mirror of
https://git.anonymousland.org/anonymousland/synapse.git
synced 2024-10-01 11:49:51 -04:00
701 lines
26 KiB
Python
701 lines
26 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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from twisted.internet import defer
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from ._base import BaseHandler
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from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
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from synapse.types import UserID
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from synapse.api.errors import AuthError, LoginError, Codes, StoreError, SynapseError
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from synapse.util.async import run_on_reactor
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from twisted.web.client import PartialDownloadError
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import logging
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import bcrypt
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import pymacaroons
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import simplejson
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import synapse.util.stringutils as stringutils
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
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SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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def __init__(self, hs):
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"""
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Args:
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hs (synapse.server.HomeServer):
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"""
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super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs)
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self.checkers = {
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LoginType.PASSWORD: self._check_password_auth,
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LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._check_recaptcha,
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LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: self._check_email_identity,
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LoginType.DUMMY: self._check_dummy_auth,
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}
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self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
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self.sessions = {}
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account_handler = _AccountHandler(
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hs, check_user_exists=self.check_user_exists
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)
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self.password_providers = [
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module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler)
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for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
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]
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self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
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self.device_handler = hs.get_device_handler()
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip):
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"""
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Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
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protocol and handles the login flow.
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As a side effect, this function fills in the 'creds' key on the user's
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session with a map, which maps each auth-type (str) to the relevant
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identity authenticated by that auth-type (mostly str, but for captcha, bool).
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Args:
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flows (list): A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
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strings representing auth-types. At least one full
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flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
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clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
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'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
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clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
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Returns:
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A tuple of (authed, dict, dict, session_id) where authed is true if
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the client has successfully completed an auth flow. If it is true
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the first dict contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
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If authed is false, the first dictionary is the server response to
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the login request and should be passed back to the client.
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In either case, the second dict contains the parameters for this
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request (which may have been given only in a previous call).
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session_id is the ID of this session, either passed in by the client
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or assigned by the call to check_auth
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"""
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authdict = None
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sid = None
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if clientdict and 'auth' in clientdict:
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authdict = clientdict['auth']
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del clientdict['auth']
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if 'session' in authdict:
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sid = authdict['session']
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session = self._get_session_info(sid)
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if len(clientdict) > 0:
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# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
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# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
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# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
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# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
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# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
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# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
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# on a home server.
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# Revisit: Assumimg the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
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# isn't arbintrary.
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session['clientdict'] = clientdict
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self._save_session(session)
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elif 'clientdict' in session:
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clientdict = session['clientdict']
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if not authdict:
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defer.returnValue(
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(
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False, self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session),
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clientdict, session['id']
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)
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)
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if 'creds' not in session:
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session['creds'] = {}
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creds = session['creds']
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# check auth type currently being presented
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errordict = {}
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if 'type' in authdict:
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login_type = authdict['type']
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if login_type not in self.checkers:
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raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.UNRECOGNIZED)
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try:
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result = yield self.checkers[login_type](authdict, clientip)
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if result:
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creds[login_type] = result
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self._save_session(session)
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except LoginError, e:
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if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY:
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# riot used to have a bug where it would request a new
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# validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it
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# got a 401 with a 'flows' field.
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# (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447).
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#
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# Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid
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# breaking old riot deployments.
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raise e
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# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
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# so that the client can have another go.
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errordict = e.error_dict()
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for f in flows:
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if len(set(f) - set(creds.keys())) == 0:
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logger.info("Auth completed with creds: %r", creds)
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defer.returnValue((True, creds, clientdict, session['id']))
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ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session)
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ret['completed'] = creds.keys()
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ret.update(errordict)
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defer.returnValue((False, ret, clientdict, session['id']))
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype, authdict, clientip):
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"""
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Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
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session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
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"""
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if stagetype not in self.checkers:
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raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
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if 'session' not in authdict:
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raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
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sess = self._get_session_info(
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authdict['session']
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)
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if 'creds' not in sess:
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sess['creds'] = {}
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creds = sess['creds']
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result = yield self.checkers[stagetype](authdict, clientip)
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if result:
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creds[stagetype] = result
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self._save_session(sess)
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defer.returnValue(True)
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defer.returnValue(False)
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def get_session_id(self, clientdict):
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"""
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Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
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Args:
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clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
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Returns:
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str|None: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
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not send a session ID, returns None.
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"""
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sid = None
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if clientdict and 'auth' in clientdict:
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authdict = clientdict['auth']
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if 'session' in authdict:
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sid = authdict['session']
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return sid
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def set_session_data(self, session_id, key, value):
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"""
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Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
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request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
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the client.
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Args:
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session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
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key (string): The key to store the data under
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value (any): The data to store
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"""
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sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
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sess.setdefault('serverdict', {})[key] = value
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self._save_session(sess)
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def get_session_data(self, session_id, key, default=None):
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"""
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Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
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Args:
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session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
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key (string): The key to store the data under
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default (any): Value to return if the key has not been set
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"""
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sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
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return sess.setdefault('serverdict', {}).get(key, default)
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def _check_password_auth(self, authdict, _):
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if "user" not in authdict or "password" not in authdict:
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raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
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user_id = authdict["user"]
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password = authdict["password"]
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if not user_id.startswith('@'):
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user_id = UserID.create(user_id, self.hs.hostname).to_string()
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return self._check_password(user_id, password)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip):
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try:
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user_response = authdict["response"]
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except KeyError:
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# Client tried to provide captcha but didn't give the parameter:
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# bad request.
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raise LoginError(
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400, "Captcha response is required",
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errcode=Codes.CAPTCHA_NEEDED
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)
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logger.info(
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"Submitting recaptcha response %s with remoteip %s",
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user_response, clientip
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)
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# TODO: get this from the homeserver rather than creating a new one for
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# each request
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try:
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client = self.hs.get_simple_http_client()
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resp_body = yield client.post_urlencoded_get_json(
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self.hs.config.recaptcha_siteverify_api,
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args={
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'secret': self.hs.config.recaptcha_private_key,
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'response': user_response,
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'remoteip': clientip,
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}
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)
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except PartialDownloadError as pde:
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# Twisted is silly
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data = pde.response
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resp_body = simplejson.loads(data)
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if 'success' in resp_body:
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# Note that we do NOT check the hostname here: we explicitly
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# intend the CAPTCHA to be presented by whatever client the
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# user is using, we just care that they have completed a CAPTCHA.
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logger.info(
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"%s reCAPTCHA from hostname %s",
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"Successful" if resp_body['success'] else "Failed",
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resp_body.get('hostname')
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)
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if resp_body['success']:
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defer.returnValue(True)
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raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _check_email_identity(self, authdict, _):
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yield run_on_reactor()
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if 'threepid_creds' not in authdict:
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raise LoginError(400, "Missing threepid_creds", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
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threepid_creds = authdict['threepid_creds']
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identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
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logger.info("Getting validated threepid. threepidcreds: %r" % (threepid_creds,))
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threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds(threepid_creds)
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if not threepid:
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raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)
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threepid['threepid_creds'] = authdict['threepid_creds']
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defer.returnValue(threepid)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _check_dummy_auth(self, authdict, _):
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yield run_on_reactor()
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defer.returnValue(True)
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def _get_params_recaptcha(self):
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return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
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def _auth_dict_for_flows(self, flows, session):
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public_flows = []
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for f in flows:
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public_flows.append(f)
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get_params = {
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LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
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}
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params = {}
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for f in public_flows:
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for stage in f:
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if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
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params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
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return {
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"session": session['id'],
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"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
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"params": params
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}
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def _get_session_info(self, session_id):
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if session_id not in self.sessions:
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session_id = None
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if not session_id:
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# create a new session
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while session_id is None or session_id in self.sessions:
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session_id = stringutils.random_string(24)
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self.sessions[session_id] = {
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"id": session_id,
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}
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return self.sessions[session_id]
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def validate_password_login(self, user_id, password):
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"""
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Authenticates the user with their username and password.
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Used only by the v1 login API.
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Args:
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user_id (str): complete @user:id
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password (str): Password
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Returns:
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defer.Deferred: (str) canonical user id
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Raises:
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StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
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LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
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"""
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return self._check_password(user_id, password)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def get_login_tuple_for_user_id(self, user_id, device_id=None,
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initial_display_name=None):
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"""
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Gets login tuple for the user with the given user ID.
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Creates a new access/refresh token for the user.
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The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
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machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
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The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
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Args:
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user_id (str): canonical User ID
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device_id (str|None): the device ID to associate with the tokens.
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None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
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we should always have a device ID)
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initial_display_name (str): display name to associate with the
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device if it needs re-registering
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Returns:
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A tuple of:
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The access token for the user's session.
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The refresh token for the user's session.
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Raises:
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StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
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LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
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"""
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logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s", user_id, device_id)
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access_token = yield self.issue_access_token(user_id, device_id)
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refresh_token = yield self.issue_refresh_token(user_id, device_id)
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# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
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# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
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# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
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# device, so we double-check it here.
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if device_id is not None:
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yield self.device_handler.check_device_registered(
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user_id, device_id, initial_display_name
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)
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defer.returnValue((access_token, refresh_token))
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def check_user_exists(self, user_id):
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"""
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Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
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insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
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Args:
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(str) user_id: complete @user:id
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Returns:
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defer.Deferred: (str) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or
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multiple matches
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"""
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res = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
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if res is not None:
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defer.returnValue(res[0])
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defer.returnValue(None)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id):
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"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
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insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
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matches.
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Returns:
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tuple: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)`
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None: if there is not exactly one match
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"""
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user_infos = yield self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
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result = None
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if not user_infos:
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logger.warn("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
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elif len(user_infos) == 1:
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# a single match (possibly not exact)
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result = user_infos.popitem()
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elif user_id in user_infos:
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# multiple matches, but one is exact
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result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
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else:
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# multiple matches, none of them exact
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logger.warn(
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"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
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"inexactly: %r",
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user_id, user_infos.keys()
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)
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defer.returnValue(result)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _check_password(self, user_id, password):
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"""Authenticate a user against the LDAP and local databases.
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user_id is checked case insensitively against the local database, but
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will throw if there are multiple inexact matches.
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Args:
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user_id (str): complete @user:id
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Returns:
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(str) the canonical_user_id
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Raises:
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LoginError if login fails
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"""
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for provider in self.password_providers:
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is_valid = yield provider.check_password(user_id, password)
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if is_valid:
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defer.returnValue(user_id)
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canonical_user_id = yield self._check_local_password(user_id, password)
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if canonical_user_id:
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defer.returnValue(canonical_user_id)
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# unknown username or invalid password. We raise a 403 here, but note
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# that if we're doing user-interactive login, it turns all LoginErrors
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# into a 401 anyway.
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raise LoginError(
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403, "Invalid password",
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errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN
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)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _check_local_password(self, user_id, password):
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"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
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user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
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multiple inexact matches.
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Args:
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user_id (str): complete @user:id
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Returns:
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(str) the canonical_user_id, or None if unknown user / bad password
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"""
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lookupres = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
|
|
if not lookupres:
|
|
defer.returnValue(None)
|
|
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
|
|
result = self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
|
|
if not result:
|
|
logger.warn("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
|
|
defer.returnValue(None)
|
|
defer.returnValue(user_id)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def issue_access_token(self, user_id, device_id=None):
|
|
access_token = self.generate_access_token(user_id)
|
|
yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user(user_id, access_token,
|
|
device_id)
|
|
defer.returnValue(access_token)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def issue_refresh_token(self, user_id, device_id=None):
|
|
refresh_token = self.generate_refresh_token(user_id)
|
|
yield self.store.add_refresh_token_to_user(user_id, refresh_token,
|
|
device_id)
|
|
defer.returnValue(refresh_token)
|
|
|
|
def generate_access_token(self, user_id, extra_caveats=None,
|
|
duration_in_ms=(60 * 60 * 1000)):
|
|
extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
|
|
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
|
|
for caveat in extra_caveats:
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_refresh_token(self, user_id):
|
|
m = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
m.add_first_party_caveat("type = refresh")
|
|
# Important to add a nonce, because otherwise every refresh token for a
|
|
# user will be the same.
|
|
m.add_first_party_caveat("nonce = %s" % (
|
|
stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),
|
|
))
|
|
return m.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id, duration_in_ms=(2 * 60 * 1000)):
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
|
|
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id):
|
|
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
|
|
return macaroon.serialize()
|
|
|
|
def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token):
|
|
auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
|
|
try:
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token)
|
|
user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
|
|
auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", True, user_id)
|
|
return user_id
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
|
|
|
|
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id):
|
|
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
|
|
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
|
|
identifier="key",
|
|
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key)
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
|
|
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
|
|
return macaroon
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def set_password(self, user_id, newpassword, requester=None):
|
|
password_hash = self.hash(newpassword)
|
|
|
|
except_access_token_id = requester.access_token_id if requester else None
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
yield self.store.user_set_password_hash(user_id, password_hash)
|
|
except StoreError as e:
|
|
if e.code == 404:
|
|
raise SynapseError(404, "Unknown user", Codes.NOT_FOUND)
|
|
raise e
|
|
yield self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
|
|
user_id, except_access_token_id
|
|
)
|
|
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_user(
|
|
user_id, except_access_token_id
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
@defer.inlineCallbacks
|
|
def add_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, validated_at):
|
|
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
|
|
# We've now moving towards the Home Server being the entity that
|
|
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
|
|
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
|
|
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
|
|
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
|
|
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
|
|
# for the presenc eof an email address during password reset was
|
|
# case sensitive).
|
|
if medium == 'email':
|
|
address = address.lower()
|
|
|
|
yield self.store.user_add_threepid(
|
|
user_id, medium, address, validated_at,
|
|
self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def _save_session(self, session):
|
|
# TODO: Persistent storage
|
|
logger.debug("Saving session %s", session)
|
|
session["last_used"] = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
self.sessions[session["id"]] = session
|
|
self._prune_sessions()
|
|
|
|
def _prune_sessions(self):
|
|
for sid, sess in self.sessions.items():
|
|
last_used = 0
|
|
if 'last_used' in sess:
|
|
last_used = sess['last_used']
|
|
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
|
|
if last_used < now - AuthHandler.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS:
|
|
del self.sessions[sid]
|
|
|
|
def hash(self, password):
|
|
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password (str): Password to hash.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Hashed password (str).
|
|
"""
|
|
return bcrypt.hashpw(password + self.hs.config.password_pepper,
|
|
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds))
|
|
|
|
def validate_hash(self, password, stored_hash):
|
|
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
password (str): Password to hash.
|
|
stored_hash (str): Expected hash value.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash (bool).
|
|
"""
|
|
if stored_hash:
|
|
return bcrypt.hashpw(password + self.hs.config.password_pepper,
|
|
stored_hash.encode('utf-8')) == stored_hash
|
|
else:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _AccountHandler(object):
|
|
"""A proxy object that gets passed to password auth providers so they
|
|
can register new users etc if necessary.
|
|
"""
|
|
def __init__(self, hs, check_user_exists):
|
|
self.hs = hs
|
|
|
|
self._check_user_exists = check_user_exists
|
|
|
|
def check_user_exists(self, user_id):
|
|
"""Check if user exissts.
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Deferred(bool)
|
|
"""
|
|
return self._check_user_exists(user_id)
|
|
|
|
def register(self, localpart):
|
|
"""Registers a new user with given localpart
|
|
|
|
Returns:
|
|
Deferred: a 2-tuple of (user_id, access_token)
|
|
"""
|
|
reg = self.hs.get_handlers().registration_handler
|
|
return reg.register(localpart=localpart)
|