anonymousland-synapse/synapse/rest/client/v2_alpha/register.py

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2015 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
from twisted.internet import defer
import synapse
import synapse.types
from synapse.api.auth import get_access_token_from_request, has_access_token
from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
from synapse.types import RoomID, RoomAlias
from synapse.api.errors import SynapseError, Codes, UnrecognizedRequestError
from synapse.http.servlet import (
RestServlet, parse_json_object_from_request, assert_params_in_request, parse_string
)
from synapse.util.msisdn import phone_number_to_msisdn
from synapse.util.threepids import check_3pid_allowed
from ._base import client_v2_patterns, interactive_auth_handler
import logging
import hmac
from hashlib import sha1
from synapse.util.async import run_on_reactor
from synapse.util.ratelimitutils import FederationRateLimiter
# We ought to be using hmac.compare_digest() but on older pythons it doesn't
# exist. It's a _really minor_ security flaw to use plain string comparison
# because the timing attack is so obscured by all the other code here it's
# unlikely to make much difference
if hasattr(hmac, "compare_digest"):
compare_digest = hmac.compare_digest
else:
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def compare_digest(a, b):
return a == b
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/email/requestToken$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
assert_params_in_request(body, [
'id_server', 'client_secret', 'email', 'send_attempt'
])
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "email", body['email']):
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raise SynapseError(
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403, "Third party identifier is not allowed", Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
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)
existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
'email', body['email']
)
if existingUid is not None:
raise SynapseError(400, "Email is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE)
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestEmailToken(**body)
defer.returnValue((200, ret))
class MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/msisdn/requestToken$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
assert_params_in_request(body, [
'id_server', 'client_secret',
'country', 'phone_number',
'send_attempt',
])
msisdn = phone_number_to_msisdn(body['country'], body['phone_number'])
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, "msisdn", msisdn):
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raise SynapseError(
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403, "Third party identifier is not allowed", Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
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)
existingUid = yield self.hs.get_datastore().get_user_id_by_threepid(
'msisdn', msisdn
)
if existingUid is not None:
raise SynapseError(
400, "Phone number is already in use", Codes.THREEPID_IN_USE
)
ret = yield self.identity_handler.requestMsisdnToken(**body)
defer.returnValue((200, ret))
class UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register/available")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.registration_handler = hs.get_handlers().registration_handler
self.ratelimiter = FederationRateLimiter(
hs.get_clock(),
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# Time window of 2s
window_size=2000,
# Artificially delay requests if rate > sleep_limit/window_size
sleep_limit=1,
# Amount of artificial delay to apply
sleep_msec=1000,
# Error with 429 if more than reject_limit requests are queued
reject_limit=1,
# Allow 1 request at a time
concurrent_requests=1,
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_GET(self, request):
ip = self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
with self.ratelimiter.ratelimit(ip) as wait_deferred:
yield wait_deferred
username = parse_string(request, "username", required=True)
yield self.registration_handler.check_username(username)
defer.returnValue((200, {"available": True}))
class RegisterRestServlet(RestServlet):
PATTERNS = client_v2_patterns("/register$")
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer): server
"""
super(RegisterRestServlet, self).__init__()
self.hs = hs
self.auth = hs.get_auth()
self.store = hs.get_datastore()
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self.auth_handler = hs.get_auth_handler()
self.registration_handler = hs.get_handlers().registration_handler
self.identity_handler = hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
self.room_member_handler = hs.get_handlers().room_member_handler
self.device_handler = hs.get_device_handler()
self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
@interactive_auth_handler
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def on_POST(self, request):
yield run_on_reactor()
body = parse_json_object_from_request(request)
kind = "user"
if "kind" in request.args:
kind = request.args["kind"][0]
if kind == "guest":
ret = yield self._do_guest_registration(body)
defer.returnValue(ret)
return
elif kind != "user":
raise UnrecognizedRequestError(
"Do not understand membership kind: %s" % (kind,)
)
# we do basic sanity checks here because the auth layer will store these
# in sessions. Pull out the username/password provided to us.
desired_password = None
if 'password' in body:
if (not isinstance(body['password'], basestring) or
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len(body['password']) > 512):
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid password")
desired_password = body["password"]
desired_username = None
if 'username' in body:
if (not isinstance(body['username'], basestring) or
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len(body['username']) > 512):
raise SynapseError(400, "Invalid username")
desired_username = body['username']
appservice = None
if has_access_token(request):
appservice = yield self.auth.get_appservice_by_req(request)
# fork off as soon as possible for ASes and shared secret auth which
# have completely different registration flows to normal users
# == Application Service Registration ==
if appservice:
# Set the desired user according to the AS API (which uses the
# 'user' key not 'username'). Since this is a new addition, we'll
# fallback to 'username' if they gave one.
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desired_username = body.get("user", desired_username)
# XXX we should check that desired_username is valid. Currently
# we give appservices carte blanche for any insanity in mxids,
# because the IRC bridges rely on being able to register stupid
# IDs.
access_token = get_access_token_from_request(request)
if isinstance(desired_username, basestring):
result = yield self._do_appservice_registration(
desired_username, access_token, body
)
defer.returnValue((200, result)) # we throw for non 200 responses
return
# for either shared secret or regular registration, downcase the
# provided username before attempting to register it. This should mean
# that people who try to register with upper-case in their usernames
# don't get a nasty surprise. (Note that we treat username
# case-insenstively in login, so they are free to carry on imagining
# that their username is CrAzYh4cKeR if that keeps them happy)
if desired_username is not None:
desired_username = desired_username.lower()
# == Shared Secret Registration == (e.g. create new user scripts)
if 'mac' in body:
# FIXME: Should we really be determining if this is shared secret
# auth based purely on the 'mac' key?
result = yield self._do_shared_secret_registration(
desired_username, desired_password, body
)
defer.returnValue((200, result)) # we throw for non 200 responses
return
# == Normal User Registration == (everyone else)
if not self.hs.config.enable_registration:
raise SynapseError(403, "Registration has been disabled")
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guest_access_token = body.get("guest_access_token", None)
if (
'initial_device_display_name' in body and
'password' not in body
):
# ignore 'initial_device_display_name' if sent without
# a password to work around a client bug where it sent
# the 'initial_device_display_name' param alone, wiping out
# the original registration params
logger.warn("Ignoring initial_device_display_name without password")
del body['initial_device_display_name']
session_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_id(body)
registered_user_id = None
if session_id:
# if we get a registered user id out of here, it means we previously
# registered a user for this session, so we could just return the
# user here. We carry on and go through the auth checks though,
# for paranoia.
registered_user_id = self.auth_handler.get_session_data(
session_id, "registered_user_id", None
)
if desired_username is not None:
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yield self.registration_handler.check_username(
desired_username,
guest_access_token=guest_access_token,
assigned_user_id=registered_user_id,
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)
# Only give msisdn flows if the x_show_msisdn flag is given:
# this is a hack to work around the fact that clients were shipped
# that use fallback registration if they see any flows that they don't
# recognise, which means we break registration for these clients if we
# advertise msisdn flows. Once usage of Riot iOS <=0.3.9 and Riot
# Android <=0.6.9 have fallen below an acceptable threshold, this
# parameter should go away and we should always advertise msisdn flows.
show_msisdn = False
if 'x_show_msisdn' in body and body['x_show_msisdn']:
show_msisdn = True
# FIXME: need a better error than "no auth flow found" for scenarios
# where we required 3PID for registration but the user didn't give one
require_email = 'email' in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid
require_msisdn = 'msisdn' in self.hs.config.registrations_require_3pid
flows = []
if self.hs.config.enable_registration_captcha:
# only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required
if not require_email and not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.RECAPTCHA]])
# only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs
if not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.RECAPTCHA]])
if show_msisdn:
# only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs
if not require_email:
flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.RECAPTCHA]])
# always let users provide both MSISDN & email
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flows.extend([
[LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.RECAPTCHA],
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])
else:
# only support 3PIDless registration if no 3PIDs are required
if not require_email and not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.DUMMY]])
# only support the email-only flow if we don't require MSISDN 3PIDs
if not require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]])
if show_msisdn:
# only support the MSISDN-only flow if we don't require email 3PIDs
if not require_email or require_msisdn:
flows.extend([[LoginType.MSISDN]])
# always let users provide both MSISDN & email
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flows.extend([
[LoginType.MSISDN, LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]
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])
auth_result, params, session_id = yield self.auth_handler.check_auth(
flows, body, self.hs.get_ip_from_request(request)
)
# Check that we're not trying to register a denied 3pid.
#
# the user-facing checks will probably already have happened in
# /register/email/requestToken when we requested a 3pid, but that's not
# guaranteed.
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if auth_result:
for login_type in [LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY, LoginType.EMAIL_MSISDN]:
if login_type in auth_result:
medium = auth_result[login_type].threepid['medium']
address = auth_result[login_type].threepid['address']
if not check_3pid_allowed(self.hs, medium, address):
raise SynapseError(
403, "Third party identifier is not allowed",
Codes.THREEPID_DENIED,
)
if registered_user_id is not None:
logger.info(
"Already registered user ID %r for this session",
registered_user_id
)
# don't re-register the threepids
add_email = False
add_msisdn = False
else:
# NB: This may be from the auth handler and NOT from the POST
if 'password' not in params:
raise SynapseError(400, "Missing password.",
Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
desired_username = params.get("username", None)
new_password = params.get("password", None)
guest_access_token = params.get("guest_access_token", None)
if desired_username is not None:
desired_username = desired_username.lower()
(registered_user_id, _) = yield self.registration_handler.register(
localpart=desired_username,
password=new_password,
guest_access_token=guest_access_token,
generate_token=False,
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)
# auto-join the user to any rooms we're supposed to dump them into
fake_requester = synapse.types.create_requester(registered_user_id)
for r in self.hs.config.auto_join_rooms:
try:
yield self._join_user_to_room(fake_requester, r)
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Failed to join new user to %r: %r", r, e)
# remember that we've now registered that user account, and with
# what user ID (since the user may not have specified)
self.auth_handler.set_session_data(
session_id, "registered_user_id", registered_user_id
)
add_email = True
add_msisdn = True
return_dict = yield self._create_registration_details(
registered_user_id, params
)
if add_email and auth_result and LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY in auth_result:
threepid = auth_result[LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY]
yield self._register_email_threepid(
registered_user_id, threepid, return_dict["access_token"],
params.get("bind_email")
)
if add_msisdn and auth_result and LoginType.MSISDN in auth_result:
threepid = auth_result[LoginType.MSISDN]
yield self._register_msisdn_threepid(
registered_user_id, threepid, return_dict["access_token"],
params.get("bind_msisdn")
)
defer.returnValue((200, return_dict))
def on_OPTIONS(self, _):
return 200, {}
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _join_user_to_room(self, requester, room_identifier):
room_id = None
if RoomID.is_valid(room_identifier):
room_id = room_identifier
elif RoomAlias.is_valid(room_identifier):
room_alias = RoomAlias.from_string(room_identifier)
room_id, remote_room_hosts = (
yield self.room_member_handler.lookup_room_alias(room_alias)
)
room_id = room_id.to_string()
else:
raise SynapseError(400, "%s was not legal room ID or room alias" % (
room_identifier,
))
yield self.room_member_handler.update_membership(
requester=requester,
target=requester.user,
room_id=room_id,
action="join",
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_appservice_registration(self, username, as_token, body):
user_id = yield self.registration_handler.appservice_register(
username, as_token
)
defer.returnValue((yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body)))
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_shared_secret_registration(self, username, password, body):
if not self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret:
raise SynapseError(400, "Shared secret registration is not enabled")
if not username:
raise SynapseError(
400, "username must be specified", errcode=Codes.BAD_JSON,
)
# use the username from the original request rather than the
# downcased one in `username` for the mac calculation
user = body["username"].encode("utf-8")
# str() because otherwise hmac complains that 'unicode' does not
# have the buffer interface
got_mac = str(body["mac"])
# FIXME this is different to the /v1/register endpoint, which
# includes the password and admin flag in the hashed text. Why are
# these different?
want_mac = hmac.new(
key=self.hs.config.registration_shared_secret,
msg=user,
digestmod=sha1,
).hexdigest()
if not compare_digest(want_mac, got_mac):
raise SynapseError(
403, "HMAC incorrect",
)
(user_id, _) = yield self.registration_handler.register(
localpart=username, password=password, generate_token=False,
)
result = yield self._create_registration_details(user_id, body)
defer.returnValue(result)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _register_email_threepid(self, user_id, threepid, token, bind_email):
"""Add an email address as a 3pid identifier
Also adds an email pusher for the email address, if configured in the
HS config
Also optionally binds emails to the given user_id on the identity server
Args:
user_id (str): id of user
threepid (object): m.login.email.identity auth response
token (str): access_token for the user
bind_email (bool): true if the client requested the email to be
bound at the identity server
Returns:
defer.Deferred:
"""
reqd = ('medium', 'address', 'validated_at')
if any(x not in threepid for x in reqd):
# This will only happen if the ID server returns a malformed response
logger.info("Can't add incomplete 3pid")
return
yield self.auth_handler.add_threepid(
user_id,
threepid['medium'],
threepid['address'],
threepid['validated_at'],
)
# And we add an email pusher for them by default, but only
# if email notifications are enabled (so people don't start
# getting mail spam where they weren't before if email
# notifs are set up on a home server)
if (self.hs.config.email_enable_notifs and
self.hs.config.email_notif_for_new_users):
# Pull the ID of the access token back out of the db
# It would really make more sense for this to be passed
# up when the access token is saved, but that's quite an
# invasive change I'd rather do separately.
user_tuple = yield self.store.get_user_by_access_token(
token
)
token_id = user_tuple["token_id"]
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().add_pusher(
user_id=user_id,
access_token=token_id,
kind="email",
app_id="m.email",
app_display_name="Email Notifications",
device_display_name=threepid["address"],
pushkey=threepid["address"],
lang=None, # We don't know a user's language here
data={},
)
if bind_email:
logger.info("bind_email specified: binding")
logger.debug("Binding emails %s to %s" % (
threepid, user_id
))
yield self.identity_handler.bind_threepid(
threepid['threepid_creds'], user_id
)
else:
logger.info("bind_email not specified: not binding email")
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _register_msisdn_threepid(self, user_id, threepid, token, bind_msisdn):
"""Add a phone number as a 3pid identifier
Also optionally binds msisdn to the given user_id on the identity server
Args:
user_id (str): id of user
threepid (object): m.login.msisdn auth response
token (str): access_token for the user
bind_email (bool): true if the client requested the email to be
bound at the identity server
Returns:
defer.Deferred:
"""
reqd = ('medium', 'address', 'validated_at')
if any(x not in threepid for x in reqd):
# This will only happen if the ID server returns a malformed response
logger.info("Can't add incomplete 3pid")
defer.returnValue()
yield self.auth_handler.add_threepid(
user_id,
threepid['medium'],
threepid['address'],
threepid['validated_at'],
)
if bind_msisdn:
logger.info("bind_msisdn specified: binding")
logger.debug("Binding msisdn %s to %s", threepid, user_id)
yield self.identity_handler.bind_threepid(
threepid['threepid_creds'], user_id
)
else:
logger.info("bind_msisdn not specified: not binding msisdn")
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _create_registration_details(self, user_id, params):
"""Complete registration of newly-registered user
Allocates device_id if one was not given; also creates access_token.
Args:
(str) user_id: full canonical @user:id
(object) params: registration parameters, from which we pull
device_id, initial_device_name and inhibit_login
Returns:
defer.Deferred: (object) dictionary for response from /register
"""
result = {
"user_id": user_id,
"home_server": self.hs.hostname,
}
if not params.get("inhibit_login", False):
device_id = yield self._register_device(user_id, params)
access_token = (
yield self.auth_handler.get_access_token_for_user_id(
user_id, device_id=device_id,
)
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)
result.update({
"access_token": access_token,
"device_id": device_id,
})
defer.returnValue(result)
def _register_device(self, user_id, params):
"""Register a device for a user.
This is called after the user's credentials have been validated, but
before the access token has been issued.
Args:
(str) user_id: full canonical @user:id
(object) params: registration parameters, from which we pull
device_id and initial_device_name
Returns:
defer.Deferred: (str) device_id
"""
# register the user's device
device_id = params.get("device_id")
initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name")
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return self.device_handler.check_device_registered(
user_id, device_id, initial_display_name
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _do_guest_registration(self, params):
if not self.hs.config.allow_guest_access:
defer.returnValue((403, "Guest access is disabled"))
user_id, _ = yield self.registration_handler.register(
generate_token=False,
make_guest=True
)
# we don't allow guests to specify their own device_id, because
# we have nowhere to store it.
device_id = synapse.api.auth.GUEST_DEVICE_ID
initial_display_name = params.get("initial_device_display_name")
yield self.device_handler.check_device_registered(
user_id, device_id, initial_display_name
)
access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(
user_id, ["guest = true"]
)
defer.returnValue((200, {
"user_id": user_id,
"device_id": device_id,
"access_token": access_token,
"home_server": self.hs.hostname,
}))
def register_servlets(hs, http_server):
EmailRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
MsisdnRegisterRequestTokenRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
UsernameAvailabilityRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)
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RegisterRestServlet(hs).register(http_server)