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851 lines
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Laurence H. Tribe, "The Constitution in Cyberspace"
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PREPARED REMARKS
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE
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FIRST CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY
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Copyright, 1991, Jim Warren & Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
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All rights to copy the materials contained herein are reserved, except as
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hereafter explicitly licensed and permitted for anyone:
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Anyone may receive, store and distribute copies of this ASCII-format
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computer textfile in purely magnetic or electronic form, including on
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computer networks, computer bulletin board systems, computer conferencing
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systems, free computer diskettes, and host and personal computers, provided
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and only provided that:
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(1) this file, including this notice, is not altered in any manner, and
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(2) no profit or payment of any kind is charged for its distribution, other
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than normal online connect-time fees or the cost of the magnetic media, and
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(3) it is not reproduced nor distributed in printed or paper form, nor on
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CD ROM, nor in any form other than the electronic forms described above
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without prior written permission from the copyright holder.
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Arrangements to publish printed Proceedings of the First Conference on
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Computers, Freedom & Privacy are near completion. Audiotape and videotape
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versions are also being arranged.
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A later version of this file on the WELL (Sausalito, California) will
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include ordering details. Or, for details, or to propose other distribution
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alternatives, contact Jim Warren, CFP Chair,345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062;
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voice:(415)851-7075; fax:(415)851-2814; e-mail:jwarren@well.sf.ca.us.[4/19/91]
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[ These were the author's *prepared* remarks.
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A transcript of Professor Tribe's March 26th comments at the Conference
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(which expanded slightly on several points herein) will be uploaded onto the
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WELL as soon as it is transcribed from the audio tapes and proofed against
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the audio and/or videotapes.]
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"The Constitution in Cyberspace:
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Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier"
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by Laurence H. Tribe
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Copyright 1991 Laurence H. Tribe,
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Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law,
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Harvard Law School.
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Professor Tribe is the author, most recently, of
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"On Reading the Constitution" (Harvard University Press,
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Cambridge, MA, 1991).
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Introduction
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My topic is how to "map" the text and structure of our
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Constitution onto the texture and topology of "cyberspace". That's
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the term coined by cyberpunk novelist William Gibson, which many
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now use to describe the "place" -- a place without physical walls
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or even physical dimensions -- where ordinary telephone
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conversations "happen," where voice-mail and e-mail messages are
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stored and sent back and forth, and where computer-generated
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graphics are transmitted and transformed, all in the form of
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interactions, some real-time and some delayed, among countless
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users, and between users and the computer itself
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Some use the "cyberspace" concept to designate fantasy worlds
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or "virtual realities" of the sort Gibson described in his novel
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*Neuromancer*, in which people can essentially turn their minds into
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computer peripherals capable of perceiving and exploring the data
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matrix. The whole idea of "virtual reality," of course, strikes a
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slightly odd note. As one of Lily Tomlin's most memorable
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characters once asked, "What's reality, anyway, but a collective
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hunch?" Work in this field tends to be done largely by people who
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share the famous observation that reality is overrated!
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However that may be, "cyberspace" connotes to some users the
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sorts of technologies that people in Silicon Valley (like Jaron
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Lanier at VPL Research, for instance) work on when they try to
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develop "virtual racquetball" for the disabled, computer-aided
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design systems that allow architects to walk through "virtual
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buildings" and remodel them *before* they are built, "virtual
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conferencing" for business meetings, or maybe someday even "virtual
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day care centers" for latchkey children. The user snaps on a pair
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of goggles hooked up to a high-powered computer terminal, puts on
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a special set of gloves (and perhaps other gear) wired into the
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same computer system, and, looking a little bit like Darth Vader,
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pretty much steps into a computer-driven, drug-free, 3-dimensional,
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interactive, infinitely expandable hallucination complete with
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sight, sound and touch -- allowing the user literally to move
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through, and experience, information.
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I'm using the term "cyberspace" much more broadly, as many
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have lately. I'm using it to encompass the full array of
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computer-mediated audio and/or video interactions that are already
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widely dispersed in modern societies -- from things as ubiquitous
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as the ordinary telephone, to things that are still coming on-line
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like computer bulletin boards and networks like Prodigy, or like
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the WELL ("Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link"), based here in San
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Francisco. My topic, broadly put, is the implications of that
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rapidly expanding array for our constitutional order. It is a
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constitutional order that tends to carve up the social, legal, and
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political universe along lines of "physical place" or "temporal
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proximity." The critical thing to note is that these very lines, in
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cyberspace, either get bent out of shape or fade out altogether.
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The question, then, becomes: when the lines along which our
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Constitution is drawn warp or vanish, what happens to the
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Constitution itself?
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Setting the Stage
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To set the stage with a perhaps unfamiliar example, consider
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a decision handed down nine months ago, *Maryland v. Craig*, where
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the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of a state to put an
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alleged child abuser on trial with the defendant's accuser
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testifying not in the defendant's presence but by one-way,
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closed-circuit television. The Sixth Amendment, which of course
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antedated television by a century and a half, says: "In all
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criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
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be confronted with the witnesses against him." Justice O'Connor
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wrote for a bare majority of five Justices that the state's
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procedures nonetheless struck a fair balance between costs to the
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accused and benefits to the victim and to society as a whole.
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Justice Scalia, joined by the three "liberals" then on the Court
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(Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens), dissented from that
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cost-benefit approach to interpreting the Sixth Amendment. He
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wrote:
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The Court has convincingly proved that the Maryland
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procedure serves a valid interest, and gives the
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defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause
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guarantees (everything, that is, except confrontation).
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I am persuaded, therefore, that the Maryland procedure is
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virtually constitutional. Since it is not, however,
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actually constitutional I [dissent].
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Could it be that the high-tech, closed-circuit TV context,
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almost as familiar to the Court's youngest Justice as to his even
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younger law clerks, might've had some bearing on Justice Scalia's
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sly invocation of "virtual" constitutional reality? Even if
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Justice Scalia wasn't making a pun on "virtual reality," and I
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suspect he wasn't, his dissenting opinion about the Confrontation
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Clause requires *us* to "confront" the recurring puzzle of how
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constitutional provisions written two centuries ago should be
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construed and applied in ever-changing circumstances.
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Should contemporary society's technology-driven cost-benefit
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fixation be allowed to water down the old-fashioned value of direct
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confrontation that the Constitution seemingly enshrined as basic?
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I would hope not. In that respect, I find myself in complete
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agreement with Justice Scalia.
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But new technological possibilities for seeing your accuser
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clearly without having your accuser see you at all -- possibilities
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for sparing the accuser any discomfort in ways that the accuser
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couldn't be spared before one-way mirrors or closed-circuit TVs
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were developed -- *should* lead us at least to ask ourselves whether
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*two*-way confrontation, in which your accuser is supposed to be made
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uncomfortable, and thus less likely to lie, really *is* the core
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value of the Confrontation Clause. If so, "virtual" confrontation
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should be held constitutionally insufficient. If not -- if the
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core value served by the Confrontation Clause is just the ability
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to *watch* your accuser say that you did it -- then "virtual"
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confrontation should suffice. New technologies should lead us to
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look more closely at just *what values* the Constitution seeks to
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preserve. New technologies should *not* lead us to react reflexively
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*either way* -- either by assuming that technologies the Framers
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didn't know about make their concerns and values obsolete, or by
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assuming that those new technologies couldn't possibly provide new
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ways out of old dilemmas and therefore should be ignored
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altogether.
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The one-way mirror yields a fitting metaphor for the task we
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confront. As the Supreme Court said in a different context several
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years ago, "The mirror image presented [here] requires us to step
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through an analytical looking glass to resolve it." (*NCAA v.
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Tarkanian*, 109 S. Ct. at 462.) The world in which the Sixth
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Amendment's Confrontation Clause was written and ratified was a
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world in which "being confronted with" your accuser *necessarily*
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meant a simultaneous physical confrontation so that your accuser
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had to *perceive* you being accused by him. Closed-circuit
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television and one-way mirrors changed all that by *decoupling* those
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two dimensions of confrontation, marking a shift in the conditions of
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information-transfer that is in many ways typical of cyberspace.
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What does that sort of shift mean for constitutional analysis?
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A common way to react is to treat the pattern as it existed *prior*
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to the new technology (the pattern in which doing "A" necessarily
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*included* doing "B") as essentially arbitrary or accidental. Taking
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this approach, once the technological change makes it possible to
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do "A" *without* "B" -- to see your accuser without having him or her
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see you, or to read someone's mail without her knowing it, to
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switch examples -- one concludes that the "old" Constitution's
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inclusion of "B" is irrelevant; one concludes that it is enough for
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the government to guarantee "A" alone. Sometimes that will be the
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case; but it's vital to understand that, sometimes, it won't be.
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A characteristic feature of modernity is the subordination of
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purpose to accident -- an acute appreciation of just how contingent
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and coincidental the connections we are taught to make often are.
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We understand, as moderns, that many of the ways we carve up and
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organize the world reflect what our social history and cultural
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heritage, and perhaps our neurological wiring, bring to the world,
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and not some irreducible "way things are." A wonderful example
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comes from a 1966 essay by Jorge Louis Borges, "Other
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Inquisitions." There, the essayist describes the following
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taxonomy of the animal kingdom, which he purports to trace to an
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ancient Chinese encyclopedia entitled *The Celestial Emporium of
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Benevolent Knowledge*:
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On those remote pages it is written that animals are
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divided into:
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(a) those belonging to the Emperor
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(b) those that are embalmed
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(c) those that are trained
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(d) suckling pigs
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(e) mermaids
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(f) fabulous ones
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(g) stray dogs
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(h) those that are included in this classification
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(i) those that tremble as if they were mad
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(j) innumerable ones
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(k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush
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(l) others
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(m) those that have just broken a water pitcher
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(n) those that, from a great distance, resemble flies
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Contemporary writers from Michel Foucault, in *The Archaeology
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of Knowledge*, through George Lakoff, in *Women, Fire, and Dangerous
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Things*, use Borges' Chinese encyclopedia to illustrate a range of
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different propositions, but the *core* proposition is the supposed
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arbitrariness -- the political character, in a sense -- of all
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culturally imposed categories.
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At one level, that proposition expresses a profound truth and
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may encourage humility by combating cultural imperialism. At
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another level, though, the proposition tells a dangerous lie: it
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suggests that we have descended into the nihilism that so obsessed
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Nietzsche and other thinkers -- a world where *everything* is
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relative, all lines are up for grabs, all principles and
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connections are just matters of purely subjective preference or,
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worse still, arbitrary convention. Whether we believe that killing
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animals for food is wrong, for example, becomes a question
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indistinguishable from whether we happen to enjoy eating beans,
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rice and tofu.
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This is a particularly pernicious notion in a era when we pass
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more and more of our lives in cyberspace, a place where, almost by
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definition, our most familiar landmarks are rearranged or disappear
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altogether -- because there is a pervasive tendency, even (and
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perhaps especially) among the most enlightened, to forget that the
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human values and ideals to which we commit ourselves may indeed be
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universal and need not depend on how our particular cultures, or
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our latest technologies, carve up the universe we inhabit. It was
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my very wise colleague from Yale, the late Art Leff, who once
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observed that, even in a world without an agreed-upon God, we can
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still agree -- even if we can't "prove" mathematically -- that
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"napalming babies is wrong."
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The Constitution's core values, I'm convinced, need not be
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transmogrified, or metamorphosed into oblivion, in the dim recesses
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of cyberspace. But to say that they *need* not be lost there is
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hardly to predict that they *will* not be. On the contrary, without
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further thought and awareness of the kind this conference might
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provide, the danger is clear and present that they *will* be.
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The "event horizon" against which this transformation might
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occur is already plainly visible:
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Electronic trespassers like Kevin Mitnik don't stop with
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cracking pay phones, but break into NORAD -- the North American
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Defense Command computer in Colorado Springs -- not in a *WarGames*
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movie, but in real life.
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Less challenging to national security but more ubiquitously
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threatening, computer crackers download everyman's credit history
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from institutions like TRW; start charging phone calls (and more)
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to everyman's number; set loose "worm" programs that shut down
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thousands of linked computers; and spread "computer viruses"
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through everyman's work or home PC.
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It is not only the government that feels threatened by
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"computer crime"; both the owners and the users of private
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information services, computer bulletin boards, gateways, and
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networks feel equally vulnerable to this new breed of invisible
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trespasser. The response from the many who sense danger has been
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swift, and often brutal, as a few examples illustrate.
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Last March, U.S. Secret Service agents staged a surprise raid
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on Steve Jackson Games, a small games manufacturer in
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Austin, Texas, and seized all paper and electronic drafts of its
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newest fantasy role-playing game, *GURPS[reg.t.m.] Cyberpunk*,
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calling the game a "handbook for computer crime."
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By last Spring, up to one quarter of the U.S. Treasury
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Department's investigators had become involved in a project of
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eavesdropping on computer bulletin boards, apparently tracking
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notorious hackers like "Acid Phreak" and "Phiber Optik" through
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what one journalist dubbed "the dark canyons of cyberspace."
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Last May, in the now famous (or infamous) "Operation Sun Devil,"
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more than 150 secret service agents teamed up with state
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and local law enforcement agencies, and with security personnel
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from AT&T, American Express, U.S. Sprint, and a number of the
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regional Bell telephone companies, armed themselves with over two
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dozen search warrants and more than a few guns, and seized 42
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computers and 23,000 floppy discs in 14 cities from New York to
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Texas. Their target: a loose-knit group of people in their teens
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and twenties, dubbed the "Legion of Doom."
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I am not describing an Indiana Jones movie. I'm talking about
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America in the 1990s.
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The Problem
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The Constitution's architecture can too easily come to seem
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quaintly irrelevant, or at least impossible to take very seriously,
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in the world as reconstituted by the microchip. I propose today to
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canvass five axioms of our constitutional law -- five basic
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assumptions that I believe shape the way American constitutional
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scholars and judges view legal issues -- and to examine how they
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can adapt to the cyberspace age. My conclusion (and I will try not
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to give away too much of the punch line here) is that the Framers
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of our Constitution were very wise indeed. They bequeathed us a
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framework for all seasons, a truly astonishing document whose
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principles are suitable for all times and all technological
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landscapes.
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Axiom 1:
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There is a Vital Difference
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*Between Government and Private Action*
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The first axiom I will discuss is the proposition that the
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Constitution, with the sole exception of the Thirteenth Amendment
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prohibiting slavery, regulates action by the *government* rather than
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the conduct of *private* individuals and groups. In an article I
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wrote in the Harvard Law Review in November 1989 on "The Curvature
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of Constitutional Space," I discussed the Constitution's
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metaphor-morphosis from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian and
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Heisenbergian paradigm. It was common, early in our history, to
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see the Constitution as "Newtonian in design with its carefully
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counterpoised forces and counterforces, its [geographical and
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institutional] checks and balances." (103 *Harv. L. Rev.* at 3.)
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Indeed, in many ways contemporary constitutional law is still
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trapped within and stunted by that paradigm. But today at least
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some post-modern constitutionalists tend to think and talk in the
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language of relativity, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory. This
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may quite naturally suggest to some observers that the
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Constitution's basic strategy of decentralizing and diffusing power
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by constraining and fragmenting governmental authority in
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particular has been rendered obsolete.
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The institutional separation of powers among the three federal
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branches of government, the geographical division of authority
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between the federal government and the fifty state governments, the
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recognition of national boundaries, and, above all, the sharp
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distinction between the public and private spheres, become easy to
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deride as relics of a simpler, pre-computer age. Thus Eli Noam, in
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the First Ithiel de Sola Pool Memorial Lecture, delivered last
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October at MIT, notes that computer networks and network
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associations acquire quasi-governmental powers as they necessarily
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take on such tasks as mediating their members' conflicting
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interests, establishing cost shares, creating their own rules of
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admission and access and expulsion, even establishing their own *de
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facto* taxing mechanisms. In Professor Noam's words, "networks
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become political entities," global nets that respect no state or
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local boundaries. Restrictions on the use of information in one
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country (to protect privacy, for example) tend to lead to export of
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that information to other countries, where it can be analyzed and
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then used on a selective basis in the country attempting to
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restrict it. "Data havens" reminiscent of the role played by the
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Swiss in banking may emerge, with few restrictions on the storage
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and manipulation of information.
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A tempting conclusion is that, to protect the free speech and
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other rights of *users* in such private networks, judges must treat
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these networks not as associations that have rights of their own
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*against* the government but as virtual "governments" in themselves
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-- as entities against which individual rights must be defended in
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the Constitution's name. Such a conclusion would be misleadingly
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simplistic. There are circumstances, of course, when
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non-governmental bodies like privately owned "company towns" or
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even huge shopping malls should be subjected to legislative and
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administrative controls by democratically accountable entities, or
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even to judicial controls as though they were arms of the state --
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but that may be as true (or as false) of multinational corporations
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or foundations, or transnational religious organizations, or even
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small-town communities, as it is of computer-mediated networks.
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It's a fallacy to suppose that, just because a computer bulletin
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board or network or gateway is *something like* a shopping mall,
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government has as much constitutional duty -- or even authority --
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to guarantee open public access to such a network as it has to
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guarantee open public access to a privately owned shopping center
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like the one involved in the U.S. Supreme Court's famous *PruneYard
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Shopping Center* decision of 1980, arising from nearby San Jose.
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The rules of law, both statutory and judge-made, through which
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each state *allocates* private powers and responsibilities themselves
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represent characteristic forms of government action. That's why a
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state's rules for imposing liability on private publishers, or for
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deciding which private contracts to enforce and which ones to
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invalidate, are all subject to scrutiny for their consistency with
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the federal Constitution. But as a general proposition it is only
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what *governments* do, either through such rules or through the
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actions of public officials, that the United States Constitution
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constrains. And nothing about any new technology suddenly erases
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the Constitution's enduring value of restraining *government* above
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all else, and of protecting all private groups, large and small,
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from government.
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It's true that certain technologies may become socially
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indispensable -- so that equal or at least minimal access to basic
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computer power, for example, might be as significant a
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constitutional goal as equal or at least minimal access to the
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franchise, or to dispute resolution through the judicial system,
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or to elementary and secondary education. But all this means (or
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should mean) is that the Constitution's constraints on government
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must at times take the form of imposing *affirmative duties* to
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assure access rather than merely enforcing *negative prohibitions*
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against designated sorts of invasion or intrusion.
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Today, for example, the government is under an affirmative
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obligation to open up criminal trials to the press and the public,
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at least where there has not been a particularized finding that
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such openness would disrupt the proceedings. The government is
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also under an affirmative obligation to provide free legal
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assistance for indigent criminal defendants, to assure speedy
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trials, to underwrite the cost of counting ballots at election
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time, and to desegregate previously segregated school systems. But
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these occasional affirmative obligations don't, or shouldn't, mean
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that the Constitution's axiomatic division between the realm of
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public power and the realm of private life should be jettisoned.
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Nor would the "indispensability" of information technologies
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provide a license for government to impose strict content, access,
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pricing, and other types of regulation. *Books* are indispensable to
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most of us, for example -- but it doesn't follow that government
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should therefore be able to regulate the content of what goes onto
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the shelves of *bookstores*. The right of a private bookstore owner
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to decide which books to stock and which to discard, which books to
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display openly and which to store in limited access areas, should
|
||
remain inviolate. And note, incidentally, that this needn't make
|
||
the bookstore owner a "publisher" who is liable for the words
|
||
printed in the books on her shelves. It's a common fallacy to
|
||
imagine that the moment a computer gateway or bulletin board begins
|
||
to exercise powers of selection to control who may be on line, it
|
||
must automatically assume the responsibilities of a newscaster, a
|
||
broadcaster, or an author. For computer gateways and bulletin
|
||
boards are really the "bookstores" of cyberspace; most of them
|
||
organize and present information in a computer format, rather than
|
||
generating more information content of their own.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Axiom 2:
|
||
The Constitutional Boundaries of Private Property
|
||
and Personality Depend on Variables Deeper Than
|
||
*Social Utility and Technological Feasibility*
|
||
|
||
The second constitutional axiom, one closely related to the
|
||
private-public distinction of the first axiom, is that a person's
|
||
mind, body, and property belong *to that person* and not to the
|
||
public as a whole. Some believe that cyberspace challenges that
|
||
axiom because its entire premise lies in the existence of computers
|
||
tied to electronic transmission networks that process digital
|
||
information. Because such information can be easily replicated in
|
||
series of "1"s and "0"s, anything that anyone has come up with in
|
||
virtual reality can be infinitely reproduced. I can log on to a
|
||
computer library, copy a "virtual book" to my computer disk, and
|
||
send a copy to your computer without creating a gap on anyone's
|
||
bookshelf. The same is true of valuable computer programs, costing
|
||
hundreds of dollars, creating serious piracy problems. This
|
||
feature leads some, like Richard Stallman of the Free Software
|
||
Foundation, to argue that in cyberspace everything should be free
|
||
-- that information can't be owned. Others, of course, argue that
|
||
copyright and patent protections of various kinds are needed in
|
||
order for there to be incentives to create "cyberspace property" in
|
||
the first place.
|
||
Needless to say, there are lively debates about what the
|
||
optimal incentive package should be as a matter of legislative and
|
||
social policy. But the only *constitutional* issue, at bottom, isn't
|
||
the utilitarian or instrumental selection of an optimal policy.
|
||
Social judgments about what ought to be subject to individual
|
||
appropriation, in the sense used by John Locke and Robert Nozick,
|
||
and what ought to remain in the open public domain, are first and
|
||
foremost *political* decisions.
|
||
To be sure, there are some constitutional constraints on these
|
||
political decisions. The Constitution does not permit anything and
|
||
everything to be made into a *private commodity*. Votes, for
|
||
example, theoretically cannot be bought and sold. Whether the
|
||
Constitution itself should be read (or amended) so as to permit all
|
||
basic medical care, shelter, nutrition, legal assistance and,
|
||
indeed, computerized information services, to be treated as mere
|
||
commodities, available only to the highest bidder, are all terribly
|
||
hard questions -- as the Eastern Europeans are now discovering as
|
||
they attempt to draft their own constitutions. But these are not
|
||
questions that should ever be confused with issues of what is
|
||
technologically possible, about what is realistically enforceable,
|
||
or about what is socially desirable.
|
||
Similarly, the Constitution does not permit anything and
|
||
everything to be *socialized* and made into a public good available
|
||
to whoever needs or "deserves" it most. I would hope, for example,
|
||
that the government could not use its powers of eminent domain to
|
||
"take" live body parts like eyes or kidneys or brain tissue for
|
||
those who need transplants and would be expected to lead
|
||
particularly productive lives. In any event, I feel certain that
|
||
whatever constitutional right each of us has to inhabit his or her
|
||
own body and to hold onto his or her own thoughts and creations
|
||
should not depend solely on cost-benefit calculations, or on the
|
||
availability of technological methods for painlessly effecting
|
||
transfers or for creating good artificial substitutes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Axiom 3:
|
||
*Government May Not Control Information Content*
|
||
|
||
A third constitutional axiom, like the first two, reflects a
|
||
deep respect for the integrity of each individual and a healthy
|
||
skepticism toward government. The axiom is that, although
|
||
information and ideas have real effects in the social world, it's
|
||
not up to government to pick and choose for us in terms of the
|
||
*content* of that information or the *value* of those ideas.
|
||
This notion is sometimes mistakenly reduced to the naive
|
||
child's ditty that "sticks and stones may break my bones, but words
|
||
can never hurt me." Anybody who's ever been called something awful
|
||
by children in a schoolyard knows better than to believe any such
|
||
thing. The real basis for First Amendment values isn't the false
|
||
premise that information and ideas have no real impact, but the
|
||
belief that information and ideas are *too important* to entrust to
|
||
any government censor or overseer.
|
||
If we keep that in mind, and *only* if we keep that in mind,
|
||
will we be able to see through the tempting argument that, in the
|
||
Information Age, free speech is a luxury we can no longer afford.
|
||
That argument becomes especially tempting in the context of
|
||
cyberspace, where sequences of "0"s and "1"s may become virtual
|
||
life forms. Computer "viruses" roam the information nets,
|
||
attaching themselves to various programs and screwing up computer
|
||
facilities. Creation of a computer virus involves writing a
|
||
program; the program then replicates itself and mutates. The
|
||
electronic code involved is very much like DNA. If information
|
||
content is "speech," and if the First Amendment is to apply in
|
||
cyberspace, then mustn't these viruses be "speech" -- and mustn't
|
||
their writing and dissemination be constitutionally protected? To
|
||
avoid that nightmarish outcome, mustn't we say that the First
|
||
Amendment is *inapplicable* to cyberspace?
|
||
The answer is no. Speech is protected, but deliberately
|
||
yelling "Boo!" at a cardiac patient may still be prosecuted as
|
||
murder. Free speech is a constitutional right, but handing a bank
|
||
teller a hold-up note that says, "Your money or your life," may
|
||
still be punished as robbery. Stealing someone's diary may be
|
||
punished as theft -- even if you intend to publish it in book form.
|
||
And the Supreme Court, over the past fifteen years, has gradually
|
||
brought advertising within the ambit of protected expression
|
||
without preventing the government from protecting consumers from
|
||
deceptive advertising. The lesson, in short, is that
|
||
constitutional principles are subtle enough to bend to such
|
||
concerns. They needn't be broken or tossed out.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Axiom 4:
|
||
The Constitution is Founded on Normative
|
||
Conceptions of Humanity That Advances
|
||
*in Science and Technology Cannot "Disprove"*
|
||
|
||
A fourth constitutional axiom is that the human spirit is
|
||
something beyond a physical information processor. That axiom,
|
||
which regards human thought processes as not fully reducible to the
|
||
operations of a computer program, however complex, must not be
|
||
confused with the silly view that, because computer operations
|
||
involve nothing more than the manipulation of "on" and "off" states
|
||
of myriad microchips, it somehow follows that government control or
|
||
outright seizure of computers and computer programs threatens no
|
||
First Amendment rights because human thought processes are not
|
||
directly involved. To say that would be like saying that
|
||
government confiscation of a newspaper's printing press and
|
||
tomorrow morning's copy has nothing to do with speech but involves
|
||
only a taking of metal, paper, and ink. Particularly if the seizure
|
||
or the regulation is triggered by the content of the information
|
||
being processed or transmitted, the First Amendment is of course
|
||
fully involved. Yet this recognition that information processing
|
||
by computer entails something far beyond the mere sequencing of
|
||
mechanical or chemical steps still leaves a potential gap between
|
||
what computers can do internally and in communication with one
|
||
another -- and what goes on within and between human minds. It is
|
||
that gap to which this fourth axiom is addressed; the very
|
||
existence of any such gap is, as I'm sure you know, a matter of
|
||
considerable controversy.
|
||
What if people like the mathematician and physicist Roger
|
||
Penrose, author of *The Emperor's New Mind*, are wrong about human
|
||
minds? In that provocative recent book, Penrose disagrees with
|
||
those Artificial Intelligence, or AI, gurus who insist that it's
|
||
only a matter of time until human thought and feeling can be
|
||
perfectly simulated or even replicated by a series of purely
|
||
physical operations -- that it's all just neurons firing and
|
||
neurotransmitters flowing, all subject to perfect modeling in
|
||
suitable computer systems. Would an adherent of that AI orthodoxy,
|
||
someone whom Penrose fails to persuade, have to reject as
|
||
irrelevant for cyberspace those constitutional protections that
|
||
rest on the anti-AI premise that minds are *not* reducible to really
|
||
fancy computers?
|
||
Consider, for example, the Fifth Amendment, which provides
|
||
that "no person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to
|
||
be a witness against himself." The Supreme Court has long held
|
||
that suspects may be required, despite this protection, to provide
|
||
evidence that is not "testimonial" in nature -- blood samples, for
|
||
instance, or even exemplars of one's handwriting or voice. Last
|
||
year, in a case called *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, the Supreme Court
|
||
held that answers to even simple questions like "When was your
|
||
sixth birthday?" are testimonial because such a question, however
|
||
straightforward, nevertheless calls for the product of mental
|
||
activity and therefore uses the suspect's mind against him. But
|
||
what if science could eventually describe thinking as a process no
|
||
more complex than, say, riding a bike or digesting a meal? Might
|
||
the progress of neurobiology and computer science eventually
|
||
overthrow the premises of the *Muniz* decision?
|
||
I would hope not. For the Constitution's premises, properly
|
||
understood, are *normative* rather than *descriptive*. The philosopher
|
||
David Hume was right in teaching that no "ought" can ever be
|
||
logically derived from an "is." If we should ever abandon the
|
||
Constitution's protection for the distinctively and universally
|
||
human, it won't be because robotics or genetic engineering or
|
||
computer science have led us to deeper truths, but rather because
|
||
they have seduced us into more profound confusions. Science and
|
||
technology open options, create possibilities, suggest
|
||
incompatibilities, generate threats. They do not alter what is
|
||
"right" or what is "wrong." The fact that those notions are
|
||
elusive and subject to endless debate need not make them totally
|
||
contingent on contemporary technology.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Axiom 5:
|
||
Constitutional Principles Should Not
|
||
*Vary With Accidents of Technology*
|
||
|
||
In a sense, that's the fifth and final constitutional axiom I
|
||
would urge upon this gathering: that the Constitution's norms, at
|
||
their deepest level, must be invariant under merely *technological*
|
||
transformations. Our constitutional law evolves through judicial
|
||
interpretation, case by case, in a process of reasoning by analogy
|
||
from precedent. At its best, that process is ideally suited to
|
||
seeing beneath the surface and extracting deeper principles from
|
||
prior decisions. At its worst, though, the same process can get
|
||
bogged down in superficial aspects of preexisting examples,
|
||
fixating upon unessential features while overlooking underlying
|
||
principles and values.
|
||
When the Supreme Court in 1928 first confronted wiretapping
|
||
and held in *Olmstead v. United States* that such wiretapping
|
||
involved no "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
|
||
Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
|
||
the majority of the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment
|
||
"itself shows that the search is to be of material things -- the
|
||
person, the house, his papers or his effects," and said that "there
|
||
was no searching" when a suspect's phone was tapped because the
|
||
Constitution's language "cannot be extended and expanded to include
|
||
telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's
|
||
house or office." After all, said the Court, the intervening wires
|
||
"are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways
|
||
along which they are stretched." Even to a law student in the
|
||
1960s, as you might imagine, that "reasoning" seemed amazingly
|
||
artificial. Yet the *Olmstead* doctrine still survived.
|
||
It would be illuminating at this point to compare the Supreme
|
||
Court's initial reaction to new technology in *Olmstead* with its
|
||
initial reaction to new technology in *Maryland v. Craig*, the 1990
|
||
closed-circuit television case with which we began this discussion.
|
||
In *Craig*, a majority of the Justices assumed that, when the 18th-
|
||
century Framers of the Confrontation Clause included a guarantee of
|
||
two-way *physical* confrontation, they did so solely because it had
|
||
not yet become technologically feasible for the accused to look his
|
||
accuser in the eye without having the accuser simultaneously watch
|
||
the accused. Given that this technological obstacle has been
|
||
removed, the majority assumed, one-way confrontation is now
|
||
sufficient. It is enough that the accused not be subject to
|
||
criminal conviction on the basis of statements made outside his
|
||
presence.
|
||
In *Olmstead*, a majority of the Justices assumed that, when the
|
||
18th-century authors of the Fourth Amendment used language that
|
||
sounded "physical" in guaranteeing against invasions of a person's
|
||
dwelling or possessions, they did so not solely because *physical*
|
||
invasions were at that time the only serious threats to personal
|
||
privacy, but for the separate and distinct reason that *intangible*
|
||
invasions simply would not threaten any relevant dimension of
|
||
Fourth Amendment privacy.
|
||
In a sense, *Olmstead* mindlessly read a new technology *out* of
|
||
the Constitution, while *Craig* absent-mindedly read a new technology
|
||
*into* the Constitution. But both decisions -- *Olmstead* and *Craig* --
|
||
had the structural effect of withholding the protections of the
|
||
Bill of Rights from threats made possible by new information
|
||
technologies. *Olmstead* did so by implausibly reading the
|
||
Constitution's text as though it represented a deliberate decision
|
||
not to extend protection to threats that 18th-century thinkers
|
||
simply had not foreseen. *Craig* did so by somewhat more plausibly
|
||
-- but still unthinkingly -- treating the Constitution's seemingly
|
||
explicit coupling of two analytically distinct protections as
|
||
reflecting a failure of technological foresight and imagination,
|
||
rather than a deliberate value choice.
|
||
The *Craig* majority's approach appears to have been driven in
|
||
part by an understandable sense of how a new information technology
|
||
could directly protect a particularly sympathetic group, abused
|
||
children, from a traumatic trial experience. The *Olmstead*
|
||
majority's approach probably reflected both an exaggerated estimate
|
||
of how difficult it would be to obtain wiretapping warrants even
|
||
where fully justified, and an insufficient sense of how a new
|
||
information technology could directly threaten all of us. Although
|
||
both *Craig* and *Olmstead* reveal an inadequate consciousness about
|
||
how new technologies interact with old values, *Craig* at least seems
|
||
defensible even if misguided, while *Olmstead* seems just plain
|
||
wrong.
|
||
Around 23 years ago, as a then-recent law school graduate
|
||
serving as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, I
|
||
found myself working on a case involving the government's
|
||
electronic surveillance of a suspected criminal -- in the form of
|
||
a tiny device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth.
|
||
Because the invasion of the suspect's privacy was accomplished
|
||
without physical trespass into a "constitutionally protected area,"
|
||
the Federal Government argued, relying on *Olmstead*, that there had
|
||
been no "search" or "seizure," and therefore that the Fourth
|
||
Amendment "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
|
||
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
|
||
seizures," simply did not apply.
|
||
At first, there were only four votes to overrule *Olmstead* and
|
||
to hold the Fourth Amendment applicable to wiretapping and
|
||
electronic eavesdropping. I'm proud to say that, as a 26-year-old
|
||
kid, I had at least a little bit to do with changing that number
|
||
from four to seven -- and with the argument, formally adopted by a
|
||
seven-Justice majority in December 1967, that the Fourth Amendment
|
||
"protects people, not places." (389 U.S. at 351.) In that
|
||
decision, *Katz v. United States*, the Supreme Court finally
|
||
repudiated *Olmstead* and the many decisions that had relied upon it
|
||
and reasoned that, given the role of electronic telecommunications
|
||
in modern life, the First Amendment purposes of protecting *free
|
||
speech* as well as the Fourth Amendment purposes of protecting
|
||
*privacy* require treating as a "search" any invasion of a person's
|
||
confidential telephone communications, with or without physical
|
||
trespass.
|
||
Sadly, nine years later, in *Smith v. Maryland*, the Supreme
|
||
Court retreated from the *Katz* principle by holding that no search
|
||
occurs and therefore no warrant is needed when police, with the
|
||
assistance of the telephone company, make use of a "pen register",
|
||
a mechanical device placed on someone's phone line that records all
|
||
numbers dialed from the phone and the times of dialing. The
|
||
Supreme Court, over the dissents of Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
|
||
Marshall, found no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers
|
||
dialed, reasoning that the digits one dials are routinely recorded
|
||
by the phone company for billing purposes. As Justice Stewart, the
|
||
author of *Katz*, aptly pointed out, "that observation no more than
|
||
describes the basic nature of telephone calls . . . . It is simply
|
||
not enough to say, after *Katz*, that there is no legitimate
|
||
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller
|
||
assumes the risk that the telephone company will expose them to the
|
||
police." (442 U.S. at 746-747.) Today, the logic of *Smith* is
|
||
being used to say that people have no expectation of privacy when
|
||
they use their cordless telephones since they know or should know
|
||
that radio waves can be easily monitored!
|
||
It is easy to be pessimistic about the way in which the
|
||
Supreme Court has reacted to technological change. In many
|
||
respects, *Smith* is unfortunately more typical than *Katz* of the way
|
||
the Court has behaved. For example, when movies were invented, and
|
||
for several decades thereafter, the Court held that movie
|
||
exhibitions were not entitled to First Amendment protection. When
|
||
community access cable TV was born, the Court hindered municipal
|
||
attempts to provide it at low cost by holding that rules requiring
|
||
landlords to install small cable boxes on their apartment buildings
|
||
amounted to a compensable taking of property. And in *Red Lion v.
|
||
FCC*, decided twenty-two years ago but still not repudiated today,
|
||
the Court ratified government control of TV and radio broadcast
|
||
content with the dubious logic that the scarcity of the
|
||
electromagnetic spectrum justified not merely government policies
|
||
to auction off, randomly allocate, or otherwise ration the spectrum
|
||
according to neutral rules, but also much more intrusive and
|
||
content-based government regulation in the form of the so-called
|
||
"fairness doctrine."
|
||
Although the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
|
||
taken a somewhat more enlightened approach in dealing with cable
|
||
television, these decisions for the most part reveal a curious
|
||
judicial blindness, as if the Constitution had to be reinvented
|
||
with the birth of each new technology. Judges interpreting a late
|
||
18th century Bill of Rights tend to forget that, unless its *terms*
|
||
are read in an evolving and dynamic way, its *values* will lose even
|
||
the *static* protection they once enjoyed. Ironically, *fidelity* to
|
||
original values requires *flexibility* of textual interpretation. It
|
||
was Judge Robert Bork, not famous for his flexibility, who once
|
||
urged this enlightened view upon then Judge (now Justice) Scalia,
|
||
when the two of them sat as colleagues on the U.S. Court of Appeals
|
||
for the D.C. Circuit.
|
||
Judicial error in this field tends to take the form of saying
|
||
that, by using modern technology ranging from the telephone to the
|
||
television to computers, we "assume the risk." But that typically
|
||
begs the question. Justice Harlan, in a dissent penned two decades
|
||
ago, wrote: "Since it is the task of the law to form and project,
|
||
as well as mirror and reflect, we should not . . . merely recite .
|
||
. . risks without examining the *desirability* of saddling them upon
|
||
society." (*United States v. White*, 401 U.S. at 786). And, I would
|
||
add, we should not merely recite risks without examining how
|
||
imposing those risks comports with the Constitution's fundamental
|
||
values of *freedom*, *privacy*, and *equality*.
|
||
Failing to examine just that issue is the basic error I
|
||
believe federal courts and Congress have made:
|
||
|
||
* in regulating radio and TV broadcasting without
|
||
adequate sensitivity to First Amendment values;
|
||
|
||
* in supposing that the selection and editing of
|
||
video programs by cable operators might be less
|
||
than a form of expression;
|
||
|
||
* in excluding telephone companies from cable and
|
||
other information markets;
|
||
|
||
* in assuming that the processing of "O"s and "1"s
|
||
by computers as they exchange data with one
|
||
another is something less than "speech"; and
|
||
|
||
* in generally treating information processed
|
||
electronically as though it were somehow less
|
||
entitled to protection for that reason.
|
||
|
||
The lesson to be learned is that these choices and these
|
||
mistakes are not dictated by the Constitution. They are decisions
|
||
for us to make in interpreting that majestic charter, and in
|
||
implementing the principles that the Constitution establishes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
*Conclusion*
|
||
|
||
If my own life as a lawyer and legal scholar could leave just
|
||
one legacy, I'd like it to be the recognition that the Constitution
|
||
*as a whole* "protects people, not places." If that is to come
|
||
about, the Constitution as a whole must be read through a
|
||
technologically transparent lens. That is, we must embrace, as a
|
||
rule of construction or interpretation, a principle one might call
|
||
the "cyberspace corollary." It would make a suitable
|
||
Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution, one befitting the
|
||
200th anniversary of the Bill of Rights. Whether adopted all at
|
||
once as a constitutional amendment, or accepted gradually as a
|
||
principle of interpretation that I believe should obtain even
|
||
without any formal change in the Constitution's language, the
|
||
corollary I would propose would do for *technology* in 1991 what I
|
||
believe the Constitution's Ninth Amendment, adopted in 1791, was
|
||
meant to do for *text*.
|
||
The Ninth Amendment says: "The enumeration in the
|
||
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
|
||
disparage others retained by the people." That amendment provides
|
||
added support for the long-debated, but now largely accepted,
|
||
"right of privacy" that the Supreme Court recognized in such
|
||
decisions as the famous birth control case of 1965, *Griswold v.
|
||
Connecticut*. The Ninth Amendment's simple message is: The *text*
|
||
used by the Constitution's authors and ratifiers does not exhaust
|
||
the values our Constitution recognizes. Perhaps a Twenty-seventh
|
||
Amendment could convey a parallel and equally simple message: The
|
||
*technologies* familiar to the Constitution's authors and ratifiers
|
||
similarly do not exhaust the *threats* against which the
|
||
Constitution's core values must be protected.
|
||
The most recent amendment, the twenty-sixth, adopted in 1971,
|
||
extended the vote to 18-year-olds. It would be fitting, in a world
|
||
where youth has been enfranchised, for a twenty-seventh amendment
|
||
to spell a kind of "childhood's end" for constitutional law. The
|
||
Twenty-seventh Amendment, to be proposed for at least serious
|
||
debate in 1991, would read simply:
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||
|
||
"This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of
|
||
speech, press, petition, and assembly, and its
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||
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
|
||
and the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
|
||
due process of law, shall be construed as fully
|
||
applicable without regard to the technological method or
|
||
medium through which information content is generated,
|
||
stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled."
|
||
|
||
|
||
[Note: The machine-readable original of this was provided by the
|
||
author on a PC diskette in WordPerfect. It was reformatted to
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||
ASCII, appropriate for general network and computer access, by Jim Warren.
|
||
Text that was underlined or boldface in the original copy was delimited
|
||
by asterisks, and a registered trademark symbol was replaced by
|
||
"reg.t.m.". Other than that, the text was as provided by the author.]
|
||
|
||
|
||
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