diff --git a/04-Goals-and-Ideology/04-Goals-and-Ideology.md b/04-Goals-and-Ideology/04-Goals-and-Ideology.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c486ddb --- /dev/null +++ b/04-Goals-and-Ideology/04-Goals-and-Ideology.md @@ -0,0 +1,604 @@ +4. Goals and Ideology -- Privacy, Freedom, New Approaches + + 4.1. copyright + THE CYPHERNOMICON: Cypherpunks FAQ and More, Version 0.666, + 1994-09-10, Copyright Timothy C. May. All rights reserved. + See the detailed disclaimer. Use short sections under "fair + use" provisions, with appropriate credit, but don't put your + name on my words. + + 4.2. SUMMARY: Goals and Ideology -- Privacy, Freedom, New Approaches + 4.2.1. Main Points + 4.2.2. Connections to Other Sections + - Crypto Anarchy is the logical outgrowth of strong crypto. + 4.2.3. Where to Find Additional Information + - Vernor Vinge's "True Names" + - David Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom" + 4.2.4. Miscellaneous Comments + - Most of the list members are libertarians, or leaning in + that direction, so the bias toward this is apparent. + - (If there's a coherent _non_-libertarian ideology, that's + also consistent with supporting strong crypto, I'm not sure + it's been presented.) + + 4.3. Why a Statement of Ideology? + 4.3.1. This is perhaps a controversial area. So why include it? The + main reason is to provide some grounding for the later + comments on many issues. + 4.3.2. People should not expect a uniform ideology on this list. + Some of us are anarcho-capitalist radicals (or "crypto + anarchists"), others of us are staid Republicans, and still + others are Wobblies and other assored leftists. + + 4.4. "Welcome to Cypherpunks" + 4.4.1. This is the message each new subscriber to the Cypherpunks + lists gets, by Eric Hughes: + 4.4.2. "Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there + were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want + privacy must create it for themselves and not expect + governments, corporations, or other large, faceless + organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. + Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own + privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, + and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other + people from speaking about their experiences or their + opinions. + + "The most important means to the defense of privacy is + encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. + But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too + much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people + desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. + + "Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. + Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement + it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that + cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks + know how to attack a system and how to defend it. + Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good + cryptosystems. + + "Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public + key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and + pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play + with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications + of all kinds. + + "Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write + code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're + going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that + their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. + Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and + are patient with incremental progress. + + "Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they + write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. + Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut + down. + + "Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy." [Eric + Hughes, 1993-07-21 version] + + 4.5. "Cypherpunks Write Code" + 4.5.1. "Cypherpunks write code" is almost our mantra. + 4.5.2. This has come to be a defining statement. Eric Hughes used it + to mean that Cypherpunks place more importance in actually + changing things, in actually getting working code out, than + in merely talking about how things "ought" to be. + - Eric Hughes statement needed here: + - Karl Kleinpaste, author of one of the early anonymous + posting services (Charcoal) said this about some proposal + made: "If you've got serious plans for how to implement + such a thing, please implement it at least skeletally and + deploy it. Proof by example, watching such a system in + action, is far better than pontification about it." + [Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu, news.admin.policy, 1994-06-30] + 4.5.3. "The admonition, "Cypherpunks write code," should be taken + metaphorically. I think "to write code" means to take + unilateral effective action as an individual. That may mean + writing actual code, but it could also mean dumpster diving + at Mycrotronx and anonymously releasing the recovered + information. It could also mean creating an offshore digital + bank. Don't get too literal on us here. What is important + is that Cypherpunks take personal responsibility for + empowering themselves against threats to privacy." [Sandy + Sandfort, 1994-07-08] + 4.5.4. A Cypherpunks outlook: taking the abstractions of academic + conferences and making them concrete + - One thing Eric Hughes and I discussed at length (for 3 days + of nearly nonstop talk, in May, 1992) was the glacial rate + of progress in converting the cryptographic primitive + operations of the academic crypto conferences into actual, + workable code. The basic RSA algorithm was by then barely + available, more than 15 years after invention. (This was + before PGP 2.0, and PGP 1.0 was barely available and was + disappointing, with RSA Data Security's various products in + limited niches.) All the neat stuff on digital cash, DC- + Nets, bit commitment, olivioius transfer, digital mixes, + and so on, was completely absent, in terms of avialable + code or "crypto ICs" (to borrow Brad Cox's phrase). If it + took 10-15 years for RSA to really appear in the real + world, how long would it take some of the exciting stuff to + get out? + - We thought it would be a neat idea to find ways to reify + these things, to get actual running code. As it happened, + PGP 2.0 appeared the week of our very first meeting, and + both the Kleinpaste/Julf and Cypherpunks remailers were + quick, if incomplete, implementations of David Chaum's 1981 + "digital mixes." (Right on schedule, 11 years later.) + - Sadly, most of the abstractions of cryptology remain + residents of academic space, with no (available) + implementations in the real world. (To be sure, I suspect + many people have cobbled-together versions of many of these + things, in C code, whatever. But their work is more like + building sand castles, to be lost when they graduate or + move on to other projects. This is of course not a problem + unique to cryptology.) + - Today, various toolkits and libraries are under + development. Henry Strickland (Strick) is working on a + toolkit based on John Ousterhout's "TCL" system (for Unix), + and of course RSADSI provides RSAREF. Pr0duct Cypher has + "PGP Tools." Other projects are underway. (My own longterm + interest here is in building objects which act as the + cryptography papers would have them act...building block + objects. For this, I'm looking at Smalltalk of some + flavor.) + - It is still the case that most of the modern crypto papers + discuss theoretical abstractions that are _not even close_ + to being implemented as reusable, robust objects or + routines. Closing the gap between theoretical papers and + practical realization is a major Cypherpunk emphasis. + 4.5.5. Prototypes, even if fatally flawed, allow for evolutionary + learning and improvement. Think of it as engineering in + action. + + 4.6. Technological empowerment + 4.6.1. (more needed here....) + 4.6.2. As Sandy Sandfort notes, "The real point of Cypherpunks is + that it's better to use strong crypto than weak crypto or no + crypto at all. Our use of crypto doesn't have to be totally + bullet proof to be of value. Let *them* worry about the + technicalities while we make sure they have to work harder + and pay more for our encrypted info than they would if it + were in plaintext." [S.S. 1994-07-01] + + 4.7. Free Speech Issues + 4.7.1. Speech + - "Public speech is not a series of public speeches, but + rather one's own + words spoken openly and without shame....I desire a society + where all may speak freely about whatever topic they will. + I desire that all people might be able to choose to whom + they wish to speak and to whom they do not wish to speak. + I desire a society where all people may have an assurance + that their words are directed only at those to whom they + wish. Therefore I oppose all efforts by governments to + eavesdrop and to become unwanted listeners." [Eric Hughes, + 1994-02-22] + - "The government has no right to restrict my use of + cryptography in any way. They may not forbid me to use + whatever ciphers I may like, nor may they require me to use + any that I do not like." [Eric Hughes, 1993-06-01] + 4.7.2. "Should there be _any_ limits whatsoever on a person's use of + cryptography?" + - No. Using the mathematics of cryptography is merely the + manipulation of symbols. No crime is involved, ipso facto. + - Also, as Eric Hughes has pointed out, this is another of + those questions where the normative "should" or "shouldn't" + invokes "the policeman inside." A better way to look at is + to see what steps people can take to make any question of + "should" this be allowed just moot. + - The "crimes" are actual physical acts like murder and + kidnapping. The fact that crypto may be used by plotters + and planners, thus making detection more difficult, is in + no way different from the possibility that plotters may + speak in an unusual language to each other (ciphers), or + meet in a private home (security), or speak in a soft voice + when in public (steganography). None of these things should + be illegal, and *none of them would be enforceable* except + in the most rigid of police states (and probably not even + there). + - "Crypto is thoughtcrime" is the effect of restricting + cryptography use. + 4.7.3. Democracy and censorship + - Does a community have the right to decide what newsgroups + or magazines it allows in its community? Does a nation have + the right to do the same? (Tennessee, Iraq, Iran, France. + Utah?) + - This is what bypasses with crypto are all about: taking + these majoritarian morality decisions out of the hands of + the bluenoses. Direct action to secure freedoms. + + 4.8. Privacy Issues + 4.8.1. "Is there an agenda here beyond just ensuring privacy?" + - Definitely! I think I can safely say that for nearly all + political persuasions on the Cypherpunks list. Left, right, + libertarian, or anarchist, there's much more to to strong + crypto than simple privacy. Privacy qua privacy is fairly + uninteresting. If all one wants is privacy, one can simply + keep to one's self, stay off high-visibility lists like + this, and generally stay out of trouble. + - Many of us see strong crypto as the key enabling technology + for a new economic and social system, a system which will + develop as cyberspace becomes more important. A system + which dispenses with national boundaries, which is based on + voluntary (even if anonymous) free trade. At issue is the + end of governments as we know them today. (Look at + interactions on the Net--on this list, for example--and + you'll see many so-called nationalities, voluntary + interaction, and the almost complete absence of any "laws." + Aside from their being almost no rules per se for the + Cypherpunks list, there are essentially no national laws + that are invokable in any way. This is a fast-growing + trend.) + + Motivations for Cypherpunks + - Privacy. If maintaining privacy is the main goal, there's + not much more to say. Keep a low profile, protect data, + avoid giving out personal information, limit the number + of bank loans and credit applications, pay cash often, + etc. + - Privacy in activism. + + New Structures. Using cryptographic constructs to build + new political, economic, and even social structures. + - Political: Voting, polling, information access, + whistleblowing + - Economic: Free markets, information markets, increased + liquidity, black markets + - Social: Cyberspatial communities, True Names + - Publically inspectable algorithms always win out over + private, secret algorithms + 4.8.2. "What is the American attitude toward privacy and + encryption?" + + There are two distinct (and perhaps simultaneously held) + views that have long been found in the American psyche: + - "A man's home is his castle." "Mind your own business." + The frontier and Calvinist sprit of keeping one's + business to one's self. + - "What have you got to hide?" The nosiness of busybodies, + gossiping about what others are doing, and being + suspicious of those who try too hard to hide what they + are doing. + + The American attitude currently seems to favor privacy over + police powers, as evidenced by a Time-CNN poll: + - "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last + week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more + important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to + preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When + informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed + it." [Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys," + _TIME_, 1994-03-04.] + - The answer given is clearly a function of how the question + is phrased. Ask folks if they favor "unbreakable + encryption" or "fortress capabilities" for terrorists, + pedophiles, and other malefactors, and they'll likely give + a quite different answer. It is this tack now being taken + by the Clipper folks. Watch out for this! + - Me, I have no doubts. + - As Perry Metzger puts it, "I find the recent disclosures + concerning U.S. Government testing of the effects of + radiation on unknowing human subjects to be yet more + evidence that you simply cannot trust the government with + your own personal safety. Some people, given positions of + power, will naturally abuse those positions, often even if + such abuse could cause severe injury or death. I see little + reason, therefore, to simply "trust" the U.S. government -- + and given that the U.S. government is about as good as they + get, its obvious that NO government deserves the blind + trust of its citizens. "Trust us, we will protect you" + rings quite hollow in the face of historical evidence. + Citizens must protect and preserve their own privacy -- the + government and its centralized cryptographic schemes + emphatically cannot be trusted." [P.M., 1994-01-01] + 4.8.3. "How is 1994 like 1984?" + - The television ad for Clipper: "Clipper--why 1994 _will_ be + like 1984" + + As Mike Ingle puts it: + - 1994: Wiretapping is privacy + Secrecy is openness + Obscurity is security + 4.8.4. "We anticipate that computer networks will play a more and + more important role in many parts of our lives. But this + increased computerization brings tremendous dangers for + infringing privacy. Cypherpunks seek to put into place + structures which will allow people to preserve their privacy + if they choose. No one will be forced to use pseudonyms or + post anonymously. But it should be a matter of choice how + much information a person chooses to reveal about himself + when he communicates. Right now, the nets don't give you + that much choice. We are trying to give this power to + people." [Hal Finney, 1993-02-23] + 4.8.5. "If cypherpunks contribute nothing else we can create a real + privacy advocacy group, advocating means of real self- + empowerment, from crypto to nom de guerre credit cards, + instead of advocating further invasions of our privacy as the + so-called privacy advocates are now doing!" [Jim Hart, 1994- + 09-08] + + 4.9. Education Issues + 4.9.1. "How can we get more people to use crypto?" + - telling them about the themes of Cypherpunks + - surveillance, wiretapping, Digital Telephony, Clipper, NSA, + FinCEN, etc....these things tend to scare a lot of folks + - making PGP easier to use, better integration with mailers, + etc. + - (To be frank, convincing others to protect themselves is + not one of my highest priorities. Then why have I written + this megabyte-plus FAQ? Good question. Getting more users + is a general win, for obvious reasons.) + 4.9.2. "Who needs to encrypt?" + + Corporations + - competitors...fax transmissions + + foreign governments + - Chobetsu, GCHQ, SDECE, Mossad, KGB + + their own government + - NSA intercepts of plans, investments + + Activist Groups + - Aryan Nation needs to encrypt, as FBI has announced their + intent to infiltrate and subvert this group + - RU-486 networks + - Amnesty International + + Terrorists and Drug Dealers + - clearly are clueless at times (Pablo Escobar using a + cellphone!) + - Triads, Russian Mafia, many are becoming crypto-literate + - (I've been appoached-'nuff said) + + Doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, etc. + - to preserve records against theft, snooping, casual + examination, etc. + - in many cases, a legal obligation has been attached to + this (notably, medical records) + - the curious situation that many people are essentially + _required_ to encrypt (no other way to ensure standards + are met) and yet various laws exists to limit + encryption...ITAR, Clipper, EES + - (Clipper is a partial answer, if unsatisfactory) + 4.9.3. "When should crypto be used?" + - It's an economic matter. Each person has to decide when to + use it, and how. Me, I dislike having to download messages + to my home machine before I can read them. Others use it + routinely. + + 4.10. Libertarian Issues + 4.10.1. A technological approach to freedom and privacy: + - "Freedom is, practically, given as much (or more) by the + tools we can build to protect it, as it is by our ability + to convince others who violently disagree with us not to + attack us. On the Internet we have tools like anon + remailers and PGP that give us a great deal of freedom + from coercion even in the midst of censors. Thus, these + tools piss off fans of centralized information control, the + defenders of the status quo, like nothing else on the + Internet." [ (Nobody), libtech- + l@netcom.com, 1994-06-08] + + Duncan Frissell, as usual, put it cogently: + - "If I withhold my capital from some country or enterprise + I am not threatening to kill anyone. When a "Democratic + State" decides to do something, it does so with armed + men. If you don't obey, they tend to shoot....[I]f + technological change enhances the powers of individuals, + their power is enhanced no matter what the government + does. + + "If the collective is weakened and the individual + strengthened by the fact that I have the power of cheap + guns, cars, computers, telecoms, and crypto then the + collective has been weakened and we should ease the + transition to a society based on voluntary rather than + coerced interaction. + + "Unless you can figure out a new, improved way of + controlling others; you have no choice." [D.F., Decline + and Fall, 1994-06-19] + 4.10.2. "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little + temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." + [Benjamin Franklin] + 4.10.3. a typical view of government + - "As I see it, it's always a home for bullies masquerading + as a collective defense. Sometimes it actually it actually + has to perform its advertised defense function. Like naked + quarks, + purely defensive governments cannot exist. They are + bipolar by nature, with some poles (i.e., the bullying + part) being "more equal than others." [Sandy Sandfort, 1994- + 09-06] + 4.10.4. Sadly, several of our speculative scenarios for various laws + have come to pass. Even several of my own, such as: + - "(Yet Another May Prediction Realized)...The text of a + "digital stalking bill" was just sent to Cyberia-l." [L. + Todd Masco, 1994-08-31] (This was a joking prediction I + made that "digital stalking" would soon be a crime; there + had been news articles about the horrors of such + cyberspatial stalkings, regardless of there being no real + physical threats, so this move is not all that surprising. + Not surprising in an age when free speech gets outlawed as + "assault speech.") + 4.10.5. "Don't tread on me." + 4.10.6. However, it's easy to get too negative on the situation, to + assume that a socialist state is right around the corner. Or + that a new Hitler will come to power. These are unlikely + developments, and not only because of strong crypto. + Financial markets are putting constraints on how fascist a + government can get...the international bond markets, for + example, will quickly react to signs like this. (This is the + theory, at least.) + 4.10.7. Locality of reference, cash, TANSTAAFL, privacy + - closure, local computation, local benefits + - no accounting system needed + - markets clear + - market distortions like rationing, coupons, quotas, all + require centralized record-keeping + - anything that ties economic transactions to identity + (rationing, entitlements, insurance) implies identity- + tracking, credentials, etc. + + Nonlocality also dramatically increases the opportunities + for fraud, for scams and con jobs + - because something is being promised for future delivery + (the essence of many scams) and is not verifiable locally + - because "trust" is invoked + - Locality also fixes the "policeman inside" problem: the + costs of decisions are borne by the decider, not by others. + + 4.11. Crypto Anarchy + 4.11.1. The Crypto Anarchy Principle: Strong crypto permits + unbreakable encrypion, unforgeable signatures, untraceable + electronic messages, and unlinkable pseudonomous identities. + This ensures that some transactions and communications can be + entered into only voluntarily. External force, law, and + regulation cannot be applied. This is "anarchy," in the sense + of no outside rulers and laws. Voluntary arrangements, back- + stopped by voluntarily-arranged institutions like escrow + services, will be the only form of rule. This is "crypto + anarchy." + 4.11.2. crypto allows a return to contracts that governments cannot + breach + - based on reputation, repeat business + - example: ordering illegal material untraceably and + anonymously,,,governments are powerless to do anything + - private spaces, with the privacy enforced via cryptographic + permissions (access credentials) + - escrows (bonds) + 4.11.3. Technological solutions over legalistic regulations + + Marc Ringuette summarized things nicely: + - "What we're after is some "community standards" for + cyberspace, and what I'm suggesting is the fairly + libertarian standard that goes like this: + + " Prefer technological solutions and self-protection + solutions + over rule-making, where they are feasible. + + "This is based on the notion that the more rules there + are, the more people will call for the "net police" to + enforce them. If we can encourage community standards + which emphasize a prudent level of self-protection, then + we'll be able to make do with fewer rules and a less + intrusive level of policing."[Marc Ringuette, 1993-03-14] + + Hal Finney has made cogent arguments as to why we should + not become too complacent about the role of technology vis- + a-vis politics. He warns us not to grow to confident: + - "Fundamentally, I believe we will have the kind of + society that most people want. If we want freedom and + privacy, we must persuade others that these are worth + having. There are no shortcuts. Withdrawing into + technology is like pulling the blankets over your head. + It feels good for a while, until reality catches up. The + next Clipper or Digital Telephony proposal will provide a + rude awakening." [Hal Finney, POLI: Politics vs + Technology, 1994-01-02] + - "The idea here is that the ultimate solution to the low + signal-to-noise ratio on the nets is not a matter of + forcing people to "stand behind their words". People can + stand behind all kinds of idiotic ideas. Rather, there + will need to be developed better systems for filtering news + and mail, for developing "digital reputations" which can be + stamped on one's postings to pass through these smart + filters, and even applying these reputations to pseudonyms. + In such a system, the fact that someone is posting or + mailing pseudonymously is not a problem, since nuisance + posters won't be able to get through." [Hal Finney, 1993- + 02-23] + 4.11.4. Reputations + 4.11.5. I have a moral outlook that many will find unacceptable or + repugnant. To cut to the chase: I support the killing of + those who break contracts, who steal in serious enough ways, + and who otherwise commit what I think of as crimes. + + I don't mean this abstractly. Here's an example: + - Someone is carrying drugs. He knows what he's involved + in. He knows that theft is punishable by death. And yet + he steals some of the merchandise. + - Dealers understand that they cannot tolerate this, that + an example must be made, else all of their employees will + steal. + - Understand that I'm not talking about the state doing the + killing, nor would I do the killing. I'm just saying such + things are the natural enforcement mechanism for such + markets. Realpolitik. + - (A meta point: the drug laws makes things this way. + Legalize all drugs and the businesses would be more like + "ordinary" businesses.) + - In my highly personal opinion, many people, including most + Congressrodents, have committed crimes that earn them the + death penalty; I will not be sorry to see anonymous + assassination markets used to deal with them. + 4.11.6. Increased espionage will help to destroy nation-state-empires + like the U.S., which has gotten far too bloated and far too + dependent on throwing its weight around; nuclear "terrorism" + may knock out a few cities, but this may be a small price to + pay to undermine totally the socialist welfare states that + have launched so many wars this century. + + 4.12. Loose Ends + 4.12.1. "Why take a "no compromise" stance?" + - Compromise often ends up in the death of a thousand cuts. + Better to just take a rejectionist stance. + - The National Rifle Association (NRA) learned this lesson + the hard way. EFF may eventually learn it; right now they + appear to be in the "coopted by the power center" mode, + luxuriating in their inside-the-Beltway access to the Veep, + their flights on Air Force One, and their general + schmoozing with the movers and shakers...getting along by + going along. + - Let's not compromise on basic issues. Treat censorship as a + problem to be routed around (as John Gilmore suggests), not + as something that needs to be compromised on. (This is + directed at rumblings about how the Net needs to "police + itself," by the "reasonable" censorship of offensive posts, + by the "moderation" of newsgroups, etc. What should concern + us is the accomodation of this view by well-meaning civil + liberties groups, which are apparently willing to play a + role in this "self-policing" system. No thanks.) + - (And since people often misunderstand this point, I'm not + saying private companies can't set whatever policies they + wish, that moderated newsgroups can't be formed, etc. + Private arrangements are just that. The issue is when + censorship is forced on those who have no other + obligations. Government usually does this, often aided and + abetted by corporations and lobbying groups. This is what + we need to fight. Fight by routing around, via technology.) + 4.12.2. The inherent evils of democracy + - To be blunt about it, I've come to despise the modern + version of democracy we have. Every issue is framed in + terms of popular sentiment, in terms of how the public + would vote. Mob rule at its worst. + - Should people be allowed to wear blue jeans? Put it to a + vote. Can employers have a policy on blue jeans? Pass a + law. Should health care be provided to all? Put it to a + vote. And so on, whittling away basic freedoms and rights. + A travesty. The tyranny of the majority. + - De Toqueville warned of this when he said that the American + experiment in democracy would last only until citizens + discovered they could pick the pockets of their neighbors + at the ballot box. + - But maybe we can stop this nonsense. I support strong + crypto (and its eventual form, crypto anarchy) because it + undermines this form of democracy. It takes some (and + perhaps many) transactions out of the realm of popularity + contests, beyond the reach of will of the herd. (No, I am + not arguing there will be a complete phase change. As the + saying goes, "You can't eat cyberspace." But a lot of + consulting, technical work, programming, etc., can in fact + be done with crypto anarchic methods, with the money gained + transferred in a variety of ways into the "real world." + More on this elsewhere.) + + Crypto anarchy effectively allows people to pick and choose + which laws they support, at least in cyberspatial contexts. + It empowers people to break the local bonds of their + majoritarian normative systems and decide for themselves + which laws are moral and which are bullshit. + - I happen to have faith that most people will settle on a + relatively small number of laws that they'll (mostly) + support, a kind of Schelling point in legal space. + 4.12.3. "Is the Cypherpunks agenda _too extreme_?" + - Bear in mind that most of the "Cypherpunks agenda," to the + extent we can identify it, is likely to provoke ordinary + citizens into _outrage_. Talk of anonymous mail, digital + money, money laundering, information markets, data havens, + undermining authority, transnationalism, and all the rest + (insert your favorite idea) is not exactly mainstream. + 4.12.4. "Crypto Anarchy sounds too wild for me." + - I accept that many people will find the implications of + crypto anarchy (which follows in turn from the existence of + strong cryptography, via the Crypto Anarchy Principle) to + be more than they can accept. + - This is OK (not that you need my OK!). The house of + Cypherpunks has many rooms.