These are easier to work with than the strings and we normally have one around.
This fixes `FederationHander._persist_auth_tree` which was passing a
RoomVersion object into event_auth.check instead of a string.
This fixes a weird bug where, if you were determined enough, you could end up with a rejected event forming part of the state at a backwards-extremity. Authing that backwards extrem would then lead to us trying to pull the rejected event from the db (with allow_rejected=False), which would fail with a 404.
When we request the state/auth_events to populate a backwards extremity (on
backfill or in the case of missing events in a transaction push), we should
check that the returned events are in the right room rather than blindly using
them in the room state or auth chain.
Given that _get_events_from_store_or_dest takes a room_id, it seems clear that
it should be sanity-checking the room_id of the requested events, so let's do
it there.
Make it return the state *after* the requested event, rather than the one
before it. This is a bit easier and requires fewer calls to
get_events_from_store_or_dest.
This fixes a weird bug where, if you were determined enough, you could end up with a rejected event forming part of the state at a backwards-extremity. Authing that backwards extrem would then lead to us trying to pull the rejected event from the db (with allow_rejected=False), which would fail with a 404.
When we request the state/auth_events to populate a backwards extremity (on
backfill or in the case of missing events in a transaction push), we should
check that the returned events are in the right room rather than blindly using
them in the room state or auth chain.
Given that _get_events_from_store_or_dest takes a room_id, it seems clear that
it should be sanity-checking the room_id of the requested events, so let's do
it there.
Make it return the state *after* the requested event, rather than the one
before it. This is a bit easier and requires fewer calls to
get_events_from_store_or_dest.
PaginationHandler.get_messages is only called by RoomMessageListRestServlet,
which is async.
Chase the code path down from there:
- FederationHandler.maybe_backfill (and nested try_backfill)
- FederationHandler.backfill
have_events was a map from event_id to rejection reason (or None) for events
which are in our local database. It was used as filter on the list of
event_ids being passed into get_events_as_list. However, since
get_events_as_list will ignore any event_ids that are unknown or rejected, we
can equivalently just leave it to get_events_as_list to do the filtering.
That means that we don't have to keep `have_events` up-to-date, and can use
`have_seen_events` instead of `get_seen_events_with_rejection` in the one place
we do need it.
Implement part [MSC2228](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/2228). The parts that differ are:
* the feature is hidden behind a configuration flag (`enable_ephemeral_messages`)
* self-destruction doesn't happen for state events
* only implement support for the `m.self_destruct_after` field (not the `m.self_destruct` one)
* doesn't send synthetic redactions to clients because for this specific case we consider the clients to be able to destroy an event themselves, instead we just censor it (by pruning its JSON) in the database
Fixes a bug where rejected events were persisted with the wrong state group.
Also fixes an occasional internal-server-error when receiving events over
federation which are rejected and (possibly because they are
backwards-extremities) have no prev_group.
Fixes#6289.
* Raise an exception if accessing state for rejected events
Add some sanity checks on accessing state_group etc for
rejected events.
* Skip calculating push actions for rejected events
It didn't actually cause any bugs, because rejected events get filtered out at
various later points, but there's not point in trying to calculate the push
actions for a rejected event.
The intention here is to make it clearer which fields we can expect to be
populated when: notably, that the _event_type etc aren't used for the
synchronous impl of EventContext.
While this is not documented in the spec (but should be), Riot (and other clients) revoke 3PID invites by sending a m.room.third_party_invite event with an empty ({}) content to the room's state.
When the invited 3PID gets associated with a MXID, the identity server (which doesn't know about revocations) sends down to the MXID's homeserver all of the undelivered invites it has for this 3PID. The homeserver then tries to talk to the inviting homeserver in order to exchange these invite for m.room.member events.
When one of the invite is revoked, the inviting homeserver responds with a 500 error because it tries to extract a 'display_name' property from the content, which is empty. This might cause the invited server to consider that the server is down and not try to exchange other, valid invites (or at least delay it).
This fix handles the case of revoked invites by avoiding trying to fetch a 'display_name' from the original invite's content, and letting the m.room.member event fail the auth rules (because, since the original invite's content is empty, it doesn't have public keys), which results in sending a 403 with the correct error message to the invited server.
Another small fixup noticed during work on a larger PR. The `origin` field of `add_display_name_to_third_party_invite` is not used and likely was just carried over from the `on_PUT` method of `FederationThirdPartyInviteExchangeServlet` which, like all other servlets, provides an `origin` argument.
Since it's not used anywhere in the handler function though, we should remove it from the function arguments.
Python will return a tuple whether there are parentheses around the returned values or not.
I'm just sick of my editor complaining about this all over the place :)
I had to add quite a lot of logging to diagnose a problem with 3pid
invites - we only logged the one failure which isn't all that
informative.
NB. I'm not convinced the logic of this loop is right: I think it
should just accept a single valid signature from a trusted source
rather than fail if *any* signature is invalid. Also it should
probably not skip the rest of middle loop if a check fails? However,
I'm deliberately not changing the logic here.