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The following article appeared, in edited form, in the
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September, 1992 issue of \Liberty\. This file contains
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the original, unedited, and complete text. Reproduction
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on computer bulletin boards is permitted for informational
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purposes only. Copyright (c) 1992 by J. Neil Schulman.
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All other rights reserved.
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IF EXECUTION IS JUST, WHAT IS JUSTICE?
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by J. Neil Schulman
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Democracy has no more sensitive gauge than the public
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opinion poll, and the recent \Los Angeles Times\ poll which shows
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that four out of five Californians favored the execution of
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murderer Robert Alton Harris tells us everything we need to know
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about the political will of the people on this subject.
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But while the voice of the people may be the final word
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regarding our political decisions, few could argue that it
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disposes of moral questions, or even that such a political will
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is unchanging. At various times in human history, the voice of
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the people has favored slavery, the execution of blasphemers,
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and the Divine Right of Kings. Obviously, both a public moral
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sense, and the political will which follow from such feelings,
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are subject to revision.
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The largest single reason, given by those who supported the
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decision to execute Harris, was "Justice/Eye for An Eye." I find
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it both refreshing and comforting that moral, rather than merely
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utilitarian, considerations are at the forefront of most people's
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consciousness.
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Still, the question remains to be asked: on what basis does
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one believe that retribution -- "an eye for an eye" -- is a valid
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principle of moral justice?
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Is it primarily an emotional, rather than an intellectual,
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reaction based on empathy to the victims? What, then of the
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revulsion felt by others to the premeditated killing of a hogtied
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man?
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Is it a sense that something which was codified four
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millennia ago in the Code of Hammurabi must be right because of
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its age? What, then, of that code's literal call for
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retaliations including putting out eyes and cutting off hands?
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Is it because the Old Testament tells us that God told Moses
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that He was ordering us to execute murderers? First, how do we
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know that early authors didn't do some rewriting, or even that
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Moses -- a politician -- wasn't lying when he said the code was
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written by God? Second, if we are using the Book of Exodus as
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our legal code, why are we not executing people who curse their
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parents, or witches, or those who commit bestiality, or those who
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make sacrifices to any other deity? Third, if we take the New
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Testament as updated orders, do we obey Jesus when he says he who
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lives by the sword dies by the sword, or when he tells us that he
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who is without sin shall cast the first stone? And fourth, what
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business does a secular state have enforcing a \religious\ code
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in the first place?
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If we answer that we do not decide what is moral or just
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based on emotions, or tradition, or ancient religious writings,
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then there remain only two other ways to derive moral premises:
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direct revelation or human reason. Either our moral premises are
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personally dictated to us by a Superior Power -- and that claim
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must be backed with incontrovertible proof or it has no merit --
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or we must use our own powers of reason to figure out morality
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for ourselves.
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Perhaps such a rational inquiry can begin by asking why it
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is right for the State -- a secular organization acting as agent
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for ordinary individuals -- to do that which is universally
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despised when done by any of those individuals? Does the State
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act from practical, utilitarian considerations alone -- in which
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case such utility must first be subjected to moral limitations --
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or can it justify its killings on the basis of moral premises
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which can be derived without reference to sectarian religious
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documents?
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The State of California finds it fairly straightforward to
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define justifiable homicide for the private individual.
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According to the California Department of Justice's booklet
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\California Firearms Laws 1991\, "The killing of one person by
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another may be justifiable when necessary to resist the attempt
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to commit a forcible and life-threatening crime, \provided\ that
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a reasonable person in the same situation would believe that: a)
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the person killed intended to commit a forcible and life-
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threatening crime; b) there was imminent danger of such crime
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being accomplished; and, c) the person acted under the belief
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that such force was necessary to save himself or herself or
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another from death or a forcible and life-threatening crime.
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Murder, mayhem, rape, and robbery are examples of forcible and
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life-threatening crimes."
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For the private person -- or even the police officer -- the
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instant the threat ends, the grounds for justifiable homicide
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end.
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Strictly speaking, the State is no more than a group of
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individuals acting for common purpose. It is hard to imagine how
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it may rightly do more than the sum of the rights of the
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individuals comprising that group. How, then, does this
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transformation -- whereby homicide is justified long after the
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threat has ended -- occur? Does mere group procedure sanctify
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killing? If so, how many individuals must be in a group before
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it earns a license to kill? What \moral\ premise distinguishes
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the state criminal justice system from the lynch mob?
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The obvious answer is that in the absence of a Divine Ruler
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anointed by God, there is no moral basis for the State to do
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anything which it is not right for the private individual or
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group to do. Logic dictates that if it is morally justifiable for
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the State to kill in just retribution, then it must likewise be
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morally justifiable for other individuals or groups to do so as
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well -- the Mafia, the Crips, and the Bloods included.
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If it seems obviously wrong to you that private individuals
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have a right to retaliate -- if California's definition of
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justifiable homicide seems to you to be based on a valid moral
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premise -- then you must come up with a \moral\ justification for
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the State to do that which none of its principals may do.
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For me, I answer that it is wrong to punish murderers with
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death, because it far exceeds the scope of human justice. Human
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justice is based on the concept of seeking repair rather than
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further destruction. The religious concept of just retribution
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-- punishment, by another name -- is mere tit for tat,
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underivable from principles of reparative equity and therefore
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thoroughly irrelevant to justice or moral behavior as it may be
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enforced by a legal system. The allure of legal punishment is to
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adrenaline rather than reason.
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Consequently, I see no possible justification for the State,
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as an agent of the people, to claim a moral right to do that
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which none of its principals may do. If we have learned anything
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in four millennia of limiting the role of government, it is that
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if civil justice is to exist in a secular society, it means
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limiting equity among individuals to reparation of wrongful
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harms.
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If one believes, as I do, that killing a murderer has no
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reason-derived moral basis, it does not logically follow that one
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is advocating that murderers should continue to enjoy a pleasant
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life at the expense of their victims. The principle of
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reparation derives the object that murderers should labor hard
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until the end of their days, and all that they produce beyond
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their mere subsistence should be paid to the heirs of their
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victims. There is no reasonable moral basis for the practice of
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murderers spending their days being supported as privileged wards
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of a welfare state. Such false humanitarianism is gravely
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offensive to those who remember the murderer's victims, and
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such offense is possibly the basis for much of the emotion behind
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calls for state executions.
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To those of religious precepts, I must argue that it is
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quite enough for the institutions of a non-theocratic society to
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place immovable walls between murderers and the rest of us, and
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extract what value can be obtained for their victims' benefit.
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That is all safety and equity calls for. That is all that we --
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as individuals or as a group -- are entitled to. Beyond that
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imperfect human institutions should not go, and what perfect
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vengeance is required must be left to God, who in His own good
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time disposes of all lives as He sees fit anyway.
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****
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J. Neil Schulman is a novelist, screenwriter, and host of a
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weekly program on the American Radio Network.
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