tillitis-key/hw/application_fpga/core/tk1
Joachim Strömbergson 00599549e3
FPGA: Add system reset API
Add API address to trigger system reset.
      When written to will send system_reset signal
      to the reset generator, which then perform a complete
      reset cycle of the FPGA system.

Signed-off-by: Joachim Strömbergson <joachim@assured.se>
2024-08-20 13:25:22 +02:00
..
rtl FPGA: Add system reset API 2024-08-20 13:25:22 +02:00
tb FPGA: Cleanup tk1 spi testbench 2024-07-11 09:39:31 +02:00
toolruns Adding testbench and simulation targets for the SPI master. 2024-06-11 15:28:29 +02:00
tools Adding testbench and simulation targets for the SPI master. 2024-06-11 15:28:29 +02:00
README.md FPGA: Add system reset API 2024-08-20 13:25:22 +02:00

tk1

Introduction

The tk1 core is where information, control and monitoring functionality unique to the TKey1 can be found. This means that it provides more than one distinct functionality accessible via the core API.

API

Access to device information

	ADDR_NAME0:   0x00
	ADDR_NAME1:   0x01
	ADDR_VERSION: 0x02

These addresses provide read only information about the name (type) and version of the device. They can be read by FW as well as applications.

Control of execution mode

	ADDR_SWITCH_APP: 0x08

This register controls if the device is executing in FW mode or in App mode. The register can be written once between power cycles, and only by FW. If set the device is in app mode.

Control of RGB LED

	ADDR_LED:  0x09
	LED_B_BIT: 0
	LED_G_BIT: 1
	LED_R_BIT: 2

This register control the RGB LED on the TKey device. Setting a bit to one turns the corresponding color on. It can be read and written by FW as well as by Apps.

Control and status of GPIO

	ADDR_GPIO: 0x0a
	GPIO1_BIT: 0
	GPIO2_BIT: 1
	GPIO3_BIT: 2
	GPIO4_BIT: 3

This register control and provide status access to the four GPIOs on the TKey. GPIO one and two are inputs. They will sample the input level and present it to SW. GPIO three and four are outputs. They will emit either high or low voltage level depending on if the corresponding register is one or zero.

Application introspection

	ADDR_APP_START: 0x0c
	ADDR_APP_SIZE:  0x0d

These registers provide read only information to the loaded app to itself - where it was loaded and its size. The values are written by FW as part of the loading of the app. The registers can't be written when the ADDR_SWITCH_APP has been set.

Access to Blake2s

	ADDR_BLAKE2S: 0x10

This register provides the 32-bit function pointer address to the Blake2s hash function in the FW. It is written by FW during boot. The register can't be written to when the ADDR_SWITCH_APP has been set.

Access to CDI

  ADDR_CDI_FIRST: 0x20
  ADDR_CDI_LAST:  0x27

These registers provide access to the 256-bit compound device secret calculated by the FW as part of loading an application. The registers are written by the FW. The register can't be written to when the ADDR_SWITCH_APP has been set. Apps can read the CDI and is it as base secret for any secrets it needs to perform its intended use case.

Access to UDI

  ADDR_UDI_FIRST: 0x30
  ADDR_UDI_LAST:  0x31

These read-only registers provide access to the 64-bit Unique Device Identity (UDI).

The two UDI words are stored using 32 named SB_LUT4 FPGA multiplexer (MUX) instances, identified in the source code as "udi_rom_idx". One instance for each bit in core read_data output bus.

Each SB_LUT4 MUX is able to store 16 bits of data, in total 512 bits. But since the UDI is 64 bits, we only use the two LSBs in each MUX. Note that only the LSB address of the SB_LUT4 instances are connected to the CPU address. This means that only the two LSBs in each MUX can be addressed.

During build of the FPGA design, the UDI is set to a known bit pattern, which means that the SB_LUT4 instantiations are initialized to a fixed bit pattern.

The tool 'patch_uds_udi.py' is used to replace the fixed bit pattern with a unique bit pattern before generating the per device unique FPGA bitstream. This allows us to generate these device unique FPGA bitstreams without having to do a full FPGA build.

RAM memory protecion

  ADDR_RAM_ADDR_RAND: 0x40
  ADDR_RAM_DATA_RAND: 0x41

These write only registers control how the data in the RAM is randomized as a way of protecting the data. The randomization is implemented using a pseudo random number generator with a state initalized by a seed.

The ADDR_RAM_ADDR_RAND store the seed for how the addresses are randomized over the memory space. The ADDR_RAM_DATA_RAND store the seed for how the data itself is randomized. FW writes random seed values to these registers during boot.

Security monitor

  ADDR_CPU_MON_CTRL: 0x60
  ADDR_CPU_MON_FIRST:0x61
  ADDR_CPU_MON_LAST: 0x62

Monitors events and state changes in the SoC and handles security violations. Currently checks for:

  1. Trying to execute instructions in FW_RAM. Always enabled.
  2. Trying to access RAM outside of the physical memory. Always enabled
  3. Trying to execute instructions from a memory area in RAM defined by the application.

Number 1 and 2 are always enabled. Number 3 is set and enabled by the device application. Once enabled, by writing to ADDR_CPU_MON_CTRL, the memory defined by ADDR_CPU_MON_FIRST and ADDR_CPU_MON_LAST will be protected against execution. Typically the application developer will set this protection to cover the application stack and/or heap.

An application can write to these registers to define the area and then enable the monitor. Once enabled the monitor can't be disabled, and the ADDR_CPU_MON_FIRST and ADDR_CPU_MON_LAST registers can't be changed. This means that an application that wants to use the monitor must define the area first before enabling the monitor.

Once enabled, if the CPU tries to read an instruction from the defined area, the core will force the CPU to instead read an all zero, which is an illegal instruction. This illegal instruction will trigger the CPU to enter its TRAP state, from which it can't return unless the TKey is power cycled.

The firmware will not write to these registers as part of loading an app. The app developer must define the area and enable the monitor to get the protection.

One feature not obvious from the API is that when the CPU traps the core will detect that and start flashing the status LED with a red light indicating that the CPU is in a trapped state and no further execution is possible.

SPI-master

The TK1 includes a minimal SPI-master that provides access to the Winbond Flash memory mounted on the board. The SPI-master is byte oriented and very minimalistic.

In order to transfer more than a single byte, SW must read status and write commands needed to send a sequence of bytes. In order to read out a sequence of bytes from the memory, SW must send as many dummy bytes as the data being read from the memory.

The SPI-master is controlled using a few API addresses:

localparam ADDR_SPI_EN		= 8'h80;
localparam ADDR_SPI_XFER	= 8'h81;
localparam ADDR_SPI_DATA	= 8'h82;

ADDR_SPI_EN enables and disabled the SPI-master. Writing a 0x01 will lower the SPI chip select to the memory. Writing a 0x00 will raise the chip select.

Writing to the ADDR_SPI_XFER starts a byte transfer. Reading from the address returns the status for the SPI-master. If the return value is not zero, the SPI-master is ready to send a byte.

ADDR_SPI_DATA is the address used to send and receive a byte. data. The least significant byte will be sent to the memory during a transfer. The byte returned from the memory will be presented to SW if the address is read after a transfer has completed.

The sequence of operations needed to perform is thus:

  1. Activate the SPI-master by writing a 0x00000001 to ADDR_SPI_EN
  2. Write a byte to ADDR_SPI_DATA
  3. Read ADDR_SPI_XFER to check status. Repeat until the read operation returns non-zero value
  4. Write to ADDR_SPI_XFER
  5. Read ADDR_SPI_XFER to check status. Repeat until the read operation returns a non-zero value
  6. Read out the received byte from ADDR_SPI_DATA
  7. Repeat 2..6 as many times as needed to send a command and data to the memory and getting the expected status, data back.
  8. Deactivate the SPI-master by writing 0x00000000 to ADDR_SPI_EN

The SPI connected memory on the board is the Winbond W25Q80. For information about the memory including support commands and protocol, see the datasheet:

https://www.mouser.se/datasheet/2/949/w25q80dv_dl_revh_10022015-1489677.pdf

System Reset

The TK1 includes an ability for FW and applications to trigger a hardware reset of the FPGA by writing to an API address.

The hardware reset will force all registers that are in the Tkey FPGA design reset circuit to be reset to their default values. Basically this is all registers in the Tkey FPGA design.

The reset will not clear the RAM. However since the CPU program counter is reset to its reset vector, the CPU will unconditionally start executing the FW. As part of the device initialization, the FW will fill the RAM with random data, overwriting any app and data present in the RAM before the reset was triggered.

The hardware reset will not force the FPGA to read its configuration. That requires a power cycle of the Tkey device.

The reset is controlled by the following API address. Note that any value written to the address will trigger the reset.

localparam ADDR_SYSTEM_RESET  = 8'h70;

Implementation

The core is implemented as a single module. Future versions will probably be separated into separate modules.

Winbond Flash memory model

The testbench for the SPI master requires a memory model of the Winbond Flash memory. The model can be downloaded from Winbond by providing the requested information and supplying the received verification code.

From the downloaded file 'W25Q80DL.zip', please extract the file W25Q80DL.v and place it in the 'tb' directory before building the simulation model.