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Newsgroups: info.firearms.politics
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Subject: Waco Article
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From: ACUS10@waccvm.sps.mot.com (Mark Fuller)
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WACO
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What really happened during the government's
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assault on, siege and ultimate destruction of
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the Branch Davidians, and who is responsible?
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by M. Pietrantoni
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as printed in American Survival 12/93
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[Most Americans believe the federal government's actions leading
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to the deaths of Branch Davidian religious sect leader David Koresh and
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nearly 100 of his followers at their compound outside Waco, Texas, last
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spring were justified and necessary to control the illegal activities of
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religious fanatics. Yet many troubling questions about the government's
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actions remain unanswered. And as of this writing, it remains unclear
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whether the Branch Davidians were in fact violating any laws. And
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critics are asking if the government's heavy handed tactics were
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justified--The editors.]
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Why did the disaster of the destructions of the Branch Davidians
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in Waco happen? Was it, as the government would have you believe, the
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inevitable result of a religious fanatic who led those who believed in
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him to their deaths? Or was it something far worse, a government out of
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control? Or worse still, a government in control, knowing full well what
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it was doing?
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The media and government played up the supposedly sinister and
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sensational aspect of "stockpiling" of weapons by the BDs, but in
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actuality, Texas Rangers recovered about 200 guns from the ashes of the
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compound, an average of 2 per person. In Texas the average number of
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guns owned by citiizens is about four per person.
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The flaws and lies in the search warrant which the federal
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Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, BATF, attempted to execute at
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the Branch Davidian compound are so numerous that it would take a book
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length article to detail them all. Here are just three of the more
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glaring examples of the flaws in the warrant:
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- Special Agent Davy Aguilera, BATF, was the head investigator
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of the Branch Davidian probe. An affidavit by Aquilera filed in support
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of the warrant notes a conversation by another BATF agent, Carlos
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Torres, with one Joyce Sparks, a child abuse investigator with the Texas
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Department of Human Services. Ms. Sparks had twice visited the BD
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residence in Mt. Carmel to investigate reports that BD leader David
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Koresh (who changed his name from Vernon Howell) had been "sexually
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abusing young girls," reports, by the way, that Ms. Sparks found to be
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unsubstantiated. In Aguilera's affidavit he says that Ms. Sparks told
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agent Torres that during her second visit to the compound on April 6,
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1992, "Koresh told her that he was the 'Messenger' from God, that the
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world was coming to an end, and that when he 'reveals' himself the riots
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in Los Angeles would pale in comparison to what was going to happen in
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Waco, Texas." If Ms. Sparks is to be believed then David Koresh may well
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have had a special link to the Almighty, since the L.A. riots, started
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on April 27, 1992. [Three weeks afterwards].
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- In another part of Aguilera's supporting affidavit he cites
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the claim by one Marc Breault, a disgruntled former member of the BDs,
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that Breault, "participated in firearm shooting exercises conducted by
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Howell (David Koresh)." One can only wonder what kind of shot Marc
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Breault proved to be during these shooting exercises, since Mr. Breault
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is blind.
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- In his affidavit agent Aguilera told the federal magistrate
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from whom he was seeking the search warrant, that Koresh was in
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possession of a "clandestine" firearms publication: The Shotgun News, a
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well-respected national publication which carries ads by gun retailers
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and wholesalers, and has a circulation of more than 150,000.
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The February 28 raid by the BATF upon the Mt. Carmel compound,
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was in all senses a disaster. Six Branch Davidians and four BATF agents
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died and an unknown number of BDs (including Koresh) and 15 agents were
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wounded. Every aspect of the raid, from its planning to its execution
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was a case study in how not to conduct such an operation.
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From a tactical standpoint dozens of questions about the raid
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have been raised, for example why were there no ambulances on scene for
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such a high risk operation? Why did BATF commanders give the go-ahead
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for the raid even though they knew before it had ever started that the
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Branch Davidians knew that the raid was imminent? Etc., etc.
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There is, however, another category of questions regarding the
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raid. Questions which call into doubt many of the government assertions.
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Consider the following.
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From the New York Times, March 28, 1993, "Moments before the
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trailers arrived at the compound, two Scout helicopters and one Apache
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helicopter from Austin, filled with senior federal agents, circled
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overhead."
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"The helicopters had been supplied by the (Texas) National
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Guard, which typically lends them to Federal agencies only when the
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agencies need them for law-enforcement operations involving illegal
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drugs. Texas officials had been told by the bureau (BATF) that the three
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helicopters were warranted because of suspicions of illegal drugs in the
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compound."
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"But for weeks after the raid, federal officials insisted to
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reporters that there was never any suspicion of drugs at Mount Carmel.
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This week, after the governor's office indicated that it believed it had
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been misled by the agency, the firearms bureau for the first time said
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the compound may have held a methamphetamine laboratory." It should be
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noted that there is no mention of drug activity anywhere in the search
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warrant. This use of military helicopters by the BATF appears to be a
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clear vviolation of Title 32, of the U.S. Code, better known as the
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"Posse Comitatus" act.
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The BATF maintains that they were "ambushed" by the Branch
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Davidians, and that it was the Davidians who opened fire first. There
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are indications that the first shots may have been fired by BATF. In an
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article of the June 1993 edition of Soldier of Fortune, author James L.
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Pate notes that; "In phone calls to Texas news outlets and to CNN Koresh
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claimed an agent fired the first shot as Koresh opened the compound door
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to ask why the BATF was there. This is given some credence by one SOF
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law enforcement source who said an agent had an accidental discharge
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getting out of ... trailers used to transport and conceal agents--that
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he wounded himself in the leg and cried out 'I'm hit!'"
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"A slightly different version was told by Brad Branch, a cult
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member who surrendered. On 23 March, Branch used a jailhouse pay phone
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to call a radio station and say it was the BATF who fired the first
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shots, wounding Koresh and killing his 2-year-old daughter. This matches
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information from FBI and Texas Ranger sources whose investigations
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indicate BATF fired first."
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In June the House Appropriations subcommittee began hearings on
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the performance of the federal agents during the BATF raid. During those
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hearings, the FBI played for the first time publicly, a 30-minute
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recording of telephone calls made to 911 during the raid, by David
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Koresh and another leading Branch Davidian, Harvard educated lawyer
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Wayne Martin. It turns out that the tapes the FBI gave the committee
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were heavily edited and portions of the tape were played out of sequence
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giving a distorted impression of what really happened. Indeed The Dallas
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Morning News reported that a Waco police communications supervisor,
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Maria DeMarco, said the 30-minute tape was incomplete and "gives a false
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impression of how the event occurred."
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This author has heard the actual tape, (it is much longer than
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30 minutes) in its normal sequence. It is chilling to listen to, as
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Koresh and later Wayne Martin speak to Lieutenant Larry Lynch of the
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sheriffs office, amidst a cacophony of gunshots. Two portions of these
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conversations are particularly interesting. The first is Koresh speaking
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to Lynch;
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Lynch: "What I'm doing is trying to establish some links with
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you."
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Koresh: "No, no, no, no, no, let me tell you something. You see,
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you brought a bunch of guys out here and you killed some of my children.
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We told you we wanted to talk." Later in the conversation Koresh says to
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Lynch: "Now we are willing and we've been willing all this time to sit
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down with anybody." It turns out that Koresh, many months before had
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indeed offered to let the BATF come into the compound to check out his
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weapons.
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In another portion of the tape is a conversation between Lynch
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and Wayne Martin. This conversation is on a speakerphone with Martin
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across the room trying to take cover from BATF fire:
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Lynch: "Wayne, talk to me Wayne. Tell me how you are."
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Martin: "I have a right to defend myself. You started firing
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first."
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Lynch: "OK let's resolve it. Let's resolve this Wayne, before
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someone gets hurt. OK?...I'm trying to make contact with the persons
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outside (referring to the BATF). OK?"
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A few moments later: Martin: "We've ceased fire but they're
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firing at us."
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The Siege--Immediately after the fiasco of the BATF raid the FBI
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was given control of operations at Mt. Carmel. For 51 days the FBI tried
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using psychological warfare tactics against those inside. The first
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thing they did was cut off the electricity, water and sewer service to
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the compound. Of course this resulted in deteriorating sanitation
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conditions inside. Even though it was the government that cut off these
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services, both Attorney General Reno and President Clinton would later
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cite the sanitary conditions as a prime reason for the FBI assault of
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April 19. "The sanitation situation within the compound we were told was
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beginning to deteriorate," said Reno. And from President Clinton; "The
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children....being forced to live in unsanitary and unsafe
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conditions,"--Liberty magazine, June 1993.
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As the days wore on the government began portraying the siege as
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a "hostage crises" and brought in the FBI's HRT, Hostage Rescue Team.
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The simple fact is that this was not a hostage crisis. Those who wanted
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to leave the compound were permitted to do so very early on, in fact
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some 37 people including 21 children left the compound voluntarily.
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The FBI began ratcheting up the psychological pressure by
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blasting music and macabre sounds into the compound all night long.
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These sounds included the screeches of rabbits being slaughtered, as
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well as Tibetan chants. The sounds were accompanied by high power
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searchlights that were aimed into the compound as government helicopters
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flew over the buildings at rooftop level.
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By day, government tanks cleared fields of fire, and crushed the
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cars, trucks, boats, bicycles and tricycles that belonged to the
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Davidians and their children.
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All the while, the FBI was holding daily press conferences,
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assuring the public that they "would wait as long as necessary" and that
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"time was on our (the FBI's) side."
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The Final Assault--According to Janet Reno, she "was convinced
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that the passage of time only increased the likelihood of incidents and
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possible attendant injuries and harm." Yet the FBI's own Hostage
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Negotiation Training Manual unequivocally states that, "Time is always
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in our favor."
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Despite the manual, and the public statements, the government
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saw fit in the pre-dawn hours of April 19, to begin an assault against
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the Branch Davidians. There had been no provocation from those within
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the compound.
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It must be remembered that what the world saw on TV that April
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morning, the Mt. Carmel compound aflame, was the very end of a more than
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six-hour-long assault by the government. That assault began with the
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absurd spectacle of government loudspeakers blaring "this is not an
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assault" into the compound while tanks were repeatedly ramming the
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building and collapsing its stairways and hallways.
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And why would those inside need or want to escape? Because the
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government had for six hours or more been pumping a virulent type of
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teargas known as CS into the building. Yet according to an article
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entitled "Mass Murder, American-Style" that appeared in the June 1993
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issue of Liberty magazine: "We find that a week before the assault, the
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FBI said that it would not use tear gas on the compound, because it
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feared for the safety of the children. It had evidence that the adults
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had gas masks but the children did not.'" However just seven days later,
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"the FBI's operational plan was to pump in gas until the masks failed --
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which would require eight hours of continuous gassing." Also of interest
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is the fact that CS gas is to be banned for military use as of January
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1994 under terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. According to
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Benjamin C. Garrett, director of the Chemical and Biological Arms
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Control Institute, CS would have particularly impacted the children:
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"The reaction would have intensified for the children" since "the
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smaller you are the sooner you would feel response."
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The government maintains that the fire which consumed the
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compound was deliberately set by those inside. Others theorize that the
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fire resulted from lighted kerosine lanterns being knocked over as the
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tanks rammed the building. There is a third possibility. One that is
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both disturbing to think about and frightening in its implications. That
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is that the fire was no accident, that it was purposely set by the
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government.
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The American Justice Federation, AJF, headed by attorney Linda
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Thompson, has released a videotape of the FBI attack against the
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compound. A lot of the footage has been compiled from satellite feeds to
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the TV networks from video tape that has not been previously available
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to the public. Some of the scenes directly contradict government
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assertions. For example, one scene clearly shows a tank ramming through
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a wall of the compound two separate times. Each timee the tank backs out
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a jet of flame coming from a nozzle at the front of the tank and aimed
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into the building is clearly visible.
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It has now been determined that most of the women and all of the
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children fled to the underground concrete bunker to escape the CS gas.
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The bunker was located underneath the lawn on the north side of the
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compound, not underneath the building itself.
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Dr. N.S. Pirwani the chief medical investigator has stated that
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"21 of the BDs died of gunshot wounds but the rest died of smoke
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inhalation and suffocation due to being buried in debris when the bunker
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collapsed." What would cause a concrete bunker to collapse? The AJF
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videotape shows a tank moving backwards and forwards over what is
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described as the roof of that bunker before the fire in the compound
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ever started.
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Dick DeGuerrin, Koresh's attorney was asked in an interview in
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SoF if the fire was deliberately set by the government. His answer, "I'm
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not ready to say that. I don't have any evidence to support it. I heard
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a rumor that six or eight specially trained [men] were sent in to shoot
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people...when you look at some of the wounds, they were not suicide
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wounds."
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The End or Just the Beginning-- Waco, coming as it did just months after
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the government seige of Idaho recluce and racial separatist Randy
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Weaver, may not be an isolated inci- dent. Are we seeing a pattern
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established where the government will use the rubric of "gun control,"
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"child abuse" or other allegations to attack law-abiding people it deems
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undesirable?
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After the immolation of the Branch Davidians, President Clinton
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said: "I hope very much that others who will be tempted to join cults
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and to become involved with people like David Koresh will be deterred by
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the horrible scenes they have seen." He also, on the evening of the fire
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called Attorney General Janet Reno and said to her, "You should sleep
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well. You did a good job today."
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The AJF tape, Waco -- The Big Lie, can be purchased for $20 from
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the American Justice Federation, 3850 South Emerson Ave., Indianapolis,
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IN 46203.
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