Pull the checkers out to their own classes, rather than having them lost in a
massive 1000-line class which does everything.
This is also preparation for some more intelligent advertising of flows, as per #6100
because, frankly, it looked like it was written by an axe-murderer.
This should be a non-functional change, except that where `m.login.dummy` was
previously advertised *before* `m.login.terms`, it will now be advertised
afterwards. AFAICT that should have no effect, and will be more consistent with
the flows that involve passing a 3pid.
This is a) simpler than querying user_ips directly and b) means we can
purge older entries from user_ips without losing the required info.
The storage functions now no longer return the access_token, since it
was unused.
This allows support users to be created even on MAU limits via
the admin API. Support users are excluded from MAU after creation,
so it makes sense to exclude them in creation - except if the
whole host is in disabled state.
Signed-off-by: Jason Robinson <jasonr@matrix.org>
Previously if the first registered user was a "support" or "bot" user,
when the first real user registers, the auto-join rooms were not
created.
Fix to exclude non-real (ie users with a special user type) users
when counting how many users there are to determine whether we should
auto-create a room.
Signed-off-by: Jason Robinson <jasonr@matrix.org>
Python will return a tuple whether there are parentheses around the returned values or not.
I'm just sick of my editor complaining about this all over the place :)
Template config files
* Imagine a system composed entirely of x, y, z etc and the basic operations..
Wait George, why XOR? Why not just neq?
George: Eh, I didn't think of that..
Co-Authored-By: Erik Johnston <erik@matrix.org>
Get rid of the labyrinthine `recoverer_fn` code, and clean up the startup code
(it seemed to be previously inexplicably split between
`ApplicationServiceScheduler.start` and `_Recoverer.start`).
Add some docstrings too.
This refactors MatrixFederationAgent to move the SRV lookup into the
endpoint code, this has two benefits:
1. Its easier to retry different host/ports in the same way as
HostnameEndpoint.
2. We avoid SRV lookups if we have a free connection in the pool
If we have recently seen a valid well-known for a domain we want to
retry on (non-final) errors a few times, to handle temporary blips in
networking/etc.
This gives a bit of a grace period where we can attempt to refetch a
remote `well-known`, while still using the cached result if that fails.
Hopefully this will make the well-known resolution a bit more torelant
of failures, rather than it immediately treating failures as "no result"
and caching that for an hour.
It costs both us and the remote server for us to fetch the well known
for every single request we send, so we add a minimum cache period. This
is set to 5m so that we still honour the basic premise of "refetch
frequently".
The `expire_access_token` didn't do what it sounded like it should do. What it
actually did was make Synapse enforce the 'time' caveat on macaroons used as
access tokens, but since our access token macaroons never contained such a
caveat, it was always a no-op.
(The code to add 'time' caveats was removed back in v0.18.5, in #1656)
There was some inconsistent behaviour in the caching layer around how
exceptions were handled - particularly synchronously-thrown ones.
This seems to be most easily handled by pushing the creation of
ObservableDeferreds down from CacheDescriptor to the Cache.
--------
- Fix a regression introduced in v1.2.0rc1 which led to incorrect labels on some prometheus metrics. ([\#5734](https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/5734))
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Merge tag 'v1.2.0rc2' into develop
Bugfixes
--------
- Fix a regression introduced in v1.2.0rc1 which led to incorrect labels on some prometheus metrics. ([\#5734](https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/issues/5734))
* Fix servlet metric names
Co-Authored-By: Richard van der Hoff <1389908+richvdh@users.noreply.github.com>
* Remove redundant check
* Cover all return paths
We can now use `_get_events_from_cache_or_db` rather than going right back to
the database, which means that (a) we can benefit from caching, and (b) it
opens the way forward to more extensive checks on the original event.
We now always require the original event to exist before we will serve up a
redaction.
First of all, let's get rid of `TOKEN_NOT_FOUND_HTTP_STATUS`. It was a hack we
did at one point when it was possible to return either a 403 or a 401 if the
creds were missing. We always return a 401 in these cases now (thankfully), so
it's not needed.
Let's also stop abusing `AuthError` for these cases. Honestly they have nothing
that relates them to the other places that `AuthError` is used, other than the
fact that they are loosely under the 'Auth' banner. It makes no sense for them
to share exception classes.
Instead, let's add a couple of new exception classes: `InvalidClientTokenError`
and `MissingClientTokenError`, for the `M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN` and `M_MISSING_TOKEN`
cases respectively - and an `InvalidClientCredentialsError` base class for the
two of them.
this is only used in one place, so it's clearer if we inline it and reduce the
API surface.
Also, fixes a buglet where we would create an access token even if we were
about to block the user (we would never return the AT, so the user could never
use it, but it was still created and added to the db.)
When asking for the relations of an event, include the original event in the response. This will mostly be used for efficiently showing edit history, but could be useful in other circumstances.
Nothing uses this now, so we can remove the dead code, and clean up the
API.
Since we're changing the shape of the return value anyway, we take the
opportunity to give the method a better name.
- Put the default window_size back to 1000ms (broken by #5181)
- Make the `rc_federation` config actually do something
- fix an off-by-one error in the 'concurrent' limit
- Avoid creating an unused `_PerHostRatelimiter` object for every single
incoming request
Adds new config option `cleanup_extremities_with_dummy_events` which
periodically sends dummy events to rooms with more than 10 extremities.
THIS IS REALLY EXPERIMENTAL.
Some keys are stored in the synapse database with a null valid_until_ms
which caused an exception to be thrown when using that key. We fix this
by treating nulls as zeroes, i.e. they keys will match verification
requests with a minimum_valid_until_ms of zero (i.e. don't validate ts)
but will not match requests with a non-zero minimum_valid_until_ms.
Fixes#5391.
Sends password reset emails from the homeserver instead of proxying to the identity server. This is now the default behaviour for security reasons. If you wish to continue proxying password reset requests to the identity server you must now enable the email.trust_identity_server_for_password_resets option.
This PR is a culmination of 3 smaller PRs which have each been separately reviewed:
* #5308
* #5345
* #5368
There are a few changes going on here:
* We make checking the signature on a key server response optional: if no
verify_keys are specified, we trust to TLS to validate the connection.
* We change the default config so that it does not require responses to be
signed by the old key.
* We replace the old 'perspectives' config with 'trusted_key_servers', which
is also formatted slightly differently.
* We emit a warning to the logs every time we trust a key server response
signed by the old key.
* Fix background updates to handle redactions/rejections
In background updates based on current state delta stream we need to
handle that we may not have all the events (or at least that
`get_events` may raise an exception).
Also:
* rename VerifyKeyRequest->VerifyJsonRequest
* calculate key_ids on VerifyJsonRequest construction
* refactor things to pass around VerifyJsonRequests instead of 4-tuples
When handling incoming federation requests, make sure that we have an
up-to-date copy of the signing key.
We do not yet enforce the validity period for event signatures.
When enabling the account validity feature, Synapse will look at startup for registered account without an expiration date, and will set one equals to 'now + validity_period' for them. On large servers, it can mean that a large number of users will have the same expiration date, which means that they will all be sent a renewal email at the same time, which isn't ideal.
In order to mitigate this, this PR allows server admins to define a 'max_delta' so that the expiration date is a random value in the [now + validity_period ; now + validity_period + max_delta] range. This allows renewal emails to be progressively sent over a configured period instead of being sent all in one big batch.
The list of server names was redundant, since it was equivalent to the keys on
the server_to_deferred map. This reduces the number of large lists being passed
around, and has the benefit of deduplicating the entries in `wait_on`.
Replaces DEFAULT_ROOM_VERSION constant with a method that first checks the config, then returns a hardcoded value if the option is not present.
That hardcoded value is now located in the server.py config file.
Rather than have three methods which have to have the same interface,
factor out a separate interface which is provided by three implementations.
I find it easier to grok the code this way.
This is a first step to checking that the key is valid at the required moment.
The idea here is that, rather than passing VerifyKey objects in and out of the
storage layer, we instead pass FetchKeyResult objects, which simply wrap the
VerifyKey and add a valid_until_ts field.
Storing server keys hammered the database a bit. This replaces the
implementation which stored a single key, with one which can do many updates at
once.
If account validity is enabled in the server's configuration, this job will run at startup as a background job and will stick an expiration date to any registered account missing one.
Prevents a SynapseError being raised inside of a IResolutionReceiver and instead opts to just return 0 results. This thus means that we have to lump a failed lookup and a blacklisted lookup together with the same error message, but the substitute should be generic enough to cover both cases.
This commit adds two config options:
* `restrict_public_rooms_to_local_users`
Requires auth to fetch the public rooms directory through the CS API and disables fetching it through the federation API.
* `require_auth_for_profile_requests`
When set to `true`, requires that requests to `/profile` over the CS API are authenticated, and only returns the user's profile if the requester shares a room with the profile's owner, as per MSC1301.
MSC1301 also specifies a behaviour for federation (only returning the profile if the server asking for it shares a room with the profile's owner), but that's currently really non-trivial to do in a not too expensive way. Next step is writing down a MSC that allows a HS to specify which user sent the profile query. In this implementation, Synapse won't send a profile query over federation if it doesn't believe it already shares a room with the profile's owner, though.
Groups have been intentionally omitted from this commit.
This endpoint isn't much use for its intended purpose if you first need to get
yourself an admin's auth token.
I've restricted it to the `/_synapse/admin` path to make it a bit easier to
lock down for those concerned about exposing this information. I don't imagine
anyone is using it in anger currently.
