# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # Copyright 2015 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd # Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. import hmac import logging from hashlib import sha1 from six import string_types from twisted.internet import defer import synapse import synapse.types from synapse.api.constants import LoginType from synapse.api.errors import ( Codes, LimitExceededError, SynapseError, UnrecognizedRequestError, ) from synapse.config.ratelimiting import FederationRateLimitConfig from synapse.config.server import is_threepid_reserved from synapse.http.servlet import ( RestServlet, assert_params_in_dict, parse_json_object_from_request, parse_string, ) from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn from synapse.util.ratelimitutils import FederationRateLimiter from synapse.util.threepids import check_3pid_allowed from ._base import client_v2_patterns, interactive_auth_handler # We ought to be using hmac.compare_digest() but on older pythons it doesn't # exist. It's a _really minor_ security flaw to use plain string comparison # because the timing attack is so obscured by all the other code here it's # unlikely to make much difference if hasattr(hmac, "compare_digest"): compare_digest = hmac.compare_digest else: def compare_digest(a, b): return a == b logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) class EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet): PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/email/requestToken$") def __init__(self, hs): """ Args: hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server """ super(EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__() self.hs = hs self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler @defer.inlineCallbacks def on_POST(self, request): body = parse_json_object_from_request(request) assert_params_in_dict(body, [ 'id_server', 'client_secret', 'email', 'send_attempt' ]) if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "email", body['email']): raise SynapseError( 403, "Your email domain is not authorized to register on this server", Codes.THREEPID_DENIED, ) existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid( 'email', body['email'] ) if existingUid is not None: raise SynapseError(400, "Email is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE) ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestEmailToken(**body) defer.returnValue((200, ret)) class MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet): PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/msisdn/requestToken$") def __init__(self, hs): """ Args: hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server """ super(MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__() self.hs = hs self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler @defer.inlineCallbacks def on_POST(self, request): body = parse_json_object_from_request(request) assert_params_in_dict(body, [ 'id_server', 'client_secret', 'country', 'phone_number', 'send_attempt', ]) msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(body['country'], body['phone_number']) if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "msisdn", msisdn): raise SynapseError( 403, "Phone numbers are not authorized to register on this server", Codes.THREEPID_DENIED, ) existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid( 'msisdn', msisdn ) if existingUid is not None: raise SynapseError( 400, "Phone number is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE ) ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestMsisdnToken(**body) defer.returnValue((200, ret)) class UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(RestServlet): PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/available") def __init__(self, hs): """ Args: hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server """ super(UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet, self).__init__() self.hs = hs self.registration_handler = hs.get_registration_handler() self.ratelimiter = FederationRateLimiter( hs.get_clock(), FederationRateLimitConfig( # Time window of 2s window_size=2000, # Artificially delay requests if rate > sleep_limit/window_size sleep_limit=1, # Amount of artificial delay to apply sleep_msec=1000, # Error with 429 if more than reject_limit requests are queued reject_limit=1, # Allow 1 request at a time concurrent_requests=1, ) ) @defer.inlineCallbacks def on_GET(self, request): ip = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request) with self.ratelimiter.ratelimit(ip) as wait_deferred: yield wait_deferred username = parse_string(request, "username", required=True) yield self.registration_handler.check_username(username) defer.returnValue((200, {"available": True})) class RegisterRestServlet(RestServlet): PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register$") def __init__(self, hs): """ Args: hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server """ super(RegisterRestServlet, self).__init__() self.hs = hs self.auth = hs.get_auth() self.store = hs.get_datastore() self.auth_handler = hs.get_auth_handler() self.registration_handler = hs.get_registration_handler() self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler self.room_member_handler = hs.get_room_member_handler() self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator() self.ratelimiter = hs.get_registration_ratelimiter() self.clock = hs.get_clock() @interactive_auth_handler @defer.inlineCallbacks def on_POST(self, request): body = parse_json_object_from_request(request) client_addr = request.getClientIP() time_now = self.clock.time() allowed, time_allowed = self.ratelimiter.can_do_action( client_addr, time_now_s=time_now, rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_registration.per_second, burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_registration.burst_count, update=False, ) if not allowed: raise LimitExceededError( retry_after_ms=int(1000 * (time_allowed - time_now)), ) kind = b"user" if b"kind" in request.args: kind = request.args[b"kind"][0] if kind == b"guest": ret = yield self._do_guest_registration(body, address=client_addr) defer.returnValue(ret) return elif kind != b"user": raise UnrecognizedRequestError( "Do not understand membership kind: %s" % (kind,) ) # we do basic sanity checks here because the auth layer will store these # in sessions. Pull out the username/password provided to us. desired_password = None if 'password' in body: if (not isinstance(body['password'], string_types) or len(body['password']) > 512): raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid password") desired_password = body["password"] desired_username = None if 'username' in body: if (not isinstance(body['username'], string_types) or len(body['username']) > 512): raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid username") desired_username = body['username'] appservice = None if self.auth.has_access_token(request): appservice = yield self.auth.get_appservice_by_req(request) # fork off as soon as possible for ASes and shared secret auth which # have completely different registration flows to normal users # == Application Service Registration == if appservice: # Set the desired user according to the AS API (which uses the # 'user' key not 'username'). Since this is a new addition, we'll # fallback to 'username' if they gave one. desired_username = body.get("user", desired_username) # XXX we should check that desired_username is valid. Currently # we give appservices carte blanche for any insanity in mxids, # because the IRC bridges rely on being able to register stupid # IDs. access_token = self.auth.get_access_token_from_request(request) if isinstance(desired_username, string_types): result = yield self._do_appservice_registration( desired_username, access_token, body ) defer.returnValue((200, result)) # we throw for non 200 responses return # for either shared secret or regular registration, downcase the # provided username before attempting to register it. This should mean # that people who try to register with upper-case in their usernames # don't get a nasty surprise. (Note that we treat username # case-insenstively in login, so they are free to carry on imagining # that their username is CrAzYh4cKeR if that keeps them happy) if desired_username is not None: desired_username = desired_username.lower() # == Shared Secret Registration == (e.g. create new user scripts) if 'mac' in body: # FIXME: Should we really be determining if this is shared secret # auth based purely on the 'mac' key? result = yield self._do_shared_secret_registration( desired_username, desired_password, body ) defer.returnValue((200, result)) # we throw for non 200 responses return # == Normal User Registration == (everyone else) if not self.hs.config.enable_registration: raise SynapseError(403, "Registration has been disabled") guest_access_token = body.get("guest_access_token", None) if ( 'initial_device_display_name' in body and 'password' not in body ): # ignore 'initial_device_display_name' if sent without # a password to work around a client bug where it sent # the 'initial_device_display_name' param alone, wiping out # the original registration params logger.warn("Ignoring initial_device_display_name without password") del body['initial_device_display_name'] session_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_id(body) registered_user_id = None if session_id: # if we get a registered user id out of here, it means we previously # registered a user for this session, so we could just return the # user here. We carry on and go through the auth checks though, # for paranoia. registered_user_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_data( session_id, "registered_user_id", None ) if desired_username is not None: yield self.registration_handler.check_username( desired_username, guest_access_token=guest_access_token, assigned_user_id=registered_user_id, ) # FIXME: need a better error than "no auth flow found" for scenarios # where we required 3PID for registration but the user didn't give one require_email = 'email' in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid require_msisdn = 'msisdn' in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid show_msisdn = True if self.hs.config.disable_msisdn_registration: show_msisdn = False require_msisdn = False flows = [] if self.hs.config.enable_registration_captcha: # only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required if not require_email and not require_msisdn: flows.extend([[LoginType.RECAPTCHA]]) # only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs if not require_msisdn: flows.extend([[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.RECAPTCHA]]) if show_msisdn: # only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs if not require_email: flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.RECAPTCHA]]) # always let users provide both MSISDN & email flows.extend([ [LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.RECAPTCHA], ]) else: # only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required if not require_email and not require_msisdn: flows.extend([[LoginType.DUMMY]]) # only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs if not require_msisdn: flows.extend([[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]]) if show_msisdn: # only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs if not require_email or require_msisdn: flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN]]) # always let users provide both MSISDN & email flows.extend([ [LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY] ]) # Append m.login.terms to all flows if we're requiring consent if self.hs.config.user_consent_at_registration: new_flows = [] for flow in flows: flow.append(LoginType.TERMS) flows.extend(new_flows) auth_result, params, session_id = yield self.auth_handler.check_auth( flows, body, self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request) ) # Check that we're not trying to register a denied 3pid. # # the user-facing checks will probably already have happened in # /register/email/requestToken when we requested a 3pid, but that's not # guaranteed. if auth_result: for login_type in [LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.MSISDN]: if login_type in auth_result: medium = auth_result[login_type]['medium'] address = auth_result[login_type]['address'] if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, medium, address): raise SynapseError( 403, "Third party identifiers (email/phone numbers)" + " are not authorized on this server", Codes.THREEPID_DENIED, ) if registered_user_id is not None: logger.info( "Already registered user ID %r for this session", registered_user_id ) # don't re-register the threepids registered = False else: # NB: This may be from the auth handler and NOT from the POST assert_params_in_dict(params, ["password"]) desired_username = params.get("username", None) guest_access_token = params.get("guest_access_token", None) new_password = params.get("password", None) if desired_username is not None: desired_username = desired_username.lower() threepid = None if auth_result: threepid = auth_result.get(LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY) # Also check that we're not trying to register a 3pid that's already # been registered. # # This has probably happened in /register/email/requestToken as well, # but if a user hits this endpoint twice then clicks on each link from # the two activation emails, they would register the same 3pid twice. for login_type in [LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.MSISDN]: if login_type in auth_result: medium = auth_result[login_type]['medium'] address = auth_result[login_type]['address'] existingUid = yield self.store.get_user_id_by_threepid( medium, address, ) if existingUid is not None: raise SynapseError( 400, "%s is already in use" % medium, Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE, ) (registered_user_id, _) = yield self.registration_handler.register( localpart=desired_username, password=new_password, guest_access_token=guest_access_token, generate_token=False, threepid=threepid, address=client_addr, ) # Necessary due to auth checks prior to the threepid being # written to the db if threepid: if is_threepid_reserved( self.hs.config.mau_limits_reserved_threepids, threepid ): yield self.store.upsert_monthly_active_user(registered_user_id) # remember that we've now registered that user account, and with # what user ID (since the user may not have specified) self.auth_handler.set_session_data( session_id, "registered_user_id", registered_user_id ) registered = True return_dict = yield self._create_registration_details( registered_user_id, params ) if registered: yield self.registration_handler.post_registration_actions( user_id=registered_user_id, auth_result=auth_result, access_token=return_dict.get("access_token"), bind_email=params.get("bind_email"), bind_msisdn=params.get("bind_msisdn"), ) defer.returnValue((200, return_dict)) def on_OPTIONS(self, _): return 200, {} @defer.inlineCallbacks def _do_appservice_registration(self, username, as_token, body): user_id = yield self.registration_handler.appservice_register( username, as_token ) defer.returnValue((yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body))) @defer.inlineCallbacks def _do_shared_secret_registration(self, username, password, body): if not self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret: raise SynapseError(400, "Shared secret registration is not enabled") if not username: raise SynapseError( 400, "username must be specified", errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON, ) # use the username from the original request rather than the # downcased one in `username` for the mac calculation user = body["username"].encode("utf-8") # str() because otherwise hmac complains that 'unicode' does not # have the buffer interface got_mac = str(body["mac"]) # FIXME this is different to the /v1/register endpoint, which # includes the password and admin flag in the hashed text. Why are # these different? want_mac = hmac.new( key=self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret.encode(), msg=user, digestmod=sha1, ).hexdigest() if not compare_digest(want_mac, got_mac): raise SynapseError( 403, "HMAC incorrect", ) (user_id, _) = yield self.registration_handler.register( localpart=username, password=password, generate_token=False, ) result = yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body) defer.returnValue(result) @defer.inlineCallbacks def _create_registration_details(self, user_id, params): """Complete registration of newly-registered user Allocates device_id if one was not given; also creates access_token. Args: (str) user_id: full canonical @user:id (object) params: registration parameters, from which we pull device_id, initial_device_name and inhibit_login Returns: defer.Deferred: (object) dictionary for response from /register """ result = { "user_id": user_id, "home_server": self.hs.hostname, } if not params.get("inhibit_login", False): device_id = params.get("device_id") initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name") device_id, access_token = yield self.registration_handler.register_device( user_id, device_id, initial_display_name, is_guest=False, ) result.update({ "access_token": access_token, "device_id": device_id, }) defer.returnValue(result) @defer.inlineCallbacks def _do_guest_registration(self, params, address=None): if not self.hs.config.allow_guest_access: raise SynapseError(403, "Guest access is disabled") user_id, _ = yield self.registration_handler.register( generate_token=False, make_guest=True, address=address, ) # we don't allow guests to specify their own device_id, because # we have nowhere to store it. device_id = synapse.api.auth.GUEST_DEVICE_ID initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name") device_id, access_token = yield self.registration_handler.register_device( user_id, device_id, initial_display_name, is_guest=True, ) defer.returnValue((200, { "user_id": user_id, "device_id": device_id, "access_token": access_token, "home_server": self.hs.hostname, })) def register_servlets(hs, http_server): EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server) MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server) UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(hs).register(http_server) RegisterRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)