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Microarchitecture bugs in Intel and AMD CPUs
Add more information about microarchitecture bugs Signed-off-by: pterocles <pterocles@proton.me>
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guide.md
@ -889,6 +889,8 @@ Model-specific registers (MSRs) and their configuration bits can also be detecte
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- [PLATYPUS](https://platypusattack.com/) <sup>[[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220814132343/https://platypusattack.com/)</sup> - Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86, which shows how an unprivileged attacker can leak AES-NI keys from Intel SGX and the Linux kernel and break kernel address-space layout randomization (KASLR).
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- [SQUIP](https://www.nextplatform.com/2022/08/11/squip-side-channel-attack-rattles-amds-zen-cores/) <sup>[[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220812082548/https://www.nextplatform.com/2022/08/11/squip-side-channel-attack-rattles-amds-zen-cores/)</sup> - Scheduler Queue Usage via Interface Probing. All of AMD's Zen CPUs are vulnerable to a medium-severity flaw which can allow threat actors to run side-channel attacks.
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- [Hertzbleed](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/06/hertzbleed-a-new-side-channel-attack.html) <sup>[[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220712000058/https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2022/06/hertzbleed-a-new-side-channel-attack.html)</sup> - Deducing cryptographic keys by analyzing power consumption has long been an attack, but it’s not generally viable because measuring power consumption is often hard. This new attack measures power consumption by measuring time, making it easier to exploit.
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- [Retbleed](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-retbleed-speculative-execution-cpu-attack-bypasses-retpoline-fixes/) <sup>[[Archive.org]](https://web.archive.org/web/20220804151557/https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-retbleed-speculative-execution-cpu-attack-bypasses-retpoline-fixes/)</sup> - Retbleed focuses on return instructions, which are part of the retpoline software mitigation against the speculative execution class of attacks that became known starting early 2018, with Spectre.
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This guide won't go too deep into side-channel and microarchitecture attacks but we will highlight some issues with both Intel and AMD CPU architectures that will be mitigated throughout. It's important to recognize hardware is just as susceptible to bugs, and therefore exploitation, regardless of manufacturer.
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