mirror of
https://git.anonymousland.org/anonymousland/synapse-product.git
synced 2024-10-01 08:25:44 -04:00
aec294ee0d
slots use less memory (and attribute access is faster) while slightly limiting the flexibility of the class attributes. This focuses on objects which are instantiated "often" and for short periods of time.
1282 lines
49 KiB
Python
1282 lines
49 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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import inspect
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import logging
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import time
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import unicodedata
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import urllib.parse
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from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple, Union
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import attr
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import bcrypt # type: ignore[import]
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import pymacaroons
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from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
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from synapse.api.errors import (
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AuthError,
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Codes,
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError,
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LoginError,
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StoreError,
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SynapseError,
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UserDeactivatedError,
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)
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from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter
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from synapse.handlers.ui_auth import INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS
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from synapse.handlers.ui_auth.checkers import UserInteractiveAuthChecker
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from synapse.http.server import finish_request, respond_with_html
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from synapse.http.site import SynapseRequest
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from synapse.logging.context import defer_to_thread
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from synapse.metrics.background_process_metrics import run_as_background_process
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from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
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from synapse.types import JsonDict, Requester, UserID
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from synapse.util import stringutils as stringutils
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from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
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from synapse.util.threepids import canonicalise_email
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from ._base import BaseHandler
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def convert_client_dict_legacy_fields_to_identifier(
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submission: JsonDict,
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) -> Dict[str, str]:
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"""
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Convert a legacy-formatted login submission to an identifier dict.
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Legacy login submissions (used in both login and user-interactive authentication)
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provide user-identifying information at the top-level instead.
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These are now deprecated and replaced with identifiers:
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https://matrix.org/docs/spec/client_server/r0.6.1#identifier-types
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Args:
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submission: The client dict to convert
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Returns:
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The matching identifier dict
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Raises:
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SynapseError: If the format of the client dict is invalid
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"""
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identifier = submission.get("identifier", {})
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# Generate an m.id.user identifier if "user" parameter is present
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user = submission.get("user")
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if user:
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identifier = {"type": "m.id.user", "user": user}
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# Generate an m.id.thirdparty identifier if "medium" and "address" parameters are present
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medium = submission.get("medium")
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address = submission.get("address")
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if medium and address:
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identifier = {
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"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
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"medium": medium,
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"address": address,
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}
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# We've converted valid, legacy login submissions to an identifier. If the
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# submission still doesn't have an identifier, it's invalid
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if not identifier:
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raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid login submission", Codes.INVALID_PARAM)
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# Ensure the identifier has a type
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if "type" not in identifier:
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raise SynapseError(
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400, "'identifier' dict has no key 'type'", errcode=Codes.MISSING_PARAM,
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)
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return identifier
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def login_id_phone_to_thirdparty(identifier: JsonDict) -> Dict[str, str]:
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"""
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Convert a phone login identifier type to a generic threepid identifier.
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Args:
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identifier: Login identifier dict of type 'm.id.phone'
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Returns:
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An equivalent m.id.thirdparty identifier dict
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"""
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if "country" not in identifier or (
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# The specification requires a "phone" field, while Synapse used to require a "number"
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# field. Accept both for backwards compatibility.
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"phone" not in identifier
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and "number" not in identifier
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):
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raise SynapseError(
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400, "Invalid phone-type identifier", errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM
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)
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# Accept both "phone" and "number" as valid keys in m.id.phone
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phone_number = identifier.get("phone", identifier["number"])
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# Convert user-provided phone number to a consistent representation
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msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(identifier["country"], phone_number)
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return {
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"type": "m.id.thirdparty",
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"medium": "msisdn",
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"address": msisdn,
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}
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class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
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SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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def __init__(self, hs):
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"""
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Args:
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hs (synapse.server.HomeServer):
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"""
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super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs)
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self.checkers = {} # type: Dict[str, UserInteractiveAuthChecker]
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for auth_checker_class in INTERACTIVE_AUTH_CHECKERS:
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inst = auth_checker_class(hs)
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if inst.is_enabled():
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self.checkers[inst.AUTH_TYPE] = inst # type: ignore
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self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
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account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self)
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self.password_providers = [
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module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler)
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for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
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]
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logger.info("Extra password_providers: %r", self.password_providers)
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self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
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self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
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self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled
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self._sso_enabled = (
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hs.config.cas_enabled or hs.config.saml2_enabled or hs.config.oidc_enabled
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)
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# we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can
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# keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first
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# type in the list. (NB that the spec doesn't require us to do so and
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# clients which favour types that they don't understand over those that
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# they do are technically broken)
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login_types = []
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if self._password_enabled:
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login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD)
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for provider in self.password_providers:
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if hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types"):
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for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
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if t not in login_types:
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login_types.append(t)
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self._supported_login_types = login_types
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# Login types and UI Auth types have a heavy overlap, but are not
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# necessarily identical. Login types have SSO (and other login types)
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# added in the rest layer, see synapse.rest.client.v1.login.LoginRestServerlet.on_GET.
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ui_auth_types = login_types.copy()
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if self._sso_enabled:
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ui_auth_types.append(LoginType.SSO)
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self._supported_ui_auth_types = ui_auth_types
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# Ratelimiter for failed auth during UIA. Uses same ratelimit config
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# as per `rc_login.failed_attempts`.
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter(
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clock=self.clock,
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rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
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burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
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)
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self._clock = self.hs.get_clock()
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# Expire old UI auth sessions after a period of time.
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if hs.config.worker_app is None:
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self._clock.looping_call(
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run_as_background_process,
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5 * 60 * 1000,
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"expire_old_sessions",
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self._expire_old_sessions,
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)
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# Load the SSO HTML templates.
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# The following template is shown to the user during a client login via SSO,
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# after the SSO completes and before redirecting them back to their client.
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# It notifies the user they are about to give access to their matrix account
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# to the client.
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self._sso_redirect_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_redirect_confirm_template
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# The following template is shown during user interactive authentication
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# in the fallback auth scenario. It notifies the user that they are
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# authenticating for an operation to occur on their account.
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self._sso_auth_confirm_template = hs.config.sso_auth_confirm_template
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# The following template is shown after a successful user interactive
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# authentication session. It tells the user they can close the window.
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self._sso_auth_success_template = hs.config.sso_auth_success_template
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# The following template is shown during the SSO authentication process if
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# the account is deactivated.
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self._sso_account_deactivated_template = (
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hs.config.sso_account_deactivated_template
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)
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self._server_name = hs.config.server_name
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# cast to tuple for use with str.startswith
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self._whitelisted_sso_clients = tuple(hs.config.sso_client_whitelist)
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async def validate_user_via_ui_auth(
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self,
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requester: Requester,
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request: SynapseRequest,
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request_body: Dict[str, Any],
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clientip: str,
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description: str,
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) -> Tuple[dict, str]:
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"""
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Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
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This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where
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the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check
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that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
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Args:
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requester: The user, as given by the access token
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request: The request sent by the client.
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request_body: The body of the request sent by the client
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clientip: The IP address of the client.
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description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
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describes the operation happening on their account.
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Returns:
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A tuple of (params, session_id).
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'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
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have been given only in a previous call).
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'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
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client or assigned by this call
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Raises:
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
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any of the permitted login flows
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AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives
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a different user to `requester`
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LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's failed request count for this
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user is too high to proceed
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"""
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user_id = requester.user.to_string()
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# Check if we should be ratelimited due to too many previous failed attempts
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(user_id, update=False)
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# build a list of supported flows
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flows = [[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types]
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try:
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result, params, session_id = await self.check_ui_auth(
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flows, request, request_body, clientip, description
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)
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except LoginError:
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# Update the ratelimiter to say we failed (`can_do_action` doesn't raise).
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self._failed_uia_attempts_ratelimiter.can_do_action(user_id)
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raise
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# find the completed login type
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for login_type in self._supported_ui_auth_types:
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if login_type not in result:
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continue
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user_id = result[login_type]
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break
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else:
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# this can't happen
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raise Exception("check_auth returned True but no successful login type")
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# check that the UI auth matched the access token
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if user_id != requester.user.to_string():
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raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth")
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return params, session_id
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def get_enabled_auth_types(self):
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"""Return the enabled user-interactive authentication types
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Returns the UI-Auth types which are supported by the homeserver's current
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config.
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"""
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return self.checkers.keys()
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async def check_ui_auth(
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self,
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flows: List[List[str]],
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request: SynapseRequest,
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clientdict: Dict[str, Any],
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clientip: str,
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description: str,
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) -> Tuple[dict, dict, str]:
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"""
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Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
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protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
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If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use
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synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a
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decorator.
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Args:
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flows: A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
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strings representing auth-types. At least one full
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flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
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request: The request sent by the client.
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clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
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'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
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clientip: The IP address of the client.
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description: A human readable string to be displayed to the user that
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describes the operation happening on their account.
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Returns:
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A tuple of (creds, params, session_id).
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'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
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'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
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have been given only in a previous call).
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'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
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client or assigned by this call
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Raises:
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InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
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all the stages in any of the permitted flows.
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"""
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authdict = None
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sid = None # type: Optional[str]
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if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
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authdict = clientdict["auth"]
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del clientdict["auth"]
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if "session" in authdict:
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sid = authdict["session"]
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# Convert the URI and method to strings.
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uri = request.uri.decode("utf-8")
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method = request.method.decode("utf-8")
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# If there's no session ID, create a new session.
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if not sid:
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session = await self.store.create_ui_auth_session(
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clientdict, uri, method, description
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)
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else:
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try:
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session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(sid)
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except StoreError:
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raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (sid,))
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# If the client provides parameters, update what is persisted,
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# otherwise use whatever was last provided.
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#
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# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
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# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
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# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
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# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
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# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
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# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
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# on a homeserver.
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#
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# Revisit: Assuming the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
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# isn't arbitrary.
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#
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# Note that the registration endpoint explicitly removes the
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# "initial_device_display_name" parameter if it is provided
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# without a "password" parameter. See the changes to
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# synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha.register.RegisterRestServlet.on_POST
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# in commit 544722bad23fc31056b9240189c3cbbbf0ffd3f9.
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if not clientdict:
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clientdict = session.clientdict
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# Ensure that the queried operation does not vary between stages of
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# the UI authentication session. This is done by generating a stable
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# comparator and storing it during the initial query. Subsequent
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# queries ensure that this comparator has not changed.
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#
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# The comparator is based on the requested URI and HTTP method. The
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# client dict (minus the auth dict) should also be checked, but some
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# clients are not spec compliant, just warn for now if the client
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# dict changes.
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if (session.uri, session.method) != (uri, method):
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raise SynapseError(
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403,
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"Requested operation has changed during the UI authentication session.",
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)
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if session.clientdict != clientdict:
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logger.warning(
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"Requested operation has changed during the UI "
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"authentication session. A future version of Synapse "
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"will remove this capability."
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)
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# For backwards compatibility, changes to the client dict are
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# persisted as clients modify them throughout their user interactive
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# authentication flow.
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await self.store.set_ui_auth_clientdict(sid, clientdict)
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user_agent = request.requestHeaders.getRawHeaders(b"User-Agent", default=[b""])[
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0
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].decode("ascii", "surrogateescape")
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await self.store.add_user_agent_ip_to_ui_auth_session(
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session.session_id, user_agent, clientip
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)
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if not authdict:
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raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
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session.session_id, self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
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)
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# check auth type currently being presented
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errordict = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
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if "type" in authdict:
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login_type = authdict["type"] # type: str
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try:
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result = await self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
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if result:
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await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
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session.session_id, login_type, result
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)
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except LoginError as e:
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if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY:
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# riot used to have a bug where it would request a new
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# validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it
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# got a 401 with a 'flows' field.
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# (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447).
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#
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# Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid
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# breaking old riot deployments.
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raise
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# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
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# so that the client can have another go.
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errordict = e.error_dict()
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creds = await self.store.get_completed_ui_auth_stages(session.session_id)
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for f in flows:
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if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0:
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# it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can
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# include the password in the case of registering, so only log
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# the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password
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# param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth
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# and is not sensitive).
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logger.info(
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"Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r",
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creds,
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list(clientdict),
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)
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return creds, clientdict, session.session_id
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ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session.session_id)
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ret["completed"] = list(creds)
|
|
ret.update(errordict)
|
|
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(session.session_id, ret)
|
|
|
|
async def add_oob_auth(
|
|
self, stagetype: str, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""
|
|
Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
|
|
session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
|
|
"""
|
|
if stagetype not in self.checkers:
|
|
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
|
|
if "session" not in authdict:
|
|
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
|
|
|
|
result = await self.checkers[stagetype].check_auth(authdict, clientip)
|
|
if result:
|
|
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
|
|
authdict["session"], stagetype, result
|
|
)
|
|
return True
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
def get_session_id(self, clientdict: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""
|
|
Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
|
|
not send a session ID, returns None.
|
|
"""
|
|
sid = None
|
|
if clientdict and "auth" in clientdict:
|
|
authdict = clientdict["auth"]
|
|
if "session" in authdict:
|
|
sid = authdict["session"]
|
|
return sid
|
|
|
|
async def set_session_data(self, session_id: str, key: str, value: Any) -> None:
|
|
"""
|
|
Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
|
|
request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
|
|
the client.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
|
|
key: The key to store the data under
|
|
value: The data to store
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.store.set_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, value)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
|
|
async def get_session_data(
|
|
self, session_id: str, key: str, default: Optional[Any] = None
|
|
) -> Any:
|
|
"""
|
|
Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
session_id: The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
|
|
key: The key to store the data under
|
|
default: Value to return if the key has not been set
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
return await self.store.get_ui_auth_session_data(session_id, key, default)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
|
|
async def _expire_old_sessions(self):
|
|
"""
|
|
Invalidate any user interactive authentication sessions that have expired.
|
|
"""
|
|
now = self._clock.time_msec()
|
|
expiration_time = now - self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS
|
|
await self.store.delete_old_ui_auth_sessions(expiration_time)
|
|
|
|
async def _check_auth_dict(
|
|
self, authdict: Dict[str, Any], clientip: str
|
|
) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]:
|
|
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
authdict: auth dict provided by the client
|
|
clientip: IP address of the client
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Result of the stage verification.
|
|
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
|
|
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
|
|
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
|
|
"""
|
|
login_type = authdict["type"]
|
|
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
|
|
if checker is not None:
|
|
res = await checker.check_auth(authdict, clientip=clientip)
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
# build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the
|
|
# v1 code
|
|
user_id = authdict.get("user")
|
|
|
|
if user_id is None:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
|
|
|
|
(canonical_id, callback) = await self.validate_login(user_id, authdict)
|
|
return canonical_id
|
|
|
|
def _get_params_recaptcha(self) -> dict:
|
|
return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
|
|
|
|
def _get_params_terms(self) -> dict:
|
|
return {
|
|
"policies": {
|
|
"privacy_policy": {
|
|
"version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
|
|
"en": {
|
|
"name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name,
|
|
"url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s"
|
|
% (
|
|
self.hs.config.public_baseurl,
|
|
self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
def _auth_dict_for_flows(
|
|
self, flows: List[List[str]], session_id: str,
|
|
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
|
|
public_flows = []
|
|
for f in flows:
|
|
public_flows.append(f)
|
|
|
|
get_params = {
|
|
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
|
|
LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
params = {} # type: Dict[str, Any]
|
|
|
|
for f in public_flows:
|
|
for stage in f:
|
|
if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
|
|
params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
"session": session_id,
|
|
"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
|
|
"params": params,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async def get_access_token_for_user_id(
|
|
self, user_id: str, device_id: Optional[str], valid_until_ms: Optional[int]
|
|
):
|
|
"""
|
|
Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
|
|
|
|
The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
|
|
machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
|
|
|
|
The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: canonical User ID
|
|
device_id: the device ID to associate with the tokens.
|
|
None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
|
|
we should always have a device ID)
|
|
valid_until_ms: when the token is valid until. None for
|
|
no expiry.
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The access token for the user's session.
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
|
|
"""
|
|
fmt_expiry = ""
|
|
if valid_until_ms is not None:
|
|
fmt_expiry = time.strftime(
|
|
" until %Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(valid_until_ms / 1000.0)
|
|
)
|
|
logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s%s", user_id, device_id, fmt_expiry)
|
|
|
|
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
|
|
|
|
access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id)
|
|
await self.store.add_access_token_to_user(
|
|
user_id, access_token, device_id, valid_until_ms
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
|
|
# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
|
|
# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
|
|
# device, so we double-check it here.
|
|
if device_id is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
await self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
|
|
raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion")
|
|
|
|
return access_token
|
|
|
|
async def check_user_exists(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""
|
|
Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
|
|
insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: complete @user:id
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The canonical_user_id, or None if zero or multiple matches
|
|
"""
|
|
res = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
|
|
if res is not None:
|
|
return res[0]
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
async def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(
|
|
self, user_id: str
|
|
) -> Optional[Tuple[str, str]]:
|
|
"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
|
|
insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
|
|
matches.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)` or `None`
|
|
if there is not exactly one match
|
|
"""
|
|
user_infos = await self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
|
|
|
|
result = None
|
|
if not user_infos:
|
|
logger.warning("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
|
|
elif len(user_infos) == 1:
|
|
# a single match (possibly not exact)
|
|
result = user_infos.popitem()
|
|
elif user_id in user_infos:
|
|
# multiple matches, but one is exact
|
|
result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
|
|
else:
|
|
# multiple matches, none of them exact
|
|
logger.warning(
|
|
"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
|
|
"inexactly: %r",
|
|
user_id,
|
|
user_infos.keys(),
|
|
)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
def get_supported_login_types(self) -> Iterable[str]:
|
|
"""Get a the login types supported for the /login API
|
|
|
|
By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
|
|
False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide
|
|
other login types.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
login types
|
|
"""
|
|
return self._supported_login_types
|
|
|
|
async def validate_login(
|
|
self, username: str, login_submission: Dict[str, Any]
|
|
) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]:
|
|
"""Authenticates the user for the /login API
|
|
|
|
Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate
|
|
m.login.password auth types.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
username: username supplied by the user
|
|
login_submission: the whole of the login submission
|
|
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A tuple of the canonical user id, and optional callback
|
|
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
|
|
Raises:
|
|
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
|
|
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
|
|
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
if username.startswith("@"):
|
|
qualified_user_id = username
|
|
else:
|
|
qualified_user_id = UserID(username, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
|
|
|
|
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
|
|
known_login_type = False
|
|
|
|
# special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface
|
|
# for the auth providers
|
|
password = login_submission.get("password")
|
|
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
|
|
if not self._password_enabled:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.")
|
|
if not password:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Missing parameter: password")
|
|
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
if hasattr(provider, "check_password") and login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
|
|
known_login_type = True
|
|
is_valid = await provider.check_password(qualified_user_id, password)
|
|
if is_valid:
|
|
return qualified_user_id, None
|
|
|
|
if not hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types") or not hasattr(
|
|
provider, "check_auth"
|
|
):
|
|
# this password provider doesn't understand custom login types
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types()
|
|
if login_type not in supported_login_types:
|
|
# this password provider doesn't understand this login type
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
known_login_type = True
|
|
login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type]
|
|
|
|
missing_fields = []
|
|
login_dict = {}
|
|
for f in login_fields:
|
|
if f not in login_submission:
|
|
missing_fields.append(f)
|
|
else:
|
|
login_dict[f] = login_submission[f]
|
|
if missing_fields:
|
|
raise SynapseError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"Missing parameters for login type %s: %s"
|
|
% (login_type, missing_fields),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
result = await provider.check_auth(username, login_type, login_dict)
|
|
if result:
|
|
if isinstance(result, str):
|
|
result = (result, None)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD and self.hs.config.password_localdb_enabled:
|
|
known_login_type = True
|
|
|
|
canonical_user_id = await self._check_local_password(
|
|
qualified_user_id, password # type: ignore
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if canonical_user_id:
|
|
return canonical_user_id, None
|
|
|
|
if not known_login_type:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type)
|
|
|
|
# We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive
|
|
# login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway.
|
|
raise LoginError(403, "Invalid password", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
async def check_password_provider_3pid(
|
|
self, medium: str, address: str, password: str
|
|
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[Callable[[Dict[str, str]], None]]]:
|
|
"""Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
medium: The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
|
|
address: The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
|
|
password: The password of the user.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
A tuple of `(user_id, callback)`. If authentication is successful,
|
|
`user_id`is the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is
|
|
then either a function to be later run after the server has
|
|
completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was
|
|
unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`.
|
|
"""
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
if hasattr(provider, "check_3pid_auth"):
|
|
# This function is able to return a deferred that either
|
|
# resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon
|
|
# success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of
|
|
# (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run
|
|
# after we've finished everything else
|
|
result = await provider.check_3pid_auth(medium, address, password)
|
|
if result:
|
|
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
|
|
if isinstance(result, str):
|
|
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
|
|
result = (result, None)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
return None, None
|
|
|
|
async def _check_local_password(self, user_id: str, password: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
|
"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
|
|
|
|
user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
|
|
multiple inexact matches.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: complete @user:id
|
|
password: the provided password
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user/bad password
|
|
"""
|
|
lookupres = await self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
|
|
if not lookupres:
|
|
return None
|
|
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
|
|
|
|
# If the password hash is None, the account has likely been deactivated
|
|
if not password_hash:
|
|
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(user_id)
|
|
if deactivated:
|
|
raise UserDeactivatedError("This account has been deactivated")
|
|
|
|
result = await self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
|
|
if not result:
|
|
logger.warning("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
|
|
return None
|
|
return user_id
|
|
|
|
async def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token: str):
|
|
auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
|
|
user_id = None
|
|
try:
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token)
|
|
user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
|
|
auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", user_id)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
await self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
|
|
return user_id
|
|
|
|
async def delete_access_token(self, access_token: str):
|
|
"""Invalidate a single access token
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
access_token: access token to be deleted
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
user_info = await self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token)
|
|
await self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
|
|
|
|
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
|
|
# This might return an awaitable, if it does block the log out
|
|
# until it completes.
|
|
result = provider.on_logged_out(
|
|
user_id=str(user_info["user"]),
|
|
device_id=user_info["device_id"],
|
|
access_token=access_token,
|
|
)
|
|
if inspect.isawaitable(result):
|
|
await result
|
|
|
|
# delete pushers associated with this access token
|
|
if user_info["token_id"] is not None:
|
|
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
|
|
str(user_info["user"]), (user_info["token_id"],)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def delete_access_tokens_for_user(
|
|
self,
|
|
user_id: str,
|
|
except_token_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
device_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: ID of user the tokens belong to
|
|
except_token_id: access_token ID which should *not* be deleted
|
|
device_id: ID of device the tokens are associated with.
|
|
If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
|
|
be deleted
|
|
"""
|
|
tokens_and_devices = await self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
|
|
user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
|
|
for provider in self.password_providers:
|
|
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
|
|
for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices:
|
|
await provider.on_logged_out(
|
|
user_id=user_id, device_id=device_id, access_token=token
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# delete pushers associated with the access tokens
|
|
await self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
|
|
user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def add_threepid(
|
|
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, validated_at: int
|
|
):
|
|
# check if medium has a valid value
|
|
if medium not in ["email", "msisdn"]:
|
|
raise SynapseError(
|
|
code=400,
|
|
msg=("'%s' is not a valid value for 'medium'" % (medium,)),
|
|
errcode=Codes.INVALID_PARAM,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
|
|
# We've now moving towards the homeserver being the entity that
|
|
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
|
|
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
|
|
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
|
|
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
|
|
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
|
|
# for the presence of an email address during password reset was
|
|
# case sensitive).
|
|
if medium == "email":
|
|
address = canonicalise_email(address)
|
|
|
|
await self.store.user_add_threepid(
|
|
user_id, medium, address, validated_at, self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def delete_threepid(
|
|
self, user_id: str, medium: str, address: str, id_server: Optional[str] = None
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
|
|
from the local database.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
user_id: ID of user to remove the 3pid from.
|
|
medium: The medium of the 3pid being removed: "email" or "msisdn".
|
|
address: The 3pid address to remove.
|
|
id_server: Use the given identity server when unbinding
|
|
any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
|
|
identity server specified when binding (if known).
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
|
|
the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
|
|
unbind API.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above
|
|
if medium == "email":
|
|
address = canonicalise_email(address)
|
|
|
|
identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
|
|
result = await identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid(
|
|
user_id, {"medium": medium, "address": address, "id_server": id_server}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
await self.store.user_delete_threepid(user_id, medium, address)
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
async def hash(self, password: str) -> str:
|
|
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password: Password to hash.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Hashed password.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def _do_hash():
|
|
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
|
|
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
|
|
|
|
return bcrypt.hashpw(
|
|
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
|
|
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds),
|
|
).decode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
|
|
|
|
async def validate_hash(
|
|
self, password: str, stored_hash: Union[bytes, str]
|
|
) -> bool:
|
|
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password: Password to hash.
|
|
stored_hash: Expected hash value.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def _do_validate_hash():
|
|
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
|
|
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
|
|
|
|
return bcrypt.checkpw(
|
|
pw.encode("utf8") + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
|
|
stored_hash,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if stored_hash:
|
|
if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes):
|
|
stored_hash = stored_hash.encode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
return await defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash)
|
|
else:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
async def start_sso_ui_auth(self, redirect_url: str, session_id: str) -> str:
|
|
"""
|
|
Get the HTML for the SSO redirect confirmation page.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
redirect_url: The URL to redirect to the SSO provider.
|
|
session_id: The user interactive authentication session ID.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
The HTML to render.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
session = await self.store.get_ui_auth_session(session_id)
|
|
except StoreError:
|
|
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown session ID: %s" % (session_id,))
|
|
return self._sso_auth_confirm_template.render(
|
|
description=session.description, redirect_url=redirect_url,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
async def complete_sso_ui_auth(
|
|
self, registered_user_id: str, session_id: str, request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
|
|
request: The request to complete.
|
|
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
|
|
process.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Mark the stage of the authentication as successful.
|
|
# Save the user who authenticated with SSO, this will be used to ensure
|
|
# that the account be modified is also the person who logged in.
|
|
await self.store.mark_ui_auth_stage_complete(
|
|
session_id, LoginType.SSO, registered_user_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Render the HTML and return.
|
|
html = self._sso_auth_success_template
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 200, html)
|
|
|
|
async def complete_sso_login(
|
|
self,
|
|
registered_user_id: str,
|
|
request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
client_redirect_url: str,
|
|
):
|
|
"""Having figured out a mxid for this user, complete the HTTP request
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
registered_user_id: The registered user ID to complete SSO login for.
|
|
request: The request to complete.
|
|
client_redirect_url: The URL to which to redirect the user at the end of the
|
|
process.
|
|
"""
|
|
# If the account has been deactivated, do not proceed with the login
|
|
# flow.
|
|
deactivated = await self.store.get_user_deactivated_status(registered_user_id)
|
|
if deactivated:
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 403, self._sso_account_deactivated_template)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
self._complete_sso_login(registered_user_id, request, client_redirect_url)
|
|
|
|
def _complete_sso_login(
|
|
self,
|
|
registered_user_id: str,
|
|
request: SynapseRequest,
|
|
client_redirect_url: str,
|
|
):
|
|
"""
|
|
The synchronous portion of complete_sso_login.
|
|
|
|
This exists purely for backwards compatibility of synapse.module_api.ModuleApi.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Create a login token
|
|
login_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_short_term_login_token(
|
|
registered_user_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Append the login token to the original redirect URL (i.e. with its query
|
|
# parameters kept intact) to build the URL to which the template needs to
|
|
# redirect the users once they have clicked on the confirmation link.
|
|
redirect_url = self.add_query_param_to_url(
|
|
client_redirect_url, "loginToken", login_token
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# if the client is whitelisted, we can redirect straight to it
|
|
if client_redirect_url.startswith(self._whitelisted_sso_clients):
|
|
request.redirect(redirect_url)
|
|
finish_request(request)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise, serve the redirect confirmation page.
|
|
|
|
# Remove the query parameters from the redirect URL to get a shorter version of
|
|
# it. This is only to display a human-readable URL in the template, but not the
|
|
# URL we redirect users to.
|
|
redirect_url_no_params = client_redirect_url.split("?")[0]
|
|
|
|
html = self._sso_redirect_confirm_template.render(
|
|
display_url=redirect_url_no_params,
|
|
redirect_url=redirect_url,
|
|
server_name=self._server_name,
|
|
)
|
|
respond_with_html(request, 200, html)
|
|
|
|
@staticmethod
|
|
def add_query_param_to_url(url: str, param_name: str, param: Any):
|
|
url_parts = list(urllib.parse.urlparse(url))
|
|
query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(url_parts[4]))
|
|
query.update({param_name: param})
|
|
url_parts[4] = urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
|
|
return urllib.parse.urlunparse(url_parts)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@attr.s(slots=True)
|
|
class MacaroonGenerator:
|
|
|
|
hs = attr.ib()
|
|
|
|
def generate_access_token(
|
|
self, user_id: str, extra_caveats: Optional[List[str]] = None
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
|
|
# Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different
|
|
# access token.
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(
|
|
"nonce = %s" % (stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),)
|
|
)
|
|
for caveat in extra_caveats:
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_short_term_login_token(
|
|
self, user_id: str, duration_in_ms: int = (2 * 60 * 1000)
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
|
|
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id: str) -> str:
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id: str) -> pymacaroons.Macaroon:
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
|
|
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
|
|
identifier="key",
|
|
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key,
|
|
)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
|
|
return macaroon
|