forked-synapse/synapse/rest/client/v2_alpha/register.py

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2015 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
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import hmac
import logging
from hashlib import sha1
from six import string_types
from twisted.internet import defer
import synapse
import synapse.types
from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
from synapse.api.errors import (
Codes,
LimitExceededError,
SynapseError,
UnrecognizedRequestError,
)
from synapse.config.ratelimiting import FederationRateLimitConfig
from synapse.config.server import is_threepid_reserved
from synapse.http.servlet import (
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RestServlet,
assert_params_in_dict,
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parse_json_object_from_request,
parse_string,
)
from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
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from synapse.util.ratelimitutils import FederationRateLimiter
from synapse.util.threepids import check_3pid_allowed
from ._base import client_patterns, interactive_auth_handler
# We ought to be using hmac.compare_digest() but on older pythons it doesn't
# exist. It's a _really minor_ security flaw to use plain string comparison
# because the timing attack is so obscured by all the other code here it's
# unlikely to make much difference
if hasattr(hmac, "compare_digest"):
compare_digest = hmac.compare_digest
else:
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def compare_digest(a, b):
return a == b
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/register/email/requestToken$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
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assert_params_in_dict(
body, ["id_server", "client_secret", "email", "send_attempt"]
)
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if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "email", body["email"]):
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raise SynapseError(
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403,
"Your email domain is not authorized to register on this server",
Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
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)
existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
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"email", body["email"]
)
if existingUid is not None:
raise SynapseError(400, "Email is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE)
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestEmailToken(**body)
return (200, ret)
class MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/register/msisdn/requestToken$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
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assert_params_in_dict(
body,
["id_server", "client_secret", "country", "phone_number", "send_attempt"],
)
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msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(body["country"], body["phone_number"])
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "msisdn", msisdn):
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raise SynapseError(
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403,
"Phone numbers are not authorized to register on this server",
Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
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)
existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
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"msisdn", msisdn
)
if existingUid is not None:
raise SynapseError(
400, "Phone number is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE
)
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestMsisdnToken(**body)
return (200, ret)
class UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/register/available")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.registration_handler = hs.get_registration_handler()
self.ratelimiter = FederationRateLimiter(
hs.get_clock(),
FederationRateLimitConfig(
# Time window of 2s
window_size=2000,
# Artificially delay requests if rate > sleep_limit/window_size
sleep_limit=1,
# Amount of artificial delay to apply
sleep_msec=1000,
# Error with 429 if more than reject_limit requests are queued
reject_limit=1,
# Allow 1 request at a time
concurrent_requests=1,
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),
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_GET(self, request):
ip = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
with self.ratelimiter.ratelimit(ip) as wait_deferred:
yield wait_deferred
username = parse_string(request, "username", required=True)
yield self.registration_handler.check_username(username)
return (200, {"available": True})
class RegisterRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_patterns("/register$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(RegisterRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.auth = hs.get_auth()
self.store = hs.get_datastore()
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self.auth_handler = hs.get_auth_handler()
self.registration_handler = hs.get_registration_handler()
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
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self.room_member_handler = hs.get_room_member_handler()
self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
self.ratelimiter = hs.get_registration_ratelimiter()
self.clock = hs.get_clock()
@interactive_auth_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
client_addr = request.getClientIP()
time_now = self.clock.time()
allowed, time_allowed = self.ratelimiter.can_do_action(
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client_addr,
time_now_s=time_now,
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_registration.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_registration.burst_count,
update=False,
)
if not allowed:
raise LimitExceededError(
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retry_after_ms=int(1000 * (time_allowed - time_now))
)
kind = b"user"
if b"kind" in request.args:
kind = request.args[b"kind"][0]
if kind == b"guest":
ret = yield self._do_guest_registration(body, address=client_addr)
return ret
return
elif kind != b"user":
raise UnrecognizedRequestError(
"Do not understand membership kind: %s" % (kind,)
)
# we do basic sanity checks here because the auth layer will store these
# in sessions. Pull out the username/password provided to us.
desired_password = None
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if "password" in body:
if (
not isinstance(body["password"], string_types)
or len(body["password"]) > 512
):
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid password")
desired_password = body["password"]
desired_username = None
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if "username" in body:
if (
not isinstance(body["username"], string_types)
or len(body["username"]) > 512
):
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid username")
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desired_username = body["username"]
appservice = None
if self.auth.has_access_token(request):
appservice = yield self.auth.get_appservice_by_req(request)
# fork off as soon as possible for ASes and shared secret auth which
# have completely different registration flows to normal users
# == Application Service Registration ==
if appservice:
# Set the desired user according to the AS API (which uses the
# 'user' key not 'username'). Since this is a new addition, we'll
# fallback to 'username' if they gave one.
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desired_username = body.get("user", desired_username)
# XXX we should check that desired_username is valid. Currently
# we give appservices carte blanche for any insanity in mxids,
# because the IRC bridges rely on being able to register stupid
# IDs.
access_token = self.auth.get_access_token_from_request(request)
if isinstance(desired_username, string_types):
result = yield self._do_appservice_registration(
desired_username, access_token, body
)
return (200, result) # we throw for non 200 responses
return
# for either shared secret or regular registration, downcase the
# provided username before attempting to register it. This should mean
# that people who try to register with upper-case in their usernames
# don't get a nasty surprise. (Note that we treat username
# case-insenstively in login, so they are free to carry on imagining
# that their username is CrAzYh4cKeR if that keeps them happy)
if desired_username is not None:
desired_username = desired_username.lower()
# == Shared Secret Registration == (e.g. create new user scripts)
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if "mac" in body:
# FIXME: Should we really be determining if this is shared secret
# auth based purely on the 'mac' key?
result = yield self._do_shared_secret_registration(
desired_username, desired_password, body
)
return (200, result) # we throw for non 200 responses
return
# == Normal User Registration == (everyone else)
if not self.hs.config.enable_registration:
raise SynapseError(403, "Registration has been disabled")
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guest_access_token = body.get("guest_access_token", None)
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if "initial_device_display_name" in body and "password" not in body:
# ignore 'initial_device_display_name' if sent without
# a password to work around a client bug where it sent
# the 'initial_device_display_name' param alone, wiping out
# the original registration params
logger.warn("Ignoring initial_device_display_name without password")
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del body["initial_device_display_name"]
session_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_id(body)
registered_user_id = None
if session_id:
# if we get a registered user id out of here, it means we previously
# registered a user for this session, so we could just return the
# user here. We carry on and go through the auth checks though,
# for paranoia.
registered_user_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_data(
session_id, "registered_user_id", None
)
if desired_username is not None:
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yield self.registration_handler.check_username(
desired_username,
guest_access_token=guest_access_token,
assigned_user_id=registered_user_id,
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)
# FIXME: need a better error than "no auth flow found" for scenarios
# where we required 3PID for registration but the user didn't give one
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require_email = "email" in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid
require_msisdn = "msisdn" in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid
show_msisdn = True
if self.hs.config.disable_msisdn_registration:
show_msisdn = False
require_msisdn = False
flows = []
if self.hs.config.enable_registration_captcha:
# only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required
if not require_email and not require_msisdn:
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# Also add a dummy flow here, otherwise if a client completes
# recaptcha first we'll assume they were going for this flow
# and complete the request, when they could have been trying to
# complete one of the flows with email/msisdn auth.
flows.extend([[LoginType.RECAPTCHA, LoginType.DUMMY]])
# only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs
if not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.RECAPTCHA, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]])
if show_msisdn:
# only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs
if not require_email:
flows.extend([[LoginType.RECAPTCHA, LoginType.MSISDN]])
# always let users provide both MSISDN & email
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flows.extend(
[[LoginType.RECAPTCHA, LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]]
)
else:
# only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required
if not require_email and not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.DUMMY]])
# only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs
if not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]])
if show_msisdn:
# only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs
if not require_email or require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN]])
# always let users provide both MSISDN & email
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flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]])
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# Append m.login.terms to all flows if we're requiring consent
if self.hs.config.user_consent_at_registration:
new_flows = []
for flow in flows:
inserted = False
# m.login.terms should go near the end but before msisdn or email auth
for i, stage in enumerate(flow):
if stage == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY or stage == LoginType.MSISDN:
flow.insert(i, LoginType.TERMS)
inserted = True
break
if not inserted:
flow.append(LoginType.TERMS)
flows.extend(new_flows)
auth_result, params, session_id = yield self.auth_handler.check_auth(
flows, body, self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
)
# Check that we're not trying to register a denied 3pid.
#
# the user-facing checks will probably already have happened in
# /register/email/requestToken when we requested a 3pid, but that's not
# guaranteed.
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if auth_result:
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for login_type in [LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.MSISDN]:
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if login_type in auth_result:
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medium = auth_result[login_type]["medium"]
address = auth_result[login_type]["address"]
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if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, medium, address):
raise SynapseError(
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403,
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"Third party identifiers (email/phone numbers)"
+ " are not authorized on this server",
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Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
)
if registered_user_id is not None:
logger.info(
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"Already registered user ID %r for this session", registered_user_id
)
# don't re-register the threepids
registered = False
else:
# NB: This may be from the auth handler and NOT from the POST
assert_params_in_dict(params, ["password"])
desired_username = params.get("username", None)
guest_access_token = params.get("guest_access_token", None)
new_password = params.get("password", None)
if desired_username is not None:
desired_username = desired_username.lower()
threepid = None
if auth_result:
threepid = auth_result.get(LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY)
# Also check that we're not trying to register a 3pid that's already
# been registered.
#
# This has probably happened in /register/email/requestToken as well,
# but if a user hits this endpoint twice then clicks on each link from
# the two activation emails, they would register the same 3pid twice.
for login_type in [LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.MSISDN]:
if login_type in auth_result:
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medium = auth_result[login_type]["medium"]
address = auth_result[login_type]["address"]
existingUid = yield self.store.get_user_id_by_threepid(
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medium, address
)
if existingUid is not None:
raise SynapseError(
400,
"%s is already in use" % medium,
Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE,
)
registered_user_id = yield self.registration_handler.register_user(
localpart=desired_username,
password=new_password,
guest_access_token=guest_access_token,
threepid=threepid,
address=client_addr,
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)
# Necessary due to auth checks prior to the threepid being
# written to the db
if threepid:
if is_threepid_reserved(
self.hs.config.mau_limits_reserved_threepids, threepid
):
yield self.store.upsert_monthly_active_user(registered_user_id)
# remember that we've now registered that user account, and with
# what user ID (since the user may not have specified)
self.auth_handler.set_session_data(
session_id, "registered_user_id", registered_user_id
)
registered = True
return_dict = yield self._create_registration_details(
registered_user_id, params
)
if registered:
yield self.registration_handler.post_registration_actions(
user_id=registered_user_id,
auth_result=auth_result,
access_token=return_dict.get("access_token"),
bind_email=params.get("bind_email"),
bind_msisdn=params.get("bind_msisdn"),
)
return (200, return_dict)
def on_OPTIONS(self, _):
return 200, {}
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_appservice_registration(self, username, as_token, body):
user_id = yield self.registration_handler.appservice_register(
username, as_token
)
return (yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body))
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_shared_secret_registration(self, username, password, body):
if not self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret:
raise SynapseError(400, "Shared secret registration is not enabled")
if not username:
raise SynapseError(
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400, "username must be specified", errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON
)
# use the username from the original request rather than the
# downcased one in `username` for the mac calculation
user = body["username"].encode("utf-8")
# str() because otherwise hmac complains that 'unicode' does not
# have the buffer interface
got_mac = str(body["mac"])
# FIXME this is different to the /v1/register endpoint, which
# includes the password and admin flag in the hashed text. Why are
# these different?
want_mac = hmac.new(
key=self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret.encode(),
msg=user,
digestmod=sha1,
).hexdigest()
if not compare_digest(want_mac, got_mac):
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raise SynapseError(403, "HMAC incorrect")
user_id = yield self.registration_handler.register_user(
localpart=username, password=password
)
result = yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body)
return result
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _create_registration_details(self, user_id, params):
"""Complete registration of newly-registered user
Allocates device_id if one was not given; also creates access_token.
Args:
(str) user_id: full canonical @user:id
(object) params: registration parameters, from which we pull
device_id, initial_device_name and inhibit_login
Returns:
defer.Deferred: (object) dictionary for response from /register
"""
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result = {"user_id": user_id, "home_server": self.hs.hostname}
if not params.get("inhibit_login", False):
device_id = params.get("device_id")
initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name")
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device_id, access_token = yield self.registration_handler.register_device(
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user_id, device_id, initial_display_name, is_guest=False
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)
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result.update({"access_token": access_token, "device_id": device_id})
return result
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_guest_registration(self, params, address=None):
if not self.hs.config.allow_guest_access:
raise SynapseError(403, "Guest access is disabled")
user_id = yield self.registration_handler.register_user(
make_guest=True, address=address
)
# we don't allow guests to specify their own device_id, because
# we have nowhere to store it.
device_id = synapse.api.auth.GUEST_DEVICE_ID
initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name")
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device_id, access_token = yield self.registration_handler.register_device(
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user_id, device_id, initial_display_name, is_guest=True
)
return (
200,
{
"user_id": user_id,
"device_id": device_id,
"access_token": access_token,
"home_server": self.hs.hostname,
},
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)
def register_servlets(hs, http_server):
EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
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RegisterRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)