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[1] Forfeiture Info from BJA, IA
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Keywords: Bureau of Justice Assistance, Forfeiture
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Date: Thu May 06 20:05:24 MDT 1993
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Organization: Apple Computer Inc.
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Lines: 1009
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ASSET FORFEITURE
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Civil Forfeiture: Tracing the Proceeds of Narcotics Trafficing
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Prepared by:
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Police Executive Research Forum
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Michael Goldsmith
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November 1988
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Addendum Added January 1992
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U.S. Department of Justice
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Office of Justice Programs
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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U.S. Department of Justice
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William P. Barr.........................Attorney General
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Office of Justice Programs
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Jimmy Gurule............................Assistant Attorney General
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Gerald (Jerry) P. Regier................Acting Director
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Elliott A. Brown........................Deputy Director
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James C. Swain..........................Director, Policy Development
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and Management Division
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Curtis H. Straub, II....................Director, State and Local
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Assistance Division
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Pamela Swain............................Director, Discretionary Grant
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Programs Division
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William F. Powers Director..............Special Programs
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Division
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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633 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20531
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(202) 514 6278
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The Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, coordinates
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the activities of the following program Offices and Bureaus: Bureau of
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Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Institute of
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Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the
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Office for Victims of Crime.
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U.S. Department of Justice
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Office of Justice Programs
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Bureau of Justice Assistance
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Office of the Director Washington DC 25031
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Dear Colleague:
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Illicit drug traffic continues to flourish in every part of the country.
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The cash received by the traffickers is often converted to assets that
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can be used by drug dealers in ways that suit their individual tastes.
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Since 1981, federal authorities have increased their attack on these
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assets through both criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings with
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remarkable success. The recent passage and use of state asset forfeiture
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laws offers an excellent means for state and local jurisdictions to
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emulate the federal success.
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The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in the Office of Justice
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Programs, has funded a nationally focused technical assistance and
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training program to help state and local jurisdictions facilitate
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broader use of such laws. BJA selected the Police Executive Research
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Forum to develop and administer this program because of its history of
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involvement in practical problem-oriented research to improve police
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operations and the Forum's central role in developing training materials
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for use by police agencies and chief executives.
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As part of this project, the Forum has contracted with experts in the
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area of asset forfeiture and financial investigations to prepare a
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series of short manuals dealing with different concerns in the area of
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asset forfeiture. We hope these manuals help meet the rapidly unfolding
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needs of the law enforcement community as more and more agencies apply
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their own forfeiture laws and strive to learn from the successes and
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problems of their peers.
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I welcome hearing your comments about this program. We have this project
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so that most requests for information or assistance can be handled
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through the Forum staff in Washington, D.C., by calling 202/466-7820.
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Sincerely yours,
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Gerald (Jerry) P Regier
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Acting Director
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Table of Contents
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Civil Forfeiture: Tracing the Proceeds of Narcotics Trafficking
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The Advantages of Civil Forfeiture
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Standard and Procedures
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Common Evidentiary Factors
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Close Proximity
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Means of Support
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Concealment Efforts and Commingled Funds
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Pre-Trial Statements
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Narcotics Records
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Evasive Trial Testimony
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Net Worth Analysis
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Basic Net Worth Analysis
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Tax and Forfeiture Proceedings Distinguished
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Net Worth Forfeiture Cases
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Conclusion
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Endnotes
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1991 Addendum
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Proceeds Broadly Defined
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The Government's Burden of Proof
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General Evidentiary Principles
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Common Factors of Circumstantial Proof
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Conclusion
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Addendum Endnotes
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Civil Forfeiture: Tracing The Proceeds Of Narcotics Trafficking
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Asset forfeiture has recently become an important weapon in the fight
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against narcotics trafficking. This development was initially spurred by
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enactment of the RICO and CCE statutes statute in 1970.(1) Through this
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law, Congress sought to provide law enforcement with a way to disgorge
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criminal enterprises of their profits.(2) Significantly, by authorizing
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forfeiture as a criminal sanction applied directly against the
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perpetrator, RICO went well beyond traditional forfeiture statutes that
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merely allowed civil proceedings against contraband or property used
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during the commission of a crime.(3)
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In 1978, further expansion was achieved when Congress authorized civil
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forfeiture of any proceeds derived from narcotics trafficking in
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violation of federal law. By expanding the type of property subject to
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seizure, 21 U.S.C. Section 881(6) gave prosecutors their first effective
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civil mechanism for striking at the profits of narcotics trafficking.(4)
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State enactment of comparable provisions soon followed.(5) However,
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though federal officials have pursued this remedy aggressively,(6) its
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potential has not yet been realized by the states. Three factors may
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explain this phenomenon. First, federal forfeiture law is more favorable
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to prosecutors than most state statutes. Second, federal resources
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exceed state levels. Third, there is the perception that forfeiture of
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profits is often impractical because, absent a monetary seizure
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contemporaneous with a narcotics transaction, the targeted asset must be
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traced to narcotics trafficking.(7) Tracing is a complex process
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requiring adequate resources and legislative tools, as well as
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investigative creativity and diligence.
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Despite these limitations, however, tracing an asset to narcotics
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trafficking is not an insurmountable task. Federal courts have
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identified a number of factors that may be sufficient to achieve the
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required linkage. Though federal law is admittedly highly favorable, the
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factors themselves transcend federal grounds. They are equally
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applicable to state litigation. Moreover, relying upon analyses
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comparable to "net worth" proof used in tax litigation, imaginative
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investigators may be able to develop new avenues for attacking this
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problem. This paper will provide an overview of the legal principles
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that must be considered in achieving successful proceeds forfeitures. It
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consists of four sections. Section I will review the advantages of civil
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forfeiture in a tracing context. Section II will review federal
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standards and procedures, and contrast them with selected state
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statutes. Section III will set forth common evidentiary factors in
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tracing litigation. Finally, Section IV will summarize pertinent
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considerations derived from net worth litigation.
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The Advantages of Civil Forfeiture
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Although tracing is a complex process, prospects for successful
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forfeiture are eased considerably by the procedural benefits of civil
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process. The most obvious feature is the lower burden of proof
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confronting enforcement officials: proof by a preponderance of the
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evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.(8) Furthermore, under
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federal law and some state legislation, the burden of proof is placed on
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the claimant rather than the government.(9) Thus, enforcement officials
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need not achieve certainty in their tracing efforts. They need only
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satisfy a relaxed standard of proof This is an advantage of enormous
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consequence, as many cases turn on the burden of proof. Moreover, even
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if criminal prosecution was precluded by operation of the exclusionary
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rule, civil forfeiture may still be possible. Although the exclusionary
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rule applies to forfeiture proceedings, tainted evidence may still be
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sufficient to meet the lower burden of proof.(10) Indeed, civil
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forfeiture may be a viable option despite an acquittal on criminal
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charges.(11)
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The civil context provides other advantages as well. For example,
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prosecutors may resort to the discovery process to obtain information
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pertinent to tracing.(12) The claimant may be deposed and disclosure of
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his records compelled. Perjury and contempt sanctions are potentially
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available against untruthful or recalcitrant witnesses. And, while the
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Fifth Amendment may still be asserted, a civil claimant risks an adverse
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factual finding by doing so.(13) This possibility places the claimant in
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a particular bind if criminal charges against him are still pending.
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Asserting the Fifth Amendment may result in an adverse factual
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determination, while answering questions may have incriminating
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consequences in the criminal proceedings.(14) And, regardless of whether
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criminal charges are pending, discovery is likely to provide useful
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information for impeachment if the claimant testifies at the forfeiture
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proceeding. Such testimony will often be necessary because, once the
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government's evidentiary burden has been sustained, failure to provide
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responsive proof will result in an adverse judgment.(15) Often times,
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however, such testimony proves counterproductive because it is presented
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in an evasive or inconsistent manner.
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A civil claimant is also required to establish his standing to contest
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the forfeiture. Frequently, legal title to property will be in someone's
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name other than the real party at interest. Most courts will not permit
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forfeitures to be contested by such so-called straw men. Thus, before
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the prosecution must present its proof, the claimant must establish his
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standing. Normally, this requires proof of dominion and control beyond
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mere legal title.(16) Federal law and some state statutes require that
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this be initially accomplished by filing a verified claim.(17) In
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addition, some United States Attorneys offices routinely make standing a
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central discovery issue.(18) Thus, civil claimants are by no means
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assured automatic access to the courtroom.
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For these reasons, the civil claimant is in a very difficult position
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relative to his posture in a criminal trial. Indeed, notwithstanding
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tracing obstacles confronting the government, many cases are uncontested
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by potential claimants or otherwise lost on standing grounds.(19) This
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means that, even when tracing obstacles exist, forfeiture proceedings
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should be considered since the government may never be put to its proof.
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Standards and Procedures
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Federal standards and procedures are designed to facilitate the civil
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forfeiture of proceeds. 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(6) authorizes the
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forfeiture of "all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other
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things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
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exchange for a controlled substance... [and] all proceeds traceable to
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such an exchange..."(20) The term proceeds extends to interest,
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dividends, income, or property derived from the original trafficking
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profits. This broad scope is a consequence of the relation back theory:
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When a statute provides for civil forfeiture, the forfeiture takes place
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at the moment the property is used or generated illegally, unless the
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statute provides otherwise. At that moment, all rights and legal title
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to the property vest in the government and any subsequent transfer is of
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no effect. In the eyes of the law, the subsequent judicial proceedings
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merely confirm or perfect a forfeiture that has, in theory, already
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taken place. This is known [sic] as the "relation back" doctrine and it
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is one of the peculiar legal rules that makes civil forfeiture such an
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effective weapon against crime. Because the government's right to
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proceeds relates back to the time they are generated, it is legally
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entitled to all the gain thereafter accruing from the proceeds.
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Once the action has been brought, the government's burden is merely to
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establish probable cause to forfeit the property at issue.(22) Hearsay
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evidence may be used to meet this burden.(23) Moreover, the probable
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cause standard does not require any showing by a preponderance of the
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evidence. Instead, probable cause is flexibly defined as a "reasonable
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ground for belief...[that the property constitutes proceeds of narcotics
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trafficking], supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than
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mere suspicion."(24) There is no need to trace the proceeds to a
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particular narcotics transaction; it is enough if the proceeds can be
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linked to narcotics trafficking generally.(25) Once this initial burden
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has been satisfied, the burden shifts to the claimant who must establish
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his case by a preponderance of the evidence.(26) Should the claimant
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fail to present any evidence, the property will be forfeited.(27)
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Given this favorable climate, civil forfeitures have flourished
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federally. Two recent cases demonstrate this point. In the United States
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v. $33,000 United States Currency,(28) probable cause for forfeiture was
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satisfied by the following evidence: l) claimant's guilty plea to
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conspiracy to distribute marijuana and to evade taxes; 2) the seizure of
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$33,000 located in a brown paper bag in claimant's home; 3) the presence
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of drugs on the premises; and 4) claimant's lack of legitimate
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employment. Although claimant presented evidence that he had received
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$21,915.92 from the recent sale of a horse, the court fownd that his
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burden of proof had not been met because of his failure to explain his
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cash transactions at a time when he had no apparent source of
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income.(29)
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In United States v. Brock,(30) the government sought forfeiture of
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jewelry, valued at $120,000, which was found in a bag in claimant's
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attic. Despite the absence of any direct evidence connecting the jewelry
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with claimant's narcotics activity, the Court of Appeals concluded
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probable cause was present:
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The circumstances were sufficient to warrant a conclusion that there was
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no other way Brock could have acquired the jewelry than... by proceeds
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of the alleged narcotics violation. The jewelry was found secreted in
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the same house as the narcotics and paraphernalia for distribution of
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narcotics. In addition, a large quantity of cash and a loaded revolver,
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further suggestive of ongoing narcotics activity, were seized at the
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house. These circumstances fairly lead to an inference that the jewelry
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was the proceeds of narcotics activity... Circumstantial evidence and
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inferences therefrom are good grounds for a finding of probable cause in
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a forfeiture proceeding.
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The conclusion to forfeit the property was justified... [especially]
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given the evidence that the claimant had no source of legitimate income
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for several years preceding the seizure.(31)
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From these examples, it is apparent that forfeiture of proceeds is
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relatively easy to accomplish under federal law. Though state laws are
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usually not as prosecution oriented, they are still adequate. Three
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generalizations may be drawn from statutes in selected states.(32)
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First, some states have adopted the federal approach to civil
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forfeiture. In Arizona, for example, the law requires prosecutors to
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establish probable cause for forfeiture; once this standard has been
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met, the claimant has the burden of proof.(33) Similar rules may apply
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in Florida, though principally because of judicial interpretation rather
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than explicit statutory mandate.(34) Moreover, even in jurisdictions not
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adopting the federal model, federal cases are still valuable persuasive
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authority.
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Second, although the federal probable cause standard is especially
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attractive to prosecutors, the traditional preponderance of the evidence
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burden is not substantially more difficult to meet. Fortunately, state
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courts have not raised the civil forfeiture standard to proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt.(35) In addition, most state laws place the burden of
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proof on the claimant to establish any available statutory
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exemptions.(36) Such exemptions, however, rarely raise tracing issues.
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Third, many state statutes estab,ish presumptions providing that money
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or negotiable instruments found in "close proximity" to contro,led
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substances are presumed to be forfeitable.(37) Though rebuttable, this
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presumption places the burden of proof on the claimant. Thus, in close
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proximity cases, state practice does not deviate significantly from
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federal practice. Predictably, most state civil forfeitures of proceeds
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have involved close proximity seizures. Though there have been numerous
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successes,(38) few reported state decisions have involved complex
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tracing efforts.(39) This suggests that state authorities are not
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attempting more difficult forfeitures. If this record is to improve,
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states must develop legally sufficient techniques for tracing proceeds
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in non-proximity situations. Fortunately, common evidentiary factors may
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be gleaned from well established federal jurisprudence.
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Common Evidentiary Factors
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The common perception is that tracing proceeds to narcotics trafficking
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necessarily involves a complex paper trail. On occasion, of course, that
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is exactly what is required. If so, investigators must be prepared to
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subpoena and analyze documents from a wide variety of institutions. In
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re Maria Familienstiftung v. United States,(40) for example, narcotics
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proceeds used to purchase real estate were traced through various
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domestic and foreign banks. This process involved subpoenaing documents
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from the banks and obtaining testimony from both bank employees and
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couriers used by the narcotics trafficker. In addition, the veil of
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various nominee corporations had to be pierced. Ultimately, the
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forfeiture was successful.(41) Similarly, in United States v. Banco
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Cafetero Panama,(42) extensive bank record analysis was necessary to
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track the flow of $3 million in narcotics proceeds through five bank
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accounts. Moreover, once traced, proceeds co-mingled with legitimate
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funds had to be distinguished.(43) Fortunately, the appellate court
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allowed the government the benefit of a favorable accounting procedure
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to facilitate this task.(44)
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The majority of reported proceeds decisions, however, have not required
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complex documents analysis. In large part, this may be explained by the
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judiciary's willingness to allow assets to be traced to narcotics
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trafficking generally rather than to a particular narcotics
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transaction.(45) A review of the cases establishes that tracing usually
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involves a few relatively simple factors. Although these factors are
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usually present in varying combinations, they are best examined in
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isolation. Accordingly, they are set forth separately below:
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Close Proximity
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Cases in which the targeted proceeds are found in close proximity to
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narcotics provide the easiest forfeiture setting. The Brock and $33, 000
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United States Currency decisions, supra, illustrate this point.(46)
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Means of Support
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Most cases involve an obvious discrepancy between the claimant's life-
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style and his apparent means of support. This category actually consists
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of a number of factors: a) strong evidence of narcotics trafficking; b)
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high expenditures, often in cash; and c) little or no legitimate source
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of income. Thus, for example, it is quite common for courts to stress
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that claimant's cash expenditwes far exceed his available income from
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legitimate employment. For example, in United States v. One 1990
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Chevrolet Blazer,(47) these factors plus evidence of efforts to conceal
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the purchase were sufficient to establish probable cause.(48) In United
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States v. Young(49) and United States v. Murillo,(50) evidence of
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defendants' narcotics trafficking, combined with tax returns, was
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sufficient for forfeiture of substantial assets in a criminal
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proceeding. Therefore, discrepant life-style factors are surely
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pertinent in any civil forfeiture proceeding. Cash expenditures, in
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particular, have proven to be extremely probative.(51) Furthermore, the
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claimant is in an obvious bind when he is unable to provide proof of
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legitimate employment. Note, however, that there must be evidence of
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narcotics trafficking. It obviously is not enough that the claimant was
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involved in criminality generally.
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Concealment Efforts and Commingled Funds
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A few courts have suggested that efforts to conceal ownership may be
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pertinent to forfeiture. This makes sense, since any person investing
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narcotics proceeds has a strong incentive to conceal their source. For
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example, in United States v. A Single Family Residence,(52) a probable
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cause factor cited by the Court was the trafficker's acknowledgment of
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having formed fictitious corporations to hide assets.(53) Similarly,
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concealment efforts were also mentioned by the court in Chevrolet
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Blazer, supra.(52) On occasion, concealment is accomplished by
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commingling narcotics proceeds with legitimate funds. Under such
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circumstances, forfeiture may be on a percentage basis.(55) When bank
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accounts are involved, at least one court has applied a different
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analysis. Banco Cafetero Panama, supra, permitted the government to
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maximize the proceeds subject to forfeiture by giving prosecutors the
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option of two accounting procedures: "drugs-in, last out" or "drugs-in,
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first-out."(56) The former may be preferred when the government seeks
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funds remaining in the account, while the latter may be preferred when
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the government seeks to forfeit an asset purchased with funds from the
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account.
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Pre-Trial Statements
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Many forfeiture decisions place heavy reliance on statements made by the
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claimant before trial. Generally, these are statements made to
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associates or to undercover agents during the investigative stage of the
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case. For example, in United States v. A Single Family Residence,(57)
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testimony from several co-conspirators established that the trafficker
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had told them narcotics proceeds had been used to buy the property.(58)
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Similar statement in United States v. Premises Known as 2639
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Meetinghouse established that narcotics proceeds had been invested in
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several bars.(59) And in United States v. All Funds,(60) the claimant
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confided to an undercover agent, posing as a bank officer, that 60 to 70
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percent of certain corporate deposits were narcotics proceeds. Such
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statements have also been obtained through nonconsensual electronic
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surveillance.(61) Finally, even evasive answers to questions concerning
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ownership of property have been cited as a factor in meeting the
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government's evidentiary burden.(62)
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Narcotics Records
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||
Although narcotics records are rarely located, they have provided a
|
||
useful way to establish a trafficker's profits. For example, in United
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States v. Lewis, entries in a drug ledger were persuasively correlated
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with currency deposits and expenditures on various homes.(63) Such
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||
records are also a valuable source of potential impeachment material.
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Evasive Trial Testimony
|
||
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||
A major factor in many forfeiture trials has been the weak testimony
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||
presented by the claimant. As previously stated, burden of proof
|
||
considerations effectively compel claimants to present some proof.(64)
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||
When they do so, however, the result is often detrimental to their
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||
interests. Technically, evasive or inconsistent testimony merely serves
|
||
to undercut the defendant's case, but its real impact implicitly
|
||
strengthens the government's position. For example, in United States v.
|
||
Yukon Delta Houseboat,(65) claimant testified that a loan was the source
|
||
of funds used to purchase property. The Court of Appeals, however,
|
||
doubted his credibility because his testimony at trial regarding the
|
||
details of that purported loan were in some respects inconsistent with
|
||
his prior deposition testimony. "Furthermore,... he never listed any...
|
||
Ioan... as a liability on [various credit] application."(66) Similarly,
|
||
|
||
|
||
in United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, the Court clearly
|
||
regarded claimant's testimony concerning the source of funds for payment
|
||
as a pure fable.(67)
|
||
|
||
Net Worth Analysis
|
||
|
||
The cases discussed in Section III demonstrate that forfeiture may be
|
||
accomplished without resort to complex financial analyses. Even so,
|
||
although many of those cases involved substantial proceeds, greater
|
||
success may require more sophisticated approaches. The logical next step
|
||
is a net worth analysis borrowed from criminal tax litigation. In
|
||
essence, this procedure seeks to establish that, an individual's
|
||
reported income from legitimate sources is inconsistent with either his
|
||
expenditures or his increased net worth during a designated time
|
||
period.(68) In criminal tax cases, this contrast establishes nonpayment
|
||
of income taxes. In narcotics cases, this procedure, combined with
|
||
evidence of narcotics trafficking, may be used to establish that assets
|
||
were acquired with trafficking proceeds. To appreciate the impact of
|
||
this analysis, three factors should be considered: l) the basics of net
|
||
worth analysis; 2) significant differences between tax and forfeiture
|
||
cases; and 3) the experience with net worth forfeiture cases.
|
||
|
||
Basic Net Worth Analysis
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
The complexities of net worth analysis are beyond the scope of this
|
||
paper. In essence, however, the procedure may be summarized as follows:
|
||
|
||
The Government makes out a prima facie case... if it establishes the
|
||
defendant's opening net worth... with reasonable certainty and then
|
||
shows increases in his net worth for each year in question which, added
|
||
to his nondeductible expenditures and excluding his known nontaxable
|
||
receipts for the year, exceed his reported taxable income by a
|
||
substantial amount.... The jury may infer that the defendant's excess
|
||
net worth increases represent unreported taxable income if the
|
||
Government either shows a likely source,... or negates all possible
|
||
nontaxable sources.(69)
|
||
|
||
The Supreme Court has legitimized this practice, provided that three
|
||
requirements are met: a) the opening net worth must be established with
|
||
reasonable certainty; b) reasonable explanations by the taxpayer
|
||
inconsistent with guilt must be negated; and c) the net worth increase
|
||
must be attributable to currently taxable income.(70) These requirements
|
||
cause substantial burdens for the government. For example, to establish
|
||
a defendant's opening net worth, an exhaustive investigation of
|
||
documents and witnesses must be undertaken.(71) In particular, the
|
||
investigation must be sufficiently thorough to negate the possibility of
|
||
|
||
|
||
a cash hoard defense in which the taxpayer maintains that substantial
|
||
cash reserves account for the appearance of increased net worth. This is
|
||
said to be the "most frequent challenge to the government's
|
||
computations..."(72) Thus, it is not uncommon for investigations to
|
||
consume many agents' time over several years.(73) As a result, this
|
||
procedure is saved for complex tax cases in which direct proof of guilt
|
||
is unavailable.
|
||
|
||
Tax and Forfeiture Proceedings Distinguished
|
||
|
||
Tax and forfeiture proceedings are similar in one critical respect. Each
|
||
requires the government to identify an asset or source of income.
|
||
Frequently, this item has been concealed in some manner. Fundamental
|
||
differences, however, make net worth procedure easier to apply in civil
|
||
forfeitures. The principal distinction is the civil nature of the
|
||
forfeiture proceeding. Because forfeitures are civil, the burden of
|
||
proof is not the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard."(74) This means
|
||
that opening net worth may be established with less certainty than in
|
||
criminal prosecutions. It also means that not every hypothesis
|
||
inconsistent with guilt need be negated. Ironically, since civil
|
||
discovery is available in forfeitures, it is also easier to meet the
|
||
requirements of a net worth case. The claimant, for example, may be
|
||
deposed and asked to state his net worth at particular time periods. He
|
||
|
||
|
||
may be compelled to produce supporting documentation. He may be asked to
|
||
account for any cash hoards, and to explain all sources of income.
|
||
Despite these obvious advantages, however, net worth theory has rarely
|
||
been applied to forfeitures.
|
||
|
||
Net Worth Forfeiture Cases
|
||
|
||
A review of federal and state decisions reveals only two cases that
|
||
explicitly apply to the net worth theory in this context. Other
|
||
decisions, however, have relied on informal variations of this doctrine
|
||
emphasizing the discrepancy between a claimant's life-style and his
|
||
apparent means of legitimate support. Examples of this approach have
|
||
already been supplied.(75) Another illustration, which comes a step
|
||
closer to using net worth analysis, is United States v. Four Parcels of
|
||
Real Estate.(76) Civil forfeiture was effected through the following
|
||
evidence: a) extensive evidence of claimant's cash expenditures on his
|
||
home; b) a tax return showing gross income in 1980 of $35,650; and c)
|
||
two financial statements, found during a search incident to arrest,
|
||
showing a net worth of $239,000 in 1981 and of $1,079,000 in 1983.
|
||
Apparently, no effort was made to comply with formal net worth
|
||
requirements, but probable cause was still found.
|
||
|
||
Given the government's probable cause burden in federal cases, it is
|
||
|
||
|
||
unlikely that complex net worth analysis will have to be used in that
|
||
context. Two criminal forfeiture cases, however, have used this method
|
||
successfully. In United States v. Harvey,(77) the government conducted
|
||
an in-depth analysis of defendant's records. The investigation included
|
||
records from his corporations, banks, real estate holdings, and tax
|
||
returns. Critical statements by the defendant were obtained through
|
||
nonconsensual electronic surveillance.(78) Based on this evidence,
|
||
prosecutors established at trial that the defendant had a zero net worth
|
||
in 1976, earned approximately $120,000 from legitimate sources between
|
||
1976 to 1982, and accumulated a net worth of $4.5 million during that
|
||
time period. This evidence was considered sufficient for a restraining
|
||
order holding the assets for trial. In reaching this decision, the judge
|
||
cited the government's use of net worth analysis which had been approved
|
||
in tax cases.(79) Because defendant Harvey never went to trial, however,
|
||
the net worth analysis was not tested again.
|
||
|
||
At this writing, United States v. Lewis(80) is the only reported
|
||
decision explicitly addressing the net worth doctrine in a forfeiture
|
||
setting. Although it stands alone, Lewis is very significant because it
|
||
was a criminal forfeiture. Since the government was able to use net
|
||
worth analysis successfully under the reasonable doubt standard, the
|
||
doctrine holds great potential for civil forfeitures operating under the
|
||
preponderance standard and liberal discovery rules. Moreover, Lewis is
|
||
|
||
|
||
significant because the court applied the net worth doctrine despite the
|
||
government's failure to establish the defendant's opening net worth. The
|
||
Court held that "where the government shows an accumulation of income
|
||
far beyond the defendant's legitimate means, an opening net worth figure
|
||
is not essential."(81)
|
||
|
||
Although this holding was limited to the "unique facts" involved,(82)
|
||
Lewis is potentially broadly applicable because its circumstances, in
|
||
fact, were hardly unique. Rather, the court stressed factors typical of
|
||
many narcotics investigations. First, consensually recorded tapes
|
||
revealed the defendant's statement refuting "the possibility of a
|
||
preexisting legitimate source for his remarkably high net worth."(83)
|
||
Second, the decision observed that "the government proved the existence
|
||
of a lucrative drug distribution enterprise over several years."(84)
|
||
Third, "the government's financial evidence was thorough; for the period
|
||
in question, the evidence [appeared] to foreclose all leads which might
|
||
have suggested other legitimate sources of income."(85) Accordingly,
|
||
Lewis provides an appropriate benchmark for considering future net worth
|
||
applications.(86)
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
|
||
Asset forfeiture continues to hold great potential for attacking large
|
||
|
||
|
||
scale narcotics trafficking. Using the benefits of civil discovery and a
|
||
lower burden of proof, law enforcement has an important opportunity to
|
||
strike at the profits generated by such criminality. Thus far, most
|
||
civil forfeitures have been accomplished by federal authorities.
|
||
Although federal law is admittedly preferable to most state statutes,
|
||
the states do have adequate legal tools to achieve comparable success.
|
||
Existing case law demonstrates that forfeitures can be accomplished
|
||
through modes of proof that are relatively straightforward. Beyond that,
|
||
net worth analysis may offer new means for reaching the proceeds of
|
||
complex narcotics enterprises.
|
||
|
||
Endnotes
|
||
|
||
1. 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq. (1976); 21 U.S.C. Section 848 (1983).
|
||
|
||
2. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27-28 (1983); S.
|
||
Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969).
|
||
|
||
For a historical overview of criminal and civil forfeiture doctrine see
|
||
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
|
||
Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1976); Maxeiner, Bane of
|
||
American Forfeiture Law Q Banished At Last?. 62 Cornell L. Rev. 768
|
||
(1977).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
4. Smith, Prosecution And Defense Of Forfeiture Cases 4-2 (1986)
|
||
[hereinafter cited as Smith, Forfeiture].
|
||
|
||
5. Citations to some pertinent state statutes are set forth infra notes
|
||
33, 36-37.
|
||
|
||
6. As recently as 1981, however, federal enforcement efforts were
|
||
severely criticized. See Asset Forfeiture Q a Seldom Used Tool In
|
||
Combatting Drug Trafficking (GAO April 1981).
|
||
|
||
7. See generally The National Governors' Association, Et Al., State Laws
|
||
And Procedures Affecting Drug Trafficking Control:A National Overview
|
||
73-77
|
||
|
||
8. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50(1914).
|
||
|
||
9. See infra notes 22-24, 33-35 and accompanying text.
|
||
|
||
10. See, e.g., United States v. $31,828,760 F.2d 228, 230 (8th Cir.
|
||
1985); United States v. Monkey, 725 F.2d 1007,1012 (5th Cir. 1984).
|
||
|
||
11. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
|
||
|
||
|
||
360 (1983); United States v. Fifty Thousand Dollars, 757 F.2d 103,104
|
||
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse,
|
||
633 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (one of forfeiture claimants had
|
||
never been prosecuted).
|
||
|
||
12. SMITH, Forfeiture, supra note 4, at 10-3.
|
||
|
||
13. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). In United States
|
||
v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 629 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986),
|
||
Baxter was cited as permitting an adverse inference when a witness
|
||
asserted the Fifth Amendment in a civil deposition.
|
||
|
||
14. For this reason, claimants customarily request that civil
|
||
proceedings be stayed pending resolution of the criminal case. This
|
||
issue is discussed in Smith, Forfeiture, supra note 4, at 10-2.
|
||
|
||
15. See, e.g., United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625,
|
||
629-30 (11th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
16. See id., at 630; re Maria Familienstiftung v. United States, 643 F.
|
||
Supp. 139, 145 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (citing other authority).
|
||
|
||
17. See, e.g., Smith, Forfeiture, supra note 4, at 9-62; N.J. STAT. ANN.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Section 2C:64-3(d) (West 1982).
|
||
|
||
18. Smith, Forfeiture, supra note 4, at 9-54.2. A further benefit of
|
||
civil forfeiture is the government's right to appeal. See id., at 11-26.
|
||
|
||
19. This is especially so when couriers have been intercepted. Under
|
||
such circumstances, the courier may not have the necessary legal
|
||
interest in the proceeds, and his employer is rarely inclined to risk
|
||
discovery by contesting the forfeiture. Id., at 420. In many instances,
|
||
all concerned deny ownership. Id., at 4-23. Consequently, default
|
||
judgments are quite common. Id., at 4-28.
|
||
|
||
20. The full text of section 881 is set forth in the appendix.
|
||
|
||
21. Smith, Forfeiture, supra note 4, at 434 to 4-35.
|
||
|
||
22. See, e.g., Unites States v. $41,305 in Currency, 802 F.2d 1339,1343
|
||
n.6 (11th Cir. 1986); Unites States v. $5,644,540 in Currency, 799 F.2d
|
||
1357,1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
23. See, e.g., United States v. One 56 Foot Motor Yacht, 702 F.2d
|
||
1276,1282 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1964 Beechcraft, 691
|
||
F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1982).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
24. United States v. $250,000 in Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir.
|
||
1987); United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 628
|
||
(11th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
25. See, e.g., United States v. $4,255,625.39 in Currency, 762 F.2d 895,
|
||
904 (11th Cir. 1985); Unites States v. $13,000 in Currency, 733 F.2d
|
||
581, 585 (8th Cir. 1984).
|
||
|
||
26. See, e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d
|
||
1154,1160 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. $4,265,000 in Currency, 762
|
||
F.2d 895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing extensive authority).
|
||
|
||
27. See, e.g., United States v. $250, 000 in Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900
|
||
(1st Cir. 1987); United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d
|
||
625, 629-30 (11th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
28. 640 F. Supp. 899-900 (D. Md. 1986).
|
||
|
||
29. Id., at 900.
|
||
|
||
30. 747 F.2d 761, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
31. Id.
|
||
|
||
32. This project involved a survey of cases and statutes in the
|
||
following states: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
|
||
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. In addition, every
|
||
state was surveyed for cases involving net worth analysis or explicit
|
||
analysis focusing on the tracing concept. No traditional net worth case
|
||
was located. Pertinent state decisions are cited in the footnotes below.
|
||
|
||
33. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. Section 13-4305, 4311(H)(Supp. 1986).
|
||
|
||
34. In re Forfeiture of Approximately $48,900, 432 So. 2d 1382,1385
|
||
(Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1983)(noting legislative intent to conform to
|
||
federal law). This decision is potentially very important because
|
||
prosecutors won a favorable interpretation despite statutory language
|
||
which did not reflect the federal model. See also People v. Lot 23,Q
|
||
Colo.QP.2dQ(April 13,1987)(forfeiture under public nuisance statute;
|
||
holding that once the government establishes a prima facie case, burden
|
||
shifts to claimant and that claimant's failure to present evidence
|
||
mandates forfeiture).
|
||
|
||
35. See People v. Lot 23, 735 P.2d 184,188 (Colo. 1987); Commonwealth v.
|
||
$15,836.85QCash, 511 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT
|
||
|
||
|
||
ch. 56 v2 para. 1655(3)(b)(Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1986).
|
||
|
||
36. See FLA. STAT. ANN. Section 893.10 (West 1976, Supp. 1987); GA. CODE
|
||
ANN. Section 16-13-50 (Supp. 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. Section 14.15(7531)
|
||
(1987 Supp.).
|
||
|
||
37. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 561/2 para. 1505(5) (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
|
||
1986); MICH STAT. ANN. Section 14.15(7521)(f)(Supp. 1987); PA. STAT.
|
||
ANN. tit. 35, Section 780-128(1)(iii)(Supp. 1986).
|
||
|
||
38. See, e.g., People v. Lot 23, 735 P.2d 184,189-91 (Colo. 1987)
|
||
(judicial inference). See also People v. Strong, 502 N.E.2d 744, 748-49
|
||
(Ill. App. 3rd Dist. 1986); Commonwealth v. $15,836.85QCash, 511 A.2d
|
||
871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
|
||
|
||
39. Two Pennsylvania decisions stand out as significant in this respect.
|
||
See Lappas v. Brown, 483 A.2d 979, 983-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (some
|
||
evaluation of bank records and claimant's reported source of legitimate
|
||
income); MI Grossman v. Commissioner of Police, 465 A.2d 1007,1009 (Pa.
|
||
Super. Ct. 1983) (detailed analysis of marijuana sales operation; issue
|
||
not addressed on appeal).
|
||
|
||
40. 643 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
41. Id., at 142-48.
|
||
|
||
42. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
43. Id., at 1157-59.
|
||
|
||
44. Id., at 1159-62.
|
||
|
||
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
|
||
|
||
46. See supra notes 28-31, and 37-38 and accompanying text.
|
||
|
||
47. 572 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
|
||
|
||
48. Id., at 995-96.
|
||
|
||
49. 745 F.2d 733, 745-46, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1984).
|
||
|
||
50. 709 F.2d 1298,1298-99 (9th Cir. 1983).
|
||
|
||
51. See generally United States v. Four Parcels of Real Estate, 647 F.
|
||
Supp. 1440 (N.D. Ala. 1986); United States v. One Plymouth Colt Vista,
|
||
|
||
|
||
644 F. Supp. 1546, 1549-50 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. One Chevy
|
||
Blazer, 572 F. Supp. 994, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
|
||
|
||
52. 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
53. Id., at 629.
|
||
|
||
54. 572 F. Supp. at 996. See also United States v. One 1980 Red Ferrari,
|
||
827 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1987) (fictitious name).
|
||
|
||
55. See United States v. Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse, 633 F.
|
||
Supp. g79, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
|
||
|
||
56. 797 F.2d at 1159.
|
||
|
||
57. 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986).
|
||
|
||
58. Id., at 629.
|
||
|
||
59. 633 F. Supp. 979, 983-85 (E.D. PA. 1986).
|
||
|
||
60. QF. Supp.Q (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Lexis Genfed Library).
|
||
61. See United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040,1090-91 (S.D. Fla.
|
||
|
||
|
||
1983).
|
||
|
||
62. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 568 F. Supp. 434, 436
|
||
(W.D. Ark. 1983).
|
||
|
||
63. 759 F.2d 1316,1330 (8th Cir. 1985).
|
||
|
||
64. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
|
||
|
||
65. 774 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985).
|
||
|
||
66. Id., at 1435.
|
||
|
||
67. 648 F. Supp. 436, 437-38 (D. Mass. 1986).
|
||
|
||
68. For an excellent review of net worth analysis, see U.S. Department
|
||
of Justice, Criminal Tax Manual Section 31 et seq. (1985) [hereinafter
|
||
cited as Criminal Tax Manual].
|
||
|
||
69. United States v. Sorentino, 726 F.2d 876, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1984).
|
||
|
||
70. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121,132-37 (1954).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
71. Criminal Tax Manual, supra note 68, at 31-17.
|
||
|
||
72. Id., at 31-26.
|
||
|
||
73. Id., at 31-19 et seq. (citing numerous examples).
|
||
|
||
74. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
|
||
|
||
75. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. In addition, a
|
||
substantial number of criminal casesQnot involving forfeitureQhave used
|
||
this method to corroborate criminality. See Nossen, "One-on one"
|
||
Uncorroborated Testimony: the Dilemma of Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys
|
||
and the Courts in Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Cases, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
|
||
1019 (1983) (containing numerous citations); R. Nossen, The Detection,
|
||
Investigation And Prosecution Of Financial Crimes (1982).
|
||
|
||
76. 647 F. Supp. 1440 (N.D. Ala. 1986); see also In re Coastal Seafood
|
||
Enterprises, 648 F. Supp 79 (D.S.C), aff'd without opinion, 823 F.2d 546
|
||
(4th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing discrepant expenditures); United States v.
|
||
Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232 (D. Md. 1987) (same); Lappas v.
|
||
Brown, 483 A.2d 979, 984 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1984).
|
||
|
||
77. 560 F. Supp. 1040,1090 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
78. Id., at 1090-91.
|
||
|
||
79. Id.
|
||
|
||
80. 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985).
|
||
|
||
81. Id., at 1327-28.
|
||
|
||
82. Id.
|
||
|
||
83. Id.
|
||
|
||
84. Id., at 1328.
|
||
|
||
85. Id.
|
||
|
||
86. Lewis also contains a useful review of the admissibility of
|
||
financial records to rebut net worth defenses. Id., at 1328-30.
|
||
|
||
ADDENDUM
|
||
|
||
Addendum Contents
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
I. Proceeds Broadly Defined
|
||
II. The Government's Burden of Proof
|
||
III. General Evidentiary Principles
|
||
IV. Common Factors of Circumstantial Proof
|
||
"Close Proximity"
|
||
Cash Hordes
|
||
Concealment Efforts and Commingled Funds
|
||
Extensive Cash Expenditures
|
||
Informal Net-Worth Analysis
|
||
Formal Net-Worth Analysis
|
||
Failure to Account for Income; Inherently Incredible Testimony and
|
||
Affirmative Misrepresentations
|
||
Proof of Narcotics Trafficking
|
||
Statements by Informants
|
||
Expert Opinions
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
Endnotes
|
||
|
||
Civil Forfeiture: Tracing the Proceeds of Narcotics Trafficking
|
||
|
||
In 1987, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) commissioned the Police
|
||
Executive Research Forum to prepare a monograph on an important aspect
|
||
|
||
|
||
of asset forfeiture: establishing the evidentiary link between narcotics
|
||
trafficking and the illicit proceeds generated by such activity.
|
||
Although Congress had authorized civil forfeiture of narcotics proceeds
|
||
almost a decade earlier, 21 U.S.C. $881(6) (1978), relatively few court
|
||
decisions had addressed the process by which the evidentiary connection
|
||
between narcotics trafficking and forfeitable proceeds could be
|
||
established. Nevertheless, the few available cases did suggest certain
|
||
principles as possible guidelines for law enforcement. The original
|
||
version of this monograph, published in 1988, set forth those guiding
|
||
principles.(1)
|
||
Since 1988, both federal and state authorities have intensified their
|
||
efforts to combat narcotics trafficking through civil forfeiture. As a
|
||
result, the case law on this subject has increased substantially. Recent
|
||
decisions have both confirmed the evidentiary principles identified in
|
||
the original monograph and articulated in more detail the standards for
|
||
tracing narcotics proceeds. Accordingly, it is appropriate to supplement
|
||
the original monograph with updated authority.
|
||
Because this monograph is designed as a supplement, it does not provide
|
||
general background on civil forfeiture. Instead, it summarizes the most
|
||
pertinent background materials. The reader is directed to the original
|
||
monograph for the remainder.
|
||
This monograph is organized in four sections. Section I addresses the
|
||
concept of "proceeds" within the meaning of the federal narcotics law on
|
||
|
||
|
||
civil forfeiture. Section II explains the operation and significance of
|
||
the burden of proof under the federal statute. Section III sets forth
|
||
general evidentiary principles, and section IV addresses common
|
||
evidentiary factors of circumstantial proof. Although the monograph
|
||
focuses on federal law, both the "proceeds" concept and the evidentiary
|
||
principles discussed readily apply to state forfeiture actions as well.
|
||
|
||
I. Proceeds Broadly Defined
|
||
|
||
21 U.S.C. $881(6) authorizes forfeiture of "all moneys, negotiable
|
||
instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended
|
||
to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance . .
|
||
. [and] all proceeds traceable to such an exchange . . ." [emphasis
|
||
added] Under the "relation back" doctrine, the government's interest in
|
||
these proceeds vests at the time of the illegal act; the forfeiture
|
||
proceeding merely perfects this interest. Consequently, courts interpret
|
||
the term "proceeds" to include derivative proceeds, such as interest,
|
||
dividends, income, or property derived from the original trafficking
|
||
activity.(2)
|
||
For example, in United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate,(3) narcotics
|
||
violators initially used their profits to buy property in North
|
||
Carolina. Later, they sold the property and used the proceeds to buy
|
||
real estate in Florida. The government obtained forfeiture of the
|
||
|
||
|
||
Florida property as derivative proceeds, thereby benefiting from
|
||
appreciation of the original investment.(4) Other decisions have
|
||
likewise taken an expansive view of the term "proceeds."(5) Moreover,
|
||
adding insult to injury, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that unsuccessful
|
||
claimants (property owners) may not deduct forfeiture losses on their
|
||
income tax returns.(6)
|
||
|
||
II. The Government's Burden of Proof
|
||
|
||
In $881 forfeiture cases, the government faces a minimal burden of
|
||
proof. It need establish only probable cause that the targeted property
|
||
is subject to forfeiture. Moreover, probable cause is defined flexibly
|
||
in this context; the evidence need furnish only a "reasonable ground for
|
||
belief . . . [that the property constitutes narcotics proceeds],
|
||
supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere
|
||
suspicion."(7) This burden may be met with hearsay evidence.(8) In
|
||
addition, the proceeds need not be linked to a particular narcotics
|
||
transaction, but only to narcotics trafficking generally.(9)
|
||
Once the government meets its burden of proof and goes forward, the
|
||
burden shifts to the claimant, who must establish his or her case by a
|
||
preponderance of the evidence.(10) Failure by the claimant to make out a
|
||
prima facie case will result in summary judgment for the government (at
|
||
the pretrial motion stage) or in a directed verdict (at the trial
|
||
|
||
|
||
stage). Most cases are decided by summary judgment because most
|
||
claimants are unable to present enough evidence even to raise a serious
|
||
factual issue. Thus, "a showing of probable cause alone will support a
|
||
judgment of forfeiture."(11)
|
||
|
||
III. General Evidentiary Principles
|
||
|
||
In general, the courts have allowed law enforcement considerable leeway
|
||
in making the connection between narcotics trafficking and illicit
|
||
proceeds. Perhaps the most significant factor in decisions granting
|
||
forfeiture has been the judiciary's repeated emphasis that
|
||
circumstantial evidence may provide an adequate basis for finding that
|
||
targeted assets represent narcotics proceeds. Thus, a "direct connection
|
||
between the property subject to seizure and the illegal activity that
|
||
renders the items forfeitable need not be shown in order to establish
|
||
probable cause.''(12) Given some prosecutors' initial reluctance to
|
||
apply forfeiture statutes aggressivelyQbecause of concern that illicit
|
||
assets could not be accurately identifiedQthe judiciary should be given
|
||
credit for applying evidentiary principles that do not make the tracing
|
||
process unduly rigid.
|
||
Recently, the courts have also stressed that determination of probable
|
||
cause should be made under a "totality of the circumstances" standard.
|
||
For example, in United States v. Thomas,(13) the Fourth Circuit reversed
|
||
|
||
|
||
a district court which, in denying forfeiture, had "consider[ed] . .
|
||
[the] evidence piecemeal rather than as parts of a total picture."(14)
|
||
For this reason, the Fourth Circuit observed: The government fairly
|
||
complains that the court engaged in a "divide and conquer" approach to
|
||
its case, one that required each item of evidence to establish probable
|
||
cause independently or be altogether disregarded. Parsing evidence in
|
||
isolation for a fatal flaw threatens to transform the standard of
|
||
"probable cause" into a steep threshold requirement that would impede
|
||
the operation of the forfeiture statutes.(15)
|
||
|
||
Similarly, in United States v. Parcels of Land (Laliberte),(16) the
|
||
First Circuit stated that "all that is required is that a court be able
|
||
to look at the 'aggregate' of the facts and find reasonable grounds to
|
||
believe that the property probably was derived from drug
|
||
transactions."(17)
|
||
In addition to indicating that evidence should be evaluated under a
|
||
"totality of the circumstances" test, the judiciary has identified
|
||
certain types of circumstantial evidence as especially probative in
|
||
forfeiture cases. The most convincing evidence generally reflects the
|
||
following factors: l) "close proximity" between asset and drugs; 2)
|
||
"cash hordes"; 3) concealment efforts and commingled funds; 4) extensive
|
||
cash expenditures; 5) informal net worth analysis; 6) formal net worth
|
||
analysis; 7) the claimant's failure to account for income; 8) proof of
|
||
|
||
|
||
narcotics trafficking 9) informant statements; and 10) expert opinions.
|
||
This evidence, which may appear in a wide variety of combinations
|
||
depending on the facts of the case, provides a viable basis for
|
||
establishing that targeted assets constitute narcotics proceeds. The
|
||
evidentiary factors are discussed in the next section.
|
||
End of article 19 (of 37)--what next? [npq]
|
||
|