anonymousland-synapse/synapse/handlers/auth.py

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2014 - 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
# Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
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import logging
import unicodedata
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import attr
import bcrypt
import pymacaroons
from canonicaljson import json
from twisted.internet import defer
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from twisted.web.client import PartialDownloadError
import synapse.util.stringutils as stringutils
from synapse.api.constants import LoginType
from synapse.api.errors import (
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AuthError,
Codes,
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError,
LoginError,
StoreError,
SynapseError,
)
from synapse.api.ratelimiting import Ratelimiter
from synapse.module_api import ModuleApi
from synapse.types import UserID
from synapse.util import logcontext
from synapse.util.caches.expiringcache import ExpiringCache
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from ._base import BaseHandler
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class AuthHandler(BaseHandler):
SESSION_EXPIRE_MS = 48 * 60 * 60 * 1000
def __init__(self, hs):
"""
Args:
hs (synapse.server.HomeServer):
"""
super(AuthHandler, self).__init__(hs)
self.checkers = {
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._check_recaptcha,
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LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY: self._check_email_identity,
LoginType.MSISDN: self._check_msisdn,
LoginType.DUMMY: self._check_dummy_auth,
LoginType.TERMS: self._check_terms_auth,
}
self.bcrypt_rounds = hs.config.bcrypt_rounds
# This is not a cache per se, but a store of all current sessions that
# expire after N hours
self.sessions = ExpiringCache(
cache_name="register_sessions",
clock=hs.get_clock(),
expiry_ms=self.SESSION_EXPIRE_MS,
reset_expiry_on_get=True,
)
account_handler = ModuleApi(hs, self)
self.password_providers = [
module(config=config, account_handler=account_handler)
for module, config in hs.config.password_providers
]
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logger.info("Extra password_providers: %r", self.password_providers)
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self.hs = hs # FIXME better possibility to access registrationHandler later?
self.macaroon_gen = hs.get_macaroon_generator()
self._password_enabled = hs.config.password_enabled
# we keep this as a list despite the O(N^2) implication so that we can
# keep PASSWORD first and avoid confusing clients which pick the first
# type in the list. (NB that the spec doesn't require us to do so and
# clients which favour types that they don't understand over those that
# they do are technically broken)
login_types = []
if self._password_enabled:
login_types.append(LoginType.PASSWORD)
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types"):
for t in provider.get_supported_login_types().keys():
if t not in login_types:
login_types.append(t)
self._supported_login_types = login_types
self._account_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter()
self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter = Ratelimiter()
self._clock = self.hs.get_clock()
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_user_via_ui_auth(self, requester, request_body, clientip):
"""
Checks that the user is who they claim to be, via a UI auth.
This is used for things like device deletion and password reset where
the user already has a valid access token, but we want to double-check
that it isn't stolen by re-authenticating them.
Args:
requester (Requester): The user, as given by the access token
request_body (dict): The body of the request sent by the client
clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
Returns:
defer.Deferred[dict]: the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
any of the permitted login flows
AuthError if the client has completed a login flow, and it gives
a different user to `requester`
"""
# build a list of supported flows
flows = [
[login_type] for login_type in self._supported_login_types
]
result, params, _ = yield self.check_auth(
flows, request_body, clientip,
)
# find the completed login type
for login_type in self._supported_login_types:
if login_type not in result:
continue
user_id = result[login_type]
break
else:
# this can't happen
raise Exception(
"check_auth returned True but no successful login type",
)
# check that the UI auth matched the access token
if user_id != requester.user.to_string():
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid auth")
defer.returnValue(params)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_auth(self, flows, clientdict, clientip):
"""
Takes a dictionary sent by the client in the login / registration
protocol and handles the User-Interactive Auth flow.
As a side effect, this function fills in the 'creds' key on the user's
session with a map, which maps each auth-type (str) to the relevant
identity authenticated by that auth-type (mostly str, but for captcha, bool).
If no auth flows have been completed successfully, raises an
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError. To handle this, you can use
synapse.rest.client.v2_alpha._base.interactive_auth_handler as a
decorator.
Args:
flows (list): A list of login flows. Each flow is an ordered list of
strings representing auth-types. At least one full
flow must be completed in order for auth to be successful.
clientdict: The dictionary from the client root level, not the
'auth' key: this method prompts for auth if none is sent.
clientip (str): The IP address of the client.
Returns:
defer.Deferred[dict, dict, str]: a deferred tuple of
(creds, params, session_id).
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'creds' contains the authenticated credentials of each stage.
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'params' contains the parameters for this request (which may
have been given only in a previous call).
'session_id' is the ID of this session, either passed in by the
client or assigned by this call
Raises:
InteractiveAuthIncompleteError if the client has not yet completed
all the stages in any of the permitted flows.
"""
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authdict = None
sid = None
if clientdict and 'auth' in clientdict:
authdict = clientdict['auth']
del clientdict['auth']
if 'session' in authdict:
sid = authdict['session']
session = self._get_session_info(sid)
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if len(clientdict) > 0:
# This was designed to allow the client to omit the parameters
# and just supply the session in subsequent calls so it split
# auth between devices by just sharing the session, (eg. so you
# could continue registration from your phone having clicked the
# email auth link on there). It's probably too open to abuse
# because it lets unauthenticated clients store arbitrary objects
# on a home server.
# Revisit: Assumimg the REST APIs do sensible validation, the data
# isn't arbintrary.
session['clientdict'] = clientdict
self._save_session(session)
elif 'clientdict' in session:
clientdict = session['clientdict']
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if not authdict:
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session),
)
if 'creds' not in session:
session['creds'] = {}
creds = session['creds']
# check auth type currently being presented
errordict = {}
if 'type' in authdict:
login_type = authdict['type']
try:
result = yield self._check_auth_dict(authdict, clientip)
if result:
creds[login_type] = result
self._save_session(session)
except LoginError as e:
if login_type == LoginType.EMAIL_IDENTITY:
# riot used to have a bug where it would request a new
# validation token (thus sending a new email) each time it
# got a 401 with a 'flows' field.
# (https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2447).
#
# Grandfather in the old behaviour for now to avoid
# breaking old riot deployments.
raise
# this step failed. Merge the error dict into the response
# so that the client can have another go.
errordict = e.error_dict()
for f in flows:
if len(set(f) - set(creds)) == 0:
# it's very useful to know what args are stored, but this can
# include the password in the case of registering, so only log
# the keys (confusingly, clientdict may contain a password
# param, creds is just what the user authed as for UI auth
# and is not sensitive).
logger.info(
"Auth completed with creds: %r. Client dict has keys: %r",
creds, list(clientdict)
)
defer.returnValue((creds, clientdict, session['id']))
ret = self._auth_dict_for_flows(flows, session)
ret['completed'] = list(creds)
ret.update(errordict)
raise InteractiveAuthIncompleteError(
ret,
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def add_oob_auth(self, stagetype, authdict, clientip):
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"""
Adds the result of out-of-band authentication into an existing auth
session. Currently used for adding the result of fallback auth.
"""
if stagetype not in self.checkers:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
if 'session' not in authdict:
raise LoginError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
sess = self._get_session_info(
authdict['session']
)
if 'creds' not in sess:
sess['creds'] = {}
creds = sess['creds']
result = yield self.checkers[stagetype](authdict, clientip)
if result:
creds[stagetype] = result
self._save_session(sess)
defer.returnValue(True)
defer.returnValue(False)
def get_session_id(self, clientdict):
"""
Gets the session ID for a client given the client dictionary
Args:
clientdict: The dictionary sent by the client in the request
Returns:
str|None: The string session ID the client sent. If the client did
not send a session ID, returns None.
"""
sid = None
if clientdict and 'auth' in clientdict:
authdict = clientdict['auth']
if 'session' in authdict:
sid = authdict['session']
return sid
def set_session_data(self, session_id, key, value):
"""
Store a key-value pair into the sessions data associated with this
request. This data is stored server-side and cannot be modified by
the client.
Args:
session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key (string): The key to store the data under
value (any): The data to store
"""
sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
sess.setdefault('serverdict', {})[key] = value
self._save_session(sess)
def get_session_data(self, session_id, key, default=None):
"""
Retrieve data stored with set_session_data
Args:
session_id (string): The ID of this session as returned from check_auth
key (string): The key to store the data under
default (any): Value to return if the key has not been set
"""
sess = self._get_session_info(session_id)
return sess.setdefault('serverdict', {}).get(key, default)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_auth_dict(self, authdict, clientip):
"""Attempt to validate the auth dict provided by a client
Args:
authdict (object): auth dict provided by the client
clientip (str): IP address of the client
Returns:
Deferred: result of the stage verification.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
"""
login_type = authdict['type']
checker = self.checkers.get(login_type)
if checker is not None:
res = yield checker(authdict, clientip)
defer.returnValue(res)
# build a v1-login-style dict out of the authdict and fall back to the
# v1 code
user_id = authdict.get("user")
if user_id is None:
raise SynapseError(400, "", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
(canonical_id, callback) = yield self.validate_login(user_id, authdict)
defer.returnValue(canonical_id)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_recaptcha(self, authdict, clientip):
try:
user_response = authdict["response"]
except KeyError:
# Client tried to provide captcha but didn't give the parameter:
# bad request.
raise LoginError(
400, "Captcha response is required",
errcode=Codes.CAPTCHA_NEEDED
)
logger.info(
"Submitting recaptcha response %s with remoteip %s",
user_response, clientip
)
# TODO: get this from the homeserver rather than creating a new one for
# each request
try:
client = self.hs.get_simple_http_client()
resp_body = yield client.post_urlencoded_get_json(
self.hs.config.recaptcha_siteverify_api,
args={
'secret': self.hs.config.recaptcha_private_key,
'response': user_response,
'remoteip': clientip,
}
)
except PartialDownloadError as pde:
# Twisted is silly
data = pde.response
resp_body = json.loads(data)
if 'success' in resp_body:
# Note that we do NOT check the hostname here: we explicitly
# intend the CAPTCHA to be presented by whatever client the
# user is using, we just care that they have completed a CAPTCHA.
logger.info(
"%s reCAPTCHA from hostname %s",
"Successful" if resp_body['success'] else "Failed",
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resp_body.get('hostname')
)
if resp_body['success']:
defer.returnValue(True)
raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)
def _check_email_identity(self, authdict, _):
return self._check_threepid('email', authdict)
def _check_msisdn(self, authdict, _):
return self._check_threepid('msisdn', authdict)
def _check_dummy_auth(self, authdict, _):
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return defer.succeed(True)
def _check_terms_auth(self, authdict, _):
return defer.succeed(True)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_threepid(self, medium, authdict):
if 'threepid_creds' not in authdict:
raise LoginError(400, "Missing threepid_creds", Codes.MISSING_PARAM)
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threepid_creds = authdict['threepid_creds']
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identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
logger.info("Getting validated threepid. threepidcreds: %r", (threepid_creds,))
threepid = yield identity_handler.threepid_from_creds(threepid_creds)
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if not threepid:
raise LoginError(401, "", errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED)
if threepid['medium'] != medium:
raise LoginError(
401,
"Expecting threepid of type '%s', got '%s'" % (
medium, threepid['medium'],
),
errcode=Codes.UNAUTHORIZED
)
threepid['threepid_creds'] = authdict['threepid_creds']
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defer.returnValue(threepid)
def _get_params_recaptcha(self):
return {"public_key": self.hs.config.recaptcha_public_key}
def _get_params_terms(self):
return {
"policies": {
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"privacy_policy": {
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"version": self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
"en": {
"name": self.hs.config.user_consent_policy_name,
"url": "%s_matrix/consent?v=%s" % (
self.hs.config.public_baseurl,
self.hs.config.user_consent_version,
),
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},
},
},
}
def _auth_dict_for_flows(self, flows, session):
public_flows = []
for f in flows:
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public_flows.append(f)
get_params = {
LoginType.RECAPTCHA: self._get_params_recaptcha,
LoginType.TERMS: self._get_params_terms,
}
params = {}
for f in public_flows:
for stage in f:
if stage in get_params and stage not in params:
params[stage] = get_params[stage]()
return {
"session": session['id'],
"flows": [{"stages": f} for f in public_flows],
"params": params
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}
def _get_session_info(self, session_id):
if session_id not in self.sessions:
session_id = None
if not session_id:
# create a new session
while session_id is None or session_id in self.sessions:
session_id = stringutils.random_string(24)
self.sessions[session_id] = {
"id": session_id,
}
return self.sessions[session_id]
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
def get_access_token_for_user_id(self, user_id, device_id=None):
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"""
Creates a new access token for the user with the given user ID.
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The user is assumed to have been authenticated by some other
machanism (e.g. CAS), and the user_id converted to the canonical case.
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The device will be recorded in the table if it is not there already.
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Args:
user_id (str): canonical User ID
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device_id (str|None): the device ID to associate with the tokens.
None to leave the tokens unassociated with a device (deprecated:
we should always have a device ID)
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Returns:
The access token for the user's session.
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem storing the token.
"""
logger.info("Logging in user %s on device %s", user_id, device_id)
access_token = yield self.issue_access_token(user_id, device_id)
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yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
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# the device *should* have been registered before we got here; however,
# it's possible we raced against a DELETE operation. The thing we
# really don't want is active access_tokens without a record of the
# device, so we double-check it here.
if device_id is not None:
try:
yield self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id)
except StoreError:
yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
raise StoreError(400, "Login raced against device deletion")
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defer.returnValue(access_token)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_user_exists(self, user_id):
"""
Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but return None if there are multiple inexact matches.
Args:
(unicode|bytes) user_id: complete @user:id
Returns:
defer.Deferred: (unicode) canonical_user_id, or None if zero or
multiple matches
Raises:
LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this
user is too high too proceed.
"""
self.ratelimit_login_per_account(user_id)
res = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if res is not None:
defer.returnValue(res[0])
defer.returnValue(None)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
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def _find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(self, user_id):
"""Checks to see if a user with the given id exists. Will check case
insensitively, but will return None if there are multiple inexact
matches.
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Returns:
tuple: A 2-tuple of `(canonical_user_id, password_hash)`
None: if there is not exactly one match
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"""
user_infos = yield self.store.get_users_by_id_case_insensitive(user_id)
result = None
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if not user_infos:
logger.warn("Attempted to login as %s but they do not exist", user_id)
elif len(user_infos) == 1:
# a single match (possibly not exact)
result = user_infos.popitem()
elif user_id in user_infos:
# multiple matches, but one is exact
result = (user_id, user_infos[user_id])
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else:
# multiple matches, none of them exact
logger.warn(
"Attempted to login as %s but it matches more than one user "
"inexactly: %r",
user_id, user_infos.keys()
)
defer.returnValue(result)
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def get_supported_login_types(self):
"""Get a the login types supported for the /login API
By default this is just 'm.login.password' (unless password_enabled is
False in the config file), but password auth providers can provide
other login types.
Returns:
Iterable[str]: login types
"""
return self._supported_login_types
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_login(self, username, login_submission):
"""Authenticates the user for the /login API
Also used by the user-interactive auth flow to validate
m.login.password auth types.
Args:
username (str): username supplied by the user
login_submission (dict): the whole of the login submission
(including 'type' and other relevant fields)
Returns:
Deferred[str, func]: canonical user id, and optional callback
to be called once the access token and device id are issued
Raises:
StoreError if there was a problem accessing the database
SynapseError if there was a problem with the request
LoginError if there was an authentication problem.
LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this
user is too high too proceed.
"""
if username.startswith('@'):
qualified_user_id = username
else:
qualified_user_id = UserID(
username, self.hs.hostname
).to_string()
self.ratelimit_login_per_account(qualified_user_id)
login_type = login_submission.get("type")
known_login_type = False
# special case to check for "password" for the check_password interface
# for the auth providers
password = login_submission.get("password")
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
if not self._password_enabled:
raise SynapseError(400, "Password login has been disabled.")
if not password:
raise SynapseError(400, "Missing parameter: password")
for provider in self.password_providers:
if (hasattr(provider, "check_password")
and login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD):
known_login_type = True
is_valid = yield provider.check_password(
qualified_user_id, password,
)
if is_valid:
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defer.returnValue((qualified_user_id, None))
if (not hasattr(provider, "get_supported_login_types")
or not hasattr(provider, "check_auth")):
# this password provider doesn't understand custom login types
continue
supported_login_types = provider.get_supported_login_types()
if login_type not in supported_login_types:
# this password provider doesn't understand this login type
continue
known_login_type = True
login_fields = supported_login_types[login_type]
missing_fields = []
login_dict = {}
for f in login_fields:
if f not in login_submission:
missing_fields.append(f)
else:
login_dict[f] = login_submission[f]
if missing_fields:
raise SynapseError(
400, "Missing parameters for login type %s: %s" % (
login_type,
missing_fields,
),
)
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result = yield provider.check_auth(
username, login_type, login_dict,
)
if result:
if isinstance(result, str):
result = (result, None)
defer.returnValue(result)
if login_type == LoginType.PASSWORD:
known_login_type = True
canonical_user_id = yield self._check_local_password(
qualified_user_id, password,
)
if canonical_user_id:
defer.returnValue((canonical_user_id, None))
if not known_login_type:
raise SynapseError(400, "Unknown login type %s" % login_type)
# unknown username or invalid password.
self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
qualified_user_id.lower(), time_now_s=self._clock.time(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
update=True,
)
# We raise a 403 here, but note that if we're doing user-interactive
# login, it turns all LoginErrors into a 401 anyway.
raise LoginError(
403, "Invalid password",
errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def check_password_provider_3pid(self, medium, address, password):
"""Check if a password provider is able to validate a thirdparty login
Args:
medium (str): The medium of the 3pid (ex. email).
address (str): The address of the 3pid (ex. jdoe@example.com).
password (str): The password of the user.
Returns:
Deferred[(str|None, func|None)]: A tuple of `(user_id,
callback)`. If authentication is successful, `user_id` is a `str`
containing the authenticated, canonical user ID. `callback` is
then either a function to be later run after the server has
completed login/registration, or `None`. If authentication was
unsuccessful, `user_id` and `callback` are both `None`.
"""
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "check_3pid_auth"):
# This function is able to return a deferred that either
# resolves None, meaning authentication failure, or upon
# success, to a str (which is the user_id) or a tuple of
# (user_id, callback_func), where callback_func should be run
# after we've finished everything else
result = yield provider.check_3pid_auth(
medium, address, password,
)
if result:
# Check if the return value is a str or a tuple
if isinstance(result, str):
# If it's a str, set callback function to None
result = (result, None)
defer.returnValue(result)
defer.returnValue((None, None))
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def _check_local_password(self, user_id, password):
"""Authenticate a user against the local password database.
user_id is checked case insensitively, but will return None if there are
multiple inexact matches.
Args:
user_id (unicode): complete @user:id
password (unicode): the provided password
Returns:
Deferred[unicode] the canonical_user_id, or Deferred[None] if
unknown user/bad password
Raises:
LimitExceededError if the ratelimiter's login requests count for this
user is too high too proceed.
"""
lookupres = yield self._find_user_id_and_pwd_hash(user_id)
if not lookupres:
defer.returnValue(None)
(user_id, password_hash) = lookupres
result = yield self.validate_hash(password, password_hash)
if not result:
logger.warn("Failed password login for user %s", user_id)
defer.returnValue(None)
defer.returnValue(user_id)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def issue_access_token(self, user_id, device_id=None):
access_token = self.macaroon_gen.generate_access_token(user_id)
yield self.store.add_access_token_to_user(user_id, access_token,
device_id)
defer.returnValue(access_token)
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@defer.inlineCallbacks
def validate_short_term_login_token_and_get_user_id(self, login_token):
auth_api = self.hs.get_auth()
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user_id = None
try:
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon.deserialize(login_token)
user_id = auth_api.get_user_id_from_macaroon(macaroon)
auth_api.validate_macaroon(macaroon, "login", True, user_id)
except Exception:
raise AuthError(403, "Invalid token", errcode=Codes.FORBIDDEN)
self.ratelimit_login_per_account(user_id)
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yield self.auth.check_auth_blocking(user_id)
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defer.returnValue(user_id)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_access_token(self, access_token):
"""Invalidate a single access token
Args:
access_token (str): access token to be deleted
Returns:
Deferred
"""
user_info = yield self.auth.get_user_by_access_token(access_token)
yield self.store.delete_access_token(access_token)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
yield provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=str(user_info["user"]),
device_id=user_info["device_id"],
access_token=access_token,
)
# delete pushers associated with this access token
if user_info["token_id"] is not None:
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
str(user_info["user"]), (user_info["token_id"], )
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_access_tokens_for_user(self, user_id, except_token_id=None,
device_id=None):
"""Invalidate access tokens belonging to a user
Args:
user_id (str): ID of user the tokens belong to
except_token_id (str|None): access_token ID which should *not* be
deleted
device_id (str|None): ID of device the tokens are associated with.
If None, tokens associated with any device (or no device) will
be deleted
Returns:
Deferred
"""
tokens_and_devices = yield self.store.user_delete_access_tokens(
user_id, except_token_id=except_token_id, device_id=device_id,
)
# see if any of our auth providers want to know about this
for provider in self.password_providers:
if hasattr(provider, "on_logged_out"):
for token, token_id, device_id in tokens_and_devices:
yield provider.on_logged_out(
user_id=user_id,
device_id=device_id,
access_token=token,
)
# delete pushers associated with the access tokens
yield self.hs.get_pusherpool().remove_pushers_by_access_token(
user_id, (token_id for _, token_id, _ in tokens_and_devices),
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def add_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, validated_at):
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses down to lower case.
# We've now moving towards the Home Server being the entity that
# is responsible for validating threepids used for resetting passwords
# on accounts, so in future Synapse will gain knowledge of specific
# types (mediums) of threepid. For now, we still use the existing
# infrastructure, but this is the start of synapse gaining knowledge
# of specific types of threepid (and fixes the fact that checking
2016-12-21 04:44:03 -05:00
# for the presence of an email address during password reset was
# case sensitive).
if medium == 'email':
address = address.lower()
yield self.store.user_add_threepid(
user_id, medium, address, validated_at,
self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
)
@defer.inlineCallbacks
def delete_threepid(self, user_id, medium, address, id_server=None):
"""Attempts to unbind the 3pid on the identity servers and deletes it
from the local database.
Args:
user_id (str)
medium (str)
address (str)
id_server (str|None): Use the given identity server when unbinding
any threepids. If None then will attempt to unbind using the
identity server specified when binding (if known).
Returns:
Deferred[bool]: Returns True if successfully unbound the 3pid on
the identity server, False if identity server doesn't support the
unbind API.
"""
# 'Canonicalise' email addresses as per above
if medium == 'email':
address = address.lower()
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identity_handler = self.hs.get_handlers().identity_handler
result = yield identity_handler.try_unbind_threepid(
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user_id,
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{
'medium': medium,
'address': address,
'id_server': id_server,
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},
)
yield self.store.user_delete_threepid(
user_id, medium, address,
)
defer.returnValue(result)
def _save_session(self, session):
# TODO: Persistent storage
logger.debug("Saving session %s", session)
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session["last_used"] = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
self.sessions[session["id"]] = session
def hash(self, password):
"""Computes a secure hash of password.
Args:
password (unicode): Password to hash.
Returns:
Deferred(unicode): Hashed password.
"""
def _do_hash():
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.hashpw(
pw.encode('utf8') + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
bcrypt.gensalt(self.bcrypt_rounds),
).decode('ascii')
return logcontext.defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_hash)
def validate_hash(self, password, stored_hash):
"""Validates that self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
Args:
password (unicode): Password to hash.
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stored_hash (bytes): Expected hash value.
Returns:
Deferred(bool): Whether self.hash(password) == stored_hash.
"""
def _do_validate_hash():
# Normalise the Unicode in the password
pw = unicodedata.normalize("NFKC", password)
return bcrypt.checkpw(
pw.encode('utf8') + self.hs.config.password_pepper.encode("utf8"),
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stored_hash
)
if stored_hash:
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if not isinstance(stored_hash, bytes):
stored_hash = stored_hash.encode('ascii')
return logcontext.defer_to_thread(self.hs.get_reactor(), _do_validate_hash)
else:
return defer.succeed(False)
def ratelimit_login_per_account(self, user_id):
"""Checks whether the process must be stopped because of ratelimiting.
Checks against two ratelimiters: the generic one for login attempts per
account and the one specific to failed attempts.
Args:
user_id (unicode): complete @user:id
Raises:
LimitExceededError if one of the ratelimiters' login requests count
for this user is too high too proceed.
"""
self._failed_attempts_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
user_id.lower(), time_now_s=self._clock.time(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_failed_attempts.burst_count,
update=False,
)
self._account_ratelimiter.ratelimit(
user_id.lower(), time_now_s=self._clock.time(),
rate_hz=self.hs.config.rc_login_account.per_second,
burst_count=self.hs.config.rc_login_account.burst_count,
update=True,
)
@attr.s
class MacaroonGenerator(object):
hs = attr.ib()
def generate_access_token(self, user_id, extra_caveats=None):
extra_caveats = extra_caveats or []
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = access")
# Include a nonce, to make sure that each login gets a different
# access token.
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("nonce = %s" % (
stringutils.random_string_with_symbols(16),
))
for caveat in extra_caveats:
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat(caveat)
return macaroon.serialize()
def generate_short_term_login_token(self, user_id, duration_in_ms=(2 * 60 * 1000)):
"""
Args:
user_id (unicode):
duration_in_ms (int):
Returns:
unicode
"""
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = login")
now = self.hs.get_clock().time_msec()
expiry = now + duration_in_ms
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("time < %d" % (expiry,))
return macaroon.serialize()
def generate_delete_pusher_token(self, user_id):
macaroon = self._generate_base_macaroon(user_id)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("type = delete_pusher")
return macaroon.serialize()
def _generate_base_macaroon(self, user_id):
macaroon = pymacaroons.Macaroon(
location=self.hs.config.server_name,
identifier="key",
key=self.hs.config.macaroon_secret_key)
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("gen = 1")
macaroon.add_first_party_caveat("user_id = %s" % (user_id,))
return macaroon