal a website set up to sell merchandise (T0152.004: Website Asset, T0148.004: Payment Processing Capability, T0061: Sell Merchandise), and a website hosting a registered French non-profit (T0152.004: Website Asset, T0097.207: NGO Persona).<br><br>To learn more about the suavelos.eu domain, we collected the following data: The domain is hosted on OVH; The owner’s identity is protected; The IP Address of the server is 94.23.253.173, which is shared with 20 other domains. <br><br>The relative low number of websites hosted on this IP address could indicate that they all belong to the same people, and are hosted on the same private server.</i><br><br>Suavelos registered a domain using the web hosting provider OVH (T0149.001: Domain Asset, T0152.003: Website Hosting Platform, T0150.006: Purchased). The site’s IP address reveals a server hosting other domains potentially owned by the actors (T0149.005: Server Asset, T0149.006: IP Address Asset). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0061: Sell Merchandise
**Summary**: Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00109 Coordinated Facebook Pages Designed to Fund a White Supremacist Agenda](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00109.md) | This report examines the white nationalist group Suavelos’ use of Facebook to draw visitors to its website without overtly revealing their racist ideology. This section of the report looks at technical indicators associated with the Suavelos website, and attributions which can be made as a consequence:<i><br><br>[The Google AdSense tag set up on Suavelos.eu was also found on the following domains, indicating that they are controlled by the same actor;] Alabastro.eu: an online shop to buy “white nationalists” t-shirts [and] ARPAC.eu: the website of a registered non-profit organisation advocating to lift regulation on gun control in France.<br><br>Other domains attributed to Suavelos (T0149.001: Domain Asset) reveal a website set up to sell merchandise (T0152.004: Website Asset, T0148.004: Payment Processing Capability, T0061: Sell Merchandise), and a website hosting a registered French non-profit (T0152.004: Website Asset, T0097.207: NGO Persona).<br><br>To learn more about the suavelos.eu domain, we collected the following data: The domain is hosted on OVH; The owner’s identity is protected; The IP Address of the server is 94.23.253.173, which is shared with 20 other domains. <br><br>The relative low number of websites hosted on this IP address could indicate that they all belong to the same people, and are hosted on the same private server.</i><br><br>Suavelos registered a domain using the web hosting provider OVH (T0149.001: Domain Asset, T0152.003: Website Hosting Platform, T0150.006: Purchased). The site’s IP address reveals a server hosting other domains potentially owned by the actors (T0149.005: Server Asset, T0149.006: IP Address Asset). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0061: Sell Merchandise
**Summary**: Sell mechandise refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world while making money
**Tactic**: TA10 Drive Offline Activity
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0065: Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
**Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0065: Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
**Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
**Tactic**: TA15 Establish Assets
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0066: Degrade Adversary
**Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0066: Degrade Adversary
**Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumours, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0068: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
**Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumours, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00106 Facebook Is Being Flooded With Gross AI-Generated Images of Hurricane Helene Devastation](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00106.md) | <i>As families desperately seek to find missing loved ones and communities grapple with immeasurable losses of both life and property in the wake of [2024’s] Hurricane Helene, AI slop scammers appear to be capitalizing on the moment for personal gain.<br><br>A Facebook account called "Coastal Views" usually shares calmer AI imagery of nature-filled beachside scenes. The account's banner image showcases a signpost reading "OBX Live," OBX being shorthand for North Carolina's Outer Banks islands.<br><br>But starting this weekend, the account shifted its approach dramatically, as first flagged by a social media user on X.<br><br>Instead of posting "photos" of leaping dolphins and sandy beaches, the account suddenly started publishing images of flooded mountain neighborhoods, submerged houses, and dogs sitting on top of roofs.<br><br>But instead of spreading vital information to those affected by the natural disaster, or at the very least sharing real photos of the destruction, the account is seemingly trying to use AI to cash in on all the attention the hurricane has been getting.<br><br>The account links to an Etsy page for a business called" OuterBanks2023," where somebody who goes by "Alexandr" sells AI-generated prints of horses touching snouts with sea turtles, Santa running down the shoreline with a reindeer, and sunsets over ocean waves.</i><br><br>A Facebook page which presented itself as being associated with North Carolina which posted AI generated images changed to posting AI generated images of hurricane damage after Hurricane Helene hit North Carolina (T0151.003: Online Community Page, T0151.001: Social Media Platform, T0115: Post Content, T0086.002: Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes), T0068: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis). <br><br>The account included links (T0122: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms) to an account on Etsy, which sold prints of AI generated images (T0146: Account Asset, T0148.007: eCommerce Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0068: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
**Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumours, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localised Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.001: Geographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localised Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.001: Geographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations in a specific geographic location, such as a region, state, or city. An influence operation may use geographic segmentation to Create Localised Content (see: Establish Legitimacy).
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.002: Demographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.002: Demographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on demographic segmentation, including age, gender, and income. Demographic segmentation may be useful for influence operations aiming to change state policies that affect a specific population sector. For example, an influence operation attempting to influence Medicare funding in the United States would likely target U.S. voters over 65 years of age.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.003: Economic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.003: Economic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their income bracket, wealth, or other financial or economic division.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.004: Psychographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.004: Psychographic Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on psychographic segmentation, which uses audience values and decision-making processes. An operation may individually gather psychographic data with its own surveys or collection tools or externally purchase data from social media companies or online surveys, such as personality quizzes.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.005: Political Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0072 Segment Audiences
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072.005: Political Segmentation
**Summary**: An influence operation may target populations based on their political affiliations, especially when aiming to manipulate voting or change policy.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072: Segment Audiences
**Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0072: Segment Audiences
**Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artefacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0073: Determine Target Audiences
**Summary**: Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artefacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0073: Determine Target Audiences
**Summary**: Determining the target audiences (segments of the population) who will receive campaign narratives and artefacts intended to achieve the strategic ends.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Favourable position on the international stage in terms of great power politics or regional rivalry. Geopolitics plays out in the realms of foreign policy, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence. It involves nation-state governments, heads of state, foreign ministers, intergovernmental organisations, and regional security alliances.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.001: Geopolitical Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position on the international stage in terms of great power politics or regional rivalry. Geopolitics plays out in the realms of foreign policy, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence. It involves nation-state governments, heads of state, foreign ministers, intergovernmental organisations, and regional security alliances.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.001: Geopolitical Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position on the international stage in terms of great power politics or regional rivalry. Geopolitics plays out in the realms of foreign policy, national security, diplomacy, and intelligence. It involves nation-state governments, heads of state, foreign ministers, intergovernmental organisations, and regional security alliances.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Favourable position vis-à-vis national or sub-national political opponents such as political parties, interest groups, politicians, candidates.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.002: Domestic Political Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position vis-à-vis national or sub-national political opponents such as political parties, interest groups, politicians, candidates.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.002: Domestic Political Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position vis-à-vis national or sub-national political opponents such as political parties, interest groups, politicians, candidates.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the realms of commerce, trade, finance, industry. Economics involves nation-states, corporations, banks, trade blocs, industry associations, cartels.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.003: Economic Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the realms of commerce, trade, finance, industry. Economics involves nation-states, corporations, banks, trade blocs, industry associations, cartels.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.003: Economic Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the realms of commerce, trade, finance, industry. Economics involves nation-states, corporations, banks, trade blocs, industry associations, cartels.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the market for ideas, beliefs, and world views. Competition plays out among faith systems, political systems, and value systems. It can involve sub-national, national or supra-national movements.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.004: Ideological Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the market for ideas, beliefs, and world views. Competition plays out among faith systems, political systems, and value systems. It can involve sub-national, national or supra-national movements.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy **Parent Technique:** T0074 Determine Strategic Ends
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074.004: Ideological Advantage
**Summary**: Favourable position domestically or internationally in the market for ideas, beliefs, and world views. Competition plays out among faith systems, political systems, and value systems. It can involve sub-national, national or supra-national movements.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: These are the long-term end-states the campaign aims to bring about. They typically involve an advantageous position vis-a-vis competitors in terms of power or influence. The strategic goal may be to improve or simply to hold one’s position. Competition occurs in the public sphere in the domains of war, diplomacy, politics, economics, and ideology, and can play out between armed groups, nation-states, political parties, corporations, interest groups, or individuals.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074: Determine Strategic Ends
**Summary**: These are the long-term end-states the campaign aims to bring about. They typically involve an advantageous position vis-a-vis competitors in terms of power or influence. The strategic goal may be to improve or simply to hold one’s position. Competition occurs in the public sphere in the domains of war, diplomacy, politics, economics, and ideology, and can play out between armed groups, nation-states, political parties, corporations, interest groups, or individuals.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0074: Determine Strategic Ends
**Summary**: These are the long-term end-states the campaign aims to bring about. They typically involve an advantageous position vis-a-vis competitors in terms of power or influence. The strategic goal may be to improve or simply to hold one’s position. Competition occurs in the public sphere in the domains of war, diplomacy, politics, economics, and ideology, and can play out between armed groups, nation-states, political parties, corporations, interest groups, or individuals.
**Tactic**: TA01 Plan Strategy
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0075.001: Discredit Credible Sources
**Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives **Parent Technique:** T0075 Dismiss
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0075.001: Discredit Credible Sources
**Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biassed.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0075: Dismiss
**Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biassed.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0075: Dismiss
**Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biassed.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artefacts like images, and change the framing around them.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0076: Distort
**Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artefacts like images, and change the framing around them.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0076: Distort
**Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artefacts like images, and change the framing around them.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0077: Distract
**Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0077: Distract
**Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0078: Dismay
**Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0078: Dismay
**Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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**Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0079: Divide
**Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0079: Divide
**Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
**Tactic**: TA02 Plan Objectives
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.001: Monitor Social Media Analytics
**Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.001: Monitor Social Media Analytics
**Summary**: An influence operation may use social media analytics to determine which factors will increase the operation content’s exposure to its target audience on social media platforms, including views, interactions, and sentiment relating to topics and content types. The social media platform itself or a third-party tool may collect the metrics.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.002: Evaluate Media Surveys
**Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.002: Evaluate Media Surveys
**Summary**: An influence operation may evaluate its own or third-party media surveys to determine what type of content appeals to its target audience. Media surveys may provide insight into an audience’s political views, social class, general interests, or other indicators used to tailor operation messaging to its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralised page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.003: Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralised page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.003: Identify Trending Topics/Hashtags
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify trending hashtags on social media platforms for later use in boosting operation content. A hashtag40 refers to a word or phrase preceded by the hash symbol (#) on social media used to identify messages and posts relating to a specific topic. All public posts that use the same hashtag are aggregated onto a centralised page dedicated to the word or phrase and sorted either chronologically or by popularity.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.004: Conduct Web Traffic Analysis
**Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.004: Conduct Web Traffic Analysis
**Summary**: An influence operation may conduct web traffic analysis to determine which search engines, keywords, websites, and advertisements gain the most traction with its target audience.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.005: Assess Degree/Type of Media Access
**Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0080 Map Target Audience Information Environment
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080.005: Assess Degree/Type of Media Access
**Summary**: An influence operation may survey a target audience’s Internet availability and degree of media freedom to determine which target audience members will have access to operation content and on which platforms. An operation may face more difficulty targeting an information environment with heavy restrictions and media control than an environment with independent media, freedom of speech and of the press, and individual liberties.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyses the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080: Map Target Audience Information Environment
**Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyses the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0080: Map Target Audience Information Environment
**Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyses the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience. Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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| -------- | -------------- |
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**Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.001: Find Echo Chambers
**Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.001: Find Echo Chambers
**Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalising on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.002: Identify Data Voids
**Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalising on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.002: Identify Data Voids
**Summary**: A data void refers to a word or phrase that results in little, manipulative, or low-quality search engine data. Data voids are hard to detect and relatively harmless until exploited by an entity aiming to quickly proliferate false or misleading information during a phenomenon that causes a high number of individuals to query the term or phrase. In the Plan phase, an influence operation may identify data voids for later exploitation in the operation. A 2019 report by Michael Golebiewski identifies five types of data voids. (1) “Breaking news” data voids occur when a keyword gains popularity during a short period of time, allowing an influence operation to publish false content before legitimate news outlets have an opportunity to publish relevant information. (2) An influence operation may create a “strategic new terms” data void by creating their own terms and publishing information online before promoting their keyword to the target audience. (3) An influence operation may publish content on “outdated terms” that have decreased in popularity, capitalising on most search engines’ preferences for recency. (4) “Fragmented concepts” data voids separate connections between similar ideas, isolating segment queries to distinct search engine results. (5) An influence operation may use “problematic queries” that previously resulted in disturbing or inappropriate content to promote messaging until mainstream media recontextualizes the term.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarise its target audience from the rest of the public.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.003: Identify Existing Prejudices
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarise its target audience from the rest of the public.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.003: Identify Existing Prejudices
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing racial, religious, demographic, or social prejudices to further polarise its target audience from the rest of the public.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.004: Identify Existing Fissures
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.004: Identify Existing Fissures
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify existing fissures to pit target populations against one another or facilitate a “divide-and-conquer" approach to tailor operation narratives along the divides.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.005: Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions
**Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.005: Identify Existing Conspiracy Narratives/Suspicions
**Summary**: An influence operation may assess preexisting conspiracy theories or suspicions in a population to identify existing narratives that support operational objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarising the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.006: Identify Wedge Issues
**Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarising the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.006: Identify Wedge Issues
**Summary**: A wedge issue is a divisive political issue, usually concerning a social phenomenon, that divides individuals along a defined line. An influence operation may exploit wedge issues by intentionally polarising the public along the wedge issue line and encouraging opposition between factions.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to centre operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.007: Identify Target Audience Adversaries
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to centre operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.007: Identify Target Audience Adversaries
**Summary**: An influence operation may identify or create a real or imaginary adversary to centre operation narratives against. A real adversary may include certain politicians or political parties while imaginary adversaries may include falsified “deep state”62 actors that, according to conspiracies, run the state behind public view.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.008: Identify Media System Vulnerabilities
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis **Parent Technique:** T0081 Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081.008: Identify Media System Vulnerabilities
**Summary**: An influence operation may exploit existing weaknesses in a target’s media system. These weaknesses may include existing biases among media agencies, vulnerability to false news agencies on social media, or existing distrust of traditional media sources. An existing distrust among the public in the media system’s credibility holds high potential for exploitation by an influence operation when establishing alternative news agencies to spread operation content.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081: Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
**Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0081: Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
**Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment. Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.
**Tactic**: TA13 Target Audience Analysis
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**Summary**: Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0082: Develop New Narratives
**Summary**: Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0082: Develop New Narratives
**Summary**: Actors may develop new narratives to further strategic or tactical goals, especially when existing narratives adequately align with the campaign goals. New narratives provide more control in terms of crafting the message to achieve specific goals. However, new narratives may require more effort to disseminate than adapting or adopting existing narratives.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0083: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
**Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0083: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
**Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.
**Tactic**: TA14 Develop Narratives
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**Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.001: Use Copypasta
**Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.001: Use Copypasta
**Summary**: Copypasta refers to a piece of text that has been copied and pasted multiple times across various online platforms. A copypasta’s final form may differ from its original source text as users add, delete, or otherwise edit the content as they repost the text.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“The sixth [website to repost a confirmed false narrative investigated in this report] is an apparent think tank, the Center for Global Strategic Monitoring. This website describes itself, in English apparently written by a non-native speaker, as a “nonprofit and nonpartisan research and analysis institution dedicated to providing insights of the think tank community publications”. It does, indeed, publish think-tank reports on issues such as Turkey and US-China relations; however, the reports are the work of other think tanks, often unattributed (the two mentioned in this sentence were actually produced by the Brookings Institution, although the website makes no mention of the fact). It also fails to provide an address, or any other contact details other than an email, and its (long) list of experts includes entries apparently copied and pasted from other institutions. Thus, the “think tank” website which shared the fake story appears to be a fake itself.”</i> In this example a website which amplified a false narrative presented itself as a think tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona).<br><br> This is an entirely fabricated persona (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona); it republished content from other think tanks without attribution (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content) and fabricated experts (T0097.108: Expert Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona) to make it more believable that they were a real think tank. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.002: Plagiarise Content
**Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00076 Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00076.md) | <i>“Some Twitter accounts in the network [of inauthentic accounts attributed to Iran] impersonated Republican political candidates that ran for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms. These accounts appropriated the candidates’ photographs and, in some cases, plagiarized tweets from the real individuals’ accounts. Aside from impersonating real U.S. political candidates, the behavior and activity of these accounts resembled that of the others in the network.<br><br> “For example, the account @livengood_marla impersonated Marla Livengood, a 2018 candidate for California’s 9th Congressional District, using a photograph of Livengood and a campaign banner for its profile and background pictures. The account began tweeting on Sept. 24, 2018, with its first tweet plagiarizing one from Livengood’s official account earlier that month”<br><br> [...]<br><br> “In another example, the account @ButlerJineea impersonated Jineea Butler, a 2018 candidate for New York’s 13th Congressional District, using a photograph of Butler for its profile picture and incorporating her campaign slogans into its background picture, as well as claiming in its Twitter bio to be a “US House candidate, NY-13” and linking to Butler’s website, jineeabutlerforcongress[.]com.”</I><br><br> In this example actors impersonated existing political candidates (T0097.110: Member of Political Party Persona, T0143.003: Impersonated Persona), strengthening the impersonation by copying legitimate accounts’ imagery (T0145.001: Copy Account Imagery), and copying its previous posts (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content). |
| [I00079 Three thousand fake tanks](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00079.md) | <i>“The sixth [website to repost a confirmed false narrative investigated in this report] is an apparent think tank, the Center for Global Strategic Monitoring. This website describes itself, in English apparently written by a non-native speaker, as a “nonprofit and nonpartisan research and analysis institution dedicated to providing insights of the think tank community publications”. It does, indeed, publish think-tank reports on issues such as Turkey and US-China relations; however, the reports are the work of other think tanks, often unattributed (the two mentioned in this sentence were actually produced by the Brookings Institution, although the website makes no mention of the fact). It also fails to provide an address, or any other contact details other than an email, and its (long) list of experts includes entries apparently copied and pasted from other institutions. Thus, the “think tank” website which shared the fake story appears to be a fake itself.”</i> In this example a website which amplified a false narrative presented itself as a think tank (T0097.204: Think Tank Persona).<br><br> This is an entirely fabricated persona (T0143.002: Fabricated Persona); it republished content from other think tanks without attribution (T0084.002: Plagiarise Content) and fabricated experts (T0097.108: Expert Persona, T0143.002: Fabricated Persona) to make it more believable that they were a real think tank. |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.002: Plagiarise Content
**Summary**: An influence operation may take content from other sources without proper attribution. This content may be either misinformation content shared by others without malicious intent but now leveraged by the campaign as disinformation or disinformation content from other sources.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.003: Deceptively Labelled or Translated
**Summary**: An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0084 Reuse Existing Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084.003: Deceptively Labelled or Translated
**Summary**: An influence operation may take authentic content from other sources and add deceptive labels or deceptively translate the content into other langauges.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarises from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilised to develop new content.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084: Reuse Existing Content
**Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarises from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilised to develop new content.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0084: Reuse Existing Content
**Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarises from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilised to develop new content.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| [T0085.008 Machine Translated Text](../../generated_pages/techniques/T0085.008.md) | Use this sub-technique when AI has been used to generate a translation of a piece of text. |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.001: Develop AI-Generated Text
**Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| [T0085.008 Machine Translated Text](../../generated_pages/techniques/T0085.008.md) | Use this sub-technique when AI has been used to generate a translation of a piece of text. |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.001: Develop AI-Generated Text
**Summary**: AI-generated texts refers to synthetic text composed by computers using text-generating AI technology. Autonomous generation refers to content created by a bot without human input, also known as bot-created content generation. Autonomous generation represents the next step in automation after language generation and may lead to automated journalism. An influence operation may use read fakes or autonomous generation to quickly develop and distribute content to the target audience.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.003: Develop Inauthentic News Articles
**Summary**: An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.003: Develop Inauthentic News Articles
**Summary**: An influence operation may develop false or misleading news articles aligned to their campaign goals or narratives.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: Produce text content in the form of a book. <br /> <br />This technique covers both e-books and physical books, however, the former is more easily deployed by threat actors given the lower cost to develop.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.005: Develop Book
**Summary**: Produce text content in the form of a book. <br /> <br />This technique covers both e-books and physical books, however, the former is more easily deployed by threat actors given the lower cost to develop.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00110 How COVID-19 conspiracists and extremists use crowdfunding platforms to fund their activities](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00110.md) | The EU Disinfo Lab produced a report into disinformation published on crowdfunding platforms:<br><br><i>More worrisome is the direct monetisation of disinformation happening on crowdfunding platforms: on Kickstarter, we found a user openly raising money for a documentary project suggesting that COVID-19 is a conspiracy.</i><br><br>A Kickstarter user attempted to use the platform to fund production of a documentary (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0087: Develop Video-Based Content, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform).<br><br><i>On Patreon, we found several instances of direct monetisation of COVID-19 disinformation, including posts promoting a device allegedly protecting against COVID-19 and 5G, as well as posts related to the “Plandemic” conspiracy video, which gained attention on YouTube before being removed by the platform.<br><br>We also found an account called “Stranger than fiction” entirely dedicated to disinformation, which openly states that their content was “Banned by screwtube and fakebook, our videos have been viewed over a billion times.”</i><br><br>The “Stranger than fiction” user presented itself as an alternative news source which had been banned from other platforms (T0146: Account Asset, T0097.202: News Outlet Persona, T0121.001: Bypass Content Bocking, T0152.012: Subscription Service Platform).<br><br><i>On the US-based crowdfunding platform IndieGogo, EU DisinfoLab found a successful crowdfunding campaign of €133.903 for a book called Revolution Q. This book, now also available on Amazon, claims to be “Written for both newcomers and long-time QAnon fans alike, this book is a treasure-trove of information designed to help everyone weather The Storm.”</i><br><br>An IndieGogo account was used to gather funds to produce a book on QAnon (T0017: Conduct Fundraising, T0085.005: Develop Book, T0146: Account Asset, T0148.006: Crowdfunding Platform), with the book later sold on Amazon marketplace (T0148.007: eCommerce Platform). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.005: Develop Book
**Summary**: Produce text content in the form of a book. <br /> <br />This technique covers both e-books and physical books, however, the former is more easily deployed by threat actors given the lower cost to develop.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources, and can be contributed by people outside the organisation. <br /> <br />Flagging articles as opinions allow news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.<br /> <br /> The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives. <br /> <br />Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.006: Develop Opinion Article
**Summary**: Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources, and can be contributed by people outside the organisation. <br /> <br />Flagging articles as opinions allow news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.<br /> <br /> The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives. <br /> <br />Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.006: Develop Opinion Article
**Summary**: Opinion articles (aka “Op-Eds” or “Editorials”) are articles or regular columns flagged as “opinion” posted to news sources, and can be contributed by people outside the organisation. <br /> <br />Flagging articles as opinions allow news organisations to distinguish them from the typical expectations of objective news reporting while distancing the presented opinion from the organisation or its employees.<br /> <br /> The use of this technique is not by itself an indication of malicious or inauthentic content; Op-eds are a common format in media. However, threat actors exploit op-eds to, for example, submit opinion articles to local media to promote their narratives. <br /> <br />Examples from the perspective of a news site involve publishing op-eds from perceived prestigious voices to give legitimacy to an inauthentic publication, or supporting causes by hosting op-eds from actors aligned with the organisation’s goals.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.001.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.007: Create Fake Research
**Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.001.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.007: Create Fake Research
**Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx.<br /> <br />This Technique previously used the ID T0019.001.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: Text which has been translated into another language using machine translation tools, such as AI.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”.<br><br><i>“A conspicuous aspect of these accounts is the likely usage of machine-translated Hebrew. The disjointed and linguistically strange comments imply that the CIB’s architects are not Hebrew-speaking and likely translate to Hebrew using online tools. There’s no official way to confirm that a text is translated, but it is evident when the gender for nouns is incorrect, very unusual words or illogical grammar being used usually lead to the conclusion that the comment was not written by a native speaker that is aware of the nuances of the language.”</i><br><br>In this example analysts asserted that accounts were posting content which had been translated via machine (T0085.008: Machine Translated Text), based on indicators such as issues with grammar and gender. |
| [I00088 Much Ado About ‘Somethings’ - China-Linked Influence Operation Endures Despite Takedown](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00088.md) | <i>“The broader War of Somethings (WoS) network, so dubbed because all the Facebook pages and user accounts in the network are connected to “The War of Somethings” page,  behaves very similarly to previous Spamouflage campaigns. [Spamouflage is a coordinated inauthentic behaviour network attributed to the Chinese state.]<br><br> “Like other components of Spamouflage, the WoS network sometimes intersperses apolitical content with its more agenda-driven material. Many members post nearly identical comments at almost the same time. The text includes markers of automatic translation while error messages included as profile photos indicate the automated pulling of stock images.”</i><br><br> In this example analysts found an indicator of automated use of stock images in Facebook accounts; some of the accounts in the network appeared to have mistakenly uploaded error messages as profile pictures (T0145.007: Stock Image Account Imagery). The text posted by the accounts also appeared to have been translated using automation (T0085.008: Machine Translated Text). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.008: Machine Translated Text
**Summary**: Text which has been translated into another language using machine translation tools, such as AI.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content **Parent Technique:** T0085 Develop Text-Based Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00086 #WeAreNotSafe – Exposing How a Post-October 7th Disinformation Network Operates on Israeli Social Media](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00086.md) | In this report accounts were identified as part of “a sophisticated and extensive coordinated network orchestrating a disinformation campaign targeting Israeli digital spaces since October 7th, 2023”.<br><br><i>“A conspicuous aspect of these accounts is the likely usage of machine-translated Hebrew. The disjointed and linguistically strange comments imply that the CIB’s architects are not Hebrew-speaking and likely translate to Hebrew using online tools. There’s no official way to confirm that a text is translated, but it is evident when the gender for nouns is incorrect, very unusual words or illogical grammar being used usually lead to the conclusion that the comment was not written by a native speaker that is aware of the nuances of the language.”</i><br><br>In this example analysts asserted that accounts were posting content which had been translated via machine (T0085.008: Machine Translated Text), based on indicators such as issues with grammar and gender. |
| [I00088 Much Ado About ‘Somethings’ - China-Linked Influence Operation Endures Despite Takedown](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00088.md) | <i>“The broader War of Somethings (WoS) network, so dubbed because all the Facebook pages and user accounts in the network are connected to “The War of Somethings” page,  behaves very similarly to previous Spamouflage campaigns. [Spamouflage is a coordinated inauthentic behaviour network attributed to the Chinese state.]<br><br> “Like other components of Spamouflage, the WoS network sometimes intersperses apolitical content with its more agenda-driven material. Many members post nearly identical comments at almost the same time. The text includes markers of automatic translation while error messages included as profile photos indicate the automated pulling of stock images.”</i><br><br> In this example analysts found an indicator of automated use of stock images in Facebook accounts; some of the accounts in the network appeared to have mistakenly uploaded error messages as profile pictures (T0145.007: Stock Image Account Imagery). The text posted by the accounts also appeared to have been translated using automation (T0085.008: Machine Translated Text). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085.008: Machine Translated Text
**Summary**: Text which has been translated into another language using machine translation tools, such as AI.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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**Summary**: Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artefacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00111 Patreon Is Bankrolling Climate Change Deniers While We All Burn](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00111.md) | In this article VICE News discusses a report produced by Advance Democracy on people who use Patreon to spread the false claim that an impending ice age will reverse the harms of the ongoing climate crisis:<br><br><i>“The spread of climate misinformation is prolific on social media, as well as on sites like Patreon, where users are actually financially compensated through the platform for spreading falsehoods,” Daniel Jones, president of Advance Democracy, told VICE News.<br><br>“Companies hosting and promoting climate misinformation have a responsibility to take action to reduce dangerous misinformation, as falsehoods about climate science are every bit as dangerous as lies about vaccinations and disinformation about our elections.”<br><br>Patreon did not respond to VICE News’ request for comment on the report’s findings.<br><br>One of the biggest accounts spreading climate conspiracies is ADAPT 2030, which is run by David DuByne, who has 1,100 followers on Patreon. He is currently making over $3,500 every month from his subscribers.<br><br>[The science DuByne relies on does not support his hypothesis. However,] this has not prevented DuByne and many others from preying on people’s fears about climate change to spread conspiracies about an impending ice age, which they say will miraculously fix all of earth’s climate problems.<br><br>DuByne offers seven different membership levels for supporters, beginning at just $1 per month.<br><br>The most expensive costs $100 a month, and gives patrons “a private 20-minute call with David DuByne once per month, to discuss your particular preparedness issues or concerns.” So far just two people are paying this amount.<br><br>The researchers also found at least eight other accounts on Patreon that have spread climate change conspiracy theories as part of wider conspiracy sharing, including baseless claims about COVID-19 and the legitimacy of Joe Biden’s presidency. Some of these accounts are earning over $600 per month.</i><br><br>David DuByne created an account on Patreon, which he uses to post text, videos, and podcasts for his subscribers to discuss (T0085: Develop Text-Based Content, T0087: Develop Video-Based Content, T0088: Develop Audio-Based Content, T0146: Account Asset, T0115: Post Content, T0152.012: Subscription Service Platform, T0151.014: Comments Section, T0155.006: Subscription Access Asset). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085: Develop Text-Based Content
**Summary**: Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artefacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
| Associated Technique | Description |
| --------- | ------------------------- |
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
| -------- | -------------------- |
| [I00111 Patreon Is Bankrolling Climate Change Deniers While We All Burn](../../generated_pages/incidents/I00111.md) | In this article VICE News discusses a report produced by Advance Democracy on people who use Patreon to spread the false claim that an impending ice age will reverse the harms of the ongoing climate crisis:<br><br><i>“The spread of climate misinformation is prolific on social media, as well as on sites like Patreon, where users are actually financially compensated through the platform for spreading falsehoods,” Daniel Jones, president of Advance Democracy, told VICE News.<br><br>“Companies hosting and promoting climate misinformation have a responsibility to take action to reduce dangerous misinformation, as falsehoods about climate science are every bit as dangerous as lies about vaccinations and disinformation about our elections.”<br><br>Patreon did not respond to VICE News’ request for comment on the report’s findings.<br><br>One of the biggest accounts spreading climate conspiracies is ADAPT 2030, which is run by David DuByne, who has 1,100 followers on Patreon. He is currently making over $3,500 every month from his subscribers.<br><br>[The science DuByne relies on does not support his hypothesis. However,] this has not prevented DuByne and many others from preying on people’s fears about climate change to spread conspiracies about an impending ice age, which they say will miraculously fix all of earth’s climate problems.<br><br>DuByne offers seven different membership levels for supporters, beginning at just $1 per month.<br><br>The most expensive costs $100 a month, and gives patrons “a private 20-minute call with David DuByne once per month, to discuss your particular preparedness issues or concerns.” So far just two people are paying this amount.<br><br>The researchers also found at least eight other accounts on Patreon that have spread climate change conspiracy theories as part of wider conspiracy sharing, including baseless claims about COVID-19 and the legitimacy of Joe Biden’s presidency. Some of these accounts are earning over $600 per month.</i><br><br>David DuByne created an account on Patreon, which he uses to post text, videos, and podcasts for his subscribers to discuss (T0085: Develop Text-Based Content, T0087: Develop Video-Based Content, T0088: Develop Audio-Based Content, T0146: Account Asset, T0115: Post Content, T0152.012: Subscription Service Platform, T0151.014: Comments Section, T0155.006: Subscription Access Asset). |
| Counters | Response types |
| -------- | -------------- |
# Technique T0085: Develop Text-Based Content
**Summary**: Creating and editing false or misleading text-based artefacts, often aligned with one or more specific narratives, for use in a disinformation campaign.
**Tactic**: TA06 Develop Content
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