Switch to crypto to typed keys everywhere

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
     - This will only be a breaking change for anyone utilizing the previous `writer` argument.
     - `writer` is now a member of `SetDHTValueOptions`, alongside the new `allow_offline` property.
   - Eliminated DHTW capability, merged into DHTV capability, now there is only one DHT enabling/disabling capability and all operations are part of it
+  - Crypto / CryptoSystem functions now use typed keys everywhere (#483)
+  - Eliminated 'best' CryptoKind concept, crypto kinds must now be explicitly stated, otherwise upgrades of veilid-core that change the 'best' CryptoKind could break functionality silently.
 
 - veilid-core:
   - Add private route example
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@
   - Improved `TypedXXX` conversion traits, including to and from `Vec<u8>`
   - Ensure utf8 replacement characters are never emitted in logs
   - Export `CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0` constant
+  - Added SequenceOrdering enum to represent ordering mode for protocols rather than a bool
 
 - veilid-python:
   - Correction of type hints
@@ -38,6 +41,10 @@
 - veilid-server:
   - Use `detect_address_changes: auto` by default
 
+- veilid-wasm:
+  - Reorganize crate and add `js` and `dart` features to enable different target bindings
+  - Revamp bindings for `js` to eliminate excessive strings and improve marshaling
+
 **Changed in Veilid 0.4.7**
 
 - _BREAKING API CHANGES_:

Earthfile

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ unit-tests-wasm-linux:
     FROM +code-linux
     # Just run build now because actual unit tests require network access
     # which should be moved to a separate integration test
-    RUN veilid-wasm/wasm_build.sh release
+    RUN veilid-wasm/wasm_build_dart.sh release
 
 unit-tests-linux:
     WAIT

scripts/clippy_all.sh

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 SCRIPTDIR="$( cd "$( dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )" >/dev/null 2>&1 && pwd )"
 pushd $SCRIPTDIR/.. >/dev/null
 
-cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
-cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu  --manifest-path=veilid-server/Cargo.toml --no-default-features --features=default-async-std
-cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu
-cargo-zigbuild clippy --target aarch64-apple-darwin
-cargo clippy --manifest-path=veilid-wasm/Cargo.toml --target wasm32-unknown-unknown
+cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu $@
+cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu  --manifest-path=veilid-server/Cargo.toml --no-default-features --features=default-async-std $@
+cargo-zigbuild clippy --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu $@
+cargo-zigbuild clippy --target aarch64-apple-darwin $@
+cargo clippy --manifest-path=veilid-wasm/Cargo.toml --target wasm32-unknown-unknown $@
 
-popd >/dev/null
+popd >/dev/null

veilid-core/Cargo.toml

@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ serde_bytes = { version = "0.11", default-features = false, features = [
 ] }
 tsify = { version = "0.5.5", features = ["js"] }
 serde-wasm-bindgen = "0.6.5"
+wasm-bindgen-derive = "0.3.0"
 
 # Network
 ws_stream_wasm = "0.7.4"

veilid-core/examples/private_route/src/main.rs

@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ async fn create_route(
     veilid_api_scope(update_callback, config, |veilid_api| async move {
 
         // Create a new private route endpoint
-        let (route_id, route_blob) =
+        let RouteBlob { route_id, blob }  =
             try_again_loop(|| async { veilid_api.new_private_route().await }).await?;
 
         // Print the blob
         println!(
             "Route id created: {route_id}\nConnect with this private route blob:\ncargo run --example private-route-example -- --connect {}",
-            data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&route_blob)
+            data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&blob)
         );
 
         // Wait for enter key to exit the application

veilid-core/src/crypto/crypto_system.rs

@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
-use super::*;
-
-pub(crate) const VEILID_DOMAIN_API: &[u8] = b"VEILID_API";
-
-pub trait CryptoSystem {
-    // Accessors
-    fn kind(&self) -> CryptoKind;
-    fn crypto(&self) -> VeilidComponentGuard<'_, Crypto>;
-
-    // Cached Operations
-    fn cached_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret>;
-
-    // Generation
-    fn random_bytes(&self, len: u32) -> Vec<u8>;
-    fn hash_password(&self, password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<String>;
-    fn verify_password(&self, password: &[u8], password_hash: &str) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
-    fn derive_shared_secret(
-        &self,
-        password: &[u8],
-        salt: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret>;
-    fn random_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce;
-    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> BareSharedSecret;
-    fn compute_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret>;
-    fn generate_shared_secret(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-        domain: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
-        let dh = self.compute_dh(key, secret)?;
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::from(
-            self.generate_hash(&[&dh, domain, VEILID_DOMAIN_API].concat()),
-        ))
-    }
-    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> BareKeyPair;
-    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> BareHashDigest;
-    fn generate_hash_reader(
-        &self,
-        reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey>;
-
-    // Validation
-    fn shared_secret_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn nonce_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn hash_digest_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn public_key_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn secret_key_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn signature_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn default_salt_length(&self) -> usize;
-    fn aead_overhead(&self) -> usize;
-
-    fn check_shared_secret(&self, secret: &BareSharedSecret) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if secret.len() != self.shared_secret_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid shared secret length: {} != {}",
-                secret.len(),
-                self.shared_secret_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-    fn check_nonce(&self, nonce: &BareNonce) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if nonce.len() != self.nonce_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid nonce length: {} != {}",
-                nonce.len(),
-                self.nonce_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-    fn check_hash_digest(&self, hash: &BareHashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if hash.len() != self.hash_digest_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid hash digest length: {} != {}",
-                hash.len(),
-                self.hash_digest_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-    fn check_public_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if key.len() != self.public_key_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid public key length: {} != {}",
-                key.len(),
-                self.public_key_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-    fn check_secret_key(&self, key: &BareSecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if key.len() != self.secret_key_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid secret key length: {} != {}",
-                key.len(),
-                self.secret_key_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-    fn check_signature(&self, signature: &BareSignature) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
-        if signature.len() != self.signature_length() {
-            apibail_generic!(format!(
-                "invalid signature length: {} != {}",
-                signature.len(),
-                self.signature_length()
-            ));
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    fn validate_keypair(&self, key: &BarePublicKey, secret: &BareSecretKey) -> bool;
-    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash: &BareHashDigest) -> bool;
-    fn validate_hash_reader(
-        &self,
-        reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-        hash: &BareHashDigest,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
-
-    // Distance Metric
-    fn distance(&self, hash1: &BareHashDigest, hash2: &BareHashDigest) -> BareHashDistance;
-
-    // Authentication
-    fn sign(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-        data: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSignature>;
-    fn verify(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        data: &[u8],
-        signature: &BareSignature,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
-
-    // AEAD Encrypt/Decrypt
-    fn decrypt_in_place_aead(
-        &self,
-        body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
-    fn decrypt_aead(
-        &self,
-        body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
-    fn encrypt_in_place_aead(
-        &self,
-        body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
-    fn encrypt_aead(
-        &self,
-        body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
-
-    // NoAuth Encrypt/Decrypt
-    fn crypt_in_place_no_auth(
-        &self,
-        body: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
-    fn crypt_b2b_no_auth(
-        &self,
-        in_buf: &[u8],
-        out_buf: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
-    fn crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
-        &self,
-        body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
-    fn crypt_no_auth_unaligned(
-        &self,
-        body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
-}

veilid-core/src/crypto/crypto_system/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+use super::*;
+mod blake3digest512;
+
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
+pub(crate) mod none;
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
+pub(crate) mod vld0;
+// #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld1")]
+// pub(crate) mod vld1;
+
+pub(crate) const VEILID_DOMAIN_API: &[u8] = b"VEILID_API";
+
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
+pub use none::sizes::*;
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
+pub use none::*;
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
+pub use vld0::sizes::*;
+#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
+pub use vld0::*;
+// #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld1")]
+// pub use vld1::*;
+
+pub use blake3digest512::*;
+
+pub trait CryptoSystem {
+    // Accessors
+    fn kind(&self) -> CryptoKind;
+    fn crypto(&self) -> VeilidComponentGuard<'_, Crypto>;
+
+    // Cached Operations
+    fn cached_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret>;
+
+    // Generation
+    fn random_bytes(&self, len: u32) -> Vec<u8>;
+    fn hash_password(&self, password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<String>;
+    fn verify_password(&self, password: &[u8], password_hash: &str) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
+    fn derive_shared_secret(&self, password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret>;
+    fn random_nonce(&self) -> Nonce;
+    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> SharedSecret;
+    fn compute_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret>;
+    fn generate_shared_secret(
+        &self,
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
+        domain: &[u8],
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
+        let dh = self.compute_dh(key, secret)?;
+        let hash = self.generate_hash(&[&dh.into_value(), domain, VEILID_DOMAIN_API].concat());
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            hash.kind(),
+            BareSharedSecret::new(&hash.into_value()),
+        ))
+    }
+    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> KeyPair;
+    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> HashDigest;
+    fn generate_hash_reader(&self, reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey>;
+
+    // Validation
+    fn shared_secret_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn nonce_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn hash_digest_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn public_key_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn secret_key_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn signature_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn default_salt_length(&self) -> usize;
+    fn aead_overhead(&self) -> usize;
+
+    fn check_shared_secret(&self, secret: &SharedSecret) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if secret.kind() != self.kind() {
+            apibail_generic!("incorrect shared secret kind");
+        }
+        if secret.value().len() != self.shared_secret_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid shared secret length: {} != {}",
+                secret.value().len(),
+                self.shared_secret_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn check_nonce(&self, nonce: &Nonce) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if nonce.len() != self.nonce_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid nonce length: {} != {}",
+                nonce.len(),
+                self.nonce_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn check_hash_digest(&self, hash: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if hash.kind() != self.kind() {
+            apibail_generic!("incorrect hash digest kind");
+        }
+        if hash.value().len() != self.hash_digest_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid hash digest length: {} != {}",
+                hash.value().len(),
+                self.hash_digest_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn check_public_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if key.kind() != self.kind() {
+            apibail_generic!("incorrect public key kind");
+        }
+        if key.value().len() != self.public_key_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid public key length: {} != {}",
+                key.value().len(),
+                self.public_key_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn check_secret_key(&self, key: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if key.kind() != self.kind() {
+            apibail_generic!("incorrect secret key kind");
+        }
+        if key.value().len() != self.secret_key_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid secret key length: {} != {}",
+                key.value().len(),
+                self.secret_key_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+    fn check_signature(&self, signature: &Signature) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if signature.kind() != self.kind() {
+            apibail_generic!("incorrect signature kind");
+        }
+        if signature.value().len() != self.signature_length() {
+            apibail_generic!(format!(
+                "invalid signature length: {} != {}",
+                signature.value().len(),
+                self.signature_length()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn validate_keypair(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
+    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
+    fn validate_hash_reader(
+        &self,
+        reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
+        hash: &HashDigest,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
+
+    // Authentication
+    fn sign(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey, data: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Signature>;
+    fn verify(&self, key: &PublicKey, data: &[u8], signature: &Signature) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool>;
+
+    // AEAD Encrypt/Decrypt
+    fn decrypt_in_place_aead(
+        &self,
+        body: &mut Vec<u8>,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
+    fn decrypt_aead(
+        &self,
+        body: &[u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
+    fn encrypt_in_place_aead(
+        &self,
+        body: &mut Vec<u8>,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
+    fn encrypt_aead(
+        &self,
+        body: &[u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+        associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
+
+    // NoAuth Encrypt/Decrypt
+    fn crypt_in_place_no_auth(
+        &self,
+        body: &mut [u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
+    fn crypt_b2b_no_auth(
+        &self,
+        in_buf: &[u8],
+        out_buf: &mut [u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()>;
+    fn crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
+        &self,
+        body: &[u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
+    fn crypt_no_auth_unaligned(
+        &self,
+        body: &[u8],
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>>;
+}

veilid-core/src/crypto/crypto_system/none/mod.rs

@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ use data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD;
 use digest::rand_core::RngCore;
 use digest::Digest;
 const NONE_AEAD_OVERHEAD: usize = NONE_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH;
-pub const CRYPTO_KIND_NONE: CryptoKind = CryptoKind(*b"NONE");
+pub const CRYPTO_KIND_NONE: CryptoKind = CryptoKind::new(*b"NONE");
 pub const CRYPTO_KIND_NONE_FOURCC: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(*b"NONE");
 pub use sizes::*;
 
-pub fn none_generate_keypair() -> BareKeyPair {
+pub fn none_generate_keypair() -> KeyPair {
     let mut csprng = VeilidRng {};
     let mut pub_bytes = [0u8; NONE_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
     let mut sec_bytes = [0u8; NONE_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ pub fn none_generate_keypair() -> BareKeyPair {
     }
     let dht_key = BarePublicKey::new(&pub_bytes);
     let dht_key_secret = BareSecretKey::new(&sec_bytes);
-    BareKeyPair::new(dht_key, dht_key_secret)
+    KeyPair::new(CRYPTO_KIND_NONE, BareKeyPair::new(dht_key, dht_key_secret))
 }
 
 fn do_xor_32(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<[u8; 32]> {
@@ -93,11 +93,7 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     }
 
     // Cached Operations
-    fn cached_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    fn cached_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         self.crypto()
             .cached_dh_internal::<CryptoSystemNONE>(self, key, secret)
     }
@@ -128,50 +124,51 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
         Ok(self.hash_password(password, &salt)? == password_hash)
     }
 
-    fn derive_shared_secret(
-        &self,
-        password: &[u8],
-        salt: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    fn derive_shared_secret(&self, password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         if salt.len() < Salt::MIN_LENGTH || salt.len() > Salt::MAX_LENGTH {
             apibail_generic!("invalid salt length");
         }
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::new(
-            blake3::hash(self.hash_password(password, salt)?.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_NONE,
+            BareSharedSecret::new(
+                blake3::hash(self.hash_password(password, salt)?.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
+            ),
         ))
     }
 
-    fn random_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce {
+    fn random_nonce(&self) -> Nonce {
         let mut nonce = [0u8; NONE_NONCE_LENGTH];
         random_bytes(&mut nonce);
-        BareNonce::new(&nonce)
+        Nonce::new(&nonce)
     }
-    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> BareSharedSecret {
+    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> SharedSecret {
         let mut s = [0u8; NONE_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH];
         random_bytes(&mut s);
-        BareSharedSecret::new(&s)
+        SharedSecret::new(CRYPTO_KIND_NONE, BareSharedSecret::new(&s))
     }
-    fn compute_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
-        let s = do_xor_32(key, secret)?;
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::new(&s))
+    fn compute_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
+        let s = do_xor_32(key.ref_value(), secret.ref_value())?;
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_NONE,
+            BareSharedSecret::new(&s),
+        ))
     }
-    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> BareKeyPair {
+    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> KeyPair {
         none_generate_keypair()
     }
-    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> BareHashDigest {
-        BareHashDigest::new(blake3::hash(data).as_bytes())
+    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> HashDigest {
+        HashDigest::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_NONE,
+            BareHashDigest::new(blake3::hash(data).as_bytes()),
+        )
     }
-    fn generate_hash_reader(
-        &self,
-        reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey> {
+    fn generate_hash_reader(&self, reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey> {
         let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
         std::io::copy(reader, &mut hasher).map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
-        Ok(BarePublicKey::new(hasher.finalize().as_bytes()))
+        Ok(PublicKey::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_NONE,
+            BarePublicKey::new(hasher.finalize().as_bytes()),
+        ))
     }
 
     // Validation
@@ -200,49 +197,56 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
         NONE_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
     }
 
-    fn validate_keypair(&self, dht_key: &BarePublicKey, dht_key_secret: &BareSecretKey) -> bool {
+    fn validate_keypair(
+        &self,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
         let data = vec![0u8; 512];
-        let Ok(sig) = self.sign(dht_key, dht_key_secret, &data) else {
-            return false;
+        let Ok(sig) = self.sign(public_key, secret_key, &data) else {
+            return Ok(false);
         };
-        let Ok(v) = self.verify(dht_key, &data, &sig) else {
-            return false;
+        let Ok(v) = self.verify(public_key, &data, &sig) else {
+            return Ok(false);
         };
-        v
+        Ok(v)
     }
-    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], dht_key: &BareHashDigest) -> bool {
-        let bytes = *blake3::hash(data).as_bytes();
-        bytes == dht_key.bytes()
+    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash_digest: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_hash_digest(hash_digest)?;
+        let out_hash = blake3::hash(data);
+        let bytes = out_hash.as_bytes();
+        Ok(*bytes == **hash_digest.ref_value())
     }
     fn validate_hash_reader(
         &self,
         reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-        dht_key: &BareHashDigest,
+        hash_digest: &HashDigest,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_hash_digest(hash_digest)?;
         let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
         std::io::copy(reader, &mut hasher).map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
-        let bytes = *hasher.finalize().as_bytes();
-        Ok(bytes == dht_key.bytes())
-    }
-    // Distance Metric
-    fn distance(&self, key1: &BareHashDigest, key2: &BareHashDigest) -> BareHashDistance {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; NONE_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-        for (n, byte) in bytes.iter_mut().enumerate() {
-            *byte = key1[n] ^ key2[n];
-        }
-
-        BareHashDistance::new(&bytes)
+        let out_hash = hasher.finalize();
+        let bytes = out_hash.as_bytes();
+        Ok(*bytes == **hash_digest.ref_value())
     }
 
     // Authentication
     fn sign(
         &self,
-        dht_key: &BarePublicKey,
-        dht_key_secret: &BareSecretKey,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
         data: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSignature> {
-        if !is_bytes_eq_32(&do_xor_32(dht_key, dht_key_secret)?, 0xFFu8)? {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Signature> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
+        if !is_bytes_eq_32(
+            &do_xor_32(public_key.ref_value(), secret_key.ref_value())?,
+            0xFFu8,
+        )? {
             return Err(VeilidAPIError::parse_error(
                 "Keypair is invalid",
                 "invalid keys",
@@ -255,31 +259,43 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
         let in_sig_bytes: [u8; NONE_SIGNATURE_LENGTH] = sig.into();
         let mut sig_bytes = [0u8; NONE_SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
         sig_bytes[0..32].copy_from_slice(&in_sig_bytes[0..32]);
-        sig_bytes[32..64].copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(&in_sig_bytes[32..64], dht_key_secret)?);
-        let dht_sig = BareSignature::new(&sig_bytes);
+        sig_bytes[32..64]
+            .copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(&in_sig_bytes[32..64], secret_key.ref_value())?);
+        let dht_sig = Signature::new(CRYPTO_KIND_NONE, BareSignature::new(&sig_bytes));
         println!("DEBUG dht_sig: {:?}", dht_sig);
         Ok(dht_sig)
     }
 
     fn verify(
         &self,
-        dht_key: &BarePublicKey,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
         data: &[u8],
-        signature: &BareSignature,
+        signature: &Signature,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_signature(signature)?;
+
         let mut dig = Blake3Digest512::new();
         dig.update(data);
         let sig = dig.finalize();
         let in_sig_bytes: [u8; NONE_SIGNATURE_LENGTH] = sig.into();
         let mut verify_bytes = [0u8; NONE_SIGNATURE_LENGTH];
-        verify_bytes[0..32].copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(&in_sig_bytes[0..32], &signature[0..32])?);
-        verify_bytes[32..64]
-            .copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(&in_sig_bytes[32..64], &signature[32..64])?);
+        verify_bytes[0..32].copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(
+            &in_sig_bytes[0..32],
+            &signature.ref_value()[0..32],
+        )?);
+        verify_bytes[32..64].copy_from_slice(&do_xor_32(
+            &in_sig_bytes[32..64],
+            &signature.ref_value()[32..64],
+        )?);
 
         if !is_bytes_eq_32(&verify_bytes[0..32], 0u8)? {
             return Ok(false);
         }
-        if !is_bytes_eq_32(&do_xor_32(&verify_bytes[32..64], dht_key)?, 0xFFu8)? {
+        if !is_bytes_eq_32(
+            &do_xor_32(&verify_bytes[32..64], public_key.ref_value())?,
+            0xFFu8,
+        )? {
             return Ok(false);
         }
 
@@ -290,13 +306,16 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn decrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         _associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut blob = nonce.to_vec();
         blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
-        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret)?;
+        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret.ref_value())?;
 
         if body.len() < NONE_AEAD_OVERHEAD {
             return Err(VeilidAPIError::generic("invalid length"));
@@ -311,10 +330,13 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn decrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out = body.to_vec();
         self.decrypt_in_place_aead(&mut out, nonce, shared_secret, associated_data)
             .map_err(map_to_string)
@@ -325,13 +347,16 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn encrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         _associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut blob = nonce.to_vec();
         blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
-        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret)?;
+        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret.ref_value())?;
         do_xor_inplace(body, &blob)?;
         body.append(&mut blob.to_vec());
         Ok(())
@@ -340,10 +365,13 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn encrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out = body.to_vec();
         self.encrypt_in_place_aead(&mut out, nonce, shared_secret, associated_data)
             .map_err(map_to_string)
@@ -355,12 +383,15 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn crypt_in_place_no_auth(
         &self,
         body: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut blob = nonce.to_vec();
         blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
-        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret)?;
+        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret.ref_value())?;
         do_xor_inplace(body, &blob)
     }
 
@@ -368,21 +399,27 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
         out_buf: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut blob = nonce.to_vec();
         blob.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
-        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret)?;
+        let blob = do_xor_32(&blob, shared_secret.ref_value())?;
         do_xor_b2b(in_buf, out_buf, &blob)
     }
 
     fn crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out_buf = unsafe { aligned_8_u8_vec_uninit(in_buf.len()) };
         self.crypt_b2b_no_auth(in_buf, &mut out_buf, nonce, shared_secret)?;
         Ok(out_buf)
@@ -391,9 +428,12 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemNONE {
     fn crypt_no_auth_unaligned(
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out_buf = unsafe { unaligned_u8_vec_uninit(in_buf.len()) };
         self.crypt_b2b_no_auth(in_buf, &mut out_buf, nonce, shared_secret)?;
         Ok(out_buf)

veilid-core/src/crypto/crypto_system/vld0/mod.rs

@@ -19,13 +19,14 @@ const VLD0_DOMAIN_SIGN: &[u8] = b"VLD0_SIGN";
 const VLD0_DOMAIN_CRYPT: &[u8] = b"VLD0_CRYPT";
 
 const VLD0_AEAD_OVERHEAD: usize = 16;
-pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0: CryptoKind = CryptoKind(*b"VLD0");
+pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0: CryptoKind = CryptoKind::new(*b"VLD0");
 pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0_FOURCC: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(*b"VLD0");
 pub use sizes::*;
 
-fn public_to_x25519_pk(public: &BarePublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::PublicKey> {
+fn public_to_x25519_pk(public: &PublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::PublicKey> {
     let pk_ed = ed::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
         public
+            .ref_value()
             .bytes()
             .try_into()
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
@@ -33,11 +34,11 @@ fn public_to_x25519_pk(public: &BarePublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::PublicKey>
     .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
     Ok(xd::PublicKey::from(*pk_ed.to_montgomery().as_bytes()))
 }
-fn secret_to_x25519_sk(secret: &BareSecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::StaticSecret> {
+fn secret_to_x25519_sk(secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::StaticSecret> {
     // NOTE: ed::SigningKey.to_scalar() does not produce an unreduced scalar, we want the raw bytes here
     // See https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/curve25519-dalek/issues/565
     let hash: [u8; VLD0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH] = ed::Sha512::default()
-        .chain_update(secret.bytes())
+        .chain_update(secret.ref_value().bytes())
         .finalize()
         .into();
     let mut output = [0u8; VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
@@ -46,14 +47,14 @@ fn secret_to_x25519_sk(secret: &BareSecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<xd::StaticSecr
     Ok(xd::StaticSecret::from(output))
 }
 
-pub(crate) fn vld0_generate_keypair() -> BareKeyPair {
+pub(crate) fn vld0_generate_keypair() -> KeyPair {
     let mut csprng = VeilidRng {};
     let signing_key = ed::SigningKey::generate(&mut csprng);
     let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
     let public_key = BarePublicKey::new(&verifying_key.to_bytes());
     let secret_key = BareSecretKey::new(&signing_key.to_bytes());
 
-    BareKeyPair::new(public_key, secret_key)
+    KeyPair::new(CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0, BareKeyPair::new(public_key, secret_key))
 }
 
 /// V0 CryptoSystem
@@ -80,11 +81,7 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
 
     // Cached Operations
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
-    fn cached_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    fn cached_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         self.crypto()
             .cached_dh_internal::<CryptoSystemVLD0>(self, key, secret)
     }
@@ -125,11 +122,7 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn derive_shared_secret(
-        &self,
-        password: &[u8],
-        salt: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    fn derive_shared_secret(&self, password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         if salt.len() < Salt::MIN_LENGTH || salt.len() > Salt::MAX_LENGTH {
             apibail_generic!("invalid salt length");
         }
@@ -141,29 +134,28 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
         argon2
             .hash_password_into(password, salt, &mut output_key_material)
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::new(&output_key_material))
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0,
+            BareSharedSecret::new(&output_key_material),
+        ))
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn random_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce {
+    fn random_nonce(&self) -> Nonce {
         let mut nonce = [0u8; VLD0_NONCE_LENGTH];
         random_bytes(&mut nonce);
-        BareNonce::new(&nonce)
+        Nonce::new(&nonce)
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> BareSharedSecret {
+    fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> SharedSecret {
         let mut s = [0u8; VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH];
         random_bytes(&mut s);
-        BareSharedSecret::new(&s)
+        SharedSecret::new(CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0, BareSharedSecret::new(&s))
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn compute_dh(
-        &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    fn compute_dh(&self, key: &PublicKey, secret: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         let pk_xd = public_to_x25519_pk(key)?;
         let sk_xd = secret_to_x25519_sk(secret)?;
 
@@ -174,27 +166,33 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
         hasher.update(&dh_bytes);
         let output = hasher.finalize();
 
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::new(output.as_bytes()))
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0,
+            BareSharedSecret::new(output.as_bytes()),
+        ))
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> BareKeyPair {
+    fn generate_keypair(&self) -> KeyPair {
         vld0_generate_keypair()
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> BareHashDigest {
-        BareHashDigest::new(blake3::hash(data).as_bytes())
+    fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> HashDigest {
+        HashDigest::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0,
+            BareHashDigest::new(blake3::hash(data).as_bytes()),
+        )
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn generate_hash_reader(
-        &self,
-        reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey> {
+    fn generate_hash_reader(&self, reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey> {
         let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
         std::io::copy(reader, &mut hasher).map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
-        Ok(BarePublicKey::new(hasher.finalize().as_bytes()))
+        Ok(PublicKey::new(
+            CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0,
+            BarePublicKey::new(hasher.finalize().as_bytes()),
+        ))
     }
 
     // Validation
@@ -224,61 +222,63 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn validate_keypair(&self, public_key: &BarePublicKey, secret_key: &BareSecretKey) -> bool {
+    fn validate_keypair(
+        &self,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
         let data = vec![0u8; 512];
         let Ok(sig) = self.sign(public_key, secret_key, &data) else {
-            return false;
+            return Ok(false);
         };
         let Ok(v) = self.verify(public_key, &data, &sig) else {
-            return false;
+            return Ok(false);
         };
-        v
+        Ok(v)
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash_digest: &BareHashDigest) -> bool {
+    fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash_digest: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_hash_digest(hash_digest)?;
+
         let bytes = *blake3::hash(data).as_bytes();
 
-        bytes == hash_digest.bytes()
+        Ok(bytes == hash_digest.ref_value().bytes())
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
     fn validate_hash_reader(
         &self,
         reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-        hash_digest: &BareHashDigest,
+        hash_digest: &HashDigest,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_hash_digest(hash_digest)?;
+
         let mut hasher = blake3::Hasher::new();
         std::io::copy(reader, &mut hasher).map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
         let bytes = *hasher.finalize().as_bytes();
-        Ok(bytes == hash_digest.bytes())
-    }
-
-    // Distance Metric
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
-    fn distance(&self, hash1: &BareHashDigest, hash2: &BareHashDigest) -> BareHashDistance {
-        let mut bytes = [0u8; VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-        (0..VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH).for_each(|n| {
-            bytes[n] = hash1[n] ^ hash2[n];
-        });
-
-        BareHashDistance::new(&bytes)
+        Ok(bytes == hash_digest.ref_value().bytes())
     }
 
     // Authentication
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
     fn sign(
         &self,
-        public_key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret_key: &BareSecretKey,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
         data: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSignature> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Signature> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
         let mut kpb: [u8; VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH + VLD0_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH] =
             [0u8; VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH + VLD0_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH];
 
-        kpb[..VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(secret_key);
-        kpb[VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].copy_from_slice(public_key);
+        kpb[..VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].copy_from_slice(secret_key.ref_value().bytes());
+        kpb[VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].copy_from_slice(public_key.ref_value().bytes());
         let keypair = ed::SigningKey::from_keypair_bytes(&kpb)
             .map_err(|e| VeilidAPIError::parse_error("Keypair is invalid", e))?;
 
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
             .sign_prehashed(dig, Some(VLD0_DOMAIN_SIGN))
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
 
-        let sig = BareSignature::new(&sig_bytes.to_bytes());
+        let sig = Signature::new(CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0, BareSignature::new(&sig_bytes.to_bytes()));
 
         if !self.verify(public_key, data, &sig)? {
             apibail_internal!("newly created signature does not verify");
@@ -300,12 +300,16 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "crypto", skip_all)]
     fn verify(
         &self,
-        public_key: &BarePublicKey,
+        public_key: &PublicKey,
         data: &[u8],
-        signature: &BareSignature,
+        signature: &Signature,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
+        self.check_public_key(public_key)?;
+        self.check_signature(signature)?;
+
         let pk = ed::VerifyingKey::from_bytes(
             public_key
+                .ref_value()
                 .bytes()
                 .try_into()
                 .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
@@ -313,6 +317,7 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
         .map_err(|e| VeilidAPIError::parse_error("Public key is invalid", e))?;
         let sig = ed::Signature::from_bytes(
             signature
+                .ref_value()
                 .bytes()
                 .try_into()
                 .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
@@ -335,11 +340,14 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn decrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let shared_secret_bytes: [u8; VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH] = shared_secret
+            .ref_value()
             .bytes()
             .try_into()
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
@@ -358,10 +366,13 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn decrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out = body.to_vec();
         self.decrypt_in_place_aead(&mut out, nonce, shared_secret, associated_data)
             .map_err(map_to_string)
@@ -373,11 +384,15 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn encrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let shared_secret_bytes: [u8; VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH] = shared_secret
+            .ref_value()
             .bytes()
             .try_into()
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
@@ -397,10 +412,13 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn encrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out = body.to_vec();
         self.encrypt_in_place_aead(&mut out, nonce, shared_secret, associated_data)
             .map_err(map_to_string)
@@ -413,10 +431,14 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn crypt_in_place_no_auth(
         &self,
         body: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let shared_secret_bytes: [u8; VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH] = shared_secret
+            .ref_value()
             .bytes()
             .try_into()
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
@@ -435,10 +457,14 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
         out_buf: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let shared_secret_bytes: [u8; VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH] = shared_secret
+            .ref_value()
             .bytes()
             .try_into()
             .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
@@ -458,9 +484,12 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out_buf = unsafe { aligned_8_u8_vec_uninit(in_buf.len()) };
         self.crypt_b2b_no_auth(in_buf, &mut out_buf, nonce, shared_secret)?;
         Ok(out_buf)
@@ -470,9 +499,12 @@ impl CryptoSystem for CryptoSystemVLD0 {
     fn crypt_no_auth_unaligned(
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        self.check_nonce(nonce)?;
+        self.check_shared_secret(shared_secret)?;
+
         let mut out_buf = unsafe { unaligned_u8_vec_uninit(in_buf.len()) };
         self.crypt_b2b_no_auth(in_buf, &mut out_buf, nonce, shared_secret)?;
         Ok(out_buf)

veilid-core/src/crypto/crypto_system/vld1/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 use super::*;
 
-pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD1: CryptoKind = CryptoKind(*b"VLD1");
+pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD1: CryptoKind = CryptoKind::new(*b"VLD1");
 pub const CRYPTO_KIND_VLD1_FOURCC: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(*b"VLD1");

veilid-core/src/crypto/dh_cache.rs

@@ -1,45 +1,62 @@
 use super::*;
 use crate::*;
 
-// Diffie-Hellman key exchange cache
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+// Diffie-Hellman key agreement cache
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
 pub struct DHCacheKey {
-    pub key: BarePublicKey,
-    pub secret: BareSecretKey,
+    pub key: PublicKey,
+    pub secret: SecretKey,
 }
 
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+impl fmt::Display for DHCacheKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}.{}", self.key, self.secret)
+    }
+}
+
+impl FromStr for DHCacheKey {
+    type Err = VeilidAPIError;
+    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+        let Some((pks, sks)) = s.split_once('.') else {
+            apibail_parse_error!("s", s);
+        };
+        let key = PublicKey::from_str(pks)?;
+        let secret = SecretKey::from_str(sks)?;
+        Ok(DHCacheKey { key, secret })
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for DHCacheKey {
+    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        let s = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+        FromStr::from_str(&s).map_err(de::Error::custom)
+    }
+}
+
+impl Serialize for DHCacheKey {
+    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+    where
+        S: Serializer,
+    {
+        serializer.serialize_str(&self.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct DHCacheValue {
-    pub shared_secret: BareSharedSecret,
+    pub shared_secret: SharedSecret,
 }
 
 pub type DHCache = LruCache<DHCacheKey, DHCacheValue>;
 pub const DH_CACHE_SIZE: usize = 4096;
 
 pub fn cache_to_bytes(cache: &DHCache) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let cnt: usize = cache.len();
-    let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(cnt * (32 + 32 + 32));
-    for e in cache.iter() {
-        out.extend_from_slice(&e.0.key);
-        out.extend_from_slice(&e.0.secret);
-        out.extend_from_slice(&e.1.shared_secret);
-    }
-    let mut rev: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(out.len());
-    for d in out.chunks(32 + 32 + 32).rev() {
-        rev.extend(d);
-    }
-    rev
+    serialize_json_bytes(cache)
 }
 
-pub fn bytes_to_cache(bytes: &[u8], cache: &mut DHCache) {
-    for d in bytes.chunks(32 + 32 + 32) {
-        let k = DHCacheKey {
-            key: BarePublicKey::new(d[0..32].try_into().expect("asdf")),
-            secret: BareSecretKey::new(d[32..64].try_into().expect("asdf")),
-        };
-        let v = DHCacheValue {
-            shared_secret: BareSharedSecret::new(d[64..96].try_into().expect("asdf")),
-        };
-        cache.insert(k, v);
-    }
+pub fn bytes_to_cache(bytes: &[u8]) -> EyreResult<DHCache> {
+    deserialize_json_bytes(bytes).wrap_err("cache format invalid")
 }

veilid-core/src/crypto/envelope.rs

@@ -1,364 +0,0 @@
-#![allow(clippy::absurd_extreme_comparisons)]
-use super::*;
-use crate::*;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
-
-pub const MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE: usize = 65507;
-pub const MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE: usize = 0x6A + 0x40; // Header + BareSignature
-
-// Version number of envelope format
-fourcc_type!(EnvelopeVersion);
-
-pub const ENVELOPE_VERSION_VLD0: EnvelopeVersion = EnvelopeVersion(*b"ENV0");
-// pub const ENVELOPE_VERSION_VLD0_FOURCC: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(*b"ENV0");
-
-/// Envelope versions in order of preference, best envelope version is the first one, worst is the last one
-pub const VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS: [EnvelopeVersion; 1] = [ENVELOPE_VERSION_VLD0];
-/// Number of envelope versions to keep on structures if many are present beyond the ones we consider valid
-pub const MAX_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS: usize = 16;
-
-/// Envelopes are versioned
-///
-/// These are the formats for the on-the-wire serialization performed by this module
-///
-/// #[repr(C, packed)]
-/// struct EnvelopeHeader {
-///     // Size is at least 4 bytes. Depending on the version specified, the size may vary and should be case to the appropriate struct
-///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x45 0x4E 0x56 0x30 ("ENV0")
-/// }
-///
-/// #[repr(C, packed)]
-/// struct EnvelopeV0 {
-///     // Size is 106 bytes without signature and 170 with signature
-///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x45 0x4E 0x56 0x30 ("ENV0")
-///     crypto_kind: [u8; 4],        // 0x04: CryptoSystemVersion FOURCC code (CryptoKind)
-///     size: u16,                   // 0x08: Total size of the envelope including the encrypted operations message. Maximum size is 65,507 bytes, which is the data size limit for a single UDP message on IPv4.
-///     timestamp: u64,              // 0x0A: Duration since UNIX_EPOCH in microseconds when this message is sent. Messages older than 10 seconds are dropped.
-///     nonce: [u8; 24],             // 0x12: Random nonce for replay protection and for dh
-///     sender_id: [u8; 32],         // 0x2A: Node ID of the message source, which is the public key of the sender (must be verified with find_node if this is a new node_id/address combination)
-///     recipient_id: [u8; 32],      // 0x4A: Node ID of the intended recipient, which is the public key of the recipient (must be the receiving node, or a relay lease holder)
-///                                  // 0x6A: message is appended (operations)
-///     signature: [u8; 64],         // 0x?? (end-0x40): BareSignature of the entire envelope including header is appended to the packet
-///                                  // entire header needs to be included in message digest, relays are not allowed to modify the envelope without invalidating the signature.
-/// }
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
-pub struct Envelope {
-    version: EnvelopeVersion,
-    crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
-    timestamp: Timestamp,
-    nonce: BareNonce,
-    sender_id: BareNodeId,
-    recipient_id: BareNodeId,
-}
-
-impl Envelope {
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn new(
-        version: EnvelopeVersion,
-        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
-        timestamp: Timestamp,
-        nonce: BareNonce,
-        sender_id: BareNodeId,
-        recipient_id: BareNodeId,
-    ) -> Self {
-        assert!(VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.contains(&version));
-        assert!(VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS.contains(&crypto_kind));
-        Self {
-            version,
-            crypto_kind,
-            timestamp,
-            nonce,
-            sender_id,
-            recipient_id,
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
-    pub fn from_signed_data(
-        crypto: &Crypto,
-        data: &[u8],
-        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Envelope> {
-        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
-        // Silent drop here, as we use zero length packets as part of the protocol for hole punching
-        if data.len() < MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
-            apibail_generic!("envelope data too small");
-        }
-
-        // Check envelope version
-        let version: EnvelopeVersion = data[0x00..0x04]
-            .try_into()
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
-        if !VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.contains(&version) {
-            apibail_parse_error!("unsupported envelope version", version);
-        }
-
-        // Check crypto kind
-        let crypto_kind = CryptoKind(
-            data[0x04..0x08]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
-            apibail_parse_error!("unsupported crypto kind", crypto_kind);
-        };
-
-        // Get size and ensure it matches the size of the envelope and is less than the maximum message size
-        let size: u16 = u16::from_le_bytes(
-            data[0x08..0x0A]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-        if (size as usize) > MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!("envelope too large", size);
-        }
-        if (size as usize) != data.len() {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "size doesn't match envelope size",
-                format!(
-                    "size doesn't match envelope size: size={} data.len()={}",
-                    size,
-                    data.len()
-                )
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Get the timestamp
-        let timestamp: Timestamp = u64::from_le_bytes(
-            data[0x0A..0x12]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        )
-        .into();
-
-        // Get nonce and sender node id
-        let mut nonce_slice: [u8; VLD0_NONCE_LENGTH] = data[0x12..0x2A]
-            .try_into()
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
-        let mut sender_id_slice: [u8; VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH] = data[0x2A..0x4A]
-            .try_into()
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
-        let mut recipient_id_slice: [u8; VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH] = data[0x4A..0x6A]
-            .try_into()
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
-
-        // Apply network key (not the best, but it will keep networks from colliding without much overhead)
-        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
-            for n in 0..VLD0_NONCE_LENGTH {
-                nonce_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-            for n in 0..VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH {
-                sender_id_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-            for n in 0..VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH {
-                recipient_id_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-        }
-
-        let nonce: BareNonce = BareNonce::new(&nonce_slice);
-        let sender_id = BareNodeId::new(&sender_id_slice);
-        let recipient_id = BareNodeId::new(&recipient_id_slice);
-
-        // Ensure sender_id and recipient_id are not the same
-        if sender_id == recipient_id {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "sender_id should not be same as recipient_id",
-                recipient_id.encode()
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Get signature
-        let signature = BareSignature::new(
-            data[(data.len() - 64)..]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-
-        // Validate signature
-        if !vcrypto
-            .verify(
-                &sender_id.clone().into(),
-                &data[0..(data.len() - 64)],
-                &signature,
-            )
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?
-        {
-            apibail_parse_error!("signature verification of envelope failed", signature);
-        }
-
-        // Return envelope
-        Ok(Self {
-            version,
-            crypto_kind,
-            timestamp,
-            nonce,
-            sender_id,
-            recipient_id,
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
-    pub fn decrypt_body(
-        &self,
-        crypto: &Crypto,
-        data: &[u8],
-        secret_key: &BareSecretKey,
-        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
-        // Get DH secret
-        let vcrypto = crypto
-            .get(self.crypto_kind)
-            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
-        let mut dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&self.sender_id.clone().into(), secret_key)?;
-
-        // Apply network key
-        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
-            let mut dh_secret_bytes = dh_secret.to_vec();
-
-            for n in 0..VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH {
-                dh_secret_bytes[n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-
-            dh_secret = BareSharedSecret::new(&dh_secret_bytes);
-        }
-        // Decrypt message without authentication
-        let body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
-            &data[0x6A..data.len() - 64],
-            &self.nonce,
-            &dh_secret,
-        )?;
-
-        // Decompress body
-        let body = decompress_size_prepended(&body, Some(MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE))?;
-
-        Ok(body)
-    }
-
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all, err)]
-    pub fn to_encrypted_data(
-        &self,
-        crypto: &Crypto,
-        body: &[u8],
-        secret_key: &BareSecretKey,
-        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
-        // Ensure body isn't too long
-        let uncompressed_body_size: usize = body.len() + MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
-        if uncompressed_body_size > MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "envelope size before compression is too large",
-                uncompressed_body_size
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Compress body
-        let body = compress_prepend_size(body);
-
-        // Ensure body isn't too long
-        let envelope_size: usize = body.len() + MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
-        if envelope_size > MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "envelope size after compression is too large",
-                envelope_size
-            );
-        }
-        // Generate dh secret
-        let vcrypto = crypto
-            .get(self.crypto_kind)
-            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
-        let mut dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&self.recipient_id.clone().into(), secret_key)?;
-
-        // Write envelope body
-        let mut data = vec![0u8; envelope_size];
-
-        // Write version
-        data[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&self.version.0);
-        // Write crypto kind
-        data[0x04..0x08].copy_from_slice(&self.crypto_kind.0);
-        // Write size
-        data[0x08..0x0A].copy_from_slice(&(envelope_size as u16).to_le_bytes());
-        // Write timestamp
-        data[0x0A..0x12].copy_from_slice(&self.timestamp.as_u64().to_le_bytes());
-        // Write nonce
-        data[0x12..0x2A].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce);
-        // Write sender node id
-        data[0x2A..0x4A].copy_from_slice(&self.sender_id);
-        // Write recipient node id
-        data[0x4A..0x6A].copy_from_slice(&self.recipient_id);
-
-        // Apply network key (not the best, but it will keep networks from colliding without much overhead)
-        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
-            let mut dh_secret_bytes = dh_secret.to_vec();
-
-            for n in 0..VLD0_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH {
-                dh_secret_bytes[n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-            for n in 0..VLD0_NONCE_LENGTH {
-                data[0x12 + n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-            for n in 0..VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH {
-                data[0x2A + n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-            for n in 0..VLD0_HASH_DIGEST_LENGTH {
-                data[0x4A + n] ^= nk[n];
-            }
-
-            dh_secret = BareSharedSecret::new(&dh_secret_bytes);
-        }
-
-        // Encrypt message
-        let encrypted_body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_unaligned(&body, &self.nonce, &dh_secret)?;
-
-        // Write body
-        if !encrypted_body.is_empty() {
-            data[0x6A..envelope_size - 64].copy_from_slice(encrypted_body.as_slice());
-        }
-
-        // Sign the envelope
-        let signature = vcrypto.sign(
-            &self.sender_id.clone().into(),
-            secret_key,
-            &data[0..(envelope_size - 64)],
-        )?;
-
-        // Append the signature
-        data[(envelope_size - 64)..].copy_from_slice(&signature);
-
-        Ok(data)
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_version(&self) -> EnvelopeVersion {
-        self.version
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
-        self.crypto_kind
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_timestamp(&self) -> Timestamp {
-        self.timestamp
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce {
-        self.nonce.clone()
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_bare_sender_id(&self) -> BareNodeId {
-        self.sender_id.clone()
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
-        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.sender_id.clone())
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_bare_recipient_id(&self) -> BareNodeId {
-        self.recipient_id.clone()
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_recipient_id(&self) -> NodeId {
-        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.recipient_id.clone())
-    }
-}

veilid-core/src/crypto/envelope/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+use super::*;
+use crate::routing_table::*;
+use core::convert::TryInto;
+
+// Version number of envelope format
+fourcc_type!(EnvelopeVersion);
+
+// ENV0
+pub const ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0: EnvelopeVersion = EnvelopeVersion::new(*b"ENV0");
+pub const ENV0_NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
+pub const ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH: usize = 64;
+pub const ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE: usize = 65507;
+pub const ENV0_MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE: usize = 0x6A + 0x40; // Header + BareSignature
+
+/// Envelope versions in order of preference, best envelope version is the first one, worst is the last one
+pub const VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS: [EnvelopeVersion; 1] = [ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0];
+/// Number of envelope versions to keep on structures if many are present beyond the ones we consider valid
+pub const MAX_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS: usize = 16;
+
+/// Envelopes are versioned
+///
+/// These are the formats for the on-the-wire serialization performed by this module
+///
+/// #[repr(C, packed)]
+/// struct EnvelopeHeader {
+///     // Size is at least 4 bytes. Depending on the version specified, the size may vary and should be case to the appropriate struct
+///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x45 0x4E 0x56 0x30 ("ENV0")
+/// }
+///
+/// #[repr(C, packed)]
+/// struct EnvelopeENV0 {
+///     // Size is 106 bytes without signature and 170 with signature
+///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x45 0x4E 0x56 0x30 ("ENV0")
+///     crypto_kind: [u8; 4],        // 0x04: CryptoSystemVersion FOURCC code (CryptoKind)
+///     size: u16,                   // 0x08: Total size of the envelope including the encrypted operations message. Maximum size is 65,507 bytes, which is the data size limit for a single UDP message on IPv4.
+///     timestamp: u64,              // 0x0A: Duration since UNIX_EPOCH in microseconds when this message is sent. Messages older than 10 seconds are dropped.
+///     nonce: [u8; 24],             // 0x12: Random nonce for replay protection and for dh
+///     sender_id: [u8; 32],         // 0x2A: Node ID of the message source, which is the public key of the sender (must be verified with find_node if this is a new node_id/address combination)
+///     recipient_id: [u8; 32],      // 0x4A: Node ID of the intended recipient, which is the public key of the recipient (must be the receiving node, or a relay lease holder)
+///                                  // 0x6A: message is appended (operations)
+///     signature: [u8; 64],         // 0x?? (end-0x40): BareSignature of the entire envelope including header is appended to the packet
+///                                  // entire header needs to be included in message digest, relays are not allowed to modify the envelope without invalidating the signature.
+/// }
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Envelope {
+    ENV0 { env0: EnvelopeENV0 },
+}
+
+impl Envelope {
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
+    pub fn try_new_env0(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+        timestamp: Timestamp,
+        nonce: Nonce,
+        sender_id: NodeId,
+        recipient_id: NodeId,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        Ok(Self::ENV0 {
+            env0: EnvelopeENV0::try_new(
+                crypto,
+                crypto_kind,
+                timestamp,
+                nonce,
+                sender_id,
+                recipient_id,
+            )?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
+    pub fn try_from_signed_data(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        data: &[u8],
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
+        // Silent drop here, as we use zero length packets as part of the protocol for hole punching
+        if data.len() < 4 {
+            apibail_generic!("envelope header too small");
+        }
+
+        // Check envelope version
+        let version: EnvelopeVersion = data[0x00..0x04]
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
+
+        match version {
+            ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0 => Ok(Self::ENV0 {
+                env0: EnvelopeENV0::try_from_signed_data(crypto, data, network_key)?,
+            }),
+            _ => {
+                apibail_parse_error!("unsupported envelope version", version);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
+    pub fn decrypt_body(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        data: &[u8],
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => env0.decrypt_body(crypto, data, secret_key, network_key),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all, err)]
+    pub fn to_encrypted_data(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        body: &[u8],
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => {
+                env0.to_encrypted_data(crypto, body, secret_key, network_key)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_version(&self) -> EnvelopeVersion {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0: _ } => ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0,
+        }
+    }
+    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => env0.get_crypto_kind(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_timestamp(&self) -> Timestamp {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => env0.get_timestamp(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => env0.get_sender_id(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_recipient_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        match self {
+            Envelope::ENV0 { env0 } => env0.get_recipient_id(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct EnvelopeENV0 {
+    crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+    timestamp: Timestamp,
+    nonce: Nonce,
+    bare_sender_id: BareNodeId,
+    bare_recipient_id: BareNodeId,
+}
+
+impl EnvelopeENV0 {
+    fn try_new(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+        timestamp: Timestamp,
+        nonce: Nonce,
+        sender_id: NodeId,
+        recipient_id: NodeId,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        let vcrypto = Self::validate_crypto_kind(crypto, crypto_kind)?;
+
+        vcrypto.check_nonce(&nonce)?;
+        Self::check_node_id(crypto_kind, &sender_id)?;
+        Self::check_node_id(crypto_kind, &recipient_id)?;
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypto_kind,
+            timestamp,
+            nonce,
+            bare_sender_id: sender_id.value(),
+            bare_recipient_id: recipient_id.value(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn try_from_signed_data(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        data: &[u8],
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
+        // Silent drop here, as we use zero length packets as part of the protocol for hole punching
+        if data.len() < ENV0_MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
+            apibail_generic!("envelope data too small");
+        }
+
+        // Check crypto kind
+        let crypto_kind = CryptoKind::new(
+            data[0x04..0x08]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+
+        let vcrypto = Self::validate_crypto_kind(crypto, crypto_kind)?;
+
+        // Get size and ensure it matches the size of the envelope and is less than the maximum message size
+        let size: u16 = u16::from_le_bytes(
+            data[0x08..0x0A]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+        if (size as usize) > ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!("envelope too large", size);
+        }
+        if (size as usize) != data.len() {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "size doesn't match envelope size",
+                format!(
+                    "size doesn't match envelope size: size={} data.len()={}",
+                    size,
+                    data.len()
+                )
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Get the timestamp
+        let timestamp: Timestamp = u64::from_le_bytes(
+            data[0x0A..0x12]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        )
+        .into();
+
+        // Get nonce and sender node id
+        let mut nonce_slice: [u8; ENV0_NONCE_LENGTH] = data[0x12..0x2A]
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
+        let mut sender_id_slice: [u8; HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH] = data[0x2A..0x4A]
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
+        let mut recipient_id_slice: [u8; HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH] = data[0x4A..0x6A]
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
+
+        // Apply network key (not the best, but it will keep networks from colliding without much overhead)
+        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
+            for n in 0..ENV0_NONCE_LENGTH {
+                nonce_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+            for n in 0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+                sender_id_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+            for n in 0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+                recipient_id_slice[n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+        }
+
+        let nonce: Nonce = Nonce::new(&nonce_slice);
+        let bare_sender_id = BareNodeId::new(&sender_id_slice);
+        let bare_recipient_id = BareNodeId::new(&recipient_id_slice);
+
+        // Ensure sender_id and recipient_id are not the same
+        if bare_sender_id == bare_recipient_id {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "bare_sender_id should not be same as bare_recipient_id",
+                bare_recipient_id.encode()
+            );
+        }
+
+        let sender_public_key = PublicKey::new(crypto_kind, BarePublicKey::new(&bare_sender_id));
+
+        // Get signature
+        let bare_signature = BareSignature::new(
+            data[(data.len() - ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)..]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+        let signature = Signature::new(crypto_kind, bare_signature);
+        // Validate signature
+        if !vcrypto
+            .verify(
+                &sender_public_key,
+                &data[0..(data.len() - ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)],
+                &signature,
+            )
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?
+        {
+            apibail_parse_error!("signature verification of envelope failed", signature);
+        }
+
+        // Return envelope
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypto_kind,
+            timestamp,
+            nonce,
+            bare_sender_id,
+            bare_recipient_id,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn decrypt_body(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        data: &[u8],
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        // Get DH secret
+        let vcrypto = crypto
+            .get(self.crypto_kind)
+            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
+        vcrypto.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
+        let sender_public_key =
+            PublicKey::new(self.crypto_kind, BarePublicKey::new(&self.bare_sender_id));
+
+        let mut dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&sender_public_key, secret_key)?;
+
+        // Apply network key
+        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
+            let mut dh_secret_bytes = dh_secret.ref_value().to_vec();
+
+            for n in 0..dh_secret_bytes.len() {
+                dh_secret_bytes[n] ^= nk[n % dh_secret_bytes.len()];
+            }
+
+            dh_secret =
+                SharedSecret::new(dh_secret.kind(), BareSharedSecret::new(&dh_secret_bytes));
+        }
+        // Decrypt message without authentication
+        let body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
+            &data[0x6A..data.len() - ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH],
+            &self.nonce,
+            &dh_secret,
+        )?;
+
+        // Decompress body
+        let body = decompress_size_prepended(&body, Some(ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE))?;
+
+        Ok(body)
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_encrypted_data(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        body: &[u8],
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+        network_key: &Option<BareSharedSecret>,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        let vcrypto = crypto
+            .get(self.crypto_kind)
+            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
+        vcrypto.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
+        // Ensure body isn't too long
+        let uncompressed_body_size: usize = body.len() + ENV0_MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
+        if uncompressed_body_size > ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "envelope size before compression is too large",
+                uncompressed_body_size
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Compress body
+        let body = compress_prepend_size(body);
+
+        // Ensure body isn't too long
+        let envelope_size: usize = body.len() + ENV0_MIN_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
+        if envelope_size > ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "envelope size after compression is too large",
+                envelope_size
+            );
+        }
+        // Generate dh secret
+        let recipient_public_key = PublicKey::new(
+            self.crypto_kind,
+            BarePublicKey::new(&self.bare_recipient_id),
+        );
+
+        let mut dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&recipient_public_key, secret_key)?;
+
+        // Write envelope body
+        let mut data = vec![0u8; envelope_size];
+
+        // Write version
+        data[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0.0);
+        // Write crypto kind
+        data[0x04..0x08].copy_from_slice(self.crypto_kind.bytes());
+        // Write size
+        data[0x08..0x0A].copy_from_slice(&(envelope_size as u16).to_le_bytes());
+        // Write timestamp
+        data[0x0A..0x12].copy_from_slice(&self.timestamp.as_u64().to_le_bytes());
+        // Write nonce
+        data[0x12..0x2A].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce);
+        // Write sender node id
+        data[0x2A..0x4A].copy_from_slice(&self.bare_sender_id);
+        // Write recipient node id
+        data[0x4A..0x6A].copy_from_slice(&self.bare_recipient_id);
+
+        // Apply network key (not the best, but it will keep networks from colliding without much overhead)
+        if let Some(nk) = network_key.as_ref() {
+            let mut dh_secret_bytes = dh_secret.ref_value().to_vec();
+
+            for n in 0..dh_secret_bytes.len() {
+                dh_secret_bytes[n] ^= nk[n % dh_secret_bytes.len()];
+            }
+            for n in 0..ENV0_NONCE_LENGTH {
+                data[0x12 + n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+            for n in 0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+                data[0x2A + n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+            for n in 0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+                data[0x4A + n] ^= nk[n];
+            }
+
+            dh_secret =
+                SharedSecret::new(dh_secret.kind(), BareSharedSecret::new(&dh_secret_bytes));
+        }
+
+        // Encrypt message
+        let encrypted_body = vcrypto.crypt_no_auth_unaligned(&body, &self.nonce, &dh_secret)?;
+
+        // Write body
+        if !encrypted_body.is_empty() {
+            data[0x6A..envelope_size - ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH]
+                .copy_from_slice(encrypted_body.as_slice());
+        }
+
+        // Sign the envelope
+        let sender_public_key =
+            PublicKey::new(self.crypto_kind, BarePublicKey::new(&self.bare_sender_id));
+
+        let signature = vcrypto.sign(
+            &sender_public_key,
+            secret_key,
+            &data[0..(envelope_size - vcrypto.signature_length())],
+        )?;
+
+        // Append the signature
+        data[(envelope_size - ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)..].copy_from_slice(signature.ref_value());
+
+        Ok(data)
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
+        self.crypto_kind
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_timestamp(&self) -> Timestamp {
+        self.timestamp
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.bare_sender_id.clone())
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_recipient_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.bare_recipient_id.clone())
+    }
+
+    //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    fn validate_crypto_kind(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<CryptoSystemGuard<'_>> {
+        let vcrypto = crypto
+            .get(crypto_kind)
+            .ok_or_else(|| VeilidAPIError::parse_error("unsupported crypto kind", crypto_kind))?;
+
+        // Verify crypto kind can be used with this envelope
+        if vcrypto.nonce_length() != ENV0_NONCE_LENGTH
+            || vcrypto.hash_digest_length() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH
+            || vcrypto.public_key_length() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH
+            || vcrypto.signature_length() != ENV0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
+        {
+            apibail_generic!("unsupported crypto kind for this envelope type");
+        }
+
+        Ok(vcrypto)
+    }
+
+    fn check_node_id(crypto_kind: CryptoKind, node_id: &NodeId) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if node_id.kind() != crypto_kind {
+            apibail_parse_error!("invalid crypto kind for ENV0", node_id.kind());
+        }
+        if node_id.ref_value().len() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+            apibail_parse_error!("invalid node_id length for ENV0", node_id.ref_value().len());
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

veilid-core/src/crypto/guard.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+use core::marker::PhantomData;
+
 use super::*;
 
 /// Guard to access a particular cryptosystem
@@ -52,9 +54,9 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     // Cached Operations
     pub async fn cached_dh(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.cached_dh(key, secret)).await
     }
 
@@ -77,47 +79,50 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
         &self,
         password: &[u8],
         salt: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.derive_shared_secret(password, salt)).await
     }
-    pub async fn random_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce {
+    pub async fn random_nonce(&self) -> Nonce {
         yielding(|| self.guard.random_nonce()).await
     }
-    pub async fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> BareSharedSecret {
+    pub async fn random_shared_secret(&self) -> SharedSecret {
         yielding(|| self.guard.random_shared_secret()).await
     }
     pub async fn compute_dh(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.compute_dh(key, secret)).await
     }
     pub async fn generate_shared_secret(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
         domain: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
         let dh = self.compute_dh(key, secret).await?;
-        Ok(BareSharedSecret::from(
-            self.generate_hash(&[&dh, domain, VEILID_DOMAIN_API].concat())
-                .await,
+        let hash = self
+            .generate_hash(&[&dh.into_value(), domain, VEILID_DOMAIN_API].concat())
+            .await;
+        Ok(SharedSecret::new(
+            hash.kind(),
+            BareSharedSecret::new(&hash.into_value()),
         ))
     }
 
-    pub async fn generate_keypair(&self) -> BareKeyPair {
+    pub async fn generate_keypair(&self) -> KeyPair {
         yielding(|| self.guard.generate_keypair()).await
     }
 
-    pub async fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> BareHashDigest {
+    pub async fn generate_hash(&self, data: &[u8]) -> HashDigest {
         yielding(|| self.guard.generate_hash(data)).await
     }
 
     pub async fn generate_hash_reader(
         &self,
         reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.generate_hash_reader(reader)).await
     }
 
@@ -154,59 +159,58 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub fn default_salt_length(&self) -> usize {
         self.guard.default_salt_length()
     }
-    pub fn check_shared_secret(&self, secret: &BareSharedSecret) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_shared_secret(&self, secret: &SharedSecret) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_shared_secret(secret)
     }
-    pub fn check_nonce(&self, nonce: &BareNonce) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_nonce(&self, nonce: &Nonce) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_nonce(nonce)
     }
-    pub fn check_hash_digest(&self, hash: &BareHashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_hash_digest(&self, hash: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_hash_digest(hash)
     }
-    pub fn check_public_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_public_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_public_key(key)
     }
-    pub fn check_secret_key(&self, key: &BareSecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_secret_key(&self, key: &SecretKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_secret_key(key)
     }
-    pub fn check_signature(&self, signature: &BareSignature) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+    pub fn check_signature(&self, signature: &Signature) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         self.guard.check_signature(signature)
     }
-    pub async fn validate_keypair(&self, key: &BarePublicKey, secret: &BareSecretKey) -> bool {
+    pub async fn validate_keypair(
+        &self,
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.validate_keypair(key, secret)).await
     }
 
-    pub async fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash: &BareHashDigest) -> bool {
+    pub async fn validate_hash(&self, data: &[u8], hash: &HashDigest) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.validate_hash(data, hash)).await
     }
 
     pub async fn validate_hash_reader(
         &self,
         reader: &mut dyn std::io::Read,
-        hash: &BareHashDigest,
+        hash: &HashDigest,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.validate_hash_reader(reader, hash)).await
     }
 
-    // Distance Metric
-    pub async fn distance(&self, key1: &BareHashDigest, key2: &BareHashDigest) -> BareHashDistance {
-        yielding(|| self.guard.distance(key1, key2)).await
-    }
-
     // Authentication
     pub async fn sign(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
         data: &[u8],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSignature> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Signature> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.sign(key, secret, data)).await
     }
     pub async fn verify(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
         data: &[u8],
-        signature: &BareSignature,
+        signature: &Signature,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<bool> {
         yielding(|| self.guard.verify(key, data, signature)).await
     }
@@ -215,8 +219,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn decrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         yielding(|| {
@@ -229,8 +233,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn decrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
         yielding(|| {
@@ -243,8 +247,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn encrypt_in_place_aead(
         &self,
         body: &mut Vec<u8>,
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         yielding(|| {
@@ -257,8 +261,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn encrypt_aead(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
         associated_data: Option<&[u8]>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
         yielding(|| {
@@ -272,8 +276,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn crypt_in_place_no_auth(
         &self,
         body: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         yielding(|| {
             self.guard
@@ -286,8 +290,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
         &self,
         in_buf: &[u8],
         out_buf: &mut [u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         yielding(|| {
             self.guard
@@ -299,8 +303,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn crypt_no_auth_aligned_8(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
         yielding(|| {
             self.guard
@@ -312,8 +316,8 @@ impl AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
     pub async fn crypt_no_auth_unaligned(
         &self,
         body: &[u8],
-        nonce: &BareNonce,
-        shared_secret: &BareSharedSecret,
+        nonce: &Nonce,
+        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
         yielding(|| {
             self.guard

veilid-core/src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-mod blake3digest512;
 mod dh_cache;
 mod envelope;
 mod guard;
@@ -6,41 +5,20 @@ mod receipt;
 mod types;
 
 pub mod crypto_system;
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
-pub(crate) mod none;
-
 #[doc(hidden)]
 pub mod tests;
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
-pub(crate) mod vld0;
-// #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld1")]
-// pub(crate) mod vld1;
-
-pub use blake3digest512::*;
 
 pub use crypto_system::*;
+use dh_cache::*;
 pub(crate) use envelope::*;
 pub use guard::*;
 pub(crate) use receipt::*;
 pub use types::*;
 
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
-pub use none::sizes::*;
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
-pub(crate) use none::*;
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
-pub use vld0::sizes::*;
-#[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
-pub(crate) use vld0::*;
-// #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld1")]
-// pub(crate) use vld1::*;
-
 use super::*;
 use core::convert::TryInto;
-use dh_cache::*;
 use hashlink::linked_hash_map::Entry;
 use hashlink::LruCache;
-use std::marker::PhantomData;
 
 impl_veilid_log_facility!("crypto");
 
@@ -67,8 +45,9 @@ cfg_if! {
 }
 /// Number of cryptosystem signatures to keep on structures if many are present beyond the ones we consider valid
 pub const MAX_CRYPTO_KINDS: usize = 3;
+
 /// Return the best cryptosystem kind we support
-pub fn best_crypto_kind() -> CryptoKind {
+pub(crate) fn best_crypto_kind() -> CryptoKind {
     VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS[0]
 }
 
@@ -160,16 +139,23 @@ impl Crypto {
             .open("crypto_caches", 1)
             .await
             .wrap_err("failed to open crypto_caches")?;
-        let caches_valid = match db.load(0, b"cache_validity_key").await? {
+        let mut caches_valid = match db.load(0, b"cache_validity_key").await? {
             Some(v) => v == cache_validity_key,
             None => false,
         };
+
         if caches_valid {
             if let Some(b) = db.load(0, b"dh_cache").await? {
                 let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
-                bytes_to_cache(&b, &mut inner.dh_cache);
+                if let Ok(dh_cache) = bytes_to_cache(&b) {
+                    inner.dh_cache = dh_cache;
+                } else {
+                    caches_valid = false;
+                }
             }
-        } else {
+        }
+
+        if !caches_valid {
             drop(db);
             table_store.delete("crypto_caches").await?;
             db = table_store.open("crypto_caches", 1).await?;
@@ -245,12 +231,12 @@ impl Crypto {
     }
 
     // Factory method to get the best crypto version
-    pub fn best(&self) -> CryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
+    pub(crate) fn best(&self) -> CryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
         self.get(best_crypto_kind()).unwrap()
     }
 
     // Factory method to get the best crypto version for async use
-    pub fn best_async(&self) -> AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
+    pub(crate) fn best_async(&self) -> AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_> {
         self.get_async(best_crypto_kind()).unwrap()
     }
 
@@ -261,17 +247,17 @@ impl Crypto {
         &self,
         public_keys: &[PublicKey],
         data: &[u8],
-        typed_signatures: &[Signature],
+        signatures: &[Signature],
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Option<PublicKeyGroup>> {
         let mut out = PublicKeyGroup::with_capacity(public_keys.len());
-        for sig in typed_signatures {
-            for nid in public_keys {
-                if nid.kind() == sig.kind() {
-                    if let Some(vcrypto) = self.get(sig.kind()) {
-                        if !vcrypto.verify(nid.ref_value(), data, sig.ref_value())? {
+        for signature in signatures {
+            for public_key in public_keys {
+                if public_key.kind() == signature.kind() {
+                    if let Some(vcrypto) = self.get(signature.kind()) {
+                        if !vcrypto.verify(public_key, data, signature)? {
                             return Ok(None);
                         }
-                        out.add(nid.clone());
+                        out.add(public_key.clone());
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -285,17 +271,16 @@ impl Crypto {
     pub fn generate_signatures<F, R>(
         &self,
         data: &[u8],
-        typed_key_pairs: &[KeyPair],
+        key_pairs: &[KeyPair],
         transform: F,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<R>>
     where
-        F: Fn(&KeyPair, BareSignature) -> R,
+        F: Fn(&KeyPair, Signature) -> R,
     {
-        let mut out = Vec::<R>::with_capacity(typed_key_pairs.len());
-        for kp in typed_key_pairs {
+        let mut out = Vec::<R>::with_capacity(key_pairs.len());
+        for kp in key_pairs {
             if let Some(vcrypto) = self.get(kp.kind()) {
-                let sig =
-                    vcrypto.sign(kp.ref_value().ref_key(), kp.ref_value().ref_secret(), data)?;
+                let sig = vcrypto.sign(&kp.key(), &kp.secret(), data)?;
                 out.push(transform(kp, sig))
             }
         }
@@ -308,12 +293,12 @@ impl Crypto {
         #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-vld0")]
         if crypto_kind == CRYPTO_KIND_VLD0 {
             let kp = vld0_generate_keypair();
-            return Ok(KeyPair::new(crypto_kind, kp));
+            return Ok(kp);
         }
         #[cfg(feature = "enable-crypto-none")]
         if crypto_kind == CRYPTO_KIND_NONE {
             let kp = none_generate_keypair();
-            return Ok(KeyPair::new(crypto_kind, kp));
+            return Ok(kp);
         }
         Err(VeilidAPIError::generic("invalid crypto kind"))
     }
@@ -323,9 +308,11 @@ impl Crypto {
     fn cached_dh_internal<T: CryptoSystem>(
         &self,
         vcrypto: &T,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BareSharedSecret> {
+        key: &PublicKey,
+        secret: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<SharedSecret> {
+        vcrypto.check_public_key(key)?;
+        vcrypto.check_secret_key(secret)?;
         Ok(
             match self.inner.lock().dh_cache.entry(DHCacheKey {
                 key: key.clone(),
@@ -430,10 +417,7 @@ impl Crypto {
         let (public_key, secret_key) =
             if let (Some(public_key), Some(secret_key)) = (public_key, secret_key) {
                 // Validate node id
-                if !vcrypto
-                    .validate_keypair(&public_key.value(), &secret_key.value())
-                    .await
-                {
+                if !vcrypto.validate_keypair(&public_key, &secret_key).await? {
                     apibail_generic!(format!(
                         "secret_key and public_key don't match:\npublic_key: {}\nsecret_key: {}",
                         public_key, secret_key
@@ -443,11 +427,7 @@ impl Crypto {
             } else {
                 // If we still don't have a valid keypair, generate one
                 veilid_log!(self debug "generating new node {} keypair", ck);
-                let kp = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await;
-                (
-                    PublicKey::new(ck, kp.key()),
-                    SecretKey::new(ck, kp.secret()),
-                )
+                vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split()
             };
 
         veilid_log!(self info  "Public Key: {}", public_key);
@@ -476,13 +456,7 @@ impl Crypto {
                 .expect("Valid crypto kind is not actually valid.");
 
             #[cfg(test)]
-            let (public_key, secret_key) = {
-                let kp = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await;
-                (
-                    PublicKey::new(ck, kp.key()),
-                    SecretKey::new(ck, kp.secret()),
-                )
-            };
+            let (public_key, secret_key) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
             #[cfg(not(test))]
             let (public_key, secret_key) = self.setup_public_key(vcrypto, table_store).await?;
 

veilid-core/src/crypto/receipt.rs

@@ -1,238 +0,0 @@
-#![allow(clippy::absurd_extreme_comparisons)]
-
-use super::*;
-use crate::*;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
-
-pub const MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 1380;
-pub const MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE: usize = MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE - MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE; // 1250
-pub const MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 130;
-
-// Version number of receipt format
-fourcc_type!(ReceiptVersion);
-
-pub const RECEIPT_VERSION_VLD0: ReceiptVersion = ReceiptVersion(*b"RCP0");
-// pub const RECEIPT_VERSION_VLD0_FOURCC: u32 = u32::from_be_bytes(*b"RCP0");
-
-/// Receipt versions in order of preference, best receipt version is the first one, worst is the last one
-pub const VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS: [ReceiptVersion; 1] = [RECEIPT_VERSION_VLD0];
-
-static_assertions::const_assert_eq!(VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS.len(), VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.len());
-
-/// Return the best receipt version we support
-pub fn best_receipt_version() -> ReceiptVersion {
-    VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS[0]
-}
-
-/// Out-of-band receipts are versioned along with envelopes.
-///
-/// #[repr(C, packed)]
-/// struct ReceiptHeader {
-///     // Size is at least 4 bytes. Depending on the version specified, the size may vary and should be case to the appropriate struct
-///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x30 ("RCP0")
-/// }
-///
-/// #[repr(C, packed)]
-/// struct ReceiptV0 {
-///     // Size is 66 bytes without extra data and signature, 130 with signature
-///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x30 ("RCP0")
-///     crypto_kind: [u8; 4],        // 0x04: CryptoSystemVersion FOURCC code
-///     size: u16,                   // 0x08: Total size of the receipt including the extra data and the signature. Maximum size is 1380 bytes.
-///     nonce: [u8; 24],             // 0x0A: Randomly chosen bytes that represent a unique receipt. Could be used to encrypt the extra data, but it's not required.
-///     sender_id: [u8; 32],         // 0x22: Node ID of the message source, which is the public key of the sender
-///     extra_data: [u8; ??],        // 0x42: Extra data is appended (arbitrary extra data, not encrypted by receipt itself, maximum size is 1250 bytes)
-///     signature: [u8; 64],         // 0x?? (end-0x40): BareSignature of the entire receipt including header and extra data is appended to the packet
-/// }
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
-pub struct Receipt {
-    version: ReceiptVersion,
-    crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
-    nonce: BareNonce,
-    sender_id: BareNodeId,
-    extra_data: Vec<u8>,
-}
-
-impl Receipt {
-    pub fn try_new<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(
-        version: ReceiptVersion,
-        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
-        nonce: BareNonce,
-        sender_id: BareNodeId,
-        extra_data: D,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
-        assert!(VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS.contains(&version));
-        assert!(VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS.contains(&crypto_kind));
-
-        if extra_data.as_ref().len() > MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "extra data too large for receipt",
-                extra_data.as_ref().len()
-            );
-        }
-        Ok(Self {
-            version,
-            crypto_kind,
-            nonce,
-            sender_id,
-            extra_data: Vec::from(extra_data.as_ref()),
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "receipt", skip_all, err)]
-    pub fn from_signed_data(crypto: &Crypto, data: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Receipt> {
-        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
-        if data.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!("receipt too small", data.len());
-        }
-
-        // Check version
-        let version: ReceiptVersion = data[0x00..0x04]
-            .try_into()
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
-        if !VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS.contains(&version) {
-            apibail_parse_error!("unsupported receipt version", version);
-        }
-
-        // Check crypto kind
-        let crypto_kind = CryptoKind::try_from(&data[0x04..0x08])?;
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
-            apibail_parse_error!("unsupported crypto kind", crypto_kind);
-        };
-
-        // Get size and ensure it matches the size of the envelope and is less than the maximum message size
-        let size: u16 = u16::from_le_bytes(
-            data[0x08..0x0A]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-        if (size as usize) > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!("receipt size is too large", size);
-        }
-        if (size as usize) != data.len() {
-            apibail_parse_error!(
-                "size doesn't match receipt size",
-                format!("size={} data.len()={}", size, data.len())
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Get sender id
-        let sender_id = BareNodeId::new(
-            data[0x22..0x42]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-
-        // Get signature
-        let signature = BareSignature::new(
-            data[(data.len() - 64)..]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-
-        // Validate signature
-        if !vcrypto
-            .verify(
-                &sender_id.clone().into(),
-                &data[0..(data.len() - 64)],
-                &signature,
-            )
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?
-        {
-            apibail_parse_error!("signature failure in receipt", signature);
-        }
-
-        // Get nonce
-        let nonce: BareNonce = BareNonce::new(
-            data[0x0A..0x22]
-                .try_into()
-                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
-        );
-
-        // Get extra data and signature
-        let extra_data: Vec<u8> = Vec::from(&data[0x42..(data.len() - 64)]);
-
-        // Return receipt
-        Ok(Self {
-            version,
-            crypto_kind,
-            nonce,
-            sender_id,
-            extra_data,
-        })
-    }
-
-    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "receipt", skip_all, err)]
-    pub fn to_signed_data(
-        &self,
-        crypto: &Crypto,
-        secret: &BareSecretKey,
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
-        // Ensure extra data isn't too long
-        let receipt_size: usize = self.extra_data.len() + MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE;
-        if receipt_size > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
-            apibail_parse_error!("receipt too large", receipt_size);
-        }
-        // Get crypto version
-        let vcrypto = crypto
-            .get(self.crypto_kind)
-            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
-
-        let mut data: Vec<u8> = vec![0u8; receipt_size];
-
-        // Write version
-        data[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&self.version.0);
-        // Write crypto kind
-        data[0x04..0x08].copy_from_slice(&self.crypto_kind.0);
-        // Write size
-        data[0x08..0x0A].copy_from_slice(&(receipt_size as u16).to_le_bytes());
-        // Write nonce
-        data[0x0A..0x22].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce);
-        // Write sender node id
-        data[0x22..0x42].copy_from_slice(&self.sender_id);
-        // Write extra data
-        if !self.extra_data.is_empty() {
-            data[0x42..(receipt_size - 64)].copy_from_slice(self.extra_data.as_slice());
-        }
-        // Sign the receipt
-        let signature = vcrypto
-            .sign(
-                &self.sender_id.clone().into(),
-                secret,
-                &data[0..(receipt_size - 64)],
-            )
-            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
-        // Append the signature
-        data[(receipt_size - 64)..].copy_from_slice(&signature);
-
-        Ok(data)
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_version(&self) -> ReceiptVersion {
-        self.version
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
-        self.crypto_kind
-    }
-
-    pub fn get_nonce(&self) -> BareNonce {
-        self.nonce.clone()
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_bare_sender_id(&self) -> BareNodeId {
-        self.sender_id.clone()
-    }
-
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
-        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.sender_id.clone())
-    }
-
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn get_extra_data(&self) -> &[u8] {
-        &self.extra_data
-    }
-}

veilid-core/src/crypto/receipt/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+#![allow(clippy::absurd_extreme_comparisons)]
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::routing_table::*;
+use core::convert::TryInto;
+
+// Version number of receipt format
+fourcc_type!(ReceiptVersion);
+
+// RCP0
+pub const RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0: ReceiptVersion = ReceiptVersion::new(*b"RCP0");
+pub const RCP0_NONCE_LENGTH: usize = 24;
+pub const RCP0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH: usize = 64;
+pub const RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 1380;
+pub const RCP0_MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE: usize = RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE - RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE; // 1250
+pub const RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE: usize = 130;
+
+/// Receipt versions in order of preference, best receipt version is the first one, worst is the last one
+pub const VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS: [ReceiptVersion; 1] = [RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0];
+
+static_assertions::const_assert_eq!(VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS.len(), VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.len());
+
+/// Return the best receipt version we support
+pub fn best_receipt_version() -> ReceiptVersion {
+    VALID_RECEIPT_VERSIONS[0]
+}
+
+/// Out-of-band receipts are versioned along with envelopes.
+///
+/// #[repr(C, packed)]
+/// struct ReceiptHeader {
+///     // Size is at least 4 bytes. Depending on the version specified, the size may vary and should be case to the appropriate struct
+///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x30 ("RCP0")
+/// }
+///
+/// #[repr(C, packed)]
+/// struct ReceiptRCP0 {
+///     // Size is 66 bytes without extra data and signature, 130 with signature
+///     version: [u8; 4],            // 0x00: 0x52 0x43 0x50 0x30 ("RCP0")
+///     crypto_kind: [u8; 4],        // 0x04: CryptoSystemVersion FOURCC code
+///     size: u16,                   // 0x08: Total size of the receipt including the extra data and the signature. Maximum size is 1380 bytes.
+///     nonce: [u8; 24],             // 0x0A: Randomly chosen bytes that represent a unique receipt. Could be used to encrypt the extra data, but it's not required.
+///     sender_id: [u8; 32],         // 0x22: Node ID of the message source, which is the public key of the sender
+///     extra_data: [u8; ??],        // 0x42: Extra data is appended (arbitrary extra data, not encrypted by receipt itself, maximum size is 1250 bytes)
+///     signature: [u8; 64],         // 0x?? (end-0x40): BareSignature of the entire receipt including header and extra data is appended to the packet
+/// }
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Receipt {
+    RCP0 { rcp0: ReceiptRCP0 },
+}
+
+impl Receipt {
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
+    pub fn try_new_rcp0<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+        nonce: Nonce,
+        sender_id: NodeId,
+        extra_data: D,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        Ok(Self::RCP0 {
+            rcp0: ReceiptRCP0::try_new(crypto, crypto_kind, nonce, sender_id, extra_data)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "receipt", skip_all, err)]
+    pub fn try_from_signed_data(crypto: &Crypto, data: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Receipt> {
+        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
+        if data.len() < 4 {
+            apibail_parse_error!("receipt header too small", data.len());
+        }
+
+        // Check version
+        let version: ReceiptVersion = data[0x00..0x04]
+            .try_into()
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
+
+        match version {
+            RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0 => Ok(Self::RCP0 {
+                rcp0: ReceiptRCP0::try_from_signed_data(crypto, data)?,
+            }),
+            _ => {
+                apibail_parse_error!("unsupported receipt version", version);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "envelope", skip_all)]
+    pub fn to_signed_data(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0 } => rcp0.to_signed_data(crypto, secret_key),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn get_version(&self) -> ReceiptVersion {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0: _ } => RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0 } => rcp0.get_crypto_kind(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_nonce(&self) -> Nonce {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0 } => rcp0.get_nonce(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0 } => rcp0.get_sender_id(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_extra_data(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        match self {
+            Receipt::RCP0 { rcp0 } => rcp0.get_extra_data(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ReceiptRCP0 {
+    crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+    nonce: Nonce,
+    bare_sender_id: BareNodeId,
+    extra_data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl ReceiptRCP0 {
+    pub fn try_new<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+        nonce: Nonce,
+        sender_id: NodeId,
+        extra_data: D,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        let vcrypto = Self::validate_crypto_kind(crypto, crypto_kind)?;
+
+        vcrypto.check_nonce(&nonce)?;
+        Self::check_node_id(crypto_kind, &sender_id)?;
+
+        if extra_data.as_ref().len() > RCP0_MAX_EXTRA_DATA_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "extra data too large for receipt",
+                extra_data.as_ref().len()
+            );
+        }
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypto_kind,
+            nonce,
+            bare_sender_id: sender_id.value(),
+            extra_data: Vec::from(extra_data.as_ref()),
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "receipt", skip_all, err)]
+    pub fn try_from_signed_data(crypto: &Crypto, data: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        // Ensure we are at least the length of the envelope
+        if data.len() < RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!("receipt too small", data.len());
+        }
+
+        // Check crypto kind
+        let crypto_kind = CryptoKind::try_from(&data[0x04..0x08])?;
+        let vcrypto = Self::validate_crypto_kind(crypto, crypto_kind)?;
+
+        // Get size and ensure it matches the size of the envelope and is less than the maximum message size
+        let size: u16 = u16::from_le_bytes(
+            data[0x08..0x0A]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+        if (size as usize) > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!("receipt size is too large", size);
+        }
+        if (size as usize) != data.len() {
+            apibail_parse_error!(
+                "size doesn't match receipt size",
+                format!("size={} data.len()={}", size, data.len())
+            );
+        }
+
+        // Get sender id
+        let bare_sender_id = BareNodeId::new(
+            data[0x22..0x42]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+        let sender_public_key = PublicKey::new(crypto_kind, BarePublicKey::new(&bare_sender_id));
+
+        // Get signature
+        let bare_signature = BareSignature::new(
+            data[(data.len() - 64)..]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+
+        let signature = Signature::new(crypto_kind, bare_signature);
+
+        // Validate signature
+        if !vcrypto
+            .verify(&sender_public_key, &data[0..(data.len() - 64)], &signature)
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?
+        {
+            apibail_parse_error!("signature failure in receipt", signature);
+        }
+
+        // Get nonce
+        let nonce: Nonce = Nonce::new(
+            data[0x0A..0x22]
+                .try_into()
+                .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?,
+        );
+
+        // Get extra data and signature
+        let extra_data: Vec<u8> = Vec::from(&data[0x42..(data.len() - 64)]);
+
+        // Return receipt
+        Ok(Self {
+            crypto_kind,
+            nonce,
+            bare_sender_id,
+            extra_data,
+        })
+    }
+
+    #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "receipt", skip_all, err)]
+    pub fn to_signed_data(
+        &self,
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        secret_key: &SecretKey,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<u8>> {
+        let vcrypto = crypto
+            .get(self.crypto_kind)
+            .expect("need to ensure only valid crypto kinds here");
+        vcrypto.check_secret_key(secret_key)?;
+
+        // Ensure extra data isn't too long
+        let receipt_size: usize = self.extra_data.len() + RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE;
+        if receipt_size > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+            apibail_parse_error!("receipt too large", receipt_size);
+        }
+
+        let mut data: Vec<u8> = vec![0u8; receipt_size];
+
+        // Write version
+        data[0x00..0x04].copy_from_slice(&RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0.0);
+        // Write crypto kind
+        data[0x04..0x08].copy_from_slice(self.crypto_kind.bytes());
+        // Write size
+        data[0x08..0x0A].copy_from_slice(&(receipt_size as u16).to_le_bytes());
+        // Write nonce
+        data[0x0A..0x22].copy_from_slice(&self.nonce);
+        // Write sender node id
+        data[0x22..0x42].copy_from_slice(&self.bare_sender_id);
+        // Write extra data
+        if !self.extra_data.is_empty() {
+            data[0x42..(receipt_size - RCP0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)]
+                .copy_from_slice(self.extra_data.as_slice());
+        }
+        // Sign the receipt
+        let sender_public_key =
+            PublicKey::new(self.crypto_kind, BarePublicKey::new(&self.bare_sender_id));
+        let signature = vcrypto
+            .sign(
+                &sender_public_key,
+                secret_key,
+                &data[0..(receipt_size - RCP0_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)],
+            )
+            .map_err(VeilidAPIError::generic)?;
+        // Append the signature
+        data[(receipt_size - 64)..].copy_from_slice(signature.ref_value());
+
+        Ok(data)
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_crypto_kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
+        self.crypto_kind
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_nonce(&self) -> Nonce {
+        self.nonce.clone()
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_sender_id(&self) -> NodeId {
+        NodeId::new(self.crypto_kind, self.bare_sender_id.clone())
+    }
+
+    pub fn get_extra_data(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        &self.extra_data
+    }
+
+    //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    fn validate_crypto_kind(
+        crypto: &Crypto,
+        crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<CryptoSystemGuard<'_>> {
+        let vcrypto = crypto
+            .get(crypto_kind)
+            .ok_or_else(|| VeilidAPIError::parse_error("unsupported crypto kind", crypto_kind))?;
+
+        // Verify crypto kind can be used with this envelope
+        if vcrypto.nonce_length() != RCP0_NONCE_LENGTH
+            || vcrypto.hash_digest_length() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH
+            || vcrypto.public_key_length() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH
+        {
+            apibail_generic!("unsupported crypto kind for this envelope type");
+        }
+
+        Ok(vcrypto)
+    }
+
+    fn check_node_id(crypto_kind: CryptoKind, node_id: &NodeId) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
+        if node_id.kind() != crypto_kind {
+            apibail_parse_error!("invalid crypto kind for RCP0", node_id.kind());
+        }
+        if node_id.ref_value().len() != HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
+            apibail_parse_error!("invalid node_id length for RCP0", node_id.ref_value().len());
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}

veilid-core/src/crypto/tests/fixtures.rs

@@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ pub fn fix_fake_public_key() -> PublicKey {
     )
 }
 
+pub fn fix_fake_secret_key() -> SecretKey {
+    SecretKey::new(
+        CryptoKind::from_str("FAKE").unwrap(),
+        fix_fake_bare_secret_key(),
+    )
+}
+
 pub fn fix_fake_bare_secret_key() -> BareSecretKey {
     let mut fake_key = [0u8; VLD0_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
     random_bytes(&mut fake_key);

veilid-core/src/crypto/tests/test_crypto.rs

@@ -182,9 +182,15 @@ pub async fn test_no_auth(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
 pub async fn test_dh(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
     trace!("test_dh");
     let (dht_key, dht_key_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    assert!(vcrypto.validate_keypair(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret).await);
+    assert!(vcrypto
+        .validate_keypair(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed"));
     let (dht_key2, dht_key_secret2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    assert!(vcrypto.validate_keypair(&dht_key2, &dht_key_secret2).await);
+    assert!(vcrypto
+        .validate_keypair(&dht_key2, &dht_key_secret2)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed"));
 
     let r1 = vcrypto
         .compute_dh(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret2)

veilid-core/src/crypto/tests/test_envelope_receipt.rs

@@ -18,16 +18,25 @@ pub async fn test_envelope_round_trip(
     // Create envelope
     let ts = Timestamp::from(0x12345678ABCDEF69u64);
     let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce().await;
-    let (sender_id, sender_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    let (recipient_id, recipient_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    let envelope = Envelope::new(
-        envelope_version,
-        vcrypto.kind(),
-        ts,
-        nonce,
-        sender_id.into(),
-        recipient_id.into(),
-    );
+    let (sender_public_key, sender_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let sender_id = crypto
+        .routing_table()
+        .generate_node_id(&sender_public_key)
+        .expect("should generate node id");
+    let (recipient_public_key, recipient_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let recipient_id = crypto
+        .routing_table()
+        .generate_node_id(&recipient_public_key)
+        .expect("should generate node id");
+    let envelope = match envelope_version {
+        ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0 => {
+            Envelope::try_new_env0(&crypto, vcrypto.kind(), ts, nonce, sender_id, recipient_id)
+                .expect("should create envelope")
+        }
+        _ => {
+            panic!("unsupported envelope version");
+        }
+    };
 
     // Create arbitrary body
     let body = b"This is an arbitrary body";
@@ -38,7 +47,7 @@ pub async fn test_envelope_round_trip(
         .expect("failed to encrypt data");
 
     // Deserialize from bytes
-    let envelope2 = Envelope::from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data, &network_key)
+    let envelope2 = Envelope::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data, &network_key)
         .expect("failed to deserialize envelope from data");
 
     let body2 = envelope2
@@ -54,13 +63,13 @@ pub async fn test_envelope_round_trip(
     let mut mod_enc_data = enc_data.clone();
     mod_enc_data[enc_data_len - 1] ^= 0x80u8;
     assert!(
-        Envelope::from_signed_data(&crypto, &mod_enc_data, &network_key).is_err(),
+        Envelope::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, &mod_enc_data, &network_key).is_err(),
         "should have failed to decode envelope with modified signature"
     );
     let mut mod_enc_data2 = enc_data.clone();
     mod_enc_data2[enc_data_len - 65] ^= 0x80u8;
     assert!(
-        Envelope::from_signed_data(&crypto, &mod_enc_data2, &network_key).is_err(),
+        Envelope::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, &mod_enc_data2, &network_key).is_err(),
         "should have failed to decode envelope with modified data"
     );
 }
@@ -76,15 +85,20 @@ pub async fn test_receipt_round_trip(
 
     // Create receipt
     let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce().await;
-    let (sender_id, sender_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    let receipt = Receipt::try_new(
-        receipt_version,
-        vcrypto.kind(),
-        nonce,
-        sender_id.into(),
-        body,
-    )
-    .expect("should not fail");
+    let (sender_public_key, sender_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let sender_id = crypto
+        .routing_table()
+        .generate_node_id(&sender_public_key)
+        .expect("should generate node id");
+    let receipt = match receipt_version {
+        RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0 => {
+            Receipt::try_new_rcp0(&crypto, vcrypto.kind(), nonce, sender_id, body)
+                .expect("should not fail")
+        }
+        _ => {
+            panic!("unsupported receipt version");
+        }
+    };
 
     // Serialize to bytes
     let mut enc_data = receipt
@@ -92,12 +106,12 @@ pub async fn test_receipt_round_trip(
         .expect("failed to make signed data");
 
     // Deserialize from bytes
-    let receipt2 = Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data)
+    let receipt2 = Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data)
         .expect("failed to deserialize envelope from data");
 
     // Should not validate even when a single bit is changed
     enc_data[5] = 0x01;
-    let _ = Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data)
+    let _ = Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, &enc_data)
         .expect_err("should have failed to decrypt using wrong secret");
 
     // Compare receipts
@@ -114,8 +128,12 @@ pub async fn test_all() {
             let vcrypto = crypto.get_async(v).unwrap();
 
             test_envelope_round_trip(ev, &vcrypto, None).await;
-            test_envelope_round_trip(ev, &vcrypto, Some(vcrypto.random_shared_secret().await))
-                .await;
+            test_envelope_round_trip(
+                ev,
+                &vcrypto,
+                Some(vcrypto.random_shared_secret().await.into_value()),
+            )
+            .await;
         }
     }
 

veilid-core/src/crypto/tests/test_types.rs

@@ -3,162 +3,188 @@ use crate::crypto::tests::fixtures::*;
 
 pub async fn test_generate_secret(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
     // Verify keys generate
-    let (dht_key, dht_key_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    let (dht_key2, dht_key_secret2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let (public_key, secret_key) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let (public_key2, secret_key2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
 
     // Verify byte patterns are different between public and secret
-    assert_ne!(dht_key.bytes(), dht_key_secret.bytes());
-    assert_ne!(dht_key2.bytes(), dht_key_secret2.bytes());
+    assert_ne!(
+        public_key.ref_value().bytes(),
+        secret_key.ref_value().bytes()
+    );
+    assert_ne!(
+        public_key2.ref_value().bytes(),
+        secret_key2.ref_value().bytes()
+    );
 
     // Verify the keys and secrets are different across keypairs
-    assert_ne!(dht_key, dht_key2);
-    assert_ne!(dht_key_secret, dht_key_secret2);
+    assert_ne!(public_key, public_key2);
+    assert_ne!(secret_key, secret_key2);
 }
 
 pub async fn test_sign_and_verify(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
     // Make two keys
-    let (dht_key, dht_key_secret) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    let (dht_key2, dht_key_secret2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let (public_key, secret_key) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let (public_key2, secret_key2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
     // Sign the same message twice
-    let dht_sig = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret, LOREM_IPSUM)
+    let sig = vcrypto
+        .sign(&public_key, &secret_key, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    trace!("dht_sig: {:?}", dht_sig);
-    let dht_sig_b = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret, LOREM_IPSUM)
+    trace!("sig: {:?}", sig);
+    let sig_b = vcrypto
+        .sign(&public_key, &secret_key, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap();
     // Sign a second message
-    let dht_sig_c = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret, CHEEZBURGER)
+    let sig_c = vcrypto
+        .sign(&public_key, &secret_key, CHEEZBURGER)
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    trace!("dht_sig_c: {:?}", dht_sig_c);
+    trace!("sig_c: {:?}", sig_c);
     // Verify they are the same signature
-    assert_eq!(dht_sig, dht_sig_b);
+    assert_eq!(sig, sig_b);
     // Sign the same message with a different key
-    let dht_sig2 = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key2, &dht_key_secret2, LOREM_IPSUM)
+    let sig2 = vcrypto
+        .sign(&public_key2, &secret_key2, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap();
     // Verify a different key gives a different signature
-    assert_ne!(dht_sig2, dht_sig_b);
+    assert_ne!(sig2, sig_b);
 
     // Try using the wrong secret to sign
     let a1 = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret, LOREM_IPSUM)
+        .sign(&public_key, &secret_key, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap();
     let a2 = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key2, &dht_key_secret2, LOREM_IPSUM)
+        .sign(&public_key2, &secret_key2, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap();
     let _b1 = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key, &dht_key_secret2, LOREM_IPSUM)
+        .sign(&public_key, &secret_key2, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap_err();
     let _b2 = vcrypto
-        .sign(&dht_key2, &dht_key_secret, LOREM_IPSUM)
+        .sign(&public_key2, &secret_key, LOREM_IPSUM)
         .await
         .unwrap_err();
 
     assert_ne!(a1, a2);
 
-    assert_eq!(vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &a1).await, Ok(true));
-    assert_eq!(vcrypto.verify(&dht_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &a2).await, Ok(true));
-    assert_eq!(vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &a2).await, Ok(false));
-    assert_eq!(vcrypto.verify(&dht_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &a1).await, Ok(false));
+    assert_eq!(
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &a1).await,
+        Ok(true)
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &a2).await,
+        Ok(true)
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &a2).await,
+        Ok(false)
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &a1).await,
+        Ok(false)
+    );
 
     // Try verifications that should work
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &dht_sig).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &sig).await,
         Ok(true)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &dht_sig_b).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &sig_b).await,
         Ok(true)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &dht_sig2).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &sig2).await,
         Ok(true)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, CHEEZBURGER, &dht_sig_c).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, CHEEZBURGER, &sig_c).await,
         Ok(true)
     );
     // Try verifications that shouldn't work
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &dht_sig).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key2, LOREM_IPSUM, &sig).await,
         Ok(false)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &dht_sig2).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, LOREM_IPSUM, &sig2).await,
         Ok(false)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key2, CHEEZBURGER, &dht_sig_c).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key2, CHEEZBURGER, &sig_c).await,
         Ok(false)
     );
     assert_eq!(
-        vcrypto.verify(&dht_key, CHEEZBURGER, &dht_sig).await,
+        vcrypto.verify(&public_key, CHEEZBURGER, &sig).await,
         Ok(false)
     );
 }
 
 pub async fn test_key_conversions(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
     // Test default key
-    let (dht_key, dht_key_secret) = (BarePublicKey::default(), BareSecretKey::default());
-    assert!(dht_key.bytes().is_empty());
-    assert!(dht_key_secret.bytes().is_empty());
-    let dht_key_string = String::from(&dht_key);
-    trace!("dht_key_string: {:?}", dht_key_string);
-    let dht_key_string2 = String::from(&dht_key);
-    trace!("dht_key_string2: {:?}", dht_key_string2);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_string, dht_key_string2);
+    let (public_key, secret_key) = (
+        PublicKey::new(
+            vcrypto.kind(),
+            BarePublicKey::new(&vec![0u8; vcrypto.public_key_length()]),
+        ),
+        SecretKey::new(
+            vcrypto.kind(),
+            BareSecretKey::new(&vec![0u8; vcrypto.secret_key_length()]),
+        ),
+    );
+    let public_key_string = public_key.to_string();
+    trace!("public_key_string: {:?}", public_key_string);
+    let public_key_string2 = public_key.to_string();
+    trace!("public_key_string2: {:?}", public_key_string2);
+    assert_eq!(public_key_string, public_key_string2);
 
-    let dht_key_secret_string = String::from(&dht_key_secret);
-    trace!("dht_key_secret_string: {:?}", dht_key_secret_string);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret_string, dht_key_string);
+    let secret_key_string = secret_key.to_string();
+    trace!("secret_key_string: {:?}", secret_key_string);
+    assert_eq!(secret_key_string, public_key_string);
 
     // Make different keys
-    let (dht_key2, dht_key_secret2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    trace!("dht_key2: {:?}", dht_key2);
-    trace!("dht_key_secret2: {:?}", dht_key_secret2);
-    let (dht_key3, _dht_key_secret3) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
-    trace!("dht_key3: {:?}", dht_key3);
-    trace!("_dht_key_secret3: {:?}", _dht_key_secret3);
+    let (public_key2, secret_key2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    trace!("public_key2: {:?}", public_key2);
+    trace!("secret_key2: {:?}", secret_key2);
+    let (public_key3, secret_key3) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    trace!("public_key3: {:?}", public_key3);
+    trace!("secret_key3: {:?}", secret_key3);
 
-    let dht_key2_string = String::from(&dht_key2);
-    let dht_key2_string2 = String::from(&dht_key2);
-    let dht_key3_string = String::from(&dht_key3);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key2_string, dht_key2_string2);
-    assert_ne!(dht_key3_string, dht_key2_string);
-    let dht_key_secret2_string = String::from(&dht_key_secret2);
-    assert_ne!(dht_key_secret2_string, dht_key_secret_string);
-    assert_ne!(dht_key_secret2_string, dht_key2_string);
+    let public_key2_string = public_key2.to_string();
+    let public_key2_string2 = public_key2.to_string();
+    let public_key3_string = public_key3.to_string();
+    assert_eq!(public_key2_string, public_key2_string2);
+    assert_ne!(public_key3_string, public_key2_string);
+    let secret_key2_string = secret_key2.to_string();
+    assert_ne!(secret_key2_string, secret_key_string);
+    assert_ne!(secret_key2_string, public_key2_string);
 
     // Assert they convert back correctly
-    let dht_key_back = BarePublicKey::try_from(dht_key_string.as_str()).unwrap();
-    let dht_key_back2 = BarePublicKey::try_from(dht_key_string2.as_str()).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_back, dht_key_back2);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_back, dht_key);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_back2, dht_key);
+    let public_key_back = PublicKey::try_from(public_key_string.as_str()).unwrap();
+    let public_key_back2 = PublicKey::try_from(public_key_string2.as_str()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(public_key_back, public_key_back2);
+    assert_eq!(public_key_back, public_key);
+    assert_eq!(public_key_back2, public_key);
 
-    let dht_key_secret_back = BareSecretKey::try_from(dht_key_secret_string.as_str()).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret_back, dht_key_secret);
+    let secret_key_back = SecretKey::try_from(secret_key_string.as_str()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(secret_key_back, secret_key);
 
-    let dht_key2_back = BarePublicKey::try_from(dht_key2_string.as_str()).unwrap();
-    let dht_key2_back2 = BarePublicKey::try_from(dht_key2_string2.as_str()).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(dht_key2_back, dht_key2_back2);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key2_back, dht_key2);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key2_back2, dht_key2);
+    let public_key2_back = PublicKey::try_from(public_key2_string.as_str()).unwrap();
+    let public_key2_back2 = PublicKey::try_from(public_key2_string2.as_str()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(public_key2_back, public_key2_back2);
+    assert_eq!(public_key2_back, public_key2);
+    assert_eq!(public_key2_back2, public_key2);
 
-    let dht_key_secret2_back = BareSecretKey::try_from(dht_key_secret2_string.as_str()).unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret2_back, dht_key_secret2);
+    let secret_key2_back = SecretKey::try_from(secret_key2_string.as_str()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(secret_key2_back, secret_key2);
 
     // Assert string roundtrip
-    assert_eq!(String::from(&dht_key2_back), dht_key2_string);
+    assert_eq!(secret_key2_back.to_string(), secret_key2_string);
+
     // These conversions should fail
     assert!(BarePublicKey::try_from("whatever!").is_err());
     assert!(BareSecretKey::try_from("whatever!").is_err());
@@ -167,41 +193,42 @@ pub async fn test_key_conversions(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
 }
 
 pub async fn test_encode_decode(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
-    let dht_key = BarePublicKey::try_decode("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA").unwrap();
-    let dht_key_secret =
+    let public_key =
+        BarePublicKey::try_decode("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA").unwrap();
+    let secret_key =
         BareSecretKey::try_decode("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA").unwrap();
-    let dht_key_b = BarePublicKey::new(&EMPTY_KEY);
-    let dht_key_secret_b = BareSecretKey::new(&EMPTY_KEY_SECRET);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key, dht_key_b);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret, dht_key_secret_b);
+    let public_key_b = BarePublicKey::new(&EMPTY_KEY);
+    let secret_key_b = BareSecretKey::new(&EMPTY_KEY_SECRET);
+    assert_eq!(public_key, public_key_b);
+    assert_eq!(secret_key, secret_key_b);
 
-    let (dht_key2, dht_key_secret2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.into_split();
+    let (public_key2, secret_key2) = vcrypto.generate_keypair().await.value().into_split();
 
-    let e1 = dht_key.encode();
+    let e1 = public_key.encode();
     trace!("e1:  {:?}", e1);
     assert_eq!(e1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA".to_owned());
-    let e1s = dht_key_secret.encode();
+    let e1s = secret_key.encode();
     trace!("e1s: {:?}", e1s);
-    let e2 = dht_key2.encode();
+    let e2 = public_key2.encode();
     trace!("e2:  {:?}", e2);
-    let e2s = dht_key_secret2.encode();
+    let e2s = secret_key2.encode();
     trace!("e2s: {:?}", e2s);
 
     let d1 = BarePublicKey::try_decode(e1.as_str()).unwrap();
     trace!("d1:  {:?}", d1);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key, d1);
+    assert_eq!(public_key, d1);
 
     let d1s = BareSecretKey::try_decode(e1s.as_str()).unwrap();
     trace!("d1s: {:?}", d1s);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret, d1s);
+    assert_eq!(secret_key, d1s);
 
     let d2 = BarePublicKey::try_decode(e2.as_str()).unwrap();
     trace!("d2:  {:?}", d2);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key2, d2);
+    assert_eq!(public_key2, d2);
 
     let d2s = BareSecretKey::try_decode(e2s.as_str()).unwrap();
     trace!("d2s: {:?}", d2s);
-    assert_eq!(dht_key_secret2, d2s);
+    assert_eq!(secret_key2, d2s);
 
     // Failures
     let f1 = BareSecretKey::try_decode("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!");
@@ -216,7 +243,7 @@ pub fn test_typed_convert(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
         vcrypto.kind()
     );
     let tk1 = PublicKey::from_str(&tks1).expect("failed");
-    assert!(vcrypto.check_public_key(tk1.ref_value()).is_ok());
+    assert!(vcrypto.check_public_key(&tk1).is_ok());
     let tks1x = tk1.to_string();
     assert_eq!(tks1, tks1x);
 
@@ -231,7 +258,7 @@ pub fn test_typed_convert(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
         vcrypto.kind()
     );
     let tk3 = PublicKey::from_str(&tks3).expect("failed");
-    assert!(vcrypto.check_public_key(tk3.ref_value()).is_err());
+    assert!(vcrypto.check_public_key(&tk3).is_err());
 
     let tks4 = "XXXX:7lxDEabK_qgjbe38RtBa3IZLrud84P6NhGP-pRTZzdQ".to_string();
     let tk4 = PublicKey::from_str(&tks4).expect("failed");
@@ -258,7 +285,7 @@ pub fn test_typed_convert(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
 }
 
 async fn test_hash(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
-    let mut s = BTreeSet::<BareHashDigest>::new();
+    let mut s = BTreeSet::<HashDigest>::new();
 
     let k1 = vcrypto.generate_hash("abc".as_bytes()).await;
     let k2 = vcrypto.generate_hash("abcd".as_bytes()).await;
@@ -289,24 +316,43 @@ async fn test_hash(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
     assert_eq!(k5, v5);
     assert_eq!(k6, v6);
 
-    vcrypto.validate_hash("abc".as_bytes(), &v1).await;
-    vcrypto.validate_hash("abcd".as_bytes(), &v2).await;
-    vcrypto.validate_hash("".as_bytes(), &v3).await;
-    vcrypto.validate_hash(" ".as_bytes(), &v4).await;
-    vcrypto.validate_hash(LOREM_IPSUM, &v5).await;
-    vcrypto.validate_hash(CHEEZBURGER, &v6).await;
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash("abc".as_bytes(), &v1)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash("abcd".as_bytes(), &v2)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash("".as_bytes(), &v3)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash(" ".as_bytes(), &v4)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash(LOREM_IPSUM, &v5)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
+    vcrypto
+        .validate_hash(CHEEZBURGER, &v6)
+        .await
+        .expect("should succeed");
 }
 
 async fn test_operations(vcrypto: &AsyncCryptoSystemGuard<'_>) {
+    // xxx we should make this fixed byte arrays when we add another cryptosystem
     let k1 = vcrypto.generate_hash(LOREM_IPSUM).await;
     let k2 = vcrypto.generate_hash(CHEEZBURGER).await;
     let k3 = vcrypto.generate_hash("abc".as_bytes()).await;
 
     // Get distance
-    let d1 = vcrypto.distance(&k1, &k2).await;
-    let d2 = vcrypto.distance(&k2, &k1).await;
-    let d3 = vcrypto.distance(&k1, &k3).await;
-    let d4 = vcrypto.distance(&k2, &k3).await;
+    let d1 = k1.to_hash_coordinate().distance(&k2.to_hash_coordinate());
+    let d2 = k2.to_hash_coordinate().distance(&k1.to_hash_coordinate());
+    let d3 = k1.to_hash_coordinate().distance(&k3.to_hash_coordinate());
+    let d4 = k2.to_hash_coordinate().distance(&k3.to_hash_coordinate());
 
     trace!("d1={:?}", d1);
     trace!("d2={:?}", d2);

veilid-core/src/crypto/types/byte_array_types.rs

@@ -10,52 +10,20 @@ use data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD;
 
 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 
-pub trait Encodable
-where
-    Self: Sized,
-{
-    fn encode(&self) -> String;
-    fn encoded_len(&self) -> usize;
-    fn try_decode<S: AsRef<str>>(input: S) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
-        let b = input.as_ref().as_bytes();
-        Self::try_decode_bytes(b)
-    }
-    fn try_decode_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self>;
-}
-
-//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-pub trait ByteArrayType
-where
-    Self: Sized,
-{
-    fn len(&self) -> usize;
-    fn is_empty(&self) -> bool;
-    fn bytes(&self) -> &[u8];
-    fn bit(&self, index: usize) -> bool;
-    fn first_nonzero_bit(&self) -> Option<usize>;
-    fn nibble(&self, index: usize) -> u8;
-    fn first_nonzero_nibble(&self) -> Option<(usize, u8)>;
-}
-
-//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
-
 macro_rules! byte_array_type {
-    ($name:ident) => {
-        #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq)]
-        #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), derive(Tsify))]
-        #[cfg_attr(
-            all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
-            tsify(from_wasm_abi, into_wasm_abi)
-        )]
-        #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), serde(transparent))]
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+
+        #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), derive(wasm_bindgen_derive::TryFromJsValue))]
+        #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+        #[derive(Clone, Hash, Default, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq)]
         #[must_use]
-        pub struct $name {
-            #[cfg_attr(
-                all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
-                tsify(type = "string")
-            )]
+        $visibility struct $name {
             bytes: Bytes,
         }
+
+        #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+        make_wasm_bindgen_stubs!($name);
+
         impl $name {
             pub fn new(data: &[u8]) -> Self {
                 Self {
@@ -65,32 +33,69 @@ macro_rules! byte_array_type {
             fn new_from_bytes(bytes: Bytes) -> Self {
                 Self { bytes }
             }
-        }
-        impl Default for $name {
-            fn default() -> Self {
-                Self {
-                    bytes: Bytes::new(),
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        impl ByteArrayType for $name {
-            fn len(&self) -> usize {
-                self.bytes.len()
-            }
-            fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
-                self.bytes.is_empty()
-            }
-            fn bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
+
+            pub fn bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
                 &self.bytes
             }
+
+            #[allow(dead_code)]
+            pub fn first_nonzero_nibble(&self) -> Option<(usize, u8)> {
+                for i in 0..(self.bytes.len() * 2) {
+                    let n = self.nibble(i);
+                    if n != 0 {
+                        return Some((i, n));
+                    }
+                }
+                None
+            }
+        }
+        #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+        #[wasm_bindgen]
+        impl $name {
+            #[wasm_bindgen(constructor)]
+            pub fn js_new(data: &[u8]) -> Self {
+                Self::new(data)
+            }
+
+            #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = parse)]
+            pub fn js_parse(s: String) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+                Self::from_str(&s)
+            }
+
+            #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = toString)]
+            pub fn js_to_string(&self) -> String {
+                self.to_string()
+            }
+
+            #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = isEqual)]
+            pub fn js_is_equal(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+                self == other
+            }
+
+            // TODO: add more typescript-only operations here
+        }
+
+        #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+        #[allow(dead_code)]
+        impl $name {
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(getter, js_name = length))]
+            pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+                self.bytes.len()
+            }
+            pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+                self.bytes.is_empty()
+            }
+            pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+                self.bytes.to_vec()
+            }
             // Big endian bit ordering
-            fn bit(&self, index: usize) -> bool {
+            pub fn bit(&self, index: usize) -> bool {
                 let bi = index / 8;
                 let ti = 7 - (index % 8);
                 ((self.bytes[bi] >> ti) & 1) != 0
             }
 
-            fn first_nonzero_bit(&self) -> Option<usize> {
+            pub fn first_nonzero_bit(&self) -> Option<usize> {
                 for i in 0..self.bytes.len() {
                     let b = self.bytes[i];
                     if b != 0 {
@@ -106,7 +111,7 @@ macro_rules! byte_array_type {
             }
 
             // Big endian nibble ordering
-            fn nibble(&self, index: usize) -> u8 {
+            pub fn nibble(&self, index: usize) -> u8 {
                 let bi = index / 2;
                 if index & 1 == 0 {
                     (self.bytes[bi] >> 4) & 0xFu8
@@ -115,24 +120,17 @@ macro_rules! byte_array_type {
                 }
             }
 
-            fn first_nonzero_nibble(&self) -> Option<(usize, u8)> {
-                for i in 0..(self.bytes.len() * 2) {
-                    let n = self.nibble(i);
-                    if n != 0 {
-                        return Some((i, n));
-                    }
-                }
-                None
-            }
-        }
-        impl Encodable for $name {
-            fn encode(&self) -> String {
+            pub fn encode(&self) -> String {
                 BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&self.bytes)
             }
-            fn encoded_len(&self) -> usize {
+            pub fn encoded_len(&self) -> usize {
                 BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode_len(self.bytes.len())
             }
-            fn try_decode_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+            pub fn try_decode(input: &str) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+                let b = input.as_bytes();
+                Self::try_decode_bytes(b)
+            }
+            pub fn try_decode_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
                 if b.len() == 0 {
                     return Ok(Self::default());
                 }
@@ -218,9 +216,10 @@ macro_rules! byte_array_type {
             }
         }
 
-        impl From<$name> for Vec<u8> {
-            fn from(value: $name) -> Self {
-                value.bytes().to_vec()
+        impl TryFrom<$name> for Vec<u8> {
+            type Error = VeilidAPIError;
+            fn try_from(value: $name) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                Ok(value.bytes().to_vec())
             }
         }
 
@@ -243,75 +242,36 @@ macro_rules! byte_array_type {
                 }
             }
         }
-    };
+    }
 }
 
 /////////////////////////////////////////
 
-byte_array_type!(BarePublicKey);
-byte_array_type!(BareSecretKey);
-byte_array_type!(BareEncapsulationKey);
-byte_array_type!(BareDecapsulationKey);
-byte_array_type!(BareSignature);
-byte_array_type!(BareNonce);
+// Untyped public key (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BarePublicKey);
+// Untyped secret key (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareSecretKey);
+// Untyped encapsulation key (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareEncapsulationKey);
+// Untyped decapsulation key (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareDecapsulationKey);
+// Untyped signature (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareSignature);
+// Untyped hash digest (hashed to 32 bytes)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareHashDigest);
+// Untyped shared secret (variable length)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareSharedSecret);
+// Untyped record key (hashed to 32 bytes)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareRecordKey);
+// Untyped route id (hashed to 32 bytes)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareRouteId);
+// Untyped node id (hashed to 32 bytes)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareNodeId);
+// Untyped member id (hashed to 32 bytes)
+byte_array_type!(pub BareMemberId);
+// Untyped nonce (random 24 bytes, no typed variant)
+byte_array_type!(pub Nonce);
 
-/*
-Notes:
-    - These are actually BareHashDigest types, but not interchangable:
-        - BareSharedSecret
-        - BareRecordKey
-        - BareRouteId (eventually will be a BareRecordKey type with DHT Routes)
-        - BareNodeId (constructible from BarePublicKey)
-        - BareMemberId (constructible from BarePublicKey)
-*/
-
-// BareHashDigest sub-types
-byte_array_type!(BareHashDigest);
-byte_array_type!(BareSharedSecret);
-byte_array_type!(BareRecordKey);
-byte_array_type!(BareHashDistance);
-byte_array_type!(BareRouteId);
-byte_array_type!(BareNodeId);
-byte_array_type!(BareMemberId);
-
-// Temporary adapters for converting to/from BareHashDigest types
-// Removing these will show where there's still issues.
-impl From<BareHashDigest> for BareSharedSecret {
-    fn from(value: BareHashDigest) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<BareHashDigest> for BareRecordKey {
-    fn from(value: BareHashDigest) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<BareRecordKey> for BareHashDigest {
-    fn from(value: BareRecordKey) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<BareNodeId> for BareHashDigest {
-    fn from(value: BareNodeId) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-/*
-- BareNodeId currently equals BarePublicKey, but should be distinct from BarePublicKey.
-    - BareNodeId eventually should be a BareHashDigest type that's constructable from a BarePublicKey
-*/
-impl From<BarePublicKey> for BareNodeId {
-    fn from(value: BarePublicKey) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<BareNodeId> for BarePublicKey {
-    fn from(value: BareNodeId) -> Self {
-        Self::new(value.bytes())
-    }
-}
+// Internal types
+byte_array_type!(pub(crate) BareHashCoordinate);
+byte_array_type!(pub(crate) HashDistance);

veilid-core/src/crypto/types/crypto_typed.rs

@@ -1,209 +1,191 @@
-use super::*;
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! impl_crypto_typed {
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+        paste::paste! {
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-#[must_use]
-pub struct CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-{
-    kind: CryptoKind,
-    value: K,
-}
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), derive(wasm_bindgen_derive::TryFromJsValue))]
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+            #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+            #[must_use]
+            $visibility struct $name
+            {
+                kind: CryptoKind,
+                value: [<Bare $name>],
+            }
 
-cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-    if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))] {
-        #[wasm_bindgen(typescript_custom_section)]
-        const CRYPOTYPED_TYPE: &'static str = r#"
-export type CryptoTyped<TCryptoKey extends string> = `${CryptoKind}:${TCryptoKey}`;
-"#;
-    }
-}
+            #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+            make_wasm_bindgen_stubs!($name);
 
-impl<K> CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-{
-    pub fn new(kind: CryptoKind, value: K) -> Self {
-        Self { kind, value }
-    }
+            impl $name {
+                pub fn new(kind: CryptoKind, value: [<Bare $name>]) -> Self {
+                    Self { kind, value }
+                }
 
-    pub fn kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
-        self.kind
-    }
-    pub fn value(&self) -> K {
-        self.value.clone()
-    }
-    pub fn ref_value(&self) -> &K {
-        &self.value
-    }
-    pub fn into_value(self) -> K {
-        self.value
-    }
-}
+                pub fn ref_value(&self) -> &[<Bare $name>] {
+                    &self.value
+                }
+                #[allow(dead_code)]
+                pub fn into_value(self) -> [<Bare $name>] {
+                    self.value
+                }
+            }
 
-impl<K> PartialOrd for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Ord + PartialOrd,
-{
-    fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
-        Some(self.cmp(other))
-    }
-}
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+            impl $name {
+                #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(getter, unchecked_return_type = "CryptoKind"))]
+                pub fn kind(&self) -> CryptoKind {
+                    self.kind
+                }
+                #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(getter))]
+                #[allow(dead_code)]
+                pub fn value(&self) -> [<Bare $name>] {
+                    self.value.clone()
+                }
+            }
 
-impl<K> Ord for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Ord + PartialOrd,
-{
-    fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
-        let x = compare_crypto_kind(&self.kind, &other.kind);
-        if x != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
-            return x;
+            impl PartialOrd for $name
+            {
+                fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
+                    Some(self.cmp(other))
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl Ord for $name
+            {
+                fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
+                    let x = compare_crypto_kind(&self.kind, &other.kind);
+                    if x != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
+                        return x;
+                    }
+                    self.value.cmp(&other.value)
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl fmt::Display for $name
+            {
+                fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+                    write!(f, "{}:{}", self.kind, self.value)
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl FromStr for $name
+            {
+                type Err = VeilidAPIError;
+                fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+                    let b = s.as_bytes();
+                    if b.len() > 5 && b[4..5] == b":"[..] {
+                        let kind: CryptoKind = b[0..4].try_into().expect("should not fail to convert");
+                        let value = [<Bare $name>]::try_decode_bytes(&b[5..])?;
+                        Ok(Self { kind, value })
+                    } else {
+                        let kind = best_crypto_kind();
+                        let value = [<Bare $name>]::try_decode_bytes(b)?;
+                        Ok(Self { kind, value })
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl TryFrom<String> for $name
+            {
+                type Error = VeilidAPIError;
+
+                fn try_from(s: String) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                    Self::from_str(&s)
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl TryFrom<&str> for $name
+            {
+                type Error = VeilidAPIError;
+
+                fn try_from(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                    Self::from_str(s)
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for $name
+            {
+                fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
+                where
+                    D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+                {
+                    let s = <String as Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+                    FromStr::from_str(&s).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
+                }
+            }
+            impl Serialize for $name
+            {
+                fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+                where
+                    S: serde::Serializer,
+                {
+                    serializer.collect_str(self)
+                }
+            }
+
+            #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+            #[wasm_bindgen]
+            impl $name {
+                #[wasm_bindgen(constructor)]
+                pub fn js_new(kind: CryptoKind, value: [<Bare $name>]) -> Self {
+                    Self::new(kind,value)
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = parse)]
+                pub fn js_parse(s: String) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+                    Self::from_str(&s)
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = toString)]
+                pub fn js_to_string(&self) -> String {
+                    self.to_string()
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = isEqual)]
+                pub fn js_is_equal(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+                    self == other
+                }
+                // TODO: add more typescript-only operations here
+            }
         }
-        self.value.cmp(&other.value)
-    }
+    };
 }
 
-impl<K> fmt::Display for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: fmt::Display,
-{
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
-        write!(f, "{}:{}", self.kind, self.value)
-    }
-}
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! impl_crypto_typed_vec {
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+        paste::paste! {
+            impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for $name
+            {
+                type Error = VeilidAPIError;
 
-impl<K> FromStr for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Encodable,
-{
-    type Err = VeilidAPIError;
-    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
-        let b = s.as_bytes();
-        if b.len() > 5 && b[4..5] == b":"[..] {
-            let kind: CryptoKind = b[0..4].try_into().expect("should not fail to convert");
-            let value = K::try_decode_bytes(&b[5..])?;
-            Ok(Self { kind, value })
-        } else {
-            let kind = best_crypto_kind();
-            let value = K::try_decode_bytes(b)?;
-            Ok(Self { kind, value })
+                fn try_from(b: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                    if b.len() < 4 {
+                        apibail_generic!("invalid cryptotyped format");
+                    }
+                    let kind: CryptoKind = b[0..4].try_into()?;
+                    let value: [<Bare $name>] = b[4..].into();
+                    Ok(Self { kind, value })
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for $name
+            {
+                type Error = VeilidAPIError;
+
+                fn try_from(b: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+                    Self::try_from(b.as_slice())
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl From<$name> for Vec<u8>
+            {
+                fn from(v: $name) -> Self {
+                    let mut out = v.kind.0.to_vec();
+                    out.extend_from_slice(v.value.as_ref());
+                    out
+                }
+            }
         }
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> TryFrom<String> for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Encodable,
-{
-    type Error = VeilidAPIError;
-
-    fn try_from(s: String) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::from_str(&s)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> TryFrom<&str> for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Encodable,
-{
-    type Error = VeilidAPIError;
-
-    fn try_from(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::from_str(s)
-    }
-}
-
-impl<'a, K> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: From<&'a [u8]>,
-{
-    type Error = VeilidAPIError;
-
-    fn try_from(b: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        if b.len() < 4 {
-            apibail_generic!("invalid cryptotyped format");
-        }
-        let kind: CryptoKind = b[0..4].try_into()?;
-        let value: K = b[4..].into();
-        Ok(Self { kind, value })
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> TryFrom<Vec<u8>> for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: for<'a> From<&'a [u8]>,
-{
-    type Error = VeilidAPIError;
-
-    fn try_from(b: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
-        Self::try_from(b.as_slice())
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> From<CryptoTyped<K>> for Vec<u8>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: AsRef<[u8]>,
-{
-    fn from(v: CryptoTyped<K>) -> Self {
-        let mut out = v.kind.0.to_vec();
-        out.extend_from_slice(v.value.as_ref());
-        out
-    }
-}
-
-impl<'de, K> Deserialize<'de> for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: Encodable,
-{
-    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
-    where
-        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
-    {
-        let s = <String as Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
-        FromStr::from_str(&s).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
-    }
-}
-impl<K> Serialize for CryptoTyped<K>
-where
-    K: Clone + fmt::Debug + PartialEq + Eq + Hash,
-    K: fmt::Display,
-{
-    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
-    where
-        S: serde::Serializer,
-    {
-        serializer.collect_str(self)
-    }
-}
-
-impl CryptoTyped<BareKeyPair> {
-    pub fn new_from_parts(key: PublicKey, bare_secret: BareSecretKey) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            kind: key.kind(),
-            value: BareKeyPair::new(key.value(), bare_secret),
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn key(&self) -> PublicKey {
-        PublicKey::new(self.kind, self.ref_value().key())
-    }
-    pub fn secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
-        SecretKey::new(self.kind, self.ref_value().secret())
-    }
-    pub fn bare_secret(&self) -> BareSecretKey {
-        self.ref_value().secret()
-    }
-    pub fn ref_bare_secret(&self) -> &BareSecretKey {
-        self.ref_value().ref_secret()
-    }
+    };
 }

veilid-core/src/crypto/types/crypto_typed_group.rs

@@ -1,301 +1,282 @@
-use super::*;
+#[macro_export]
+macro_rules! impl_crypto_typed_group {
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+        paste::paste! {
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
-#[serde(from = "Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>", into = "Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>")]
-pub struct CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    items: Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>,
-}
-
-cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-    if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))] {
-        #[wasm_bindgen(typescript_custom_section)]
-        const CRYPOTYPEDGROUP_TYPE: &'static str = r#"
-export type CryptoTypedGroup<TCryptoKey extends string> = Array<CryptoTyped<TCryptoKey>>;
-"#;
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn new() -> Self {
-        Self { items: Vec::new() }
-    }
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn with_capacity(cap: usize) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            items: Vec::with_capacity(cap),
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn kinds(&self) -> Vec<CryptoKind> {
-        let mut out = Vec::new();
-        for tk in &self.items {
-            out.push(tk.kind());
-        }
-        out.sort_by(compare_crypto_kind);
-        out
-    }
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn keys(&self) -> Vec<K> {
-        let mut out = Vec::new();
-        for tk in &self.items {
-            out.push(tk.value());
-        }
-        out
-    }
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn get(&self, kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<CryptoTyped<K>> {
-        self.items.iter().find(|x| x.kind() == kind).cloned()
-    }
-    pub fn add(&mut self, typed_key: CryptoTyped<K>) {
-        for x in &mut self.items {
-            if x.kind() == typed_key.kind() {
-                *x = typed_key;
-                return;
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), derive(wasm_bindgen_derive::TryFromJsValue))]
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+            #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Default)]
+            #[serde(from = "Vec<_>", into = "Vec<_>")]
+            pub struct [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                items: Vec<$name>,
             }
-        }
-        self.items.push(typed_key);
-        self.items.sort()
-    }
-    pub fn add_all(&mut self, typed_keys: &[CryptoTyped<K>]) {
-        'outer: for typed_key in typed_keys {
-            for x in &mut self.items {
-                if x.kind() == typed_key.kind() {
-                    *x = typed_key.clone();
-                    continue 'outer;
+
+            #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+            make_wasm_bindgen_stubs!([<$name Group>]);
+
+            impl [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn new() -> Self {
+                    Self { items: Vec::new() }
+                }
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn with_capacity(cap: usize) -> Self {
+                    Self {
+                        items: Vec::with_capacity(cap),
+                    }
+                }
+
+                pub fn iter(&self) -> core::slice::Iter<'_, $name> {
+                    self.items.iter()
+                }
+
+                pub fn add_all_from_slice(&mut self, typed_keys: &[$name]) {
+                    'outer: for typed_key in typed_keys {
+                        for x in &mut self.items {
+                            if x.kind() == typed_key.kind() {
+                                *x = typed_key.clone();
+                                continue 'outer;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        self.items.push(typed_key.clone());
+                    }
+                    self.items.sort()
+                }
+
+                pub fn contains_any_from_slice(&self, typed_keys: &[$name]) -> bool {
+                    for typed_key in typed_keys {
+                        if self.items.contains(typed_key) {
+                            return true;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    false
+                }
+
+            }
+
+            #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+            #[wasm_bindgen]
+            impl [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn get(&self,
+                    #[wasm_bindgen(unchecked_param_type = "CryptoKind")]
+                    kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<$name> {
+                    self.items.iter().find(|x| x.kind() == kind).cloned()
+                }
+
+                pub fn remove(&mut self,
+                    #[wasm_bindgen(unchecked_param_type = "CryptoKind")]
+                    kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<$name> {
+                    if let Some(idx) = self.items.iter().position(|x| x.kind() == kind) {
+                        return Some(self.items.remove(idx));
+                    }
+                    None
+                }
+
+                pub fn remove_all(&mut self,
+                    #[wasm_bindgen(unchecked_param_type = "CryptoKind[]")]
+                    kinds: Vec<CryptoKind>) {
+                    for k in kinds {
+                        self.remove(k);
+                    }
                 }
             }
-            self.items.push(typed_key.clone());
-        }
-        self.items.sort()
-    }
-    pub fn remove(&mut self, kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<CryptoTyped<K>> {
-        if let Some(idx) = self.items.iter().position(|x| x.kind() == kind) {
-            return Some(self.items.remove(idx));
-        }
-        None
-    }
-    pub fn remove_all(&mut self, kinds: &[CryptoKind]) {
-        for k in kinds {
-            self.remove(*k);
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn clear(&mut self) {
-        self.items.clear();
-    }
+            #[cfg(not(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown")))]
+            impl [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn get(&self, kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<$name> {
+                    self.items.iter().find(|x| x.kind() == kind).cloned()
+                }
 
-    /// Return preferred typed key of our supported crypto kinds
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn best(&self) -> Option<CryptoTyped<K>> {
-        self.items
-            .iter()
-            .find(|k| VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS.contains(&k.kind()))
-            .cloned()
-    }
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
-        self.items.is_empty()
-    }
-    #[must_use]
-    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
-        self.items.len()
-    }
-    pub fn iter(&self) -> core::slice::Iter<'_, CryptoTyped<K>> {
-        self.items.iter()
-    }
-    pub fn contains(&self, typed_key: &CryptoTyped<K>) -> bool {
-        self.items.contains(typed_key)
-    }
-    pub fn contains_any(&self, typed_keys: &[CryptoTyped<K>]) -> bool {
-        for typed_key in typed_keys {
-            if self.items.contains(typed_key) {
-                return true;
+                pub fn remove(&mut self, kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<$name> {
+                    if let Some(idx) = self.items.iter().position(|x| x.kind() == kind) {
+                        return Some(self.items.remove(idx));
+                    }
+                    None
+                }
+
+                pub fn remove_all(&mut self, kinds: Vec<CryptoKind>) {
+                    for k in kinds {
+                        self.remove(k);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+
+
+            #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+            impl [<$name Group>] {
+                #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(getter, unchecked_return_type = "CryptoKind[]"))]
+                pub fn kinds(&self) -> Vec<CryptoKind> {
+                    let mut out = Vec::new();
+                    for tk in &self.items {
+                        out.push(tk.kind());
+                    }
+                    out.sort_by(compare_crypto_kind);
+                    out
+                }
+
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn keys(&self) -> Vec<[<Bare $name>]> {
+                    let mut out = Vec::<[<Bare $name>]>::new();
+                    for tk in &self.items {
+                        out.push(tk.value());
+                    }
+                    out
+                }
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+                    self.items.is_empty()
+                }
+                #[must_use]
+                #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(getter, js_name = length))]
+                pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+                    self.items.len()
+                }
+                pub fn contains(&self, typed_key: &$name) -> bool {
+                    self.items.contains(typed_key)
+                }
+
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn contains_any(&self, typed_keys: Vec<$name>) -> bool {
+                    self.contains_any_from_slice(&typed_keys)
+                }
+
+                #[must_use]
+                #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen(js_name = toArray))]
+                pub fn to_vec(&self) -> Vec<$name> {
+                    self.items.clone()
+                }
+
+                pub fn add(&mut self, typed_key: $name) {
+                    for x in &mut self.items {
+                        if x.kind() == typed_key.kind() {
+                            *x = typed_key;
+                            return;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    self.items.push(typed_key);
+                    self.items.sort()
+                }
+
+                pub fn add_all(&mut self, typed_keys: Vec<$name>) {
+                    self.add_all_from_slice(&typed_keys)
+                }
+
+                pub fn clear(&mut self) {
+                    self.items.clear();
+                }
+
+
+            }
+
+            impl core::ops::Deref for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                type Target = [$name];
+
+                #[inline]
+                fn deref(&self) -> &[$name] {
+                    &self.items
+                }
+            }
+
+            impl fmt::Display for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
+                    write!(f, "[")?;
+                    let mut first = true;
+                    for x in &self.items {
+                        if first {
+                            first = false;
+                        } else {
+                            write!(f, ",")?;
+                        }
+                        write!(f, "{}", x)?;
+                    }
+                    write!(f, "]")
+                }
+            }
+            impl FromStr for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                type Err = VeilidAPIError;
+                fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
+                    let mut items = Vec::new();
+                    if s.len() < 2 {
+                        apibail_parse_error!("invalid length", s);
+                    }
+                    if &s[0..1] != "[" || &s[(s.len() - 1)..] != "]" {
+                        apibail_parse_error!("invalid format", s);
+                    }
+                    for x in s[1..s.len() - 1].split(',') {
+                        let tk = $name::from_str(x.trim())?;
+                        items.push(tk);
+                    }
+
+                    Ok(Self { items })
+                }
+            }
+            impl From<$name> for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                fn from(x: $name) -> Self {
+                    let mut tks = [<$name Group>]::with_capacity(1);
+                    tks.add(x);
+                    tks
+                }
+            }
+            impl From<Vec<$name>> for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                fn from(x: Vec<$name>) -> Self {
+                    let mut tks = [<$name Group>]::with_capacity(x.len());
+                    tks.add_all_from_slice(&x);
+                    tks
+                }
+            }
+            impl From<&[$name]> for [<$name Group>]
+            {
+                fn from(x: &[$name]) -> Self {
+                    let mut tks = [<$name Group>]::with_capacity(x.len());
+                    tks.add_all_from_slice(x);
+                    tks
+                }
+            }
+            impl From<[<$name Group>]> for Vec<$name>
+            {
+                fn from(val: [<$name Group>]) -> Self {
+                    val.items
+                }
+            }
+
+            #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))]
+            #[wasm_bindgen]
+            impl [<$name Group>] {
+                #[wasm_bindgen(constructor)]
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn js_new() -> Self {
+                    Self::new()
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = parse)]
+                pub fn js_parse(s: String) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+                    Self::from_str(&s)
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = toString)]
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn js_to_string(&self) -> String {
+                    self.to_string()
+                }
+
+                #[wasm_bindgen(js_name = isEqual)]
+                #[must_use]
+                pub fn js_is_equal(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+                    self == other
+                }
+
+                // TODO: add more typescript-only operations here
             }
         }
-        false
-    }
-    pub fn contains_value(&self, value: &K) -> bool {
-        for tk in &self.items {
-            if tk.ref_value() == value {
-                return true;
-            }
-        }
-        false
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> core::ops::Deref for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    type Target = [CryptoTyped<K>];
-
-    #[inline]
-    fn deref(&self) -> &[CryptoTyped<K>] {
-        &self.items
-    }
-}
-
-impl<K> fmt::Display for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
-        write!(f, "[")?;
-        let mut first = true;
-        for x in &self.items {
-            if first {
-                first = false;
-            } else {
-                write!(f, ",")?;
-            }
-            write!(f, "{}", x)?;
-        }
-        write!(f, "]")
-    }
-}
-impl<K> FromStr for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    type Err = VeilidAPIError;
-    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
-        let mut items = Vec::new();
-        if s.len() < 2 {
-            apibail_parse_error!("invalid length", s);
-        }
-        if &s[0..1] != "[" || &s[(s.len() - 1)..] != "]" {
-            apibail_parse_error!("invalid format", s);
-        }
-        for x in s[1..s.len() - 1].split(',') {
-            let tk = CryptoTyped::<K>::from_str(x.trim())?;
-            items.push(tk);
-        }
-
-        Ok(Self { items })
-    }
-}
-impl<K> From<CryptoTyped<K>> for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    fn from(x: CryptoTyped<K>) -> Self {
-        let mut tks = CryptoTypedGroup::<K>::with_capacity(1);
-        tks.add(x);
-        tks
-    }
-}
-impl<K> From<Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>> for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    fn from(x: Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>) -> Self {
-        let mut tks = CryptoTypedGroup::<K>::with_capacity(x.len());
-        tks.add_all(&x);
-        tks
-    }
-}
-impl<K> From<&[CryptoTyped<K>]> for CryptoTypedGroup<K>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    fn from(x: &[CryptoTyped<K>]) -> Self {
-        let mut tks = CryptoTypedGroup::<K>::with_capacity(x.len());
-        tks.add_all(x);
-        tks
-    }
-}
-impl<K> From<CryptoTypedGroup<K>> for Vec<CryptoTyped<K>>
-where
-    K: Clone
-        + fmt::Debug
-        + fmt::Display
-        + FromStr
-        + PartialEq
-        + Eq
-        + PartialOrd
-        + Ord
-        + Hash
-        + Encodable,
-{
-    fn from(val: CryptoTypedGroup<K>) -> Self {
-        val.items
-    }
+    };
 }

veilid-core/src/crypto/types/keypair.rs

@@ -1,56 +1,66 @@
 use super::*;
 
-#[derive(Clone, Default, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+#[cfg_attr(
+    all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+    derive(wasm_bindgen_derive::TryFromJsValue)
+)]
+#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+#[derive(Clone, Default, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, PartialEq, Eq)]
 #[must_use]
 pub struct BareKeyPair {
     key: BarePublicKey,
     secret: BareSecretKey,
 }
 
-cfg_if::cfg_if! {
-    if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))] {
-        #[wasm_bindgen(typescript_custom_section)]
-        const KEYPAIR_TYPE: &'static str = r#"
-export type BareKeyPair = `${BarePublicKey}:${BareSecretKey}`;
-"#;
-    }
-}
-
 impl BareKeyPair {
     pub fn new(key: BarePublicKey, secret: BareSecretKey) -> Self {
         Self { key, secret }
     }
-    pub fn key(&self) -> BarePublicKey {
-        self.key.clone()
-    }
-    pub fn secret(&self) -> BareSecretKey {
-        self.secret.clone()
-    }
     pub fn ref_key(&self) -> &BarePublicKey {
         &self.key
     }
     pub fn ref_secret(&self) -> &BareSecretKey {
         &self.secret
     }
-    pub fn split(&self) -> (BarePublicKey, BareSecretKey) {
-        (self.key.clone(), self.secret.clone())
-    }
     pub fn ref_split(&self) -> (&BarePublicKey, &BareSecretKey) {
         (&self.key, &self.secret)
     }
+    pub fn split(&self) -> (BarePublicKey, BareSecretKey) {
+        (self.key.clone(), self.secret.clone())
+    }
     pub fn into_split(self) -> (BarePublicKey, BareSecretKey) {
         (self.key, self.secret)
     }
 }
 
-impl Encodable for BareKeyPair {
-    fn encode(&self) -> String {
+#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+impl BareKeyPair {
+    #[cfg_attr(
+        all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+        wasm_bindgen(getter)
+    )]
+    pub fn key(&self) -> BarePublicKey {
+        self.key.clone()
+    }
+    #[cfg_attr(
+        all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+        wasm_bindgen(getter)
+    )]
+    pub fn secret(&self) -> BareSecretKey {
+        self.secret.clone()
+    }
+    pub fn encode(&self) -> String {
         format!("{}:{}", self.key.encode(), self.secret.encode())
     }
-    fn encoded_len(&self) -> usize {
+    pub fn encoded_len(&self) -> usize {
         self.key.encoded_len() + 1 + self.secret.encoded_len()
     }
-    fn try_decode_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+    pub fn try_decode(input: &str) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
+        let b = input.as_bytes();
+        Self::try_decode_bytes(b)
+    }
+    pub fn try_decode_bytes(b: &[u8]) -> VeilidAPIResult<Self> {
         let parts: Vec<_> = b.split(|x| *x == b':').collect();
         if parts.len() != 2 {
             apibail_parse_error!(
@@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ impl Encodable for BareKeyPair {
         Ok(BareKeyPair { key, secret })
     }
 }
+
 impl fmt::Display for BareKeyPair {
     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
         write!(f, "{}", self.encode())
@@ -125,3 +136,50 @@ impl<'de> serde::Deserialize<'de> for BareKeyPair {
         BareKeyPair::try_decode(s.as_str()).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
     }
 }
+
+////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+impl KeyPair {
+    pub fn into_split(self) -> (PublicKey, SecretKey) {
+        let kind = self.kind;
+        let (pk, sk) = self.into_value().into_split();
+        (PublicKey::new(kind, pk), SecretKey::new(kind, sk))
+    }
+
+    pub fn ref_bare_secret(&self) -> &BareSecretKey {
+        self.ref_value().ref_secret()
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), wasm_bindgen)]
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+impl KeyPair {
+    pub fn new_from_parts(key: PublicKey, bare_secret: BareSecretKey) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            kind: key.kind(),
+            value: BareKeyPair::new(key.value(), bare_secret),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[cfg_attr(
+        all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+        wasm_bindgen(getter)
+    )]
+    pub fn key(&self) -> PublicKey {
+        PublicKey::new(self.kind, self.ref_value().key())
+    }
+    #[cfg_attr(
+        all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+        wasm_bindgen(getter)
+    )]
+    pub fn secret(&self) -> SecretKey {
+        SecretKey::new(self.kind, self.ref_value().secret())
+    }
+    #[cfg_attr(
+        all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"),
+        wasm_bindgen(getter)
+    )]
+    pub fn bare_secret(&self) -> BareSecretKey {
+        self.ref_value().secret()
+    }
+}

veilid-core/src/crypto/types/mod.rs

@@ -48,94 +48,38 @@ mod crypto_typed_group;
 mod keypair;
 
 pub use byte_array_types::*;
-pub use crypto_typed::*;
-pub use crypto_typed_group::*;
 pub use keypair::*;
 
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type EncapsulationKey = CryptoTyped<BareEncapsulationKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type DecapsulationKey = CryptoTyped<BareDecapsulationKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type PublicKey = CryptoTyped<BarePublicKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type SecretKey = CryptoTyped<BareSecretKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type KeyPair = CryptoTyped<BareKeyPair>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type Signature = CryptoTyped<BareSignature>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type SharedSecret = CryptoTyped<BareSharedSecret>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type HashDigest = CryptoTyped<BareHashDigest>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type RecordKey = CryptoTyped<BareRecordKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type NodeId = CryptoTyped<BareNodeId>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type RouteId = CryptoTyped<BareRouteId>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type MemberId = CryptoTyped<BareMemberId>;
-
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type EncapsulationKeyGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareEncapsulationKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type DecapsulationKeyGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareDecapsulationKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type PublicKeyGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BarePublicKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type SecretKeyGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareSecretKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type KeyPairGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareKeyPair>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type SignatureGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareSignature>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type SharedSecretGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareSharedSecret>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type HashDigestGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareHashDigest>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type RecordKeyGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareRecordKey>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type NodeIdGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareNodeId>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type RouteIdGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareRouteId>;
-#[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), declare)]
-pub type MemberIdGroup = CryptoTypedGroup<BareMemberId>;
-
-impl From<NodeId> for HashDigest {
-    fn from(value: NodeId) -> Self {
-        HashDigest::new(value.kind(), value.into_value().into())
-    }
+macro_rules! impl_crypto_typed_and_group {
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+        impl_crypto_typed!($visibility $name);
+        impl_crypto_typed_group!($visibility $name);
+    };
 }
 
-impl From<RecordKey> for HashDigest {
-    fn from(value: RecordKey) -> Self {
-        HashDigest::new(value.kind(), value.into_value().into())
-    }
+macro_rules! impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec {
+    ($visibility:vis $name:ident) => {
+        impl_crypto_typed!($visibility $name);
+        impl_crypto_typed_group!($visibility $name);
+        impl_crypto_typed_vec!($visibility $name);
+    };
 }
 
-impl From<NodeId> for PublicKey {
-    fn from(value: NodeId) -> Self {
-        PublicKey::new(value.kind(), value.into_value().into())
-    }
-}
+// CryptoKind typed, with group and vector conversions
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub EncapsulationKey);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub DecapsulationKey);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub PublicKey);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub SecretKey);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub Signature);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub SharedSecret);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub HashDigest);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub RecordKey);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub NodeId);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub RouteId);
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group_and_vec!(pub MemberId);
 
-impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
-    fn from(value: PublicKey) -> Self {
-        NodeId::new(value.kind(), value.into_value().into())
-    }
-}
+// No vector representation
+impl_crypto_typed_and_group!(pub KeyPair);
 
-impl From<NodeIdGroup> for PublicKeyGroup {
-    fn from(value: NodeIdGroup) -> Self {
-        let items: Vec<PublicKey> = value.iter().map(|node_id| node_id.clone().into()).collect();
-        PublicKeyGroup::from(items)
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<PublicKeyGroup> for NodeIdGroup {
-    fn from(value: PublicKeyGroup) -> Self {
-        let items: Vec<NodeId> = value.iter().map(|node_id| node_id.clone().into()).collect();
-        NodeIdGroup::from(items)
-    }
-}
+// Internal types
+impl_crypto_typed!(pub(crate) HashCoordinate);

veilid-core/src/network_manager/bootstrap/bootstrap_record.rs

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl BootstrapRecord {
     }
 
     pub fn merge(&mut self, other: BootstrapRecord) {
-        self.public_keys.add_all(&other.public_keys);
+        self.public_keys.add_all_from_slice(&other.public_keys);
         for x in other.envelope_support {
             if !self.envelope_support.contains(&x) {
                 self.envelope_support.push(x);
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ impl BootstrapRecord {
             .envelope_support()
             .iter()
             .map(|x| {
-                if (x.0)[0..3] == *b"ENV" {
+                if x.bytes()[0..3] == *b"ENV" {
                     x.to_string().split_off(3)
                 } else {
                     x.to_string()
@@ -161,19 +161,20 @@ impl BootstrapRecord {
 
         let crypto = network_manager.crypto();
 
-        let sig = match crypto.generate_signatures(v1.as_bytes(), &[signing_key_pair], |kp, sig| {
-            Signature::new(kp.kind(), sig).to_string()
-        }) {
-            Ok(v) => {
-                let Some(sig) = v.first().cloned() else {
-                    bail!("No signature generated");
-                };
-                sig
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                bail!("Failed to generate signature: {}", e);
-            }
-        };
+        let sig =
+            match crypto.generate_signatures(v1.as_bytes(), &[signing_key_pair], |_kp, sig| {
+                sig.to_string()
+            }) {
+                Ok(v) => {
+                    let Some(sig) = v.first().cloned() else {
+                        bail!("No signature generated");
+                    };
+                    sig
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    bail!("Failed to generate signature: {}", e);
+                }
+            };
 
         v1 += &sig;
         Ok(v1)

veilid-core/src/network_manager/bootstrap/direct_bootstrap/mod.rs

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
                     // and as such, a routing domain can not be determined for it
                     // by the code that receives the FindNodeA result
                     for pi in bootv1response.peers.iter().cloned() {
-                        if pi.node_info().public_keys().contains_any(bsrec.public_keys()) {
+                        if pi.node_info().public_keys().contains_any_from_slice(bsrec.public_keys()) {
                             return Some(pi);
                         }
                     }

veilid-core/src/network_manager/bootstrap/direct_bootstrap/v1.rs

@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ impl NetworkManager {
             .filter_map(|bsrec| {
                 if routing_table.matches_own_public_key(bsrec.public_keys()) {
                     routing_table.get_published_peer_info(routing_domain)
-                } else if let Some(best_public_key) = bsrec.public_keys().best() {
-                    if let Ok(best_node_id) = routing_table.generate_node_id(&best_public_key) {
+                } else if let Some(best_public_key) = bsrec.public_keys().first() {
+                    if let Ok(best_node_id) = routing_table.generate_node_id(best_public_key) {
                         if let Some(nr) = routing_table.lookup_node_ref(best_node_id).ok().flatten()
                         {
                             nr.get_peer_info(routing_domain)

veilid-core/src/network_manager/bootstrap/txt_bootstrap/v0.rs

@@ -104,7 +104,10 @@ impl NetworkManager {
             let mut mbi = 0;
             while mbi < merged_bootstrap_records.len() {
                 let mbr = &mut merged_bootstrap_records[mbi];
-                if mbr.public_keys().contains_any(bsrec.public_keys()) {
+                if mbr
+                    .public_keys()
+                    .contains_any_from_slice(bsrec.public_keys())
+                {
                     // Merge record, pop this one out
                     let mbr = merged_bootstrap_records.remove(mbi);
                     bsrec.merge(mbr);

veilid-core/src/network_manager/bootstrap/txt_bootstrap/v1.rs

@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ impl NetworkManager {
             let mut mbi = 0;
             while mbi < merged_bootstrap_records.len() {
                 let mbr = &mut merged_bootstrap_records[mbi];
-                if mbr.public_keys().contains_any(bsrec.public_keys()) {
+                if mbr
+                    .public_keys()
+                    .contains_any_from_slice(bsrec.public_keys())
+                {
                     // Merge record, pop this one out
                     let mbr = merged_bootstrap_records.remove(mbi);
                     bsrec.merge(mbr);

veilid-core/src/network_manager/mod.rs

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ pub const TXT_LOOKUP_CACHE_SIZE: usize = 256;
 /// Duration that TXT lookups are valid in the cache (5 minutes, <= the DNS record expiration timeout)
 pub const TXT_LOOKUP_EXPIRATION: TimestampDuration = TimestampDuration::new_secs(300);
 /// Maximum size for a message is the same as the maximum size for an Envelope
-pub const MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
+pub const MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = ENV0_MAX_ENVELOPE_SIZE;
 /// Statistics table size for tracking performance by IP address
 pub const IPADDR_TABLE_SIZE: usize = 1024;
 /// Eviction time for ip addresses from statistics tables (5 minutes)
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ impl SendDataResult {
                 Some(ncm) if ncm.is_direct()
             )
     }
-    pub fn is_ordered(&self) -> bool {
-        self.unique_flow.flow.protocol_type().is_ordered()
+    pub fn sequence_ordering(&self) -> SequenceOrdering {
+        self.unique_flow.flow.protocol_type().sequence_ordering()
     }
 
     pub fn unique_flow(&self) -> UniqueFlow {
@@ -286,9 +286,11 @@ impl NetworkManager {
                     Some(
                         bcs.derive_shared_secret(
                             network_key_password.as_bytes(),
-                            &bcs.generate_hash(network_key_password.as_bytes()),
+                            bcs.generate_hash(network_key_password.as_bytes())
+                                .ref_value(),
                         )
-                        .expect("failed to derive network key"),
+                        .expect("failed to derive network key")
+                        .value(),
                     )
                 } else {
                     None
@@ -593,6 +595,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
 
     /// Generates a multi-shot/normal receipt
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip(self, extra_data, callback))]
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn generate_receipt<D: AsRef<[u8]>>(
         &self,
         expiration_us: TimestampDuration,
@@ -612,15 +615,19 @@ impl NetworkManager {
 
         let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce();
         let node_id = routing_table.node_id(vcrypto.kind());
-        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind()).value();
+        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind());
+
+        // Encode envelope
+        let version = best_receipt_version();
+        let receipt = match version {
+            RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0 => {
+                Receipt::try_new_rcp0(&crypto, node_id.kind(), nonce, node_id, extra_data)?
+            }
+            _ => {
+                bail!("unsupported receipt version: {:?}", version);
+            }
+        };
 
-        let receipt = Receipt::try_new(
-            best_receipt_version(),
-            node_id.kind(),
-            nonce,
-            node_id.value(),
-            extra_data,
-        )?;
         let out = receipt
             .to_signed_data(&crypto, &secret_key)
             .wrap_err("failed to generate signed receipt")?;
@@ -652,15 +659,19 @@ impl NetworkManager {
 
         let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce();
         let node_id = routing_table.node_id(vcrypto.kind());
-        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind()).value();
+        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind());
+
+        let version = best_receipt_version();
+
+        let receipt = match version {
+            RECEIPT_VERSION_RCP0 => {
+                Receipt::try_new_rcp0(&crypto, node_id.kind(), nonce, node_id, extra_data)?
+            }
+            _ => {
+                bail!("unsupported receipt version: {:?}", version);
+            }
+        };
 
-        let receipt = Receipt::try_new(
-            best_receipt_version(),
-            node_id.kind(),
-            nonce,
-            node_id.value(),
-            extra_data,
-        )?;
         let out = receipt
             .to_signed_data(&crypto, &secret_key)
             .wrap_err("failed to generate signed receipt")?;
@@ -687,7 +698,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         let receipt_manager = self.receipt_manager();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
 
-        let receipt = match Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
+        let receipt = match Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
             Err(e) => {
                 return NetworkResult::invalid_message(e.to_string());
             }
@@ -713,7 +724,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         let receipt_manager = self.receipt_manager();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
 
-        let receipt = match Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
+        let receipt = match Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
             Err(e) => {
                 return NetworkResult::invalid_message(e.to_string());
             }
@@ -738,7 +749,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         let receipt_manager = self.receipt_manager();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
 
-        let receipt = match Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
+        let receipt = match Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
             Err(e) => {
                 return NetworkResult::invalid_message(e.to_string());
             }
@@ -755,7 +766,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
     pub async fn handle_private_receipt<R: AsRef<[u8]>>(
         &self,
         receipt_data: R,
-        private_route: BarePublicKey,
+        private_route: PublicKey,
     ) -> NetworkResult<()> {
         let Ok(_guard) = self.startup_context.startup_lock.enter() else {
             return NetworkResult::service_unavailable("network is not started");
@@ -764,7 +775,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         let receipt_manager = self.receipt_manager();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
 
-        let receipt = match Receipt::from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
+        let receipt = match Receipt::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, receipt_data.as_ref()) {
             Err(e) => {
                 return NetworkResult::invalid_message(e.to_string());
             }
@@ -805,9 +816,11 @@ impl NetworkManager {
                 };
 
                 // Restrict reverse connection to same sequencing requirement as inbound signal
-                if signal_flow.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
-                    peer_nr.set_sequencing(Sequencing::EnsureOrdered);
-                }
+                let sequencing = signal_flow
+                    .protocol_type()
+                    .sequence_ordering()
+                    .strict_sequencing();
+                peer_nr.set_sequencing(sequencing);
 
                 // Make a reverse connection to the peer and send the receipt to it
                 rpc.rpc_call_return_receipt(Destination::direct(peer_nr), receipt)
@@ -886,21 +899,21 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         };
 
         let node_id = routing_table.node_id(vcrypto.kind());
-        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind()).value();
+        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(vcrypto.kind());
 
         // Get timestamp, nonce
         let ts = Timestamp::now();
         let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce();
 
         // Encode envelope
-        let envelope = Envelope::new(
-            version,
-            node_id.kind(),
-            ts,
-            nonce,
-            node_id.value(),
-            dest_node_id.value(),
-        );
+        let envelope = match version {
+            ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0 => {
+                Envelope::try_new_env0(&crypto, node_id.kind(), ts, nonce, node_id, dest_node_id)?
+            }
+            _ => {
+                bail!("unsupported envelope version: {:?}", version);
+            }
+        };
         envelope
             .to_encrypted_data(&crypto, body.as_ref(), &secret_key, &self.network_key)
             .wrap_err("envelope failed to encode")
@@ -1046,7 +1059,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
 
         // Decode envelope header (may fail signature validation)
         let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let envelope = match Envelope::from_signed_data(&crypto, data, &self.network_key) {
+        let envelope = match Envelope::try_from_signed_data(&crypto, data, &self.network_key) {
             Ok(v) => v,
             Err(e) => {
                 veilid_log!(self debug "envelope failed to decode: {}", e);
@@ -1164,9 +1177,8 @@ impl NetworkManager {
             if let Some((mut relay_nr, relay_kind)) = some_relay {
                 // Ensure the protocol used to forward is of the same sequencing requirement
                 // Address type is allowed to change if connectivity is better
-                if flow.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
-                    relay_nr.set_sequencing(Sequencing::EnsureOrdered);
-                };
+                let sequencing = flow.protocol_type().sequence_ordering().strict_sequencing();
+                relay_nr.set_sequencing(sequencing);
 
                 // Pass relay to RPC system
                 if let Err(e) = self.enqueue_relay(relay_nr, data.to_vec(), relay_kind) {
@@ -1180,7 +1192,7 @@ impl NetworkManager {
         }
 
         // DH to get decryption key (cached)
-        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(envelope.get_crypto_kind()).value();
+        let secret_key = routing_table.secret_key(envelope.get_crypto_kind());
 
         // Decrypt the envelope body
         let crypto = self.crypto();
@@ -1257,7 +1269,12 @@ impl NetworkManager {
 
         // Inform the connection table about the flow's priority
         let is_relaying_flow = node_ref.is_relaying(routing_domain);
-        if is_relaying_flow && flow.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
+        if is_relaying_flow
+            && matches!(
+                flow.protocol_type().sequence_ordering(),
+                SequenceOrdering::Ordered
+            )
+        {
             self.connection_manager().add_relaying_flow(flow);
         }
     }

veilid-core/src/network_manager/native/igd_manager.rs

@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ impl IGDManager {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "net", skip_all)]
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub async fn unmap_port(
         &self,
         protocol_type: IGDProtocolType,

veilid-core/src/network_manager/receipt_manager.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ pub enum ReceiptEvent {
     ReturnedSafety,
     ReturnedPrivate {
         #[expect(dead_code)]
-        private_route: BarePublicKey,
+        private_route: PublicKey,
     },
     Expired,
     Cancelled,
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ pub(super) enum ReceiptReturned {
     OutOfBand,
     InBand { inbound_noderef: FilteredNodeRef },
     Safety,
-    Private { private_route: BarePublicKey },
+    Private { private_route: PublicKey },
 }
 
 pub trait ReceiptCallback: Send + 'static {
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ struct ReceiptRecord {
 }
 
 impl ReceiptRecord {
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn new(
         receipt: Receipt,
         expiration_ts: Timestamp,
@@ -145,7 +144,7 @@ impl PartialOrd for ReceiptRecordTimestampSort {
 ///////////////////////////////////
 
 struct ReceiptManagerInner {
-    records_by_nonce: BTreeMap<BareNonce, Arc<Mutex<ReceiptRecord>>>,
+    records_by_nonce: BTreeMap<Nonce, Arc<Mutex<ReceiptRecord>>>,
     next_oldest_ts: Option<Timestamp>,
     stop_source: Option<StopSource>,
     timeout_task: MustJoinSingleFuture<()>,
@@ -405,7 +404,7 @@ impl ReceiptManager {
     }
 
     #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub async fn cancel_receipt(&self, nonce: &BareNonce) -> EyreResult<()> {
+    pub async fn cancel_receipt(&self, nonce: &Nonce) -> EyreResult<()> {
         event!(target: "receipt", Level::DEBUG, "== Cancel Receipt {}", nonce.encode());
 
         let _guard = self.unlocked_inner.startup_lock.enter()?;

veilid-core/src/network_manager/send_data.rs

@@ -691,13 +691,13 @@ impl NetworkManager {
                 relay_nr.set_sequencing(sequencing);
 
                 // Tighten sequencing for the target to the best reverse connection flow we can get
-                let tighten = peer_a
+                let max_ordering = peer_a
                     .node_info()
                     .filtered_dial_info_details(DialInfoDetail::NO_SORT, &|did| {
                         did.matches_filter(&dial_info_filter)
                     })
                     .iter()
-                    .find_map(|did| {
+                    .fold(SequenceOrdering::Unordered, |ord, did| {
                         if peer_b
                             .node_info()
                             .address_types()
@@ -706,21 +706,17 @@ impl NetworkManager {
                                 .node_info()
                                 .outbound_protocols()
                                 .contains(did.dial_info.protocol_type())
-                            && did.dial_info.protocol_type().is_ordered()
                         {
-                            Some(true)
+                            cmp::max(ord, did.dial_info.protocol_type().sequence_ordering())
                         } else {
-                            None
+                            ord
                         }
-                    })
-                    .unwrap_or(false);
+                    });
 
                 let mut target_node_ref = target_node_ref.filtered_clone(
                     NodeRefFilter::from(dial_info_filter).with_routing_domain(routing_domain),
                 );
-                if tighten {
-                    target_node_ref.set_sequencing(Sequencing::EnsureOrdered);
-                }
+                target_node_ref.set_sequencing(max_ordering.strict_sequencing());
                 Some(NodeContactMethodKind::SignalReverse(
                     relay_nr,
                     target_node_ref,

veilid-core/src/network_manager/tests/test_signed_node_info.rs

@@ -15,14 +15,14 @@ pub async fn test_signed_node_info() {
     for ck in VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS {
         let vcrypto = crypto.get(ck).unwrap();
         let keypair = vcrypto.generate_keypair();
-        let secret_key_group = SecretKeyGroup::from(SecretKey::new(ck, keypair.secret()));
+        let secret_key_group = SecretKeyGroup::from(keypair.secret());
 
         // Build test node info
         let node_info = NodeInfo::new(
             Timestamp::now(),
             VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.to_vec(),
             vec![CryptoInfo::VLD0 {
-                public_key: keypair.key(),
+                public_key: keypair.key().value(),
             }],
             PUBLIC_INTERNET_CAPABILITIES.to_vec(),
             ProtocolTypeSet::all(),
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ pub async fn test_signed_node_info() {
         .expect_err("should not validate");
 
         let invalid_crypto_kind = SignatureGroup::from(Signature::new(
-            CryptoKind(*b"FOOO"),
+            CryptoKind::new(*b"FOOO"),
             BareSignature::default(),
         ));
 

veilid-core/src/network_manager/types/dial_info_filter.rs

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ impl DialInfoFilter {
     }
     pub fn is_ordered_only(&self) -> bool {
         for pt in self.protocol_type_set {
-            if !pt.is_ordered() {
+            if !matches!(pt.sequence_ordering(), SequenceOrdering::Ordered) {
                 return false;
             }
         }

veilid-core/src/network_manager/types/flow.rs

@@ -29,7 +29,12 @@ impl fmt::Display for Flow {
 
 impl Flow {
     pub fn new(remote: PeerAddress, local: SocketAddress) -> Self {
-        assert!(!remote.protocol_type().is_ordered() || !local.address().is_unspecified());
+        assert!(
+            !matches!(
+                remote.protocol_type().sequence_ordering(),
+                SequenceOrdering::Ordered
+            ) || !local.address().is_unspecified()
+        );
 
         Self {
             remote,

veilid-core/src/network_manager/types/protocol_type.rs

@@ -14,28 +14,12 @@ pub(crate) enum ProtocolType {
 }
 
 impl ProtocolType {
-    pub fn is_ordered(&self) -> bool {
-        matches!(
-            self,
-            ProtocolType::TCP | ProtocolType::WS | ProtocolType::WSS
-        )
-    }
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn minimum_sequencing(&self) -> Sequencing {
+    pub fn sequence_ordering(&self) -> SequenceOrdering {
         match self {
-            ProtocolType::UDP => Sequencing::NoPreference,
-            ProtocolType::TCP => Sequencing::PreferOrdered,
-            ProtocolType::WS => Sequencing::PreferOrdered,
-            ProtocolType::WSS => Sequencing::PreferOrdered,
-        }
-    }
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub fn maximum_sequencing(&self) -> Sequencing {
-        match self {
-            ProtocolType::UDP => Sequencing::PreferOrdered,
-            ProtocolType::TCP => Sequencing::EnsureOrdered,
-            ProtocolType::WS => Sequencing::EnsureOrdered,
-            ProtocolType::WSS => Sequencing::EnsureOrdered,
+            ProtocolType::UDP => SequenceOrdering::Unordered,
+            ProtocolType::TCP => SequenceOrdering::Ordered,
+            ProtocolType::WS => SequenceOrdering::Ordered,
+            ProtocolType::WSS => SequenceOrdering::Ordered,
         }
     }
 

veilid-core/src/network_manager/types/signal_info.rs

@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ impl SignalInfo {
                 receipt,
                 peer_info: _,
             } => {
-                if receipt.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+                if receipt.len() < RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
                     return Err(RPCError::protocol("SignalInfo HolePunch receipt too short"));
                 }
-                if receipt.len() > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+                if receipt.len() > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
                     return Err(RPCError::protocol("SignalInfo HolePunch receipt too long"));
                 }
                 Ok(())
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ impl SignalInfo {
                 receipt,
                 peer_info: _,
             } => {
-                if receipt.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+                if receipt.len() < RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
                     return Err(RPCError::protocol(
                         "SignalInfo ReverseConnect receipt too short",
                     ));
                 }
-                if receipt.len() > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+                if receipt.len() > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
                     return Err(RPCError::protocol(
                         "SignalInfo ReverseConnect receipt too long",
                     ));

veilid-core/src/routing_table/bucket.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ impl_veilid_log_facility!("rtab");
 
 /// Routing Table Bucket
 /// Stores map of public keys to entries, which may be in multiple routing tables per crypto kind
-/// Keeps entries at a particular 'dht distance' from this cryptokind's node id
+/// Keeps entries at a particular 'hash coordinate distance' from this cryptokind's node id
 /// Helps to keep managed lists at particular distances so we can evict nodes by priority
 /// where the priority comes from liveness and age of the entry (older is better)
 pub struct Bucket {

veilid-core/src/routing_table/bucket_entry.rs

@@ -162,10 +162,8 @@ impl fmt::Display for BucketEntryLocalNetwork {
 /// The data associated with each bucket entry
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub(crate) struct BucketEntryInner {
-    /// The node ids matching this bucket entry, with the cryptography versions supported by this node as the 'kind' field
-    validated_node_ids: NodeIdGroup,
-    /// The node ids claimed by the remote node that use cryptography versions we do not support
-    unsupported_node_ids: NodeIdGroup,
+    /// The node ids matching this bucket entry
+    node_ids: NodeIdGroup,
     /// The set of envelope versions supported by the node inclusive of the requirements of any relay the node may be using
     envelope_support: Vec<EnvelopeVersion>,
     /// If this node has updated it's SignedNodeInfo since our network
@@ -220,8 +218,7 @@ pub(crate) struct BucketEntryInner {
 
 impl fmt::Display for BucketEntryInner {
     fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
-        writeln!(f, "validated_node_ids: {}", self.validated_node_ids)?;
-        writeln!(f, "unsupported_node_ids: {}", self.unsupported_node_ids)?;
+        writeln!(f, "node_ids: {}", self.node_ids)?;
         writeln!(f, "envelope_support: {:?}", self.envelope_support)?;
         writeln!(
             f,
@@ -281,9 +278,46 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
 
     /// Get all node ids
     pub fn node_ids(&self) -> NodeIdGroup {
-        let mut node_ids = self.validated_node_ids.clone();
-        node_ids.add_all(&self.unsupported_node_ids);
-        node_ids
+        self.node_ids.clone()
+    }
+
+    /// Get public keys
+    pub fn public_keys(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> PublicKeyGroup {
+        match routing_domain {
+            RoutingDomain::LocalNetwork => self
+                .local_network
+                .peer_info
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|x| x.node_info().public_keys())
+                .unwrap_or_default(),
+            RoutingDomain::PublicInternet => self
+                .public_internet
+                .peer_info
+                .as_ref()
+                .map(|x| x.node_info().public_keys())
+                .unwrap_or_default(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Get best node id
+    pub fn best_node_id(&self) -> Option<NodeId> {
+        self.node_ids.first().cloned()
+    }
+
+    /// Get best public key
+    pub fn best_public_key(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+        match routing_domain {
+            RoutingDomain::LocalNetwork => self
+                .local_network
+                .peer_info
+                .as_ref()
+                .and_then(|x| x.node_info().public_keys().first().cloned()),
+            RoutingDomain::PublicInternet => self
+                .public_internet
+                .peer_info
+                .as_ref()
+                .and_then(|x| x.node_info().public_keys().first().cloned()),
+        }
     }
 
     /// Add a node id for a particular crypto kind.
@@ -291,28 +325,17 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
     /// Returns Ok(None) if no previous existing node id was associated with that crypto kind, or one existed but nothing changed.
     /// Results Err() if this operation would add more crypto kinds than we support
     pub fn add_node_id(&mut self, node_id: NodeId) -> EyreResult<Option<NodeId>> {
-        let total_node_id_count = self.validated_node_ids.len() + self.unsupported_node_ids.len();
-        let node_ids = if VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS.contains(&node_id.kind()) {
-            &mut self.validated_node_ids
-        } else {
-            &mut self.unsupported_node_ids
-        };
-
-        if let Some(old_node_id) = node_ids.get(node_id.kind()) {
+        if let Some(old_node_id) = self.node_ids.get(node_id.kind()) {
             // If this was already there we do nothing
             if old_node_id == node_id {
                 return Ok(None);
             }
             // Won't change number of crypto kinds, but the node id changed
-            node_ids.add(node_id);
+            self.node_ids.add(node_id);
 
             return Ok(Some(old_node_id));
         }
-        // Check to ensure we aren't adding more crypto kinds than we support
-        if total_node_id_count == MAX_CRYPTO_KINDS {
-            bail!("too many crypto kinds for this node");
-        }
-        node_ids.add(node_id);
+        self.node_ids.add(node_id);
 
         Ok(None)
     }
@@ -321,17 +344,7 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
     /// Returns Some(node) any previous existing node id associated with that crypto kind
     /// Returns None if no previous existing node id was associated with that crypto kind
     pub fn remove_node_id(&mut self, crypto_kind: CryptoKind) -> Option<NodeId> {
-        let node_ids = if VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS.contains(&crypto_kind) {
-            &mut self.validated_node_ids
-        } else {
-            &mut self.unsupported_node_ids
-        };
-
-        node_ids.remove(crypto_kind)
-    }
-
-    pub fn best_node_id(&self) -> Option<NodeId> {
-        self.validated_node_ids.best()
+        self.node_ids.remove(crypto_kind)
     }
 
     pub fn relay_ids(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> Vec<NodeIdGroup> {
@@ -354,11 +367,11 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
 
     /// Get crypto kinds
     pub fn crypto_kinds(&self) -> Vec<CryptoKind> {
-        self.validated_node_ids.kinds()
+        self.node_ids.kinds()
     }
     /// Compare sets of crypto kinds
     pub fn common_crypto_kinds(&self, other: &[CryptoKind]) -> Vec<CryptoKind> {
-        common_crypto_kinds(&self.validated_node_ids.kinds(), other)
+        common_crypto_kinds(&self.node_ids.kinds(), other)
     }
 
     /// All-of capability check
@@ -699,7 +712,7 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
                 // Check if the connection is still considered live
                 let alive =
                     // Should we check the connection table?
-                    if v.0.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
+                    if matches!(v.0.protocol_type().sequence_ordering(), SequenceOrdering::Ordered) {
                         // Look the connection up in the connection manager and see if it's still there
                         if let Some(connection_manager) = &opt_connection_manager {
                             connection_manager.get_connection(v.0).is_some()
@@ -1095,13 +1108,16 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
         ts: Timestamp,
         bytes: ByteCount,
         expects_answer: bool,
-        ordered: bool,
+        ordering: SequenceOrdering,
     ) {
         self.transfer_stats_accounting.add_up(bytes);
-        if ordered {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered.record_question(ts);
-        } else {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered.record_question(ts);
+        match ordering {
+            SequenceOrdering::Ordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered.record_question(ts);
+            }
+            SequenceOrdering::Unordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered.record_question(ts);
+            }
         }
         self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.messages_sent += 1;
         self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.failed_to_send = 0;
@@ -1125,43 +1141,53 @@ impl BucketEntryInner {
         send_ts: Timestamp,
         recv_ts: Timestamp,
         bytes: ByteCount,
-        ordered: bool,
+        ordering: SequenceOrdering,
     ) {
         self.transfer_stats_accounting.add_down(bytes);
-        if ordered {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered.record_answer(recv_ts);
-            self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered = 0;
-        } else {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered
-                .record_answer(recv_ts);
-            self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered = 0;
+
+        match ordering {
+            SequenceOrdering::Ordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered.record_answer(recv_ts);
+                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered = 0;
+            }
+            SequenceOrdering::Unordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered
+                    .record_answer(recv_ts);
+                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered = 0;
+            }
         }
+
         self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.messages_rcvd += 1;
         self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.questions_in_flight -= 1;
         self.record_latency(recv_ts.saturating_sub(send_ts));
         self.touch_last_seen(recv_ts);
     }
-    pub(super) fn lost_answer(&mut self, ordered: bool) {
+    pub(super) fn lost_answer(&mut self, ordering: SequenceOrdering) {
         let cur_ts = Timestamp::now();
-        if ordered {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered
-                .record_lost_answer(cur_ts);
-            self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered += 1;
-            if self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered
-                > UNRELIABLE_LOST_ANSWERS_ORDERED
-            {
-                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.first_consecutive_seen_ts = None;
+
+        match ordering {
+            SequenceOrdering::Ordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_ordered
+                    .record_lost_answer(cur_ts);
+                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered += 1;
+                if self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_ordered
+                    > UNRELIABLE_LOST_ANSWERS_ORDERED
+                {
+                    self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.first_consecutive_seen_ts = None;
+                }
             }
-        } else {
-            self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered
-                .record_lost_answer(cur_ts);
-            self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered += 1;
-            if self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered
-                > UNRELIABLE_LOST_ANSWERS_UNORDERED
-            {
-                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.first_consecutive_seen_ts = None;
+            SequenceOrdering::Unordered => {
+                self.answer_stats_accounting_unordered
+                    .record_lost_answer(cur_ts);
+                self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered += 1;
+                if self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.recent_lost_answers_unordered
+                    > UNRELIABLE_LOST_ANSWERS_UNORDERED
+                {
+                    self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.first_consecutive_seen_ts = None;
+                }
             }
         }
+
         self.peer_stats.rpc_stats.questions_in_flight -= 1;
     }
     pub(super) fn failed_to_send(&mut self, ts: Timestamp, expects_answer: bool) {
@@ -1199,8 +1225,7 @@ impl BucketEntry {
 
         let now = Timestamp::now();
         let inner = BucketEntryInner {
-            validated_node_ids: NodeIdGroup::from(first_node_id),
-            unsupported_node_ids: NodeIdGroup::new(),
+            node_ids: NodeIdGroup::from(first_node_id),
             envelope_support: Vec::new(),
             updated_since_last_network_change: false,
             last_flows: BTreeMap::new(),

veilid-core/src/routing_table/debug.rs

@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
             let is_relaying = node
                 .operate(|_rti, e| {
                     e.node_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
-                        .map(|ni| our_node_ids.contains_any(&ni.relay_ids()))
+                        .map(|ni| our_node_ids.contains_any_from_slice(&ni.relay_ids()))
                 })
                 .unwrap_or(false);
 

veilid-core/src/routing_table/find_peers.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     pub fn find_preferred_closest_peers(
         &self,
         routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
-        hash_coordinate: &HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         capabilities: &[VeilidCapability],
     ) -> NetworkResult<Vec<Arc<PeerInfo>>> {
         if Crypto::validate_crypto_kind(hash_coordinate.kind()).is_err() {
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     pub fn find_preferred_peers_closer_to_key(
         &self,
         routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
-        hash_coordinate: &HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         required_capabilities: Vec<VeilidCapability>,
     ) -> NetworkResult<Vec<Arc<PeerInfo>>> {
         // add node information for the requesting node to our routing table
@@ -80,18 +80,9 @@ impl RoutingTable {
 
         // find N nodes closest to the target node in our routing table
         // ensure the nodes returned are only the ones closer to the target node than ourself
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
-            return NetworkResult::invalid_message("unsupported cryptosystem");
-        };
-        let vcrypto = &vcrypto;
+        let own_distance = own_node_id.to_hash_coordinate().distance(&hash_coordinate);
 
-        let own_distance = vcrypto.distance(
-            &BareHashDigest::from(own_node_id.value()),
-            &hash_coordinate.value(),
-        );
-
-        let value = hash_coordinate.value();
+        let hash_coordinate2 = hash_coordinate.clone();
         let filter = Box::new(
             move |_rti: &RoutingTableInner, opt_entry: Option<Arc<BucketEntry>>| {
                 // Exclude our own node
@@ -112,8 +103,9 @@ impl RoutingTable {
                     let Some(entry_node_id) = e.node_ids().get(crypto_kind) else {
                         return false;
                     };
-                    let entry_distance = vcrypto
-                        .distance(&BareHashDigest::from(entry_node_id.value()), &value.clone());
+                    let entry_distance = entry_node_id
+                        .to_hash_coordinate()
+                        .distance(&hash_coordinate2);
                     if entry_distance >= own_distance {
                         return false;
                     }
@@ -151,10 +143,9 @@ impl RoutingTable {
 
         // Validate peers returned are, in fact, closer to the key than the node we sent this to
         // This same test is used on the other side so we vet things here
-        let valid = match Self::verify_peers_closer(
-            vcrypto,
-            &own_node_id.clone().into(),
-            &hash_coordinate.clone(),
+        let valid = match self.verify_peers_closer(
+            own_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
+            hash_coordinate.clone(),
             &closest_nodes,
         ) {
             Ok(v) => v,
@@ -175,24 +166,22 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     /// Determine if set of peers is closer to key_near than key_far is to key_near
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "rtab", skip_all, err)]
     pub fn verify_peers_closer(
-        vcrypto: &crypto::CryptoSystemGuard<'_>,
-        key_far: &HashDigest,
-        key_near: &HashDigest,
+        &self,
+        hash_coordinate_far: HashCoordinate,
+        hash_coordinate_near: HashCoordinate,
         peers: &[Arc<PeerInfo>],
     ) -> EyreResult<bool> {
-        let kind = vcrypto.kind();
-
-        if key_far.kind() != kind || key_near.kind() != kind {
+        if hash_coordinate_far.kind() != hash_coordinate_near.kind() {
             bail!("keys all need the same cryptosystem");
         }
 
         let mut closer = true;
-        let d_far = vcrypto.distance(key_far.ref_value(), key_near.ref_value());
+        let d_far = hash_coordinate_far.distance(&hash_coordinate_near);
         for peer in peers {
-            let Some(key_peer) = peer.node_ids().get(kind) else {
+            let Some(key_peer) = peer.node_ids().get(hash_coordinate_far.kind()) else {
                 bail!("peers need to have a key with the same cryptosystem");
             };
-            let d_near = vcrypto.distance(key_near.ref_value(), &key_peer.value().into());
+            let d_near = hash_coordinate_near.distance(&key_peer.to_hash_coordinate());
             if d_far < d_near {
                 let warning = format!(
                     r#"peer: {}
@@ -202,14 +191,13 @@ far (self): {}
      d_far: {}
        cmp: {:?}"#,
                     key_peer,
-                    key_near,
-                    key_far,
+                    hash_coordinate_near,
+                    hash_coordinate_far,
                     d_near,
                     d_far,
                     d_near.cmp(&d_far)
                 );
-                let crypto = vcrypto.crypto();
-                veilid_log!(crypto warn "{}", warning);
+                veilid_log!(self warn "{}", warning);
                 closer = false;
                 break;
             }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/mod.rs

@@ -36,9 +36,7 @@ impl_veilid_log_facility!("rtab");
 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 
 /// Routing table bucket count (one per bit per 32 byte node id)
-pub const BUCKET_COUNT: usize = 256;
-/// Fixed length for NodeId in bytes
-pub const NODE_ID_LENGTH: usize = 32;
+pub const BUCKET_COUNT: usize = HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH * 8;
 
 /// Minimum number of nodes we need, per crypto kind, per routing domain, or we trigger a bootstrap
 pub const MIN_BOOTSTRAP_CONNECTIVITY_PEERS: usize = 4;
@@ -375,18 +373,9 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         false
     }
 
-    pub fn matches_own_node_id_key(&self, node_id_key: &BareNodeId) -> bool {
-        for tk in self.node_ids().iter() {
-            if tk.ref_value() == node_id_key {
-                return true;
-            }
-        }
-        false
-    }
-
     /// Produce node id from public key
     pub fn generate_node_id(&self, public_key: &PublicKey) -> VeilidAPIResult<NodeId> {
-        if public_key.ref_value().len() == NODE_ID_LENGTH {
+        if public_key.ref_value().len() == HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH {
             return Ok(NodeId::new(
                 public_key.kind(),
                 BareNodeId::new(public_key.ref_value()),
@@ -399,13 +388,13 @@ impl RoutingTable {
 
         let idhash = vcrypto.generate_hash(public_key.ref_value());
         assert!(
-            idhash.len() >= NODE_ID_LENGTH,
+            idhash.ref_value().len() >= HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH,
             "generate_hash needs to produce at least {} bytes",
-            NODE_ID_LENGTH
+            HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH
         );
         Ok(NodeId::new(
             public_key.kind(),
-            BareNodeId::new(&idhash[0..NODE_ID_LENGTH]),
+            BareNodeId::new(&idhash.ref_value()[0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH]),
         ))
     }
 
@@ -413,16 +402,12 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         if node_id.ref_value().len() * 8 != BUCKET_COUNT {
             bail!("NodeId should be hashed down to BUCKET_COUNT bits");
         }
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let self_node_id_key = self.node_id(node_id.kind()).value();
-        let vcrypto = crypto.get(node_id.kind()).unwrap();
+        let self_hash_coordinate = self.node_id(node_id.kind()).to_hash_coordinate();
         Ok((
             node_id.kind(),
-            vcrypto
-                .distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(node_id.value()),
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(self_node_id_key),
-                )
+            node_id
+                .to_hash_coordinate()
+                .distance(&self_hash_coordinate)
                 .first_nonzero_bit()
                 .unwrap(),
         ))
@@ -615,6 +600,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         self.inner.read().dial_info_details(domain)
     }
 
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn all_filtered_dial_info_details(
         &self,
         routing_domain_set: RoutingDomainSet,
@@ -676,6 +662,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     }
 
     /// Return a list of the current valid bootstrap peers in a particular routing domain
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn get_bootstrap_peers(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> Vec<NodeRef> {
         self.inner.read().get_bootstrap_peers(routing_domain)
     }
@@ -932,26 +919,30 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     pub fn find_preferred_closest_nodes<'a, T, O>(
         &self,
         node_count: usize,
-        node_id: HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         filters: VecDeque<RoutingTableEntryFilter>,
         transform: T,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<O>>
     where
         T: for<'r> FnMut(&'r RoutingTableInner, Option<Arc<BucketEntry>>) -> O + Send,
     {
-        self.inner
-            .read()
-            .find_preferred_closest_nodes(node_count, node_id, filters, transform)
+        self.inner.read().find_preferred_closest_nodes(
+            node_count,
+            hash_coordinate,
+            filters,
+            transform,
+        )
     }
 
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn sort_and_clean_closest_noderefs(
         &self,
-        node_id: HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         closest_nodes: &[NodeRef],
     ) -> Vec<NodeRef> {
         self.inner
             .read()
-            .sort_and_clean_closest_noderefs(node_id, closest_nodes)
+            .sort_and_clean_closest_noderefs(hash_coordinate, closest_nodes)
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip(self, peer_info_list))]
@@ -1076,6 +1067,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip(self, filter, metric), ret)]
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn find_fastest_node(
         &self,
         cur_ts: Timestamp,
@@ -1099,6 +1091,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip(self, filter, metric), ret)]
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn get_node_speed_percentile(
         &self,
         node_id: NodeId,

veilid-core/src/routing_table/node_ref/node_ref_lock.rs

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ impl<'a, N: NodeRefAccessorsTrait + NodeRefOperateTrait + fmt::Debug + fmt::Disp
         }
     }
 
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn unlocked(&self) -> N {
         self.nr.clone()
     }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/node_ref/traits.rs

@@ -50,9 +50,15 @@ pub(crate) trait NodeRefCommonTrait: NodeRefAccessorsTrait + NodeRefOperateTrait
     fn node_ids(&self) -> NodeIdGroup {
         self.operate(|_rti, e| e.node_ids())
     }
+    fn public_keys(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> PublicKeyGroup {
+        self.operate(|_rti, e| e.public_keys(routing_domain))
+    }
     fn best_node_id(&self) -> Option<NodeId> {
         self.operate(|_rti, e| e.best_node_id())
     }
+    fn best_public_key(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+        self.operate(|_rti, e| e.best_public_key(routing_domain))
+    }
 
     fn relay_ids(&self, routing_domain: RoutingDomain) -> Vec<NodeIdGroup> {
         self.operate(|_rti, e| e.relay_ids(routing_domain))
@@ -254,7 +260,7 @@ pub(crate) trait NodeRefCommonTrait: NodeRefAccessorsTrait + NodeRefOperateTrait
                 return false;
             };
             let our_node_ids = rti.routing_table().node_ids();
-            our_node_ids.contains_any(relay_ids.as_slice())
+            our_node_ids.contains_any_from_slice(relay_ids.as_slice())
         })
     }
 
@@ -284,11 +290,11 @@ pub(crate) trait NodeRefCommonTrait: NodeRefAccessorsTrait + NodeRefOperateTrait
         ts: Timestamp,
         bytes: ByteCount,
         expects_answer: bool,
-        ordered: bool,
+        ordering: SequenceOrdering,
     ) {
         self.operate_mut(|rti, e| {
             rti.transfer_stats_accounting().add_up(bytes);
-            e.question_sent(ts, bytes, expects_answer, ordered);
+            e.question_sent(ts, bytes, expects_answer, ordering);
         })
     }
     fn stats_question_rcvd(&self, ts: Timestamp, bytes: ByteCount) {
@@ -308,18 +314,18 @@ pub(crate) trait NodeRefCommonTrait: NodeRefAccessorsTrait + NodeRefOperateTrait
         send_ts: Timestamp,
         recv_ts: Timestamp,
         bytes: ByteCount,
-        ordered: bool,
+        ordering: SequenceOrdering,
     ) {
         self.operate_mut(|rti, e| {
             rti.transfer_stats_accounting().add_down(bytes);
             rti.latency_stats_accounting()
                 .record_latency(recv_ts.saturating_sub(send_ts));
-            e.answer_rcvd(send_ts, recv_ts, bytes, ordered);
+            e.answer_rcvd(send_ts, recv_ts, bytes, ordering);
         })
     }
-    fn stats_lost_answer(&self, ordered: bool) {
+    fn stats_lost_answer(&self, ordering: SequenceOrdering) {
         self.operate_mut(|_rti, e| {
-            e.lost_answer(ordered);
+            e.lost_answer(ordering);
         })
     }
     fn stats_failed_to_send(&self, ts: Timestamp, expects_answer: bool) {

veilid-core/src/routing_table/privacy.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ impl_veilid_log_facility!("rtab");
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub(crate) struct RouteHopData {
     /// The nonce used in the encryption ENC(Xn,DH(PKn,SKapr))
-    pub nonce: BareNonce,
+    pub nonce: Nonce,
     /// The encrypted blob
     pub blob: Vec<u8>,
 }
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ impl RouteNode {
             RouteNode::NodeId(id) => {
                 format!("{}", id)
             }
-            RouteNode::PeerInfo(pi) => match pi.node_ids().best() {
+            RouteNode::PeerInfo(pi) => match pi.node_ids().first() {
                 Some(id) => format!("{}", id),
                 None => {
                     format!("?({})", pi.node_ids())

veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/mod.rs

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                     }
 
                     // Exclude nodes we have specifically chosen to avoid
-                    if e.node_ids().contains_any(avoid_nodes) {
+                    if e.node_ids().contains_any_from_slice(avoid_nodes) {
                         return false;
                     }
 
@@ -375,11 +375,11 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                     // Relay check
                     for their_relay_info in their_ni.relay_info_list() {
                         // Exclude nodes whose relays we have chosen to avoid
-                        if their_relay_info.node_ids().contains_any(avoid_nodes) {
+                        if their_relay_info.node_ids().contains_any_from_slice(avoid_nodes) {
                             return false;
                         }
                         // Exclude nodes whose relay is our own relay if we have one
-                        if their_relay_info.node_ids().contains_any(&own_relay_ids) {
+                        if their_relay_info.node_ids().contains_any_from_slice(&own_relay_ids) {
                             return false;
                         }
                     }
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             }
 
             // Ensure this route is viable by checking that each node can contact the next one
-            let mut can_do_sequenced = true;
+            let mut orderings = SequenceOrderingSet::all();
             if directions.contains(Direction::Outbound) {
                 let mut previous_node = published_peer_info.clone();
                 let mut reachable = true;
@@ -554,18 +554,18 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                         break;
                     }
 
-                    // Check if we can do sequenced specifically
-                    if can_do_sequenced {
+                    // Check if we can do each ordering strictly
+                    for ordering in orderings {
                         let cm = rti.get_contact_method(
                             RoutingDomain::PublicInternet,
                             previous_node.clone(),
                             current_node.clone(),
                             DialInfoFilter::all(),
-                            Sequencing::EnsureOrdered,
+                            ordering.strict_sequencing(),
                             None,
                         );
                         if matches!(cm, ContactMethod::Unreachable) {
-                            can_do_sequenced = false;
+                            orderings.remove(ordering);
                         }
                     }
 
@@ -593,18 +593,18 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                         break;
                     }
 
-                    // Check if we can do sequenced specifically
-                    if can_do_sequenced {
+                    // Check if we can do each ordering strictly
+                    for ordering in orderings {
                         let cm = rti.get_contact_method(
                             RoutingDomain::PublicInternet,
                             next_node.clone(),
                             current_node.clone(),
                             DialInfoFilter::all(),
-                            Sequencing::EnsureOrdered,
+                            ordering.strict_sequencing(),
                             None,
                         );
                         if matches!(cm, ContactMethod::Unreachable) {
-                            can_do_sequenced = false;
+                            orderings.remove(ordering);
                         }
                     }
                     next_node = current_node;
@@ -615,19 +615,19 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             }
             // Keep this route
             let route_nodes = permutation.to_vec();
-            Some((route_nodes, can_do_sequenced))
+            Some((route_nodes, orderings))
         }) as PermFunc;
 
         let mut route_nodes: Vec<usize> = Vec::new();
-        let mut can_do_sequenced: bool = true;
+        let mut orderings = SequenceOrderingSet::new();
 
         for start in 0..(nodes.len() - safety_spec.hop_count) {
             // Try the permutations available starting with 'start'
-            if let Some((rn, cds)) =
+            if let Some((rn, ord)) =
                 with_route_permutations(safety_spec.hop_count, start, &mut perm_func)
             {
                 route_nodes = rn;
-                can_do_sequenced = cds;
+                orderings = ord;
                 break;
             }
         }
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         // Got a unique route, lets build the details, register it, and return it
         let hop_node_refs: Vec<NodeRef> = route_nodes.iter().map(|k| nodes[*k].clone()).collect();
-        let mut route_set = BTreeMap::<BarePublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>::new();
+        let mut route_set = BTreeMap::<PublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>::new();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
         for crypto_kind in crypto_kinds.iter().copied() {
             let vcrypto = crypto.get(crypto_kind).unwrap();
@@ -652,7 +652,6 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             route_set.insert(
                 keypair.key(),
                 RouteSpecDetail {
-                    crypto_kind,
                     secret_key: keypair.secret(),
                     hops,
                 },
@@ -665,7 +664,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             hop_node_refs,
             directions,
             safety_spec.stability,
-            can_do_sequenced,
+            orderings,
             automatic,
         );
 
@@ -697,12 +696,8 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     {
         let inner = &*self.inner.lock();
         let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(public_key.kind()) else {
-            veilid_log!(self debug "can't handle route with public key: {:?}", public_key);
-            return None;
-        };
 
-        let Some(rsid) = inner.content.get_id_by_key(public_key.ref_value()) else {
+        let Some(rsid) = inner.content.get_id_by_key(public_key) else {
             veilid_log!(self debug target: "network_result", "route id does not exist: {:?}", public_key.ref_value());
             return None;
         };
@@ -710,7 +705,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             veilid_log!(self debug "route detail does not exist: {:?}", rsid);
             return None;
         };
-        let Some(rsd) = rssd.get_route_by_key(public_key.ref_value()) else {
+        let Some(rsd) = rssd.get_route_by_key(public_key) else {
             veilid_log!(self debug "route set {:?} does not have key: {:?}", rsid, public_key.ref_value());
             return None;
         };
@@ -723,28 +718,35 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
         }
         // Validate signatures to ensure the route was handled by the nodes and not messed with
         // This is in private route (reverse) order as we are receiving over the route
-        for (hop_n, hop_node_id) in rsd.hops.iter().rev().enumerate() {
+        for (hop_n, hop_node_ref) in rssd.hop_node_refs().iter().rev().enumerate() {
             // The last hop is not signed, as the whole packet is signed
             if hop_n == signatures.len() {
                 // Verify the node we received the routed operation from is the last hop in our route
-                if hop_node_id != last_hop_id {
-                    veilid_log!(self debug "received routed operation from the wrong hop ({} should be {}) on private route {}", hop_node_id, last_hop_id, public_key);
+                if !hop_node_ref.node_ids().contains(last_hop_id) {
+                    veilid_log!(self debug "received routed operation from the wrong hop ({} should be {}) on private route {}", hop_node_ref, last_hop_id, public_key);
                     return None;
                 }
             } else {
+                let Some(hop_public_key) = hop_node_ref
+                    .public_keys(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+                    .get(signatures[hop_n].kind())
+                else {
+                    veilid_log!(self debug "no hop public key matching signature kind {} at hop {} for routed operation on private route {}", signatures[hop_n].kind(), hop_n, public_key);
+                    return None;
+                };
                 // Verify a signature for a hop node along the route
-                match vcrypto.verify(
-                    &hop_node_id.ref_value().clone().into(),
-                    data,
-                    signatures[hop_n].ref_value(),
-                ) {
+                let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(hop_public_key.kind()) else {
+                    veilid_log!(self debug "can't handle route hop with public key: {:?}", hop_public_key.kind());
+                    return None;
+                };
+                match vcrypto.verify(&hop_public_key, data, &signatures[hop_n]) {
                     Ok(true) => {}
                     Ok(false) => {
-                        veilid_log!(self debug "invalid signature for hop {} at {} on private route {}", hop_n, hop_node_id, public_key);
+                        veilid_log!(self debug "invalid signature for hop {} at {} on private route {}", hop_n, hop_node_ref, public_key);
                         return None;
                     }
                     Err(e) => {
-                        veilid_log!(self debug "error verifying signature for hop {} at {} on private route {}: {}", hop_n, hop_node_id, public_key, e);
+                        veilid_log!(self debug "error verifying signature for hop {} at {} on private route {}: {}", hop_n, hop_node_ref, public_key, e);
                         return None;
                     }
                 }
@@ -773,7 +775,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                 };
                 // Get the hops so we can match the route's hop length for safety
                 // route length as well as marking nodes as unreliable if this fails
-                let hops = rssd.hops_node_refs();
+                let hops = rssd.hop_node_refs();
                 (key, hops)
             };
 
@@ -952,7 +954,10 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                 && rssd.hop_count() >= min_hop_count
                 && rssd.hop_count() <= max_hop_count
                 && rssd.get_directions().is_superset(directions)
-                && rssd.get_route_set_keys().kinds().contains(&crypto_kind)
+                && rssd
+                    .get_route_set_keys()
+                    .iter()
+                    .any(|x| x.kind() == crypto_kind)
                 && !rssd.is_published()
                 && !rssd.contains_nodes(avoid_nodes)
             {
@@ -1072,7 +1077,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
         let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
             apibail_generic!("crypto not supported for route");
         };
-        let pr_pubkey = private_route.public_key.value();
+        let pr_pubkey = private_route.public_key.clone();
 
         // See if we are using a safety route, if not, short circuit this operation
         let safety_spec = match safety_selection {
@@ -1114,7 +1119,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                         routing_table.public_key(crypto_kind),
                         private_route,
                     ),
-                    secret: routing_table.secret_key(crypto_kind).value(),
+                    secret: routing_table.secret_key(crypto_kind),
                     first_hop,
                 });
             }
@@ -1209,12 +1214,42 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             // Each loop mutates 'nonce', and 'blob_data'
             let mut nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce();
             // Forward order (safety route), but inside-out
-            for h in (1..safety_rsd.hops.len()).rev() {
+            for h in (1..safety_rssd.hop_node_refs().len()).rev() {
+                let hop_node_ref = safety_rssd.hop_node_ref(h).unwrap();
+                let Some(hop_node_id) = hop_node_ref.locked(rti).node_ids().get(crypto_kind) else {
+                    apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                        "no hop node id for route hop",
+                        "crypto_kind",
+                        crypto_kind
+                    );
+                };
+                let Some(hop_public_key) = hop_node_ref
+                    .locked(rti)
+                    .public_keys(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+                    .get(crypto_kind)
+                else {
+                    apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                        "no hop public key for route hop",
+                        "crypto_kind",
+                        crypto_kind
+                    );
+                };
+                let Some(hop_peer_info) = hop_node_ref
+                    .locked(rti)
+                    .get_peer_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+                else {
+                    apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                        "no hop peer info for route hop",
+                        "crypto_kind",
+                        crypto_kind
+                    );
+                };
+
                 // Get blob to encrypt for next hop
                 blob_data = {
                     // Encrypt the previous blob ENC(nonce, DH(PKhop,SKsr))
                     let dh_secret = vcrypto
-                        .cached_dh(&safety_rsd.hops[h].value().into(), &safety_rsd.secret_key)
+                        .cached_dh(&hop_public_key, &safety_rsd.secret_key)
                         .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
                     let enc_msg_data = vcrypto
                         .encrypt_aead(blob_data.as_slice(), &nonce, &dh_secret, None)
@@ -1230,21 +1265,10 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                     let route_hop = RouteHop {
                         node: if optimize {
                             // Optimized, no peer info, just the dht key
-                            RouteNode::NodeId(safety_rsd.hops[h].clone())
+                            RouteNode::NodeId(hop_node_id)
                         } else {
                             // Full peer info, required until we are sure the route has been fully established
-                            let node_id = safety_rsd.hops[h].clone();
-                            let pi = rti
-                                .with_node_entry(node_id, |entry| {
-                                    entry.with(rti, |_rti, e| {
-                                        e.get_peer_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
-                                    })
-                                })
-                                .flatten();
-                            if pi.is_none() {
-                                apibail_internal!("peer info should exist for route but doesn't");
-                            }
-                            RouteNode::PeerInfo(pi.unwrap())
+                            RouteNode::PeerInfo(hop_peer_info)
                         },
                         next_hop: Some(route_hop_data),
                     };
@@ -1265,8 +1289,21 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             }
 
             // Encode first RouteHopData
+            let hop_node_ref = safety_rssd.hop_node_ref(0).unwrap();
+            let Some(hop_public_key) = hop_node_ref
+                .locked(rti)
+                .public_keys(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+                .get(crypto_kind)
+            else {
+                apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                    "no hop public key for route hop",
+                    "crypto_kind",
+                    crypto_kind
+                );
+            };
+
             let dh_secret = vcrypto
-                .cached_dh(&safety_rsd.hops[0].value().into(), &safety_rsd.secret_key)
+                .cached_dh(&hop_public_key, &safety_rsd.secret_key)
                 .map_err(VeilidAPIError::internal)?;
             let enc_msg_data = vcrypto
                 .encrypt_aead(blob_data.as_slice(), &nonce, &dh_secret, None)
@@ -1282,7 +1319,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         // Build safety route
         let safety_route = SafetyRoute {
-            public_key: PublicKey::new(crypto_kind, sr_pubkey.clone()),
+            public_key: sr_pubkey,
             hops,
         };
 
@@ -1315,7 +1352,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
         safety_spec: &SafetySpec,
         direction: DirectionSet,
         avoid_nodes: &[NodeId],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey> {
         // Ensure the total hop count isn't too long for our config
         let max_route_hop_count = self.max_route_hop_count;
         if safety_spec.hop_count == 0 {
@@ -1340,7 +1377,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                 if let Some(preferred_key) = preferred_rssd.get_route_set_keys().get(crypto_kind) {
                     // Only use the preferred route if it doesn't contain the avoid nodes
                     if !preferred_rssd.contains_nodes(avoid_nodes) {
-                        return Ok(preferred_key.value());
+                        return Ok(preferred_key);
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -1378,8 +1415,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             .unwrap()
             .get_route_set_keys()
             .get(crypto_kind)
-            .unwrap()
-            .value();
+            .unwrap();
 
         Ok(sr_pubkey)
     }
@@ -1391,7 +1427,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
         crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
         safety_spec: &SafetySpec,
         avoid_nodes: &[NodeId],
-    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<BarePublicKey> {
+    ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PublicKey> {
         let inner = &mut *self.inner.lock();
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
         let rti = &mut *routing_table.inner.write();
@@ -1408,8 +1444,9 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
     fn assemble_private_route_inner(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
         rsd: &RouteSpecDetail,
+        rssd: &RouteSetSpecDetail,
         optimized: bool,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PrivateRoute> {
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
@@ -1417,12 +1454,9 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         // Ensure we get the crypto for it
         let crypto = routing_table.network_manager().crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(rsd.crypto_kind) else {
-            apibail_invalid_argument!(
-                "crypto not supported for route",
-                "rsd.crypto_kind",
-                rsd.crypto_kind
-            );
+        let crypto_kind = key.kind();
+        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
+            apibail_invalid_argument!("crypto not supported for route", "crypto_kind", crypto_kind);
         };
 
         // Ensure our network class is valid before attempting to assemble any routes
@@ -1434,11 +1468,11 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
         // Make innermost route hop to our own node
         let mut route_hop = RouteHop {
             node: if optimized {
-                let Some(node_id) = routing_table.node_ids().get(rsd.crypto_kind) else {
+                let Some(node_id) = routing_table.node_ids().get(crypto_kind) else {
                     apibail_invalid_argument!(
                         "missing node id for crypto kind",
-                        "rsd.crypto_kind",
-                        rsd.crypto_kind
+                        "crypto_kind",
+                        crypto_kind
                     );
                 };
                 RouteNode::NodeId(node_id)
@@ -1448,10 +1482,37 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             next_hop: None,
         };
 
-        // Loop for each hop
-        let hop_count = rsd.hops.len();
-        // iterate hops in private route order (reverse, but inside out)
-        for h in 0..hop_count {
+        // Iterate hops in private route order (reverse, but inside out)
+        for hop_node_ref in rssd.hop_node_refs() {
+            let hop_node_ref = hop_node_ref.locked(rti);
+
+            let Some(hop_node_id) = hop_node_ref.node_ids().get(crypto_kind) else {
+                apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                    "no hop node id for route hop",
+                    "crypto_kind",
+                    crypto_kind
+                );
+            };
+            let Some(hop_public_key) = hop_node_ref
+                .public_keys(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+                .get(crypto_kind)
+            else {
+                apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                    "no hop public key for route hop",
+                    "crypto_kind",
+                    crypto_kind
+                );
+            };
+            let Some(hop_peer_info) = hop_node_ref.get_peer_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
+            else {
+                apibail_invalid_argument!(
+                    "no hop peer info for route hop",
+                    "crypto_kind",
+                    crypto_kind
+                );
+            };
+
+            // Encrypt the previous blob ENC(nonce, DH(PKhop,SKpr))
             let nonce = vcrypto.random_nonce();
 
             let blob_data = {
@@ -1461,8 +1522,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
                 message_builder_to_vec(rh_message)?
             };
 
-            // Encrypt the previous blob ENC(nonce, DH(PKhop,SKpr))
-            let dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&rsd.hops[h].value().into(), &rsd.secret_key)?;
+            let dh_secret = vcrypto.cached_dh(&hop_public_key, &rsd.secret_key)?;
             let enc_msg_data =
                 vcrypto.encrypt_aead(blob_data.as_slice(), &nonce, &dh_secret, None)?;
             let route_hop_data = RouteHopData {
@@ -1473,28 +1533,17 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             route_hop = RouteHop {
                 node: if optimized {
                     // Optimized, no peer info, just the dht key
-                    RouteNode::NodeId(rsd.hops[h].clone())
+                    RouteNode::NodeId(hop_node_id)
                 } else {
                     // Full peer info, required until we are sure the route has been fully established
-                    let node_id = rsd.hops[h].clone();
-                    let pi = rti
-                        .with_node_entry(node_id, |entry| {
-                            entry.with(rti, |_rti, e| {
-                                e.get_peer_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
-                            })
-                        })
-                        .flatten();
-                    if pi.is_none() {
-                        apibail_internal!("peer info should exist for route but doesn't");
-                    }
-                    RouteNode::PeerInfo(pi.unwrap())
+                    RouteNode::PeerInfo(hop_peer_info)
                 },
                 next_hop: Some(route_hop_data),
             }
         }
 
         let private_route = PrivateRoute {
-            public_key: PublicKey::new(rsd.crypto_kind, key.clone()),
+            public_key: key.clone(),
             hops: PrivateRouteHops::FirstHop(Box::new(route_hop)),
         };
         Ok(private_route)
@@ -1505,7 +1554,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "route", skip_all)]
     pub fn assemble_private_route(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
         optimized: Option<bool>,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PrivateRoute> {
         let inner: &RouteSpecStoreInner = &self.inner.lock();
@@ -1525,7 +1574,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
             .get_route_by_key(key)
             .expect("route key index is broken");
 
-        self.assemble_private_route_inner(key, rsd, optimized)
+        self.assemble_private_route_inner(key, rsd, rssd, optimized)
     }
 
     /// Assemble private route set for publication
@@ -1547,7 +1596,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         let mut out = Vec::new();
         for (key, rsd) in rssd.iter_route_set() {
-            out.push(self.assemble_private_route_inner(key, rsd, optimized)?);
+            out.push(self.assemble_private_route_inner(key, rsd, rssd, optimized)?);
         }
         Ok(out)
     }
@@ -1631,7 +1680,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     }
 
     /// Get a route id for a route's public key
-    pub fn get_route_id_for_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
+    pub fn get_route_id_for_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
         let inner = &mut *self.inner.lock();
         // Check for local route
         if let Some(id) = inner.content.get_id_by_key(key) {
@@ -1650,7 +1699,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     /// This happens when you communicate with a private route without a safety route
     pub fn has_remote_private_route_seen_our_node_info(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
         published_peer_info: &PeerInfo,
     ) -> bool {
         let inner = &*self.inner.lock();
@@ -1680,7 +1729,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     /// was that node that had the private route.
     pub fn mark_remote_private_route_seen_our_node_info(
         &self,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
+        key: &PublicKey,
         cur_ts: Timestamp,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<()> {
         let Some(our_node_info_ts) = self
@@ -1711,22 +1760,14 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
     }
 
     /// Get the route statistics for any route we know about, local or remote
-    pub fn with_route_stats_mut<F, R>(
-        &self,
-        cur_ts: Timestamp,
-        key: &BarePublicKey,
-        f: F,
-    ) -> Option<R>
+    pub fn with_route_stats_mut<F, R>(&self, cur_ts: Timestamp, key: &PublicKey, f: F) -> Option<R>
     where
         F: FnOnce(&mut RouteStats) -> R,
     {
         let inner = &mut *self.inner.lock();
 
         // Check for stub route
-        if self
-            .routing_table()
-            .matches_own_node_id_key(&key.clone().into())
-        {
+        if self.routing_table().public_keys().contains(key) {
             return None;
         }
 
@@ -1893,7 +1934,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         Ok(RouteId::new(
             vcrypto.kind(),
-            BareRouteId::new(vcrypto.generate_hash(&pkbytes).bytes()),
+            BareRouteId::new(vcrypto.generate_hash(&pkbytes).ref_value()),
         ))
     }
 
@@ -1927,7 +1968,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStore {
 
         Ok(RouteId::new(
             vcrypto.kind(),
-            BareRouteId::new(vcrypto.generate_hash(&pkbytes).bytes()),
+            BareRouteId::new(vcrypto.generate_hash(&pkbytes).ref_value()),
         ))
     }
 }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/permutation.rs

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ fn _get_route_permutation_count(hop_count: usize) -> usize {
     // hop_count = 4 -> 3! -> 6
     (3..hop_count).fold(2usize, |acc, x| acc * x)
 }
-pub type PermReturnType = (Vec<usize>, bool);
+pub type PermReturnType = (Vec<usize>, SequenceOrderingSet);
 pub type PermFunc<'t> = Box<dyn FnMut(&[usize]) -> Option<PermReturnType> + Send + 't>;
 
 /// get the route permutation at particular 'perm' index, starting at the 'start' index

veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/route_set_spec_detail.rs

@@ -2,18 +2,16 @@ use super::*;
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RouteSpecDetail {
-    /// Crypto kind
-    pub crypto_kind: CryptoKind,
     /// Secret key
-    pub secret_key: BareSecretKey,
-    /// Route hops (node id keys)
+    pub secret_key: SecretKey,
+    /// Route hop node ids
     pub hops: Vec<NodeId>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RouteSetSpecDetail {
-    /// Route set per crypto kind
-    route_set: BTreeMap<BarePublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>,
+    /// Routes in the set
+    route_set: BTreeMap<PublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>,
     /// Route noderefs
     #[serde(skip)]
     hop_node_refs: Vec<NodeRef>,
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ pub struct RouteSetSpecDetail {
     /// Stability preference (prefer reliable nodes over faster)
     stability: Stability,
     /// Sequencing capability (connection oriented protocols vs datagram)
-    can_do_sequenced: bool,
+    orderings: SequenceOrderingSet,
     /// Stats
     stats: RouteStats,
     /// Automatically allocated route vs manually allocated route
@@ -36,11 +34,11 @@ pub struct RouteSetSpecDetail {
 impl RouteSetSpecDetail {
     pub fn new(
         cur_ts: Timestamp,
-        route_set: BTreeMap<BarePublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>,
+        route_set: BTreeMap<PublicKey, RouteSpecDetail>,
         hop_node_refs: Vec<NodeRef>,
         directions: DirectionSet,
         stability: Stability,
-        can_do_sequenced: bool,
+        orderings: SequenceOrderingSet,
         automatic: bool,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
@@ -49,32 +47,50 @@ impl RouteSetSpecDetail {
             published: false,
             directions,
             stability,
-            can_do_sequenced,
+            orderings,
             stats: RouteStats::new(cur_ts),
             automatic,
         }
     }
-    pub fn get_route_by_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> Option<&RouteSpecDetail> {
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+        self.route_set.len()
+    }
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.route_set.is_empty()
+    }
+    pub fn get_route_by_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> Option<&RouteSpecDetail> {
         self.route_set.get(key)
     }
     pub fn get_route_set_keys(&self) -> PublicKeyGroup {
         let mut tks = PublicKeyGroup::new();
-        for (k, v) in &self.route_set {
-            tks.add(PublicKey::new(v.crypto_kind, k.clone()));
+        for k in self.route_set.keys() {
+            tks.add(k.clone());
         }
         tks
     }
-    pub fn get_best_route_set_key(&self) -> Option<BarePublicKey> {
-        self.get_route_set_keys().best().map(|k| k.value())
+    pub fn get_best_route_set_key(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
+        self.get_route_set_keys().first().cloned()
     }
     pub fn set_hop_node_refs(&mut self, node_refs: Vec<NodeRef>) {
         self.hop_node_refs = node_refs;
     }
     pub fn iter_route_set(
         &self,
-    ) -> alloc::collections::btree_map::Iter<'_, BarePublicKey, RouteSpecDetail> {
+    ) -> alloc::collections::btree_map::Iter<'_, PublicKey, RouteSpecDetail> {
         self.route_set.iter()
     }
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn iter_route_set_mut(
+        &mut self,
+    ) -> alloc::collections::btree_map::IterMut<'_, PublicKey, RouteSpecDetail> {
+        self.route_set.iter_mut()
+    }
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
+    pub fn remove_route(&mut self, key: &PublicKey) {
+        self.route_set.remove(key);
+    }
     pub fn get_stats(&self) -> &RouteStats {
         &self.stats
     }
@@ -90,7 +106,7 @@ impl RouteSetSpecDetail {
     pub fn hop_count(&self) -> usize {
         self.hop_node_refs.len()
     }
-    pub fn hops_node_refs(&self) -> Vec<NodeRef> {
+    pub fn hop_node_refs(&self) -> Vec<NodeRef> {
         self.hop_node_refs.clone()
     }
     pub fn hop_node_ref(&self, idx: usize) -> Option<NodeRef> {
@@ -103,16 +119,17 @@ impl RouteSetSpecDetail {
         self.directions
     }
     pub fn is_sequencing_match(&self, sequencing: Sequencing) -> bool {
-        match sequencing {
-            Sequencing::NoPreference => true,
-            Sequencing::PreferOrdered => true,
-            Sequencing::EnsureOrdered => self.can_do_sequenced,
+        for ordering in self.orderings.iter() {
+            if sequencing.matches_ordering(ordering) {
+                return true;
+            }
         }
+        false
     }
     pub fn contains_nodes(&self, nodes: &[NodeId]) -> bool {
         for tk in nodes {
             for rsd in self.route_set.values() {
-                if rsd.crypto_kind == tk.kind() && rsd.hops.contains(tk) {
+                if rsd.hops.contains(tk) {
                     return true;
                 }
             }
@@ -122,23 +139,15 @@ impl RouteSetSpecDetail {
     pub fn is_automatic(&self) -> bool {
         self.automatic
     }
-
     /// Generate a key for the cache that can be used to uniquely identify this route's contents
-    pub fn make_cache_key(&self, rti: &RoutingTableInner) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    pub fn make_cache_key(&self, rti: &RoutingTableInner) -> Vec<u8> {
         let hops = &self.hop_node_refs;
-
-        let mut cachelen = 0usize;
-        let mut nodebytes = Vec::<BareNodeId>::with_capacity(hops.len());
+        let mut cache: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(hops.len() * 32); // xxx hack: this code is going away soon anyway
         for hop in hops {
-            let b = hop.locked(rti).best_node_id()?.value();
-            cachelen += b.len();
-            nodebytes.push(b);
+            if let Some(b) = hop.locked(rti).best_node_id() {
+                cache.extend_from_slice(b.ref_value());
+            }
         }
-        let mut cache: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(cachelen);
-        for b in nodebytes {
-            cache.extend_from_slice(&b);
-        }
-
-        Some(cache)
+        cache
     }
 }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/route_spec_store_cache.rs

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ impl_veilid_log_facility!("rtab");
 // Compiled route key for caching
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
 struct CompiledRouteCacheKey {
-    sr_pubkey: BarePublicKey,
-    pr_pubkey: BarePublicKey,
+    sr_pubkey: PublicKey,
+    pr_pubkey: PublicKey,
 }
 
 /// Compiled route (safety route + private route)
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub struct CompiledRoute {
     /// The safety route attached to the private route
     pub safety_route: SafetyRoute,
     /// The secret used to encrypt the message payload
-    pub secret: BareSecretKey,
+    pub secret: SecretKey,
     /// The node ref to the first hop in the compiled route
     /// filtered to the safetyselection it was compiled with
     pub first_hop: FilteredNodeRef,
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ pub struct RouteSpecStoreCache {
     /// Remote private routes we've imported and statistics
     remote_private_route_set_cache: LruCache<RouteId, RemotePrivateRouteInfo>,
     /// Remote private route ids indexed by route's public key
-    remote_private_routes_by_key: HashMap<BarePublicKey, RouteId>,
+    remote_private_routes_by_key: HashMap<PublicKey, RouteId>,
     /// Compiled route cache
     compiled_route_cache: LruCache<CompiledRouteCacheKey, SafetyRoute>,
     /// List of dead allocated routes
@@ -62,9 +62,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
 
     /// add an allocated route set to our cache via its cache key
     pub fn add_to_cache(&mut self, rti: &RoutingTableInner, rssd: &RouteSetSpecDetail) {
-        let Some(cache_key) = rssd.make_cache_key(rti) else {
-            panic!("all routes should have a cache key");
-        };
+        let cache_key = rssd.make_cache_key(rti);
         if !self.hop_cache.insert(cache_key) {
             panic!("route should never be inserted twice");
         }
@@ -94,9 +92,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
         id: RouteId,
         rssd: &RouteSetSpecDetail,
     ) -> bool {
-        let Some(cache_key) = rssd.make_cache_key(rti) else {
-            panic!("all routes should have a cache key");
-        };
+        let cache_key = rssd.make_cache_key(rti);
 
         // Remove from hop cache
         if !self.hop_cache.remove(&cache_key) {
@@ -161,7 +157,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
         // also store in id by key table
         for private_route in rprinfo.get_private_routes() {
             self.remote_private_routes_by_key
-                .insert(private_route.public_key.value(), id.clone());
+                .insert(private_route.public_key.clone(), id.clone());
         }
 
         let mut dead = None;
@@ -179,9 +175,9 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
             for dead_private_route in dead_rpri.get_private_routes() {
                 let _ = self
                     .remote_private_routes_by_key
-                    .remove(dead_private_route.public_key.ref_value())
+                    .remove(&dead_private_route.public_key)
                     .unwrap();
-                self.invalidate_compiled_route_cache(dead_private_route.public_key.ref_value());
+                self.invalidate_compiled_route_cache(&dead_private_route.public_key);
             }
             self.dead_remote_routes.push(dead_id);
         }
@@ -265,7 +261,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
     }
 
     /// look up a remote private route id by one of the route public keys
-    pub fn get_remote_private_route_id_by_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
+    pub fn get_remote_private_route_id_by_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
         self.remote_private_routes_by_key.get(key).cloned()
     }
 
@@ -307,22 +303,18 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
         for private_route in rprinfo.get_private_routes() {
             let _ = self
                 .remote_private_routes_by_key
-                .remove(private_route.public_key.ref_value())
+                .remove(&private_route.public_key)
                 .unwrap();
-            self.invalidate_compiled_route_cache(private_route.public_key.ref_value());
+            self.invalidate_compiled_route_cache(&private_route.public_key);
         }
         self.dead_remote_routes.push(id);
         true
     }
 
     /// Stores a compiled 'safety + private' route so we don't have to compile it again later
-    pub fn add_to_compiled_route_cache(
-        &mut self,
-        pr_pubkey: BarePublicKey,
-        safety_route: SafetyRoute,
-    ) {
+    pub fn add_to_compiled_route_cache(&mut self, pr_pubkey: PublicKey, safety_route: SafetyRoute) {
         let key = CompiledRouteCacheKey {
-            sr_pubkey: safety_route.public_key.value(),
+            sr_pubkey: safety_route.public_key.clone(),
             pr_pubkey: pr_pubkey.clone(),
         };
 
@@ -334,8 +326,8 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
     /// Looks up an existing compiled route from the safety and private route components
     pub fn lookup_compiled_route_cache(
         &mut self,
-        sr_pubkey: BarePublicKey,
-        pr_pubkey: BarePublicKey,
+        sr_pubkey: PublicKey,
+        pr_pubkey: PublicKey,
     ) -> Option<SafetyRoute> {
         let key = CompiledRouteCacheKey {
             sr_pubkey,
@@ -345,7 +337,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreCache {
     }
 
     /// When routes are dropped, they should be removed from the compiled route cache
-    fn invalidate_compiled_route_cache(&mut self, dead_key: &BarePublicKey) {
+    fn invalidate_compiled_route_cache(&mut self, dead_key: &PublicKey) {
         let mut dead_entries = Vec::new();
         for (k, _v) in self.compiled_route_cache.iter() {
             if k.sr_pubkey == *dead_key || k.pr_pubkey == *dead_key {

veilid-core/src/routing_table/route_spec_store/route_spec_store_content.rs

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use super::*;
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub(super) struct RouteSpecStoreContent {
     /// All of the route sets we have allocated so far indexed by key (many to one)
-    id_by_key: HashMap<BarePublicKey, RouteId>,
+    id_by_key: HashMap<PublicKey, RouteId>,
     /// All of the route sets we have allocated so far
     details: HashMap<RouteId, RouteSetSpecDetail>,
 }
@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreContent {
             // Apply noderefs
             rssd.set_hop_node_refs(hop_node_refs);
         }
+
         for id in dead_ids {
-            veilid_log!(table_store trace "no entry, killing off private route: {}", id);
+            veilid_log!(table_store trace "no entry, killing route set: {}", id);
             content.remove_detail(&id);
         }
 
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ impl RouteSpecStoreContent {
     pub fn get_detail_mut(&mut self, id: &RouteId) -> Option<&mut RouteSetSpecDetail> {
         self.details.get_mut(id)
     }
-    pub fn get_id_by_key(&self, key: &BarePublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
+    pub fn get_id_by_key(&self, key: &PublicKey) -> Option<RouteId> {
         self.id_by_key.get(key).cloned()
     }
     // pub fn iter_ids(&self) -> std::collections::hash_map::Keys<RouteId, RouteSetSpecDetail> {

veilid-core/src/routing_table/routing_table_inner/mod.rs

@@ -840,6 +840,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
     }
 
     /// Resolve an existing routing table entry and call a function on its entry without using a noderef
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn with_node_entry<F, R>(&self, node_id: NodeId, f: F) -> Option<R>
     where
         F: FnOnce(Arc<BucketEntry>) -> R,
@@ -886,7 +887,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
         let node_info = peer_info.node_info();
         let relay_ids = node_info.relay_ids();
         let node_ids = peer_info.node_ids().clone();
-        if node_ids.contains_any(&relay_ids) {
+        if node_ids.contains_any_from_slice(&relay_ids) {
             bail!("node can not be its own relay");
         }
 
@@ -972,7 +973,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
                     "routing domains should be the same here",
                 );
                 let mut node_ids = old_pi.node_ids().clone();
-                node_ids.add_all(new_pi.node_ids());
+                node_ids.add_all_from_slice(new_pi.node_ids());
                 (new_pi.routing_domain(), node_ids)
             }
         };
@@ -986,7 +987,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
                 .iter()
                 .flat_map(|rdr| rdr.relay_node.locked(rti).node_ids().to_vec())
                 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-            if node_ids.contains_any(&our_relay_node_ids) {
+            if node_ids.contains_any_from_slice(&our_relay_node_ids) {
                 rd.refresh();
                 rd.publish_peer_info(rti);
             }
@@ -1102,6 +1103,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
+    #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub fn transform_to_peer_info(
         &self,
         routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
@@ -1260,7 +1262,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
     pub fn find_preferred_closest_nodes<T, O>(
         &self,
         node_count: usize,
-        hash_coordinate: HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         mut filters: VecDeque<RoutingTableEntryFilter>,
         transform: T,
     ) -> VeilidAPIResult<Vec<O>>
@@ -1272,10 +1274,6 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
 
         // Get the crypto kind
         let crypto_kind = hash_coordinate.kind();
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
-            apibail_generic!("invalid crypto kind");
-        };
 
         // Filter to ensure entries support the crypto kind in use
         // always filter out dead and punished nodes
@@ -1334,14 +1332,14 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
             };
 
             // distance is the next metric, closer nodes first
-            let da = vcrypto.distance(
-                &BareHashDigest::from(a_key.value()),
-                hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-            );
-            let db = vcrypto.distance(
-                &BareHashDigest::from(b_key.value()),
-                hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-            );
+            let da = a_key
+                .ref_value()
+                .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+                .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
+            let db = b_key
+                .ref_value()
+                .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+                .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
             da.cmp(&db)
         };
 
@@ -1354,11 +1352,11 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
     #[instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
     pub fn sort_and_clean_closest_noderefs(
         &self,
-        node_id: HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         closest_nodes: &[NodeRef],
     ) -> Vec<NodeRef> {
         // Lock all noderefs
-        let kind = node_id.kind();
+        let kind = hash_coordinate.kind();
         let mut closest_nodes_locked: Vec<LockedNodeRef> = closest_nodes
             .iter()
             .filter_map(|nr| {
@@ -1372,8 +1370,7 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
             .collect();
 
         // Sort closest
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let sort = make_closest_noderef_sort(&crypto, node_id);
+        let sort = make_closest_noderef_sort(hash_coordinate);
         closest_nodes_locked.sort_by(sort);
 
         // Unlock noderefs
@@ -1530,14 +1527,10 @@ impl RoutingTableInner {
     }
 }
 
-#[instrument(level = "trace", skip_all)]
-pub fn make_closest_noderef_sort<'a>(
-    crypto: &'a Crypto,
-    hash_coordinate: HashDigest,
-) -> impl Fn(&LockedNodeRef, &LockedNodeRef) -> core::cmp::Ordering + 'a {
+pub fn make_closest_noderef_sort(
+    hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
+) -> impl Fn(&LockedNodeRef, &LockedNodeRef) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
     let kind = hash_coordinate.kind();
-    // Get cryptoversion to check distance with
-    let vcrypto = crypto.get(kind).unwrap();
 
     move |a: &LockedNodeRef, b: &LockedNodeRef| -> core::cmp::Ordering {
         // same nodes are always the same
@@ -1552,38 +1545,42 @@ pub fn make_closest_noderef_sort<'a>(
                 let b_key = b_entry.node_ids().get(kind).unwrap();
 
                 // distance is the next metric, closer nodes first
-                let da = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(a_key.value()),
-                    hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-                );
-                let db = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(b_key.value()),
-                    hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-                );
+                let da = a_key
+                    .ref_value()
+                    .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+                    .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
+                let db = b_key
+                    .ref_value()
+                    .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+                    .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
                 da.cmp(&db)
             })
         })
     }
 }
 
-pub fn make_closest_node_id_sort(
-    crypto: &Crypto,
-    hash_coordinate: HashDigest,
-) -> impl Fn(&BareNodeId, &BareNodeId) -> core::cmp::Ordering + '_ {
-    let kind = hash_coordinate.kind();
-    // Get cryptoversion to check distance with
-    let vcrypto = crypto.get(kind).unwrap();
-
+pub fn make_closest_bare_node_id_sort(
+    bare_hash_coordinate: BareHashCoordinate,
+) -> impl Fn(&BareNodeId, &BareNodeId) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
     move |a: &BareNodeId, b: &BareNodeId| -> core::cmp::Ordering {
-        // distance is the next metric, closer nodes first
-        let da = vcrypto.distance(
-            &BareHashDigest::from(a.bytes()),
-            hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-        );
-        let db = vcrypto.distance(
-            &BareHashDigest::from(b.bytes()),
-            hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-        );
+        let da = a.to_bare_hash_coordinate().distance(&bare_hash_coordinate);
+        let db = b.to_bare_hash_coordinate().distance(&bare_hash_coordinate);
+        da.cmp(&db)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn make_closest_node_id_sort(
+    hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
+) -> impl Fn(&NodeId, &NodeId) -> core::cmp::Ordering {
+    move |a: &NodeId, b: &NodeId| -> core::cmp::Ordering {
+        let da = a
+            .ref_value()
+            .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+            .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
+        let db = b
+            .ref_value()
+            .to_bare_hash_coordinate()
+            .distance(hash_coordinate.ref_value());
         da.cmp(&db)
     }
 }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/routing_table_inner/routing_domains/mod.rs

@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ pub trait RoutingDomainDetail {
     ) -> ContactMethod;
 
     // Bootstrap peers
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
     fn get_bootstrap_peers(&self) -> Vec<NodeRef>;
     fn clear_bootstrap_peers(&self);
     fn add_bootstrap_peer(&self, bootstrap_peer: NodeRef);

veilid-core/src/routing_table/routing_table_inner/routing_domains/public_internet/mod.rs

@@ -69,7 +69,10 @@ impl PublicInternetRoutingDomainDetail {
             // Note that relay_peer_info could be node_a, in which case a connection already exists
             // and we only get here if the connection had dropped, in which case node_a is unreachable until
             // it gets a new relay connection up
-            if node_b_relay.node_ids().contains_any(ctx.peer_a.node_ids()) {
+            if node_b_relay
+                .node_ids()
+                .contains_any_from_slice(ctx.peer_a.node_ids())
+            {
                 return Some(ContactMethod::Existing);
             }
 
@@ -163,7 +166,10 @@ impl PublicInternetRoutingDomainDetail {
         // Note that relay_peer_info could be node_a, in which case a connection already exists
         // and we only get here if the connection had dropped, in which case node_b is unreachable until
         // it gets a new relay connection up
-        if node_b_relay.node_ids().contains_any(ctx.peer_a.node_ids()) {
+        if node_b_relay
+            .node_ids()
+            .contains_any_from_slice(ctx.peer_a.node_ids())
+        {
             return Some(ContactMethod::Existing);
         }
 

veilid-core/src/routing_table/routing_table_inner/routing_domains/relay_status.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ pub struct RelayStatus {
     /// All protocol/address types requiring inbound relays for this node
     pub need_relay_protocols: HashSet<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>,
     /// Ordering modes we still need for relaying, per address type
-    pub need_relay_orderings: HashSet<(bool, AddressType)>,
+    pub need_relay_orderings: HashSet<(SequenceOrdering, AddressType)>,
     /// All protocol/address types we can offer inbound relaying for from this node
     #[expect(dead_code)]
     pub can_relay_protocols: HashSet<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>,
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
         let ordering_modes = node_info
             .outbound_protocols()
             .iter()
-            .map(|x| x.is_ordered())
+            .map(|x| x.sequence_ordering())
             .collect::<HashSet<_>>();
 
         // Get the dial info list in preferred deterministic order
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
         for at in AddressTypeSet::all() {
             for pt in ProtocolTypeSet::all() {
                 // if we can't use this protocol because we don't have its ordering mode enabled at all, then we should exclude it
-                if !ordering_modes.contains(&pt.is_ordered()) {
+                if !ordering_modes.contains(&pt.sequence_ordering()) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
                     can_relay_protocols.insert((pt, at));
 
                     // Note the relay ordering
-                    need_relay_orderings.remove(&(pt.is_ordered(), at));
+                    need_relay_orderings.remove(&(pt.sequence_ordering(), at));
                 }
 
                 if needs_hairpin_nat_support || !direct_did_protoaddrs.contains(&(pt, at)) {
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
         // Determine for this relay, if there are dialinfo that are reachable with our node's
         // dialinfo filter, and which ordering modes can be satisfied by those flows
 
-        let mut possible_ordering_modes = HashSet::<bool>::new();
+        let mut possible_ordering_modes = SequenceOrderingSet::new();
         for did in &dial_info_list {
             if did.class.requires_signal() {
                 continue;
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
             // If this dial info can be contacted directly, then it can be used for receiving
             // relaying and satsifying an ordering mode
             if did.dial_info.matches_filter(&self.dial_info_filter) {
-                possible_ordering_modes.insert(didpa.0.is_ordered());
+                possible_ordering_modes.insert(didpa.0.sequence_ordering());
             }
         }
 
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ impl RelayStatus {
 
                 // Mark this ordering mode as satisfied
                 self.need_relay_orderings
-                    .remove(&(didpa.0.is_ordered(), didpa.1));
+                    .remove(&(didpa.0.sequence_ordering(), didpa.1));
             }
         }
 
@@ -284,8 +284,8 @@ impl RelayStatus {
                 let mut add_ping = false;
 
                 // See if we should add the ping for ordering mode coverage
-                let is_ordered = didpa.0.is_ordered();
-                add_ping |= possible_ordering_modes.remove(&is_ordered);
+                let ordering = didpa.0.sequence_ordering();
+                add_ping |= possible_ordering_modes.remove(ordering);
 
                 // See if we should add the ping for low level port mapping coverage
                 if let Some((llpt, port)) = self

veilid-core/src/routing_table/routing_table_inner/routing_domains/relay_status.rs.orig

@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
-use super::*;
-
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct RelayPing {
-    pub node_ref: FilteredNodeRef,
-}
-
-impl PartialEq for RelayPing {
-    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
-        self.node_ref.equivalent(&other.node_ref)
-    }
-}
-
-impl Eq for RelayPing {}
-
-/// The current node's relaying capabilities and requirements
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
-pub struct RelayStatus {
-    /// Routing domain this is for
-    pub routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
-    /// Low level port info for this node
-    /// This is which ports are mapped externally that we may need keepalive pings for
-    pub low_level_port_info: LowLevelPortInfo,
-    /// This node's outbound dial info filter
-    /// Used to determine if a relay's dialinfo is directly reachable
-    pub dial_info_filter: DialInfoFilter,
-    /// All protocol/address types requiring inbound relays for this node
-    pub need_relay_protocols: HashSet<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>,
-    /// Ordering modes we still need for relaying, per address type
-    pub need_relay_orderings: HashSet<(bool, AddressType)>,
-    /// All protocol/address types we can offer inbound relaying for from this node
-    #[expect(dead_code)]
-    pub can_relay_protocols: HashSet<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>,
-    /// All the low level protocols and ports that require nat keepalive pings
-    pub wants_nat_keepalives: LowLevelProtocolPorts,
-    /// All of the relays and their configuration currently included in our status
-    pub relays: Vec<RoutingDomainRelay>,
-}
-
-impl RelayStatus {
-    pub fn new_from_routing_domain_detail(
-        rdd: &dyn RoutingDomainDetail,
-        needs_hairpin_nat_support: bool,
-    ) -> Self {
-        // Make temporary nodeinfo without relay info or keys
-        let node_info = NodeInfo::new(
-            Timestamp::now(),
-            VALID_ENVELOPE_VERSIONS.to_vec(),
-            vec![],
-            rdd.capabilities(),
-            rdd.outbound_protocols(),
-            rdd.address_types(),
-            rdd.dial_info_details().clone(),
-            vec![],
-        );
-
-        Self::new_from_node_info(rdd.routing_domain(), &node_info, needs_hairpin_nat_support)
-    }
-
-    fn new_from_node_info(
-        routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
-        node_info: &NodeInfo,
-        needs_hairpin_nat_support: bool,
-    ) -> Self {
-        let low_level_port_info = node_info.get_low_level_port_info();
-        let dial_info_filter = DialInfoFilter::all()
-            .with_protocol_type_set(node_info.outbound_protocols())
-            .with_address_type_set(node_info.address_types());
-
-        // Determine ordering modes we need relaying for
-        let ordering_modes = node_info
-            .outbound_protocols()
-            .iter()
-            .map(|x| x.is_ordered())
-            .collect::<HashSet<_>>();
-
-        // Get the dial info list in preferred deterministic order
-        let mut dial_info_list = node_info.dial_info_detail_list().to_vec();
-        dial_info_list.sort_by(DialInfoDetail::ordered_sequencing_sort);
-
-        // Figure out which dial info combinations we have that are direct-capable
-        let mut direct_did_protoaddrs = HashSet::<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>::new();
-        let mut wants_nat_keepalives = LowLevelProtocolPorts::new();
-        for did in dial_info_list {
-            if !did.class.requires_signal() {
-                direct_did_protoaddrs
-                    .insert((did.dial_info.protocol_type(), did.dial_info.address_type()));
-            }
-            if did.class.wants_nat_keepalive() {
-                wants_nat_keepalives.insert((
-                    did.dial_info.protocol_type().low_level_protocol_type(),
-                    did.dial_info.address_type(),
-                    did.dial_info.port(),
-                ));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Calculate which address/protocol type combinations we require
-        // relays for, and which we can offer relay support for
-        let mut need_relay_protocols = HashSet::<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>::new();
-        let mut can_relay_protocols = HashSet::<(ProtocolType, AddressType)>::new();
-        for at in AddressTypeSet::all() {
-            for pt in ProtocolTypeSet::all() {
-                // if we can't use this protocol because we don't have its ordering mode enabled at all, then we should exclude it
-                if !ordering_modes.contains(&pt.is_ordered()) {
-                    continue;
-                }
-
-                if direct_did_protoaddrs.contains(&(pt, at)) {
-                    // We can relay this combination
-                    can_relay_protocols.insert((pt, at));
-                }
-
-                if needs_hairpin_nat_support || !direct_did_protoaddrs.contains(&(pt, at)) {
-                    // We can't relay this, so we must need a relay for it ourselves
-                    // Or we want to allocate a hairpin NAT relay
-                    need_relay_protocols.insert((pt, at));
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Get the ordering modes per address type we need, at a minimum, to be able to publish peer info
-        let need_relay_orderings = AddressTypeSet::all()
-            .iter()
-            .flat_map(|at| ordering_modes.iter().map(move |om| (*om, at)))
-            .collect::<HashSet<_>>();
-
-        RelayStatus {
-            routing_domain,
-            low_level_port_info,
-            dial_info_filter,
-            need_relay_protocols,
-            need_relay_orderings,
-            can_relay_protocols,
-            wants_nat_keepalives,
-            relays: vec![],
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Check if we would like more relays
-    pub fn wants_more_relays(&self) -> bool {
-        !self.need_relay_protocols.is_empty() || !self.wants_nat_keepalives.is_empty()
-    }
-
-    /// Check if we need more relays before publication
-    pub fn needs_more_relays(&self) -> bool {
-        !self.need_relay_orderings.is_empty() || !self.wants_nat_keepalives.is_empty()
-    }
-
-    /// Get the routing domain relays list when we're done
-    pub fn get_sorted_relays_list(&self) -> Vec<RoutingDomainRelay> {
-        let mut relays = self.relays.clone();
-
-        // Sort things in order of relay preference, using least-capable relays first
-        relays.sort_by(|ardr, brdr| {
-            // Get address types and protocol types to sort by
-            let mut aats = AddressTypeSet::new();
-            let mut apts = ProtocolTypeSet::new();
-            for did in &ardr.dial_info_details {
-                aats |= did.dial_info.address_type();
-                apts |= did.dial_info.protocol_type();
-            }
-
-            let mut bats = AddressTypeSet::new();
-            let mut bpts = ProtocolTypeSet::new();
-            for did in &brdr.dial_info_details {
-                bats |= did.dial_info.address_type();
-                bpts |= did.dial_info.protocol_type();
-            }
-
-            // Compare by address type set first (fewer address types is less)
-            let c = aats.len().cmp(&bats.len());
-            if c != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
-                return c;
-            }
-            for at in AddressTypeSet::all() {
-                let a = aats.contains(at);
-                let b = bats.contains(at);
-                let c = a.cmp(&b);
-                if c != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
-                    return c;
-                }
-            }
-
-            // Compare by protocol types set second (fewer protocol types is less)
-            let c = apts.len().cmp(&bpts.len());
-            if c != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
-                return c;
-            }
-            for pt in ProtocolTypeSet::all() {
-                let a = apts.contains(pt);
-                let b = bpts.contains(pt);
-                let c = a.cmp(&b);
-                if c != cmp::Ordering::Equal {
-                    return c;
-                }
-            }
-
-            // Then just compare by node id lists, so things are stable
-            let a_nodes = ardr.relay_node.node_ids().to_vec();
-            let b_nodes = brdr.relay_node.node_ids().to_vec();
-
-            a_nodes.cmp(&b_nodes)
-        });
-        relays
-    }
-
-    /// Remove a relay's capabilities from our current requirements and determine which
-    /// pings should be performed.
-    /// Returns true if the requirements changed, or false if applying the relay had no effect
-    pub fn apply_relay(&mut self, mut relay: RoutingDomainRelay) -> bool {
-        // Make sure this relay is the correct routing domain and has peer info
-        let Some(relay_peer_info) = relay.relay_node.get_peer_info(self.routing_domain) else {
-            return false;
-        };
-
-        // Clear out the dial info details and the pings because we'll add new ones
-        relay.dial_info_details.clear();
-        relay.pings.clear();
-
-        // For all for the relay's dial info, see if it matches a protocol+address type we need covered
-        let mut dial_info_list = relay_peer_info.node_info().dial_info_detail_list().to_vec();
-        dial_info_list.sort_by(DialInfoDetail::ordered_sequencing_sort);
-
-        // Determine for this relay, if there are dialinfo that are reachable with our node's
-        // dialinfo filter, and which ordering modes can be satisfied by those flows
-
-        let mut possible_ordering_modes = HashSet::<bool>::new();
-        for did in &dial_info_list {
-            if did.class.requires_signal() {
-                continue;
-            }
-            let didpa = (did.dial_info.protocol_type(), did.dial_info.address_type());
-
-            // If this dial info can be contacted directly, then it can be used for receiving
-            // relaying and satsifying an ordering mode
-            if did.dial_info.matches_filter(&self.dial_info_filter) {
-                possible_ordering_modes.insert(didpa.0.is_ordered());
-            }
-        }
-
-        // If we did not get a single ordering mode we need for relaying, then this relay is disqualified
-        // because we can't connect to it with our outbound protocols/address types directly
-        if possible_ordering_modes.is_empty() {
-            return false;
-        }
-
-        let mut useful = false;
-
-        // Determine relay dial infos we can use from this relay out of our set of needed relay combinations
-        // Builds up a set of needed ordering modes to keep flows open for the dial infos we are getting relayed
-        for did in &dial_info_list {
-            if did.class.requires_signal() {
-                continue;
-            }
-            let didpa = (did.dial_info.protocol_type(), did.dial_info.address_type());
-
-            if self.need_relay_protocols.remove(&didpa) {
-                // Still needed this protocol+address type
-                useful = true;
-
-                // Mark this dial info as one we're using
-                relay.dial_info_details.push(did.clone());
-
-                // Mark this ordering mode as needed
-                self.need_relay_orderings
-                    .remove(&(didpa.0.is_ordered(), didpa.1));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Collect pings we can use from this relay
-        for did in &dial_info_list {
-            if did.class.requires_signal() {
-                continue;
-            }
-            let didpa = (did.dial_info.protocol_type(), did.dial_info.address_type());
-
-            // If this dial info can be contacted directly, then it is a ping candidate
-            if did.dial_info.matches_filter(&self.dial_info_filter) {
-                // See if we should add this ping
-                let mut add_ping = false;
-
-                // See if we should add the ping for ordering mode coverage
-                let is_ordered = didpa.0.is_ordered();
-                add_ping |= possible_ordering_modes.remove(&is_ordered);
-
-                // See if we should add the ping for low level port mapping coverage
-                if let Some((llpt, port)) = self
-                    .low_level_port_info
-                    .protocol_to_port
-                    .get(&didpa)
-                    .copied()
-                {
-                    let wnk = (llpt, didpa.1, port);
-                    add_ping |= self.wants_nat_keepalives.remove(&wnk);
-                }
-
-                // Add the ping if we determined we could use it
-                if add_ping {
-                    relay.pings.push(RelayPing {
-                        node_ref: relay.relay_node.unfiltered().custom_filtered(
-                            NodeRefFilter::new()
-                                .with_routing_domain(self.routing_domain)
-                                .with_dial_info_filter(did.dial_info.make_filter()),
-                        ),
-                    });
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Add a relay info to our list if it turned out to be useful
-        if useful {
-            self.relays.push(relay);
-        }
-
-        useful
-    }
-}

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tasks/closest_peers_refresh.rs

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
             let noderefs = self
                 .find_preferred_closest_nodes(
                     CLOSEST_PEERS_REQUEST_COUNT,
-                    self_node_id.into(),
+                    self_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
                     filters,
                     |_rti, entry: Option<Arc<BucketEntry>>| {
                         NodeRef::new(self.registry(), entry.unwrap().clone())

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tasks/kick_buckets.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         _last_ts: Timestamp,
         cur_ts: Timestamp,
     ) -> EyreResult<()> {
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
         let kick_queue: Vec<BucketIndex> = core::mem::take(&mut *self.kick_queue.lock())
             .into_iter()
             .collect();
@@ -30,7 +29,8 @@ impl RoutingTable {
             let Some(buckets) = inner.buckets.get(&kind) else {
                 continue;
             };
-            let sort = make_closest_node_id_sort(&crypto, our_node_id.into());
+            let sort =
+                make_closest_bare_node_id_sort(our_node_id.ref_value().to_bare_hash_coordinate());
 
             let mut closest_peers = BTreeSet::<BareNodeId>::new();
             let mut closest_unreliable_count = 0usize;

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tasks/ping_validator.rs

@@ -274,10 +274,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         let ordering_modes = self
             .get_current_peer_info(RoutingDomain::PublicInternet)
             .node_info()
-            .outbound_protocols()
-            .iter()
-            .map(|x| x.is_ordered())
-            .collect::<HashSet<_>>();
+            .outbound_sequence_orderings();
 
         // Just do a single ping with the best protocol for all the other nodes to check for liveness
         for nr in node_refs {
@@ -286,11 +283,8 @@ impl RoutingTable {
 
             let all_noderefs = if nr.operate(|_rti, e| !relay_node_filter(e)) {
                 let mut nrs = vec![];
-                if ordering_modes.contains(&false) {
-                    nrs.push(nr.sequencing_clone(Sequencing::NoPreference));
-                }
-                if ordering_modes.contains(&true) {
-                    nrs.push(nr.sequencing_clone(Sequencing::EnsureOrdered));
+                for ordering in ordering_modes {
+                    nrs.push(nr.sequencing_clone(ordering.strict_sequencing()));
                 }
                 nrs
             } else {

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tasks/private_route_management.rs

@@ -194,10 +194,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
         let mut local_unpublished_route_count = 0usize;
 
         self.route_spec_store().list_allocated_routes(|_k, v| {
-            if !v.is_published()
-                && v.hop_count() == default_route_hop_count
-                && v.get_route_set_keys().kinds() == VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS
-            {
+            if !v.is_published() && v.hop_count() == default_route_hop_count {
                 local_unpublished_route_count += 1;
             }
             Option::<()>::None

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tasks/relay_management.rs

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
                     if rdr
                         .relay_node
                         .node_ids()
-                        .contains_any(outbound_relay_peerinfo.node_ids())
+                        .contains_any_from_slice(outbound_relay_peerinfo.node_ids())
                     {
                         has_outbound_relay = true;
                         true
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ impl RoutingTable {
             // Exclude any nodes that are relaying directly through us
             if own_peer_info
                 .node_ids()
-                .contains_any(&peer_info.node_info().relay_ids())
+                .contains_any_from_slice(&peer_info.node_info().relay_ids())
             {
                 return false;
             }

veilid-core/src/routing_table/tests/fixtures.rs

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ pub fn fix_typed_node_id_group(valid_kinds: bool, unknown: bool) -> NodeIdGroup
         });
     }
     if unknown {
-        tks.add(fix_typed_node_id(CryptoKind([1, 2, 3, 4]), 0));
+        tks.add(fix_typed_node_id(CryptoKind::new([1, 2, 3, 4]), 0));
     }
     tks
 }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ pub fn fix_peer_info(
 ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PeerInfo> {
     let node_info = NodeInfo::new(
         Timestamp::new(0),
-        vec![ENVELOPE_VERSION_VLD0],
+        vec![ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0],
         crypto_info_list,
         PUBLIC_INTERNET_CAPABILITIES.to_vec(),
         ProtocolTypeSet::new(),
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ pub fn fix_unsigned_peer_info(
 ) -> VeilidAPIResult<PeerInfo> {
     let node_info = NodeInfo::new(
         Timestamp::new(0),
-        vec![ENVELOPE_VERSION_VLD0],
+        vec![ENVELOPE_VERSION_ENV0],
         crypto_info_list,
         PUBLIC_INTERNET_CAPABILITIES.to_vec(),
         ProtocolTypeSet::new(),

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/hash_coordinate.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+use super::*;
+
+pub const HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH: usize = 32;
+
+// Internal types
+
+impl HashCoordinate {
+    pub(crate) fn distance(&self, other: &HashCoordinate) -> HashDistance {
+        assert_eq!(self.kind(), other.kind());
+        self.ref_value().distance(other.ref_value())
+    }
+}
+
+impl NodeId {
+    pub(crate) fn to_hash_coordinate(&self) -> HashCoordinate {
+        HashCoordinate::new(self.kind(), self.ref_value().to_bare_hash_coordinate())
+    }
+}
+impl BareNodeId {
+    pub(crate) fn to_bare_hash_coordinate(&self) -> BareHashCoordinate {
+        BareHashCoordinate::new(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl RecordKey {
+    pub(crate) fn to_hash_coordinate(&self) -> HashCoordinate {
+        HashCoordinate::new(self.kind(), self.ref_value().to_bare_hash_coordinate())
+    }
+}
+impl BareRecordKey {
+    pub(crate) fn to_bare_hash_coordinate(&self) -> BareHashCoordinate {
+        BareHashCoordinate::new(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl HashDigest {
+    pub(crate) fn to_hash_coordinate(&self) -> HashCoordinate {
+        HashCoordinate::new(self.kind(), self.ref_value().to_bare_hash_coordinate())
+    }
+}
+impl BareHashDigest {
+    pub(crate) fn to_bare_hash_coordinate(&self) -> BareHashCoordinate {
+        BareHashCoordinate::new(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl BareHashCoordinate {
+    pub(crate) fn distance(&self, other: &BareHashCoordinate) -> HashDistance {
+        assert_eq!(self.len(), HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH);
+        assert_eq!(other.len(), HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH);
+
+        let mut bytes = [0u8; HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH];
+
+        (0..HASH_COORDINATE_LENGTH).for_each(|n| {
+            bytes[n] = self[n] ^ other[n];
+        });
+
+        HashDistance::new(&bytes)
+    }
+}

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/mod.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ mod direction;
 mod events;
 #[cfg(feature = "geolocation")]
 mod geolocation_info;
+mod hash_coordinate;
 mod low_level_port_info;
 mod node_info;
 mod node_status;
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ pub use direction::*;
 pub use events::*;
 #[cfg(feature = "geolocation")]
 pub use geolocation_info::*;
+pub use hash_coordinate::*;
 pub use low_level_port_info::*;
 pub use node_info::*;
 pub use node_status::*;

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/node_info.rs

@@ -80,6 +80,13 @@ impl NodeInfo {
     pub fn outbound_protocols(&self) -> ProtocolTypeSet {
         self.outbound_protocols
     }
+    pub fn outbound_sequence_orderings(&self) -> SequenceOrderingSet {
+        self.outbound_protocols
+            .iter()
+            .map(|x| x.sequence_ordering())
+            .collect::<SequenceOrderingSet>()
+    }
+
     pub fn address_types(&self) -> AddressTypeSet {
         self.address_types
     }
@@ -240,13 +247,8 @@ impl HasDialInfoDetailList for NodeInfo {
     fn has_sequencing_matched_dial_info(&self, sequencing: Sequencing) -> bool {
         // Check our dial info
         for did in self.dial_info_detail_list() {
-            match sequencing {
-                Sequencing::NoPreference | Sequencing::PreferOrdered => return true,
-                Sequencing::EnsureOrdered => {
-                    if did.dial_info.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
-                        return true;
-                    }
-                }
+            if sequencing.matches_ordering(did.dial_info.protocol_type().sequence_ordering()) {
+                return true;
             }
         }
         // Check our relays

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/peer_info.rs

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ impl PeerInfo {
         let signatures = SignatureGroup::from(crypto.generate_signatures(
             &node_info_message,
             &keypairs,
-            |kp, sig| Signature::new(kp.kind(), sig),
+            |_kp, sig| sig,
         )?);
 
         // Extract node ids for convenience

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/relay_info.rs

@@ -89,13 +89,8 @@ impl HasDialInfoDetailList for RelayInfo {
     fn has_sequencing_matched_dial_info(&self, sequencing: Sequencing) -> bool {
         // Check our dial info
         for did in self.dial_info_detail_list() {
-            match sequencing {
-                Sequencing::NoPreference | Sequencing::PreferOrdered => return true,
-                Sequencing::EnsureOrdered => {
-                    if did.dial_info.protocol_type().is_ordered() {
-                        return true;
-                    }
-                }
+            if sequencing.matches_ordering(did.dial_info.protocol_type().sequence_ordering()) {
+                return true;
             }
         }
 

veilid-core/src/routing_table/types/veilid_capability.rs

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 use super::*;
 
 fourcc_type!(VeilidCapability);
-pub const CAP_ROUTE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"ROUT");
+pub const CAP_ROUTE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"ROUT");
 #[cfg(feature = "unstable-tunnels")]
-pub const CAP_TUNNEL: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"TUNL");
-pub const CAP_SIGNAL: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"SGNL");
-pub const CAP_RELAY: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"RLAY");
-pub const CAP_VALIDATE_DIAL_INFO: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"DIAL");
-pub const CAP_DHT: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"DHTV");
-pub const CAP_APPMESSAGE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"APPM");
+pub const CAP_TUNNEL: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"TUNL");
+pub const CAP_SIGNAL: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"SGNL");
+pub const CAP_RELAY: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"RLAY");
+pub const CAP_VALIDATE_DIAL_INFO: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"DIAL");
+pub const CAP_DHT: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"DHTV");
+pub const CAP_APPMESSAGE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"APPM");
 #[cfg(feature = "unstable-blockstore")]
-pub const CAP_BLOCKSTORE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability(*b"BLOC");
+pub const CAP_BLOCKSTORE: VeilidCapability = VeilidCapability::new(*b"BLOC");
 
 pub const DISTANCE_METRIC_CAPABILITIES: &[VeilidCapability] = &[CAP_DHT];
 pub const CONNECTIVITY_CAPABILITIES: &[VeilidCapability] =

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/answer.rs

@@ -5,14 +5,14 @@ pub struct Answer<T> {
     /// Hpw long it took to get this answer
     pub _latency: TimestampDuration,
     /// The private route requested to receive the reply
-    pub reply_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+    pub reply_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
     /// The answer itself
     pub answer: T,
 }
 impl<T> Answer<T> {
     pub fn new(
         latency: TimestampDuration,
-        reply_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+        reply_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
         answer: T,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/byte_array_types.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ macro_rules! define_typed_byte_data_coder {
                 $capnp_name: &$rust_name,
                 builder: &mut veilid_capnp::$capnp_name::Builder,
             ) {
-                builder.set_kind(u32::from_be_bytes($capnp_name.kind().0));
+                builder.set_kind(u32::from($capnp_name.kind()));
                 builder.set_value($capnp_name.ref_value());
             }
         }
@@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ define_typed_byte_data_coder!(route_id, RouteId);
 define_typed_byte_data_coder!(signature, Signature);
 
 // Nonce
-define_untyped_byte_data_coder!(nonce, BareNonce);
+define_untyped_byte_data_coder!(nonce, Nonce);

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/node_info.rs

@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ pub fn encode_node_info(
         let capvec: Vec<u32> = node_info
             .capabilities()
             .iter()
-            .map(|x| u32::from_be_bytes(x.0))
+            .copied()
+            .map(u32::from)
             .collect();
 
         s.clone_from_slice(&capvec);

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/operations/operation_find_node.rs

@@ -66,11 +66,7 @@ impl RPCOperationFindNodeQ {
             .reborrow()
             .init_capabilities(self.capabilities.len() as u32);
         if let Some(s) = cap_builder.as_slice() {
-            let capvec: Vec<u32> = self
-                .capabilities
-                .iter()
-                .map(|x| u32::from_be_bytes(x.0))
-                .collect();
+            let capvec: Vec<u32> = self.capabilities.iter().copied().map(u32::from).collect();
 
             s.clone_from_slice(&capvec);
         }

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/operations/operation_return_receipt.rs

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ pub(in crate::rpc_processor) struct RPCOperationReturnReceipt {
 
 impl RPCOperationReturnReceipt {
     pub fn new(receipt: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Self, RPCError> {
-        if receipt.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+        if receipt.len() < RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
             return Err(RPCError::protocol("ReturnReceipt receipt too short to set"));
         }
-        if receipt.len() > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+        if receipt.len() > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
             return Err(RPCError::protocol("ReturnReceipt receipt too long to set"));
         }
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ impl RPCOperationReturnReceipt {
     ) -> Result<Self, RPCError> {
         rpc_ignore_missing_property!(reader, receipt);
         let rr = reader.get_receipt()?;
-        rpc_ignore_min_max_len!(rr, MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE, MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE);
+        rpc_ignore_min_max_len!(rr, RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE, RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE);
 
         Ok(Self {
             receipt: rr.to_vec(),

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/operations/operation_route.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ pub(in crate::rpc_processor) struct RoutedOperation {
     routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
     sequencing: Sequencing,
     signatures: Vec<Signature>,
-    nonce: BareNonce,
+    nonce: Nonce,
     data: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ impl RoutedOperation {
     pub fn new(
         routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
         sequencing: Sequencing,
-        nonce: BareNonce,
+        nonce: Nonce,
         data: Vec<u8>,
     ) -> Self {
         Self {
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ impl RoutedOperation {
         self.signatures.push(signature);
     }
 
-    pub fn nonce(&self) -> &BareNonce {
+    pub fn nonce(&self) -> &Nonce {
         &self.nonce
     }
     pub fn data(&self) -> &[u8] {

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/operations/operation_validate_dial_info.rs

@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ pub(in crate::rpc_processor) struct RPCOperationValidateDialInfo {
 
 impl RPCOperationValidateDialInfo {
     pub fn new(dial_info: DialInfo, receipt: Vec<u8>, redirect: bool) -> Result<Self, RPCError> {
-        if receipt.len() < MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+        if receipt.len() < RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE {
             return Err(RPCError::protocol(
                 "ValidateDialInfo receipt too short to set",
             ));
         }
-        if receipt.len() > MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
+        if receipt.len() > RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE {
             return Err(RPCError::protocol(
                 "ValidateDialInfo receipt too long to set",
             ));
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ impl RPCOperationValidateDialInfo {
 
         rpc_ignore_missing_property!(reader, receipt);
         let rcpt_reader = reader.get_receipt()?;
-        rpc_ignore_min_max_len!(rcpt_reader, MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE, MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE);
+        rpc_ignore_min_max_len!(rcpt_reader, RCP0_MIN_RECEIPT_SIZE, RCP0_MAX_RECEIPT_SIZE);
 
         let receipt = rcpt_reader.to_vec();
         let redirect = reader.get_redirect();

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/coders/operations/operation_watch_value.rs

@@ -34,16 +34,9 @@ impl RPCOperationWatchValueQ {
         }
 
         let signature_data = Self::make_signature_data(&key, &subkeys, expiration, count, watch_id);
-        let signature = Signature::new(
-            vcrypto.kind(),
-            vcrypto
-                .sign(
-                    watcher.ref_value().ref_key(),
-                    watcher.ref_value().ref_secret(),
-                    &signature_data,
-                )
-                .map_err(RPCError::protocol)?,
-        );
+        let signature = vcrypto
+            .sign(&watcher.key(), &watcher.secret(), &signature_data)
+            .map_err(RPCError::protocol)?;
 
         Ok(Self {
             key,
@@ -51,7 +44,7 @@ impl RPCOperationWatchValueQ {
             expiration,
             count,
             watch_id,
-            watcher: PublicKey::new(watcher.kind(), watcher.ref_value().key()),
+            watcher: watcher.key(),
             signature,
         })
     }
@@ -68,7 +61,7 @@ impl RPCOperationWatchValueQ {
 
         let mut sig_data =
             Vec::with_capacity(key.ref_value().len() + 4 + (subkeys_ranges_len * 8) + 8 + 8);
-        sig_data.extend_from_slice(&key.kind().0);
+        sig_data.extend_from_slice(key.kind().bytes());
         sig_data.extend_from_slice(key.ref_value());
         for sk in subkeys.ranges() {
             sig_data.extend_from_slice(&sk.start().to_le_bytes());
@@ -96,11 +89,7 @@ impl RPCOperationWatchValueQ {
             self.watch_id,
         );
         if !vcrypto
-            .verify(
-                self.watcher.ref_value(),
-                &sig_data,
-                self.signature.ref_value(),
-            )
+            .verify(&self.watcher, &sig_data, &self.signature)
             .map_err(RPCError::protocol)?
         {
             return Err(RPCError::protocol("failed to validate watcher signature"));

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/destination.rs

@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
                         .kind();
 
                     let mut avoid_nodes = relay.node_ids();
-                    avoid_nodes.add_all(&target.node_ids());
+                    avoid_nodes.add_all_from_slice(&target.node_ids());
                     let pr_key = network_result_try!(rss
                         .get_private_route_for_safety_spec(crypto_kind, safety_spec, &avoid_nodes,)
                         .to_rpc_network_result()?);
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
                         // Determine if we can use optimized nodeinfo
                         let route_node = if rss.has_remote_private_route_seen_our_node_info(
-                            private_route.public_key.ref_value(),
+                            &private_route.public_key,
                             &published_peer_info,
                         ) {
                             RouteNode::NodeId(routing_table.node_id(crypto_kind))
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
                         Ok(NetworkResult::value(RespondTo::PrivateRoute(
                             PrivateRoute::new_stub(
-                                routing_table.node_id(crypto_kind).into(),
+                                routing_table.public_key(crypto_kind),
                                 route_node,
                             ),
                         )))
@@ -450,12 +450,12 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
                         // Check for loopback test
                         let opt_private_route_id =
-                            rss.get_route_id_for_key(private_route.public_key.ref_value());
+                            rss.get_route_id_for_key(&private_route.public_key);
                         let pr_key = if opt_private_route_id.is_some()
                             && safety_spec.preferred_route == opt_private_route_id
                         {
                             // Private route is also safety route during loopback test
-                            private_route.public_key.value()
+                            private_route.public_key.clone()
                         } else {
                             // Get the private route to respond to that matches the safety route spec we sent the request with
                             network_result_try!(rss

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/error.rs

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ impl RPCError {
     pub fn map_network<M: ToString, X: ToString>(message: M) -> impl FnOnce(X) -> Self {
         move |x| Self::Network(format!("{}: {}", message.to_string(), x.to_string()))
     }
-    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), expect(dead_code))]
     pub fn try_again<X: ToString>(x: X) -> Self {
         Self::TryAgain(x.to_string())
     }

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/fanout/fanout_call.rs

@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ pub fn capability_fanout_peer_info_filter(caps: Vec<VeilidCapability>) -> Fanout
 /// in the given time
 pub(crate) struct FanoutCall<'a> {
     routing_table: &'a RoutingTable,
-    hash_coordinate: HashDigest,
+    hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
     node_count: usize,
     fanout_tasks: usize,
     consensus_count: usize,
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ impl<'a> FanoutCall<'a> {
     #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
     pub fn new(
         routing_table: &'a RoutingTable,
-        hash_coordinate: HashDigest,
+        hash_coordinate: HashCoordinate,
         node_count: usize,
         fanout_tasks: usize,
         consensus_count: usize,
@@ -259,10 +259,7 @@ impl<'a> FanoutCall<'a> {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "fanout", skip_all)]
-    async fn fanout_processor<'b>(
-        &self,
-        context: &Mutex<FanoutContext<'b>>,
-    ) -> Result<bool, RPCError> {
+    async fn fanout_processor(&self, context: &Mutex<FanoutContext<'_>>) -> Result<bool, RPCError> {
         // Make a work request channel
         let (work_sender, work_receiver) = flume::bounded(1);
 
@@ -407,27 +404,7 @@ impl<'a> FanoutCall<'a> {
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "fanout", skip_all)]
     pub async fn run(&self, init_fanout_queue: Vec<NodeRef>) -> Result<FanoutResult, RPCError> {
         // Create context for this run
-        let crypto = self.routing_table.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(self.hash_coordinate.kind()) else {
-            return Err(RPCError::internal(
-                "should not try this on crypto we don't support",
-            ));
-        };
-        let node_sort = Box::new(
-            |a_key: &CryptoTyped<BareNodeId>,
-             b_key: &CryptoTyped<BareNodeId>|
-             -> core::cmp::Ordering {
-                let da = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(a_key.value()),
-                    self.hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-                );
-                let db = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(b_key.value()),
-                    self.hash_coordinate.ref_value(),
-                );
-                da.cmp(&db)
-            },
-        );
+        let node_sort = Box::new(make_closest_node_id_sort(self.hash_coordinate.clone()));
         let context = Arc::new(Mutex::new(FanoutContext {
             fanout_queue: FanoutQueue::new(
                 self.routing_table.registry(),

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/message_header.rs

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ pub(in crate::rpc_processor) struct RPCMessageHeaderDetailSafetyRouted {
     /// Direct header
     pub direct: RPCMessageHeaderDetailDirect,
     /// Remote safety route used
-    pub remote_safety_route: BarePublicKey,
+    pub remote_safety_route: PublicKey,
     /// The sequencing used for this route
     pub sequencing: Sequencing,
 }
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ pub(in crate::rpc_processor) struct RPCMessageHeaderDetailPrivateRouted {
     /// Direct header
     pub direct: RPCMessageHeaderDetailDirect,
     /// Remote safety route used (or possibly node id the case of no safety route)
-    pub remote_safety_route: BarePublicKey,
+    pub remote_safety_route: PublicKey,
     /// The private route we received the rpc over
-    pub private_route: BarePublicKey,
+    pub private_route: PublicKey,
     // The safety spec for replying to this private routed rpc
     pub safety_spec: SafetySpec,
 }

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/mod.rs

@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ struct WaitableReplyContext {
     node_ref: NodeRef,
     send_ts: Timestamp,
     send_data_result: SendDataResult,
-    safety_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
-    remote_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
-    reply_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+    safety_route: Option<PublicKey>,
+    remote_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
+    reply_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
         let fanout_call = FanoutCall::new(
             &routing_table,
-            node_id.into(),
+            node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
             count,
             fanout,
             0,
@@ -570,10 +570,10 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
                             ));
                         }
                         RPCMessageHeaderDetail::SafetyRouted(sr) => {
-                            let node_id = self
+                            let public_key = self
                                 .routing_table()
-                                .node_id(sr.direct.envelope.get_crypto_kind());
-                            if node_id.value() != reply_private_route.into() {
+                                .public_key(sr.direct.envelope.get_crypto_kind());
+                            if public_key != reply_private_route {
                                 return Err(RPCError::protocol(
                                     "should have received reply from safety route to a stub",
                                 ));
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         routing_domain: RoutingDomain,
         safety_selection: SafetySelection,
         remote_private_route: PrivateRoute,
-        reply_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+        reply_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
         message_data: Vec<u8>,
     ) -> RPCNetworkResult<RenderedOperation> {
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
         // Get useful private route properties
         let pr_is_stub = remote_private_route.is_stub();
-        let pr_pubkey = remote_private_route.public_key.value();
+        let pr_pubkey = remote_private_route.public_key.clone();
         let crypto_kind = remote_private_route.crypto_kind();
         let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(crypto_kind) else {
             return Err(RPCError::internal(
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             .compile_safety_route(safety_selection, remote_private_route)
             .to_rpc_network_result()?);
         let sr_is_stub = compiled_route.safety_route.is_stub();
-        let sr_pubkey = compiled_route.safety_route.public_key.value();
+        let sr_pubkey = compiled_route.safety_route.public_key.clone();
 
         // Encrypt routed operation
         // Xmsg + ENC(Xmsg, DH(PKapr, SKbsr))
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let reply_private_route = match operation.kind() {
             RPCOperationKind::Question(q) => match q.respond_to() {
                 RespondTo::Sender => None,
-                RespondTo::PrivateRoute(pr) => Some(pr.public_key.value()),
+                RespondTo::PrivateRoute(pr) => Some(pr.public_key.clone()),
             },
             RPCOperationKind::Statement(_) | RPCOperationKind::Answer(_) => None,
         };
@@ -759,8 +759,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
                             Some(pi) => pi,
                         };
                         let private_route = PrivateRoute::new_stub(
-                            match destination_node_ref.best_node_id() {
-                                Some(nid) => nid.into(),
+                            match destination_node_ref.best_public_key(routing_domain) {
+                                Some(pk) => pk,
                                 None => {
                                     return Ok(NetworkResult::no_connection_other(
                                         "No best node id for stub private route",
@@ -859,8 +859,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         rpc_kind: RPCKind,
         send_ts: Timestamp,
         node_ref: NodeRef,
-        safety_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
-        remote_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+        safety_route: Option<PublicKey>,
+        remote_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
     ) {
         let wants_answer = matches!(rpc_kind, RPCKind::Question);
 
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         if context.safety_route.is_none() && context.remote_private_route.is_none() {
             context
                 .node_ref
-                .stats_lost_answer(context.send_data_result.is_ordered());
+                .stats_lost_answer(context.send_data_result.sequence_ordering());
 
             // Also clear the last_connections for the entry so we make a new connection next time
             context.node_ref.clear_last_flows();
@@ -936,9 +936,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         send_ts: Timestamp,
         bytes: ByteCount,
         node_ref: NodeRef,
-        safety_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
-        remote_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
-        ordered: bool,
+        safety_route: Option<PublicKey>,
+        remote_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
+        ordering: SequenceOrdering,
     ) {
         // Record for node if this was not sent via a route
         if safety_route.is_none() && remote_private_route.is_none() {
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             if is_answer {
                 node_ref.stats_answer_sent(bytes);
             } else {
-                node_ref.stats_question_sent(send_ts, bytes, wants_answer, ordered);
+                node_ref.stats_question_sent(send_ts, bytes, wants_answer, ordering);
             }
             return;
         }
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
                 context.send_ts,
                 recv_ts,
                 bytes,
-                context.send_data_result.is_ordered(),
+                context.send_data_result.sequence_ordering(),
             );
             return;
         }
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             node_ref.unfiltered(),
             safety_route.clone(),
             remote_private_route.clone(),
-            send_data_result.is_ordered(),
+            send_data_result.sequence_ordering(),
         );
 
         // Ref the connection so it doesn't go away until we're done with the waitable reply
@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             node_ref.unfiltered(),
             safety_route,
             remote_private_route,
-            send_data_result.is_ordered(),
+            send_data_result.sequence_ordering(),
         );
 
         Ok(NetworkResult::value(()))
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             node_ref.unfiltered(),
             safety_route,
             remote_private_route,
-            send_data_result.is_ordered(),
+            send_data_result.sequence_ordering(),
         );
 
         Ok(NetworkResult::value(()))

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rendered_operation.rs

@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@ pub struct RenderedOperation {
     /// Node to send envelope to (may not be destination node in case of relay)
     pub node_ref: FilteredNodeRef,
     /// The safety route used to send the message
-    pub safety_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+    pub safety_route: Option<PublicKey>,
     /// The private route used to send the message
-    pub remote_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+    pub remote_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
     /// The private route requested to receive the reply
-    pub reply_private_route: Option<BarePublicKey>,
+    pub reply_private_route: Option<PublicKey>,
 }
 
 impl fmt::Debug for RenderedOperation {

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_find_node.rs

@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
         let closest_nodes = network_result_try!(routing_table.find_preferred_closest_peers(
             routing_domain,
-            &node_id.clone().into(),
+            node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
             &capabilities
         ));
 

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_get_value.rs

@@ -141,10 +141,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         }
 
         // Validate peers returned are, in fact, closer to the key than the node we sent this to
-        let valid = match RoutingTable::verify_peers_closer(
-            &vcrypto,
-            &target_node_id.clone().into(),
-            &record_key.clone().into(),
+        let valid = match self.routing_table().verify_peers_closer(
+            target_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
+            record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
             &peers,
         ) {
             Ok(v) => v,
@@ -226,7 +225,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let closer_to_key_peers = network_result_try!(routing_table
             .find_preferred_peers_closer_to_key(
                 routing_domain,
-                &record_key.clone().into(),
+                record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
                 vec![CAP_DHT]
             ));
 

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_inspect_value.rs

@@ -138,10 +138,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         }
 
         // Validate peers returned are, in fact, closer to the key than the node we sent this to
-        let valid = match RoutingTable::verify_peers_closer(
-            &vcrypto,
-            &target_node_id.clone().into(),
-            &record_key.clone().into(),
+        let valid = match self.routing_table().verify_peers_closer(
+            target_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
+            record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
             &peers,
         ) {
             Ok(v) => v,
@@ -214,7 +213,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let closer_to_key_peers = network_result_try!(routing_table
             .find_preferred_peers_closer_to_key(
                 routing_domain,
-                &record_key.clone().into(),
+                record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
                 vec![CAP_DHT]
             ));
 

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_route.rs

@@ -89,11 +89,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
     ) -> RPCNetworkResult<()> {
         // Now that things are valid, decrypt the routed operation with DEC(nonce, DH(the SR's public key, the PR's (or node's) secret)
         // xxx: punish nodes that send messages that fail to decrypt eventually? How to do this for safety routes?
-        let secret_key = self
-            .routing_table()
-            .secret_key(remote_sr_pubkey.kind())
-            .value();
-        let Ok(dh_secret) = vcrypto.cached_dh(remote_sr_pubkey.ref_value(), &secret_key) else {
+        let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(remote_sr_pubkey.kind());
+        let Ok(dh_secret) = vcrypto.cached_dh(&remote_sr_pubkey, &secret_key) else {
             return Ok(NetworkResult::invalid_message(
                 "dh failed for remote safety route for safety routed operation",
             ));
@@ -116,7 +113,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         // Pass message to RPC system
         self.enqueue_safety_routed_message(
             detail,
-            remote_sr_pubkey.value(),
+            remote_sr_pubkey,
             routed_operation.sequencing(),
             body,
         )
@@ -146,7 +143,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         // Ensure the route is validated, and construct a return safetyspec that matches the inbound preferences
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
         let rss = routing_table.route_spec_store();
-        let preferred_route = rss.get_route_id_for_key(pr_pubkey.ref_value());
+        let preferred_route = rss.get_route_id_for_key(&pr_pubkey);
 
         let Some((secret_key, safety_spec)) = rss.with_signature_validated_route(
             &pr_pubkey,
@@ -172,7 +169,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
 
         // Now that things are valid, decrypt the routed operation with DEC(nonce, DH(the SR's public key, the PR's (or node's) secret)
         // xxx: punish nodes that send messages that fail to decrypt eventually. How to do this for private routes?
-        let Ok(dh_secret) = vcrypto.cached_dh(remote_sr_pubkey.ref_value(), &secret_key) else {
+        let Ok(dh_secret) = vcrypto.cached_dh(&remote_sr_pubkey, &secret_key) else {
             return Ok(NetworkResult::invalid_message(
                 "dh failed for remote safety route for private routed operation",
             ));
@@ -189,14 +186,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         };
 
         // Pass message to RPC system
-        self.enqueue_private_routed_message(
-            detail,
-            remote_sr_pubkey.value(),
-            pr_pubkey.value(),
-            safety_spec,
-            body,
-        )
-        .map_err(RPCError::internal)?;
+        self.enqueue_private_routed_message(detail, remote_sr_pubkey, pr_pubkey, safety_spec, body)
+            .map_err(RPCError::internal)?;
 
         Ok(NetworkResult::value(()))
     }
@@ -210,13 +201,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         remote_sr_pubkey: PublicKey,
         pr_pubkey: PublicKey,
     ) -> RPCNetworkResult<()> {
-        // If the private route public key is our node id, then this was sent via safety route to our node directly
+        // If the private route public key is our public key, then this was sent via safety route to our node directly
         // so there will be no signatures to validate
-        if self
-            .routing_table()
-            .node_ids()
-            .contains(&pr_pubkey.clone().into())
-        {
+        if self.routing_table().public_keys().contains(&pr_pubkey) {
             // The private route was a stub
             self.process_safety_routed_operation(
                 detail,
@@ -310,9 +297,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         };
 
         // Decrypt the blob with DEC(nonce, DH(the PR's public key, this hop's secret)
-        let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind).value();
+        let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind);
         let dh_secret = vcrypto
-            .cached_dh(pr_pubkey.ref_value(), &secret_key)
+            .cached_dh(pr_pubkey, &secret_key)
             .map_err(RPCError::protocol)?;
         let dec_blob_data = match vcrypto.decrypt_aead(
             &route_hop_data.blob,
@@ -343,18 +330,11 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         // Sign the operation if this is not our last hop
         // as the last hop is already signed by the envelope
         if route_hop.next_hop.is_some() {
-            let node_id = self.routing_table().node_id(crypto_kind);
-            let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind).value();
-            let sig = Signature::new(
-                vcrypto.kind(),
-                vcrypto
-                    .sign(
-                        &node_id.value().into(),
-                        &secret_key,
-                        routed_operation.data(),
-                    )
-                    .map_err(RPCError::internal)?,
-            );
+            let public_key = self.routing_table().public_key(crypto_kind);
+            let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind);
+            let sig = vcrypto
+                .sign(&public_key, &secret_key, routed_operation.data())
+                .map_err(RPCError::internal)?;
             routed_operation.add_signature(sig);
         }
 
@@ -413,10 +393,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
             // There is a safety route hop
             SafetyRouteHops::Data(ref route_hop_data) => {
                 // Decrypt the blob with DEC(nonce, DH(the SR's public key, this hop's secret)
-                let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind).value();
-                let Ok(dh_secret) =
-                    vcrypto.cached_dh(safety_route.public_key.ref_value(), &secret_key)
-                else {
+                let secret_key = self.routing_table().secret_key(crypto_kind);
+                let Ok(dh_secret) = vcrypto.cached_dh(&safety_route.public_key, &secret_key) else {
                     return Ok(NetworkResult::invalid_message(
                         "dh failed for safety route hop",
                     ));

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_set_value.rs

@@ -154,10 +154,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         }
 
         // Validate peers returned are, in fact, closer to the key than the node we sent this to
-        let valid = match RoutingTable::verify_peers_closer(
-            &vcrypto,
-            &target_node_id.clone().into(),
-            &record_key.clone().into(),
+        let valid = match self.routing_table().verify_peers_closer(
+            target_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
+            record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
             &peers,
         ) {
             Ok(v) => v,
@@ -241,7 +240,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let closer_to_key_peers = network_result_try!(routing_table
             .find_preferred_peers_closer_to_key(
                 routing_domain,
-                &record_key.clone().into(),
+                record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
                 vec![CAP_DHT]
             ));
 

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_validate_dial_info.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ impl_veilid_log_facility!("rpc");
 impl RPCProcessor {
     // Can only be sent directly, not via relays or routes
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "rpc", skip(self), ret, err(level=Level::DEBUG))]
+    #[cfg_attr(all(target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"), expect(dead_code))]
     pub async fn rpc_call_validate_dial_info(
         &self,
         peer: NodeRef,

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_value_changed.rs

@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
                     "not processing value change over safety route",
                 ));
             }
-            RPCMessageHeaderDetail::PrivateRouted(p) => NodeId::new(
-                p.direct.envelope.get_crypto_kind(),
-                p.remote_safety_route.clone().into(),
-            ),
+            RPCMessageHeaderDetail::PrivateRouted(p) => self
+                .routing_table()
+                .generate_node_id(&p.remote_safety_route)
+                .map_err(RPCError::internal)?,
         };
 
         if debug_target_enabled!("dht") {

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_watch_value.rs

@@ -153,10 +153,9 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         }
 
         // Validate peers returned are, in fact, closer to the key than the node we sent this to
-        let valid = match RoutingTable::verify_peers_closer(
-            &vcrypto,
-            &target_node_id.clone().into(),
-            &record_key.clone().into(),
+        let valid = match self.routing_table().verify_peers_closer(
+            target_node_id.to_hash_coordinate(),
+            record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
             &peers,
         ) {
             Ok(v) => v,
@@ -266,7 +265,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
         let closer_to_key_peers = network_result_try!(routing_table
             .find_preferred_peers_closer_to_key(
                 routing_domain,
-                &record_key.clone().into(),
+                record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
                 vec![CAP_DHT]
             ));
 

veilid-core/src/rpc_processor/rpc_worker.rs

@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
     pub(super) fn enqueue_safety_routed_message(
         &self,
         direct: RPCMessageHeaderDetailDirect,
-        remote_safety_route: BarePublicKey,
+        remote_safety_route: PublicKey,
         sequencing: Sequencing,
         body: Vec<u8>,
     ) -> EyreResult<()> {
@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ impl RPCProcessor {
     pub(super) fn enqueue_private_routed_message(
         &self,
         direct: RPCMessageHeaderDetailDirect,
-        remote_safety_route: BarePublicKey,
-        private_route: BarePublicKey,
+        remote_safety_route: PublicKey,
+        private_route: PublicKey,
         safety_spec: SafetySpec,
         body: Vec<u8>,
     ) -> EyreResult<()> {

veilid-core/src/storage_manager/get_value.rs

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
                     let routing_table = registry.routing_table();
                     let fanout_call = FanoutCall::new(
                         &routing_table,
-                        record_key.clone().into(),
+                        record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
                         key_count,
                         fanout,
                         consensus_count,
@@ -374,18 +374,11 @@ impl StorageManager {
             return Ok(None);
         };
 
-        // Get cryptosystem
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(record_key.kind()) else {
-            apibail_generic!("unsupported cryptosystem");
-        };
-
         // Keep the list of nodes that returned a value for later reference
         let mut inner = self.inner.lock().await;
 
         Self::process_fanout_results_inner(
             &mut inner,
-            &vcrypto,
             record_key.clone(),
             core::iter::once((ValueSubkeyRangeSet::single(subkey), result.fanout_result)),
             false,

veilid-core/src/storage_manager/inspect_value.rs

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
         let routing_table = self.routing_table();
         let fanout_call = FanoutCall::new(
             &routing_table,
-            record_key.into(),
+            record_key.to_hash_coordinate(),
             key_count,
             fanout,
             consensus_count,

veilid-core/src/storage_manager/mod.rs

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
         for ck in VALID_CRYPTO_KINDS {
             let vcrypto = crypto.get(ck).unwrap();
             let kp = vcrypto.generate_keypair();
-            anonymous_watch_keys.add(KeyPair::new(ck, kp));
+            anonymous_watch_keys.add(kp);
         }
 
         let inner = Self::new_inner();
@@ -530,11 +530,11 @@ impl StorageManager {
         schema_data: &[u8],
     ) -> RecordKey {
         let mut hash_data = Vec::<u8>::with_capacity(owner_key.len() + 4 + schema_data.len());
-        hash_data.extend_from_slice(&vcrypto.kind().0);
+        hash_data.extend_from_slice(vcrypto.kind().bytes());
         hash_data.extend_from_slice(owner_key);
         hash_data.extend_from_slice(schema_data);
         let hash = vcrypto.generate_hash(&hash_data);
-        RecordKey::new(vcrypto.kind(), BareRecordKey::from(hash))
+        RecordKey::new(vcrypto.kind(), BareRecordKey::new(hash.ref_value()))
     }
 
     /// Create a local record from scratch with a new owner key, open it, and return the opened descriptor
@@ -894,7 +894,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
             &descriptor.owner(),
             subkey,
             &vcrypto,
-            &writer.bare_secret(),
+            &writer.secret(),
         )?);
 
         // Check if we are offline
@@ -1293,12 +1293,6 @@ impl StorageManager {
             subkeys
         };
 
-        // Get cryptosystem
-        let crypto = self.crypto();
-        let Some(vcrypto) = crypto.get(record_key.kind()) else {
-            apibail_generic!("unsupported cryptosystem");
-        };
-
         let mut inner = self.inner.lock().await;
         let safety_selection = {
             let Some(opened_record) = inner.opened_records.get(&record_key) else {
@@ -1390,7 +1384,6 @@ impl StorageManager {
 
         Self::process_fanout_results_inner(
             &mut inner,
-            &vcrypto,
             record_key.clone(),
             results_iter,
             false,
@@ -1552,7 +1545,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
             }
             owner
         } else {
-            KeyPair::new(vcrypto.kind(), vcrypto.generate_keypair())
+            vcrypto.generate_keypair()
         };
 
         // Calculate dht key
@@ -1563,7 +1556,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
             owner.key(),
             schema_data,
             &vcrypto,
-            owner.bare_secret(),
+            owner.secret(),
         )?);
 
         // Add new local value record
@@ -1704,7 +1697,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
         // Otherwise this is just another subkey writer
         let owner_secret = if let Some(writer) = writer.clone() {
             if writer.key() == owner {
-                Some(writer.bare_secret())
+                Some(writer.secret())
             } else {
                 None
             }
@@ -1753,7 +1746,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
         // Otherwise this is just another subkey writer
         let owner_secret = if let Some(writer) = &writer {
             if writer.key() == owner {
-                Some(writer.bare_secret())
+                Some(writer.secret())
             } else {
                 None
             }
@@ -1807,12 +1800,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
             d.nodes
                 .keys()
                 .cloned()
-                .filter_map(|x| {
-                    routing_table
-                        .lookup_node_ref(NodeId::new(record_key.kind(), x))
-                        .ok()
-                        .flatten()
-                })
+                .filter_map(|nr| routing_table.lookup_node_ref(nr).ok().flatten())
                 .collect()
         });
 
@@ -1822,7 +1810,6 @@ impl StorageManager {
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "stor", skip_all)]
     fn process_fanout_results_inner<I: IntoIterator<Item = (ValueSubkeyRangeSet, FanoutResult)>>(
         inner: &mut StorageManagerInner,
-        vcrypto: &CryptoSystemGuard<'_>,
         record_key: RecordKey,
         subkey_results_iter: I,
         is_set: bool,
@@ -1839,7 +1826,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
                 for node_id in fanout_result
                     .value_nodes
                     .iter()
-                    .filter_map(|x| x.node_ids().get(record_key.kind()).map(|k| k.value()))
+                    .filter_map(|x| x.node_ids().get(record_key.kind()))
                 {
                     let pnd = d.nodes.entry(node_id).or_default();
                     if is_set || pnd.last_set == Timestamp::default() {
@@ -1863,14 +1850,13 @@ impl StorageManager {
                     return res;
                 }
                 // Distance is the next metric, closer nodes first
-                let da = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(a.0.clone()),
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(record_key.value()),
-                );
-                let db = vcrypto.distance(
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(b.0.clone()),
-                    &BareHashDigest::from(record_key.value()),
-                );
+                let da =
+                    a.0.to_hash_coordinate()
+                        .distance(&record_key.to_hash_coordinate());
+
+                let db =
+                    b.0.to_hash_coordinate()
+                        .distance(&record_key.to_hash_coordinate());
                 da.cmp(&db)
             });
 
@@ -1969,7 +1955,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "stor", skip_all, err)]
-    pub(super) async fn handle_inspect_local_value_inner(
+    async fn handle_inspect_local_value_inner(
         &self,
         inner: &mut StorageManagerInner,
         record_key: RecordKey,
@@ -1998,7 +1984,7 @@ impl StorageManager {
     }
 
     #[instrument(level = "trace", target = "stor", skip_all, err)]
-    pub(super) async fn handle_get_remote_value_inner(
+    async fn handle_get_remote_value_inner(
         inner: &mut StorageManagerInner,
         record_key: RecordKey,
         subkey: ValueSubkey,