From 6f1b0cc7ebc385e3a4a65989b2238138d5199406 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: TwoSixtyThreeFiftyFour
<108928957+TwoSixtyThreeFiftyFour@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 18:23:49 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] Getting rid of Archive.org , Wikiless , Nitter ,
Invidious cross-references
Getting rid of Archive.org , Wikiless , Nitter , Invidious cross-references
---
guide.md | 3783 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
1 file changed, 1242 insertions(+), 2541 deletions(-)
diff --git a/guide.md b/guide.md
index 3c990b2..3d654de 100644
--- a/guide.md
+++ b/guide.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The manual is here: , quick-start guide here:
**Your experience may vary.** **Remember to check regularly for an updated version of this guide.**
-This guide is a non-profit open-source initiative, licensed under Creative Commons **Attribution-NonCommercial** 4.0 International ([cc-by-nc-4.0][] [[Archive.org]][27]).
+This guide is a non-profit open-source initiative, licensed under Creative Commons **Attribution-NonCommercial** 4.0 International ([cc-by-nc-4.0][] [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)).
- For mirrors see [Appendix A6: Mirrors]
@@ -66,23 +66,23 @@ Precautions while reading this guide and accessing the various links:
- **Documents/Files** have a **[Archive.org]** link next to them for accessing content through Archive.org for increased privacy and in case the content goes missing. Some links are not yet archived or outdated on archive.org in which case we encourage you to ask for a new save if possible.
-- **YouTube Videos** have a **[Invidious]** link next to them for accessing content through an Invidious Instance (in this case yewtu.be hosted in the Netherlands) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]][29] for more information.
+- **YouTube Videos** have a **[Invidious]** link next to them for accessing content through an Invidious Instance (in this case yewtu.be hosted in the Netherlands) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/iv-org/invidious) for more information.
-- **Twitter** links have a **[Nitter]** link next to them for accessing content through a Nitter Instance (in this case nitter.net) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]][30] for more information.
+- **Twitter** links have a **[Nitter]** link next to them for accessing content through a Nitter Instance (in this case nitter.net) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/zedeus/nitter) for more information.
-- **Wikipedia** links have a **[Wikiless]** link next to them for accessing content through a Wikiless Instance (in this case Wikiless.org) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]][31] for more information.
+- **Wikipedia** links have a **[Wikiless]** link next to them for accessing content through a Wikiless Instance (in this case Wikiless.org) for increased privacy. It is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://codeberg.org/orenom/wikiless) for more information.
-- **Medium** links have **[Scribe.rip]** link next to them for accessing content through a Scribe.rip Instance for increased privacy. Again, it is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]][32] for more information.
+- **Medium** links have **[Scribe.rip]** link next to them for accessing content through a Scribe.rip Instance for increased privacy. Again, it is recommended to use these links when possible. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://scribe.rip/) for more information.
- If you are reading this in PDF or ODT format, you will notice plenty of \`\`\` in place of double quotes (""). These \`\`\` are there to ease conversion into Markdown/HTML format for online viewing of code blocks on the website.
-If you do not want the hassle and use one of the browsers below, you could also just install the following extension on your browser: [[Archive.org]][33]:
+If you do not want the hassle and use one of the browsers below, you could also just install the following extension on your browser: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220509220021/https://libredirect.github.io/):
- Firefox:
- Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Brave, Edge):
-**If you are having trouble accessing any of the many academic articles referenced in this guide due to paywalls, feel free to use Sci-Hub (** [[Wikiless]][34] [[Archive.org]][35]**) or LibGen (** [[Wikiless]][36] [[Archive.org]][37]**) for finding and reading them. Because Science should be free. All of it. If you are faced with a paywall accessing some resources, consider using .**
+**If you are having trouble accessing any of the many academic articles referenced in this guide due to paywalls, feel free to use Sci-Hub (** [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Sci-Hub) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sci-Hub)**) or LibGen (** [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Library_Genesis) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_Genesis)**) for finding and reading them. Because Science should be free. All of it. If you are faced with a paywall accessing some resources, consider using .**
Finally note that this guide does mention and even recommends various commercial services (such as VPNs, CDNs, e-mail providers, hosting providers...) **but is not endorsed or sponsored by any of them in any way. There are no referral links and no commercial ties with any of these providers. This project is 100% non-profit and only relying on donations.**
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ Here is a basic simplified threat model for this guide:
Disclaimer: Jokes aside (magical amulet...). Of course, there are also advanced ways to mitigate attacks against such advanced and skilled adversaries but those are just out of the scope of this guide. It is crucially important that you understand the limits of the threat model of this guide. And therefore, this guide will not double in size to help with those advanced mitigations as this is just too complex and will require an exceedingly high knowledge and skill level that is not expected from the targeted audience of this guide.
-The EFF provides a few security scenarios of what you should consider depending on your activity. While some of those tips might not be within the scope of this guide (more about Privacy than Anonymity), they are still worth reading as examples. See [[Archive.org]][41].
+The EFF provides a few security scenarios of what you should consider depending on your activity. While some of those tips might not be within the scope of this guide (more about Privacy than Anonymity), they are still worth reading as examples. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://ssd.eff.org/en/module-categories/security-scenarios).
If you want to go deeper into threat modeling, see [Appendix B3: Threat modeling resources].
@@ -491,17 +491,17 @@ There are many ways you can be tracked besides browser cookies and ads, your e-m
First, you could also consider these more general resources on privacy and security to learn more basics:
-- The New Oil*: [[Archive.org]][42]
+- The New Oil*: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://thenewoil.org/)
-- Techlore videos*: [[Invidious]][43]
+- Techlore videos*: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/c/Techlore)
-- Privacy Guides: [[Archive.org]][44]
+- Privacy Guides: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://privacyguides.org/)
-- Privacy Tools*: [[Archive.org]][45]
+- Privacy Tools*: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://privacytools.io/)
*Note that these websites could contain affiliate/sponsored content and/or merchandising. This guide does not endorse and is not sponsored by any commercial entity in any way.*
-If you skipped those, you should really still consider viewing this YouTube playlist from the Techlore Go Incognito project ( [[Archive.org]][46]) as an introduction before going further: [[Invidious]][47]. This guide will cover many of the topics in the videos of this playlist with more details and references as well as some added topics not covered within that series. This will just take you 2 or 3 hours to watch it all.
+If you skipped those, you should really still consider viewing this YouTube playlist from the Techlore Go Incognito project ( [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/techlore-official/go-incognito)) as an introduction before going further: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/playlist?list=PL3KeV6Ui_4CayDGHw64OFXEPHgXLkrtJO). This guide will cover many of the topics in the videos of this playlist with more details and references as well as some added topics not covered within that series. This will just take you 2 or 3 hours to watch it all.
**Now, here is a non-exhaustive list of some of the many ways you could be tracked and de-anonymized:**
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ DNS stands for "Domain Name System"[^31] and is a service used by your browser (
Every time your browser wants to access a certain service such as Google through www.google.com. Your Browser (Chrome or Firefox) will query a DNS service to find the IP addresses of the Google web servers.
-Here is a video explaining DNS visually if you are already lost: [[Invidious]][48]
+Here is a video explaining DNS visually if you are already lost: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=vrxwXXytEuI)
Usually, the DNS service is provided by your ISP and automatically configured by the network you are connecting to. This DNS service could also be subject to data retention regulations or will just keep logs for other reasons (data collection for advertising purposes for instance). Therefore, this ISP will be capable of telling everything you did online just by looking at those logs which can, in turn, be provided to an adversary. Conveniently this is also the easiest way for many adversaries to apply censoring or parental control by using DNS blocking[^32]. The provided DNS servers will give you a different address (than their real one) for some websites (like redirecting thepiratebay.org to some government website). Such blocking is widely applied worldwide for certain sites[^33].
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ A solution to this is to use encrypted DNS using DoH (DNS over HTTPS[^36]), DoT
Small in-between Disclaimer: **This guide does not necessarily endorse or recommend Cloudflare services even if it is mentioned several times in this section for technical understanding.**
-Unfortunately, the TLS protocol used in most HTTPS connections in most Browsers (Chrome/Brave among them) will leak the Domain Name again through SNI[^39] handshakes (this can be checked here at Cloudflare: [[Archive.org]][49] ). **As of the writing of this guide, only Firefox-based browsers supports ECH (Encrypted Client Hello**[^40] **previously known as eSNI**[^41]**) on some websites which will encrypt everything end to end (in addition to using a secure private DNS over TLS/HTTPS) and will allow you to hide your DNS requests from a third party**[^42]**.** And this option is not enabled by default either so you will have to enable it yourself.
+Unfortunately, the TLS protocol used in most HTTPS connections in most Browsers (Chrome/Brave among them) will leak the Domain Name again through SNI[^39] handshakes (this can be checked here at Cloudflare: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl/encrypted-sni/) ). **As of the writing of this guide, only Firefox-based browsers supports ECH (Encrypted Client Hello**[^40] **previously known as eSNI**[^41]**) on some websites which will encrypt everything end to end (in addition to using a secure private DNS over TLS/HTTPS) and will allow you to hide your DNS requests from a third party**[^42]**.** And this option is not enabled by default either so you will have to enable it yourself.
![][50]
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ Some countries like Russia[^45] and China[^46] might (unverified despite the art
The issues do not end here. Part of the HTTPS TLS validation is called OCSP[^47] and this protocol used by Firefox-based browsers will leak metadata in the form of the serial number of the certificate of the website you are visiting. An adversary can then easily find which website you are visiting by matching the certificate number[^48]. This issue can be mitigated by using OCSP stapling[^49]. Unfortunately, this is enabled but not enforced by default in Firefox/Tor Browser. But the website you are visiting must also be supporting it and not all do. Chromium-based browsers on the other hand use a different system called CRLSets[^50]'[^51] which is arguably better.
-Here is a list of how various browsers behave with OCSP: [[Archive.org]][51]
+Here is a list of how various browsers behave with OCSP: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.ssl.com/blogs/how-do-browsers-handle-revoked-ssl-tls-certificates/)
Here is an illustration of the issue you could encounter on Firefox-based browsers:
@@ -625,14 +625,14 @@ Here is an illustration of the issue you could encounter on Firefox-based browse
Finally, even if you use a custom encrypted DNS server (DoH or DoT) with ECH/eSNI support and OCSP stapling, it might still not be enough as traffic analysis studies[^52] have shown it is still possible to reliably fingerprint and block unwanted requests. Only DNS over Tor was able to show efficient DNS Privacy in recent studies but even that can still be defeated by other means (see [Your Anonymized Tor/VPN traffic][Your Anonymized Tor/VPN traffic:]).
-One could also decide to use a Tor Hidden DNS Service or ODoH (Oblivious DNS over HTTPS[^53]) to further increase privacy/anonymity but **unfortunately**, as far as we know, these methods are only provided by Cloudflare as of this writing ( [[Archive.org]][53], [[Archive.org]][54]). These are workable and reasonably secure technical options but there is also a moral choice if you want to use Cloudflare or not (despite the risk posed by some researchers[^54]).
+One could also decide to use a Tor Hidden DNS Service or ODoH (Oblivious DNS over HTTPS[^53]) to further increase privacy/anonymity but **unfortunately**, as far as we know, these methods are only provided by Cloudflare as of this writing ( [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://blog.cloudflare.com/welcome-hidden-resolver/), [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://blog.cloudflare.com/oblivious-dns/)). These are workable and reasonably secure technical options but there is also a moral choice if you want to use Cloudflare or not (despite the risk posed by some researchers[^54]).
**Note that Oblivious DNS addresses an adversary that eavesdrops on one of the connections listed here but not all. It does not address a global passive adversary (GPA) who can eavesdrop on many or all of these connections**:
- traffic between the client resolver and the recursive resolver
- the recursive resolver and the ODNS resolver
- the ODNS resolver and an authoritative server.
-Lastly, there is also this new possibility called DoHoT which stands for DNS over HTTPS over Tor which could also further increase your privacy/anonymity and which you could consider if you are more skilled with Linux. See [[Archive.org]][55]. This guide will not help you with this one at this stage, but it might be coming soon.
+Lastly, there is also this new possibility called DoHoT which stands for DNS over HTTPS over Tor which could also further increase your privacy/anonymity and which you could consider if you are more skilled with Linux. See [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/alecmuffett/dohot). This guide will not help you with this one at this stage, but it might be coming soon.
Here is an illustration showing the current state of DNS and HTTPS privacy based on our current knowledge.
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ Here is an illustration showing the current state of DNS and HTTPS privacy based
As for your normal daily use (non-sensitive), remember that only Firefox-based browsers support ECH (formerly eSNI) so far and that it is only useful with websites hosted behind Cloudflare CDN at this stage. If you prefer a Chrome-based version (which is understandable for some due to some better-integrated features like on-the-fly Translation), then we would recommend the use of Brave instead which supports all Chrome extensions and offers much better privacy than Chrome.
-But the story does not stop there right. Now because after all this, even if you encrypt your DNS and use all possible mitigations. Simple IP requests to any server will probably allow an adversary to still detect which site you are visiting. And this is simply because the majority of websites have unique IPs tied to them as explained here: [[Archive.org]][57]. This means that an adversary can create a dataset of known websites for instance including their IPs and then match this dataset against the IP you ask for. In most cases, this will result in a correct guess of the website you are visiting. This means that despite OCSP stapling, despite ECH/eSNI, despite using Encrypted DNS ... An adversary can still guess the website you are visiting anyway.
+But the story does not stop there right. Now because after all this, even if you encrypt your DNS and use all possible mitigations. Simple IP requests to any server will probably allow an adversary to still detect which site you are visiting. And this is simply because the majority of websites have unique IPs tied to them as explained here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an-ip-address/). This means that an adversary can create a dataset of known websites for instance including their IPs and then match this dataset against the IP you ask for. In most cases, this will result in a correct guess of the website you are visiting. This means that despite OCSP stapling, despite ECH/eSNI, despite using Encrypted DNS ... An adversary can still guess the website you are visiting anyway.
Therefore, to mitigate all these issues (as much as possible and as best as we can), this guide will later recommend two solutions: Using Tor and a virtualized (See [Appendix W: Virtualization][Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers:]) multi-layered solution of VPN over Tor solution (DNS over VPN over Tor or DNS over TOR). Other options will also be explained (Tor over VPN, VPN only, No Tor/VPN) but are less recommended.
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ But unfortunately, this is not limited to your smartphone, and you also probably
While all these cannot be used to de-anonymize you from a remote online adversary, they can be used to narrow down a search if your approximate location at a certain time is known. For instance, you cannot rule out that some stores will effectively scan (and log) all RFID chips passing through the door. They might be looking for their loyalty cards but are also logging others along the way. Such RFID tags could be traced to your identity and allow for de-anonymization.
-More information over at Wikipedia: [[Wikiless]][58] [[Archive.org]][59] and [[Wikiless]][58] [[Archive.org]][59]
+More information over at Wikipedia: [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://web.archive.org/web/20220530073225/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification) and [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://web.archive.org/web/20220530073225/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio-frequency_identification)
The only way to mitigate this problem is to have no RFID tags on you or to shield them again using a type of Faraday cage. You could also use specialized wallets/pouches that specifically block RFID communications. Many of those are now made by well-known brands such as Samsonite[^57]. You should just not carry such RFID devices while conducting sensitive activities.
@@ -686,9 +686,9 @@ This allows them to provide accurate locations even when GPS is off, but it also
Note: If you have an Android smartphone, Google probably knows where it is no matter what you do. You cannot really trust the settings. The whole operating system is built by a company that wants your data. Remember that if it is free then you are the product.
-But that is not what all those Wi-Fi access points can do. Recently developed techs could even allow someone to track your movements accurately just based on radio interferences. What this means is that it is possible to track your movement inside a room/building based on the radio signals passing through. This might seem like a tinfoil hat conspiracy theory claim but here are the references[^63] with demonstrations showing this tech in action: [[Archive.org]][60] and the video here: [[Invidious]][61]
+But that is not what all those Wi-Fi access points can do. Recently developed techs could even allow someone to track your movements accurately just based on radio interferences. What this means is that it is possible to track your movement inside a room/building based on the radio signals passing through. This might seem like a tinfoil hat conspiracy theory claim but here are the references[^63] with demonstrations showing this tech in action: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/http://rfpose.csail.mit.edu/) and the video here: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=HgDdaMy8KNE)
-Other researchers have found a way to count the people in a defined space using only Wi-Fi, see [[Archive.org]][62]
+Other researchers have found a way to count the people in a defined space using only Wi-Fi, see [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.news.ucsb.edu/2021/020392/dont-fidget-wifi-will-count-you)
You could therefore imagine many use cases for such technologies like recording who enters specific buildings/offices (hotels, hospitals, or embassies for instance) and then discover who meets who and thereby tracking them from outside. Even if they have no smartphone on them.
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ You could therefore imagine many use cases for such technologies like recording
Again, such an issue could only be mitigated by being in a room/building that would act as a Faraday cage.
-Here is another video of the same kind of tech in action: [[Invidious]][64]
+Here is another video of the same kind of tech in action: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=FDZ39h-kCS8)
See [Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices]
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ Here are some videos explaining more about the topic:
- HOPE 2020,
-- YouTube, Hak5, Wi-Fi Pineapple Mark VII [[Invidious]][65]
+- YouTube, Hak5, Wi-Fi Pineapple Mark VII [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=7v3JR4Wlw4Q)
These devices can fit in a small bag and can take over the Wi-Fi environment of any place within their range. For instance, a Bar/Restaurant/Café/Hotel Lobby. These devices can force Wi-Fi clients to disconnect from their current Wi-Fi (using de-authentication, disassociation attacks[^66]) while spoofing the normal Wi-Fi networks at the same location. They will continue to perform this attack until your computer, or you decide to try to connect to the rogue AP.
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ How to mitigate those? If you do connect to a public wi-fi access point, use Tor
Tor and VPNs are not silver bullets. Many advanced techniques have been developed and studied to de-anonymize encrypted Tor traffic over the years[^68]. Most of those techniques are Correlation attacks that will correlate your network traffic in one way or another to logs or datasets. Here are some examples:
-- **Correlation Fingerprinting Attack:** As illustrated (simplified) below, this attack will fingerprint your encrypted Tor traffic (like the websites you visited) based on the analysis of your encrypted traffic without decrypting it. Some of those methods can do so with a 96% success rate **in a closed-world setting**. **The efficacy of those methods in a real open-world setting** **has not been demonstrated yet and would probably require tremendous resources computing power making it very unlikely that such techniques would be used by a local adversary in the near future.** Such techniques could however hypothetically be used by an advanced and probably global adversary with access to your source network to determine some of your activity. Examples of those attacks are described in several research papers[^69]'[^70]'[^71] as well as their limitations[^72]. The Tor Project itself published an article about these attacks with some mitigations: [[Archive.org]][66].
+- **Correlation Fingerprinting Attack:** As illustrated (simplified) below, this attack will fingerprint your encrypted Tor traffic (like the websites you visited) based on the analysis of your encrypted traffic without decrypting it. Some of those methods can do so with a 96% success rate **in a closed-world setting**. **The efficacy of those methods in a real open-world setting** **has not been demonstrated yet and would probably require tremendous resources computing power making it very unlikely that such techniques would be used by a local adversary in the near future.** Such techniques could however hypothetically be used by an advanced and probably global adversary with access to your source network to determine some of your activity. Examples of those attacks are described in several research papers[^69]'[^70]'[^71] as well as their limitations[^72]. The Tor Project itself published an article about these attacks with some mitigations: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://blog.torproject.org/new-low-cost-traffic-analysis-attacks-mitigations).
![][67]
@@ -752,17 +752,17 @@ Be aware again that this might not be enough against a motivated global adversar
Be also aware that all the other methods described in this guide such as Behavioral analysis can also be used to deanonymize Tor users indirectly (see further [Your Digital Fingerprint, Footprint, and Online Behavior][Your Digital Fingerprint, Footprint, and Online Behavior:]).
-I also strongly recommend reading this very good, complete, and thorough (and more detailed) guide on most known Attack Vectors on Tor: [[Archive.org]][70] as well as this recent research publication [[Archive.org]][71]
+I also strongly recommend reading this very good, complete, and thorough (and more detailed) guide on most known Attack Vectors on Tor: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/Attacks-on-Tor/Attacks-on-Tor) as well as this recent research publication [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323627387_Shedding_Light_on_the_Dark_Corners_of_the_Internet_A_Survey_of_Tor_Research)
-As well as this great series of blog posts: [[Archive.org]][72]
+As well as this great series of blog posts: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/906-Tor-0day-The-Management-Vulnerability.html)
-Recently, one of these attacks was attempted on the Tor Network with more information here: [[Archive.org]][73]
+Recently, one of these attacks was attempted on the Tor Network with more information here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/active-attack-on-tor-network-tried-to-decloak-users-for-five-months/)
Lastly, do remember that using Tor can already be considered suspicious activity[^76], and its use could be considered malicious by some[^77].
-This guide will later propose some mitigations to such attacks by changing your origin from the start (using public wi-fi's for instance). Remember that such attacks are usually carried by highly skilled, highly resourceful, and motivated adversaries and are out of scope from this guide. It is also recommended that you learn about practical correlation attacks, as performed by intelligence agencies: [[Archive.org]][1385]
+This guide will later propose some mitigations to such attacks by changing your origin from the start (using public wi-fi's for instance). Remember that such attacks are usually carried by highly skilled, highly resourceful, and motivated adversaries and are out of scope from this guide. It is also recommended that you learn about practical correlation attacks, as performed by intelligence agencies: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220516000616/https://officercia.mirror.xyz/WeAilwJ9V4GIVUkYa7WwBwV2II9dYwpdPTp3fNsPFjo)
-**Disclaimer: it should also be noted that Tor is not designed to protect against a global adversary. For more information see [[Archive.org]][74] and specifically, "Part 3. Design goals and assumptions.".**
+**Disclaimer: it should also be noted that Tor is not designed to protect against a global adversary. For more information see [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://svn-archive.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf) and specifically, "Part 3. Design goals and assumptions.".**
### Some Devices can be tracked even when offline:
@@ -770,7 +770,9 @@ This guide will later propose some mitigations to such attacks by changing your
You have seen this in action/spy/Sci-Fi movies and shows, the protagonists always remove the battery of their phones to make sure it cannot be used. Most people would think that's overkill. Well, unfortunately, no, this is now becoming true at least for some devices:
- iPhones and iPads (IOS 13 and above)[^78]'[^79]
+
- Samsung Phones (Android 10 and above)[^80]
+
- MacBooks (macOS 10.15 and above)[^81]
Such devices will continue to broadcast identity information to nearby devices even when offline using Bluetooth Low-Energy[^82]. They do not have access to the devices directly (which are not connected to the internet) but instead use BLE to find them through other nearby devices[^83]. They are using peer-to-peer short-range Bluetooth communication to broadcast their status through nearby online devices.
@@ -815,9 +817,9 @@ The IMEI and IMSI can be traced back to you in at least six ways:
- ...
-Here is also a good YouTube video on this topic: DEFCON Safe Mode - Cooper Quintin - Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real-Time [[Invidious]][75]
+Here is also a good YouTube video on this topic: DEFCON Safe Mode - Cooper Quintin - Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real-Time [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=siCk4pGGcqA)
-**For these reasons, it is crucial to get dedicated an anonymous phone number and/or an anonymous burner phone with an anonymous pre-paid sim card that is not tied to you in any way (past or present) for conducting sensitive activities. It is also possible get an anonymous pre-paid but preferably dedicated number from specific free and paid online services accepting anonymous cryptocurrencies like Monero (Get more practical guidance here: [Getting an anonymous Phone number][Getting an anonymous Phone number:]).**
+**For these reasons, it is crucial to get dedicated an anonymous phone number and/or an anonymous burner phone with an anonymous pre-paid sim card that is not tied to you in any way (past or present) for conducting sensitive activities (See more practical guidance in [Getting an anonymous Phone number][Getting an anonymous Phone number:] section).**
While there are some smartphones manufacturers like Purism with their Librem series[^98] who claim to have your privacy in mind, they still do not allow IMEI randomization which we believe is a key anti-tracking feature that should be provided by such manufacturers. While this measure will not prevent IMSI tracking within the SIM card, it would at least allow you to keep the same "burner phone" and only switch SIM cards instead of having to switch both for privacy.
@@ -855,25 +857,25 @@ See [Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices]
All modern CPUs[^102] are now integrating hidden management platforms such as the now infamous Intel Management Engine[^103] and the AMD Platform Security Processor[^104].
-Those management platforms are small operating systems running directly on your CPU as long as they have power. These systems have full access to your computer's network and could be accessed by an adversary to de-anonymize you in various ways (using direct access or using malware for instance) as shown in this enlightening video: BlackHat, How to Hack a Turned-Off Computer, or Running Unsigned Code in Intel Management Engine [[Invidious]][76].
+Those management platforms are small operating systems running directly on your CPU as long as they have power. These systems have full access to your computer's network and could be accessed by an adversary to de-anonymize you in various ways (using direct access or using malware for instance) as shown in this enlightening video: BlackHat, How to Hack a Turned-Off Computer, or Running Unsigned Code in Intel Management Engine [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=mYsTBPqbya8).
These have already been affected by several security vulnerabilities in the past[^105] that allowed malware to gain control of target systems. These are also accused by many privacy actors including the EFF and Libreboot of being a backdoor into any system[^106].
There are some not so straightforward ways[^107] to disable the Intel IME on some CPUs and you should do so if you can. For some AMD laptops, you can disable it within the BIOS settings by disabling PSP.
-Note that, to AMD's defense, there were no security vulnerabilities found for ASP and no backdoors either. See [[Invidious]][77]. In addition, AMD PSP does not provide any remote management capabilities contrary to Intel IME.
+Note that, to AMD's defense, there were no security vulnerabilities found for ASP and no backdoors either. See [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=bKH5nGLgi08&t=2834s). In addition, AMD PSP does not provide any remote management capabilities contrary to Intel IME.
If you are feeling a bit more adventurous, you could install your own BIOS using Libreboot or Coreboot [^108] if your laptop supports it (be aware that Coreboot does contain some propriety code unlike its fork Libreboot).
Check yourself:
-- If you are using Linux you can check the vulnerability status of your CPU to Spectre/Meltdown attacks by using [[Archive.org]][80] which is available as a package for most Linux distros including Whonix. Spectre is a transient execution attack. There is also PoC code for Spectre v1 and v2 on iPhone devices here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220814122148/https://github.com/cispa/BranchDifferent) and here [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220814122652/https://misc0110.net/files/applespectre_dimva22.pdf)
+- If you are using Linux you can check the vulnerability status of your CPU to Spectre/Meltdown attacks by using [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker) which is available as a package for most Linux distros including Whonix. Spectre is a transient execution attack. There is also PoC code for Spectre v1 and v2 on iPhone devices here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220814122148/https://github.com/cispa/BranchDifferent) and here [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220814122652/https://misc0110.net/files/applespectre_dimva22.pdf)
-- If you are using Windows, you can check the vulnerability status of your CPU using inSpectre [[Archive.org]][81]
+- If you are using Windows, you can check the vulnerability status of your CPU using inSpectre [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.grc.com/inspectre.htm)
Some CPUs have unfixable flaws (especially Intel CPUs) that could be exploited by various malware. Here is a good current list of such vulnerabilities affecting recent widespread CPUs: [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transient_execution_CPU_vulnerability)
-Some of these can be avoided using Virtualization Software settings that can mitigate such exploits. See this guide for more information [[Archive.org]][82] (warning: these can severely impact the performance of your VMs).
+Some of these can be avoided using Virtualization Software settings that can mitigate such exploits. See this guide for more information [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Spectre_Meltdown) (warning: these can severely impact the performance of your VMs).
This guide won't go too deep into side-channel and microarchitecture attacks but we will highlight some issues with both Intel and AMD CPU architectures that will be mitigated throughout. It's important to recognize hardware is just as susceptible to bugs, and therefore exploitation, regardless of manufacturer.
@@ -889,31 +891,31 @@ Here are good overviews of what is being collected by those five popular OSes in
- Android/Google:
- - Just have a read at their privacy policy [[Archive.org]][83]
+ - Just have a read at their privacy policy [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://policies.google.com/privacy)
- - School of Computer Science & Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google [[Archive.org]][84]
+ - School of Computer Science & Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.scss.tcd.ie/doug.leith/apple_google.pdf)
- IOS/Apple:
- - More information at [[Archive.org]][85] and [[Archive.org]][86]
+ - More information at [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/) and [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202100)
- - School of Computer Science & Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google [[Archive.org]][84]
+ - School of Computer Science & Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.scss.tcd.ie/doug.leith/apple_google.pdf)
- Apple does claim[^109] that they anonymize this data using differential privacy[^110] but you will have to trust them on that.
- Windows/Microsoft:
- - Full list of required diagnostic data: [[Archive.org]][87]
+ - Full list of required diagnostic data: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/required-windows-diagnostic-data-events-and-fields-2004)
- - Full list of optional diagnostic data: [[Archive.org]][88]
+ - Full list of optional diagnostic data: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/windows-diagnostic-data)
- macOS:
- - More details on [[Archive.org]][89]
+ - More details on [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/share-analytics-information-mac-apple-mh27990/mac)
- Ubuntu:
- - Ubuntu despite being a Linux distribution also collects Telemetry Data nowadays. This data however is quite limited compared to the others. More details on [[Archive.org]][90]
+ - Ubuntu despite being a Linux distribution also collects Telemetry Data nowadays. This data however is quite limited compared to the others. More details on [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://ubuntu.com/desktop/statistics)
Not only are Operating Systems gathering telemetry services but so are Apps themselves like Browsers, Mail Clients, and Social Networking Apps installed on your system.
@@ -989,7 +991,7 @@ The question is: Is there someone somewhere that would have both pieces of infor
Have you heard of Edward Snowden[^134]? Now is the time to google him and read his book[^135]. Also read about XKEYSCORE[^136]'[^137], MUSCULAR[^138], SORM[^139], Tempora[^140] , and PRISM[^141].
-See "We kill people based on Metadata"[^142] or this famous tweet from the IDF [[Archive.org]][91] [[Nitter]][92].
+See "We kill people based on Metadata"[^142] or this famous tweet from the IDF [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://twitter.com/idf/status/1125066395010699264) [[Nitter]](https://nitter.net/idf/status/1125066395010699264).
See [Appendix N: Warning about smartphones and smart devices]
@@ -1007,9 +1009,9 @@ While these methods are usually used for marketing purposes and advertising, the
Here are some examples:
-- Specialized companies are selling to, for example, law enforcement agencies products for analyzing social network activities such as [[Archive.org]][93]
+- Specialized companies are selling to, for example, law enforcement agencies products for analyzing social network activities such as [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://mediasonar.com/)
-- For example, as a basis of authentication, a user's typing speed, keystroke depressions, patterns of error (say accidentally hitting an "l" instead of a "k" on three out of every seven transactions) and mouse movements establish that person's unique pattern of behavior[^152]. Some commercial services such as TypingDNA ( [[Archive.org]][94]) even offer such analysis as a replacement for two-factor authentications.
+- For example, as a basis of authentication, a user's typing speed, keystroke depressions, patterns of error (say accidentally hitting an "l" instead of a "k" on three out of every seven transactions) and mouse movements establish that person's unique pattern of behavior[^152]. Some commercial services such as TypingDNA ( [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.typingdna.com/)) even offer such analysis as a replacement for two-factor authentications.
- This technology is also widely used in CAPTCHAS[^371] services to verify that you are "human" and can be used to fingerprint a user.
@@ -1023,17 +1025,17 @@ Here is also a recent example just showing what Google Chrome collects on you: <
Here are some other resources on the topic if you cannot see this documentary:
-- 2017, Behavior Analysis in Social Networks, [[Archive.org]][95]
+- 2017, Behavior Analysis in Social Networks, [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4614-7163-9_110198-1)
-- 2017, Social Networks and Positive and Negative Affect [[Archive.today]][96]
+- 2017, Social Networks and Positive and Negative Affect [[Archive.today]](https://archive.ph/iuowI)
-- 2015, Using Social Networks Data for Behavior and Sentiment Analysis [[Archive.org]][97]
+- 2015, Using Social Networks Data for Behavior and Sentiment Analysis [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300562034_Using_Social_Networks_Data_for_Behavior_and_Sentiment_Analysis)
-- 2016, A Survey on User Behavior Analysis in Social Networks [[Archive.org]][98]
+- 2016, A Survey on User Behavior Analysis in Social Networks [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.academia.edu/30936118/A_Survey_on_User_Behaviour_Analysis_in_Social_Networks)
- 2017, DEF CON 25 presentation: [DEF CON 25 - Svea Eckert, Andreas Dewes - Dark Data](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo) [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1nvYGi7-Lxo)
-- 2019, Influence and Behavior Analysis in Social Networks and Social Media [[Archive.org]][99]
+- 2019, Influence and Behavior Analysis in Social Networks and Social Media [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://web.archive.org/web/https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2)
So, how can you mitigate these?
@@ -1063,13 +1065,13 @@ These are clues you might give over time that could point to your real identity.
A real use and well-documented case of this was the arrest of the hacker Jeremy Hammond[^153] who shared over time several details about his past and was later discovered.
-There are also a few cases involving OSINT at Bellingcat[^154]. Have a look at their very informative (but slightly outdated) toolkit here: [[Archive.org]][100]
+There are also a few cases involving OSINT at Bellingcat[^154]. Have a look at their very informative (but slightly outdated) toolkit here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18rtqh8EG2q1xBo2cLNyhIDuK9jrPGwYr9DI2UncoqJQ/edit)
**We have an OSINT discussion room in our Matrix community. Feel free to join at ```#OSINT:matrix.org```.**
You can also view some convenient lists of some available OSINT tools here if you want to try them on yourself for example:
-- [[Archive.org]][101]
+- [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/jivoi/awesome-osint)
-
@@ -1077,7 +1079,7 @@ You can also view some convenient lists of some available OSINT tools here if yo
-
-As well as this interesting Playlist on YouTube: [[Invidious]][102]
+As well as this interesting Playlist on YouTube: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/playlist?list=PLrFPX1Vfqk3ehZKSFeb9pVIHqxqrNW8Sy)
As well as those interesting podcasts:
@@ -1095,25 +1097,25 @@ If you are walking in a touristy place, you will most likely appear in someone's
Here are a few resources for even trying this yourself:
-- Bellingcat, Guide To Using Reverse Image Search For Investigations: [[Archive.org]][103]
+- Bellingcat, Guide To Using Reverse Image Search For Investigations: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2019/12/26/guide-to-using-reverse-image-search-for-investigations/)
-- Bellingcat, Using the New Russian Facial Recognition Site SearchFace [[Archive.org]][104]
+- Bellingcat, Using the New Russian Facial Recognition Site SearchFace [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2019/02/19/using-the-new-russian-facial-recognition-site-searchface-ru/)
-- Bellingcat, Dali, Warhol, Boshirov: Determining the Time of an Alleged Photograph from Skripal Suspect Chepiga [[Archive.org]][105]
+- Bellingcat, Dali, Warhol, Boshirov: Determining the Time of an Alleged Photograph from Skripal Suspect Chepiga [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/10/24/dali-warhol-boshirov-determining-time-alleged-photograph-skripal-suspect-chepiga/)
-- Bellingcat, Advanced Guide on Verifying Video Content [[Archive.org]][106]
+- Bellingcat, Advanced Guide on Verifying Video Content [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2017/06/30/advanced-guide-verifying-video-content/)
-- Bellingcat, Using the Sun and the Shadows for Geolocation [[Archive.org]][107]
+- Bellingcat, Using the Sun and the Shadows for Geolocation [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2020/12/03/using-the-sun-and-the-shadows-for-geolocation/)
-- Bellingcat, Navalny Poison Squad Implicated in Murders of Three Russian Activists [[Archive.org]][108]
+- Bellingcat, Navalny Poison Squad Implicated in Murders of Three Russian Activists [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2021/01/27/navalny-poison-squad-implicated-in-murders-of-three-russian-activists/)
-- Bellingcat, Berlin Assassination: New Evidence on Suspected FSB Hitman Passed to German Investigators [[Archive.org]][109]
+- Bellingcat, Berlin Assassination: New Evidence on Suspected FSB Hitman Passed to German Investigators [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/03/19/berlin-assassination-new-evidence-on-suspected-fsb-hitman-passed-to-german-investigators/)
-- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Investigating a Saudi-Led Coalition Bombing of a Yemen Hospital [[Invidious]][110]
+- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Investigating a Saudi-Led Coalition Bombing of a Yemen Hospital [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=cAVZaPiVArA)
-- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Using Facial Recognition in Investigations [[Invidious]][111]
+- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Using Facial Recognition in Investigations [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=awY87q2Mr0E)
-- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Geolocating (Allegedly) Corrupt Venezuelan Officials in Europe [[Invidious]][112]
+- Bellingcat, Digital Research Tutorial: Geolocating (Allegedly) Corrupt Venezuelan Officials in Europe [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=bS6gYWM4kzY)
### Gait Recognition and Other Long-Range Biometrics
@@ -1125,11 +1127,11 @@ Other things than can be used to identify you include your earlobes, which are a
![][113]
-(Illustration from [[Archive.org]][114])
+(Illustration from [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-79310-1.pdf))
![][115]
-(illustration from [[Archive.org]][116])
+(illustration from [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://rd.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-42504-3_15))
Those platforms (Google/Facebook) already know who you are for a few reasons:
@@ -1147,9 +1149,9 @@ Governments already know who you are because they have your ID/Passport/Driving
Here are some resources detailing some techniques used by Law Enforcement today:
-- CCC video explaining current Law Enforcement surveillance capabilities: [[Archive.org]][117]
+- CCC video explaining current Law Enforcement surveillance capabilities: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://media.ccc.de/v/rc3-11406-spot_the_surveillance)
-- EFF SLS: [[Archive.org]][118]
+- EFF SLS: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.eff.org/sls)
Apple is making FaceID mainstream and pushing its use to log you into many services including the Banking systems.
@@ -1161,9 +1163,9 @@ Even your iris can be used for identification in some places[^190].
We can safely imagine a near future where you will not be able to create accounts or sign in anywhere without providing unique biometrics (A suitable time to re-watch Gattaca[^191], Person of Interest[^192] , and Minority Report[^193]). And you can safely imagine how useful these large biometrics databases could be to some interested third parties.
-In addition, all this information can also be used against you (if you are already de-anonymized) using deepfake[^194] by crafting false information (Pictures, Videos, Voice Recordings[^195]...) and have already been used for such purposes[^196]'[^197]. There are even commercial services for this readily available such as [[Archive.org]][119] and [[Archive.org]][120].
+In addition, all this information can also be used against you (if you are already de-anonymized) using deepfake[^194] by crafting false information (Pictures, Videos, Voice Recordings[^195]...) and have already been used for such purposes[^196]'[^197]. There are even commercial services for this readily available such as [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.respeecher.com/) and [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.descript.com/overdub).
-See this demo: [[Invidious]][121]
+See this demo: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=t5yw5cR79VA)
At this time, there are a few steps[^198] you can use to mitigate (and only mitigate) face recognition when conducting sensitive activities where CCTV might be present:
@@ -1173,9 +1175,9 @@ At this time, there are a few steps[^198] you can use to mitigate (and only miti
- Wear sunglasses in addition to the facemask and baseball cap to mitigate identification from your eye's features.
-- Consider wearing special sunglasses (expensive, unfortunately) called "Reflectacles" [[Archive.org]][122]. There was a small study showing their efficiency against IBM and Amazon facial recognition[^201].
+- Consider wearing special sunglasses (expensive, unfortunately) called "Reflectacles" [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.reflectacles.com/). There was a small study showing their efficiency against IBM and Amazon facial recognition[^201].
-- All that might still be useless because of gait recognition mentioned earlier but there might be hope here if you have a 3D Printer: [[Archive.org]][123]
+- All that might still be useless because of gait recognition mentioned earlier but there might be hope here if you have a 3D Printer: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://gitlab.com/FG-01/fg-01)
(see [Gait Recognition and Other Long-Range Biometrics])
@@ -1189,9 +1191,9 @@ A typical case is an adversary using a man-in-the-middle[^97] attack or a fake e
Such attacks can also be used to de-anonymize someone by tricking them into downloading malware or revealing personal information over time. The only defense against those is not to fall for them and common sense.
-These have been used countless times since the early days of the internet and the usual one is called the "419 scam" (see [[Wikiless]][124] [[Archive.org]][125]).
+These have been used countless times since the early days of the internet and the usual one is called the "419 scam" (see [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/Advance-fee_scam) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance-fee_scam)).
-Here is a good video if you want to learn a bit more about phishing types: Black Hat, Ichthyology: Phishing as a Science [[Invidious]][126].
+Here is a good video if you want to learn a bit more about phishing types: Black Hat, Ichthyology: Phishing as a Science [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=Z20XNp-luNA).
## Malware, exploits, and viruses:
@@ -1207,9 +1209,9 @@ These could be exploiting a vulnerability in an outdated format or an outdated r
See these good videos for more explanations on the matter:
-- What is a File Format? [[Invidious]][127]
+- What is a File Format? [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=VVdmmN0su6E)
-- Ange Albertini: Funky File Formats: [[Invidious]][128]
+- Ange Albertini: Funky File Formats: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=hdCs6bPM4is)
You should always use extreme caution. To mitigate these attacks, this guide will later recommend the use of virtualization (See [Appendix W: Virtualization][Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers:]) to mitigate leaking any information even in case of opening such a malicious file.
@@ -1239,13 +1241,13 @@ To reflect these recommendations, this guide will therefore later guide you in t
There are readily available commercial and cheap "badUSB" [^213]devices that can take deploy malware, log your typing, geolocate you, listen to you or gain control of your laptop just by plugging them in. Here are some examples that you can already buy yourself:
-- Hak5, USB Rubber Ducky [[Archive.org]][129]
+- Hak5, USB Rubber Ducky [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://shop.hak5.org/products/usb-rubber-ducky-deluxe)
-- Hak5, O.MG Cable [[Invidious]][130]
+- Hak5, O.MG Cable [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=V5mBJHotZv0)
-- Keelog [[Archive.org]][131]
+- Keelog [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.keelog.com/)
-- AliExpress [[Archive.org]][132]
+- AliExpress [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.aliexpress.com/i/4000710369016.html)
Such devices can be implanted anywhere (charging cable, mouse, keyboard, USB key ...) by an adversary and can be used to track you or compromise your computer or smartphone. The most notable example of such attacks is probably Stuxnet[^214] in 2005.
@@ -1279,7 +1281,7 @@ Here is an example of EXIF data that could be on a picture:
(Illustration from Wikipedia)
-This also works for videos. Yes, videos too have geo-tagging, and many are very unaware of this. Here Is for instance a very convenient tool to geo-locate YouTube videos: [[Archive.org]][134]
+This also works for videos. Yes, videos too have geo-tagging, and many are very unaware of this. Here Is for instance a very convenient tool to geo-locate YouTube videos: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://mattw.io/youtube-geofind/location)
For this reason, you will always have to be incredibly careful when uploading files using your anonymous identities and check the metadata of those files.
@@ -1293,7 +1295,7 @@ Pictures/Videos often contain visible watermarks indicating who is the owner/cre
So, if you are a whistleblower and thinking about leaking some picture/audio/video file. Think twice. There are chances that those might contain invisible watermarking within them that would include information about you as a viewer. Such watermarks can be enabled with a simple switch in like Zoom (Video[^223] or Audio[^224]) or with extensions[^225] for popular apps such as Adobe Premiere Pro. These can be inserted by various content management systems.
-For a recent example where someone leaking a Zoom meeting recording was caught because it was watermarked: [[Tor Mirror]][135] [[Archive.org]][136]
+For a recent example where someone leaking a Zoom meeting recording was caught because it was watermarked: [[Tor Mirror]](https://27m3p2uv7igmj6kvd4ql3cct5h3sdwrsajovkkndeufumzyfhlfev4qd.onion/2021/01/18/leak-zoom-meeting/) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://theintercept.com/2021/01/18/leak-zoom-meeting/)
Such watermarks can be inserted by various products[^226]'[^227]'[^228]'[^229] using Steganography[^230] and can resist compression[^231] and re-encoding[^232]'[^233].
@@ -1307,15 +1309,15 @@ Be extremely careful when publishing videos/pictures/audio files from known comm
Did you know your printer is most likely spying on you too? Even if it is not connected to any network? This is usually a known fact by many people in the IT community but few outside people.
-Yes ... Your printers can be used to de-anonymize you as well as explained by the EFF here [[Archive.org]][137]
+Yes ... Your printers can be used to de-anonymize you as well as explained by the EFF here [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.eff.org/issues/printers)
-With this (old but still relevant) video explaining how from the EFF as well: [[Invidious]][138]
+With this (old but still relevant) video explaining how from the EFF as well: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=izMGMsIZK4U)
Many printers will print an invisible watermark allowing for identification of the printer on every printed page. This is called Printer Steganography[^235]. There is no tangible way to mitigate this but to inform yourself on your printer and make sure it does not print any invisible watermark. This is important if you intend to print anonymously.
-Here is an (old but still relevant) list of printers and brands who do not print such tracking dots provided by the EFF [[Archive.org]][139]
+Here is an (old but still relevant) list of printers and brands who do not print such tracking dots provided by the EFF [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.eff.org/pages/list-printers-which-do-or-do-not-display-tracking-dots)
-Here are also some tips from the Whonix documentation ( [[Archive.org]][140]):
+Here are also some tips from the Whonix documentation ( [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Printing_and_Scanning)):
**Do not ever print in Color, usually, watermarks are not present without color toners/cartridges**[^236]**.**
@@ -1325,21 +1327,21 @@ Did you ever see a document with blurred text? Did you ever make fun of those mo
Well, there are techniques for recovering information from such documents, videos, and pictures.
-Here is for example an open-source project you could use yourself for recovering text from some blurred images yourself: [[Archive.org]][141]
+Here is for example an open-source project you could use yourself for recovering text from some blurred images yourself: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/beurtschipper/Depix)
![][142]
This is of course an open-source project available for all to use. But you can imagine that such techniques have probably been used before by other adversaries. These could be used to reveal blurred information from published documents that could then be used to de-anonymize you.
-There are also tutorials for using such techniques using Photo Editing tools such as GIMP such as [[Archive.org]][144] followed by [[Scribe.rip]][145] [[Archive.org]][146]
+There are also tutorials for using such techniques using Photo Editing tools such as GIMP such as [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://medium.com/@somdevsangwan/unblurring-images-for-osint-and-more-part-1-5ee36db6a70b) followed by [[Scribe.rip]](https://scribe.rip/@somdevsangwan/deblurring-images-for-osint-part-2-ba564af8eb5d) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://medium.com/@somdevsangwan/deblurring-images-for-osint-part-2-ba564af8eb5d)
![][147]
-Finally, you will find plenty of deblurring resources here: [[Archive.org]][148]
+Finally, you will find plenty of deblurring resources here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://github.com/subeeshvasu/Awesome-Deblurring)
Some online services could even help you do this automatically to some extent like MyHeritage.com enhance tool:
- [[Archive.org]][149]
+ [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.myheritage.com/photo-enhancer)
Here is the result of the above image:
@@ -1347,7 +1349,7 @@ Here is the result of the above image:
Of course, this tool is more like "guessing" than really deblurring at this point, but it could be enough to find you using various reverse image searching services.
-There are also techniques to deblur/depixelate parts in videos: see [[Archive.org]][1371]
+There are also techniques to deblur/depixelate parts in videos: see [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://positive.security/blog/video-depixelation)
For this reason, it is always extremely important that you correctly redact and curate any document you might want to publish. Blurring is not enough, and you should always completely blacken/remove any sensitive data to avoid any attempt at recovering data from any adversary. Do not pixelized, do not blur, just put a hard black rectangle to redact information.
@@ -1355,7 +1357,7 @@ For this reason, it is always extremely important that you correctly redact and
Contrary to widespread belief, Crypto transactions (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) are not anonymous[^237]. Most cryptocurrencies can be tracked accurately through various methods[^238]'[^239].
-Remember what they say on their page: [[Archive.org]][151] and [[Archive.org]][152]: "Bitcoin is not anonymous"
+Remember what they say on their page: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know) and [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy): "Bitcoin is not anonymous"
The main issue is not setting up a random Crypto wallet to receive some currency behind a VPN/Tor address (at this point, the wallet is anonymous). The issue is mainly when you want to convert Fiat money (Euros, Dollars ...) to Crypto and then when you want to cash in your Crypto. You will have few realistic options but to transfer those to an exchange (such as Coinbase/Kraken/Bitstamp/Binance). Those exchanges have known wallet addresses and will keep detailed logs (due to KYC[^240] financial regulations) and can then trace back those crypto transactions to you using the financial system[^241].
@@ -1381,13 +1383,13 @@ There are specialized commercial forensics solutions available (Magnet Axiom[^24
Notable Examples:
-- Apple iCloud: [[Archive.org]][153] : "Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on**, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages**. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices. ".
+- Apple iCloud: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303) : "Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on**, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages**. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices. ".
-- Google Drive and WhatsApp: [[Archive.org]][154]: "**Media and messages you back up aren't protected by WhatsApp end-to-end encryption while in Google Drive**. ". Do however note that Facebook/Whatsapp have announced the rollout of encrypted backups on October 14^th^ 2021 ( [[Archive.org]][155]) which should solve this issue.
+- Google Drive and WhatsApp: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://faq.whatsapp.com/android/chats/about-google-drive-backups/): "**Media and messages you back up aren't protected by WhatsApp end-to-end encryption while in Google Drive**. ". Do however note that Facebook/Whatsapp have announced the rollout of encrypted backups on October 14^th^ 2021 ( [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/end-to-end-encrypted-backups-on-whatsapp/)) which should solve this issue.
-- Dropbox: [[Archive.org]][156] "To provide these and other features, **Dropbox accesses, stores, and scans Your Stuff**. You give us permission to do those things, and this permission extends to our affiliates and trusted third parties we work with".
+- Dropbox: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.dropbox.com/privacy) "To provide these and other features, **Dropbox accesses, stores, and scans Your Stuff**. You give us permission to do those things, and this permission extends to our affiliates and trusted third parties we work with".
-- Microsoft OneDrive: [[Archive.org]][157]: Productivity and communications products, "When you use OneDrive, we collect data about your usage of the service, as well as the content you store, to provide, improve, and protect the services. **Examples include indexing the contents of your OneDrive documents so that you can search for them later and using location information to enable you to search for photos based on where the photo was taken**".
+- Microsoft OneDrive: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement): Productivity and communications products, "When you use OneDrive, we collect data about your usage of the service, as well as the content you store, to provide, improve, and protect the services. **Examples include indexing the contents of your OneDrive documents so that you can search for them later and using location information to enable you to search for photos based on where the photo was taken**".
You should not trust cloud providers with your (not previously and locally encrypted) sensitive data and you should be wary of their privacy claims. In most cases, they can access your data and provide it to a third party if they want to[^250].
@@ -1399,15 +1401,15 @@ Your Browser and Device Fingerprints[^382] are set of properties/capabilities of
You can find a lot of detailed information and publications about this on these resources:
-- [[Archive.org]][158]
+- [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://amiunique.org/links)
-- [[Archive.org]][159]
+- [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://brave.com/brave-fingerprinting-and-privacy-budgets/)
Most of the time, those fingerprints will, unfortunately, be unique or nearly unique to your Browser/System. This means that even If you log out from a website and then log back in using a different username, your fingerprint might remain the same if you did not take precautionary measures.
An adversary could then use such fingerprints to track you across multiple services even if you have no account on any of them and are using adblocking. These fingerprints could in turn be used to de-anonymize you if you keep the same fingerprint between services.
-It should also be noted that while some browsers and extensions will offer some fingerprint resistance, this resistance in itself can also be used to fingerprint you as explained here [[Archive.org]][160]
+It should also be noted that while some browsers and extensions will offer some fingerprint resistance, this resistance in itself can also be used to fingerprint you as explained here [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://palant.info/2020/12/10/how-anti-fingerprinting-extensions-tend-to-make-fingerprinting-easier/)
This guide will mitigate these issues by mitigating, obfuscating, and randomizing many of those fingerprinting identifiers by using Virtualization (See [Appendix W: Virtualization][Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers:]), using specific recommendations (See [Appendix A5: Additional browser precautions with JavaScript enabled] and [Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers][Appendix V1: Hardening your Browsers:]) and using by fingerprinting resistant Browsers (Brave and Tor Browser).
@@ -1415,7 +1417,7 @@ This guide will mitigate these issues by mitigating, obfuscating, and randomizin
There was an attack published that can deanonymize users if they have a known alias. For example, an attacker trying to track the activities of a journalist can use that journalist's public Twitter handle to link their anonymous identities with their public one. This breaks compartmentalization of identities and can lead to complete deanonymization, even of users who practice proper OPSEC.
-The attack, published at [[Archive.org]][1386], can be mitigated using the well-known [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension and will be our preferred recommendation.
+The attack, published at [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220720023429/https://leakuidatorplusteam.github.io/), can be mitigated using the well-known [NoScript](https://noscript.net/) extension and will be our preferred recommendation.
## Tor Browser:
@@ -1450,17 +1452,17 @@ Forensics techniques are now very advanced and can reveal a staggering amount of
Here are some recent resources you should read about your smartphone:
-- UpTurn, The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones [[Archive.org]][161]
+- UpTurn, The Widespread Power of U.S. Law Enforcement to Search Mobile Phones [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.upturn.org/reports/2020/mass-extraction/)
-- New-York Times, The Police Can Probably Break Into Your Phone [[Archive.org]][162]
+- New-York Times, The Police Can Probably Break Into Your Phone [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/iphone-encryption-police.html)
-- Vice, Cops Around the Country Can Now Unlock iPhones, Records Show [[Archive.org]][163]
+- Vice, Cops Around the Country Can Now Unlock iPhones, Records Show [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.vice.com/en/article/vbxxxd/unlock-iphone-ios11-graykey-grayshift-police)
I also highly recommend that you read some documents from a forensics examiner perspective such as:
-- EnCase Forensic User Guide, [[Archive.org]][164]
+- EnCase Forensic User Guide, [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/http://encase-docs.opentext.com/documentation/encase/forensic/8.07/Content/Resources/External%20Files/EnCase%20Forensic%20v8.07%20User%20Guide.pdf)
-- FTK Forensic Toolkit, [[Archive.org]][165]
+- FTK Forensic Toolkit, [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://accessdata.com/products-services/forensic-toolkit-ftk)
- SANS Digital Forensics and Incident Response Videos,
@@ -1502,7 +1504,7 @@ Cryptography is a complex topic and bad cryptography could easily lead to your d
In the context of this guide,we recommend sticking to Apps/Services using well-established, published, and peer-reviewed methods.
-So, what to prefer and what to avoid as of 2021? You will have to look up for yourself to get the technical details of each app and see if they are using "bad crypto" or "good crypto". Once you get the technical details, you could check this page for seeing what it is worth: [[Archive.org]][166]
+So, what to prefer and what to avoid as of 2021? You will have to look up for yourself to get the technical details of each app and see if they are using "bad crypto" or "good crypto". Once you get the technical details, you could check this page for seeing what it is worth: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://latacora.micro.blog/2018/04/03/cryptographic-right-answers.html)
Here are some examples:
@@ -1549,7 +1551,7 @@ Here are some examples:
- Prefer ECDSA (ed25519)+ECDH (ec25519) or RSA 4096 Bits*
- - **Consider a more modern**[^270] **alternative to PGP/GPG: Minisign ** [[Archive.org]][167]
+ - **Consider a more modern**[^270] **alternative to PGP/GPG: Minisign ** [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/)
- Avoid: RSA 2048 bits
@@ -1563,13 +1565,13 @@ Here are some examples:
Here are some real cases of issues bad cryptography:
-- Telegram: [[Archive.org]][168]
+- Telegram: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://democratic-europe.eu/2021/07/20/cryptographers-uncover-four-vulnerabilities-in-telegram/)
-- Telegram: [[Archive.org]][169]
+- Telegram: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://buttondown.email/cryptography-dispatches/archive/cryptography-dispatches-the-most-backdoor-looking/)
- Cryptocat:
-- Some other examples can be found here: [[Archive.org]][170]
+- Some other examples can be found here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.cryptofails.com/)
Later this guide will not recommend "bad cryptography" and that should hopefully be enough to protect you?
@@ -1613,55 +1615,55 @@ If the VPN provider knows nothing about you, it should mitigate any issue due to
(Illustration: an excellent movie we highly recommend: Das Leben der Anderen[^286])
-Many advanced techniques can be used by skilled adversaries[^287] to bypass your security measures provided they already know where your devices are. Many of those techniques are detailed here [[Archive.org]][172] (Air-Gap Research Page, Cyber-Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) but also in this report [[Archive.org]][173] (ESET, JUMPING THE AIR GAP: 15 years of nation-state effort) and include:
+Many advanced techniques can be used by skilled adversaries[^287] to bypass your security measures provided they already know where your devices are. Many of those techniques are detailed here [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap) (Air-Gap Research Page, Cyber-Security Research Center, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel) but also in this report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/eset_jumping_the_air_gap_wp.pdf) (ESET, JUMPING THE AIR GAP: 15 years of nation-state effort) and include:
- Attacks requiring malware implants:
- - Exfiltration of Data through a Malware infected Router: [[Invidious]][174]
+ - Exfiltration of Data through a Malware infected Router: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=mSNt4h7EDKo)
- - Exfiltration of Data through observation of Light variation in a Backlit keyboard with a compromised camera: [[Invidious]][175]
+ - Exfiltration of Data through observation of Light variation in a Backlit keyboard with a compromised camera: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=1kBGDHVr7x0)
- - Exfiltration of Data through a compromised Security Camera (that could first use the previous attack) [[Invidious]][176]
+ - Exfiltration of Data through a compromised Security Camera (that could first use the previous attack) [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=om5fNqKjj2M)
- - Communication from outsider to compromised Security Cameras through IR light signals: [[Invidious]][177]
+ - Communication from outsider to compromised Security Cameras through IR light signals: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=auoYKSzdOj4)
- - Exfiltration of data from a compromised air-gapped computer through acoustic analysis of the FAN noises with a smartphone [[Invidious]][178]
+ - Exfiltration of data from a compromised air-gapped computer through acoustic analysis of the FAN noises with a smartphone [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=v2_sZIfZkDQ)
- - Exfiltration of data from a malware-infected air-gapped computer through HD LEDs with a Drone [[Invidious]][179]
+ - Exfiltration of data from a malware-infected air-gapped computer through HD LEDs with a Drone [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=4vIu8ld68fc)
- - Exfiltration of data from a USB malware on an air-gapped computer through electromagnetic interferences [[Invidious]][180]
+ - Exfiltration of data from a USB malware on an air-gapped computer through electromagnetic interferences [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=E28V1t-k8Hk)
- - Exfiltration of data from a malware-infected HDD drive through covert acoustic noise [[Invidious]][181]
+ - Exfiltration of data from a malware-infected HDD drive through covert acoustic noise [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=H7lQXmSLiP8)
- - Exfiltration of data through GSM frequencies from a compromised (with malware) air-gapped computer [[Invidious]][182]
+ - Exfiltration of data through GSM frequencies from a compromised (with malware) air-gapped computer [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=RChj7Mg3rC4)
- - Exfiltration of data through electromagnetic emissions from a compromised Display device [[Invidious]][183]
+ - Exfiltration of data through electromagnetic emissions from a compromised Display device [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=2OzTWiGl1rM&t=20s)
- - Exfiltration of data through magnetic waves from a compromised air-gapped computer to a Smartphone stored inside a Faraday bag [[Invidious]][184]
+ - Exfiltration of data through magnetic waves from a compromised air-gapped computer to a Smartphone stored inside a Faraday bag [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=yz8E5n1Tzlo)
- - Communication between two compromised air-gapped computers using ultrasonic soundwaves [[Invidious]][184]
+ - Communication between two compromised air-gapped computers using ultrasonic soundwaves [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=yz8E5n1Tzlo)
- - Exfiltration of Bitcoin Wallet from a compromised air-gapped computer to a smartphone [[Invidious]][185]
+ - Exfiltration of Bitcoin Wallet from a compromised air-gapped computer to a smartphone [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=2WtiHZNeveY)
- - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer using display brightness [[Invidious]][186]
+ - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer using display brightness [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=ZrkZUO2g4DE)
- - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer through vibrations [[Invidious]][187]
+ - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer through vibrations [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=XGD343nq1dg)
- - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer by turning RAM into a Wi-Fi emitter [[Invidious]][188]
+ - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer by turning RAM into a Wi-Fi emitter [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=vhNnc0ln63c)
- - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer through power lines [[Archive.org]][189]
+ - Exfiltration of Data from a compromised air-gapped computer through power lines [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.04014.pdf)
- **Attacks not requiring malware:**
- - Observing a blank wall in a room from a distance to figure how many people are in a room and what they are doing[^288]. Publication with demonstration: [[Archive.org]][190]
+ - Observing a blank wall in a room from a distance to figure how many people are in a room and what they are doing[^288]. Publication with demonstration: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/http://wallcamera.csail.mit.edu/)
- - Observing a reflective bag of snacks in a room from a distance to reconstruct the entire room[^289]. Publication with photographic examples: [[Archive.org]][191]
+ - Observing a reflective bag of snacks in a room from a distance to reconstruct the entire room[^289]. Publication with photographic examples: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.04642.pdf)
- - Measuring floor vibrations to identify individuals and determine their health condition and mood[^290]. Publication with demonstration: [[Archive.org]][192]
+ - Measuring floor vibrations to identify individuals and determine their health condition and mood[^290]. Publication with demonstration: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://engineering.cmu.edu/news-events/news/2020/02/17-mauraders-map.html)
- - Observing a light bulb from a distance to listen to the sound in the room[^291] **without any malware**: Demonstration: [[Invidious]][193]. It should be noted that this type of attack is not new at all and there have been articles about such techniques as far back as 2013[^292] and that you can even buy devices to perform this yourself such as here: [[Archive.org]][194]
+ - Observing a light bulb from a distance to listen to the sound in the room[^291] **without any malware**: Demonstration: [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=t32QvpfOHqw). It should be noted that this type of attack is not new at all and there have been articles about such techniques as far back as 2013[^292] and that you can even buy devices to perform this yourself such as here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/http://www.gcomtech.com/ccp0-prodshow/laser-surveillance-laser-listening.html)
-Here is also a good video from the same authors to explain those topics: Black Hat, The Air-Gap Jumpers [[Invidious]][195]
+Here is also a good video from the same authors to explain those topics: Black Hat, The Air-Gap Jumpers [[Invidious]](https://yewtu.be/watch?v=YKRtFgunyj4)
**Realistically, this guide will be of little help against such adversaries as such malware could be implanted on the devices by a manufacturer, anyone in the middle**[^293]**, or by anyone with physical access to the air-gapped computer but there are still some ways to mitigate such techniques:**
@@ -1681,53 +1683,53 @@ Here is also a good video from the same authors to explain those topics: Black H
## Some bonus resources:
-- Have a look at the Whonix Documentation concerning Data Collection techniques here: [[Archive.org]][196]
+- Have a look at the Whonix Documentation concerning Data Collection techniques here: [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Data_Collection_Techniques)
-- You might also enjoy looking at this service [[Archive.org]][197] (Terms of Services, Didn't Read) that will give you a good overview of the various ToS of many services.
+- You might also enjoy looking at this service [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://tosdr.org/) (Terms of Services, Didn't Read) that will give you a good overview of the various ToS of many services.
-- Have a look at [[Archive.org]][198] for some more resources.
+- Have a look at [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy) for some more resources.
-- Have a look at [[Wikiless]][199] [[Archive.org]][200] to have an overview of all known mass-surveillance projects, current, and past.
+- Have a look at [[Wikiless]](https://wikiless.org/wiki/List_of_government_mass_surveillance_projects) [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government_mass_surveillance_projects) to have an overview of all known mass-surveillance projects, current, and past.
-- Have a look at [[Archive.org]][201] (even if you don't know about Death Note).
+- Have a look at [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.gwern.net/Death-Note-Anonymity) (even if you don't know about Death Note).
- Consider finding and reading Michael Bazzell's book "Open-Source Intelligence Techniques" (eighth edition as of this writing to find out more about recent OSINT techniques)
-- Finally, check [[Archive.org]][202] for the latest academic papers related to Online Anonymity.
+- Finally, check [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html) for the latest academic papers related to Online Anonymity.
## Notes:
If you still do not think such information can be used by various actors to track you, you can see some statistics for yourself for some platforms and keep in mind those are only accounting for the lawful data requests and will not count things like PRISM, MUSCULAR, SORM or XKEYSCORE explained earlier:
-- Google Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][203]
+- Google Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview)
-- Facebook Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][204]
+- Facebook Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://transparency.facebook.com/)
-- Apple Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][205]
+- Apple Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/)
-- Cloudflare Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][206]
+- Cloudflare Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.cloudflare.com/transparency/)
-- Snapchat Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][207]
+- Snapchat Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.snap.com/en-US/privacy/transparency)
-- Telegram Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][208] (requires telegram installed)
+- Telegram Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://t.me/transparency) (requires telegram installed)
-- Microsoft Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][209]
+- Microsoft Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/law-enforcement-requests-report)
-- Amazon Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][210]
+- Amazon Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GYSDRGWQ2C2CRYEF)
-- Dropbox Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][211]
+- Dropbox Transparency Report [[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.dropbox.com/transparency)
-- Discord Transparency Report [[Archive.org]][212]
+- Discord Transparency Report