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251 lines
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251 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
INSTEAD OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
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By. J. Neil Schulman
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Copyright (c) 1992 by J. Neil Schulman.
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This article may be reproduced without further
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permission on computer bulletin boards provided that
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it is reproduced whole and unchanged.
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All other rights reserved.
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Is there any relation between crimes and arrests, or
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crime and punishment, for that matter? On this second
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question, we know there is not: according to the Department
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of Justice, 75% - 80% of violent crimes in this country
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are committed by repeat offenders. Further, a chart in
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the \Los Angeles Times\ provides good evidence there is
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little relationship between crimes committed and arrests
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made, as well.
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As a sidebar to an article in the February 27, 1992
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\Los Angeles Times\ on the brutality of the Japanese
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criminal justice system, the \Times\ provided a chart of
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Violations of Criminal Law per 100K of population in
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various countries, and another chart comparing the Arrest
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Rates in those countries.
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The Violations chart shows Britain leading the pack
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with 7,355 criminal law violations per 100K, West Germany
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with 7,031 (the stats are from 1989, pre-German-
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unification), France with 5,831, the U.S. with 5,741, Japan
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with 1,358, and South Korea with 912.
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The Arrest Rate chart (also 1989) shows South Korea
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with 78.8%, West Germany with 47.2%, Japan with 46.2%,
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France with 38.8%, Britain with 33.6%, and the U.S. with
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21.1%
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Since every country on this list aside from the U.S.
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has a virtual prohibition of private ownership of firearms,
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gun control doesn't lead to a less-criminal society.
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Obviously that is a blind alley for those seeking a
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reduction of crime.
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Further, a comparison of the West German crime rate
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with its arrest rates also seems to blow out of the water
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the argument made by American law & order advocates that a
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greater certainty of arrest and punishment will necessarily
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lead to less crime: West Germany has both the second
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highest crime rate and the second highest arrest rate --
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possibly the first highest arrest rate, since the South
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Korean arrest claims, requiring superhuman powers worthy of
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Sherlock Holmes, strain any sensible person's credulity.
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INDICTING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
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Libertarian critics of the policy of crime and
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punishment have long argued that crime is a necessary
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product of the very nature of the State, created by it
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along with provoking foreign threats to justify a military-
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industrial complex, as a way of manipulating the public
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into submission to political control. It is a sweeping
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charge and one which is likely to be dismissed as crackpot
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by anyone who can't conceive of an alternative way of
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thinking about the subject.
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But if we were to indict the criminal justice system
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as a criminal conspiracy might be so indicted, and look for
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evidence to support the charge, what do we find as the
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system's "modus operandi"?
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First, the State creates a set of laws which mix the
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concept of crime as an attack upon an individual's life or
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property with the idea that a crime is anything the State
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says it is -- and thus crimes without victims -- or with
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"the State" as the sole "victim" -- are created wholesale.
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Thus "possession" of a prohibited substance or object, even
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if such possession has inflicted no actual damage upon
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another person, in many cases receives as much punishment
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from the State as a robbery or murder. Additionally, the
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State sets itself up as the judge of what is an offense
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against itself, the judge which decides whether someone is
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guilty of an offense against itself, and the judge which
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decides what pains and costs to inflict upon a transgressor
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against itself. Then it sends out armed agents to enforce
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its decisions. Thus does the State treat itself as a God
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or Sovereign, whose will is to be feared and obeyed, and
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everyone else treated as one of its subjects.
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Second, the "protection" of the "public" from crime,
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defined however the State decides, is turned over to the
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State which taxes the public on the basis that they "need"
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protection from crime, then hires police to "enforce the
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law" -- but police have no legal obligation to protect the
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public which is being taxed to pay them from criminals, and
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suffer no liability from failure to do so.
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Third, a "criminal justice" system is set up in which
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the guilt or innocence of a suspect bears only passing
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resemblance to the sentences imposed on them after plea
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bargains which trade ease of conviction for reduced
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sentences -- regardless of whether the person charged is
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guilty or innocent. No compensation is given to those who
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are charged but found innocent, and often have their lives
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ruined by the accusation; compensation of the victim of a
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crime exists only as an occasional sideshow: the center
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ring is reserved for imprisonment of the criminal at
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taxpayer's expense, imposing additional costs upon the
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victim.
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When the system is supposedly "working," those who are
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found guilty are sent into prisons which ensure that a
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prisoner will learn the craft of crime as a permanent
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lifestyle, creating a revolving-door criminal class which
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provides permanent employment for police, lawyers, prison-
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guards, and "crime-fighting" governors and legislators --
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while everything these officials do, regardless of their
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rhetoric, \increases\ the number of attacks by criminals
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on the innocent.
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When the system is supposedly "not working," this
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massive prison bureaucracy is so clogged that convicted
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criminals are sent back out the street in short order, to
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attack more innocent victims and provide more grist for the
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criminal-justice mill.
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Meanwhile, the same system which creates crime and
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does little to protect the public from it also demands that
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the public disarm and rely on the government for protection
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against criminals.
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Is the libertarian indictment fantasy? Or is it a
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stripping away of the Emperor's New Clothes? It seems
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hard to avoid the conclusion that if you put all this
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together, Criminal Justice is the protection shakedown of
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the public by professional organized criminals in control
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of an entire society: a system set up to terrorize the
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public into a condition where it will abide any amount of
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legalized theft and police control in order to be
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liberated from constant criminal invasions engineered to
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justify the system itself.
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In a precise metaphor: the disease is being spread by
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the very doctors the public relies on for the cure.
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A NEW THEORY OF CRIME MANAGEMENT
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The alternative to the game of Cops and Robbers by
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which the criminal justice system encourages criminals to
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prey upon the public so there is an excuse for the State to
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catch and imprison them, is to eliminate the State from the
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system as much as possible.
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First, the public must come to realize that the first
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line of defense against criminal invasion of their lives
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and property is: themselves. No one cares about protecting
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you, your loved ones, and your neighbors as much as you do
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-- and no one aside from the potential victim is more
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likely to be able to provide effective counter-measures
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against invasion. The defense against criminal invasion
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requires vigilance, planning, and a willingness to fight
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back. The best and surest way to reduce crime is to make
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it unprofitable and dangerous for the criminal. The
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likelihood that a criminal attack will result in the
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criminal's being injured or dying during the attack is,
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both logically and practically, the surest way to achieve a
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low-crime society. The example of Switzerland, a society
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organized along the lines of universal defense by all
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citizens, and where criminal attacks are virtually non-
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existent, comes to mind immediately.
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Second, the public must realize that there are three
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"criminal justice" systems already at work in our country,
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and the system of police, criminal indictments, trial, and
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punishment is the least effective of the three. The other
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two are the system of civil laws by which individuals who
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cause damage to another can be sued and compensation
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collected, and the insurance industry, by which victims can
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measure the statistical likelihood of victimization against
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the costs of potential attack, and calculate proper
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"compensation" for themselves in advance.
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Third, the public must realize that the criminal
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justice system promotes crime and protects criminals rather
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than fighting it, and move to eliminate it as quickly as is
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humanly possible. This requires a massive awakening by the
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American people to the actual functioning of the criminal
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justice system, so they can evaluate for themselves whether
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it is "failing," or whether it is doing precisely what it
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is designed to do: victimize the public at all turns. The
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concept of "crime" must be completely severed from its
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statutory definitions, and replaced with a simple test: If
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a crime has been committed, (a) Who committed it, (b) Who
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is the victim, and (c) What costs has the criminal invasion
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imposed upon the victim? If these three questions cannot
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be answered clearly and firmly, there has been no crime
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committed.
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Fourth, the solution of what to do with a criminal who
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is not killed in process of the crime -- a criminal who is
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captured alive or manages to escape, or must be hunted down
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-- must be made as much as possible contingent on the
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accountable costs the criminal has imposed upon the victim.
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Instead of "rehabilitating" a criminal or "punishing" a
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criminal, the object must be to calculate as much as is
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humanly possible the costs that a criminal has imposed upon
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a victim (and the costs of apprehension and conviction as
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well), and extract as much value as possible from that
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criminal so that it may be used in compensation to the
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victim.
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The object of "criminal justice" must be restricted to
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(a) augmenting the public's first-line self-defense with
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additional lines of response, such as armed response to
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burglar alarms; (b) detective work to locate, identify, and
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capture those who have committed criminal invasions or
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thefts; and (c) a trial system to assure that those
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charged with an invasion or theft actually committed it,
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and upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to calculate the
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costs of that invasion and extract that cost from the
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criminal so that it may be used to compensate the victim.
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In the case where a criminal invasion has produced
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irreparable harm such as the death of a victim or victims,
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the murderer must be regarded as the property of the
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victim's heirs, to dispose of as they wish, limited only
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by such mitigations that the precepts of society deem
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humane.
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The current criminal justice system has failed. On
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that there can be no doubt. A proof of this failure is
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that each year the increased crime rate is used as an
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excuse to ask for more money and wider powers. This sort of
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reward for failure occurs only in the public sector; in the
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private sector, where competition is allowed, merchants who
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operate on this basis are driven out of business by
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customers going elsewhere and, if the failure is deliberate
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policy, the merchant indicted for fraud. They are not
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given more money and told to keep trying.
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The question remains: do the American people have the
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courage and clarity of thought to identify the cause of
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the failure of the criminal justice system as its very
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design, and re-design the system so that it makes sense?
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On that question, only time will tell.
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