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76 KiB
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[1] Forfeiture Info from BJA, II
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Keywords: Bureau of Justice Assistance, Forfeiture
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Date: Thu May 06 20:12:03 MDT 1993
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Organization: Apple Computer Inc.
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Lines: 1124
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BTW, for more info send mail to publish@ganymede.apple.com
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body of msg:
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help
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send /publish/Index
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i have some GAO reports (not many :-<) and am putting on this series
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of 14 pamphlets on Forfeiture for police.
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ps: i am not selling anything, this is all free info.
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=======================================================================
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ASSET FORFEITURE
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Public Record and Other Information on Hidden Assets
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Prepared by:
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Police Executive Research Forum
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Frank R Booth
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November 1988
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Reprinted January 1992
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U.S. Department of Justice
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Office of Justice Programs
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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U.S. Department of Justice
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William P. Barr.........................Attorney General
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Office of Justice Programs
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Jimmy Gurule............................Assistant Attorney General
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Gerald (Jerry) P. Regier................Acting Director
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Elliott A. Brown........................Deputy Director
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James C. Swain..........................Director, Policy Development
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and Management Division
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Curtis H. Straub, II....................Director, State and Local
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Assistance Division
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Pamela Swain............................Director, Discretionary Grant
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Programs Division
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William F. Powers Director..............Special Programs
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Division
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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633 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20531
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(202) 514 6278
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The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates
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the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: Bureau of
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Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Institute of
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Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the
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Office for Victims of Crime.
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U.S. Department of Justice
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Office of Justice Programs
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Office of the Director Washington DC 25031
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Dear Colleague:
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Illicit drug traffic continues to flourish in every part of the country.
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The cash received by the traffickers is often converted to assets that
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can be used by drug dealers in ways that suit their individual tastes.
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Since 1981, federal authorities have increased their attack on these
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assets through both criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings with
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remarkable success. The recent passage and use of state asset forfeiture
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laws offers an excellent means for state and local jurisdictions to
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emulate the federal success.
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The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in the Office of Justice
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Programs, has funded a nationally focused technical assistance and
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training program to help state and local jurisdictions facilitate
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broader use of such laws. BJA selected the Police Executive Research
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Forum to develop and administer this program because of its history of
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involvement in practical problem-oriented research to improve police
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operations and the Forum's central role in developing training materials
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for use by police agencies and chief executives.
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As part of this project, the Forum has contracted with experts in the
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area of asset forfeiture and financial investigations to prepare a
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series of short manuals dealing with different concerns in the area of
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asset forfeiture. We hope these manuals help meet the rapidly unfolding
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needs of the law enforcement community as more and more agencies apply
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their own forfeiture laws and strive to learn from the successes and
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problems of their peers.
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I welcome hearing your comments about this program. We have this project
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so that most requests for information or assistance can be handled
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through the Forum staff in Washington, D.C., by calling 202/466-7820.
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Sincerely yours,
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Gerald (Jerry) P Regier
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Acting Director
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Table of Contents
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Introduction
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The Initial Lead
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Intelligence
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Sources Of InformationQGovernment Records
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County Records
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Recorder of Deeds
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Liens Office/Clerk of Courts
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Health Departments
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Weights and Measures Department
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County Taxing Authority
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Sheriff/County Prosecutor
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State Records
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Corporation Bureau
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Labor and Industry
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Department of Revenue
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State Police/Fire Marshals
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Licensing Boards/Regulatory Bodies
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Federal and Local Records
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Sources Of InformationQAffiliated Businesses
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The Former Property Owner/Lessor
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The Realtor
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The Title Company
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The Bank Account
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The Accountant
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Vendors
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Tenants/Former Employees
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Conclusion
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Endnotes
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Selected References And Writings
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Introduction
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In 1970, the federal Organized Crime Control Act was enacted. Part of
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this Act included the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations
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statute (RICO), which allowed for both the civil and criminal
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prosecution of individuals investing moneys derived from illegal sources
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into legitimate enterprises. This legislation also allowed for civil and
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criminal seizure of identified properties or assets that had been
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purchased with these illicit funds.
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In the last ten years many states have enacted asset forfeiture and
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seizure laws, modeled to varying degrees after the 1970 federal statute,
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to target the great profits in crime that help sustain and further
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promote criminal enterprises. Some states also permit the prosecutor or
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law enforcement agency to convert seized assets to real dollars for
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agencies use in future investigations. For example, the seizure of a
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boat valued at six figures that was purchased as a result of illegal
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narcotics profiteering can certainly ease the strain of tight government
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budgets and increase the availability of "buy" or "flash" money.
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Federal and state laws regarding ill-gotten assets have several
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important meanings to the law-enforcement community and the general
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public:
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- The statutes provide another legal tool for prosecuting major
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offenders.
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- The laws allow for a comprehensive crippling assault on major
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offenders allowing their illicit investment assets to be seized and
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removed as supplemental sources of "legitimate" income.
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- Seizing and eliminating the illicit business assets of major offenders
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also strengthens the legitimate business community. The major
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offender/"businessman" will certainly inject his criminal tactics into
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the business community and secure for himself an unfair competitive
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edge. Elimination of the illicit assets can help eliminate this edge.
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- And, as noted above, asset forfeiture can be a financial benefit to
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all levels of government if the illicit assets are converted to funds
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that benefit the law-enforcement community.
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The major offender with cash ready for investment is usually surrounded
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by a cadre of professionalsQattorneys, accountants, investment
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counselors, bankers and realtors. These professionals are supplemented
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by a ready supply of individuals and corporate "straws" and "fronts."
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These associates may range from criminal cronies to the attorney's
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secretary, from trusted relatives to legitimate businessmen seeking new
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partners or lucrative, quick turn around investments.
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As major offenders use these professionals and associates to oversee
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their investments, law enforcement agencies face major barriers in
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detecting and identifying the real ownership and sources of investment.
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There are, however, methods and sources of information available to the
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investigator which, if applied diligently and explored fully, can reveal
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these assets and investments and at least partially remove the veil of
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secrecy that surrounds these transactions.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore these unveiling methods and
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share these sources of information. Some are obvious and have been
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mentioned in many publications; others are less so. Many are
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interrelated, with the result that one source of information leads to
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the necessity of pursuing another source of information. Some may
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require special investigative tools, such as subpoenas, writs or search
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warrants; others simply require instinct, diligence, hard work and
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attention to detail.
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For the purpose of this paper we will limit the nature of the hidden
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asset to those of real estate investment and investment in a business
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enterprise.
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The reader will note that references to various state, county and local
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government sources of information have a "Pennsylvania flavor." This
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reflects the author's experiences with sources of information and laws
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in that state. The sources in your jurisdiction may be known by other
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names, but the same information is sure to be available regardless of
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the jurisdiction.
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The Initial Lead
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The initial information or lead that generates hidden asset
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investigations may result either as a "spin-off" or developed lead from
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another investigation, or as a result of a "proactive" investigation
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specifically targeting a major offender.
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The spin-off lead results from an investigation not directly relating to
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revealing hidden assets. It most often arises from a more traditional
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criminal investigation, such as that of a major narcotics trafficker, or
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as a result of intelligence gathering. This type of initial information
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may also surface indirectly when debriefing a criminal informant,
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conversing with a legitimate businessman, or conducting surveillance.
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For example:
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- A meeting observed between a recognized major organized-crime figure
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and the president of a local meat cutters' union in southeast
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Pennsylvania was the catalyst that generated an investigation into the
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relationship between a health benefit provider and a union employee
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group. The result was a significant prosecution of an organized crime
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figure in this industry.(1)
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- A major numbers banker visiting a work crew at a small multiple-unit
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dwelling led to a major recovery of hidden investments of ill-gotten
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gambling monies in various businesses in Chester, Pennsylvania.(2)
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The spin-off lead also may be generated through analyzing telephone toll
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records, bank records or business records in an unrelated investigation.
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The payment of a utility bill or real estate taxes on a property
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unrelated or previously unconnected to the offender by investigators can
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be the single item leading to a major hidden-asset investigation.
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In addition to the spin-off lead or the lead developed from another
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investigation, leads to hidden-asset investigations can be developed in
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a proactive manner. If the investigator allows, as his initial premise,
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that a major offender has generated capital for investment and that this
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capital may have been invested, then initial investigative procedures
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can be taken to determine the validity of this premise.
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If proper legal process and cause can be developed, both mail covers and
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telephone toll analysis, in combination with the use of a Dial Number
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Recorder (DNR), are valuable tools in this proactive approach to initial
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leads. Telephone or mail contacts between the targeted offender and
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professionals and businesses involved in real estate investments or
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financing can prove to be critical leads. If patterns of contacts are
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observed, the likelihood of an investment transaction increasesQas does
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eventual success in detection.
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The types of contacts by mail or telephone that indicate asset
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investment include communications with realtors and real estate
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businesses; banks and savings and loan institutions (particularly those
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not previously identified); and attorneys known as investment or real
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estate specialists. Others include contacts with accounting firms,
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insurance companies, utility companies, taxing authorities, commercial
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trash haulers, construction companies, home improvement and repair
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businesses, title companies, telephone companies and business consulting
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firms. These contacts are major indicators of asset investment, as well
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as your "lead sheet OQnot only to documenting the asset ownership, but
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to identifying knowledgeable sources of information and potential
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witnesses for prosecution.
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In addition to the analysis of mail and telephone records as proactive
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tools, the legal pick-up and careful analysis of your target's trash, at
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either their residences or known businesses, should never be overlooked
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as a potentially important proactive source of intelligence. It must be
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stressed, however, that this must be accomplished in a totally legal
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manner to avoid tainting the evidence.
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If you are legally able to secure your target's trash, you may well
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obtain leads and information generated by the group of businesses and
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individuals identified above. In addition, you may find notes written by
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your target regarding his involvement in some previously undisclosed
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business or investment. Or you could discover hand-carried invoices or
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bills from a supplier to the hidden-asset business. Many businesses do
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this as a matter of practice. Others may be requested to hand deliver
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the material to avoid detection and to avoid the mails. Many
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sophisticated criminals today are wary of potential mail fraud charges
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and take extreme measures to avoid use of the mails.
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If you have identified a particular professional involved in investment
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who has been determined to have extensive contact with your target, a
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"targeted surveillance" could be initiated on this professional. This
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could prove very productive if your target and this professional meet
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and are observed visiting a business site, or if they are involved in a
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business meeting with some previously unknown associates. The potential
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for additional initial leads from this scenario are vast. Depending upon
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your available resourcesQboth time and staffQthis approach should be
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considered carefully. However, a surveillance of this nature can be
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quite time consuming, costly and of limited productivity unless specific
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prior knowledge of a meeting is known.
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Both the "spin offS lead and the "proactive" effort, if properly
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pursued, can generate that initial lead so vital to an asset-disclosure
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investigation. However, as important as proper pursuit is, of equal
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importance is the need for investigator awareness and education. The
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investigator in a major narcotics case must realize the great potential
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for asset disclosure in these matters and be alert to asking that extra
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question or two that could provide that initial detail or lead to asset
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disclosure. The investigator also must be aware of the need for
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attention to detail and the potential significance of a seemingly minor
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item. For instance, the discovery of a utility bill of less that $10
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paid by the major narcotics trafficker on a property previously
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unrelated to him can be that vital initial lead to a major asset
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disclosure investigation.
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Intelligence
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The value of intelligence to the hidden asset investigation is directly
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related to the quality, quantity and source of the intelligence
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information. In conducting a traditional narcotics related investigation
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over a lengthy period, great quantities of information can be developed
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from a multitude of sources. Sometimes information is maintained in a
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well-organized, retrievable and manageable manner, however, often it is
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not. This information is not considered true intelligence if it has not
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been maintained in a manageable manner and is not retrievable. It also
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is not considered intelligence unless some effort has been made to
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determine its validity, its source's reliability, or to confirm it
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through other investigative efforts.
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If the criminal intelligence relating to your investigation target has
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been managed properly, it is a primary source of leads and information
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for your investigation. Information that should be extracted from this
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organized intelligence should include at least the following:
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- Names and identifying data of all participants, major and minor, in
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the criminal structure.
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- The participants' past and present occupations, places of employment
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and their businesses.
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- Female participants in the criminal structure, and wives and
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girlfriends of participants in the criminal structure, should be
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identified by all previously known names.
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- All non-criminal associates and friends of members of the criminal
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organization should be identified, along with their businesses and
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occupations.
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- Past and current business partners of all members of the criminal
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structure should be identified.
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- All known associates in the financial community should be identified.
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Included should be those associated with real estate, banking, the law
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and accounting.
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Information in these categories is important as raw material to connect
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with intelligence developed later in the investigation which may reveal
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the "front" or "front organization."
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Previously used criminal informants who have knowledge of your target
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may prove helpful. Were these sources who had knowledge of the target's
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narcotics operation ever questioned concerning his investments? If not,
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they should be located immediately and be debriefed in this area. Also,
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leads may be generated from others who have previously investigated your
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target. Investigators and prosecutors do not commit to paper all of
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their knowledge regarding an investigation. That initial lead, so
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important to success in an asset probe, could be gained from them as a
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result of a simple telephone call.
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All other information in law-enforcement files relating to your target
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that has not been organized properly should be thoroughly examined, and
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pertinent information in the above categories and any other data should
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be consolidated into a new, comprehensive intelligence system that
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allows ready retrieval.(3)
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Having extracted, organized and consolidated all available intelligence
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from the traditional criminal files and intelligence, there likely will
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be significant gaps in the information needed to pursue your asset
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investigation.
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Now you must fill those information and intelligence voids. Much of the
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balance of this paper will explore the sources of information that will
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assist you, not only filling these voids, but in providing additional
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information and potential witnesses and informants for success in a
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difficult investigative undertaking.
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Sources Of InformationQGovernment Records
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Government records are probably the most accessible records, with the
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most broad applications, available to assist in the hidden-asset
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investigation as it relates to real estate purchases or investments in a
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business enterprise. Of particular value are the records maintained at
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the county and state level.
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County Records
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Recorder of Deeds.
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This office is responsible for recording all deeds in the county
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regarding real estate transactions. The recorded deed contains the names
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of both the buyer and seller, in addition to a description of the
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property, and in most cases, the recorded selling price.
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In addition, the deed may reveal the addresses of the buyer and the
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seller (known respectively as the grantor and the grantee) and the
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identification of the attorney or other representative of either the
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buyer or seller. The identification of the seller of the property or his
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representative is, of course, an immediate lead possibility for the
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hidden asset investigation.
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In addition to maintaining deeds, the Recorder of Deeds also maintains
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and records all mortgages relating to real estate or property
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transactions. This document is the source of a number of vital pieces of
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information. One obvious piece of information is the source of a loan
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(mortgage) to purchase the property. The mortgage document identifies a
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lending institution that has agreed to finance the purchase of the
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property. This leads the investigation to possible sources of
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documentation and witnesses who may know and have done business with the
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target of the investigation.
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The mortgage, and sometimes the deed, also may provide another
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potentially vital lead to true ownership and the unveiling of the hidden
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assetQ the title company. If a title company was involved in the sale,
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that company will hold such important information as the settlement
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sheet, which reveals the distribution of monies to the buyer and seller
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resulting from the sale. In
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addition, the title company may retain copies of the financial
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instruments, such as checks, used to consummate the transaction.
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Title companies may not be readily identifiable on a deed or mortgage.
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They may only be identifiable as a code stamped or handwritten on the
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public document. For example, you may observe the following: CT 12345Q
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03. In this example, the letters "CT" identify Commonwealth Title
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Company and the number "03" identifies Commonwealth Title's #3 office at
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a certain location. The number "12345" identifies their file number.
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Liens Office/Clerk of Courts.
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Locating a supplier or vendor to whom the subject of the investigation
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or his "front" or "front corporation" is indebted can be a valuable
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lead. Because the indebtedness may have been involuntary, this can lead
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the investigator to a target's antagonist, who may have reason to
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cooperate. Liens or judgments filed by businesses or individuals against
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other businesses can be located in county offices of various names. In
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Pennsylvania, this office is known as the Office of the Prothonotary.
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These files should be reviewed carefully. The filing of a lien does not
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always indicate that a true debt has been established. For instance, a
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mechanic's lien is filed by a subcontractor against the property owner
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to secure the subcontractor against the possible future contractor's
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failure to compensate for work completed.
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If liens or judgments are located, the next step in developing lead
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material is checking with the Office of the Clerk of Courts. This office
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maintains records of all civil and criminal actions in the county. A
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thorough review of these records should be made relevant to each
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judgment or lien. If civil litigation has been initiated, it can produce
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additional leads and information valuable to the hidden-asset case. Of
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primary significance in these files are sworn depositions and
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interrogatories, possibly used by both sides. These documents can be
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particularly revealing.
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Health Departments.
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Most county health departments have an inspection division that is
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responsible for routine sanitary or health inspections of various
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businesses within the jurisdiction. These inspectors are potential
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sources of information because of their on-site presence and their
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routine contacts with business employees and owners. In this capacity,
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they can identify former employees as possible future sources or they
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may provide insight into the true ownership of the business.
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Weights and Measures Departments.
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Like the county health department, the county weights and measures
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department (in most counties) has an inspection division. In this
|
|
capacity the inspectors have access to the employees and the owners of
|
|
the inspected business, and thus have information potentially valuable
|
|
to the investigation. They may have leads, for example, to former
|
|
employees or dissatisfied vendors.
|
|
|
|
Also, because of the weights and measures department's enforcement
|
|
responsibility, an adversarial situation may exist, thereby bringing the
|
|
true ownership closer to the surface or providing other insight into the
|
|
true ownership.
|
|
|
|
County Taxing Authority.
|
|
|
|
The county taxing authority can be the source of several types of
|
|
valuable information. Identification of who pays the taxes on a property
|
|
and where the billing notice is mailed are often of interest. If the
|
|
billing notice is mailed to a practitioner associated with the hidden
|
|
|
|
|
|
owner, rather than the owner of record, a key lead has just been
|
|
developed. The taxing authority also will have a record of payment of
|
|
taxes that may lead to a previously unknown bank account, which could in
|
|
turn be traced to the true owner. A tax dispute can lead to some
|
|
connection to true ownership, either directly or through professional
|
|
representation.
|
|
|
|
Sheriff/County Prosecutor.
|
|
|
|
Beyond general criminal intelligence, the sheriff and county prosecutor
|
|
may maintain a general incident file related to businesses within the
|
|
county, in addition to maintaining an emergency telephone contact
|
|
number.
|
|
|
|
The incident file can lead to non-criminal reports or contacts with the
|
|
managers or owners of a business, or identification of individuals
|
|
involved in a non-criminal incident reported and investigated by county
|
|
officials. This may develop further lead material or even connect the
|
|
subject of the investigation to the business or property.
|
|
|
|
If an emergency telephone contact number is provided, it should be
|
|
checked to determine if its subscriber is consistent with the recorded
|
|
ownership.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
State Records
|
|
|
|
Corporation Bureau.
|
|
|
|
If initial leads in the investigation disclose corporate entities as
|
|
possibly holding these assets, the first investigative source should be
|
|
the state's Corporation Bureau or Office of Corporate Registry.
|
|
|
|
The quality and substance of information maintained by this office
|
|
varies from state to state. However, certain data appears common to most
|
|
jurisdictions. That information includes the following:
|
|
|
|
- Name of Corporation
|
|
|
|
- Purpose of Corporation
|
|
|
|
- Corporate Officers
|
|
|
|
- Corporate Directors
|
|
|
|
- Stock Distribution
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Date of Incorporation
|
|
|
|
- Registered Agent (if any)
|
|
|
|
Some states require additional data and periodic updates of changes in
|
|
any of the above areas. Enforcement of these changes varies widely from
|
|
state to state; some enforce aggressively, others less so. Certain
|
|
states also require the periodic filing of financial statements that can
|
|
be an asset to the investigator.
|
|
|
|
Those states with aggressive enforcement programs may seek to revoke
|
|
corporate charters if certain filing requirements are not met. By
|
|
forcing the corporation structure to file information or face charter
|
|
revocation, states can help generate additional investigative leads.
|
|
|
|
In reality, the sophisticated major offender normally will not file
|
|
information that will aid the investigation effort. But all avenues must
|
|
be thoroughly examined in seeking even the slightest opening in the
|
|
corporate veil. For example, if filed information can be shown to be
|
|
false, the investigation could use the Corporation Bureau's regulatory
|
|
authority to revoke the charter of the front corporation. If this action
|
|
is fought by the corporation counsel or other representative, the
|
|
resulting conflict could further remove the veil of secrecy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Labor and Industry.
|
|
|
|
Many states, under their labor departments, require the filing of
|
|
periodic lists of employees, revealing their names, social security
|
|
numbers and salaries. In Pennsylvania, this is accomplished on a
|
|
quarterly basis through the Department of Labor and Industry.
|
|
|
|
This provides a relatively updated listing of employees, their salaries
|
|
and social security numbers. In addition, it gives the investigator the
|
|
opportunity to identify former employees by comparing old quarterly
|
|
reports with recent ones. As mentioned, former employees can be
|
|
excellent inside sources of information.
|
|
|
|
The Labor Department in your state may also have a Labor Relations
|
|
Board, a Bureau of Mediation or both. If the alleged hidden asset
|
|
business employs a unionized work force, these offices may well provide
|
|
leads, particularly if a labor dispute has arisen.
|
|
|
|
Department of Revenue.
|
|
|
|
Although state revenue departments, like the U.S. Internal Revenue
|
|
Service, are statutorily prohibited from disclosing much tax
|
|
|
|
|
|
information, they can be sources of certain vital information of a
|
|
public record nature.
|
|
|
|
Some revenue departments license businesses. The department may issue
|
|
sales tax licenses. Generally, these licenses and the applications for
|
|
them are considered public information. If so, they will contain
|
|
potentially useful elements of information. However, of even greater
|
|
potential value is the local or regional state tax collector who has
|
|
been assigned to a targeted business' delinquent collection. The revenue
|
|
investigator may be able to provide inside information regarding the
|
|
business, its true ownership, who represents the business and other
|
|
"inside" information. A contact with a revenue investigator, however,
|
|
must be conducted carefully to avoid improper receipt or disclosure of
|
|
confidential tax information.
|
|
|
|
In some states and under specified conditions, law enforcement and
|
|
prosecutors can obtain access to corporate, business and personal income
|
|
tax information.
|
|
|
|
If you are able to access either corporate or personal state income tax
|
|
returns in your jurisdiction, you have access to an invaluable source of
|
|
information. Several leads to possible sources of hidden investments can
|
|
be derived from personal and corporate tax returns.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loans to and from stockholders, and loans to and from corporate
|
|
officers, can be questionable and should be pursued. Also, mortgages,
|
|
notes and bonds shown as liabilities on a corporate return must be
|
|
closely investigated.
|
|
|
|
Another key item on both corporate and personal returns that should be
|
|
analyzed carefully are interest payments. Interest income may have been
|
|
derived from a source, often a bank, that was previously unknown to the
|
|
investigator. This may lead to bank accounts controlled by the subject
|
|
of the investigation that have been used for an illicit investment
|
|
financed with illegally earned funds.
|
|
|
|
Tax returns also may disclose the identity of the accountant preparing
|
|
the return. This provides the identity and location of a person
|
|
intimately familiar with either the corporation or the target. In
|
|
addition, the investigator now has potential access to additional
|
|
important recordsQthe accountant's work papers. These will be discussed
|
|
in more detail later.
|
|
|
|
State Police/Fire Marshals.
|
|
|
|
Any record of a fire related to the subject business or property should
|
|
|
|
|
|
be thoroughly pursued. Fire often relates to insurance. The
|
|
identification of a previously unknown insurance company can be an
|
|
important lead. Who pays the premium? Who are the beneficiaries? And the
|
|
agent assigned or responsible for the policy can be an important lead
|
|
because of his first-hand knowledge of the business.
|
|
|
|
When arson is investigated, additional witness interviews of employees,
|
|
owners or other witnesses could prove useful.
|
|
|
|
Licensing Boards/Regulatory Bodies.
|
|
|
|
Like other types of state and local authority, the licensing and
|
|
regulation of businesses and occupations varies from state to state and
|
|
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|
In a hidden-asset investigation, the various boards, agencies and bodies
|
|
that license, regulate and inspect must be considered primary sources of
|
|
information. And in most jurisdictions, the files and records of these
|
|
agencies are considered public information and are readily accessible.
|
|
|
|
In Pennsylvania, a myriad of occupations and businesses are licensed,
|
|
regulated and inspected. The Department of State alone licenses twenty-
|
|
six separate areas, including accountants and real estate agents that
|
|
|
|
|
|
can be significant to the hidden-asset investigation. State licensing
|
|
ranges from architects to auctioneers, cosmetologists to chiropractors,
|
|
and podiatrists to psychologists. In addition, licensing and inspection
|
|
or audit occurs in banking, insurance, environmental resources, fish and
|
|
game, liquor, milk marketing, public utilities, securities and
|
|
transportation.
|
|
|
|
Obviously, the range of oversight is great, and the degree of useful
|
|
information available from these various agencies ranges from a simple
|
|
application that is approved routinely and without follow-up, to an
|
|
application requiring in-depth financial statements, bonding and
|
|
thorough background investigation before approval is allowed.
|
|
|
|
Whatever information the licensing board or regulatory agency requires,
|
|
investigators should search for the following types of information:
|
|
|
|
- An application with basic information provided by the applicant that
|
|
may be used to develop leads,
|
|
|
|
- Sources of financing often are required, which can be traced in an
|
|
attempt to identify the hidden owner,
|
|
|
|
- Bonding and insurance sources may be identified which, when pursued,
|
|
|
|
|
|
may lead to hidden ownership,
|
|
|
|
- Employment and occupation histories may be required that can aid
|
|
investigations,
|
|
|
|
- Leads to accountants, attorneys and lending institutions can be found
|
|
and lead to valuable information, and
|
|
|
|
- Inspection or audit divisions within the licensing and regulatory
|
|
bodies provide on-site sources that may lead to quality informants or
|
|
witnesses.
|
|
|
|
It must also be pointed out that the regulatory or licensing authority
|
|
may do more than license; it also may exercise the authority to suspend,
|
|
fine or even revoke the license necessary for the business to operateQa
|
|
powerful legal weapon. Effective use of state regulatory agencies is a
|
|
largely untapped investigative tool.
|
|
|
|
Federal and Local Records.
|
|
|
|
In pursuing the hidden-asset investigation, state and county records are
|
|
of predominant importance, but federal and local records sources also
|
|
must be combed. In many instances, similar categories of information
|
|
|
|
|
|
will be developed from these sources. Both conduct regulatory and
|
|
inspection operations, in that data, as categorized above, will be
|
|
developed which could be useful. Federal and local data falls into two
|
|
broad categories: (1) applications and documents as required by the
|
|
agency, and (2) documents that will lead to potential informants or
|
|
witnesses who can link the hidden owner to the hidden asset.
|
|
|
|
Because it would be repetitious in many cases, no further discussion
|
|
will be given to the local and federal sources of information. Suffice
|
|
it to say that at the local level, licensing boards and agencies, health
|
|
inspectors, zoning boards and taxing authorities can be prime sources,
|
|
in addition to such sources as local law enforcement and prosecutors. At
|
|
the federal level, the same licensing and inspection authorities, in
|
|
addition to the various federal law enforcement and investigation
|
|
agencies, are key sources.
|
|
|
|
Sources Of Information - Affiliated Businesses
|
|
|
|
In addition to using previously collected information and intelligence
|
|
and government records as sources of information and leads, information
|
|
must be gathered on businesses affiliated with the business or real
|
|
estate investment being investigated. There are two categories. The
|
|
first category is the business that supplies services necessary for day-
|
|
|
|
|
|
to-day basic business operations. This includes suppliers of raw
|
|
materials, vendors and trash collectors. The second category is the
|
|
provider of professional servicesQfor instance, the accountant, banker
|
|
and realtor.
|
|
|
|
Before probing these two categories of affiliated businesses, the
|
|
investigation should have accomplished the following:
|
|
|
|
- Identified, analyzed and consolidated all available intelligence into
|
|
a retrievable, understandable intelligence system.
|
|
|
|
- Completely identified all participants in the criminal organization
|
|
and developed background information on their businesses and
|
|
occupations.
|
|
|
|
- Completely identified all noncriminal associates of your criminal
|
|
target who have relations to the business community or the professional
|
|
community.
|
|
|
|
- Established one or more initial leads to an undisclosed investment in
|
|
real estate or a business enterprise.
|
|
|
|
- Searched all potential public records available regarding these
|
|
|
|
|
|
initial leads and incorporated these findings into the intelligence
|
|
system.
|
|
|
|
Up to this point, most of the sources of information discussed would be
|
|
considered part of the public domain and readily accessible. Information
|
|
required from these affiliated businesses, however, in most cases, will
|
|
require legal proceeding to fully secure them.
|
|
|
|
Also, your investigation has now moved from its confidential phase to an
|
|
overt stage where your attorney (whom you will need) most likely will be
|
|
required to engage in enforcement litigation with attorneys opposing
|
|
your access to records. Hidden asset investigations cannot succeed
|
|
without the combined efforts and talents of the investigator and the
|
|
attorney, working as a team.
|
|
|
|
The Former Property Owner/Lessor.
|
|
|
|
The investigation likely will turn up, at some point, a physical
|
|
property. It may simply be a piece of land, or it could be a small
|
|
building, an apartment house or a restaurant. This physical property may
|
|
have been purchased, it could be leased, or it may be used on a
|
|
lease/purchase arrangement. Regardless of the nature of the relationship
|
|
of the hidden owner to the property, there are several common
|
|
|
|
|
|
denominators.
|
|
|
|
In each interview or contact with anyone associated with the hidden
|
|
asset investigation, the investigator must obtain the two necessary
|
|
ingredients for successQdocumentation and potential witnesses.
|
|
|
|
An initial interview with either the owner (if the property is leased)
|
|
or the former owner (if the property has been purchased) should be
|
|
conducted. The interview should cover the following:
|
|
|
|
- Why did you sell or lease the business?
|
|
|
|
- How did you advertise that the business was for sale or lease?
|
|
|
|
- Identify all individuals who expressed any interest whatsoever in the
|
|
purchase or lease of the business.
|
|
|
|
- What were the terms of the sale or lease agreement?
|
|
|
|
- Where was the agreement of sale or lease consummated? Who was present?
|
|
|
|
- How were (are) you compensated for the purchase or lease of the
|
|
business?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- What changes in vendors or employees have occurred since your sale or
|
|
lease?
|
|
|
|
- What documents do you have concerning the purchase or lease?
|
|
|
|
Responses to these inquiries may identify the subject as having
|
|
personally shown an interest in the property at some time; it may
|
|
identify a title company involved; it will surely identify Realtors
|
|
involved; it may identify associates of the target as expressing
|
|
interest, or as serving as new employees, vendors or financial sources;
|
|
it will identify banks or payment and lending institutions; it will
|
|
identify former employees and former vendors as potential sources; and
|
|
it may identify the target's accountant or attorney.
|
|
|
|
Contact with these affiliated businesses will provide varying degrees of
|
|
cooperation. The recalcitrant interviewee should be made aware of the
|
|
possibility of legal processes and that he is not a target of the
|
|
investigation, if this is so. If he continues to be uncooperative, legal
|
|
proceedings should be used.
|
|
|
|
In these contacts, the investigator also must remain attentive to the
|
|
smallest item that can seem unimportant but that could lead to a major
|
|
|
|
|
|
breakthrough. For instance, a single call from a Realtor to the seller
|
|
expressing interest in the business, but with no follow-up, can develop
|
|
a lead to other property investments or a key future witness.
|
|
|
|
The Realtor.
|
|
|
|
Having made that contact with the owner/lessor and having established
|
|
involvement by a Realtor, the Realtor is the next logical contact.
|
|
|
|
The Realtor can be the source of a variety of information, and the
|
|
Realtor's role can range from full knowledge of hidden ownership to
|
|
merely servicing an account. The Realtor's cooperation will vary in
|
|
proportion to his role and his knowledge; if deeply involved, he likely
|
|
will be uncooperative.
|
|
|
|
The Realtor could have been contacted by the hidden owner who, after
|
|
expressing interest in the asset, replaced himself with a front or front
|
|
corporation, or a close criminal associate of the subject could have
|
|
assumed the same role.
|
|
|
|
In addition the Realtor may have executed the Agreement of Sale and
|
|
established escrow accounts for the deposit of down payment monies.
|
|
These documents may be retained by the Realtor and are vital leads. A
|
|
|
|
|
|
new bank account with a record of deposits for asset purchase purposes
|
|
may lead to or connect to the subject of the investigation.
|
|
|
|
The Realtor may also have a management role in the asset, depending on
|
|
the nature of the business. He could, for example, be responsible for
|
|
collecting rent, maintaining the property or paying utility bills. If
|
|
so, this allows for new avenues of inquiry. Exercising a management role
|
|
means a Realtor has a more intimate knowledge of the hidden asset than
|
|
the Realtor merely providing servicing. The management Realtor should be
|
|
questioned regarding former and current tenants, vendors and employees
|
|
of the hidden asset.
|
|
|
|
The Title Company.
|
|
|
|
Most transactions between buyer and seller involve title insurance. The
|
|
purpose of title insurance is to assure the buyer that the asset is free
|
|
from any unknown encumbrances or debts. This protection is provided by a
|
|
title company. In many cases, the title company is the location where
|
|
the asset actually changes ownership. For this reason, title companies
|
|
can be excellent sources of information. Unfortunately, most title
|
|
companies require a subpoena or some other legal process before
|
|
relinquishing their records.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Not only does the title company maintain documents important to the
|
|
investigation, but the company officer assigned the transaction may have
|
|
first-hand knowledge of the asset's ownership because title insurance is
|
|
buyer generated. As with the Realtor, the title company officer must be
|
|
questioned thoroughly in all aspects of the transaction, from initial
|
|
contact by the buyer to consummation of the sale.
|
|
|
|
The records maintained by the title company will include the settlement
|
|
sheet, which will show the distribution of monies between buyer and
|
|
seller. Also, the title company should retain copies of any financial
|
|
instruments used in the transaction. These instruments could be checks,
|
|
money orders or other financial instruments. If cash was involved, a
|
|
record of that is also available from the title company. In addition,
|
|
like the Realtor, the title-company escrow account may have been used as
|
|
a repository for down payments or other transactions involving the asset
|
|
purchase.
|
|
|
|
The Bank Account.
|
|
|
|
The financial transaction may relate to a bank, or it could relate to
|
|
another category of financial institution: a savings and loan
|
|
association, a brokerage account, a credit union, a pension fund, or any
|
|
combination of these institutions. Or it could be a pure cash
|
|
|
|
|
|
transaction.
|
|
|
|
At all financial institutions two functions occur: money flows in and
|
|
money flows out. In a hidden-asset investigation, the money flowing from
|
|
the account may be the investment in the hidden asset. The money flowing
|
|
into the account may be even more important.
|
|
|
|
When an account has been identified as the source (or possible source)
|
|
of an illicit investment, you must secure that account in its entirety.
|
|
That account can only be secured by proper legal process to the bank or
|
|
other institution, or directly to the subject business.
|
|
|
|
Often it is preferable to secure the financial records directly from the
|
|
subject business or the suspected front, for a number of reasons. You
|
|
will be securing the original document, which is, of course, the best
|
|
evidence. Also, you may obtain the records even faster and you will
|
|
eliminate the possibility of poor quality documents so often associated
|
|
with financial institution duplication.
|
|
|
|
This method is suggested but must be tailored to your investigation. If
|
|
your effort is overt at this phase of the investigation, the bank or
|
|
financial institution can be used as a backup source for documents not
|
|
received from the subject business or suspected front.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Upon receipt of financial records, tracing of investments begins.
|
|
Assuming that the investigation has revealed an investment of a specific
|
|
amount from a front's corporate account, the following should be
|
|
analyzed at once:
|
|
|
|
- All opening account deposits should be obtained and examined.
|
|
|
|
- All major deposits shortly before and shortly after the date of
|
|
investment in the illicit enterprise should be obtained.
|
|
|
|
- All cash deposits during the same period as (2) should be noted.
|
|
|
|
- Establish a dollar threshold based on the magnitude of the account and
|
|
record all deposits greater than that threshold.
|
|
|
|
- Complete (4) for all withdrawals of funds.
|
|
|
|
- Pay special attention to even-dollar disbursements.
|
|
|
|
- Identify and investigate all regular payments for potential leads.
|
|
|
|
- Note all wire transfers and credit and debit memos for follow-up
|
|
|
|
|
|
investigation.
|
|
|
|
Pursuit of the above items should be the initial steps in the analysis
|
|
of bank or financial accounts. The purpose is to identify funds of major
|
|
proportion flowing in and out of the account to the subject of the
|
|
investigation or his accounts. It may also generate new lead material.
|
|
|
|
In the analysis of bank accounts, it is crucial that attention be given
|
|
to detail and items small in size. Although you may want to focus
|
|
initial investigation on the major items in the account as suggested
|
|
above, do not overlook the balance of the records. They could be
|
|
critical.
|
|
|
|
There are an array of banking records that could prove valuable,
|
|
including certificates of deposit, credit card advances and currency
|
|
transaction reports. Loan records deserve special attention.
|
|
|
|
If a deposit analyzed in the financial records was generated as a result
|
|
of a loan, it should be pursued diligently. Several questions should be
|
|
addressed. Who applied for the loan? How were the proceeds deposited to
|
|
the account of interest to the investigation? And perhaps most
|
|
important, how was it secured or collateralized?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Answers to these questions regarding the loan could tie your target to
|
|
the business, especially the security or collateral for the loan.
|
|
|
|
Along with bank records, consider the banker. The banker could be the
|
|
liaison between the loan for the investment in the illicit asset and the
|
|
subject of your investigation. He may also have intimate knowledge of
|
|
the business and may even be an informal advisor. Include the banker in
|
|
your investigation as a possible valuable source of "inside" information
|
|
concerning the ownership and operation of the illicit enterprise.
|
|
|
|
The Accountant.
|
|
|
|
In the hidden-asset investigation, the accountant for the targeted
|
|
business enterprise can be an important source, not only for documents
|
|
but also as an "insider" and possible witness. Like the Realtor and the
|
|
banker, the accountant's degree of cooperation will be directly
|
|
proportional to his personal and professional involvement with the
|
|
subject of the investigation and the investments.
|
|
|
|
The documents held by the accountant most vital to a hidden-asset
|
|
investigation are known simply as the accountant's work papers. These
|
|
work papers will identify expenditures made by the enterprise; sources
|
|
of business income; loans obtained by the business; loans made by the
|
|
|
|
|
|
business; and other financial records. Generally, the accountant's work
|
|
papers are not only an excellent supplement to the bank records, but
|
|
also may serve as a primary source of new information or records.
|
|
|
|
Of particular interest in the work papers are notes or memos made by the
|
|
accountant during the preparation of tax returns, m conversation with
|
|
those operating the hidden-asset business, or both. For example, if a
|
|
business loan had been made to a corporate officer, there may be a note
|
|
indicating the purpose of the loan. This note also could identify who
|
|
approved the loan, and this could lead to your target.
|
|
|
|
The accountant's work papers may also include copies of tax returns
|
|
prepared by the accountant for the hidden-asset business. If you do not
|
|
have access to state or local tax returns, these work papers may provide
|
|
you with access. These papers also may provide possible new sources of
|
|
information, such as former accountants, vendors, real estate or asset
|
|
investments by your target, and employee records.
|
|
|
|
In addition to his function as accountant and preparer of tax returns,
|
|
the accountant may serve as a business advisor or investment consultant
|
|
to the business or your target. His activity m this role may shed
|
|
further light on the case.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vendors.
|
|
|
|
As mentioned earlier, the identification of vendors, particularly former
|
|
vendors, can be critical to a hidden-asset investigation. The vendor has
|
|
access to the day-to-day operation of the business and often has
|
|
critical insight into the business management and financial workings.
|
|
The vendor may have direct contact with the true ownership, particularly
|
|
m the early stages of the vendor/business relationship.
|
|
|
|
Vendors can range from renovation contractors and insurance providers to
|
|
trash collectors and vending-machine managers. The more substantial the
|
|
vendor's dollar role in the hidden-asset business, the more likely a
|
|
direct contact between the vendor and your target has occurred.
|
|
|
|
For example, as evidenced in a past investigation, a vending company
|
|
supplied a variety of vending machines to a bar/restaurant owned by a
|
|
major criminal figure but fronted by an associate. The vending company
|
|
offered an interest-free loan to the business for using their vending
|
|
machines, with the loan being paid on a monthly basis from 50 percent of
|
|
the vending machine receipts. The loan was substantial and of major
|
|
concern to the hidden owner. As a result, he negotiated the loan
|
|
repayment agreement and his name and a record of his involvement
|
|
appeared in the vending company records. This was not conclusive
|
|
|
|
|
|
evidence on its own, but served as a critical element that subsequently
|
|
was combined with other investigative evidence in a successful hidden-
|
|
asset investigation.
|
|
|
|
Former or current vendors who have been identified as experiencing
|
|
financial problems with the suspect business may be primary leads
|
|
because their adversarial relationship makes these vendors more likely
|
|
than others to cooperate.
|
|
|
|
The vendor's own records may prove helpful. The investigation should
|
|
check samples of payment sources relating to the vendor; review any
|
|
contractual agreements between vendor and target business; and identify
|
|
all vendor employees involved with supplying goods and services to the
|
|
target enterprise.
|
|
|
|
Tenants/Former Employees.
|
|
|
|
If the hidden-asset business leases space or apartments to tenants, the
|
|
tenants may give valuable information. The tenants and former tenants
|
|
share a business relationship with the hidden asset and, as such, should
|
|
be questioned regarding payments of rent, identification of collectors,
|
|
identification of vendors, and who responds to complaints.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
One of the best sources of information regarding any business is the
|
|
former employee. His usefulness to the investigation centers on his role
|
|
in the business, how long he functioned m that role and why his
|
|
employment was ended.
|
|
|
|
A former employee involved m the hidden-asset business from its
|
|
inception is most valuable because of his knowledge of the hidden
|
|
owner's initial involvement. Also, a former employee who had a role in
|
|
the financial aspect of the business is invaluable. As mentioned
|
|
earlier, analysis of state Labor and Industry reports can be valuable m
|
|
locating former employees prior to obtaining bank or business records
|
|
from other sources.
|
|
|
|
Conclusion
|
|
|
|
The hidden-assets investigation is difficult, time-consuming and costly.
|
|
But, it is critical and must be pursued to prevent the corruption and
|
|
disruption of the legitimate business community and to deter the illegal
|
|
marketplace from meshing successfully with the legitimate marketplace.
|
|
Success in the hidden-asset investigation also discourages other major
|
|
narcotics financiers or dealers and their corrupt business and
|
|
professional associates from future investment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To succeed in the hidden-asset investigation requires sincere commitment
|
|
and total dedication by the attorney/investigator team. In most cases,
|
|
it requires a proactive effort, rather than the traditional reactive
|
|
investigation. And it requires dogged attention to detail, logic in your
|
|
methods, organization of effort, and patience. But it can be successful.
|
|
|
|
Endnotes
|
|
|
|
1. Health Care Fraud: A Rising Threat; Pennsylvania Crime Commission,
|
|
1981.
|
|
|
|
2. Chester City Racketeer; Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1978.
|
|
|
|
3. Use of a mini or personal computer, if available, and legal in your
|
|
jurisdiction is an excellent tool for managing this kind of data.
|
|
|
|
4. May be identified elsewhere as County Court, Circuit Court, Court of
|
|
Quarter Sessions or some other designation.
|
|
|
|
Selected Reference And Writings
|
|
|
|
The Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of Financial Crimes,
|
|
Richard A. Nossen (1982).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money
|
|
Laundering, President's Commission on Organized Crime (1984).
|
|
|
|
RICO Investigations: A Case Study, Gregory T. Magarity, American
|
|
Criminal Law Review (1980).
|
|
|
|
A Chester City Racketeer: Hidden Interests Revealed, Pennsylvania Crime
|
|
Commission (1978).
|
|
|
|
Health Care Fraud: A Rising Threat, Pennsylvania Crime Commission
|
|
(1981).
|
|
|
|
Sources of Information for Criminal Investigators, ANACAPA Sciences,
|
|
Inc.
|
|
|
|
Penetration of Legitimate Business by Organized Crime, National
|
|
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (1970).
|
|
|
|
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute, US Department of
|
|
Justice, Criminal Division, 4th Edition.
|
|
|
|
Techniques in the Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime,
|
|
|
|
|
|
Materials on RICO, G. Robert Blakey (Editor), January 1980.
|
|
|
|
The First National Seminar on Asset Seizure and Forfeiture, National
|
|
Institute on Economic Crime, and Washington Crime News Service, April
|
|
1985.
|
|
End of article 21 (of 37)--what next? [npq] alt.society.resistance #22 (7 more) [1]
|
|
From: kiddyr@gallant.apple.com (Ray Kiddy)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[1] Forfeiture Info from BJA, III
|
|
Keywords: Bureau of Justice Assitance, Forfeiture
|
|
Date: Thu May 06 20:13:13 MDT 1993
|
|
Organization: Apple Computer Inc.
|
|
Lines: 451
|
|
|
|
BTW, for more info send mail to publish@ganymede.apple.com
|
|
|
|
body of msg:
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
send /publish/Index
|
|
|
|
i have some GAO reports (not many :-<) and am putting on this series
|
|
of 14 pamphlets on Forfeiture for police.
|
|
|
|
ps: i am not selling anything, this is all free info.
|
|
|
|
=======================================================================
|
|
|
|
ASSET FORFEITURE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Management and Disposition of Seized Assets
|
|
|
|
Prepared by:
|
|
Police Executive Research Forum
|
|
G Patrick Gallagher
|
|
|
|
November 1988
|
|
Reprinted January 1992
|
|
|
|
U.S. Department of Justice
|
|
Office of Justice Programs
|
|
Bureau of Justice Assistance
|
|
|
|
U.S. Department of Justice
|
|
William P. Barr.........................Attorney General
|
|
|
|
Office of Justice Programs
|
|
Jimmy Gurule............................Assistant Attorney General
|
|
|
|
Bureau of Justice Assistance
|
|
Gerald (Jerry) P. Regier................Acting Director
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Elliott A. Brown........................Deputy Director
|
|
|
|
James C. Swain..........................Director, Policy Development
|
|
and Management Division
|
|
|
|
Curtis H. Straub, II....................Director, State and Local
|
|
Assistance Division
|
|
|
|
Pamela Swain............................Director, Discretionary Grant
|
|
Programs Division
|
|
|
|
William F. Powers Director..............Special Programs
|
|
Division
|
|
|
|
Bureau of Justice Assistance
|
|
633 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20531
|
|
(202) 514 6278
|
|
|
|
The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates
|
|
the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: Bureau of
|
|
Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Institute of
|
|
Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the
|
|
Office for Victims of Crime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
U.S. Department of Justice
|
|
Office of Justice Programs
|
|
Bureau of Justice Assistance
|
|
|
|
Office of the Director Washington DC 25031
|
|
|
|
Dear Colleague:
|
|
|
|
Illicit drug traffic continues to flourish in every part of the country.
|
|
The cash received by the traffickers is often converted to assets that
|
|
can be used by drug dealers in ways that suit their individual tastes.
|
|
Since 1981, federal authorities have increased their attack on these
|
|
assets through both criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings with
|
|
remarkable success. The recent passage and use of state asset forfeiture
|
|
laws offers an excellent means for state and local jurisdictions to
|
|
emulate the federal success.
|
|
|
|
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in the Office of Justice
|
|
Programs, has funded a nationally focused technical assistance and
|
|
training program to help state and local jurisdictions facilitate
|
|
broader use of such laws. BJA selected the Police Executive Research
|
|
|
|
|
|
Forum to develop and administer this program because of its history of
|
|
involvement in practical problem-oriented research to improve police
|
|
operations and the Forum's central role in developing training materials
|
|
for use by police agencies and chief executives.
|
|
|
|
As part of this project, the Forum has contracted with experts in the
|
|
area of asset forfeiture and financial investigations to prepare a
|
|
series of short manuals dealing with different concerns in the area of
|
|
asset forfeiture. We hope these manuals help meet the rapidly unfolding
|
|
needs of the law enforcement community as more and more agencies apply
|
|
their own forfeiture laws and strive to learn from the successes and
|
|
problems of their peers.
|
|
|
|
I welcome hearing your comments about this program. We have this project
|
|
so that most requests for information or assistance can be handled
|
|
through the Forum staff in Washington, D.C., by calling 202/466-7820.
|
|
|
|
Sincerely yours,
|
|
|
|
Gerald (Jerry) P Regier
|
|
Acting Director
|
|
|
|
Table of Contents
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
Background on Seized Assets
|
|
Major Issues in the Management of Seized Assets
|
|
Disposition Issues
|
|
Methods for Handling Common Problems
|
|
Liability Issues
|
|
Resource Directory: Roster of Persons Interviewed
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
|
|
From March to May, 1987, the Police Executive Research Forum (the
|
|
Forum), surveyed seven law enforcement agencies on how they manage and
|
|
dispose of seized assets, and the liability issues involved in asset
|
|
seizure and forfeiture.
|
|
|
|
The agencies covered in the study are the U.S. Marshals Service; the
|
|
U.S. Customs Service; the Florida Department of Law Enforcement; the
|
|
Broward County, Florida SheriffUs Department; the Metro-Dade, Florida
|
|
Police Department; the Fort Lauderdale, Florida Po,ice Department; and
|
|
the Detroit, Michigan Police Department. These agencies were chosen
|
|
because they have been dealing with large volumes of seized assets over
|
|
an extended period and the non-federal agencies, in particular, have
|
|
|
|
|
|
acquired a reputation for sophisticated management of those assets.
|
|
|
|
The July, 1985, National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief
|
|
entitled "Use of Forfeiture Sanctions in Drug Cases, " provides an
|
|
overview of the forfeiture provisions on a state-by-state basis.
|
|
Regarding the disposition of forfeited property, that brief notes that:
|
|
|
|
more than half the states provide that confiscated property goes to the
|
|
State or local treasury, or part to each. In some States, however, law
|
|
enforcement agencies may keep the property for official use. If the
|
|
property is sold or if it is cash, then the money goes to the State or
|
|
local treasury. In eight States, law enforcement agencies can keep all
|
|
property, cash, and sales proceeds (p. 5).
|
|
|
|
Some federal agencies have been actively involved in managing seized
|
|
assets. The state of Florida, pushed by its proximity, and in response
|
|
to substantial, drug traffic, has responded to the point that many of
|
|
the state's law enforcement agencies have developed smoothly operating
|
|
forfeiture processes under the State forfeiture statute, and high-
|
|
quality management procedures for handling and disposing of seized
|
|
assets. While this should be the response of any advanced and
|
|
professional agency, in Florida the agencies' expertise has developed
|
|
out of necessity. Innovative procedures must be used to take the
|
|
|
|
|
|
offensive against the drug trade. Moreover, the agencies literally would
|
|
be inundated with seized assets if they had not learned to process them
|
|
expeditiously, and turn the newly acquired properties into valuable
|
|
resources in the fight against drug trafficking.
|
|
|
|
Background On Seized Assets
|
|
|
|
When asked what were the most commonly seized assets, the seven
|
|
agencies' responses were remarkably similar: the two top assets were
|
|
cash and cars, followed by boats, planes, jewelry and weapons. Those
|
|
items made up 95 percent of all seized assets. Local agencies rarely
|
|
become involved in seizing businesses or real property (although this
|
|
seems to be changing as more and more state forfeiture laws are used to
|
|
seize so-called derivative assets). State and federal agencies, in
|
|
contrast, conduct such seizures frequently.
|
|
|
|
One reason local agencies usually did not target real property for
|
|
seizure is because they recognize the attendant difficulties in managing
|
|
them (Detroit made this very clear: " . . . if at all possible do not
|
|
get involved in seizing property"). Under the Florida Contraband
|
|
Forfeiture Act, authorities can seize only that property that is an
|
|
instrumentality of the crime--that is, cars, cash, and the Rolex watch
|
|
mentioned below. Property seizable under federal law and special
|
|
|
|
|
|
provisions of the Florida statutes are property and assets acquired by
|
|
using financial resources accruing (derived) from illegal activities.
|
|
Therefore, under Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
|
|
(RICO) statutes, law enforcement agencies may be aggressive in seizing
|
|
real estate acquired with drug or other racketeering proceeds.
|
|
|
|
The U.S. Marshals Service generally does not seize assets, except for
|
|
judicial seizures conducted pursuant to a federal court order. However,
|
|
the marshals do manage assets seized by other federal agencies, such as
|
|
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Immigration and
|
|
Naturalization Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
|
|
with DEA accounting for 90 percent of seized items.
|
|
|
|
Among the more unusual items seized or turned over to the Marshals from
|
|
other agencies are a bank, a horse ranch, a golf course, gas stations,
|
|
flower shops, a drug store, a recording studio and a brass foundry. The
|
|
U.S. Customs Service lists elephants and kangaroos among the noteworthy
|
|
items seized, while local agencies reported gymnastic equipment,
|
|
Kruggerands, pill machines for making quaaludes, and even a Rolex watch
|
|
(noted earlier) used to set the time for a drug deal.
|
|
|
|
Most of the survey respondents, as local agencies, operate independently
|
|
of the U.S. Marshals Service, although Detroit currently is trying to
|
|
|
|
|
|
establish a working relationship with the Service. The Broward County
|
|
SheriffUs Department has probably the closest arrangement with the
|
|
Service, for their county's personnel are named special U.S. Deputy
|
|
Marshals for enforcement purposes, and they operate under their legal
|
|
umbrellaQtraveling cross country to serve subpoenas, gaining access to
|
|
selected Service intelligence, and receiving information on federal
|
|
investigations in their area. In short, this cooperative arrangement
|
|
provides a major boost to furthering the Broward County Sheriff's
|
|
Department's objectives.
|
|
|
|
In pursuing forfeiture action against such property, local agencies have
|
|
not been deterred by the need to track assets to other states: The
|
|
Broward County Sheriff's Department, for example, seized sixty-four
|
|
Arabian horses and autos
|
|
|
|
on a farm in Michigan where marijuana was being grown. The Detroit
|
|
Police Department went far afield to seize a farm in Tennessee.
|
|
|
|
Major Issues In The Management Of Seized Assets
|
|
|
|
When Detroit personnel were asked about how they maintain and preserve
|
|
the value of such assets as cars, real estate, farms, and businesses,
|
|
their answer was precise: "prompt disposal." The issues of maintenance
|
|
|
|
|
|
and preservation were of major concern to all seven agencies, or they
|
|
remained sensitive to the requirement to responsibly manage the asset
|
|
while it was in their possession.
|
|
|
|
In Florida, local departmental use of the most frequently seized
|
|
property, cars, requires approval from local courts. Then, the agency
|
|
can use the autos in investigations or hold them for auction with the
|
|
proceeds going to the asset forfeiture Law Enforcement Trust Fund
|
|
(LETF). This type of account can be set up in Florida jurisdictions to
|
|
hold seized proceeds, pending approval of city or county commissions for
|
|
its expenditureQexclusively for additional investigative activity.
|
|
|
|
After seizure, an item should be appraised in order to document its
|
|
value at the time of seizure, and to identify encumbrances and liens
|
|
(especially those affecting autos and real estate parcels) that might
|
|
make an item a financial liability to the seizing agency. Detroit even
|
|
has second appraisal done if they must go to court, so that they have a
|
|
record that the property did not decrease in value while in their
|
|
possession.
|
|
|
|
Some agencies (e.g., the U.S. Marshals Service and the Florida
|
|
Department of Law Enforcement) report that they try to determine if an
|
|
item will be a financial liability prior to deciding whether to seize
|
|
|
|
|
|
it. In fact, the Marshals Service participates with the local U.S.
|
|
AttorneyUs Office and the investigating federal agency in a "pre-seizure
|
|
planning" process to avoid having to assume responsibility for high
|
|
financial liability items.
|
|
|
|
Storing conveyances (including planes, boats and automobiles) often
|
|
requires an enclosed space to preserve the items in optimum condition.
|
|
This requires either owning or renting storage space. Often the dollar
|
|
value of the conveyance will determine how it is held in storageQfor
|
|
example, a Rolls Royce in good condition warrants an enclosed storage
|
|
facility, while an old model automobile in poor condition could be
|
|
stored in an open-fenced area. Broward County processes older and less
|
|
valuable cars (with book values of $500 to $1000) by allowing owners to
|
|
repossess them for a fee of $250 to cover the agencyUs legal costs. Ft.
|
|
Lauderdale places a $250 service charge on seized rental cars, or those
|
|
with legitimate liens.
|
|
|
|
In addition to storage, mechanical maintenance must be provided, and
|
|
that requires either using staff skills within the agency or hiring
|
|
qualified contractors. If a conveyance such as a boat or plane is
|
|
expected to be stored for an extended period, experienced mechanics must
|
|
be hired to specially prepare ("pickle") the engine and other mechanical
|
|
parts for long-term storage.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Autos are comparatively simple to maintain, and some agencies use their
|
|
own people (in many cases sworn personnel) to handle servicing. In other
|
|
agencies, civilians assigned to city or county maintenance yards care
|
|
for cars. Planes and boats present a more difficult task, for their
|
|
maintenance requires much more technical knowledge and skill. Most
|
|
agencies that deal with planes and boats use contracted maintenance
|
|
servicesQexcept for Broward, which assigns the boats permanently to the
|
|
Marine Interdiction Unit of the Organized Crime Bureau. The planes are
|
|
assigned to their own Aviation Section.
|
|
|
|
Usually, the boats and planes are first stripped of valuable electronic
|
|
equipment. This is either used by the agency (for, in many cases, the
|
|
hardware is better and more sophisticated than the agencies current
|
|
equipment) or, in Florida, sold with the proceeds going into a Law
|
|
Enforcement Trust Fund (LETF). Every agency commented on the
|
|
extraordinary expense of maintaining boats and planes.
|
|
|
|
Seized cash is immediately placed in interest bearing accounts. In
|
|
Florida, upon receiving court approval through the receipt of title, the
|
|
account with the cash is transferred to the appropriate LETFQlocal or
|
|
state, depending upon the seizing agency. Ft. Lauderdale's arrangement
|
|
with a local bank and the state's attorney allows the bank to use its
|
|
|
|
|
|
machines to count and simultaneously photograph every bill, and then
|
|
deposit the funds in the agencyUs account.
|
|
|
|
Florida's Law Enforcement Trust Fund (LETF) program merits special
|
|
mention. Seized money and the proceeds from sales and auctions are
|
|
placed in such accounts, subject to certain state statutory provisions.
|
|
A local department must apply to the locally maintained Fund to use the
|
|
money; a state agency applies to the state fund. A request from a
|
|
particular division or bureau in a locality is passed through the chain
|
|
of command to the chiefs office and, if approved, is forwarded to the
|
|
respective city or county council for consideration. Ft. Lauderdale has
|
|
to submit monthly reports on all seizures and trust fund activity to the
|
|
city manager, and along with other Florida agencies, another complete
|
|
list to FDLE.
|
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As an example of concrete activity in Florida's trust fund program,
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Metro-Dade recently requested and received funds to rent a large airport
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|
hangar as an enclosed space for a large number of seized vehicles
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|
managed by the department. Previously, the vehicles were housed in an
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|
open-fenced lot. In addition, Ft. Lauderdale funds five staff positions
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out of this fund: an attorney, three forfeiture specialists, and a
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|
secretaryQall of whom work directly on forfeiture legal proceedings and
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|
the preservation and maintenance of seized assets.
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Most agencies use a combination of in-house expertise, such as sworn
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|
personnel who are pilots or auto mechanics, and hired consultants,
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|
including aircraft mechanics and marina staff, to manage the various
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|
types of conveyances seized. Following a competitive bidding process,
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|
the U.S. Customs Service hired a general management consultant who is
|
|
responsible for all custody, management and disposition of seized
|
|
conveyances. The general contractor is responsible for hiring
|
|
subcontractors to deal with specific mechanical and storage requirements
|
|
of seized assets.
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|
|
|
When businesses are seized, it must be determined whether to continue
|
|
operating the business or close down its activity. Experiences among
|
|
agencies has varied. Obviously, Broward County did not choose to
|
|
continue to operate a seized porno theatre, on the rare occasion when it
|
|
seized a business. If it is projected to be cost-effective to continue
|
|
operation of a seized business, the U.S. Marshals will employ a business
|
|
manager to oversee the business. The Florida Department of Law
|
|
Enforcement has never had occasion to continue operating any business
|
|
seized, and the U.S. Customs Service and local agencies usually avoid
|
|
seizing businesses.
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|
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|
When hiring consultants to appraise the value of a conveyance or a
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|
business, provide mechanical maintenance, store items or actually manage
|
|
a business, the seven agencies reported using a variety of methods to
|
|
locate reputable contractors. Typically, local trade associations and
|
|
professional groups are contacted for referrals, advertisements are
|
|
placed in appropriate trade journals and newspapers, and other law
|
|
enforcement agencies may be contacted for assistance. Metro-Dade uses
|
|
the countyUs current list of approved vendors. References are requested
|
|
and checked to assure that the contractors are competent and reputable.
|
|
The U.S. Marshals Service maintains a list of vendors in each of its
|
|
thirteen regional offices, while the other agencies surveyed stated that
|
|
they do not maintain approved lists but can easily retrieve the names of
|
|
reputable contractors with whom they have dealt in the past.
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|
|
|
Disposition Issues
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|
|
|
All agencies stated that they are allowed to convert seized equipment to
|
|
departmental use. Although a state or federal agency may on its own
|
|
decide to use a vehicle which has been seizedQusually in a district or
|
|
region outside the one where it was seizedQa local agency is more likely
|
|
to sell the seized vehicle. In Florida, an agency may in turn request
|
|
money from the Law Enforcement Trust Fund to purchase another needed
|
|
vehicle. By selling assets, a local agency avoids any appearance of
|
|
seizing an item specifically for agency use. Broward County has even
|
|
|
|
|
|
"traded" one piece of seized equipment for another. On one occasion,
|
|
because its regular radios did not have enough channels, the
|
|
|
|
and those of its membership to address law enforcement groups and to
|
|
make sure that those groups are familiar with all of the requirements of
|
|
the pertinent statutes. All agencies reported that, if at all possible,
|
|
each asset is evaluated before seizure to be sure that it actually
|
|
belongs to the suspect.
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|
|
|
The Marshals use a system of "pre-seizure planning," in which targeted
|
|
assets are evaluated to ascertain ownership and the existence of any
|
|
encumbrances or liens. The Marshals stated that they have had difficulty
|
|
with mortgage lenders and title insurance companies recognizing the
|
|
Marshal's title to a piece of seized real estate. Such companies are
|
|
concerned that owners may claim their constitutional rights have been
|
|
violated, and that the property is still theirs. For example, has a
|
|
fugitive received the notification required by law regarding the pending
|
|
disposition of his property?
|
|
|
|
The Marshals Service has never been sued directly, but they reported a
|
|
suit has been brought challenging the constitutionality of a particular
|
|
seizure. The Marshals also noted that they would hesitate to seize an
|
|
asset deemed a financial liability because of encumbrances or liens that
|
|
|
|
|
|
summed to an amount greater than the propertyUs assessed value.
|
|
|
|
Asset seizure and forfeiture lawsuits have focused almost exclusively on
|
|
the perceived slowness of the process for returning a seized asset to
|
|
the rightful owner. However, on the bright side, when jurisdictions have
|
|
been sued, their actions have been upheld in every case (such as Ft.
|
|
Lauderdale and Detroit).
|
|
|
|
With the reasonable burden of proof and the preponderance of the
|
|
evidence burden in civil cases, the above agencies reported few
|
|
reservations about pursuing a case or deciding to attempt the seizure.
|
|
After seizure, however, other troublesome situations may arise. Broward
|
|
wrestled with the problem of what to do with a load of maple wood that
|
|
was surrounded by a load of hashish. Could they donate it to a shelter
|
|
facility? They eventually destroyed it, feeling that they could not
|
|
justify returning it, or giving it away.
|
|
|
|
Resource Directory:
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|
|
Roster Of Persons Interviewed
|
|
|
|
1. U.S. Marshals Service
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Joseph Enders, Chief
|
|
Operations Support
|
|
(703) 285-1271
|
|
|
|
2. U.S. Customs Service
|
|
|
|
Gary George
|
|
Seized Property Officer
|
|
(202) 566-5435
|
|
|
|
3. Metro-Dade Police Department
|
|
|
|
Major Art Nehrbass
|
|
Executive Officer
|
|
Special Investigations Division
|
|
(305) 592-7323
|
|
|
|
George Aylesworth, Esq.
|
|
Supervisor
|
|
Police Legal Unit
|
|
(305) 547-7404
|
|
|
|
4. Ft. Lauderdale Police Department
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Robert Wennerholm, Esq.
|
|
Legal Advisor
|
|
(305) 761-5626
|
|
|
|
5. Broward County SheriffUs Department
|
|
|
|
Captain Carl Parrott
|
|
Assistant Commander
|
|
Organized Crime Unit
|
|
|
|
Commander William Dunman
|
|
Director
|
|
Organized Crime Centre
|
|
(305) 492-1810
|
|
|
|
6. Detroit Police Department
|
|
|
|
Inspector Terry Ford, Esq.
|
|
Director
|
|
Forfeiture Unit
|
|
(313) 224-4490
|