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383 lines
17 KiB
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383 lines
17 KiB
Plaintext
from the Amnet Civil Liberties BBS, Chicago
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BUGS, TAPS AND INFILTRATORS: WHAT TO DO ABOUT POLITICAL SPYING
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by Linda Lotz
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American Friends Service Committee
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Organizations involved in controversial issues -- particularly those who
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encourage or assist members to commit civil disobedience -- should be alert to
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the possibility of surveillance and disruption by police or federal agencies.
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During the last three decades, many individuals and organizations were spied
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upon, wiretapped, their personal lives dirupted in an effort to draw them away
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from their political work, and their organizations infiltrated. Hundreds of
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thousands of pages of evidence from agencies such as the FBI and CIA were
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obtained by Congressional inquiries headed by Senator Frank Church and
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Representative Otis Pike, others were obtained through use of the Freedom of
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Information Act and as a result of lawsuits seeking damages for First
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Amendment violations.
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Despite the public outcry to these revelations, the apparatus remains in place,
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and federal agencies have been given increased powers by the Reagan
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Administration.
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Good organizers should be acquainted with this sordid part of American history,
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and with the signs that may indicate their group is the target of an
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investigation.
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HOWEVER, DO NOT LET PARANOIA IMMOBILIZE YOU. The results of paranoia and
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overreaction to evidence of surveillance can be just as disruptive to an
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organization as an actual infiltrator or disruption campaign.
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This document is a brief outline of what to look for -- and what to do if you
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think your group is the subject of an investigation. This is meant to suggest
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possible actions, and is not intended to provide legal advice.
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POSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT SPYING
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|| OBVIOUS SURVEILLANCE
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Look for:
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* Visits by police or federal agents to politically involved individuals,
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landlords, employers, family members or business associates. These visits may
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be to ask for information, to encourage or create possibility of eviction or
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termination of employment, or to create pressure for the person to stop his or
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her political involvement.
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* Uniformed or plainclothes officers taking pictures of people entering your
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office or participating in your activities. Just before and during
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demonstrations and other public events, check the area including windows and
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rooftops for photographers. (Credentialling press can help to separate the
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media from the spies.)
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* People who seem out of place. If they come to your office or attend your
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events, greet them as potential members. Try to determine if they are really
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interested in your issues -- or just your members!
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* People writing down license plate numbers of cars and other vehicles in
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the vicinity of your meetings and rallies.
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Despite local legislation and several court orders limiting policy spying
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activities, these investigatory practices have been generally found to be
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legal unless significant "chilling" of constitutional rights can be proved.
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|| TELEPHONE PROBLEMS:
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Electronic surveillance equipment is now so sophisticated that you should not
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be able to tell if your telephone converstaions are being monitored. Clicks,
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whirrs, and other noises probably indicate a problem in the telephone line or
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other equipment.
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For example, the National Security Agency has the technology to monitor
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microwave communications traffic, and to isolate all calls to or from a
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particular line, or to listen for key words that activate a tape recording
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device. Laser beams and "spike" microphones can detect sound waves hitting
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walls and window panes, and then transmit those waves for recording. In these
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cases, there is little chance that the subject would be able to find out about
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the surveillance.
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Among the possible signs you may find are:
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* Hearing a tape recording of a conversation you, or someone else in your
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home or office, have recently held.
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* Hearing people talking about your activities when you try to use the
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telephone.
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* Losing service several days before major events.
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Government use of electronic surveillance is governed by two laws, the Omnibus
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Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
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Act. Warrants for such surveillance can be obtained if there is evidence of a
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federal crime, such as murder, drug trafficking, or crimes characteristic of
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organized crime, or for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
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information available within the U.S. In the latter case, an "agent of a
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foreign power" can be defined as a representative of a foriegn government,
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from a faction or opposition group, or foreign based political groups.
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|| MAIL PROBLEMS:
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Because of traditional difficulties with the US Postal Service, some problems
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with mail delivery will occur, such as a machine catching an end of an envelope
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and tearing it, or a bag getting lost and delaying delivery.
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However, a pattern of problems may occur because of political intelligence
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gathering:
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* Envelopes may have been opened prior to reaching their destination;
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contents were removed and/or switched with other mail. Remember that the glue
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on envelopes doesn't work as well when volume or bulk mailings are involved.
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* Mail may arrive late, on a regular basis different from others in your
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neighborhood.
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* Mail may never arrive.
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There are currently two kinds of surveillance permitted with regards to mail:
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the mail cover, and opening of mail. The simplest, and least intrusive form is
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the "mail cover" in which postal employees simply list any information that can
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be obtained from the envelope, or opening second, third or fourth class mail.
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Opening of first class mail requires a warrant unless it is believed to hold
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drugs .... More leeway is given for opening first class international mail.
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|| BURGLARIES:
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A common practice during the FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)
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was the use of surreptitious entries or "black bag jobs." Bureau agents were
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given special training in burglary, key reproduction, etc. for use in entering
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homes and offices. In some cases, keys could be obtained from "loyal American"
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landlords or building owners.
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Typical indicators are:
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* Files, including membership and financial reports, are rifled, copied or
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stolen.
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* Items of obvious financial value are left untouched.
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* Equipment vital to the organization may be broken or stolen, such as
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typewriters, printing machinery, and computers.
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* Signs of a political motive are left, such as putting a membership list or
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a poster from an important event in an obvious place.
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Although warrantless domestic security searches are in violation of the Fourth
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Amendment, and any evidence obtained this way cannot be used in criminal
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proceedings, the Reagan Administration and most recent Presidents (excepting
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Carter) have asserted the inherent authority to conduct searches against those
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viewed as agents of a foreign power.
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|| INFORMERS AND INFILTRATORS:
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Information about an organization or individual can also be obtined by placing
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an informer or infiltrator. This person may be a police officer, employee of a
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federal agency, someone who has been charged or convicted of criminal activity
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and has agreed to "help" instead of serve time, or anyone from the public.
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Once someone joins an organization for the purposes of gathering information,
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the line between data gathering and participation blurs. Two types of
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infiltrators result -- those who are under "deep cover" and adapt to the
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lifestyle of the people they are infiltrating, and agents provocateurs.
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Deep-cover infiltrators may maintain their cover for many years, and an
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organization may never know who these people are. Agents provocateurs are more
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visible, because they will deliberately attempt to disrupt or lead the group
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into illegal activites. They often become involved just as an event or crisis
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is occurring, and leave town or drop out after the organizing slows down.
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An agent may:
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* Volunteer for tasks which provide access to important meetings and papers
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such as financial records, membership lists, minutes and confidential files.
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* Not follow through or complete tasks, or else do them poorly despite an
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obvious ability to do good work.
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* Cause problems for a group such as commiting it to activities or expenses
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without following proper channels, or urge the group to plan activities that
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divide group unity.
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* Seem to create or be in the middle of personal or political difference that
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slow the work of the group.
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* Seek the public spotlight, in the name of your group, and then make
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comments or present an image different from the rest of the group.
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* Urge the use of violence or breaking the law, and provide information and
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resources to enable such ventures.
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* Have no obvious source of income over a period of time, or have more money
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available than his or her job should pay.
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* Charge other people with being agents (a process called snitch-jackets),
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thereby diverting attention from him or herself, and draining the group's
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energy from other work.
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THESE ARE NOT THE ONLY SIGNS, NOR IS A PERSON WHO FITS SEVERAL OF THESE
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CATEGORIES NECESSARILY AN AGENT. BE EXTREMELY CAUTIONS AND DO NOT CALL ANOTHER
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PERSON AN AGENT WITHOUT HAVING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
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Courts have consistently found that an invividual who provides information,
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even if it is incriminating, to an informer has not had his or her
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Constitutional rights violated. This includes the use of tape recorders or
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electronic transmitters as well.
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Lawsuits in Los Angeles, Chicago and elsewhere, alleging infiltration of lawful
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political groups, have resulted in court orders limiting the use of police
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informers and infiltrators. However, this does not affect activities of federal
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agencies.
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|| IF YOU FIND EVIDENCE OF SURVEILLANCE:
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* Hold a meeting to discuss spying and harassment
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* Determine if any of your members have experienced any harassment or noticed
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any surveillance activities that appear to be directed at the organization's
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activities. Carefully record all the details of these and see if any patterns
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develop.
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* Review past suspicious activities or difficulties in your group. Have one
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or several people been involved in many of these events? List other possible
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"evidence" of infiltration.
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* Develop internal policy on how the group should respond to any possible
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surveillance or suspicious actions. Decide who should be the contact person(s),
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what information should be recorded, what process to follow during any event or
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demonstration if disruption tactics are used.
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* Consider holding a public meeting to discuss spying in your community and
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around the country. Schedule a speaker or film discussing political
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surveillance.
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* Make sure to protect important documents or computer disks, by keeping a
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second copy in a separate, secret location. Use fireproof, locked cabinets if
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possible.
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* Implement a sign-in policy for your office and/or meetings. This is helpful
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for your organizing, developing a mailing list, and can provide evidence that
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an infiltrator or informer was at your meeting. Appoint a contact for spying
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concerns. This contact person or committee should implement the policy
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developed above and should be given authority to act, to get others to respond
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should any problems occur.
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The contact should:
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* Seek someone familiar with surveillance history and law, such as the local
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chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
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National Conference of Black Lawyers or the American Friends Service Committee.
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Brief them about your evidence and suspicions. They will be able to make
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suggestions about actions to take, as well as organizing and legal contacts.
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* Maintain a file of all suspected or confirmed experiences of surveillance
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and disruption. Include: date, place, time, who was present, a complete
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description of everything that happened, and any comments explaining the
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context of the event or showing what impact the event had on the individual or
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organization. If this is put in deposition form and signed, it can be used as
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evidence in court.
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* Under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, request any files
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on the organization from federal agencies such as the FBI, CIA, Immigration and
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Naturalization, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, etc. File similar
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requests with local and state law enforcement agencies, if your state freedom
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of information act applies.
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|| PREPARE FOR MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND EVENTS:
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* Plan ahead; brief your legal workers on appropriate state and federal
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statutes on police and federal officials spying. Discuss whether photographing
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with still or video cameras is anticipated and decide if you want to challenge
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it.
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* If you anticipate surveillance, brief reporters who are expected to cover
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the event, and provide them with materials about past surveillance by your
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city's police in the past, and/or against other activitists throughout the
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country.
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* Tell the participants when surveillance is anticipated and discuss what
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the group's response will be. Also, decide how to handle provocateurs, police
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violence, etc. and incorporate this into any affinity group, marshall or other
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training.
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|| DURING THE EVENT:
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* Carefully monitor the crowd, looking for surveillance or possible
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disruption tactics. Photograph any suspicious or questionable activities.
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* Approach police officer(s) seen engaging in questionable activities.
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Consider having a legal worker and/or press person monitor their actions.
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|| IF YOU SUSPECT SOMEONE IS AN INFILTRATOR:
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* Try to obtain information about his or her background: where s/he attended
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high school and college; place of employment, and other pieces of history.
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Attempt to verify this information.
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* Check public records which include employment; this can include voter
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registation, mortgages or other debt filings, etc.
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* Check listings of police academy graduates, if available.
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|| ONCE YOU OBTAIN EVIDENCE THAT SOMEONE IS AN INFILTRATOR:
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* Confront him or her in a protected setting, such as a small meeting with
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several other key members of your group (and an attorney if available).
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Present the evidence and ask for the person's response.
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* You should plan how to inform your members about the infiltration,
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gathering information about what the person did while a part of the group and
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determining any additional impact s/he may have had.
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* You should consider contacting the press with evidence of the infiltration.
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|| IF YOU CAN ONLY GATHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT THE
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PERSON IS DISRUPTING THE GROUP:
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* Hold a strategy session with key leadership as to how to handle the
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troublesome person.
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* Confront the troublemaker, and lay out why the person is disrupting the
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organization. Set guidelines for further involvement and carefully monitor the
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person's activities. If the problems continue, consider asking the person to
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leave the organization.
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* If sufficient evidence is then gathered which indicates s/he is an
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infiltrator, confront the person with the information in front of witnesses
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and carefully watch reactions.
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* Request an investigation or make a formal complaint
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* Report telephone difficulties to your local and long distance carriers.
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Ask for a check on the lines to assure that the equipment is working properly.
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Ask them to do a sweep/check to see if any wiretap equipment is attached
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(Sometimes repair staff can be very helpful in this way.) If you can afford it,
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request a sweep of your phone and office or home from a private security firm.
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Remember this will only be good at the time that the sweep is done.
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* File a formal complaint with the US Postal Service, specifying the problems
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you have been experiencing, specific dates, and other details. If mail has
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failed to arrive, ask the Post Office to trace the envelope or package.
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* Request a formal inquiry by the police, if you have been the subject of
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surveillance or infiltration. Describe any offending actions by police
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officers and ask a variety of questions. If an activity was photographed, ask
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what will be done with the pictures. Set a time when you expect a reply from
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the police chief. Inform members of the City Council and the press of your
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request.
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* If you are not pleased with the results of the police chief's reply, file
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a complaint with the Police Board or other administrative body. Demand a full
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investigation. Work with investigators to insure that all witnesses are
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contacted. Monitor the investigation and respond publicy to the conclusions.
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* Initiate a lawsuit if applicable federal or local statutes have been
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violated. Before embarking on a lawsuit, remember that most suits take many
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years to complete and require tremendous amounts of organizers' and legal
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workers' energy and money.
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* Always notify the press when you have a good story; keep interested
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reporters updated on any new developments. They may be aware of other police
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abuses, or be able to obtain further evidence of police practices. Press
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coverage of spying activities is very important, because publicity-conscious
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politicians and police chiefs will be held accountable for questionable
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practices.
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Prepared by:
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Linda Lotz
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American Friends Service Committee
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980 North Fair Oaks Avenue
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Pasadena, CA 91103
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