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3178 lines
184 KiB
Plaintext
3178 lines
184 KiB
Plaintext
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THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
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This is ... a translation of a best-selling Japanese book called "The
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Japan That Can Say No." If you read no further in this introductory
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note, please at least read this: the group that has typed in and
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posted this translation wishes to secure for it the widest possible
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distribution. Please ... mail [this document] either in print or
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electronically, to colleagues, newspaper editors, members of the
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national and local government, academics, radio talk-show hosts,
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friends, and family; hand them out at work; leave piles of them by
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the coffee machine. Note that the book is rather short, and so can
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be conveniently Xerox-copied.
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This book has been a best-seller in Japan, and has been the subject
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of some attention in the United States; members of Congress have read
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it, and some spoke of reading it into the Congressional Record, but
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none of them ever did that. It has been excerpted in newspaper
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articles and Usenet postings, but these excerpts are always the same,
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because nearly no one has available the full text of a translation.
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This has not been an oversight on the part of the authors, Akio
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Morita and Shintaro Ishihara. Akio Morita is the chairman of Sony,
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the very large electronics conglomerate that has recently purchased
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Columbia Pictures. Shintaro Ishihara has been described in some news
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accounts as a right-wing extremist, and Morita's association with him
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has been described as a foolish mistake. These accounts are very
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misleading; so nearly as I can tell, Mr. Ishihara is no more an
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extremist in his country than, say, Bob Dole is in ours. He is a
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somewhat right-of-center, charismatic and powerful member of the
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ruling Liberal Democratic Party who placed third in the race to
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succeed Prime Minister Sosuke Uno this past August. Ishihara has
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served as the Minister of Transport, and is currently a member of the
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Diet, Japan's legislative body.
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The writers of American news accounts that call Mr. Morita's
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co-authorship of the book with Mr. Ishihara a foolish mistake are
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making a basic error of a sort that has complicated our understanding
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of the relationship between the United States and Japan: they are
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imagining that the reception the book would be given in the United
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States should have played a major factor in Morita's decision. But
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this book was not written to be read in the United States (and, so
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far, it has not been); it was written to be read by a Japanese public
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that questions the nature of the post-war political relationship
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between the United States and Japan. It is a political instrument
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that has helped to define for the public the positions of its authors
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in much the same way that a popular book of political essays might do
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so for an up-and-coming politician in the United States, and more so,
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because the Japanese read such books more avidly than does the
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American public.
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The book's publisher, Kobunsha Publishing Ltd., has said that it has
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no plans to publish the book in English and has authorized no
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translations. Ishihara and Morita have spoken of how the United
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States government has violated their copyright in distributing
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translations of the book to members of Congress, and Morita has gone
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on record as saying that he does not want to publish the book in the
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United States, as this might inflame relations between the two
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countries.
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According to rumor, the translations available in Washington have
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been written by either DARPA or the CIA. We have no idea if this is
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true, or which translation this might be; however, it is one of those
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circulated in Washington. It was apparently done in haste (and
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perhaps by non-native speakers of English), as it contains numerous
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typographical errors, errors of grammar, and errors of diction, which
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we have made no attempt to rectify.
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This translation has been entered and electronically distributed by a
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group that wishes to remain anonymous. This is because we have no
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wish to be bear-hugged in court by a powerful Japanese politician and
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the CEO of an immense Japanese conglomerate, all under the approving
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eye of the U.S. Department of State. However, we should like to
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explain why we wished to embark on a project whose success could only
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worsen the trade relationship, and even the political relationship
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between the United States and Japan.
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We Americans live in a country controlled by a variety of interests.
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Over the past ten years we have repeatedly put into government a
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group of people who cannot even make up their minds as to whether
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public education should be funded; who are against the creation of a
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national industrial policy; and who do not believe that the
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government should take any steps to ensure that manufacturing jobs
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should continue to exist in the United States.
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Like many Americans, those of us who have undertaken to distribute
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this book are able to make up our minds about all of these issues.
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We believe that public education should be one of the first national
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priorities and that the United States should have national industrial
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and trade policies to ensure the continued existence of domestic
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manufacturing. Our feelings about this are based on a simple desire
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to see the United States maintain a decent standard of living for its
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citizens. People who flip burgers are able to realize fewer of their
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dreams than are skilled laborers who build things, not least because
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people who flip burgers create less value for the economy and so make
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less money.
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How does "The Japan That Can Say No" figure in this? Our country is
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obsessed with feeling good, to the exclusion of good sense. The
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popular conception of our time runs something like this:
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"Everything's great, just like the president says. Those crazy folks
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on Wall Street go up and down, but they do okay, and if some more
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factories close, if a few shiftless characters can't afford housing,
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what the hell, huh? And those clever Japanese, what will they think
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of next? They're always thinking of neat new toys to make for us."
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The reality is much more grim. It seems very possible that in ten or
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twenty years there will be no sector in which American-made products
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are internationally competitive. Many American industrial concerns
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no longer establish domestic manufacturing plants because they are
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unable to find laborers sufficiently skilled to operate them
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efficiently. We educate fewer and fewer engineers each year. Much
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of American commerce is controlled by a managerial class that has
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been trained mostly in marketing, has trouble with simple technical
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concepts, and prefers the ease of marketing foreign products to the
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complexities of managing manufacturing and development. Meanwhile,
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many American citizens are unable to make ends meet, and their number
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is clearly increasing.
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All of these points are made regularly by domestic policy analysts,
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to absolutely no significant effect. We were struck by the fact that
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they are also made repeatedly in "The Japan That Can Say No,"
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although here they are often couched in racist and belligerent
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language. Ishihara and Morita wrote their book for domestic
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consumption, to promote themselves and particular Japanese national
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policies. We wish to use the book for an analogous purpose: we hope
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that reading "The Japan That Can Say No" will help to jolt Americans
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out of their complacency.
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We believe that the urgency of our country's situation justifies our
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disregard for the wishes of the book's authors. Their interest in
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analyzing the United States' problems seems to be motivated at best
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by a penchant for self-congratulation and at worst by one for
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jingoistic sentiment and self-promotion. The fact that they are
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attempting to ensure that their audience remains exclusively Japanese
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reinforces our sense that they do not see our country's interests as
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theirs. Still, much of what they say is accurate, and we believe
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that reading it may help our country to act in its own interests.
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Consider the analogy of a family who make their living by farming,
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and who are in domestic trouble. The head of the family (say the
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father) is a compulsive gambler, and, although some family members do
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their best to wake him up to the fact that he is destroying the
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family's livelihood, he pays no attention, selling off the tractor,
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the truck, the cows, mortgaging the house and the fields. He points
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out to his family that his good friends in town who run the bank, the
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general store, and the casino are still happy to do business with
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him. The bank still gives him mortgages, the general store still
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buys what's left of the farming equipment, and the casino always lets
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him in to play.
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Perhaps if the farmer knew he was the laugh of the town, he'd pay
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some attention. If he heard his friends clucking their tongues and
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saying that it was an awful shame, what he was doing to his family
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and that they didn't think he'd ever again get back on his feet, even
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as they eagerly bought his tractor and his fields and continued
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taking his money at the casino, he might think twice. Maybe he'd
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even realize how far he'd fallen, and set about the difficult work of
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putting his farm back in order.
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If this makes sense to you, please work to disseminate copies of this
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book as much as possible, especially to people outside of the Usenet
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community -- those of us with access to networks are, after all, a
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small minority of the national community. Please feel free to
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disseminate as well this introductory note.
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THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO
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The New U.S.-Japan Relations Card
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by
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Akio Morita
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Shintaro Ishihara
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Published in Japan by Kobunsha Publishing Ltd.
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[the cover sheet then says:]
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Kappa-Holmes
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Translator's Note: The material written by Mr. Morita is very
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straightforward; however, Mr. Ishihara tends to ramble, change from
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one subject to another without much transition, and uses a great deal
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of sayings and proverbs which when directly translated to English make
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no sense. What has been translated is the closest equivalent in
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English we could get.
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Editor's Note: This material was given numbered section headings and
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reformatted for easier reading. Also, a number of small misspellings
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were corrected.
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1.0 THE NECESSITY FOR PRESENT DAY JAPANESE TO REFORM THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS
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(Ishihara)
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1.1 Japanese People Have Become Top Heavy
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Each month, there is the Cabinet meeting for the economic report. I
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am one of those kinds of guys who gets up early and goes before the
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cabinet meeting, which winds up by 9 a.m., or 8 at the earliest.
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While rubbing my sleepy eyes, I go over the reports by the Bureau
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Chief of the Economic Planning Agency and by the Director of the Bank
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of Japan. Each month, the reports are almost identical. Generally,
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the Cabinet ministers sleep through it. When I suggested to the Chief
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Cabinet Secretary that in this age of governmental administra- tive
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reform, why not give up these meetings, the reponse, not entirely
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unexpected on my part, was that these were absolutely necessary, even
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if there were some Party executives who did not attend.
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Thus, each month, there is a repetition of a nearly identical report.
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The Bureau Chief of the Economic Planning Agency said this month, just
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as he did last month, that the magnitude of Japan's surplus in
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international revenues was tending to shrink. In other words, this
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means he is saying that it is perfectly alright for business not to be
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so good. The Cabinet members all nod and underline this in red.
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Myself, I thought this was a really strange phenomenon, so I turned to
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the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Kajiyama, who was sitting beside
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me, and asked what was going on here. Everybody is thinking it's just
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great that business isn't prospering that much and eagerly red-lining
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that information. Couldn't you say, however, that a country like that
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won't last long? Words, words -- if the meaning of words keeps
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changing, you can never be really sure what is being said. In other
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words, aren't our values changing?
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If we take Japan's vast trade surpluses as one type of crisis
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situation, then this points to the necessity of changing Japan's
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economic and industrial structure. While leaving undetermined for the
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moment whether or not the conclusions of the Maekawa Report were
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valid, it is true that the "comprehensive and vast" industries are
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tending to recede and the lean and mean knowledge-intensive types are
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coming into their own. When the term "comprehensive and vast"
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(jukochodai) is applied to human beings, it is a form of praise, while
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the opposite, "light and small" would be to berate the same. However,
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when these terms are applied to the industrial structure, their
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meaning has come to change.
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What matters, however, is whether or not this is good. Should we all
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be at ease, not that we are not dirtying our hands and sweating in
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order to make things with our own hands? Certainly know-how comes
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about from one type of mental activity, and coming up with it is a
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work worthy of respect. Looking at history, however, in cases where
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the whole society of the country was using their brains instead of
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their hands, not one has lasted to prosper today. In some sense, it
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may be true that the Japanese people are being forced into a new
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historical experience, but can we go on now, as we are, thinking we
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are the chosen people?
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When looking at the actions of the Japanese people these days, I
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recall that these seem similar to ET, the extra-terrestrial, in the
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Speilburg films. I feel that it may well be the Japanese people will
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evolve into something like ET with pronounced eyes and noses and a big
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head making them top-heavy, over an abnormally thin body and slender
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arms and legs.
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Therefore, it was impossible for Japan to get more than a few gold
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medals at the Seoul Olympics, which many Japanese read as being
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abnormal. While it may be that this is a sign that a new people has
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arisen to make contributions in other areas, it seems more natural to
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me that our descendants would be able to continue to sweat and work to
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keep the country strong.
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1.2 Japan's Advanced Technology Is at the Heart of Military Strength
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This is something advocated by Mr. Morita, who is a company leader
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that has driven Japan's advanced technology and who is known for
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manufacturing excellent products. He pointed out that the INF
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limitations (the restrictions on intermediate range nuclear forces)
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was something that the Soviet and American leaders came to each other
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on. While this was an epoch-making event, it was certainly not done
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because Americans and Russians had a new sense of the danger of
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nuclear weapons, they were not acting from the standpoint of human
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morality.
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There may be some people who took the INF negotiaions as a sign that
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both countries were beginning to act from their sense of humanity, but
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I think the reason why they got together on this is different.
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Whether it be mid-range nuclear weapons or inter-continental ballistic
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missiles, what ensures the accuracy of weapons is none other than
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compact, high-precision computers. As everyone knows, current ICBMs
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use the MIRV concept where there are multiple warheads. When an
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attacking missile gets near enough to be detected, the warhead splits
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into 8 or 9 separate heads. Not all of them contain hydrogen bombs,
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however, some are dummies designed just to dupe the enemy.
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The remaining warheads lose speed, reenter from space, fall, run
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sideways and follow complicated paths, but in the end, they hit the
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targets picked for them by spy satellites and destroy them to within 1
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second of latitudinal and longitudinal accuracy. For a Soviet ICBM,
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this would mean hitting the silo containing the retaliatory ICBM in
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Vandenburg AFB California.
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These silos go 50 or 60 meters underground and are strong fortresses
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having thick walls of reinforced concrete. If a direct hit is not
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scored upon them, one cannot destroy the hydrogen bombs inside. The
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equipment will not even be affected as much as it is in an earthquake
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if a direct hit is not made. Thus, it is absolutely vital that a
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direct hit is made.
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At the present time, Soviet technology allows these missiles to hit
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within a 60 meter accuracy, while for the U.S., it is 15 meters, and
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there is concern that this 15 meters has to be brought down to zero.
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This type of precision calls for a more complex orbit the further the
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attack proceeds, and only artificial intelligence can ensure accuracy.
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It may well be that America was the 4th generation leader and that the
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1 megabit and several megabit devices which will support the next, the
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5th generation, can be developed by American know-how. However, to
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use this know-how across diverse applications, including weapons,
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requires a country with dramatically advanced production management;
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it is only Japan that can deliver on it.
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In sum, if Japanese semiconductors are not used, this accuracy cannot
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be assured. It has come to the point that no matter how much they
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continue military expansion, if Japan stopped selling them the chips,
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there would be nothing more they could do.
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If, for example, Japan sold chips to the Soviet Union and stopped
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selling them to the U.S., this would upset the entire military
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balance. Some Americans say that if Japan were thinking of doing
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that, it would be occupied. Certainly, this is an age where things
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could come to that. The more technology advances, the more the U.S.
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and the Soviet Union will become dependent upon the initiative of the
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Japanese people -- this is getting crazy now, but the point is clear.
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The U.S. Defense Department's Science Commission recently prepared a
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huge classified report on electronic engineering. Looking at this,
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one can well understand the sense of crisis that the U.S. has with
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respect to Japan.
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The report states that if Japan is left to go as it is, it will be
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impossible to get the lead back. This report is very accurate in
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assessing the areas of weakness in the U.S. and the strengths in
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Japan, but only the President and a few select people have seen the
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report. If it were seen by the general public, it would certainly
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raise quite a commotion. It is in this area where the U.S.
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specialists have their greatest sense of danger, primarily centering
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on Japan's semiconductor technology.
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-- We have grown very dependent upon America's technological
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superiority in military strength. In that technology, electronic
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equipment is the most effective technology. Semiconductors are the
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"key" to preserving this superiority in electronic equipment, they are
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the "heart of the equipment." If competitive, mass production of
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semiconductors is the key, then this is in turn dependent upon having
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the market to support mass production. --
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This dependence on the market for supporting mass production can be
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seen in that America did not have the vast and diverse needs for
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semiconductors, as Japan did in rice cookers and other household
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appliances. In Japan, these sizable and diverse needs created the
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market for semiconductor production. The report continues:
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-- American's Semiconductor Industry for its commercial mass
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production is losing its superiority minute by minute. There is a
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strong relationship between superiority in production technology and
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superiority in semiconductor technology, this is being transferred to
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foreign countries minute by minute. Very soon now, the defense of
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America will become dependent upon supply sources abroad. It is the
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opinion of the task team that this is something which is absolutely
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unacceptable for the United States. --
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What is meant in the report by "foreign supply sources" is none other
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than Japan. Further, they seem to worry about the following:
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-- What is more problematic is that the electronic equipment systems
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are being transferred abroad, where they could more easily get
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transferred into the hands of the Soviet Union. --
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In other words, their sense of crisis stems from the fact that the
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semiconductor technology is absolutely vital in maintaining military
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superiority, and that this might flow from Japan to the Soviet Union.
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I feel that what is behind this abnormal hysteria on the part of this
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country is that this pivotal military technology is in the hands of
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another country, not even Europe, but in the hands of an Asian
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country, Japan.
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Toshiba, etc. which was speared by COCOM is the fault of this hysteria
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by the U.S. If that had been criticism from the pure perspective of
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the law, it would not for a moment have any basis at all.
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The 1 megabit semiconductors which are used in the hearts of
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computers, which carry hundreds of millions of circuits in an area
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which is one-third the size of your little fingernail, are only made
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in Japan. Japan has nearly a 100 percent share of these 1 megabit
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semiconductors.
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The United States has the know-how to make them, but when it comes
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down to actual production, they don't have the technicians; they don't
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have the employees. Further, they don't have the production
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management. Because they don't have development and production linked
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into one unit, they guard know-how like a jewel.
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America went after cheap labor and set up factories in Southeast Asia,
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where they could make 256k chips (1/4 the capacity of 1 megabit
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chips), but they could not catch Japan. Now, Japan is at least 5
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years ahead of the U.S. in this area and the gap is widening. There
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is even some kinds of basic research which cannot be accomplished
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without using one of these advanced computers. It take excellent
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computers in order to develop other advanced computers -- it is a
|
||
cycle of technology. In other words, the bigger the gap in advanced
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computer technology, the more difficult it is to catch up.
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||
The current situation in the world is that those kinds of computers
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are central to military strength and therefore central to national
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power. This is why the U.S. is being driven so hard. For example, in
|
||
performing simulations of what elements would be needed by aircraft
|
||
flying at mach 2, a regular computer might take 40 years to perform
|
||
the necessary computations. If the same query is put to a new,
|
||
advanced, computer, however, the answer will come out in a year.
|
||
Japan has almost the total share of the 1 megabit chips which are at
|
||
the heart of these computers. In that sense, Japan has become a very
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important country.
|
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1.3 There Is A Need for Japanese to Change Their Consciousness in Light
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of High Technology
|
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||
As the world goes smaller, and issues in the world further settle
|
||
down, whether it be China or Siberia, development will proceed. In
|
||
order to get the needed access (participation in the market), the most
|
||
important possibility lies in linear technology. Japan and West
|
||
Germany are the most advanced countries in this research and
|
||
development, and the theoretical base of Japanese technology is far
|
||
superior. West Germany has given up in research on superconducting,
|
||
but Japan has cleared three technological obstacles which were
|
||
envisioned by West Germany.
|
||
|
||
To make a long story short, the West German magnetic floating train
|
||
development realized a levitation of only 8mm, but Japan's "Maglevel"
|
||
superconducting linear motorcar realized a levitation of 10
|
||
centimeters, and speeds of 500 kilometers per hour. This type of
|
||
technology does not exist anywhere in the Soviet Union or the United
|
||
States, it only exists in Japan and West Germany. If the giants in
|
||
the economic field and the politicians can join together around this
|
||
type of technology, it would open up new possibilities for our
|
||
advancement. Whether or not this can be achieved depends upon our
|
||
large and small choices in the future; in sum, it is a question
|
||
involving the sensibilities of our politicians.
|
||
|
||
There is a Jiyu Shakai Kenkyu-kai (Free Society Research Association)
|
||
which is presided over by Mr. Morita. This was formed more than 10
|
||
years ago as an association of politicians and businessmen. I am the
|
||
youngest, but I also participate. We get together for discussions one
|
||
or twice per year.
|
||
|
||
Recently, Mr. Kissinger predicted that Japan might become a military
|
||
superpower. This, however, was not the foolish step of Japan getting
|
||
ICBMs and refurbishing the old Yamato battleship, it pointed to the
|
||
danger that no matter how much the U.S. or Soviet Union developed
|
||
space, equippped themselves with space platform weapons, the military
|
||
initiative to control these would be dependent upon Japanese
|
||
technology. The question now is whether Japan has politicians who
|
||
accurately understand the history behind what we have now become.
|
||
|
||
We Japanese now face choices on whether we can boldly proceed or stand
|
||
back quietly. It may be possible that Japan can secure a new culture
|
||
for itself based upon the skeleton of the development of high
|
||
technology. We must not restrain ourselves to what we have done up to
|
||
this point. The dregs of the postwar period are too prominent in the
|
||
consciousness of Japanese. I feel that however hesitatingly, the
|
||
revolution in our consciousness has already begun.
|
||
|
||
The Soviet Union implemented a revolution in consciousness with its
|
||
criticism of Stalinism, and China achieved the Great Cultural
|
||
Revolution. The United States also realized a type of consciousness
|
||
reform through its bitter experiences in the Vietnam War. Japan is
|
||
the only one which has not felt the need for some kind of reform since
|
||
the end of the war. We do not need a drastic reform of consciousness,
|
||
but rather, a smooth reform based upon the technology that we have
|
||
developed for ourselves. I think that only by doing this will we
|
||
realize a society which is mature in the true sense of the word.
|
||
|
||
|
||
2.0 THE DECLINE OF AN AMERICAN WHICH CAN ONLY SEE 10 MINUTES AHEAD (Morita)
|
||
|
||
2.1 American Neglects the Significance of Production
|
||
|
||
The gist of the Ishihara message is the importance of production
|
||
activities.
|
||
|
||
I have had frequent occasion to deliver speeches, both in Europe and
|
||
in the United States, due to the nature of my business activities, and
|
||
have involved myself in many debates at international conferences. As
|
||
a result of my conversations with Europeans and Americans, I have
|
||
become very aware of and concerned about the fact that they appear to
|
||
have forgotten the importance of production acitivities.
|
||
|
||
Americans make money by playing "money games," namely M&A (mergers and
|
||
acquistions), by simply moving money back and forth. If you look at
|
||
the exchange rate, for example, the dollar is now worth about 120
|
||
Japanese yen, and enormous and quick profits are made by just moving
|
||
money by computer, satellite, and even by telephone.
|
||
|
||
The summer before last, I had the opportunity to talk to a group of
|
||
three thousand foreign currency dealers, who specialize in buying and
|
||
selling money, at a conference on the future of money transfers and
|
||
financing. I have been known to be critical of the floating exchange
|
||
rate system. Talking to money dealers about my ideas was like telling
|
||
stockbrokers that the movement of stock prices if wrong; it takes a
|
||
lot of courage. I stressed that money should not be the subject of
|
||
speculation, because the fundamental function of money should not be
|
||
to enrich banks and security companies, but to smooth the path of
|
||
production activities. It has been said that America is entering a
|
||
so-called post-industrialist society where the weight of the service
|
||
industry sector is growing. Yet, when people forget how to produce
|
||
goods, and that appears to be the case in America, they will not be
|
||
able to supply themselves even with their most basic needs.
|
||
|
||
Last summer, a friend of mine who is always criticizing Japan for
|
||
being "unfair" invited me to his summer home to play golf. At the
|
||
first tee, I pulled out my MacGregor driver whereas my friend had a
|
||
Japanese Yonex club. I criticized him for using Japanese clubs since
|
||
he had been telling everyone not to buy Japanese products. He
|
||
responded simply: "These clubs give me better distance." Well, I was
|
||
not able to sacrifice distance and so I kept quiet. After the game, he
|
||
invited me to his house and while his wife was preparing dinner, he
|
||
showed me around. In the garage, I saw a Kawasaki snowmobile, which
|
||
he said he needed because winters in the northern part of New York
|
||
State have a lot of snow. Next to it was a Japanese motor boat, which
|
||
he said he needs because his house is surrounded by lakes. I also saw
|
||
an off-road vehicle made in Japan.
|
||
|
||
Finally, dinner was ready and as I went into the house, I saw a Sony
|
||
television and numerous other Japanese-made products. I said, "You
|
||
criticize us all the time for not buying American products while it's
|
||
obvious that you prefer Japanese products. Are you asking us to buy
|
||
something you won't buy yourself?"
|
||
|
||
Americans today make money by "handling" money and shuffling it
|
||
around, instead of creating and producing goods with some actual
|
||
value.
|
||
|
||
|
||
2.2 America Looks 10 Minutes Ahead; Japan Looks 10 Years
|
||
|
||
I delivered a speech in Chicago entitled "Ten Minutes vs. Ten Years."
|
||
I stated that we Japanese plan and develop our business strategies ten
|
||
years ahead. When I asked an American money trader, "how far ahead do
|
||
you plan...one week?" The reply was "no, no...ten minutes." He was
|
||
moving money through a computer, targeting the fate of that
|
||
transaction ten minutes later. So, as I told the Americans, we are
|
||
focusing on business ten years in advance, while you seem to be
|
||
concerned only with profits ten minutes from now. At that rate, you
|
||
may well never be able to compete with us.
|
||
|
||
A well-known economist, Peter Drucker, wrote recently: "Americans
|
||
cannot live in a symbol economy where businessmen play only with
|
||
numbers; Americans should come back to a real economy where money
|
||
moves in accordance with real production acitivities."
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, in America, stocks are owned and handled by
|
||
institutional investors whose fund managers actually buy and sell
|
||
stocks in huge numbers in an attempt to maximize profits in a given
|
||
short period of time. At the slightest increase in stock prices, they
|
||
sell, and when the profit margin of any company declines as a result
|
||
of poor management, they sell before the company's stock prices begin
|
||
to decline. For them, the name of the game of nothing but quick
|
||
profits.
|
||
|
||
It is expected that the American service industry will flourish. This
|
||
includes finance and financial services, where entrepreneurs and
|
||
investors alike do not leave their money in long-term projects, such
|
||
as the ten-year projects that have been implemented in Japan. The
|
||
American economy is, then, an economy without substance. It must
|
||
return to a real production economy.
|
||
|
||
In America, R&D is closely linked to the military budget. R&D in the
|
||
private sector is heavily dependent on military expenditure. As a
|
||
result, a corporation can engage in the development of a new fighter
|
||
without worrying about profit or loss. On the other hand, budget
|
||
constraints on NASA and the military agencies will directly reduce the
|
||
volume of R&D.
|
||
|
||
A ten-minute profit cycle economy does not permit companies to invest
|
||
in long term development. There are some exceptions, such as IBM,
|
||
AT&T, DuPont, and some others. But they do not represent the
|
||
mainstream of American business nowadays. Gradually but surely,
|
||
American business is shifting toward a symbol economy. In addition,
|
||
it seems fashionable to call the service industry the "futuristic
|
||
third wave" and information and intelligence is the business of the
|
||
future. But these produce nothing. Business, in my mind, is nothing
|
||
but "value added;" we must add value and wisdom to things and this is
|
||
what America seems to have forgotten. And this is the most deplorable
|
||
aspect of America today.
|
||
|
||
Japan will do fine as long as it continues to develop and produce
|
||
things of tangible value; a shift from high-technology industry to
|
||
quick profits from the money game will only serve to accelerate the
|
||
degeneration of the country. We must take precautions against such
|
||
developments, providing for, for example, tax advantages for long term
|
||
investments.
|
||
|
||
It is even more the case in America. A quick profit from a stock deal
|
||
should be taxed at a higher rate than those on long term investments.
|
||
Capital gains should be subject to a lower rate of taxation.
|
||
|
||
Recently I said, "America is supposedly the number one industrial
|
||
country in the world. Why don't you have a Department of Industry?"
|
||
Seated next to me was the chairman of the Ford Motor Corporation, Mr.
|
||
Caldwell, who replied, "that's right - we are supervised by the
|
||
Department of Transportation." The Department of Transportation is
|
||
interested in emissions control and highway safety, but has no
|
||
interest or jurisdiction over the future of the automobile industry in
|
||
the United States.
|
||
|
||
America is the only nation among the advanced industrial countries
|
||
that does not have a Department of Industry which is responsible for
|
||
industrial policy. Instead, the Department of Commerce and U.S.T.R.
|
||
preside and their only real concern is trade-related matters and they
|
||
criticize others for the failure of American industry.
|
||
|
||
|
||
2.3 Japan's Impact on the World Economy Will Be Recognized
|
||
|
||
The American Economy appears to be deteriorating. I assume that the
|
||
Bush administration will take steps to tackle the present problems,
|
||
but the country as a whole seems to be extremely nonchalant about the
|
||
so-called twin deficits: budget and trade.
|
||
|
||
There seems to be the feeling that Reaganomics raised the standard of
|
||
living, taxes are relatively low, and they can buy goods from all over
|
||
the world. When the Republicans captured the White House again, I
|
||
began to wonder if there was any sector in America which was truly
|
||
concerned about the twin deficits since Bush repeatedly denies any
|
||
possibility of a tax increase. How in the world do the Americans
|
||
expect to restore their economy?
|
||
|
||
Let's examine the price of gasoline. Consumption of gasoline is
|
||
growing rapidly, yet the price is still below a dollar a gallon. The
|
||
ongoing world price per gallon is $4 U.S. A one-cent per gallon tax
|
||
increase means an additional $10 billion; think what the government
|
||
could get if they levied an additional 25 cents per gallon. Yet the
|
||
government will not even begin to initiate such a move.
|
||
|
||
In fact, even with such an additional tax, American gasoline prices
|
||
will still remain less than international prices. Politicians are
|
||
simply afraid of losing votes by adopting unpopular policies. Some of
|
||
my closest American friends have said that Bush could have been
|
||
elected without promising not to raise taxes. He has so firmly
|
||
committed himself and his Administration to not raising taxes, yet it
|
||
is so obvious that the twin deficits cannot be solved without
|
||
additional national revenue.
|
||
|
||
Bush should have been more realistic if he was, and is, honestly
|
||
concerned with the American bugdet crisis. Tactically, he could have
|
||
said early on that he would not raise taxes, but as he gained support,
|
||
he should have become more honest and direct, and told the people that
|
||
it was necessary to pursue a more realistic financial policy. On the
|
||
contrary, he confirmed his pledge even after he was elected.
|
||
Solutions to the deficit problem seem even more remote.
|
||
|
||
This being the case, the U.S. dollar has continued to decline, and the
|
||
U.S. has had to increase interest rates to further attract foreign
|
||
money to the U.S., for which it will have to pay a great deal of
|
||
interest. The result is an increasingly vicious circle.
|
||
|
||
The U.S. inflation situation might well become an even more chronic
|
||
phenomenon. Economic growth without inflation is ideal, whereas
|
||
endless inflation might well bring the dollar's value to the level of
|
||
trash. This, in turn will make European and Japanese assets trash
|
||
since sizable asset of both are in U.S. dollars.
|
||
|
||
Both the Europeans and the Japanese cannot sit idly by, ignoring or
|
||
overlooking the trend in the American economy. At one time, when the
|
||
U.S. dollar was very high, the Japanese and Europeans asked Americans
|
||
if "they could absorb the trade deficit caused by the high dollar?"
|
||
At that time, Treasury Secretary Regan was of the opinion that the
|
||
U.S. dollar should stay high and strong. When James Baker became the
|
||
new Secretary of the Treasury, he recognized the problem and entered
|
||
into the Plaza Accord to lower the value of the dollar.
|
||
|
||
The American economy does not stand alone. It is not only a domestic
|
||
issue. The collapse of the American economy would cause a worldwide
|
||
disaster. 1987's Black Monday chilled all nations momentarily. I am
|
||
not a pessimist, but I cannot help thinking that unless the Bush
|
||
Adminstration handles economic issues very seriously, a worldwide
|
||
collapse is not just a worry, but a very real possibility. The
|
||
ever-growing American inflation and thus its economic crisis will not
|
||
only make other nations catch cold, but bring their economies into
|
||
crisis as well.
|
||
|
||
It is said that Japan contributed to efforts to stop a possible
|
||
disastrous chain reaction ignited by Black Monday which began in
|
||
America and soon affected the London stock market as well. At that
|
||
point, the Japanese Ministry of Finance asked Japanese institutional
|
||
investors to support prices for a time, which instantly normalized
|
||
Japanese stock prices. Later, the chairman of one of the major U.S.
|
||
banks, who was visiting Japan, told me, "It was Japan who put a stop
|
||
to the chain reaction and it was the Ministry of Finance who was able
|
||
to move the Tokyo stock market. The Japanese government now has the
|
||
clout to sustain Wall Street and the City of London. So-called
|
||
Japanese guidance is truly powerful."
|
||
|
||
This gentlemen went on to say, "we are worried about the fact that the
|
||
Japanese people are unaware of the fact that they have a significant
|
||
impact on the world economy. And I believe that it is true that
|
||
Japan's economic status has been much enhanced."
|
||
|
||
Like it or not, this is the picture held by Americans, and the
|
||
Japanese people have to recognize it and, inevitably, they have to
|
||
behave in accordance with that status in the world community today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
3.0 RACIAL PREJUDICE IS AT THE ROOT OF JAPAN BASHING (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
3.1 America Will Never Hold Its World Leadership Position Unless It Ends
|
||
Its Racial Prejudice
|
||
|
||
I had the opportunity to visit Washingotn, D.C. in April a year ago,
|
||
and was suprised at the very hostile atmosphere. It was only five
|
||
days after Congress passed the resolution condemning Japan on the
|
||
semiconductor issue. I met some of my old friends, senators and
|
||
congressmen, who with subtle smiles admitted that racial
|
||
considerations, or more directly, racial prejudice, played a role in
|
||
U.S.-Japan relations. This was after I had discussed several concrete
|
||
examples with them. Although they shied away from the subject of
|
||
racial prejudice as if it were taboo, they did admit that it is there.
|
||
|
||
Initially, they violently denied my allegations, citing that the
|
||
Pacific War of 40-some years ago as the only real source of prejudice
|
||
against the Japanese. I declared that it was not as simple as that.
|
||
It appears that the Americans were firmly of the opinion that it was
|
||
the West, namely Euro-Americans, who established modernism. My
|
||
reaction was as follows.
|
||
|
||
It may be true that the modern era is a creation of the white race,
|
||
but you have become somewhat presumptous about it. In the pre-modern
|
||
era, Asiatic races such as Genghis Khan and his armies raided the
|
||
European continent, destroying towns and villages, looting and raping.
|
||
Yet at that time, many Europeans actually imitated the style and
|
||
behavior of Khan's hordes, cutting their hair short, shaving their
|
||
eyebrows, and walking menacingly with knees apart. That was nothing
|
||
compared to the strange ways modern Europeans and American adopt the
|
||
style and fashions of some of the present era's heros, such as the
|
||
Beatles and Michael Jackson. Even Asian kids do this. Probably Khan
|
||
was some kind of cult figure then and while women regarded him as a
|
||
"hero" of sorts.
|
||
|
||
Some say that the roots of the so-called "yellow peril" can be traced
|
||
back to the atrocities committed by Khan and his men. At any rate, we
|
||
should keep in mind that there is prejudice committed by Khan and his
|
||
men. At any rate, we should keep in mind that there is prejudice
|
||
against Orientals, as the following episode illustrates.
|
||
|
||
I had a chance to talk with the Secretary of the Navy about the Amber
|
||
System. Amber is supposed to be the color of caution and danger and
|
||
this system is named for this concept. Under the Amber System,
|
||
ordinary vessels such as tankers and container ships, are equipped
|
||
with sonar on their bows. The sonar can detect underwater objects.
|
||
Some objects are rocks, etc. which navigational charts will show.
|
||
What the system is looking for are nuclear submarines.
|
||
l
|
||
The Amber System alone cannot detect the nationality of the submarines
|
||
detected; it cannot tell if they are American, Russian, or whatever.
|
||
It simply detects the presence of some foreign object and this
|
||
information is relayed directly to the Pentagon, which knows what is
|
||
on the navigational charts and also where U.S. subs are located, so
|
||
they will be able to ascertain whether the particular sub is American
|
||
or not.
|
||
|
||
I suggested that the Navy equip all Japanese commerical vessels with
|
||
this system. Japanese seamen are reliable and the Japanese merchant
|
||
marine travels all the oceans and seas. Japanese vessels, including
|
||
our oil tankers, could gather information along vital cargo routes and
|
||
the U.S. could analyze the information received from the Japanese
|
||
ships.
|
||
|
||
To my suprise, the Americans said that it was none of Japan's
|
||
business. I asked that how, in light of the very limited number of
|
||
U.S. ships, how can you deny the need for such assistance. Their
|
||
answer: "We cannot leave such a critical matter with Japan." I asked
|
||
if it was appropriate to involve the British and the Germans, and they
|
||
said it would be.
|
||
|
||
The fact of the matter is that Americans do not trust Japan. Japan
|
||
would have no basis with which to analyze the information collected by
|
||
the Amber System, yet they were still worried about the Japanese
|
||
reliability in merely collecting the information. It seems that in
|
||
their minds, even the Soviets are more trustworthy than the Japanese.
|
||
American racial prejudice toward Japan is very fundamental and we
|
||
should always keep it in mind when dealing with the Americans.
|
||
|
||
During the Second World War, Americans bombed civilian targets in
|
||
Germany, but only on Japan did they use the atomic bomb. While they
|
||
refuse to admit it, the only reason they could use the atomic bomb on
|
||
Japan was because of their racial attitude toward Japan. The fact
|
||
that they actually dropped the atomic bomb on Japan is sufficient
|
||
indication that racial prejudice was a factor.
|
||
|
||
It is my firm conviction that the roots of the U.S.-Japan friction lie
|
||
in the soil of racial prejudice. American racial prejudice is based
|
||
upon the cultural belief that the modern era is the creation of the
|
||
white race, including Americans. This confidence appears a bit
|
||
overwhelming, probably due to America's relative youth as a nation,
|
||
which tends to blind it to other cultures. If Americans were ever to
|
||
be made aware of the presence of a real Japanese culture in the
|
||
Azuchi-Momoyama period as did the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries,
|
||
they might develop some respect for Japanese cultural history.
|
||
Unfortunately, the present American education system does not teach
|
||
children the value of other cultures. In the period noted above,
|
||
there were over 20,000 "terakoya" schools all over Japan. No other
|
||
nation had such an extensive schooling system at such an early point
|
||
in their history.
|
||
|
||
During the Edo period, even farmers and peasants were able to read and
|
||
write at least one or two thousand characters, including hiragana and
|
||
katakana. Japan already, at that time, had a complete postal network,
|
||
called "hikyaku" as far as the southernmost end of Kyushu. Documents
|
||
and information of various kinds were available in libraries in many
|
||
cities and towns.
|
||
|
||
This is the kind of information I give to Americans who exhibit
|
||
ignorance of our culture. Unfortunately, most Americans don't like to
|
||
see these facts, and they tend to change the subject. In short, their
|
||
historical prejudice and cultural narrowness has reached a point where
|
||
they cannot see another's point or see the value of another culture.
|
||
All this has made Americans, in the post war period, very irritable on
|
||
the issue.
|
||
|
||
The American position at this point seems to be that the British and
|
||
Germans can play whatever role the Japanese could, and can do so
|
||
without irritating the U.S. Americans are essentially an honest
|
||
people, and in fact do admit to the existence of racial prejudice, if
|
||
they are pressed on the subject, which I do. However, this is not
|
||
enough. They should also admit that prejudice does not hold any
|
||
solutions to the problems developing in the world today. It is
|
||
important that they face the situation, aware of the historical
|
||
context, seeing that the reality is that the power in the world,
|
||
including the economic power, is shifting gradually from West to East.
|
||
It may not be as strong a shift as is expressed in the expression the
|
||
"Pacific era," but at any rate it is in America's interest to rid
|
||
itself of prejudice against Asis, including that against Japan, in
|
||
order to maintain a position of leadership in the world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
3.2 Japan Should Become More Cosmopolitan
|
||
|
||
The calendar clearly indicates that we are moving toward the end of a
|
||
century, and with it is coming the end of the modern era as developed
|
||
by white Westerners. History is entering a period of new genesis.
|
||
The promoter of this era is Japan as well as the U.S. It is a
|
||
historical development which America's political leaders should make
|
||
known, so that America will be better equipped to meet the tasks of
|
||
the future.
|
||
|
||
The Japanese have their own problems. They may have to go through a
|
||
mental evolution to meet the needs of this new era. As Mr. Morita has
|
||
pride and confidence in the products of his company, and attitude
|
||
which has made him a truly cosmopolitan man, so must the Japanese
|
||
develop pride and confidence in our culture and our technology. We
|
||
cannot become overbearing, which will not be tolerated in the new era,
|
||
but by the same token, an inferiority complex is equally harmful. The
|
||
Japanese people must move out of their current mental stagnation; I
|
||
feel this is especially important for Japanese diplomats.
|
||
|
||
Except for the young and especially qualified, most Japanese diplomats
|
||
suffer from a peculiar inferiority complex [and] as a result are
|
||
spreading the seeds of misunderstanding throughout the world. When I
|
||
was young, I had the opportunity to live with one of Japan's
|
||
ambassadors and his family. He was a hell of a nice guy -- a really
|
||
wonderful human being. However, he seldom socialized with anyone. At
|
||
the end of a game of golf, if someone suggested dropping into the
|
||
lounge for beer, he would refuse, saying that he preferred to have one
|
||
when he got home. This is the same attitude that some Japanese have
|
||
when they won't even accept a cup of tea while a guest in another's
|
||
home. It may be for most Japanese that only in his home and only with
|
||
his family can he really relax. If this is true, then the Japanese
|
||
can never truly be cosmopolitan. When the heads of some of Japan's
|
||
top trading companies, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, wanted to join
|
||
prestigious country clubs in the countries in which they were
|
||
stationed, their applications were rejected because it was felt that
|
||
Japanese were too parochial, staying to themselves and not socializing
|
||
with others. Some Japanese diplomats don't hesitate to show their
|
||
inferiority complex. One ambassador even publicly said that the
|
||
Japanese were a race a "pygmies." Such things happen all the time!
|
||
|
||
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to cover up the news of the
|
||
firing training by an American cruiser (the Towers, 3370 tons) last
|
||
year in Tokyo Bay. A single cannon on the Towers, the Mark 42, can
|
||
send a 32kg ball over 23 kilometers at 36 rounds per minute. American
|
||
authorities said non-explosive training ammunition was being used.
|
||
But even these could easily damage of Uraga class Japanese Coast Guard
|
||
frigate (33231 [sic] tons), not to mention what it could do to small
|
||
fishing vessels. Tokyo Bay is a busy commerical harbor, similar to
|
||
New York Harbor inside the Verrazano Bridge. American television
|
||
reported that the American people would be furious if that happened in
|
||
their country.
|
||
|
||
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Japanese media to hold the
|
||
story until further notice, since that event was incidental. I was
|
||
very angry and protested, saying that I would release the news on my
|
||
own. This happened on Japanese soverign territory in an area clearly
|
||
barred from such firings due to the fact it was a vital maritime
|
||
channel. It was a clear violation of Japan's sovereign rights. I
|
||
observed that "It was like seeing a ranking Self Defense Agency
|
||
official firing his service revolver at the Ginza junction." I still
|
||
feel the same way.
|
||
|
||
Americans can say that they are here to protect Japan under the
|
||
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. But at times, it appears to me that the
|
||
Americans behave more like mad dogs instead of watch dogs.
|
||
|
||
I use the term "mad dogs" when referring to the Americans recalling
|
||
that Mr. Shiina, Deputy President of the LDP, used it when he was
|
||
Foreign Minister. This is another instance where "no" clearly [must
|
||
be] said when that is what is meant [and] would be useful. One must
|
||
say "no" when he means "no" and failure to do so reduces credibility.
|
||
In the case of the U.S.-Japan relationship, such an attitude only
|
||
further increases American racial prejudice. The Japanese people
|
||
should know that they are in essence protecting American interests as
|
||
the new era in international relations begins, something the Americans
|
||
seem quicker to sense. This is the reality of the U.S.-Japan
|
||
relationship today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
4.0 BASHING JAPAN GETS VOTES (Morita)
|
||
|
||
4.1 The Paradox of Welcoming Investment but Criticism of Japan
|
||
|
||
I am worried about the tide of attitude in America with respect to
|
||
Japan. The U.S. Government and the Congress have adopted a number of
|
||
harsh policies with respect to Japan. Some 37 states in the U.S. have
|
||
established offices in Tokyo. Since I am responsible for
|
||
investment-related matters in the Keidanren (Federation of Economic
|
||
Organizations), when the state governors visit, I am the one to meet
|
||
with them, if my time permits.
|
||
|
||
It never fails, they are always coming to Japan saying, "invest,
|
||
please invest." Just when I am about to assume that America welcomes
|
||
Japanese, U.S. congressmen elected from these same states are bashing
|
||
Japan. The state government has no involvement with this, of course,
|
||
but they are saying to Japan's big business, "come on, come on."
|
||
|
||
"What in the world is the meaning of this?" I wonder. In addition,
|
||
recently a number of famous academics and journalists have published
|
||
books which are critical of Japan. Recently, there has been a book,
|
||
"Buying into America" which suggests that Japan is buying up America,
|
||
and there is a book called "Yen" which envisions a future after the
|
||
year 200 in which Japan uses its financial power to control the world.
|
||
The latter is rather calm in its perspective, but both books reveal a
|
||
clear Japanese menace - the tides have really shifted since "Japan As
|
||
Number One" was published.
|
||
|
||
A book written by a famous journalist which depicts Japan in a very
|
||
harsh light has become a best seller, so this is indicative of the
|
||
critical attitude on Japan held by the American masses. The more this
|
||
attitude increases, politicians will beat up on Japan in an attempt to
|
||
make votes for themselves, because getting votes is the most important
|
||
aspect of being a politician.
|
||
|
||
The politicians themselves are not at all concerned, however. When
|
||
asked why they bash Japan, they respond that if they say "Japan is
|
||
good," votes will drop off. If Japan is bashed, further, if a Toshiba
|
||
radio-cassette player is smashed, this is not indicative of hating
|
||
Toshiba, but they think if they do such things, votes will increase.
|
||
|
||
The state governments welcome Japanese industry because if they invest
|
||
in their state, tax collections increase, along with employment, but
|
||
among the American people, the attitude with respect to Japan is
|
||
becomming more and more critical.
|
||
|
||
The Keidanren has established a "Council for Better Investment in the
|
||
United States," which is the English language name of the council
|
||
(literally it is the "Council for Investment in the U.S." -
|
||
translator). What we mean by "better investment" is the type of
|
||
investment which will get Americans on Japan's side. If the number of
|
||
Americans who view things the way Japan does increases, then bashing
|
||
Japan will cause lower vote counts. That would probably make
|
||
politicians stop bashing Japan.
|
||
|
||
I think that it is vital that we help build a feeling of friendship
|
||
among the American masses with respect to Japan. At the present time,
|
||
everyone buys Japanese goods and is delighted with them. They do not
|
||
hate Japanese products. What makes them hate Japan, however, is that
|
||
when Japanese businesses enter the American society, they have the
|
||
feeling that foreigners are coming.
|
||
|
||
|
||
4.2 Japanese Industries in the U.S. Should Work at Community Service
|
||
|
||
Direct investment in the United States is currently expanding very
|
||
rapidly. The end result of this is that Japanese companies, including
|
||
Sony, have established themselves in local districts throughout the
|
||
country. When the English or French invest in a local area, the
|
||
communities and local society do not see this as an invasion of
|
||
foreigners. However, when the Japanese come, they feel that
|
||
strangers, or something foreign has entered their midst. This gives
|
||
them strong feelings of fear and anxiety.
|
||
|
||
To give a simple example, when Japanese go to the U.S., their children
|
||
go to schools. The schools have an organization, the P.T.A. This
|
||
stands for Parent and Teachers Association. The corresponding
|
||
organization in Japan is called the "Fathers and Brothers Association"
|
||
but no fathers and brothers participate, it is more of a "mothers and
|
||
sisters" association. Myself, I have never attended the Fathers and
|
||
Brothers Association in Japan. In the case of America, however,
|
||
husbands go with their wives to attend meetings for their elementary
|
||
school or local area school and discuss how those schools should be
|
||
run. In Japan, it is the mother's duty to take care of educational
|
||
matters for the children, so the father does not attend. In America,
|
||
however, when the father takes off work to attend a PTA meeting, his
|
||
company does not charge him leave. The man, therefore, must go to the
|
||
PTA meetings.
|
||
|
||
When I was living in the U.S., I went to PTA meetings where I was able
|
||
to associate with persons from various walks of life. My daughter
|
||
went to the Nightingale Bonford School in Manhattan and my son went to
|
||
St. Bernards. I got to know Stokowski (the late) conductor at one of
|
||
the PTA meetings. John Gunther, a very influential behind-the-scenes
|
||
man was also someone I met through [the] PTA; he is now the Ambassador
|
||
to Austria. Henry Grunwald, the editor of Time, was [the father of] a
|
||
classmate of my daughter's who I also got to know.
|
||
|
||
At a gathering of Japanese businessment in the United States, I got up
|
||
and told them "to go as a couple to the PTA to get to know the other
|
||
people involved and to start getting personally involved in the
|
||
school." The people I was speaking to made such remarks as "I don't
|
||
like to hear that," or "Why do we have to do that?" When I told them
|
||
there was actually a meeting the other night and asked what they did,
|
||
the responses were "I was too busy, I sent my wife," or "My wife can't
|
||
speak English, so she just gossiped with the other Japanese women and
|
||
came home." Because of instances like this, there is no doubt that
|
||
the PTA would view them as the foreigners who'd come to town.
|
||
|
||
Also, when Sunday morning came, the whole community dresses up and
|
||
goes to church. At that time, however, the Japanese are all walking in
|
||
the opposite direction to the country club. When they are asked why
|
||
they are not going to church, they are likely to respond that "I'm a
|
||
Buddhist," or a similar reply. I'm not saying that they should
|
||
necessarily go to church, but it is natural for the people in the
|
||
community to think that some really strange foreigners are in their
|
||
midst when they see them all trotting off to the golf course on Sunday
|
||
morning.
|
||
|
||
I golf in America too. But I always do it with foreigners. When
|
||
Saturday night comes, I take my wife to the country club, have dinner
|
||
and talk with the other members. However, golf for Japanese is
|
||
usually a business-related event; there are usually guests from Japan
|
||
and a group solely composed of Japanese people plays the course. This
|
||
is another way in which a strange image is transmitted to the local
|
||
community.
|
||
|
||
Another example is that American wives often volunteer their spare
|
||
time for community service activities, such as preparing Braille for
|
||
the visually handicapped. Japanese housewives normally do not
|
||
participate in such activities.
|
||
|
||
There are also public fund-raising dinner parties for local community
|
||
centers, which do not involve mere contributions, it is a major social
|
||
event where funds are raised. Tickets for the party are $30, $50,
|
||
$100 and $200 which represent contributions to the fund-raising event.
|
||
They view participation in these events as a contribution to their
|
||
local society. While this is a little different than the golf example
|
||
above, it is another area where Japanese isolate themselves as strange
|
||
foreigners.
|
||
|
||
It is vital that we participate in the local society in order to
|
||
resolve any racial problems. When Japanese build factories in the
|
||
United States, these usually go to the regional or rural areas due to
|
||
the large amount of space they require. In such a small community
|
||
context, if Japanese avoid contributing to the local community, they
|
||
will be disliked in the area, and then the people of that area will
|
||
cast their votes for Japan-bashing politicians.
|
||
|
||
One Japanese company that had established in the U.S. had its
|
||
headquarters in Japan make a very substantial contribution to build a
|
||
community center, in an effort to counter any adverse prejudice, even
|
||
though the local company had not yet become profitable. The local
|
||
community was delighted and named the hall after the company that had
|
||
contributed. When the plant manager was reassigned back to Japan, the
|
||
whole community threw a "sayonara" party for him.
|
||
|
||
I am not saying that all Japanese companies coming to the United
|
||
States are bad, but just a little kindness and consideration can turn
|
||
around attitudes about Japanese people. The Council for Better
|
||
Investment in the United States is trying very hard to get this
|
||
information out in an effort to have the Japanese company weave itself
|
||
into the fabric of the local community in which it is locating.
|
||
|
||
At the current time, two hundred and forty or fifty companies who have
|
||
invested in the U.S. are members of the Council, but it aims to
|
||
attract even more members.
|
||
|
||
Information about these efforts is gradually becoming known in the
|
||
U.S., and this has already done much to change perceptions there. I
|
||
think Japanese people in the U.S. are also making better efforts.
|
||
|
||
|
||
4.3 Let's Build an American Society Where Japan Bashing Causes Votes to
|
||
Decline
|
||
|
||
Therefore, I think that the only way to erase the perception Mr.
|
||
Ishihara points to where Japanese are disliked just for being Japanese
|
||
is to make the above types of efforts. This is because they
|
||
[Americans] are stubborn and not likely to be induced by saying "you
|
||
guys change."
|
||
|
||
I have so many American friends myself that I have been accused of
|
||
being an American. Since I have lived in America and have been
|
||
counted as a friend by many Americans, I am not overly sensitive to
|
||
what is said about me. As Ishihara has said, to Americans, they feel
|
||
that because their hair color is different, it is difficult for them
|
||
to know what Japanese are thinking. I think there is another
|
||
important point. The structure of the Japanese language and English
|
||
is different, and this affects our discussions together.
|
||
|
||
I have written this elsewhere in a book, but when Japanese read
|
||
Chinese, they put in arrows and symbols to change word order, but
|
||
Chinese read it directly and understand the meaning of the sentence
|
||
immediately. English is the same kind of language, which is read one
|
||
word after another. In sum, this means that Americans have a
|
||
different sequential order in thought processes. Therefore, no matter
|
||
if you use interpreters, it is impossible to interpret in the same
|
||
sequential order as the thought processes that that generated the
|
||
words in Japanese. Thus, when a message is to be delivered, it is
|
||
regrettable but true, that the sequential thought process of Japanese
|
||
is in the minority in the world. When communicating with occidentals,
|
||
who are in the majority, if things are not communicated in an order
|
||
they can comprehend, they do not understand what we are saying. It is
|
||
necessary that we be cognizant of this disadvantage that Japan has in
|
||
this area.
|
||
|
||
While the color of our hair will never be identical to Americans, from
|
||
the point of view of practical businessmen, I think we must recognize
|
||
that if the current trade imbalance with the U.S. is not rectified,
|
||
America will always say Japan is at fault. If Japanese business does
|
||
not go to the U.S. with manufacturing and sales to bring down the
|
||
imbalance, there is no way the problem will be rectified. We must
|
||
bring our factories to foreign shores, and invest in these areas where
|
||
our goods are sold.
|
||
|
||
At this point, if there are any racial problems, it would be the fault
|
||
of the Americans, but that does nothing to resolve them. Through the
|
||
success of Japanese-American citizens' groups, racial problems are not
|
||
so prominent anymore. When the Second World War began, all
|
||
Japanese-Americans were placed in detention camps.
|
||
|
||
In the United States, people having different colored skin have
|
||
realized great successes. An example is the Wang company which was
|
||
founded by a Chinese. In our quest to find out why it is only Japan
|
||
that is bashed, it would be a bit strange to say it is because Japan
|
||
is not internationalized, but it is really because we have been lax in
|
||
not following the "when in Rome, do as the Romans do" in incorporating
|
||
ourselves in the local community. I think this is why we remain
|
||
foreign. That is exactly why I am saying we need to make such
|
||
efforts. I am not saying that everything they do is alright, but I am
|
||
saying there is a need for internationalization by both parties, and
|
||
we have the need to do business.
|
||
|
||
The internment of Japanese-Americans during the war was a prime
|
||
example of the emotionalism that the U.S. displayed with respect to
|
||
Japan. After the passage of 40 years, the President has finally
|
||
publicly recognized that this was wrong. It would be nice if
|
||
emotionalism with respect to Japan ended right there, but that is not
|
||
the case. An example is the Toshiba clause included in the Omnibus
|
||
Trade and Competitiveness Bill -- no buying of Toshiba products --
|
||
Toshiba Machine is bad.
|
||
|
||
I said in a speech that this was a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
|
||
This was due to the provision in the Constitution that proscribes the
|
||
enactment of laws which would deal retroactively with crimes. It also
|
||
allows anyone accused of a crime the opportunity to defend himself.
|
||
In the process of compiling this bill, sanctions were put on Toshiba
|
||
for its crime. Toshiba had already been punished for its crime under
|
||
Japanese law; but by adopting these sanctions restricting Toshiba's
|
||
business activities, the Bill would impose retroactive punishment.
|
||
|
||
When I recently spoke in Seattle, I suggested that this Bill was
|
||
unconstitutional, that it was an emotional response, and that it
|
||
should be treated as an emotional international issue, which was
|
||
similar in substance to the internment of Japanese-Americans during
|
||
the war.
|
||
|
||
When something can become this emotional, perhaps Mr. Ishihara is
|
||
right in his contention that racial problems lie at the root of the
|
||
problem. During the occupation era, the Americans built fences and
|
||
stayed inside and didn't mingle too much with the Japanese people.
|
||
This created an unpleasant atmosphere. Now, however, there are no
|
||
occupation zones and we are at peace, we must behave appropriately and
|
||
associate with each other.
|
||
|
||
If we do make efforts in this direction I have indicated to establish
|
||
a framework where Japan-bashing politicians are rewarded by fewer
|
||
votes for their efforts, there is no doubt that political pressure
|
||
will be exerted to the point where there can be no reduction in
|
||
frictions between the countries.
|
||
|
||
Thus, it is my way of thinking that Japan must take the kind of action
|
||
this situation calls for.
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.0 THE CRITICISM OF JAPAN AS AN IMITATOR IS OFF THE MARK (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
5.1 The America Which Closes Its Eyes to Its Own Unfairness, and Criticizes
|
||
Japan
|
||
|
||
The more I hear Americans bellowing complaints that Japan is unfair,
|
||
the more I would like them to calm down and think. An example is a
|
||
harsh exchange between myself and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. It
|
||
was a coincidence, but at the time when Commerce Secretary Verity
|
||
visited Japan, there had been an agreement for an American company to
|
||
participate in the second phase construction at Haneda International
|
||
Airport. Verity was in Japan, and his mission included offering his
|
||
thanks for this deal. However, I threw some cold water on him by
|
||
saying that this would be the only time I would permit such a big
|
||
commotion over such an issue.
|
||
|
||
The U.S. Congress had been criticizing Japan for having a "closed"
|
||
market in large construction projects. In fact, however, there was
|
||
only one U.S. construction firm that had been licensed to work in
|
||
Japan - two, if you count pending applications. They say that the
|
||
barriers are too thick, but I think that anyone wishing to do business
|
||
in a foreign country has to make some adjustments to correspond to the
|
||
local conditions.
|
||
|
||
After we went back and forth along that line, I commented that Japan's
|
||
design for the Airport Building and the Shinkansen [bullet train]
|
||
station, including the interior was poor -- not refined enough and too
|
||
idiosyncratic. I went on to say that this might well be something
|
||
which could be consigned to a foreign country.
|
||
|
||
This was true of Narita International Airport too. I noticed the
|
||
other day that the pillars were painted with rust-proofing primer
|
||
coat. When I suggested to the person in charge that he get busy and
|
||
have them painted, he said, "Mr. Minister, did you just notice this?
|
||
They have been that way since the airport was completed." When I
|
||
asked why, he replied that it was OK this way because of the contrast
|
||
between the red, white and black. When I asked whose design that was,
|
||
he calmly replied that the painting contractor had made the
|
||
determination.
|
||
|
||
Actually, there is not even a bar in the whole airport. One might
|
||
like to have a drink to ease one's tension about flying before the
|
||
flight, or one after to relax. Foreign airports always have a place
|
||
where you can get a drink. Day or night, there is a place where the
|
||
customer can get a drink. This is an integral part of air travel.
|
||
|
||
When I relayed these stories, Secretary Verity nodded his head,
|
||
indicating that he understood my point. You could tell he was the
|
||
Commerce Secretary, because when we went on to discuss the Kansai
|
||
Airport, he said it would be a great idea if American companies could
|
||
do the design.
|
||
|
||
Just that would be nice, he went on, but after it is completed, he
|
||
said that the same number of U.S. aircraft should be permitted to fly
|
||
from the airport as was permitted by Japanese carriers. I replied
|
||
sharply, "No, that won't do." He turned colors and asked back, "Why
|
||
not?"
|
||
|
||
There is an aviation treaty between the U.S. and Japan. It is a relic
|
||
of the occupation era. Not only is it not balanced, it is outright
|
||
unfair.
|
||
|
||
Among the mutually agreed upon rights in this treaty is the right for
|
||
air transport to points in the signatory country, and for rights from
|
||
those airports to points beyond in third countries. These rights are
|
||
all rights held unilaterally by the U.S. side. American can fly into
|
||
whatever Japanese airport it pleases and then fly to anywhere else.
|
||
In other words, it has unlimited rights to fly through Japan to
|
||
destinations beyond.
|
||
|
||
Japan, however, only has the right to navigate through limited
|
||
airports, the economically unprofitable routes from San Francisco->New
|
||
York->Europe. Actually, these routes are not even being used. During
|
||
the U.S.-Japan Summit in 1982, we were allowed two flights per week
|
||
from Los Angeles to Rio and San Paulo, Brazil. One of the concerns on
|
||
the Japan side is that Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) was finally
|
||
obtaining 9 flights weekly in 1985 on the Tokyo->San Francisco->New
|
||
York route.
|
||
|
||
However, in exchange for this, America got the right to land jumbo
|
||
jets in Japan, and then fly from there further in small cargo aircraft
|
||
to Manila, Taiwan, and Korea. The most profitable rights went to the
|
||
U.S. in this agreement too. In the midst of all this, Japan cannot
|
||
get the right to fly a cargo aircraft in and out of Chicago.
|
||
|
||
While points of origin are limited by land space, Japan is restricted
|
||
to just three points, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka. America can fly to
|
||
Japan from 19 airports. Looking at the number of flights, according
|
||
to a study made in November of 1988, Japan had 204.5 and the U.S. 371
|
||
passenger flights, and 60 cargo flights for Japan versus 170 for the
|
||
U.S. This is really unfair of the U.S. to be party to the U.S.-Japan
|
||
Aviation Treaty which gives it so overwhelming of an advantage.
|
||
|
||
American specialists are well aware of this situation, so they do not
|
||
want to engage in further negotiations. This type of situation
|
||
continues while the U.S makes selfish assertions.
|
||
|
||
I explained to the Secretary that since the U.S. maintained that
|
||
attitude, it was at fault. The Secretary said he knew nothing of
|
||
these matters. I pointed out to him that we couldn't even begin
|
||
talking about getting negotiations started if he knew nothing about
|
||
these matters.
|
||
|
||
An official from the State Department was accompanying the Secretary
|
||
on his visit. He was an honest guy, and told the Secretary that the
|
||
Treaty was indeed unfair. Secretary Verity became troubled. It was a
|
||
very strange atmosphere between the Commerce Secretary and the
|
||
official from the State Department, standing there in front of me, a
|
||
Japanese. America is not the solid rock we thought it to be.
|
||
|
||
For example, relations are extremely poor between the Department of
|
||
Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative. Yeutter and Verity
|
||
quarreled like dogs and monkeys, they never got along and were always
|
||
bad mouthing each other. While none of these references about these
|
||
two went on in front of me, there was an official from the U.S.T.R in
|
||
the delegation who was there to keep an eye on things.
|
||
|
||
Anyway, once the potential for a scene between the Secretary and me
|
||
had quieted down, the "spy" from the U.S.T.R. caught my eye and said
|
||
"Hang in there." I laughed, thinking what an interesting country the
|
||
U.S. was.
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.2 Japan, A Country Where Each Person Is Highly Creative
|
||
|
||
America closes its eyes to its own unfairness and criticizes others.
|
||
I think that it should not be forgotten what such a shifty country has
|
||
done.
|
||
|
||
As Mr. Morita has pointed out, it is off the mark to say that Japan
|
||
has relied on the U.S. for the creativity to develop technology, and
|
||
then has just cleverly developed and marketed it. Americans and
|
||
Europeans say that Japan can do nothing but imitate, but it is not
|
||
right for Japanese themselves to begin to agree with such a statement.
|
||
The Japanese people have been possessed of creativity for ages.
|
||
|
||
There has been a gradual increase in the number of Americans and
|
||
Europeans who recognize creativity in the Japanese. The same can be
|
||
said for cultural creativity.
|
||
|
||
Take the field of literature. Some while ago, the French did not
|
||
recognize Japanese literature at all. They did not think it had any
|
||
value. More recently, however, the French have grown to appreciate
|
||
Japanese literature more and more. The reason for this is quite
|
||
interesting; it came about because of Japan's high technology. That
|
||
is, foreigners who were interested in Japan's high technology began
|
||
studying the Japanese language and started reading modern Japanese
|
||
novels.
|
||
|
||
They recognized that modern Japanese literature was indeed quite
|
||
interesting. It was not their masters of literature or translators
|
||
who pointed this out, but the intelligentsia who were coming from
|
||
scientific backgrounds.
|
||
|
||
In any case, I do not think we should stand still and agree that
|
||
outside of literature, we are still nothing but imitators as the
|
||
Americans say. It is time that Japanese take pride in their own
|
||
spontaneous creativity and march forward.
|
||
|
||
Sony developed the transistor [possible ambiguity in translation -- as
|
||
Morita notes in essay 4, Sony licensed the transistor from Bell
|
||
Laboratories in 1953] and took it to the U.S. market and changed the
|
||
way Americans thought. In other words, they ripped apart the immutable
|
||
principle of one radio per each family. The concept of making radios
|
||
a personal appliance was nothing other than an exhibition of
|
||
creativity on the order of that shown by Columbus.
|
||
|
||
The bountiful creativity of the Japanese is not something which can
|
||
only be seen in a few of the elite, but something which can be broadly
|
||
witnessed across the board in the general citizenry.
|
||
|
||
Japanese technology has found its way to the very heart of the world's
|
||
military forces. I think this the product of the integration of our
|
||
creativity.
|
||
|
||
Even if you have one creative genius, unless you can produce the
|
||
product of his creativity in a factory, it will not come to anything.
|
||
It takes a large number of excellent general technicians and excellent
|
||
employees or one will not begin to see the light of day.
|
||
|
||
|
||
5.3 The Excellence of Japanese Products Relates to the Educational High
|
||
Level of the Employees
|
||
|
||
One can partially grasp the superiority of Japan's technological
|
||
ability in the low rate of breakdown in Japanese products. The vital
|
||
element in the excellence of technology and in tackling the problem of
|
||
product breakdowns is possible because of the excellence in abilities
|
||
of the general employees.
|
||
|
||
The U.S. Boeing Corporation which was scrutinized due to an aircraft
|
||
crash was found to have problems with its employees' work methods, and
|
||
they quickly set about making improvements. Certainly the
|
||
re-education of the management could be undertaken quickly to the
|
||
satisfaction of Japan and other countries, but since the level of the
|
||
general employees was so low, concern remains in that area. When the
|
||
president of Boeing's Seattle plant was asked: "How long will it take
|
||
after re-education has begun before the technological strength [of
|
||
your company] will begin bearing fruit?" His answer was seven years.
|
||
Seven years! How can we ride around in jumbo jets for seven years not
|
||
knowing what types of defects they might have?
|
||
|
||
As we learned from the tragic Boeing crash in Japan, all of those
|
||
responsible got off, bearing no criminal responsibility. The legal
|
||
systems in Japan and the U.S. are different: in Japan, a national
|
||
inspector is sent out, but in America, aircraft manufacturers are not
|
||
held responsible. The Boeing company did not even name the
|
||
responsible persons. They say that it is better to prevent a
|
||
recurrence than to spend all of their energies in finding fault, but
|
||
the thinking that exemption from prosecution is the only way the truth
|
||
can be told is something that is very hard to take for the families of
|
||
those killed in the accident. According to an investigation by the
|
||
Japanese police, there were four Boeing employees who should have been
|
||
further pursued to assess their responsibility. The U.S. side
|
||
acknowledges this.
|
||
|
||
The Boeing accident was nothing more than a worker's mistake -- it
|
||
happened well before the crash. There was no follow up after the
|
||
crash except to say that the maintenance operations were sloppily
|
||
done. While the specifications had called for three thick divider
|
||
walls to be tightly bolted on, it just was not done.
|
||
|
||
Bolts had been placed on the left and right, but they did not reach
|
||
through the three sheets, just to the second one. This caused a
|
||
serious weakening of the aircraft strength. This tells the story of
|
||
the low level of the people who are performing maintenance.
|
||
|
||
Despite the fact that they are employees of the Boeing Corporation, a
|
||
world-class manufacturer of aircraft, it would still take 7 years to
|
||
re-educate them. This is a story which could not be comprehended in
|
||
Japan's industrial circles.
|
||
|
||
The United States wants everyone to buy American-made semiconductors,
|
||
and these are even being used in Japan, but the number of defective
|
||
ones is amazingly high. When we complain, the answer is: Japan is the
|
||
only country that is complaining, nobody else has any complaints. It
|
||
leads me to think that there is no hope for the U.S.
|
||
|
||
The manufacturing defect rate in the United States has improved
|
||
somewhat recently, but it is still 5 to 6 times higher than that in
|
||
Japan - it used to be 10 times higher. The report by the task team in
|
||
the Pentagon also admits this.
|
||
|
||
To contrast this with Japan, I would like to insert the following
|
||
episode.
|
||
|
||
This is an episode illustrating the exceptional knowledge and decision
|
||
making capability of one female employee of the Kumamoto plant of
|
||
Nippon Electric Corporation(NEC). For one reason or the other, the
|
||
rate of rejects at the Kumamoto plant had been higher than it was at
|
||
other NEC plants. No matter how hard they tried, they could not get
|
||
the reject rate down. If it could be done in other plants, why
|
||
couldn't it be done in Kumamoto? There were all-hands meetings with
|
||
the plant supervisor daily on this problem.
|
||
|
||
One day, a female shift worker at the plant stopped at a crossing for
|
||
the Kagoshima Line which ran in front of the factory. This was on her
|
||
way to work. It was a rare event, but this day, she had to wait while
|
||
a long freight train passed. Rumbling vibrations were sent through
|
||
her legs as the train passed. The thought crossed her mind that these
|
||
vibrations might have some sort of adverse effect on the products made
|
||
at the plant. While she was working, she paid attention to the time
|
||
and stopped when a train was scheduled to pass by. In the factory,
|
||
however, she couldn't feel anything unusual. She still wondered,
|
||
however, if the machines were not being affected. She reported her
|
||
concerns to the foreman, suggesting that the precision machinery in
|
||
the plant might be so affected.
|
||
|
||
The plant supervisor said, "That's it." He reacted immediately by
|
||
digging a large ditch between the plant and the railroad tracks and
|
||
filling it with water. The result was a drastic decline in the number
|
||
of rejects.
|
||
|
||
That woman was 18 years old. This woman took pride in the products
|
||
made by her company and identified with it. It is my feeling that
|
||
this type of result is due to the vast differences in our formal
|
||
education system.
|
||
|
||
In any case, when it comes to economics among the free world
|
||
countries, the basis for existence is economic warfare, or, if that is
|
||
too harsh of [a] word, in economic competition. It is probably
|
||
natural, therefore, that various cheerleading groups of the other
|
||
party will rough you up by calling you unfair, but we cannot stand
|
||
still and be defeated just because our adversary is making a lot of
|
||
noise. This is exactly the position Japan is in today.
|
||
|
||
|
||
6.0 IS AMERICA A COUNTRY WHICH PROTECTS HUMAN RIGHTS? (Morita)
|
||
|
||
6.1 Workers' Rights Are Ignored by American Companies
|
||
|
||
American demands of Japan may increase in the future but America has a
|
||
great many defects of its own, to which we must continuously direct
|
||
its attention.
|
||
|
||
My long observation of American corporations leaves me puzzled about
|
||
American human rights legitimacy. Human rights are held to be such
|
||
high moral values in America and it preaches on the subject
|
||
continuously all over the world. America has been criticizing and
|
||
condemning nations such as South Africa and Afghanistan on human
|
||
rights issues; however, I must ask Americans if they are applying
|
||
these same standards to their own workers.
|
||
|
||
American corporations hire workers right and left and build new plants
|
||
all over whenever the market is bullish, in an attempt to maximize
|
||
their profits. Yet once the tide shifts, they lay off workers simply
|
||
to protect company profits. These laid-off workers have nothing to do
|
||
with poor market conditions.
|
||
|
||
American corporate executives are of the opinion that it is a
|
||
corporate right to pursue maximum profits and that fired workers
|
||
should be able to live on their savings. However, people do not work
|
||
for wages alone. Work has more meaning to most people than just as a
|
||
means of subsistence. A Japanese worker has a sense of mission in
|
||
holding his job for his lifetime as well as supporting the corporation
|
||
which provides him with meaning to his life. This may well not be the
|
||
case in America. American workers may only expect a comfortable wage
|
||
for their work. However, this attitude could change. People can
|
||
easily develop loyalty to a group or to a company to which they
|
||
belong, depending upon conditions and guidance provided. This sense
|
||
of loyalty to the company is a formidable asset. Repetitive hiring
|
||
and firing denies any possibility of cultivating a sense of loyalty.
|
||
|
||
I must ask American executives if they regard workers as mere tools
|
||
which they can use to assure profits and then dump whenever the market
|
||
sags. It seems that workers are treated simply as resources or tools
|
||
rather than as human beings with inalienable rights. I would like to
|
||
suggest that they should first do something to protect the human
|
||
rights of workers in America before they start asking other nations to
|
||
protect and enhance the human rights of their citizens. There are
|
||
good reasons why American labor unions must be confrontational in
|
||
protecting their members and attempting to assure maximum wages during
|
||
periods of employment since they have no assurance that the jobs will
|
||
continue. Attitudes of executives are not actually much different
|
||
than those of the union to the extent that they grab whatever they can
|
||
- as much as half the company's annual profits in the form of huge
|
||
bonuses, claiming that this is just since they were responsible for
|
||
the profits.
|
||
|
||
A corporate chairman with whom I am acquainted, complained that he has
|
||
no use for all the money he receives. His company is doing well and
|
||
his income is in the multi-million dollar a year range. His children
|
||
are all grown and he and his wife already have vacation villas, a
|
||
yacht and a private airplane; he said they just have no way to spend
|
||
any more money on themselves.
|
||
|
||
Japanese executives work morning to night to improve the position of
|
||
their companies, and yet the majority of their salaries are wiped out
|
||
by taxes. The income gap between American and Japanese business
|
||
executives is astounding. In Japan, even if one works very hard to
|
||
increase his income to assure himself of some of the amenities of
|
||
life, there is no way that he could expect to equal the luxuries
|
||
enjoyed by American executives. Mr. Matsushita, probably the
|
||
wealthiest man in Japan, when traveling abroad with his secretary,
|
||
uses regular commercial flights. Having a private plane is simply out
|
||
of his realm of consideration.
|
||
|
||
There is some talk in Japan concerning levying taxes on profits
|
||
generated by the founder of a corporation. I am opposed to this
|
||
proposal as I believe the spirit of free enterprise must be protected.
|
||
While an unbridled pursuit of personal gain is not ideal, those who
|
||
have created new business through extraordinary effort and who have
|
||
made this contribution to society, should be rewarded financially to a
|
||
certain extent as this will provide encouragement to young people,
|
||
motivating them to follow their dreams and create new industries.
|
||
|
||
The current popular idea that everyone belongs in the middle class and
|
||
the wealthy are suspect may undermine the very basis of a free
|
||
economy. The Liberal Democratic Party, however, tends to accept this
|
||
premise, as put forth by the opposition for the sole purpose of
|
||
parliamentary manipulation, which is a shame since they have a
|
||
300-seat majority.
|
||
|
||
Japan has been a practicing free economy and a good majority of the
|
||
people do in fact belong to the so-called middle class, which I think
|
||
is marvelous. We have no real social classes and everyone is free to
|
||
choose whatever profession or occupation they wish.
|
||
|
||
Today in Japan, nearly all company executives dine out on company
|
||
accounts and ride in corporate-owned cars. As a child, I never saw
|
||
this kind of lavish living by corporate executives such as my father.
|
||
He had a car and a chauffeur, but they were financed directly by him,
|
||
out of his own pocket. It would be beyond his comprehension to use a
|
||
company car and driver for his personal use. I am not particularly
|
||
opposed to such benefits enjoyed by today's executives, as they can be
|
||
correct rewards and incentives.
|
||
|
||
American corporate practices, from my personal observations, are
|
||
extreme. An example is the so-called "golden parachute," which is the
|
||
ultimate executive privilege. When one's reputation as an executive
|
||
is well established, and he is hired by another company, his contract
|
||
may well contain these "golden parachutes." The executive may demand
|
||
a certain percentage of corporate profits as his bonus, or perhaps
|
||
some stock options. Upon retirement, he may still receive his salary
|
||
for a number of years. Should he pass away during this period, his
|
||
wife may be entitled to receive all or a percentage of these benefits.
|
||
Should he be fired, for whatever reason, he may still collect his
|
||
salary under his contract. A contract is a contract and "golden
|
||
parachutes" are a part of the system.
|
||
|
||
So even though the corporation may stall or crash, the executive is
|
||
equipped with his "golden parachute" and is thereby guaranteed to land
|
||
safely and comfortably. He may go to Florida and elsewhere to enjoy a
|
||
rich retirement life. Who suffers? Who suffers is America: the
|
||
American economy suffers from this outrageous system.
|
||
|
||
|
||
6.2 American Executives Prefer Immediate Rewards
|
||
|
||
Poverty is very visible all over America, particularly among blacks
|
||
and Hispanics. The minority issue is a crucial one in America. The
|
||
gap between rich and poor is enormous. Only one percent of the
|
||
population controls 36% of the national wealth, an outrageous
|
||
condition that should somehow be corrected.
|
||
|
||
A free economy basically should assure profit to anyone who works.
|
||
Yet if an individual's gains go to the extreme, he becomes a celebrity
|
||
and an egotist. This is what I have seen to be the case in many
|
||
corporations today.
|
||
|
||
Such individuals regard their employees as their own tools to enhance
|
||
their personal performance for which they collect all the rewards.
|
||
Should one fail and be fired, he will land comfortable on his feet,
|
||
thanks to his golden parachute. As an example of an extreme case of
|
||
such, a friend of mine mismanaged his company while he was its
|
||
chairman. The company failed, but he and his wife are leading a
|
||
luxurious life, something that would never happen in Japan. This man
|
||
simply played the American game. He had no real intention of
|
||
remaining with that company in any case; he was only working to
|
||
maximize his personal income during that time.
|
||
|
||
I have been involved in a number of joint venture projects in America.
|
||
I make every effort to improve my joint venture situations. I want to
|
||
close the deal as quickly as possible whenever we are involved in
|
||
substantial capital investment. When we spend capital on facilities
|
||
investment, we are entitled to tax benefits. I like to utilize the
|
||
extra profits generated by these tax benefits to get rid of debt
|
||
service. Whenever I suggest that, my partners ask "why do we have to
|
||
sacrifice our profits for people in the future?"
|
||
|
||
For me, the most crucial objective is to make the company healthy and
|
||
free of debt service, hoping that our successors will do the same for
|
||
their successors by availing whatever profits we get from repaying the
|
||
debt, while my joint venture partners feel that their personal gains
|
||
should not be so sacrificed. They have no intention of remaining with
|
||
these companies for very long and so they want to increase their
|
||
personal income by maximizing disposable company profits in the short
|
||
run.
|
||
|
||
For example, they moved production facilities to Singapore or Japan
|
||
when the U.S. dollar was high because they could not expect to
|
||
maintain high profits when production costs were high.
|
||
|
||
This is the case in the semiconductor industry as well. Production
|
||
has been moved out of the U.S., leaving production primarily with
|
||
Japan. This has deprived America of the capacity for anything other
|
||
than 256K bit chips. It is cheaper and easier to buy them from Japan
|
||
rather than dealing with expensive, unionized workers in America.
|
||
These very same business executives have been blaming the trade
|
||
imbalance and the Japanese trade surplus for their difficulties while
|
||
at the same time choosing to import these products from Japan. Japan
|
||
has not forced them to buy its products, but it cannot begin to catch
|
||
up on orders placed by American firms.
|
||
|
||
|
||
6.3 A Japanese Corporation is a Community Bound Together by a Common
|
||
Destiny
|
||
|
||
The fundamental principles which govern a Japanese corporation are
|
||
basically different from those of an American corporation, from the
|
||
viewpoint of both executives and workers.
|
||
|
||
The structure of pre-war Japanese corporations bear some resemblance
|
||
to American corporations today to the extent that the president could
|
||
fire anyone at his discretion. A variety of labor activities were
|
||
implemented to meet such situations. Taxes were low and executives
|
||
were leading comfortable lives, able to have company stock allocated,
|
||
assuring themselves of a comfortable retirement. A top executive was
|
||
able to buy a house with just one bonus. By the time he retired, he
|
||
could have several houses for rental, which alone would have ensured a
|
||
luxurious life.
|
||
|
||
After the war, General MacArthur changed Japanese labor laws as well
|
||
as tax laws, among other things, which put Japanese business
|
||
executives in a different situation. First, they were now unable to
|
||
fire employees at their discretion, not even to reduce the size of
|
||
their labor force. At times a company must reduce the size of the
|
||
work force if it cannot afford to keep them or if they are
|
||
unproductive.
|
||
|
||
When I first found that American companies can hire and fire and
|
||
rehire at will, I wondered perhaps if Japanese companies were more
|
||
charitable organizations than profit making institutions. However,
|
||
Japanese managers have developed a concept which, in essence binds the
|
||
company, workers, and management, into a community with a common fate
|
||
or destiny. I have explained to American corporate managers that in
|
||
Japan, once an individual is hired, he has been hired for life and
|
||
unless he commits some serious offense, the company cannot fire him.
|
||
Americans want to know how in the world we are capable of operating
|
||
profitably. I say that since a Japanese company is a community bound
|
||
together by a common destiny, like the relationship between a married
|
||
couple, all must work together to solve common problems.
|
||
|
||
This concept of a fate-sharing community might sound particular to
|
||
Japan. However, recently, it appears to have had some impact on
|
||
American corporations, which are showing interest in the Japanese
|
||
corporate management system. They seem anxious to absorb some of the
|
||
positive elements of the Japanese system.
|
||
|
||
When I find an employee who turns out to be wrong for a job, I feel it
|
||
is my fault because I made the decision to hire him. Generally, I
|
||
would invest in additional training, education, or change of duty,
|
||
even perhaps sending him overseas for additional experience. As a
|
||
result, he will usually turn out to be an asset in the long run. Even
|
||
if the positive return is only one out of every five, that one
|
||
individual's productivity will cover the losses incurred by the other
|
||
four. It is a greater loss to lose that one productive person than to
|
||
maintain the presence of the four incompetents.
|
||
|
||
In a fate-sharing corporation, one capable individual can easily carry
|
||
a number of other not-so-capable individuals. The confidence of
|
||
Japanese employees in their company, knowing that he is employed for
|
||
life, means that he will develop a strong sense of dedication to that
|
||
company. For these reasons, Japanese corporate executives are anxious
|
||
to train their employees well, as they will be their successors.
|
||
|
||
As the chief executive officer, it is my responsibility not only to
|
||
pursue profit, but also to create a community where those I have
|
||
employed can complete their careers 20-30 years from now with the
|
||
feeling that he had truly made a good life with the company.
|
||
|
||
Japanese company employees know that they are members of a community
|
||
bound together by a mutual fate for which they bear the hardships of
|
||
today in anticipation of a better future. There are many company
|
||
presidents today in Japan who at one time or another served as union
|
||
leaders. This fact makes present union leaders feel that they too
|
||
may, sometime in the future, move into management positions within
|
||
their company, and therefore their long term interests are closely
|
||
tied to the company. They do not pursue short term, myopic profits
|
||
for the immediate future. When the company proposes a plan to save a
|
||
certain portion of profits for facility investment or to pool to the
|
||
following year, unions may well be willing to make compromises,
|
||
because they know that the future of the workers is tied to the future
|
||
of the corporation. I would like to ask presidents of American
|
||
corporations if they ever heard of any American union leaders who have
|
||
become heads of corporations. Japanese executives have a
|
||
categorically different corporate philosophy than do American
|
||
executives, who are more anxious to demonstrate profitability to
|
||
please stockholders. I have asked Americans what, in their minds, is
|
||
the meaning of "company." In my mind, it is a group of people
|
||
conforming where interests are shared. I must point out that in the
|
||
American interpretation of company, this concept does not exist. It
|
||
is my firm conviction that man is created equal, irrespective of color
|
||
of skin or nationality and it is natural that my concept of company
|
||
includes the employees of my overseas Sony operations. My California
|
||
plant opened in 1972, initially with 250 employees. Soon after the
|
||
plant opened, we were hit with the worldwide oil crisis, which caused
|
||
a recession. The California plant was not immune to this development
|
||
and the facility lost business and was unable to support its 250
|
||
employees.
|
||
|
||
The president of Sony America was, of course, an American and he came
|
||
to me saying that there was no other choice but to lay off some of the
|
||
employees. I refused his proposal, telling him that I would take the
|
||
responsibility for possible losses in order to retain the employees.
|
||
We sent capital from the Japanese headquarters to sustain the 250
|
||
person work force for some time. During this period, there was not
|
||
enough work to keep everyone busy, so we developed educational
|
||
programs, out of which grew not only a sense of appreciation, but also
|
||
a real emotional involvement with the company. They began to feel
|
||
that the plant was their home, and began to clean and polish the
|
||
facilities, and take care of their work sites on their own. These
|
||
people became the central core of the California plant, which now
|
||
employs 1500 people. They don't even talk about unionizing
|
||
themselves. American unions are basically industrial, which means
|
||
that there is always active union leaders from outside who attempt to
|
||
unionize our plant. Our workers had T-shirts made, with their own
|
||
money, saying "WE DON'T NEED THE UNION."
|
||
|
||
The United Kingdom has a unique law which unionizes every company.
|
||
Sony U.K. is no exception. Yet our women union members insisted, in
|
||
an interview on the BBC, that their union is different than other,
|
||
ordinary ones. This is a positive demonstration of the feeling that
|
||
we all share the same fate, no matter where we are in the world.
|
||
|
||
In the U.S. and the U.K., most employees never have even seen their
|
||
top executives. When I go to one of our plants, I normally mingle
|
||
with the employees and eat together with them in the company
|
||
cafeteria. This helps in developing communication and trust. It may
|
||
be a bit difficult to expect the same response from foreign employees,
|
||
but it is still the best approach. The Japanese system is not
|
||
completely applicable to the American system, of course. Yet patient
|
||
demonstration to show that the company truly wishes to protect their
|
||
interests, even when business is at its worst, will show results.
|
||
People tend to develop trust under these circumstances. The best
|
||
thing a company can do is to treat its employees as dignified human
|
||
beings.
|
||
|
||
|
||
6.4 The Japanese Approach Can Be Used Worldwide
|
||
|
||
European corporations appear to be treating their employees more
|
||
humanely than their American counterparts, although they are still far
|
||
from the concept of lifetime employment. Large corporations do not
|
||
hesitate to lay off employees whenever business is down; they even
|
||
close operations without notice or sell out, treating employees as if
|
||
they were tools or equipment.
|
||
|
||
There is also obvious class discrimination within companies.
|
||
Engineers, for example, wear white collars, stay in their offices, and
|
||
seldom show up in the factories. They want to tell workers what to
|
||
do, rather than donning blues and showing them. In my company, all
|
||
workers wear the same uniforms. I also wear the same uniform, not
|
||
only in the plants, but also at company headquarters. All our plant
|
||
managers do the same. Those who are in training have been instructed
|
||
to walk through the plant frequently, establishing personal contacts
|
||
with the workers. Those who become foremen or section managers are
|
||
encouraged to hold brief meetings each morning with their subordinates
|
||
to read their mood and detect problems in advance. They are
|
||
instructed to talk with those who seem ill or depressed, to find out
|
||
if they need medical care or if they are having family or personal
|
||
problems. Should this be the case, they should be allowed to take
|
||
time off and deal with these problems first, while the other workers
|
||
cover for them. This also helps the sense of togetherness among
|
||
workers.
|
||
|
||
On the occasion of 20th and 25th anniversaries of Sony America, my
|
||
wife and I visited all our American plants, gave talks, had dinner
|
||
with our employees and shook the hands of all our workers. Since at
|
||
some plants we had three shifts, we had dinner three times in one day,
|
||
with the night shift taking their turn at 4:00a.m. I told everyone
|
||
that we greatly appreciated their contributions which helped make the
|
||
25th anniversary a celebration and shook everyone's hand. I was able
|
||
to feel their response even physically. These employees told me that
|
||
this experience was something they never would have had in an American
|
||
company. I felt our Japanese approach was not foreign to them at all!
|
||
|
||
One episode made me particularly happy. I visited one of our rather
|
||
small laboratories, and said that I wanted to meet all of its members,
|
||
[when] the head of the lab asked if he could take my picture. He took
|
||
his camera from his desk drawer and took me to each member of his
|
||
staff, introducing me to him or her and taking our picture as we shook
|
||
hands. There were almost 80 people at this facility and he promised
|
||
to make a print for each person. I was surprised that this typically
|
||
Japanese activity was taking place in a facility where there were no
|
||
Japanese! There again, I felt that we are all basically the same,
|
||
irrespective of national and cultural differences.
|
||
|
||
Our style and our efforts have a ripple effect and make other members
|
||
of our company feel the Sony spirit. I am not saying that whatever
|
||
style and customs we have developed are automatically good and
|
||
acceptable everywhere. What I am emphasizing here is that the basic
|
||
attitude of a corporation and its philosophy can be understood
|
||
worldwide, and certain aspects of Japanese tradition and style can be
|
||
rooted overseas.
|
||
|
||
On the other hand, I recognize fully that certain aspects of American
|
||
business administration, such as numerical and analytical operations,
|
||
are excellent as we have sent many individuals from our company to
|
||
American business schools to learn such matters. Combining good
|
||
traditions and practices of both the Japanese and American systems
|
||
will, I believe, make for a very strong corporation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
7.0 LET'S BECOME A JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO (Morita)
|
||
|
||
7.1 Saying "No" Actually Represents a Deepening of Mutual Understanding
|
||
|
||
It is inevitable that Japanese companies have been establishing
|
||
American operations. America after the era of Reaganomics is now
|
||
responding to that trend with new Bush Administration policies. In
|
||
response, Japan should now begin to make it a habit to say no when its
|
||
position is clearly negative. It [is] the rule in the West to say
|
||
"no" whenever one's position is clearly negative. We are in a
|
||
business environment where "well" or "probably" have no place in
|
||
normal business conduct. I have been saying "no" to foreigners for
|
||
the last thirty years. Clearly, the Japanese Government has missed
|
||
many, many opportunities to say "no."
|
||
|
||
Take the auto trade issue, for example. America forced Japan to limit
|
||
its auto exports to two million units per year under the guise of
|
||
voluntary restrictions. When the American market became more
|
||
lucrative, and the number of imported cars could have been increased,
|
||
American auto manufacturers demanded that the quota be tripled. MITI
|
||
and the Prime Minister gave in to American demands.
|
||
|
||
In my opinion, this was a great mistake. Both the MITI minister and
|
||
the prime minister at that time should have taken the position that
|
||
the American demands were unfair. The Big Three had already increased
|
||
their profits enormously and individuals such as Lee Iacocca and Roger
|
||
Smith were receiving more than a million dollars each in bonuses.
|
||
They simply demanded special treatment in order to increase profits
|
||
from the Japanese imports which they sold under their company brands
|
||
when they requested that the quotas be tripled. That was the time for
|
||
Japan to have said "you are being hypocritical, criticizing others as
|
||
unfair when in fact what you are demanding is what is really unfair."
|
||
The timing was crucial; unless one registers opposition or negative
|
||
reaction at precisely the right time, Americans take the situation for
|
||
granted and later insist that they were right as no opposition was
|
||
registered at the time of the demand. This has always been the case
|
||
in the past.
|
||
|
||
The trade imbalance is another case which should be scrutinized as to
|
||
whether or not American demands are based on fact and reality. I once
|
||
asked Americans to investigate what Americans had been importing from
|
||
Japan.
|
||
|
||
American imports from Japan are mostly products which require a high
|
||
tech capacity to produce. Many of these products fall into the area
|
||
of military procurement, but it is true that even the private sector
|
||
is buying Japanese products which are technologically indispensable.
|
||
Even some of the inexpensive home electrical appliances may be
|
||
obtained from Japanese manufacturers within a short time frame if they
|
||
require high technological skills in the production process.
|
||
|
||
America has left the production responsibility with Japan, resulting
|
||
in a heavy dependency upon Japan. American politicians only talk
|
||
about the results of this situation, blaming Japan for the trade
|
||
deficit to get votes. Yet it seems that these same politicians don't
|
||
even know specifically what it is that America buys from Japan. If
|
||
they took the time and the effort to seriously investigate the matter,
|
||
they could not condemn Japan so out of hand.
|
||
|
||
Japan should tell America that it may buy these quality products
|
||
irrespective of the exchange rates, even when the U.S. dollar falls to
|
||
the 100 [presumably yen] to 1 ratio. Artificial manipulation of the
|
||
exchange rate does not benefit the American economy. Such products as
|
||
transistors, which Sony originally marketed, may today be purchased
|
||
anywhere outside Japan, and so are not a matter of friction between
|
||
the U.S. and Japan. Products recently developed in Japan are not as
|
||
easily obtained elsewhere. There are some things that can only be
|
||
found in Japan and Japan cannot be blamed for over-exporting. Those
|
||
who say otherwise simply do not know the facts.
|
||
|
||
Computer terminals are in short supply and are being rapidly developed
|
||
in Japan. Japan should let America know what the situation is and
|
||
make the U.S. realize that the relationship between the two nations is
|
||
increasingly mutually dependent.
|
||
|
||
My purpose in advocating saying "no" is to promote that awareness.
|
||
"No" is not the beginning of a disagreement or a serious argument. On
|
||
the contrary, "no" is the beginning of a new collaboration. If Japan
|
||
truly says "no" when it means "no" it will serve as a means of
|
||
improving the U.S.-Japan relationship.
|
||
|
||
|
||
7.2 National Characteristics Which Make It Difficult for the Japanese to
|
||
Say "No"
|
||
|
||
The question arises as to who should say "no?" Japan's Confucian
|
||
background makes it very difficult for its people to say "no" within
|
||
the context of normal human relationships. In a traditional
|
||
hierarchy, subordinates dare not say "no" to higher-ups without
|
||
violating normal courtesy. The higher-up takes a "no" from a
|
||
subordinate as insubordination. In a staff relationship, "no" is
|
||
something to be avoided in order to maintain smooth human
|
||
relationships.
|
||
|
||
Living in a homogeneous society since childhood, we Japanese have
|
||
grown up without practical experience in quarreling and fighting in a
|
||
heterocultural environment. Many of us feel that others will
|
||
eventually understand our true feelings on an issue without [our]
|
||
verbalizing them. In short, we expect a lot when it comes to mutual
|
||
understanding. Americans may go directly to their boss to offer an
|
||
explanation when they feel they are not properly understood. Japanese,
|
||
on the other fand, even if they feel they are not properly understood,
|
||
remain hopeful that they will eventually be understood or that the
|
||
truth will reveal itself sooner or later. They do the same with
|
||
foreigners in foreign countries. They feel that sincerity and effort
|
||
should automatically be reciprocated. In my mind, this can only
|
||
happen in Japan, but never in foreign countries. Wordless
|
||
communication and telepathy will just not happen.
|
||
|
||
I admit that I may be more westernized than most Japanese, since I
|
||
believe that we should be more straightforward as we become closer,
|
||
and that a serious quarrel need not destroy a friendship. This may
|
||
not be accepted in a traditional Japanese relationship; we avoid
|
||
serious confrontation by turning away from the cold facts. Instead,
|
||
we tend to make loose compromises. It is quite simply not our
|
||
tradition to say "no" to our friends.
|
||
|
||
We should not expect to find a similar understanding from foreigners
|
||
concerning this particular Japanese mentality. It is too easy to
|
||
expect understanding of one's opposition without using "no." I could
|
||
say it is a Japanese defect to expect something without using the
|
||
rational verbal procedures.
|
||
|
||
If you stay silent when you have a particular demand or an opposing
|
||
position to express, the other party will take it for granted that you
|
||
have no demands or opposition. When you close your mind to the
|
||
outside, remaining in a uniquely Japanese mental framework, you will
|
||
be isolated in this modern, interdependent world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
8.0 LET'S NOT GIVE IN TO AMERICA'S BLUSTER (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
8.1 Statesmen Ought to Make Best Use of All Available Cards
|
||
|
||
America has renewed its bluster in the last year. Politicians must
|
||
sense that they will win more votes bashing Japan than bashing the
|
||
Soviet Union. Criticism of Japan by U.S. politicians has taken on a
|
||
rather hysterical tone these days. I experienced it personally when I
|
||
was there and met with politicians who told me that there was a new
|
||
power shift between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., as if this development
|
||
should scare Japan somehow. These same politicians indicated that
|
||
since both Americans and the Soviets are white, at a final
|
||
confrontation, they might gang up against a non-white Japan.
|
||
|
||
Japan should never give in to such irrational threats. Japan also
|
||
holds very strong cards in high technology capabilities which are
|
||
indispensable to military equipment in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Yet
|
||
Japan has never played this card to improve its position vis-a-vis the
|
||
U.S. Japan could well have said "no" to making available specific
|
||
technology. Japan has substantial national strength to deal with
|
||
other nations, yet some of the powerful cards it holds have been
|
||
wasted diplomatically.
|
||
|
||
I happened to be in America at the time the U.S. Congress passed a
|
||
resolution to impose sanctions on Japan on the semiconductor issue.
|
||
Congress seemed to be very excited, almost in the same mood as was the
|
||
League of Nations when it sent the Litton Mission to Manchuria to
|
||
observe Japanese activities there in relation to the Manchukuo
|
||
incident.
|
||
|
||
I talked with members of Congress in this tense atmosphere, and I did
|
||
not feel they were conducting matters on a rational basis. Some
|
||
Congressmen were actually brandishing sledgehammers, smashing Toshiba
|
||
electronic equipment, with their sleeves rolled up. It was just ugly
|
||
to watch them behave so.
|
||
|
||
I commented at that time that the U.S. Congress is too hysterical to
|
||
trust. their faces turned red in anger and they demanded an
|
||
explanation. I told them: "Look -- only a few decades ago you passed
|
||
the Prohibition Amendment. No sincere Congress would ever pass such
|
||
irrational legislation." They all just grinned at me in response.
|
||
|
||
Yet I must admit, that it was Japan who aggravated the semiconductor
|
||
issue to such a low level, by not saying "no" on the appropriate
|
||
occasions.
|
||
|
||
After he was elected to a second term, Mr. Nakasone promised America
|
||
that Japan would avail highly strategic technology without giving
|
||
adequate thought to the significance of that kind of commitment. The
|
||
strongest card, which he should have played, was virtually given away
|
||
free to America. He probably wanted to impress America, hoping for a
|
||
tacit reciprocity from a thankful U.S. Unfortunately, it was only Mr.
|
||
Nakasone who recognized the value of that card at the time. Both the
|
||
Liberal Democrats and opposition parties overlooked the significance
|
||
of this issue. I assume that the leaders of those parties, such as
|
||
Takeshita, Miyazawa and Abe did not know it either. It is such a pity
|
||
that Japan's politicians are not aware of the political significance
|
||
of Japan's high technology capabilities.
|
||
|
||
In reality, Japanese technology has advanced so much that America gets
|
||
hysterical, an indication of the tremendous value of that card --
|
||
perhaps our ace. My frustration stems from the fact that Japan has
|
||
not, so far, utilized that powerful card in the arena of international
|
||
relations.
|
||
|
||
What Mr. Nakasone got out of the free gift was Reagan's friendship,
|
||
so-called. We all know that love and friendship alone cannot solve
|
||
international conflicts and hardships.
|
||
|
||
|
||
8.2 Nakasone Bungled the Relationship
|
||
|
||
I truly regret that Japanese diplomacy has been based on a series of
|
||
"yesses" instead of skillful manipulation of strong ace cards. Former
|
||
prime minister Nakasone has done a substantial disservice to Japan in
|
||
terms of his handling of relations with the U.S. These are among his
|
||
most unfortunate mistakes. He boasted of the so-called "Ron-Yasu"
|
||
relationship as if he had succeeded in bringing about a skillful
|
||
policy toward the U.S. In reality, he was simply a lowly yes-man to
|
||
Reagan.
|
||
|
||
It was actually I who introduced Mr. Nakasone to Mr. Reagan. I asked
|
||
one of Mr. Reagan's assistants if he ever recalled a "no" from
|
||
Nakasone to reagan. He immediately replied he did not know of any, and
|
||
Mr. Nakasone was a "nice guy with a sardonic smile."
|
||
|
||
Former Prime Minister Nakasone was in a position to know that Japan's
|
||
leading edge technology was superior to that of the U.S.; so much so
|
||
that Americans had become nervous concerning the magnitude of Japan's
|
||
superiority in the area. Yet he still did not say "no." Was he taken
|
||
advantage of? Did he have some weak spot as did the prime minister
|
||
(Tanaka) at the time of the Lockheed scandal during the Nixon
|
||
Administration? Otherwise, Japanese leaders who hold such high cards
|
||
should be able to play them in dealing with American demands.
|
||
|
||
The FSX, the next generation of fighters, developed by Mitsubishi
|
||
Heavy Industries during the Nakasone era, has become another source of
|
||
controversy in the U.S. as it relates to defense matters. Further
|
||
development of the FSX appears to be quashed by the U.S. I am unaware
|
||
of any deals made under the table, but there is considerable
|
||
frustration in Japan over the matter.
|
||
|
||
Mitsubishi Heavy industries is a conglomerate with a wide variety of
|
||
technology used in manufacturing advanced products. The chief
|
||
engineer there is a contemporary of mine who developed the most
|
||
advanced land-to-air missile. He is also the man responsible for the
|
||
design of the next generation fighter and he believes that Japan
|
||
should have its own capacity to provide such equipment, which of
|
||
course astonishes Americans.
|
||
|
||
The FSX is a marvelous and formidable fighter. No existing fighter,
|
||
including the F-15 and F-16 can match it in a dog fight. I recall
|
||
when Secretary of Defense Weinberger became serious about quashing the
|
||
FSX Japanese development plan, simply out of fear.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, Japan has not yet developed a powerful enough jet
|
||
engine, although I advocated such development while I was a member of
|
||
the Upper House. Japan still must purchase jet engines, which are
|
||
mounted on the F-15 and F-16. If America gets really nasty, Japan
|
||
could buy engines from France, which is quite anxious to export
|
||
military equipment (at the same time that that country's president is
|
||
advocating truces all over the world, I might add). If France is
|
||
reluctant to sell what we need, I would not mind going to the Soviet
|
||
Union, although the quality of the Russian engines is not particularly
|
||
impressive.
|
||
|
||
New Mitsubishi-designed jet fighters equipped with Russian engines may
|
||
only have a top speed of 95% of existing F-15 and -16 class fighters,
|
||
so one might think them inferior. On the contrary: their combat
|
||
capability is far superior in a dogfight situation. It can make a 380
|
||
degree turn [sic] with a third of the diameter needed by other top
|
||
fighters. The F-15 and -16 require 5000 meters; the Mitsubishi
|
||
fighter only requires 1600 meters. Just think of war as a game of
|
||
tag. What is necessary is not maximum speed but great maneuver-
|
||
ability. Mitsubishi's FSX fighter can get right on an enemy plane
|
||
and send heat-seeking missiles with 100% accuracy. Incidentally,
|
||
there are two types of air-to-air missiles, heat-seeking and
|
||
radar-controlled. The radar-controlled type may even fail to hit a
|
||
jumbo jet, while the heat-tracing type can fine-tune its direction to
|
||
head for the enemy's source of heat.
|
||
|
||
The FSX was a surprise to Americans, as were to Zero fighters at the
|
||
beginning of the Second World War. They never expected to see such an
|
||
advanced fighter as the Zero, which virtually controlled the air at
|
||
the beginning of the war. That such a formidable weapon as the FSX is
|
||
in production today outside the U.S. came as a shock to Americans.
|
||
The Japanese FSX is equipped with four vertical fins, similar to a
|
||
shark's fins. Each acts as a steering mechanism, like the steering
|
||
wheel of a four wheel drive [four-wheel steering intended, presumably]
|
||
automobile that can make a complete turn in a small area without
|
||
moving back and forth. Such a marvelous idea probably is not the
|
||
monopoly of Japan, but it was a Japanese manufacturer who developed
|
||
the idea to reality, thanks to Japanese advanced high technology.
|
||
|
||
Russian fighters are also equipped using Japanese know-how, especially
|
||
in the areas of ceramics and carbon fibers. Special paints on
|
||
American reconaissance planes which assist in avoiding radar detection
|
||
are also made in Japan.
|
||
|
||
Shocked by the high standards of the FSX, I guess that the U.S.
|
||
pressured Mr. Nakasone, probably citing his earlier commitment on
|
||
technology. His submission to American pressure eventually caused the
|
||
mothballing of the FSX, to be replaced by future products of a joint
|
||
U.S.-Japan development plan. In November 1988, the governments signed
|
||
an agreement that set the course for the joint development of the FSX;
|
||
an agreement which leaves many unsolved problems at the industry
|
||
level.
|
||
|
||
One of the manufacturers involved, General Dynamics, was very anxious
|
||
to assume the initiative on the project, dividing it up among others.
|
||
It met with resistance from Mitsubishi, and General Dynamics came up
|
||
with a plan that would separate the development of the left and right
|
||
wing -- a very peculiar approach.
|
||
|
||
In short, America wants to steal Japanese know-how. They cannot
|
||
manufacture the most technologically advanced fighters without
|
||
advanced ceramic and carbon fiber technology from Japan. That is why
|
||
America is applying so much pressure, attempting to force Japan to
|
||
come to American terms. Some of Japan's industry representatives
|
||
appear willing to deal with the Americans under the table, probably
|
||
with the good intentions of smoothing U.S.-Japan relations on the
|
||
issue. I happen to disagree with such an approach. We just cannot
|
||
give in on this issue. We must be persistent -- to the maximum
|
||
degree. If America does not appreciate a rational division of labor
|
||
on the project, we should discontinue the project and start all over
|
||
from scratch.
|
||
|
||
The joint development idea is a legacy of the Reagan-Nakasone era.
|
||
Both men are now out of power and we can retract the whole thing and
|
||
tell the U.S. that we have decided to develop our own project without
|
||
its participation. It is our choice. We must bluff to counter
|
||
American bluff, otherwise we will continue to be the loser.
|
||
|
||
I brought this subject up the other day to Mr. Nakasone. He
|
||
responded, "Well, you had a pretty sharp interest in that issue at
|
||
that time." I said that I was "probably the only one concerned about
|
||
the issue at the time." Mr. Nakasone then insisted that he made the
|
||
decision to compromise in order to maintain good U.S.-Japan relations.
|
||
He also admitted that America was then already very much afraid of
|
||
further Japanese technical advances. Well, compromise is fine, but in
|
||
reality this was not a compromise: it was a sell-out -- a simple
|
||
sell-out of Japan's interests.
|
||
|
||
I don't regret it any less when we make the silly mistake of not
|
||
saying "no" especially when we hold the strong cards. Such freebies
|
||
are now taken for granted and America comes back with more bluff. On
|
||
the record, U.S.T.R.'s Yeutter stated that the "application of high
|
||
pressure is the best way to manipulate Japan."
|
||
|
||
My position may draw some criticism in Japan, where it probably will
|
||
be said that I am playing with dynamite in dealing with America in
|
||
this fashion. It goes without saying that an equal partnership must be
|
||
carried out without humiliating pressure or compromise as the result
|
||
of such pressure. This is the reason I am advocating that Japan say
|
||
"no." "No" is an important instrument in the bargaining process.
|
||
|
||
|
||
8.3 Diplomacy Should Be Free of External Pressures
|
||
|
||
Diplomacy which lacks the "no" factor cannot be diplomacy for the
|
||
benefit of Japan. Japan has a solid basis for saying "no" on many
|
||
occasions. All we must do is play our cards wisely, playing our ace
|
||
intelligently. Japan is very poor at diplomatic tactics. It is a
|
||
wonder too me that Japan has failed to recognize that its initiatives
|
||
are instrumental in the ultimate decision-making process in the
|
||
international arena.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Glen Fukushima, an American of Japanese descent in the office of
|
||
the U.S.T.R. (Deputy Assistant U.S.T.R. for Japan and China), who was
|
||
acquainted with Senator Aquino of the Philippines while both were at
|
||
Harvard, is one of the most capable Asian specialists. His wife is an
|
||
intellectual Keio University graduate, who prefers to live in Japan,
|
||
forcing Glen to commute to Japan two or three times a month.
|
||
|
||
On one occasion, I had dinner with him and asked him what America's
|
||
next Japan-bashing scenario would entail. He replied that the U.S.
|
||
would take up the distribution issue since this cannot be rectified by
|
||
Japanese politicians without pressure from the U.S. I have to use
|
||
American pressure in order to accomplish a national objective, yet, I
|
||
must admit that the distribution system is one of Japan's biggest
|
||
headaches today. There is no question that the high prices in Japan
|
||
are caused by the distribution system itself, which is made worse by
|
||
Japanese politicians.
|
||
|
||
There are domestic areas where we Japanese must say "no" also, even
|
||
before we say "no" to outsiders. The liberalization of rice is one
|
||
such issue. Opinions on the rice issue sharply divide politicians such
|
||
as I, whose constituents are urban, from those representing farmers.
|
||
|
||
Former Minister of Agriculture Sato is a good friend of mine, but his
|
||
advocacy of food security is becoming diminished. Inevitably, mutual
|
||
dependence is becoming more and more a reality in our world today.
|
||
America was not even able to place [a] ban on exports of grain to the
|
||
Soviet Union when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. There would have
|
||
been too much pressure from American farmers. If that is the case, it
|
||
would probably be practically impossible to put a ban on agricultural
|
||
exports to Japan. The rice issue has its sentimental aspects in Japan
|
||
as well as its practical aspects, which make the overall issue more
|
||
complicated. Yet it is obvious that we must liberalize the market.
|
||
Such is also true of construction projects. It is inevitable that we
|
||
allow foreign construction firms to participate in Japanese public
|
||
construction projects. Japanese general contractors have been
|
||
maintaining prices as much as 40% higher in comparison to foreign
|
||
bidders, due to bid-rigging traditions to assure a monopoly on
|
||
business for themselves. There is no way these practices could ever
|
||
be free of foreign criticism.
|
||
|
||
In the course of my conversation with Glen Fukushima, I asked whom
|
||
among the Japanese negotiators he considers the best. He immediately
|
||
came up with the name of MITI's Kuroda, whom the Japanese press used
|
||
to criticize for his tough positions. The press claimed that his
|
||
participation aggravated the problems with the U.S. The Americans
|
||
criticized him for being stubborn. Strabgely, the American negotiator
|
||
named him the most effective. He is stubborn and is able to say "no"
|
||
decisively whenever he should do so. The Americans usually try to
|
||
overpower negotiations by increasing pressure. But Kuroda does not
|
||
feel that he must say "yes" to American pressure. America is a giant
|
||
in many ways, and, in many ways, Japan is a dwarf. This obvious
|
||
contrast has been exploited by the Americans often in the past.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Kuroda kept pointing out that irrational pressure is not always
|
||
the result of reason or logic, and reinforced this position by
|
||
withstanding increased pressure. His "no" is not a no for its own
|
||
sake; he always states his reasons. This is the proper approach and
|
||
attitude in negotiations. In the past, there have been allegations
|
||
that Japanese logic and opinions have not made any sense to the other
|
||
side.
|
||
|
||
When the opposing side points out that Japanese opinions and demands
|
||
have no logical basis, all of a sudden the illogical Japanese start
|
||
saying "yes, yes, yes..." in a panic. But these "yesses" do not
|
||
necessarily mean yes in the sense of positive assertion. At any rate,
|
||
the other side then comes to the conclusion that Japan will not take
|
||
action unless pressure is placed on them. This is a rather unfortunate
|
||
situation for the people of Japan. The Japanese image of being soft
|
||
in the face of pressure does not help Japan's diplomatic efforts at
|
||
all.
|
||
|
||
I have often suggested that at least half of Japan's diplomats
|
||
stationed abroad be civilians. Those who are in business and other
|
||
professions who have dealt with foreigners are in a better position to
|
||
represent the interests of Japan than are career diplomats. Send Mr.
|
||
Morita to America as our ambassador: a brilliant idea! But it should
|
||
not be just an idea. I truly believe that it would be most beneficial
|
||
to the U.S.-Japan relationship to have such an ambassador from Japan
|
||
to the U.S.
|
||
|
||
|
||
9.0 THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE "INESCAPABLY INTERDEPENDENT" (Morita)
|
||
|
||
9.1 No Way To Avoid the Trade Frictions
|
||
|
||
Recently the expression, "inescapable interdependence" has been heard
|
||
quite often among Americans. If we dare to explain this concept in a
|
||
more extreme way, perhaps we can say it's a "fatal attraction". With
|
||
this trend now prevailing in the world, we have no choice but to live
|
||
cooperatively. Everyone on earth, not just the United States and
|
||
Japan, is mutually dependent and this is unavoidable. This is the
|
||
times that we are facing now. What does cooperation mean?
|
||
|
||
A Japanese tends to say, "Let's work together". But I often wonder
|
||
whether they really understand its meaning. This can be applicable to
|
||
Americans as well. We are at home using this expression but it seems
|
||
to only be used as a convenience. Furthermore it is out of the
|
||
question to force "cooperation" through threats.
|
||
|
||
To cooperate means to maintain harmony. It is not harmonious to force
|
||
your adversary. When they cope with you, you too, must cope with
|
||
them. You have to give up some of your interests; you must abandon
|
||
something.
|
||
|
||
I tell people whenever I have a chance that we know what it is to be
|
||
selfish but hardly anybody is aware when he himself is being selfish.
|
||
We say that one is selfish but actually this person probably has no
|
||
idea that he is perceived as such. In this sense, Japan also can be
|
||
thought a little bit selfish by other countries, although we hardly
|
||
have such ideas.
|
||
|
||
Looking for the reason, we are so perceived, the opening of the
|
||
domestic market can be one example. Everyone agrees that we should
|
||
open our markets to foreign traders, but when it comes to individual,
|
||
this is hard to actualize since someone says, "no, I cannot accept
|
||
this", and then someone says, "no, I cannot accept that." Although at
|
||
summit meetings, Japanese leaders assure others that they will do
|
||
their best, and they actually do try to open the market. In the end,
|
||
however, this is never actualized since their promise goes against
|
||
domestic interest groups and they are forced to back down. Only
|
||
lip-service followed by no achievement might result in being called
|
||
"liars" and this is surely worse than "selfish".
|
||
|
||
The development of communication technologies means this is a
|
||
shrinking world and any country will be left alone if it does not talk
|
||
frankly to its people and friendly countries about the compromises
|
||
that they must accept.
|
||
|
||
Free people in the free world ask for their freedom but at the same
|
||
time they respect the freedom of others. And I think it is genuine
|
||
freedom to think "we should abandon some so that we can respect
|
||
others." It will simply increase friction if we just look out for our
|
||
own benefit, and put priority on winning the race based on the premise
|
||
that we simply can focus on our interests alone since we are in the
|
||
world of free economy.
|
||
|
||
We should also recognize that friction seldom occurs with those who
|
||
are far from you. Friction occurs as we move closer. We cannot
|
||
escape from the trade friction as long as we belong to the world of
|
||
"inescapable interdependence".
|
||
|
||
|
||
9.2 Japan's Central Role is Asia
|
||
|
||
The closer we become, the harsher the friction can be. So it would be
|
||
wise for us to prepare for problems with neighboring Asian countries.
|
||
|
||
I went to Singapore recently to attend a ceremony marking the opening
|
||
of our new plant, and had a chance to talk with President Lee Kuan Yew
|
||
who has been a friend for a long time. He invited me to his home, we
|
||
talked over dinner and I stayed with him.
|
||
|
||
The plant our company opened this time in Singapore is operated
|
||
automatically by robots. We use materials Singapore supplies and
|
||
employ able engineers graduated from good schools in Singapore,
|
||
producing special parts in large numbers. The plant itself will be a
|
||
foothold to supply the products all over the world. When I proudly
|
||
held forth my new plant, he was very pleased and said that in the past
|
||
when Japanese firms opened plants in his country, they needed a large
|
||
number of employees, where they in fact have never had enough
|
||
personnel. Because of the nature of his country, that is, Singapore
|
||
is a small island, this caused wage increases at a drastic pace. This
|
||
is what they had wanted; a plant with sophisticated technology.
|
||
|
||
Transferring our technologies, not teaching management, I believe, is
|
||
the best way to alleviate friction between Southeast Asian countries
|
||
and Japan. These countries, NICS, then NIES, are now the Four Tigers
|
||
or Five Tigers. It might be too much to say they developed thanks to
|
||
the Japanese economy and industrial technologies, but I believe we
|
||
contributed to them in such a way that contributed to their current
|
||
prosperity. From now on Japan will need to take a major role in Asia.
|
||
You are already able to see this is happening when you recognize that
|
||
Tokyo has taken on a major role as a finance and money center like New
|
||
York and London.
|
||
|
||
In the past, we yearned to go to New York when we were young.
|
||
Similarly, the youth of Southeast Asia yearn to visit Tokyo or
|
||
Disneyland in Japan. I should avoid the expression, "leadership", but
|
||
Japan has begun to assume that role as a center in Asia.
|
||
|
||
To take on the role as an initiator means we must also be able to take
|
||
on the role of arbitrator. That is, we must think carefully what
|
||
constitutes a real leadership role in this mutually dependent world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
9.3 America, You Had Better Give Up Certain Arrogance
|
||
|
||
As you (Mr. Ishihara) mentioned before, rapprochement between the
|
||
United States and the Soviet Union and Japan's involvement in their
|
||
military strategies because of its highly-sophisticated technology
|
||
directly affects new trends on the world scene.
|
||
|
||
I do not think anybody imagined a decade ago that these two
|
||
superpowers would be mutually dependent on each other in a military
|
||
sense and that there would be a strange structure in the power balance
|
||
among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Nobody can deny
|
||
that we are going to have a totally new configuration in the balance
|
||
of power in the world.
|
||
|
||
Facing this, most important to Japan in the practical sense is the
|
||
relationship between Japan and the United States. Japan needs the
|
||
United States. I think the United States need Japan as well. It is a
|
||
bond we can never cut, and this might be the "fatal attraction"
|
||
between us. Since we can never seperate, we had better look for the
|
||
way to develop through cooperation a healthy relationship through
|
||
cooperation. And we want to ask you Americans, "what is going on now
|
||
in your country? Do Americans really understand the meaning of
|
||
'freedom' and the role of Japan which is so necessary to the United
|
||
States?." When you see present conditions, it is obvious that the
|
||
United States is not strong enough in a fundamental and structural
|
||
sense. So, I think what is most important is that we ask them frankly
|
||
as equal and not as a subordinate, "Are you really sure that you are
|
||
all right?" We will be in trouble as will the whole world if the
|
||
United States is not strong enough in the fundamentals and this means
|
||
more than talking about something that is current. It must be
|
||
recognized by Mr. Bush as well. In this sense, it is important for
|
||
Mr. Takeshita to deliver our message correctly at the coming summit.
|
||
In my understanding, however, these summit meetings are held according
|
||
to an itinerary prepared at the working level and they decided what
|
||
was supposed to be said by the leaders. In negotiations among
|
||
business leaders, we, top management hold discussions face to face,
|
||
saying "yes" or "no", or "if you do that we will do this." However,
|
||
we have a tendency to prepare answers for negotiations even in
|
||
business world in Japan. Take my case, for example. Once a chairman
|
||
of a large Japanese firm was vistiting me and I planned to talk to him
|
||
face to face. Then, someone from that office called us and asked what
|
||
I was going to talk about when we met. "Our chairman is going to say
|
||
such and such. How will you respond?" They wanted to prepare all
|
||
answers beforehand. I do not think we need to have meetings if the
|
||
content is planned beforehand. I want Mr. Takeshita to say correctly
|
||
how we, Japanese, see the present situation in the United States and
|
||
tell them clearly what we want to do. I think we should tell them,
|
||
"please do not cling to the image that you are the superpower, but
|
||
rather look for the way to get your economy on the road to recovery."
|
||
We should tell them, "we are going to back up your dollar, so face the
|
||
fact and issue yen-bonds, for example, as Carter Administration issued
|
||
pound-bonds." Americans have to abandon the idea, such as, "our
|
||
federal obligations do not bother us since we can print more green
|
||
backs." They have to change the way they think about their own
|
||
economy. To this end, we Japanese must deliver the message, "if you
|
||
cannot make both ends meet, we cannot either." We must do this even
|
||
if it takes time to make them understand.
|
||
|
||
It is high time to let them know we might go bankrupt together if
|
||
things are not worked. The United States and Japan relationship is in
|
||
serious trouble. Because of our historical discipline, Japan has
|
||
adhered to the principle that "silence is golden," but I believe Japan
|
||
must insist that the United States do what must be done. An outspoken
|
||
person like me is easily criticized from every corner and I am sure
|
||
Mr. Ishihara has had the same experience since he is also very
|
||
outspoken. But to be silent and to put up with things do not work at
|
||
all in the West. As Ishihara has suggested, I think we should say
|
||
what we have to say. If not, I am afraid we will lose our own
|
||
identity as Japanese in the world.
|
||
|
||
|
||
10.0 AMERICAN ITSELF IS UNFAIR (Morita)
|
||
|
||
10.1 America Lacks Business Creativity
|
||
|
||
Americans and Europeans are always saying "We're getting ripped off by
|
||
Japan. They take the ideas we have invented, make products, and then
|
||
the onslaught comes. We are being damaged, they're disgraceful."
|
||
Japan has certainly done better more recently, but the U.S. and Europe
|
||
are very much advanced in basic research.
|
||
|
||
Last year, I was invited to speak to about 100 researchers who worked
|
||
at the Bell Laboratories at ATT.
|
||
|
||
The Bell Laboratories have about 7 people who have won the Nobel
|
||
Prize. To me, it seemed that I would be speaking before some of the
|
||
greatest men of our time. Prior to the speech, I was shown around the
|
||
Bell Laboratories, where a number of wonderful research projects were
|
||
underway.
|
||
|
||
As you must know, the transistor and the semiconductor, which are at
|
||
the root of the current revolution in industry were invented at the
|
||
Bell Laboratories. It really brought home to me how wonderful America
|
||
was.
|
||
|
||
The basic message I brought that day was that this type of research
|
||
was extremely significant academically in terms of both science and
|
||
culture, but to be significant from the standpoint of business and
|
||
industry, two other types of creativity, in addition to the creativity
|
||
required to make the original invention, were absolutely necessary.
|
||
|
||
Industry requires three types of creativity. The first, of course, is
|
||
the basic creativity necessary to make technological inventions and
|
||
discoveries. This alone, however, does not make for good business or
|
||
good industry.
|
||
|
||
The second type of creativity that is necessary is that involving how
|
||
to use this new technology, and how to use it in large quantities and
|
||
in a manner that is appropriate. In English, this would be called
|
||
"product planning and production creativity."
|
||
|
||
The third type of creativity is in marketing. That is, selling the
|
||
things you have produced. Even if you succeed in manufacturing
|
||
something, it takes marketing to put that article into actual use
|
||
before you have a business.
|
||
|
||
The strength in Japanese industry is in finding many ways to turn
|
||
basic technology into products and using basic technology. In basic
|
||
technology, it is true that Japan has relied on a number of foreign
|
||
sources. Turning technology into products is where Japan is number 1
|
||
in the world.
|
||
|
||
Sony was the first company in Japan to license the transistor patent
|
||
from Bell Laboratories, back in 1953. At that time, the transistor
|
||
was only being used in hearing aids. We were repeatedly told to take
|
||
this transistor and manufacture hearing aids.
|
||
|
||
When we brought this new transistor back to Japan, however, Mr. Ibuka
|
||
of Sony said, "There is not much potential in hearing aids, let's make
|
||
a new transistor and build radios." At that point, we put all of our
|
||
energies each day in developing radios which used transistors. One of
|
||
our researchers during this development effort, Mr. Esaki,
|
||
subsequently went to work for IBM where he earned a Nobel Prize, but
|
||
it was at our company where he did work worthy of the Prize. There
|
||
are a number of Japanese who have received Nobel Prizes, but Esaki was
|
||
the only one who worked for a research laboratory of a company. We
|
||
poured money into development of new transistors, and developed small
|
||
radios for the market, an effort that was worthy of the Nobel Prize.
|
||
|
||
It was an American company, however, who made the first transistor
|
||
radio. I became a salesman, and took my product with full confidence
|
||
to the United States to sell it. Prior to this sales effort, the
|
||
newest invention was a vacuum tube type of amplifier which required a
|
||
lot of space. When the American company, which was a famous radio
|
||
manufacturer, was initially rebuffed by people telling him "since we
|
||
have this great sound and large speakers, who would want to buy your
|
||
little radio?", that company just quit trying to manufacture
|
||
transistor radios.
|
||
|
||
We, however, had something else in mind as a way to sell these radios.
|
||
"Currently in New York, there are 20 radio stations broadcasting 20
|
||
different programs during the same time frame. If everyone had their
|
||
own radio, then each person could tune in to the program he or she
|
||
wanted to listen to. Don't be satisfied with one radio for the whole
|
||
family, get your own radio. The next step was to do the same for
|
||
televisions." This was a new marketing concept. One radio for one
|
||
person became a kind of catch phrase in this campaign and the result
|
||
was that Sony transistor radios became famous throughout the world.
|
||
|
||
While it was true that Sony was second in developing the transistor
|
||
radio, the company who did it first lacked the marketing creativity,
|
||
so without much thought, they simply quit and pulled out of the
|
||
market.
|
||
|
||
America has stopped manufacturing things, but this does not mean that
|
||
they do not have the technology. The reason why the link between this
|
||
technology and business has not been firmly connected is because they
|
||
lack the second and third types of creativity, turning products made
|
||
with the new technology into a business. I feel that this is a big
|
||
problem for them. This exact area happens to be Japan's stronghold
|
||
for the moment.
|
||
|
||
When I went to speak at the Bell Laboratories, I got the chance to
|
||
look at a lot of their research on advanced technology. I felt that
|
||
they may well come up with something new that was even more important
|
||
than the transistor, but since Bell Labs is a part of ATT, they are
|
||
not thinking of anything except telecommunications applications.
|
||
There is not one person there who is thinking about how to use the new
|
||
technology they are developing as a business. I think that this is
|
||
one area where the U.S. comes up wanting. It is my feeling that even
|
||
though times are good in American now and employment is up, the time
|
||
will never again come when America will regain its strength in
|
||
industry.
|
||
|
||
There is a television network in the U.S. called CBS. CBS has a
|
||
weekly program which airs every Sunday evening called "60 Minutes,"
|
||
which has a very high viewership rating. This is a news program which
|
||
devotes segments just under 20 minutes to various stories and opinion
|
||
from around the whole world. More than 10 years ago, I was on the
|
||
program. This is a program that takes a lot of money to produce. A
|
||
crew followed me around Europe for about 6 months to prepare the
|
||
segment.
|
||
|
||
Now they want me to do another one. A cameraman followed me to
|
||
London, and when I went to Singapore, they followed me there too.
|
||
The other day, a famous and beautiful interviewer in the U.S., Diane
|
||
Sawyer, came to Japan to interview me for the program. We spent a
|
||
long time in front of the TV cameras, and the questions grew sharper.
|
||
This made me mad and at the end, it was like we were in a fight.
|
||
|
||
She asked me what I thought of Lee Iacocca. Since this is a program
|
||
he would be sure to see, I was frank in my statements. I said he was
|
||
a disgrace, and that he was unfair. Iacocca comes to Japan and says
|
||
Japanese are unfair. Very recently, he headed his sentence with, "Let
|
||
me make myself very clear," and then he went on to slander Japan. I
|
||
know he wrote that book which labeled Japan as "unfair" but I think it
|
||
is Iacocca who is unfair, and that is what I said.
|
||
|
||
When I was asked why he was unfair, I answered clearly, in front of
|
||
the camera.
|
||
|
||
The president of a Chrysler company came to Japan. I had met this
|
||
person before. I knew he was involved in selling Chrysler auto-
|
||
mobiles, so I asked him how sales were going. He turned to me and
|
||
said quite plainly that he had not come to Japan to sell cars, but he
|
||
had come to purchase Japanese parts and engines. He said he had come
|
||
to Japan to buy Japanese products so they could sell them in the U.S.
|
||
|
||
At the present time, the three big automobile manufacturers have
|
||
purchased 250,000 automobiles from Japan in 1987. How many have they
|
||
sold to Japan? Only 4,000. They make no effort at all to sell their
|
||
cars in Japan, and then call Japan unfair because Japan sells too much
|
||
in the U.S. and Japan will not buy their products.
|
||
|
||
One of the reasons why U.S.-Japan relations are in such a mess is that
|
||
Japan has not told the U.S. the things that need to be said.
|
||
|
||
|
||
10.2 Japan Has Not Forced Its Sales on the U.S.
|
||
|
||
When I go to foreign countries, I hear that Japanese work too much.
|
||
But why is working too hard so bad? Our society cannot continue to
|
||
eat unless we keep producing products. People have to have products
|
||
in order to live. They use golf clubs, and drive automobiles. If
|
||
they want these products and do not wish to import them, they must
|
||
manufacture them. I am a businessman. I am not forcing my customers
|
||
to buy things from me. We expend our energies on how to make our
|
||
products most attractive to the customer.
|
||
|
||
The Americans say that there is a U.S.-Japan trade imbalance, and it
|
||
is not because Japan is not buying U.S. products or because Japan is
|
||
forcibly selling the products. There are few things in the U.S. that
|
||
Japanese want to buy, but there are a lot of things in Japan that
|
||
Americans want to buy. This is at the root of the trade imbalance.
|
||
The problem arises in that American politicians fail to understand
|
||
this simple fact. It could never be the case that we are selling too
|
||
much; it is not because we are exporting; the imbalance arises as a
|
||
result of commercial transactions based on preferences.
|
||
|
||
Therefore, the only thing that Americans or Europeans can do to
|
||
correct this imbalance is reassess themselves and make an effort to
|
||
produce products which are attractive to Japanese consumers. It is in
|
||
this area where I would like to see Japanese politicians get courage
|
||
enough to expound abroad to our trading partners.
|
||
|
||
Recently, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Verity brought representatives of
|
||
25 companies to Japan who wanted to sell their company's products in
|
||
Japan. I was the person responsible for welcoming this group, and I
|
||
told them Japan would do its best to help out. I remarked, however,
|
||
that I had been doing my best to sell Japanese products in the United
|
||
States over the past 30 years. Yet, not once had the Minister of
|
||
International Trade and Industry accompanied me and helped out in my
|
||
efforts. I asked the Secretary of Commerce if it was his intention to
|
||
create an "America Incorporated." Secretary Verity smiled, but
|
||
everyone else laughed out loud.
|
||
|
||
The Government of Japan has, in both the good sense and the bad sense,
|
||
passed along various types of administrative guidance, which have been
|
||
criticized by foreign countries as being an alliance between
|
||
government and business -- even if the Minister of international Trade
|
||
and Industry does not go on trade missions.
|
||
|
||
One of the Americans in the group then asked me why the Japanese
|
||
government backed up Japanese industry. Let's think about it. Even
|
||
though the government does not own one share of my stock, I pay more
|
||
than half of my profits to the government in taxes. If my business
|
||
does not do well, the government does not receive more revenues.
|
||
Thus, the government, we feel, is a kind of partner. I asked them why
|
||
American industries, which are paying taxes to the government say,
|
||
"the government is trying to control industry; don't touch us." Your
|
||
viewing of the government as the enemy seems strange.
|
||
|
||
During this visit, Secretary Verity did voice his support for
|
||
cooperation between government and business to sell products, but it
|
||
is my feeling that the establishment of a framework for this type of
|
||
cooperation is still a long way off.
|
||
|
||
|
||
10.3 Let Us Think About the Role Japan Should Play in the World
|
||
|
||
On the other side of the question, however, there are certainly
|
||
aspects of Japan which are "unfair" when viewed from the U.S.
|
||
perspective. When you consider what Japan has done for the world in
|
||
the course of its becoming the second largest economy, I think this is
|
||
an area where Japan is in line for some critical reflection.
|
||
|
||
Recently, since the time of Prime Minister Takeshita, Japan has been
|
||
making enormous efforts to become the second most open country in the
|
||
world for trading. The long-boiling problems over beef and citrus
|
||
imports were gradually resolved through efforts directed at those
|
||
problems. However, from the perspective of Americans, Japan has still
|
||
not done what it should do. I am not saying we should put more money
|
||
in defense spending, but if we are not to exceed 1% of GNP on defense,
|
||
then the government should put more money into Official Development
|
||
Assistance (ODA) (foreign aid), which helps the other countries of the
|
||
world.
|
||
|
||
In addressing the ODA to GNP ratio, of the 18 countries in the world
|
||
who provide foreign aid, Japan is number 15. Also, if we look at the
|
||
amount of non-loan foreign aid for which there is no remuneration,
|
||
Japan is number eighteen of eighteen. I shrink when I am asked
|
||
whether that record is something Japan can be proud of.
|
||
|
||
Almost all U.S. corporations make donations of about 1 percent of
|
||
their pre-tax profits to the community -- using some of their money
|
||
for the community is a kind of custom with them. In Japan too, we
|
||
also make some contributions to return money to society, and at the
|
||
current time many Japanese companies are returning more than 1
|
||
percent.
|
||
|
||
But when Japan is looked at as a state, it is perceived as unfair by
|
||
the rest of the world because it is not returning some of the benefits
|
||
it reaps from the world back into the world society.
|
||
|
||
Therefore, when I speak before Japanese groups, I emphasize what is
|
||
meant when America says Japan is acting disgracefully. I tell them,
|
||
"Shouldn't we review what we are doing once again?" Japan should be
|
||
bold in telling the U.S. what it needs to be told, but at the same
|
||
time, Japan must establish a code of standards for the role it should
|
||
be playing in the world.
|
||
|
||
Japan should open its markets to the extent where there would be no
|
||
room for their complaints, and money that Japan has should be provided
|
||
to help developing countries where people are not being oppressed.
|
||
This would be a magnificaent behavior on Japan's part, and I think
|
||
that Japan needs to become aware of its responsibilities.
|
||
|
||
Certainly the full opening of our markets and advancing large sums of
|
||
money for developing countries is very painful. However, things will
|
||
not get better in the world until the pain is shared more equitably.
|
||
How much pain do you think was involved during the Meiji Restoration
|
||
where the privileged class of samurai gave up their power, cut their
|
||
special hair styles, and tossed out their swords? It allowed a
|
||
bloodless revolution to take place within Japan.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Ishihara has said there is a need for a reform of consciousness in
|
||
Japan. He is exactly on the mark. If we do not reorient our
|
||
consciousness from the perspective of being international people, then
|
||
I do not feel Japan will be able to continue to walk the globe as an
|
||
economic power.
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.0 JAPAN SHOULD LIVE IN HARMONY WITH ASIA (Ishihara)
|
||
|
||
11.1 Restrain America!
|
||
|
||
When the time comes when Japan does say "no" decisively on a
|
||
particular issue, there may be a dramatic reaction. It could come as
|
||
a shock to the Americans, and a number of different reactions would be
|
||
possible. Even now, some Americans suggest the possible physical
|
||
occupation of Japan in case Japan engages in semicondcutor trade with
|
||
the Soviet Union.
|
||
|
||
Yet when the time comes, we may well dare say "no." The relationship
|
||
between Japan and the U.S., as Mr. Morita describes it, is unbreakable.
|
||
However, the whole world does not exist for the sake of Japan and the
|
||
U.S. Japan's relationship with the rest of the world does not exist
|
||
only in relation to or through the U.S. Should America behave
|
||
unreasonably toward Japan, Japan must open channels to deal with the
|
||
rest of the world from a different standpoint than on the basis of the
|
||
U.S.-Japan relationship and it must show that it is doing this to the
|
||
Americans.
|
||
|
||
America itself has already exhibited certain indications that it is
|
||
shifting towards a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, as Alvin
|
||
Toffler stated, insinuating that Japan will be threatened once the
|
||
U.S. establishes a more collaborative realetionship with the Soviet
|
||
Union similar to the case of the U.S. movement toward China, which burst
|
||
forth in December 1978, there was also an astonishing high technolgy
|
||
demostration.
|
||
|
||
I for one had a chance to observe some of that demonstration. It
|
||
began with a set of satellte photos which Dr. Kissinger brought to
|
||
China. At that time Viet Nam was engaged in a military conflict with
|
||
China, subsequent to the fall of the Saigon government in April 1970
|
||
and the Cambodian war. The Sino-Vietnamese war was recklessly
|
||
provoked by Deng Shoa Ping, chief of staff in China. In the initial
|
||
encounters, China was severely defeated. The real power behind Viet
|
||
Nam was the Soviet Union. The Soviets provided Viet Nam with detailed
|
||
satellite photos illustrating the movements of the Chinese military,
|
||
the number of soldiers and divisions, the number of tanks unloaded at
|
||
Kuang Tong station and which direction all these troops took. Taking
|
||
adavantage of the superior information available to them, as provided
|
||
by the Soviet Union, Viet Nam was able to lure the Chinese troops deep
|
||
into the mountains, then desroy them with anti-tank missiles. This
|
||
miserable battle was all recorded by American satellites, which Dr.
|
||
Kissinger presented to the Chinese with the comment "what a silly war
|
||
you have conducted."
|
||
|
||
Needless to say, it was a shock to the Chinese leaders to see how step
|
||
by step their military was demolished.
|
||
|
||
I assume that the Americans showed another series of satellite
|
||
pictures showing the horrible massacre of Chinese soldiers at the
|
||
siege of Damansky Island (in Russian) or Chin Pao Island (in Chinese),
|
||
which is located in the middle of the Amur (phonetic rendering) River.
|
||
At first, only a small number of Russian soldiers occupied the island
|
||
and they were soon driven off by the Chinese, who had many more troops
|
||
than did the Russians. The Russians returned in greater numbers and
|
||
recaptured the island. Fianlly, the Chinese sent the equivalent of a
|
||
human wave of troops, almost flooding the island with soldiers. As
|
||
the Chinese shouted victory, the island was surrounded by a sudden
|
||
mist and eventually it was covered by a dense fog. The Russians
|
||
exploited this climactic assistance, surrounding the island with tanks
|
||
and opening a salvo. At dawn, there were a great many dead Chinese
|
||
troops. The Russians landed their tanks, rolling over the dead,
|
||
wounded, and living, reducing all to nothing.
|
||
|
||
The Americans showed clear pictures of the events, illustrating what
|
||
had taken place using satellite pictures, a great demonstration of the
|
||
combination of technology and intelligence gathering. China was
|
||
shocked and disturbed that it could not effectively counter a
|
||
situation like that as they simply did not have access to the
|
||
technology required. They listened to the Americans, and agreed to
|
||
the development of a bilateral relationship with the U.S. on American
|
||
terms. America had played its high tech card quite effectively.
|
||
|
||
The normalization of relations with China, by-passing Japan, set a
|
||
precedent and provided a basis for other such threats to Japan by the
|
||
U.S. America can bluff Japan by indicating that it can develop a
|
||
similar relationship with the Soviet Union, without consultation, so
|
||
that Japan would be less needed within the framework of U.S. global
|
||
strategy. But Japan has a similar card to play, counter to the
|
||
American bluff.
|
||
|
||
Some of Japan's business leaders have long had an interest in Siberian
|
||
development, which now appears to be a realistic possibility. Some of
|
||
them are of the opinion that Japan could go neutral, revoking the
|
||
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, if the Soviets will return the northern
|
||
islands, granted that Japan would be given the right to develop
|
||
Siberian resources.
|
||
|
||
This may be a realistice choice from the Soviet point of view since
|
||
some critical technologies such as linear technology are available
|
||
from Japan. The U.S. simply does not have them. Japan had better
|
||
start sending some signals of its own to America. My American friends
|
||
comment that my behavior in the U.S. is too provocative; I feel that
|
||
more of us should speak out like this more often.
|
||
|
||
Japan could have the Soviets formally request Japan's linear
|
||
technolgy. The COCOM would claim that it is illegal for Japan to
|
||
provide this technology. Japan would then mount a public relations
|
||
campaign, appealing to the rest of the world that the use of its
|
||
linear technology is simply to enhance the efficiency of the Soviet
|
||
railroad system in Siberia so that travel time is shortened and the
|
||
whole thing will be rationalized as an attempt to restrain American
|
||
intervention. In fact, the U.K. and France are champions at this kind
|
||
of public relations game, in combination with diplomacy. We need more
|
||
skillful players in the game to counter the formidable American
|
||
challenges in the international arena.
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.2 Japan Is Not a Free Ride on the U.S.-Japan Security Pact
|
||
|
||
It goes witout saying that the U.S.-Japan relationship is a vital one.
|
||
The security treaty has certainly been helpful to Japan. America,
|
||
however, has chosen to become involved for American interests; it did
|
||
not want to see the restoration of Japanese military power. However,
|
||
the so-called American nuclear umbrella as a deterent power for Japan
|
||
is not as valuable as the Americans have said. I verified this myself
|
||
twenty years ago and put it into the official record. The American
|
||
nuclear umbrella is just an illusion as far as the Japanese people are
|
||
concerned. Also, the so-called "free ride" on the U.S.-Japan Security
|
||
treaty is no such thing and has no earthly basis. I have stated this
|
||
repeatedly. The Japanese people have been forced to thank the U.S.
|
||
for an illusion. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had to enter the INF
|
||
agreement due to the nature of a changing power shift in the world,
|
||
which on the bottom line, is inevitable in light of the high tech-
|
||
nology dominance by Japan. This has been clearly seen by individuals
|
||
such as Dr. Kissinger, who even foresaw the situation today long ago,
|
||
a position he has stated on a number of occasions. Poor Japanese
|
||
politicians have never studied these issues systematically and
|
||
therefore can never provide a rebuttal to American allegations.
|
||
Americans, for their part, seem to have emotional and intellectual
|
||
difficulties in admitting to changes and new developments.
|
||
|
||
A Pentagon task force sent a warning on electronics, with particular
|
||
emphasis on semiconductors, those who have nothing to worry about but
|
||
Japan [sic]. America is very seriously concerned about losing power
|
||
of any kind to Japan. Some Americans have been raising their voices
|
||
in advocation of an increased Japanese defense capacity. This may be
|
||
a worthwile suggestion. We should overhaul our current defense
|
||
system, although I am not advocating an abrupt cutting of ties with
|
||
the U.S. We have accepted this absurd defense formal [formula?]
|
||
consisting of three defense forces. This system must be completely
|
||
overhauled to suit present realities, including a much greater
|
||
deterrent capacity, exploiting our high technology to the maximum. We
|
||
should develop the most persuasive and demonstratable deterrent
|
||
formula which would, without any doubt, show our adversaries that any
|
||
attack on Japn will end with unbearable damage to the aggressor from
|
||
both a stategic and a tactical viewpoint.
|
||
|
||
Production and maintenance of escort ships which can only exhaust
|
||
their missiles and ammunition in a few minutes, and then sit and wait
|
||
for death is absurd. Participation in RIMPAC with such equipment
|
||
makes no sense. RIMPAC has nothing to do with the concept of active
|
||
defense.
|
||
|
||
In a lecture that the Defense College of Japan, the commander of the
|
||
U.S. 7th Fleet declared it 100% unlikely that Soviet forces could land
|
||
on Japanese territory. This is [an] honest -- but stupid -- comment.
|
||
Some time ago we invited a famous Israeli tank division commander
|
||
named Tam (phonetic rendering) to Japan. He kept annoying the Defense
|
||
Agency by asking why Japan was building tanks. He was considered to
|
||
be one of the top tank strategists in the world, and he told us that
|
||
even on Hokkaido there is no need [for] tanks for defense. He said
|
||
that Soviet attacks would have to be destroyed at sea. He also
|
||
expressed doubt in the value of escort ships.
|
||
|
||
His points are absolutely valid. Tanks and escort ships were built
|
||
and maintained at the direction of the Americans. America has imposed
|
||
its defense formula for Japan on Japan, reproducing its own defense
|
||
formula within Japan. Thus, Japan has ended up with the defense system
|
||
it has simply because of one-sided, pro-American diplomacy: one in
|
||
which Japan says only "yes."
|
||
|
||
I conducted my own cost analysis of Japanese defense systems and
|
||
discovered that the whole thing would be far less expensive if Japan
|
||
developed its own system in accordance with its own initiative and
|
||
planning, in comparison to the expenditures forced on us today by the
|
||
U.S. Despite the bowing under to American will by Japan, it is still
|
||
the target of American politicians such as McClosky who charge that
|
||
"Japan is protected by American bloodshed in the Persian Gulf."
|
||
|
||
The time has come for Japan to tell the U.S. that we do not need
|
||
American protection. Japan will protect itself with its own power and
|
||
wisdom. This will require a strong commitment and will on our part.
|
||
We can do it as long as there is a national consensus to do so. There
|
||
may be some political difficulties at this point in forming this
|
||
consensus. From both a financial and technological point of view,
|
||
there are no barriers to accomplishing this goal in the near future.
|
||
We can develop a more effective and efficient defense capability at
|
||
less than we are paying today.
|
||
|
||
In reality, the abrupt cancellation of the security treaty is not
|
||
feasible. But it is a diplomatic option and a powerful card.
|
||
Outright refusal to consider such an option means giving up a valuable
|
||
diplomatic card. The fact remains that we do not necessarily need the
|
||
security treaty and a security system which will meet Japanese [needs]
|
||
can be built by Japan alone.
|
||
|
||
Both the right and left on this issue tend to become fanatical on the
|
||
security treaty debate. It is most regrettable that we do not have a
|
||
cool and rational forum where the objective profit and loss aspects of
|
||
the issue can be analyzed. But the time will come when we will have
|
||
to face this issue and this time is in the near future.
|
||
|
||
The current state of the Liberal Democratic Party means that it cannot
|
||
afford a serious deliberation on this issue. Once the opposition
|
||
parties disassociate themselves from a one-sided pro Russian and
|
||
Chinese policy and demonstrate their capacity to be able to replace
|
||
the LDP as alternative political parties fully recognized by the
|
||
voters, we will be in the position to examine our options with greater
|
||
flexibility.
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.3 Japan Should Live in Harmony With Asia
|
||
|
||
Japanese popular songs are heard all over Asia these days; it reminds
|
||
me of the time when Japanese became so interested in American pop
|
||
music, which, at the time, conditioned our psycho-emotional base so
|
||
that post-war Japan evolved into a consumer-oriented society.
|
||
Structurally, there must be similar powers during such social
|
||
phenomena and I wonder what it is today.
|
||
|
||
As a matter of fact, it has always been some technological
|
||
breakthrough which has moved history into the next stage, during any
|
||
given era, even as far back as the stone age or the copper epoch.
|
||
Technology has always set the pace of civilization and cultures
|
||
flourish on this basis. When we start seeing only the pretty flowers
|
||
that are the result of this flourishing, and forget about the roots
|
||
that nourish the blossoms, we soon experience the decline of the
|
||
civilization, as has been the case of nations in the past. This is
|
||
the way I interpret history, in cool and orthodox terms.
|
||
|
||
With respect to the development of commercial uses of the
|
||
semiconductor, materialized by Japan in Asia, I must say that we can
|
||
easily understand the reason why this happened. When the French
|
||
minister of culture, Andre Malroux, came to Japan, he pointed out the
|
||
distinction between Western religious artifacts and those of Japan.
|
||
He told an audience that the Western expression of a crucified Christ
|
||
is bloody and even grotesque and might well discourage a religious
|
||
attachment to Christ. However, he said, the Miroku Buddha at the
|
||
Horiyuji Temple emits such a sublime beauty, beyond the barriers of
|
||
race and religion, that it is raised to the level of an eternal or
|
||
ultimate object to be revered.
|
||
|
||
What he meant was that the type of beauty and the impression given in
|
||
such an artifact as the Miroku Buddha or the Horiyuji Temple attract
|
||
interest and respect from all over the world, beyond national, racial,
|
||
and cultual boundaries. These are products of refinement from the
|
||
Japanese people. The original image of Buddha came from India, by way
|
||
of China and the Korean peninsula. The image of Buddha in Japan is
|
||
the product of refinement of Japanese art. The process has been
|
||
constantly refined and it becomes a product of Japanese intellectual
|
||
processes, as the Minister explained, it is clearly Japanese.
|
||
|
||
In my judgement, Japan has acquired this ability primarily because of
|
||
the particular geographical environment surrounding the Japanese
|
||
archipelago. In the long journey from West to East, Japan is located
|
||
at a dead end; there is nothing beyond except the Pacific Ocean.
|
||
Japan is in no position to pass on to other nations what it has
|
||
received; it must live with what it receives for the rest of history.
|
||
Everything stops at Japan; the Japanese people refine what has come
|
||
their way; Japan is the last stop in cultural transition.
|
||
|
||
Among Japanese statesmen, Mr. Minoru Genda is one I truly respect. He
|
||
once said that Western swords were basically instruments of killing,
|
||
although there are some variations, such as those used in the sport of
|
||
fencing. But these swords are just tools and we cannot be impressed
|
||
looking at Western swords. Japanese swords make viewers feel they are
|
||
looking at artifacts and that they are being invited in the world of
|
||
art and mystery. He went on to say that the Japanese people have
|
||
converted these awful tools, made originally to butcher other people,
|
||
into art objects.
|
||
|
||
Another time, Mr Genda told me: "Mr Ishihara -- after all, in the end,
|
||
Japan will be all right. It is able to defend itself." When I
|
||
replied, "how," he said that "Japan's technology can be the basis of
|
||
Japan's defense." What he pointed out was that Japanese technology,
|
||
which has been refined and polished to the ultimate extent, just like
|
||
the swords, would provide the basis for Japan's future existence.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Genda also affirmed the points I made, suggesting that in certain
|
||
crucial technological areas, Japan should move at least five years
|
||
ahead of other nations and if possible, further, to at least ten
|
||
years. As long as Japan maintains that ten year advance, it will be
|
||
in a safe position for the first twenty-five years of the 21st
|
||
century. And this can be accomplished if politicians use their ace
|
||
card wisely.
|
||
|
||
I had an argument with an American correspondent recently. I asked
|
||
him to look at those developing nations which were under American
|
||
auspices. The Philippines and those in Africa, Central and South
|
||
America are all in hopeless situations. Americans once called the
|
||
Philippines "a showcase for democracy." I said that Americans are
|
||
mistaken.
|
||
|
||
While the Philippines may have felt more comfortable under American
|
||
administration than under Spanish colonial rule, and while they still
|
||
listen to America, the U.S. never really imparted to them an under-
|
||
standing of genuine democracy. The chairman of the House Subcommittee
|
||
on Southeast Asia once suggested to me that the U.S. and Japan should
|
||
split the cost of financial aid to the Philippines. I responded
|
||
"You're kidding!" He said that money alone cannot improve the
|
||
situation in the Pilippines because of the internal situation. The
|
||
U.S. does not even know where its aid money actually ends up. And most
|
||
fundamentally, social conflict in a nation cannot be solved with an
|
||
outsider's cash.
|
||
|
||
The most crucial task in the Philippines if to face the cause of
|
||
social turmoil there. The cause is the role of the landowners;
|
||
Philippine landowners have accumulated incredible power and wealth,
|
||
siphoning everything from the ordinary people. These landowners will
|
||
get no sympathy from me. The Philippines must act to redistribute the
|
||
land and wealth in much the same manner as took place in Japan after
|
||
the war. Landowners cannot remain landowners unless the country is
|
||
stabilized. Should a military junta take power, and decide upon a
|
||
socialist economic policy, these landowners would be wiped out.
|
||
|
||
Usurpers must be removed, otherwise there is no way the seeds of
|
||
democracy can be planted. This so-called "showcase of democracy" is
|
||
empty. And pouring additonal aid money into the hands of the
|
||
landowners in the form of compensation for losing their land is not
|
||
only a utter waste of funds, but also ruins any basis for self-help
|
||
and self-motivation.
|
||
|
||
There is a chieftan in the Truk Islands, who speaks Japanese, and who
|
||
said that since the Japanese left, their children have only learned to
|
||
be lazy as the Americans give aid-money and things which spoil human
|
||
beings. If you give people lettuce seeds, they will learn to grow
|
||
lettuce, but if you give them money they will simply import lettuce
|
||
and learn nothing.
|
||
|
||
America is reluctant to recognize the importance and value of local
|
||
cultures. Christian missionaries do not permit the natives to chant
|
||
their charms and they prohibit the use of herbs as medicine -- herbs
|
||
that have traditionally been used in healing sicknesses, found in
|
||
certain localities and used according to local customs. Local
|
||
festivals are banned so that traditional songs and dances are
|
||
forgotten. Tradition is dismantled. Americans force other cultures to
|
||
give up their traditional value and impose American culture upon them.
|
||
And they do not even recognize that this is an atrocity -- a barbaric
|
||
act!
|
||
|
||
Natives who once had a traditional festival similar to Japan's
|
||
ceremony of tasting the fruits of the first harvest. (Our ancestors
|
||
may well have come from these southern islands, by the way). The
|
||
festival was held on the night of the full moon. Beating drums and
|
||
dancing, the people indulged in open sex as the festival had by its
|
||
nature this element of fertility. Christian priests prohibited these
|
||
festivals and instructed the natives to bring the fruits of the
|
||
harvest to the church altar. One hour after this was done, the
|
||
priests ate the gifts. The chieftan, still speaking Japanese,
|
||
complained "we did not grow this to feed priests." This kind of
|
||
misunderstanding goes on and on and Americans don't even realize it.
|
||
|
||
Those Asian nations where the economy has been a success story, such
|
||
as Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were all, at one time or another,
|
||
under Japanese administration. We are aware that some negative things
|
||
happened under the Japanese administration, but it cannot be denied
|
||
that many positive changes were left behind.
|
||
|
||
Among the resource-supplying nations, the only Southeast Asian nations
|
||
which have developed stable socio-economic systems are those where
|
||
Japan has cooperated as a fellow Asian country. I pointed this out to
|
||
that correspondent with whom I had the argument; in return he only
|
||
kept silent.
|
||
|
||
In any case, these NICS are turning into NIES who are catching up to
|
||
Japan, which make Japan nervous. However, this is fine with me.
|
||
Japan should work more positively, basing its approach on the premise
|
||
that we must live in harmony with other Asian nations, developing
|
||
constructive political strategies to assist these countries
|
||
economically and politically. Entering a new era -- the Pacific Age
|
||
-- Japan cannot remain prosperous without the rest of Asia. We need
|
||
Asia more than we need America.
|
||
|
||
|
||
11.4 Japan Can Be Admitted to the World Community by Saying "No"
|
||
|
||
Japan is not quite the tiny country most Japanese think it is. We
|
||
should not be presumptuous or arrogant, ending up hated by others, but
|
||
we should have pride and dignity as a respected memeber of the world
|
||
community.
|
||
|
||
Our world view appears to be very peculiar, conditioned in part by our
|
||
geography and our climate. In our mind, Japan and the rest of the
|
||
world do not exist in a concentric circle. The rest of the world has
|
||
its center and the center of Japan is somewhere outside this. I feel
|
||
it is time to overhaul this concept and enter into the concentric
|
||
world.
|
||
|
||
We want to enter that arena not through the kind is individual
|
||
performance as given by Mr. Nakasone [sic], but rather by saying "no"
|
||
decisively. The Japanese people will define their position in facing
|
||
the consequences and significance of their "no" and will be able to
|
||
join the world community in the concentric circle as a true "adult"
|
||
member. It is therefore imperative to normalize our relationship with
|
||
the U.S., so we can get on with becoming a true member of the world
|
||
community
|
||
|
||
I often suggested a G2 conference with the U.S. This would help
|
||
establish Japan's status and America might welcome the suggestion.
|
||
When there are only two parties meeting, Japan will have no choice but
|
||
to say "yes" or "no" without resorting to gray areas. Japan must be
|
||
equipped with logic and reason whenever it says "no." Best of all, by
|
||
holding a G2, Japan will only have itself and the U.S. with which to
|
||
be concerned, making it easier to stick to the "no." No other nation
|
||
will pay attention to Japan if Japan cannot say "no" to the U.S. A
|
||
good example is China.
|
||
|
||
Japan is flattered by many nations these days for no reason than its
|
||
wealth. Money is important, but Japan has many more valuable assets,
|
||
such as tradition, culture, creativity, as well as powerful high
|
||
technology; this last item is one that even the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
|
||
cannot afford to ignore. In order to make the rest of the world
|
||
realize that Japan has much more to offer than wealth, we must develop
|
||
the logic and reasoning to be able to say "no", explain why, and stick
|
||
to it at certain crucial moments.
|