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dataset updates
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# Technique T0001: 5Ds (dismiss, distort, distract, dismay, divide)
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# Technique T0001: Determine Target Audiences
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* **Summary**: Nimmo's "4Ds of propaganda": dismiss, distort, distract, dismay (MisinfosecWG added divide in 2019). Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. This is often not possible.
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
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# Technique T0002: Facilitate State Propaganda
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# Technique T0002: Determine Strategic Ends
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* **Summary**: Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
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# Technique T0003: Leverage Existing Narratives
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# Technique T0003: Dismiss
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* **Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
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* **Summary**: Push back against criticism by dismissing your critics. This might be arguing that the critics use a different standard for you than with other actors or themselves; or arguing that their criticism is biased.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0004: Devise Competing Narratives
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# Technique T0004: Distort
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* **Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss.
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* **Summary**: Twist the narrative. Take information, or artifacts like images, and change the framing around them.
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Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.
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These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA01
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0005: Center of Gravity Analysis
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# Technique T0005: Distract
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* **Summary**: Recon/research to identify "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength". Includes demographic and network analysis of communities
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* **Summary**: Shift attention to a different narrative or actor, for instance by accusing critics of the same activity that they’ve accused you of (e.g. police brutality).
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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# Technique T0006: Develop Narrative Concepts
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# Technique T0006: Dismay
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* **Summary**: The promotion of beneficial master narratives is perhaps the most effective method for achieving long-term strategic narrative dominance. From a "whole of society" perspective the promotion of the society's core master narratives should occupy a central strategic role. From a misinformation campaign / cognitive security perpectve the tactics around master narratives center more precisely on the day-to-day promotion and reinforcement of this messaging. In other words, beneficial, high-coverage master narratives are a central strategic goal and their promotion consitutes an ongoing tactical struggle carried out at a whole-of-society level. Tactically, their promotion covers a broad spectrum of activities both on- and offline.
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* **Summary**: Threaten the critic or narrator of events. For instance, threaten journalists or news outlets reporting on a story.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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# Technique T0007: Create fake Social Media Profiles / Pages / Groups
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# Technique T0007: Divide
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* **Summary**: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets.
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* **Summary**: Create conflict between subgroups, to widen divisions in a community
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Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0008: Create fake or imposter news sites
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# Technique T0008: Degrade Adversary
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* **Summary**: Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.
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* **Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0009: Create fake experts
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# Technique T0009: Facilitate State Propaganda
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* **Summary**: Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself.
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* **Summary**: Organize citizens around pro-state messaging. Coordinate paid or volunteer groups to push state propaganda.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0010: Cultivate ignorant agents
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# Technique T0010: Map Target Audience Information Environment
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* **Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
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* **Summary**: Mapping the target audience information environment analyzes the information space itself, including social media analytics, web traffic, and media surveys. Mapping the information environment may help the influence operation determine the most realistic and popular information channels to reach its target audience.
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Mapping the target audience information environment aids influence operations in determining the most vulnerable areas of the information space to target with messaging.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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| [C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves](../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md) | D03 |
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| [C00190 open engagement with civil society](../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md) | D03 |
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| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ](../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
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| [C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
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| [C00212 build public resilience by making civil society more vibrant](../generated_pages/counters/C00212.md) | D03 |
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# Technique T0011: Compromise legitimate account
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# Technique T0011: Identify Social and Technical Vulnerabilities
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* **Summary**: Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.
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* **Summary**: Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities determines weaknesses within the target audience information environment for later exploitation. Vulnerabilities include decisive political issues, weak cybersecurity infrastructure, search engine data voids, and other technical and non technical weaknesses in the target information environment.
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Identifying social and technical vulnerabilities facilitates the later exploitation of the identified weaknesses to advance operation objectives.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0012: Use concealment
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# Technique T0012: Segment Audiences
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* **Summary**: Use anonymous social media profiles. Examples include page or group administrators, masked "whois" website directory data, no bylines connected to news article, no masthead connect to news websites.
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* **Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA03
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0013: Create fake websites
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# Technique T0013: Develop New Narratives
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* **Summary**: Create media assets to support fake organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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# Technique T0014: Prepare fundraising campaigns
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# Technique T0014: Leverage Existing Narratives
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* **Summary**: Generate revenue through new or existing funding campaigns. e.g. Gather data, advance credible persona via Gofundme; Patreon; or via fake website connecting via PayPal or Stripe.
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* **Summary**: Use or adapt existing narrative themes, where narratives are the baseline stories of a target audience. Narratives form the bedrock of our worldviews. New information is understood through a process firmly grounded in this bedrock. If new information is not consitent with the prevailing narratives of an audience, it will be ignored. Effective campaigns will frame their misinformation in the context of these narratives. Highly effective campaigns will make extensive use of audience-appropriate archetypes and meta-narratives throughout their content creation and amplifiction practices.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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# Technique T0015: Create hashtags
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# Technique T0015: Develop Competing Narratives
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* **Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
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* **Summary**: Advance competing narratives connected to same issue ie: on one hand deny incident while at same time expresses dismiss. Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on. These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the "firehose of misinformation" approach.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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# Technique T0016: Clickbait
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# Technique T0016: Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives
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* **Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset
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* **Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives" appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the "firehose of falsehoods" model.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0017: Conduct Fundraising Campaigns
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# Technique T0017: Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative
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* **Summary**: Drive traffic/engagement to funding campaign sites; helps provide measurable metrics to assess conversion rates
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* **Summary**: An influence operation may seek to exploit the preexisting weaknesses, fears, and enemies of the target audience for integration into the operation’s narratives and overall strategy. Integrating existing vulnerabilities into the operational approach conserves resources by exploiting already weak areas of the target information environment instead of forcing the operation to create new vulnerabilities in the environment.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0018: Purchase advertisements
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# Technique T0018: Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis
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* **Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
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* **Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0019: Generate information pollution
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# Technique T0019: Demand insurmountable proof
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* **Summary**: Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.
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* **Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0020: Trial content
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# Technique T0020: Reuse Existing Content
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* **Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
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* **Summary**: When an operation recycles content from its own previous operations or plagiarizes from external operations. An operation may launder information to conserve resources that would have otherwise been utilized to develop new content.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0021: Memes
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# Technique T0021: Develop Text-based Content
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* **Summary**: Memes are one of the most important single artefact types in all of computational propaganda. Memes in this framework denotes the narrow image-based definition. But that naming is no accident, as these items have most of the important properties of Dawkins' original conception as a self-replicating unit of culture. Memes pull together reference and commentary; image and narrative; emotion and message. Memes are a powerful tool and the heart of modern influence campaigns.
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0022: Conspiracy narratives
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# Technique T0022: Develop Image-based Content
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* **Summary**: "Conspiracy narratives appeal to the human desire for explanatory order, by invoking the participation of poweful (often sinister) actors in pursuit of their own political goals. These narratives are especially appealing when an audience is low-information, marginalized or otherwise inclined to reject the prevailing explanation. Conspiracy narratives are an important component of the ""firehose of falsehoods"" model.
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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| [C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves](../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md) | D03 |
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| [C00190 open engagement with civil society](../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md) | D03 |
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| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ](../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
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| [C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
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| [C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting](../generated_pages/counters/C00205.md) | D03 |
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| [C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives](../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md) | D03 |
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# Technique T0023: Distort facts
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# Technique T0023: Develop Video-based Content
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* **Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0024: Create fake videos and images
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# Technique T0024: Develop Audio-based Content
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* **Summary**: Create fake videos and/or images by manipulating existing content or generating new content (e.g. deepfakes).
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* **Summary**:
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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# Technique T0025: Leak altered documents
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# Technique T0025: Generate information pollution
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* **Summary**: Obtain documents (eg by theft or leak), then alter and release, possibly among factual documents/sources.
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* **Summary**: Flood social channels; drive traffic/engagement to all assets; create aura/sense/perception of pervasiveness/consensus (for or against or both simultaneously) of an issue or topic. "Nothing is true, but everything is possible." Akin to astroturfing campaign.
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
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* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
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| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
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| [C00176 Improve Coordination amongst stakeholders: public and private](../generated_pages/counters/C00176.md) | D07 |
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| [C00190 open engagement with civil society](../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md) | D03 |
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| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ](../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
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| [C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
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| [C00202 Set data 'honeytraps'](../generated_pages/counters/C00202.md) | D02 |
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| [C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting](../generated_pages/counters/C00205.md) | D03 |
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| [C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives](../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md) | D03 |
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|
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# Technique T0026: Create pseudoscientific or disingenuous research
|
||||
# Technique T0026: Distort facts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create fake academic research. Example: fake social science research is often aimed at hot-button social issues such as gender, race and sexuality. Fake science research can target Climate Science debate or pseudoscience like anti-vaxx
|
||||
* **Summary**: Change, twist, or exaggerate existing facts to construct a narrative that differs from reality. Examples: images and ideas can be distorted by being placed in an improper content
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0027: Adapt existing narratives
|
||||
# Technique T0027: Create hashtags and search artifacts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Adapting existing narratives to current operational goals is the tactical sweet-spot for an effective misinformation campaign. Leveraging existing narratives is not only more effective, it requires substantially less resourcing, as the promotion of new master narratives operates on a much larger scale, both time and scope. Fluid, dynamic & often interchangeable key master narratives can be ("The morally corrupt West") adapted to divisive (LGBT propaganda) or to distort (individuals working as CIA operatives). For Western audiences, different but equally powerful framings are available, such as "USA has a fraught history in race relations, especially in criminal justice areas."
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create one or more hashtags and/or hashtag groups. Many incident-based campaigns will create hashtags to promote their fabricated event. Creating a hashtag for an incident can have two important effects: 1. Create a perception of reality around an event. Certainly only "real" events would be discussed in a hashtag. After all, the event has a name!, and 2. Publicize the story more widely through trending lists and search behavior. Asset needed to direct/control/manage "conversation" connected to launching new incident/campaign with new hashtag for applicable social media sites).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
|
|||
| [C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves](../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00190 open engagement with civil society](../generated_pages/counters/C00190.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ](../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
|
||||
| [C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00205 strong dialogue between the federal government and private sector to encourage better reporting](../generated_pages/counters/C00205.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives](../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md) | D03 |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,12 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0028: Create competing narratives
|
||||
# Technique T0028: Obtain Private Documents
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Misinformation promotes an agenda by advancing narratives supportive of that agenda. This is most effective when the advanced narrative pre-dates the revelation of the specific misinformation content. But this is often not possible.
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
Suppressing or discouraging narratives already spreading requires an alternative. The most simple set of narrative techniques in response would be the construction and promotion of contradictory alternatives centered on denial, deflection, dismissal, counter-charges, excessive standards of proof, bias in prohibition or enforcement, and so on.
|
||||
|
||||
These competing narratives allow loyalists cover, but are less compelling to opponents and fence-sitters than campaigns built around existing narratives or highly explanatory master narratives. Competing narratives, as such, are especially useful in the *firehose of misinformation* approach.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA05
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0029: Manipulate online polls
|
||||
# Technique T0029: Create Inauthentic Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0030: Backstop personas
|
||||
# Technique T0030: Recruit bad actors
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create other assets/dossier/cover/fake relationships and/or connections or documents, sites, bylines, attributions, to establish/augment/inflate crediblity/believability
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0031: YouTube
|
||||
# Technique T0031: Cultivate ignorant agents
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use YouTube as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**: Cultivate propagandists for a cause, the goals of which are not fully comprehended, and who are used cynically by the leaders of the cause. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. Many are traffickers in conspiracy theories or hoaxes, unified by a suspicion of Western governments and mainstream media. Their narratives, which appeal to leftists hostile to globalism and military intervention and nationalists against immigration, are frequently infiltrated and shaped by state-controlled trolls and altered news items from agencies such as RT and Sputnik. Also know as "useful idiots" or "unwitting agents".
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0032: Reddit
|
||||
# Technique T0032: Build Network
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use Reddit as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0033: Instagram
|
||||
# Technique T0033: Acquire/ recruit Network
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use Instagram as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0034: LinkedIn
|
||||
# Technique T0034: Infiltrate Existing Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use LinkedIn as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0035: Pinterest
|
||||
# Technique T0035: Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use Pinterest as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create key social engineering assets needed to amplify content, manipulate algorithms, fool public and/or specific incident/campaign targets. Computational propaganda depends substantially on false perceptions of credibility and acceptance. By creating fake users and groups with a variety of interests and commitments, attackers can ensure that their messages both come from trusted sources and appear more widely adopted than they actually are.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0036: WhatsApp
|
||||
# Technique T0036: Create inauthentic websites
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use WhatsApp as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create media assets to support inauthentic organizations (e.g. think tank), people (e.g. experts) and/or serve as sites to distribute malware/launch phishing operations.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0037: Facebook
|
||||
# Technique T0037: Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use Facebook as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0038: Twitter
|
||||
# Technique T0038: Develop Owned Media Assets
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use Twitter as a narrative dissemination channel
|
||||
* **Summary**: An owned media asset refers to an agency or organization through which an influence operation may create, develop, and host content and narratives. Owned media assets include websites, blogs, social media pages, forums, and other platforms that facilitate the creation and organization of content.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0039: Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
# Technique T0039: Prepare fundraising campaigns
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns (see: Develop Information Pathways) to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
|
||||
|
||||
By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0040: Demand unsurmountable proof
|
||||
# Technique T0040: Leverage Content Farm
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Campaigns often leverage tactical and informational asymmetries on the threat surface, as seen in the Distort and Deny strategies, and the "firehose of misinformation". Specifically, conspiracy theorists can be repeatedly wrong, but advocates of the truth need to be perfect. By constantly escalating demands for proof, propagandists can effectively leverage this asymmetry while also priming its future use, often with an even greater asymmetric advantage. The conspiracist is offered freer rein for a broader range of "questions" while the truth teller is burdened with higher and higher standards of proof.
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA06
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0041: Deny involvement
|
||||
# Technique T0041: Compromise legitimate accounts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Without "smoking gun" proof (and even with proof), incident creator can or will deny involvement. This technique also leverages the attacker advantages outlined in T0040 "Demand unsurmountable proof", specifically the asymmetric disadvantage for truth-tellers in a "firehose of misinformation" environment.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Hack or take over legimate accounts to distribute misinformation or damaging content.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,12 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0042: Kernel of Truth
|
||||
# Technique T0042: Create fake experts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Stories planted or promoted in computational propaganda operations often make use of experts fabricated from whole cloth, sometimes specifically for the story itself.
|
||||
|
||||
Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies.
|
||||
|
||||
When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0043: Use SMS/ WhatsApp/ Chat apps
|
||||
# Technique T0043: Create personas
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Direct messaging via encypted app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a diffucult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0044: Seed distortions
|
||||
# Technique T0044: Establish Inauthentic News Sites
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Modern computational propaganda makes use of a cadre of imposter news sites spreading globally. These sites, sometimes motivated by concerns other than propaganda--for instance, click-based revenue--often have some superficial markers of authenticity, such as naming and site-design. But many can be quickly exposed with reference to their owenership, reporting history and adverstising details.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0045: Use fake experts
|
||||
# Technique T0045: Prepare Assets Impersonating Legitimate Entities
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up in T0009. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
|
||||
* **Summary**: An influence operation may prepare assets impersonating legitimate entities to further conceal its network identity and add a layer of legitimacy to its operation content. Users will more likely believe and less likely fact-check news from recognizable sources rather than unknown sites. Legitimate entities may include authentic news outlets, public figures, organizations, or state entities.
|
||||
An influence operation may use a wide variety of cyber techniques to impersonate a legitimate entity’s website or social media account. Typosquatting87 is the international registration of a domain name with purposeful variations of the impersonated domain name through intentional typos, top-level domain (TLD) manipulation, or punycode. Typosquatting facilitates the creation of falsified websites by creating similar domain names in the URL box, leaving it to the user to confirm that the URL is correct.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
@ -42,7 +43,7 @@
|
|||
| [C00184 Media exposure](../generated_pages/counters/C00184.md) | D04 |
|
||||
| [C00188 Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence moves](../generated_pages/counters/C00188.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00195 Redirect searches away from disinformation or extremist content ](../generated_pages/counters/C00195.md) | D02 |
|
||||
| [C00200 Influencer disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00200 Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo](../generated_pages/counters/C00200.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00203 Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets](../generated_pages/counters/C00203.md) | D03 |
|
||||
| [C00211 Use humorous counter-narratives](../generated_pages/counters/C00211.md) | D03 |
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0046: Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
# Technique T0046: Co-opt Trusted Sources
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
|
||||
* **Summary**: An influence operation may co-opt trusted sources by infiltrating or repurposing a source to reach a target audience through existing, previously reliable networks. Co-opted trusted sources may include:
|
||||
- National or local new outlets
|
||||
- Research or academic publications
|
||||
- Online blogs or websites
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA07
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0047: Muzzle social media as a political force
|
||||
# Technique T0047: Create Clickbait
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create attention grabbing headlines (outrage, doubt, humor) required to drive traffic & engagement. This is a key asset.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0048: Cow online opinion leaders
|
||||
# Technique T0048: Purchase Targeted Advertisements
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Intimidate, coerce, threaten critics/dissidents/journalists via trolling, doxing.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create or fund advertisements targeted at specific populations
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0049: Flooding
|
||||
# Technique T0049: Create Localized Content
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Localized content refers to content that appeals to a specific community of individuals, often in defined geographic areas. An operation may create localized content using local language and dialects to resonate with its target audience and blend in with other local news and social media. Localized content may help an operation increase legitimacy, avoid detection, and complicate external attribution.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0050: Cheerleading domestic social media ops
|
||||
# Technique T0050: Leverage Echo Chambers/Filter Bubbles
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Deploy state-coordinated social media commenters and astroturfers. Both internal/domestic and external social media influence operations.
|
||||
* **Summary**: An echo chamber refers to an internet subgroup, often along ideological lines, where individuals only engage with “others with which they are already in agreement.” A filter bubble refers to an algorithm's placement of an individual in content that they agree with or regularly engage with, possibly entrapping the user into a bubble of their own making. An operation may create these isolated areas of the internet by match existing groups, or aggregating individuals into a single target audience based on shared interests, politics, values, demographics, and other characteristics. Echo chambers and filter bubbles help to reinforce similar biases and content to the same target audience members.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA08
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0051: Fabricate social media comment
|
||||
# Technique T0051: Chat apps
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, chat bots (programmed to reply to specific key words/hashtags) influence online conversations, product reviews, web-site comment forums.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Direct messaging via chat app is an increasing method of delivery. These messages are often automated and new delivery and storage methods make them anonymous, viral, and ephemeral. This is a difficult space to monitor, but also a difficult space to build acclaim or notoriety.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0052: Tertiary sites amplify news
|
||||
# Technique T0052: Livestream
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create content/news/opinion web-sites to cross-post stories. Tertiary sites circulate and amplify narratives. Often these sites have no masthead, bylines or attribution.
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0053: Twitter trolls amplify and manipulate
|
||||
# Technique T0053: Social Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use trolls to amplify narratives and/or manipulate narratives. Fake profiles/sockpuppets operating to support individuals/narratives from the entire political spectrum (left/right binary). Operating with increased emphasis on promoting local content and promoting real Twitter users generating their own, often divisive political content, as it's easier to amplify existing content than create new/original content. Trolls operate where ever there's a socially divisive issue (issues that can/are be politicized).
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0054: Twitter bots amplify
|
||||
# Technique T0054: Media Sharing Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use bots to amplify narratives above algorithm thresholds. Bots are automated/programmed profiles designed to amplify content (ie: automatically retweet or like) and give appearance it's more "popular" than it is. They can operate as a network, to function in a coordinated/orchestrated manner. In some cases (more so now) they are an inexpensive/disposable assets used for minimal deployment as bot detection tools improve and platforms are more responsive.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Media sharing networks refer to services whose primary function is the hosting and sharing of specific forms of media. Examples include Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok, Youtube, SoundCloud.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0055: Use hashtag
|
||||
# Technique T0055: Discussion Forums
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use a dedicated hashtag for the incident - either create a campaign/incident specific hashtag, or take over an existing hashtag.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Platforms for finding, discussing, and sharing information and opinions. Examples include Reddit, Quora, Digg, message boards, interest-based discussion forums, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0056: Dedicated channels disseminate information pollution
|
||||
# Technique T0056: Bookmarking and Content Curation
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Output information pollution (e.g. articles on an unreported false story/event) through channels controlled by or related to the incident creator.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Platforms for searching, sharing, and curating content and media. Examples include Pinterest, Flipboard, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0057: Organise remote rallies and events
|
||||
# Technique T0057: Blogging and Publishing Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Examples include WordPress, Blogger, Weebly, Tumblr, Medium, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0058: Legacy web content
|
||||
# Technique T0058: Consumer Review Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Make incident content visible for a long time, e.g. by exploiting platform terms of service, or placing it where it's hard to remove or unlikely to be removed.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Platforms for finding, reviewing, and sharing information about brands, products, services, restaurants, travel destinations, etc. Examples include Yelp, TripAdvisor, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0059: Play the long game
|
||||
# Technique T0059: Online polls
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Play the long game can mean a couple of things:
|
||||
1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold
|
||||
2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create fake online polls, or manipulate existing online polls. Data gathering tactic to target those who engage, and potentially their networks of friends/followers as well
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0060: Continue to amplify
|
||||
# Technique T0060: Formal Diplomatic Channels
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: continue narrative or message amplification after the main incident work has finished
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0061: Sell merchandising
|
||||
# Technique T0061: Traditional Media
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Sell hats, t-shirts, flags and other branded content that's designed to be seen in the real world
|
||||
* **Summary**: Examples include TV, Newspaper, Radio, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0062: Behaviour changes
|
||||
# Technique T0062: Email
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Monitor and evaluate behaviour changes from misinformation incidents.
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA09
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0063: Message reach
|
||||
# Technique T0063: Trial content
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Monitor and evaluate message reach in misinformation incidents.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Iteratively test incident performance (messages, content etc), e.g. A/B test headline/content enagagement metrics; website and/or funding campaign conversion rates
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0064: Social media engagement
|
||||
# Technique T0064: Bait legitimate influencers
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Monitor and evaluate social media engagement in misinformation incidents.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Credibility in a social media environment is often a function of the size of a user's network. "Influencers" are so-called because of their reach, typically understood as: 1) the size of their network (i.e. the number of followers, perhaps weighted by their own influence); and 2) The rate at which their comments are re-circulated (these two metrics are related). Add traditional media players at all levels of credibility and professionalism to this, and the number of potential influencial carriers available for unwitting amplification becomes substantial. By targeting high-influence people and organizations in all types of media with narratives and content engineered to appeal their emotional or ideological drivers, influence campaigns are able to add perceived credibility to their messaging via saturation and adoption by trusted agents such as celebrities, journalists and local leaders.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0065: Use physical broadcast capabilities
|
||||
# Technique T0065: Seed Kernel of truth
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create or coopt broadcast capabilities (e.g. TV, radio etc).
|
||||
* **Summary**: Wrap lies or altered context/facts around truths. Influence campaigns pursue a variety of objectives with respect to target audiences, prominent among them: 1. undermine a narrative commonly referenced in the target audience; or 2. promote a narrative less common in the target audience, but preferred by the attacker. In both cases, the attacker is presented with a heavy lift. They must change the relative importance of various narratives in the interpretation of events, despite contrary tendencies. When messaging makes use of factual reporting to promote these adjustments in the narrative space, they are less likely to be dismissed out of hand; when messaging can juxtapose a (factual) truth about current affairs with the (abstract) truth explicated in these narratives, propagandists can undermine or promote them selectively. Context matters.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA04
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0066: Degrade adversary
|
||||
# Technique T0066: Seed distortions
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Plan to degrade an adversary’s image or ability to act. This could include preparation and use of harmful information about the adversary’s actions or reputation.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Try a wide variety of messages in the early hours surrounding an incident or event, to give a misleading account or impression.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0067: Plan to discredit credible sources
|
||||
# Technique T0067: Use fake experts
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Plan to delegitimize the media landscape and degrade public trust in reporting, by discrediting credible sources. This makes it easier to promote influence operation content.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use the fake experts that were set up during Establish Legitimacy. Pseudo-experts are disposable assets that often appear once and then disappear. Give "credility" to misinformation. Take advantage of credential bias
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0068: Respond to breaking news event
|
||||
# Technique T0068: Use Search Engine Optimization
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Media attention on a story or event is heightened during a breaking news event, where unclear facts and incomplete information increase speculation, rumors, and conspiracy theories, which are all vulnerable to manipulation.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Manipulate content engagement metrics (ie: Reddit & Twitter) to influence/impact news search results (e.g. Google), also elevates RT & Sputnik headline into Google news alert emails. aka "Black-hat SEO"
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0069: Respond to active crisis
|
||||
# Technique T0069: Employ Commercial Analytic Firms
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Panic, rumors, and speculation are heightened during active crises (violent events, natural disasters, public health phenomena, etc); these are all vulnerable to manipulation.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Commercial analytic firms collect data on target audience activities and evaluate the data to detect trends, such as content receiving high click-rates. An influence operation may employ commercial analytic firms to facilitate external collection on its target audience, complicating attribution efforts and better tailoring the content to audience preferences.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA10
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0070: Analyze existing communities
|
||||
# Technique T0070: Deliver Ads
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Assess influence operation potential of existing social media communities, where communities share interests, experiences, politics, or other characteristics that join online users together. Assessment includes the potential use of social group trauma that could be targeted to gain support, using emotional appeals to shared grievances in a set population.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Delivering content via any form of paid media or advertising.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA02
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0071: Find echo chambers
|
||||
# Technique T0071: Post Content
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Find or plan to create areas (social media groups, search term groups, hashtag groups etc) where individuals only engage with people they agree with.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Delivering content by posting via owned media (assets that the operator controls).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0072: Segment audiences
|
||||
# Technique T0072: Comment or Reply on Content
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Create audience segmentations by features of interest to the influence campaign, including political affiliation, geographic location, income, demographics, and psychographics.
|
||||
* **Summary**: Delivering content by replying or commenting via owned media (assets that the operator controls).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0073.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0073.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0073: Attract Traditional Media
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Deliver content by attracting the attention of traditional media (earned media).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA11
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0074.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0074.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0074: Flooding the Information Space
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Flooding and/or mobbing social media channels feeds and/or hashtag with excessive volume of content to control/shape online conversations and/or drown out opposing points of view. Bots and/or patriotic trolls are effective tools to acheive this effect.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0075.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0075.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0075: Amplify Existing Narrative
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: An influence operation may amplify existing narratives that align with its narratives to support operation objectives.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0076.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0076.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0076: Cross-Posting
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Cross-posting refers to posting the same message to multiple internet discussions, social media platforms or accounts, or news groups at one time. An influence operation may post content online in multiple communities and platforms to increase the chances of content exposure to the target audience.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0077.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0077.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0077: Incentivize Sharing
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Incentivizing content sharing refers to actions that encourage users to share content themselves, reducing the need for the operation itself to post and promote its own content.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0078.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0078.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0078: Manipulate Platform Algorithm
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Manipulating a platform algorithm refers to conducting activity on a platform in a way that intentionally targets its underlying algorithm. After analyzing a platform’s algorithm (see: Select Platforms), an influence operation may use a platform in a way that increases its content exposure, avoids content removal, or otherwise benefits the operation’s strategy. For example, an influence operation may use bots to amplify its posts so that the platform’s algorithm recognizes engagement with operation content and further promotes the content on user timelines.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0079.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0079.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0079: Direct Users to Alternative Platforms
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Direct users to alternative platforms refers to encouraging users to move from the platform on which they initially viewed operation content and engage with content on alternate information channels, including separate social media channels and inauthentic websites. An operation may drive users to alternative platforms to diversify its information channels and ensure the target audience knows where to access operation content if the initial platform suspends, flags, or otherwise removes original operation assets and content.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA12
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0080.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0080.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0080: Harass
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Threatening or harassing believers of opposing narratives refers to the use of intimidation techniques, including cyberbullying and doxing, to discourage opponents from voicing their dissent. An influence operation may threaten or harass believers of the opposing narratives to deter individuals from posting or proliferating conflicting content.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0081.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0081.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0081: Censor social media as a political force
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Use political influence or the power of state to stop critical social media comments. Government requested/driven content take downs (see Google Transperancy reports).
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0082.md
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|
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|
|||
# Technique T0082: Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Controling the information environment through offensive cyberspace operations uses cyber tools and techniques to alter the trajectory of content in the information space to either prioritize operation messaging or block opposition messaging.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0083.md
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generated_pages/techniques/T0083.md
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|
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|
|||
# Technique T0083: Suppress Opposition
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0084.md
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generated_pages/techniques/T0084.md
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|
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|
|||
# Technique T0084: Platform Filtering
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Platform filtering refers to the decontextualization of information as claims cross platforms (from Joan Donovan https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/disinformation-design-use-evidence-collages-and-platform-filtering-media-manipulation)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA13
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0085.md
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|
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|
|||
# Technique T0085: Encourage Attendance at Events
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Operation encourages attendance at existing real world event.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0086.md
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generated_pages/techniques/T0086.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0086: Organize Events
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Coordinate and promote real-world events across media platforms, e.g. rallies, protests, gatherings in support of incident narratives.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0087.md
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17
generated_pages/techniques/T0087.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0087: Conduct fundraising
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Fundraising campaigns refer to an influence operation’s systematic effort to seek financial support for a charity, cause, or other enterprise using online activities that further promote operation information pathways while raising a profit. Many influence operations have engaged in crowdfunding services166 on platforms including Tipee, Patreon, and GoFundMe. An operation may use its previously prepared fundraising campaigns to promote operation messaging while raising money to support its activities.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0088.md
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17
generated_pages/techniques/T0088.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0088: Physical Violence
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Physical violence refers to the use of force to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy. An influence operation may conduct or encourage physical violence to discourage opponents from promoting conflicting content or draw attention to operation narratives using shock value.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0089.md
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17
generated_pages/techniques/T0089.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0089: Merchandising/ Advertising
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Merchandising/Advertising refers to getting the message or narrative into physical space in the offline world
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA14
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0090.md
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17
generated_pages/techniques/T0090.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0090: Conceal People
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Conceal the identity or provenance of the account and people assets.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0091.md
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17
generated_pages/techniques/T0091.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0091: Conceal Operational Activity
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0092.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0092.md
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|
|
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|
|||
# Technique T0092: Conceal Infrastructure
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0093.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0093.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0093: Exploit TOS/Content Moderation
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0094.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0094.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0094: Play the long game
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**: Play the long game refers to two phenomena: 1. To plan messaging and allow it to grow organically without conducting your own amplification. This is methodical and slow and requires years for the message to take hold 2. To develop a series of seemingly disconnected messaging narratives that eventually combine into a new narrative.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA15
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0095.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0095.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0095: Measure Performance
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0096.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0096.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0096: Measure Effectiveness
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0097.md
Normal file
17
generated_pages/techniques/T0097.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
# Technique T0097: Measure Effectiveness Indicators (or KPIs)
|
||||
|
||||
* **Summary**:
|
||||
|
||||
* **Belongs to tactic stage**: TA16
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Incident | Descriptions given for this incident |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
| Counters | Response types |
|
||||
| -------- | -------------- |
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DO NOT EDIT ABOVE THIS LINE - PLEASE ADD NOTES BELOW
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue