The 'time' caveat on the access tokens was something of a lie, since we weren't
enforcing it; more pertinently its presence stops us ever adding useful time
caveats.
Let's move in the right direction by not lying in our caveats.
Since we're not doing refresh tokens any more, we should start killing off the
dead code paths. /tokenrefresh itself is a bit of a thornier subject, since
there might be apps out there using it, but we can at least not generate
refresh tokens on new logins.
This is currently very conservative in that it only does this if there is no
`since` token. This limits the risk to clients likely to be doing one-off
syncs (like bridges), but does mean that normal human clients won't benefit
from the time savings here. If the savings are large enough, I would consider
generalising this to just check the filter.
There's a bug somewhere that causes typing notifications to not be timed
out properly. By adding a paranoia timer and using correct inequalities
notifications should stop being stuck, even if it the root cause hasn't
been fixed.
If a client didn't specify a from token when paginating backwards
synapse would attempt to query the (global) maximum topological token.
This a) doesn't make much sense since they're room specific and b) there
are no indices that lets postgres do this efficiently.
This adds a flag loaded from the registration file of an AS that will determine whether or not its users are rate limited (by ratelimit in _base.py). Needed for IRC bridge reasons - see https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-appservice-irc/issues/240.
This requires a bit of fettling, because I want to return a helpful error
message too but we don't want to distinguish between unknown user and invalid
password. To avoid hardcoding the error message into 15 places in the code,
I've had to refactor a few methods to return None instead of throwing.
Fixes https://matrix.org/jira/browse/SYN-744
Allows delegating the password auth to an external module. This also
moves the LDAP auth to using this system, allowing it to be removed from
the synapse tree entirely in the future.
- properly parse return values of ldap bind() calls
- externalize authentication methods
- change control flow to be more error-resilient
- unbind ldap connections in many places
- improve log messages and loglevels
When a server sends a third party invite another server may be the one
that the inviting user registers with. In this case it is that remote
server that will issue an actual invitation, and wants to do it "in the
name of" the original invitee. However, the new proper invite will not
be signed by the original server, and thus other servers would reject
the invite if it was seen as coming from the original user.
To fix this, a special case has been added to the auth rules whereby
another server can send an invite "in the name of" another server's
user, so long as that user had previously issued a third party invite
that is now being accepted.
