There is a problem with `StreamIdGenerator` where it can go backwards
over restarts when a stream ID is requested but then not inserted into
the DB. This is problematic if we want to land #17215, and is generally
a potential cause for all sorts of nastiness.
Instead of trying to fix `StreamIdGenerator`, we may as well move to
`MultiWriterIdGenerator` that does not suffer from this problem (the
latest positions are stored in `stream_positions` table). This involves
adding SQLite support to the class.
This only changes id generators that were already using
`MultiWriterIdGenerator` under postgres, a separate PR will move the
rest of the uses of `StreamIdGenerator` over.
Currently sending a to-device message to a user ID with a dodgy
destination is accepted, but then ends up spamming the logs when we try
and send to the destination.
An alternative would be to reject the request, but I'm slightly nervous
that could break things.
When a module rejects a piece of media we end up trying to close the
same logging context twice.
Instead of fixing the existing code we refactor to use an async context
manager, which is easier to write correctly.
The log format is the same as the request log format, except:
- fields that are specific to HTTP requests have been removed
- the task's params are included at the end of the log line.
These log lines are emitted:
- when the task function finishes — both completion and failure (and I
suppose it is possible for a task to become schedulable again?)
- every 5 minutes whilst it is running
Closes#17217.
---------
Signed-off-by: Olivier 'reivilibre <oliverw@matrix.org>
This PR ports the logic from the
[synapse_auto_accept_invite](https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse-auto-accept-invite)
module into synapse.
I went with the naive approach of injecting the "module" next to where
third party modules are currently loaded. If there is a better/preferred
way to handle this, I'm all ears. It wasn't obvious to me if there was a
better location to add this logic that would cleanly apply to all
incoming invite events.
Relies on https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17166 to fix linter
errors.
Re-introduces #17191, and includes #17197 and #17214
The basic idea is to stop calling `get_rooms_for_user` everywhere, and
instead use the table `device_lists_changes_in_room`.
Commits reviewable one-by-one.
Removed `request_key` from the `SyncConfig` (moved outside as its own function parameter) so it doesn't have to flow into `_generate_sync_entry_for_xxx` methods. This way we can separate the concerns of caching from generating the response and reuse the `_generate_sync_entry_for_xxx` functions as we see fit. Plus caching doesn't really have anything to do with the config of sync.
Split from https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17167
Spawning from https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/pull/17167#discussion_r1601497279
It's almost always more efficient to query the rooms that have device
list changes, rather than looking at the list of all users whose devices
have changed and then look for shared rooms.
This is to allow clients to query the configured federation whitelist.
Disabled by default.
---------
Co-authored-by: Devon Hudson <devonhudson@librem.one>
Co-authored-by: devonh <devon.dmytro@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Andrew Morgan <1342360+anoadragon453@users.noreply.github.com>
Linter errors are showing up in #17147 that are unrelated to that PR.
The errors do not currently show up on develop.
This PR aims to resolve the linter errors separately from #17147.
When there have been lots of changes compared with the number of
entities, we can do a fast(er) path.
Locally I ran some benchmarking, and the comparison seems to give the
best determination of which method we use.
This change will apply the `email` & `picture` provided by OIDC to the
new user account when registering a new user via OIDC. If the user is
directed to the account details form, this change makes sure they have
been selected before applying them, otherwise they are omitted. In
particular, this change ensures the values are carried through when
Synapse has consent configured, and the redirect to the consent form/s
are followed.
I have tested everything manually. Including:
- with/without consent configured
- allowing/not allowing the use of email/avatar (via
`sso_auth_account_details.html`)
- with/without automatic account detail population (by un/commenting the
`localpart_template` option in synapse config).
### Pull Request Checklist
<!-- Please read
https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest/development/contributing_guide.html
before submitting your pull request -->
* [X] Pull request is based on the develop branch
* [X] Pull request includes a [changelog
file](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest/development/contributing_guide.html#changelog).
The entry should:
- Be a short description of your change which makes sense to users.
"Fixed a bug that prevented receiving messages from other servers."
instead of "Moved X method from `EventStore` to `EventWorkerStore`.".
- Use markdown where necessary, mostly for `code blocks`.
- End with either a period (.) or an exclamation mark (!).
- Start with a capital letter.
- Feel free to credit yourself, by adding a sentence "Contributed by
@github_username." or "Contributed by [Your Name]." to the end of the
entry.
* [X] [Code
style](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest/code_style.html) is
correct
(run the
[linters](https://element-hq.github.io/synapse/latest/development/contributing_guide.html#run-the-linters))
... when workers are unreachable, etc.
Fixes https://github.com/element-hq/synapse/issues/17117.
The general principle is just to make sure that we propagate any
exceptions to the JsonResource, so that we return an error code to the
sending server. That means that the sending server no longer considers
the message safely sent, so it will retry later.
In the issue, Erik mentions that an alternative solution would be to
persist the to-device messages into a table so that they can be retried.
This might be an improvement for performance, but even if we did that,
we still need this mechanism, since we might be unable to reach the
database. So, if we want to do that, it can be a later follow-up.
---------
Co-authored-by: Erik Johnston <erik@matrix.org>
Weakness in auth chain indexing allows DoS from remote room members
through disk fill and high CPU usage.
A remote Matrix user with malicious intent, sharing a room with Synapse
instances before 1.104.1, can dispatch specially crafted events to
exploit a weakness in how the auth chain cover index is calculated. This
can induce high CPU consumption and accumulate excessive data in the
database of such instances, resulting in a denial of service.
Servers in private federations, or those that do not federate, are not
affected.
