mirror of
https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap.git
synced 2025-02-22 23:59:49 -05:00
626 lines
15 KiB
Rust
626 lines
15 KiB
Rust
#![allow(non_snake_case)]
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#![allow(non_upper_case_globals)]
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#![allow(non_camel_case_types)]
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#![warn(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
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use std::convert::TryInto;
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use anyhow::{bail, Result};
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use curve25519_dalek::constants::ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
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use curve25519_dalek::edwards::EdwardsPoint;
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use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
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use hash_edwards_to_edwards::hash_point_to_point;
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use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
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use tiny_keccak::{Hasher, Keccak};
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use monero::util::ringct::Clsag;
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pub struct AdaptorSignature {
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s_0: Scalar,
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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h_0: Scalar,
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/// Key image of the real key in the ring.
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I: EdwardsPoint,
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/// Commitment key image `D = z * hash_to_p3(signing_public_key)`
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D: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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pub struct HalfAdaptorSignature {
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s_0_half: Scalar,
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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h_0: Scalar,
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/// Key image of the real key in the ring.
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I: EdwardsPoint,
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/// Commitment key image `D = z * hash_to_p3(signing_public_key)`
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D: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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impl HalfAdaptorSignature {
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fn complete(self, s_other_half: Scalar) -> AdaptorSignature {
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AdaptorSignature {
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s_0: self.s_0_half + s_other_half,
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fake_responses: self.fake_responses,
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h_0: self.h_0,
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I: self.I,
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D: self.D,
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}
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}
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}
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impl AdaptorSignature {
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pub fn adapt(self, y: Scalar) -> Clsag {
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let r_last = self.s_0 + y;
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let _responses: [Scalar; 11] = self
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.fake_responses
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.iter()
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.chain([r_last].iter())
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.copied()
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.collect::<Vec<_>>()
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.try_into()
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.expect("correct response size");
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todo!()
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// Signature {
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// responses,
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// h_0: self.h_0,
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// I: self.I,
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// D: self.D,
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// }
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}
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}
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pub struct Alice0 {
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// secret index is always 0
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ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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commitment_ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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pseudo_output_commitment: EdwardsPoint,
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msg: [u8; 32],
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// encryption key
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R_a: EdwardsPoint,
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// R'a = r_a*H_p(p_k) where p_k is the signing public key
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R_prime_a: EdwardsPoint,
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// this is not s_a cos of something to with one-time-address??
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s_prime_a: Scalar,
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// secret value:
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alpha_a: Scalar,
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H_p_pk: EdwardsPoint,
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I_a: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_a: EdwardsPoint,
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T_a: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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impl Alice0 {
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pub fn new(
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ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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msg: [u8; 32],
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commitment_ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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pseudo_output_commitment: EdwardsPoint,
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R_a: EdwardsPoint,
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R_prime_a: EdwardsPoint,
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s_prime_a: Scalar,
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rng: &mut (impl Rng + CryptoRng),
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) -> Result<Self> {
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let mut fake_responses = [Scalar::zero(); 10];
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for response in fake_responses.iter_mut().take(10) {
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*response = Scalar::random(rng);
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}
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let alpha_a = Scalar::random(rng);
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let p_k = ring[0];
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let H_p_pk = hash_point_to_point(p_k);
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let I_a = s_prime_a * H_p_pk;
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let I_hat_a = alpha_a * H_p_pk;
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let T_a = alpha_a * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
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Ok(Alice0 {
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ring,
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fake_responses,
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commitment_ring,
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pseudo_output_commitment,
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msg,
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R_a,
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R_prime_a,
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s_prime_a,
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alpha_a,
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H_p_pk,
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I_a,
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I_hat_a,
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T_a,
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})
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}
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pub fn next_message(&self, rng: &mut (impl Rng + CryptoRng)) -> Message0 {
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Message0 {
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pi_a: DleqProof::new(
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ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT,
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self.T_a,
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self.H_p_pk,
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self.I_hat_a,
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self.alpha_a,
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rng,
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),
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c_a: Commitment::new(self.fake_responses, self.I_a, self.I_hat_a, self.T_a),
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}
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}
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// TODO: Pass commitment-related data as an argument to this function, like z
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pub fn receive(self, msg: Message1, z: Scalar) -> Result<Alice1> {
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msg.pi_b
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.verify(ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT, msg.T_b, self.H_p_pk, msg.I_hat_b)?;
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let I = self.I_a + msg.I_b;
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let sig = monero::clsag::sign(
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&self.msg,
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self.s_prime_a,
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0,
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self.H_p_pk,
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self.alpha_a,
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&self.ring,
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&self.commitment_ring,
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self.fake_responses,
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z,
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self.pseudo_output_commitment,
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self.T_a + msg.T_b + self.R_a,
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self.I_hat_a + msg.I_hat_b + self.R_prime_a,
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I,
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);
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let sig = HalfAdaptorSignature {
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s_0_half: todo!(),
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fake_responses: self.fake_responses,
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h_0: todo!(),
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I,
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D: todo!(),
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};
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Ok(Alice1 {
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fake_responses: self.fake_responses,
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I_a: self.I_a,
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I_hat_a: self.I_hat_a,
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T_a: self.T_a,
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sig,
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})
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}
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}
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pub struct Alice1 {
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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I_a: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_a: EdwardsPoint,
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T_a: EdwardsPoint,
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sig: HalfAdaptorSignature,
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}
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impl Alice1 {
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pub fn next_message(&self) -> Message2 {
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Message2 {
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d_a: Opening::new(self.fake_responses, self.I_a, self.I_hat_a, self.T_a),
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s_0_a: self.sig.s_0_half,
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}
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}
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pub fn receive(self, msg: Message3) -> Alice2 {
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let adaptor_sig = self.sig.complete(msg.s_0_b);
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Alice2 { adaptor_sig }
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}
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}
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pub struct Alice2 {
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pub adaptor_sig: AdaptorSignature,
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}
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pub struct Bob0 {
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ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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msg: [u8; 32],
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commitment_ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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pseudo_output_commitment: EdwardsPoint,
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R_a: EdwardsPoint,
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R_prime_a: EdwardsPoint,
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s_b: Scalar,
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alpha_b: Scalar,
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H_p_pk: EdwardsPoint,
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I_b: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_b: EdwardsPoint,
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T_b: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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impl Bob0 {
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pub fn new(
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ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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msg: [u8; 32],
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commitment_ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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pseudo_output_commitment: EdwardsPoint,
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R_a: EdwardsPoint,
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R_prime_a: EdwardsPoint,
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s_b: Scalar,
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rng: &mut (impl Rng + CryptoRng),
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) -> Result<Self> {
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let alpha_b = Scalar::random(rng);
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let p_k = ring[0];
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let H_p_pk = hash_point_to_point(p_k);
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let I_b = s_b * H_p_pk;
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let I_hat_b = alpha_b * H_p_pk;
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let T_b = alpha_b * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
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Ok(Bob0 {
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ring,
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msg,
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commitment_ring,
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pseudo_output_commitment,
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R_a,
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R_prime_a,
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s_b,
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alpha_b,
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H_p_pk,
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I_b,
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I_hat_b,
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T_b,
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})
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}
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pub fn receive(self, msg: Message0) -> Bob1 {
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Bob1 {
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ring: self.ring,
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msg: self.msg,
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commitment_ring: self.commitment_ring,
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pseudo_output_commitment: self.pseudo_output_commitment,
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R_a: self.R_a,
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R_prime_a: self.R_prime_a,
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s_b: self.s_b,
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alpha_b: self.alpha_b,
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H_p_pk: self.H_p_pk,
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I_b: self.I_b,
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I_hat_b: self.I_hat_b,
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T_b: self.T_b,
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pi_a: msg.pi_a,
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c_a: msg.c_a,
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}
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}
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}
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pub struct Bob1 {
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ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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msg: [u8; 32],
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commitment_ring: [EdwardsPoint; 11],
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pseudo_output_commitment: EdwardsPoint,
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R_a: EdwardsPoint,
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R_prime_a: EdwardsPoint,
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s_b: Scalar,
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alpha_b: Scalar,
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H_p_pk: EdwardsPoint,
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I_b: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_b: EdwardsPoint,
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T_b: EdwardsPoint,
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pi_a: DleqProof,
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c_a: Commitment,
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}
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impl Bob1 {
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pub fn next_message(&self, rng: &mut (impl Rng + CryptoRng)) -> Message1 {
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Message1 {
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I_b: self.I_b,
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T_b: self.T_b,
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I_hat_b: self.I_hat_b,
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pi_b: DleqProof::new(
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ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT,
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self.T_b,
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self.H_p_pk,
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self.I_hat_b,
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self.alpha_b,
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rng,
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),
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}
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}
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// TODO: Pass commitment-related data as an argument to this function, like z
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pub fn receive(self, msg: Message2, z: Scalar) -> Result<Bob2> {
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let (fake_responses, I_a, I_hat_a, T_a) = msg.d_a.open(self.c_a)?;
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self.pi_a
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.verify(ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT, T_a, self.H_p_pk, I_hat_a)?;
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let I = I_a + self.I_b;
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let sig = monero::clsag::sign(
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&self.msg,
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self.s_b,
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0,
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self.H_p_pk,
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self.alpha_b,
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&self.ring,
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&self.commitment_ring,
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fake_responses,
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z,
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self.pseudo_output_commitment,
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T_a + self.T_b + self.R_a,
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I_hat_a + self.I_hat_b + self.R_prime_a,
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I,
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);
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let s_0_b = todo!();
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let sig = HalfAdaptorSignature {
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s_0_half: s_0_b,
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fake_responses,
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h_0: todo!(),
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I,
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D: todo!(),
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};
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let adaptor_sig = sig.complete(msg.s_0_a);
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Ok(Bob2 { s_0_b, adaptor_sig })
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}
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}
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pub struct Bob2 {
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s_0_b: Scalar,
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pub adaptor_sig: AdaptorSignature,
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}
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impl Bob2 {
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pub fn next_message(&self) -> Message3 {
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Message3 { s_0_b: self.s_0_b }
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}
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}
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struct DleqProof {
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s: Scalar,
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c: Scalar,
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}
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impl DleqProof {
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fn new(
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G: EdwardsPoint,
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xG: EdwardsPoint,
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H: EdwardsPoint,
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xH: EdwardsPoint,
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x: Scalar,
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rng: &mut (impl Rng + CryptoRng),
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) -> Self {
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let r = Scalar::random(rng);
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let rG = r * G;
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let rH = r * H;
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let mut keccak = Keccak::v256();
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keccak.update(G.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(xG.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(H.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(xH.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(rG.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(rH.compress().as_bytes());
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let mut output = [0u8; 32];
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keccak.finalize(&mut output);
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let c = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(output);
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let s = r + c * x;
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Self { s, c }
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}
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fn verify(
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&self,
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G: EdwardsPoint,
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xG: EdwardsPoint,
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H: EdwardsPoint,
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xH: EdwardsPoint,
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) -> Result<()> {
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let s = self.s;
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let c = self.c;
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let rG = (s * G) + (-c * xG);
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let rH = (s * H) + (-c * xH);
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let mut keccak = Keccak::v256();
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keccak.update(G.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(xG.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(H.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(xH.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(rG.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(rH.compress().as_bytes());
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let mut output = [0u8; 32];
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keccak.finalize(&mut output);
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let c_prime = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order(output);
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if c != c_prime {
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bail!("invalid DLEQ proof")
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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struct Commitment([u8; 32]);
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impl Commitment {
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fn new(
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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I_a: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_a: EdwardsPoint,
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T_a: EdwardsPoint,
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) -> Self {
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let fake_responses = fake_responses
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.iter()
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.flat_map(|r| r.as_bytes().to_vec())
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.collect::<Vec<u8>>();
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let mut keccak = Keccak::v256();
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keccak.update(&fake_responses);
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keccak.update(I_a.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(I_hat_a.compress().as_bytes());
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keccak.update(T_a.compress().as_bytes());
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let mut output = [0u8; 32];
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keccak.finalize(&mut output);
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Self(output)
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}
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}
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struct Opening {
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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I_a: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_a: EdwardsPoint,
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T_a: EdwardsPoint,
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}
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impl Opening {
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fn new(
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fake_responses: [Scalar; 10],
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I_a: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_a: EdwardsPoint,
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T_a: EdwardsPoint,
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) -> Self {
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Self {
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fake_responses,
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I_a,
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I_hat_a,
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T_a,
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}
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}
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fn open(
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self,
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commitment: Commitment,
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) -> Result<([Scalar; 10], EdwardsPoint, EdwardsPoint, EdwardsPoint)> {
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let self_commitment =
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Commitment::new(self.fake_responses, self.I_a, self.I_hat_a, self.T_a);
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if self_commitment == commitment {
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Ok((self.fake_responses, self.I_a, self.I_hat_a, self.T_a))
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} else {
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bail!("opening does not match commitment")
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}
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}
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}
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// Alice Sends this to Bob
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pub struct Message0 {
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c_a: Commitment,
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pi_a: DleqProof,
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}
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// Bob sends this to ALice
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pub struct Message1 {
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I_b: EdwardsPoint,
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T_b: EdwardsPoint,
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I_hat_b: EdwardsPoint,
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pi_b: DleqProof,
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}
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// Alice sends this to Bob
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pub struct Message2 {
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d_a: Opening,
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s_0_a: Scalar,
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}
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// Bob sends this to Alice
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#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct Message3 {
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s_0_b: Scalar,
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use rand::rngs::OsRng;
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn sign_and_verify_success() {
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let msg_to_sign = b"hello world, monero is amazing!!";
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let s_prime_a = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
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let s_b = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
|
|
|
|
let pk = (s_prime_a + s_b) * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
|
|
|
|
let (r_a, R_a, R_prime_a) = {
|
|
let r_a = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
|
|
let R_a = r_a * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT;
|
|
|
|
let pk_hashed_to_point = hash_point_to_point(pk);
|
|
|
|
let R_prime_a = r_a * pk_hashed_to_point;
|
|
|
|
(r_a, R_a, R_prime_a)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut ring = [EdwardsPoint::default(); 11];
|
|
ring[0] = pk;
|
|
|
|
ring[1..].fill_with(|| {
|
|
let x = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
|
|
x * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let mut commitment_ring = [EdwardsPoint::default(); 11];
|
|
|
|
let real_commitment_blinding = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
|
|
commitment_ring[0] = real_commitment_blinding * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT; // + 0 * H
|
|
commitment_ring[1..].fill_with(|| {
|
|
let x = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
|
|
x * ED25519_BASEPOINT_POINT
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// TODO: document
|
|
let pseudo_output_commitment = commitment_ring[0];
|
|
|
|
let alice = Alice0::new(
|
|
ring,
|
|
*msg_to_sign,
|
|
commitment_ring,
|
|
pseudo_output_commitment,
|
|
R_a,
|
|
R_prime_a,
|
|
s_prime_a,
|
|
&mut OsRng,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
let bob = Bob0::new(
|
|
ring,
|
|
*msg_to_sign,
|
|
commitment_ring,
|
|
pseudo_output_commitment,
|
|
R_a,
|
|
R_prime_a,
|
|
s_b,
|
|
&mut OsRng,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let msg = alice.next_message(&mut OsRng);
|
|
let bob = bob.receive(msg);
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Document this
|
|
let msg = bob.next_message(&mut OsRng);
|
|
let alice = alice.receive(msg, Scalar::zero()).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let msg = alice.next_message();
|
|
let bob = bob.receive(msg, Scalar::zero()).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let msg = bob.next_message();
|
|
let alice = alice.receive(msg);
|
|
|
|
let I = alice.adaptor_sig.I;
|
|
let sig = alice.adaptor_sig.adapt(r_a);
|
|
|
|
assert!(monero::clsag::verify(
|
|
&sig,
|
|
msg_to_sign,
|
|
&ring,
|
|
&commitment_ring,
|
|
I,
|
|
pseudo_output_commitment,
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|