mirror of
https://github.com/nhammer514/textfiles-politics.git
synced 2024-12-18 04:04:34 -05:00
546 lines
35 KiB
Plaintext
546 lines
35 KiB
Plaintext
<conspiracyFile>Article 6208 of alt.conspiracy:
|
||
Path: bilver!tarpit!peora!masscomp!usenet.coe.montana.edu!decwrl
|
||
!uunet!sun-barr!cronkite.Central.Sun.COM!jethro!finess.Corp.Sun.COM
|
||
!rburns
|
||
From: rburns@finess.Corp.Sun.COM (Randy Burns)
|
||
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
|
||
Subject: Nugan Hand Bank--More Grist for the Mill
|
||
Keywords: bank CIA corruption
|
||
Message-ID: <7691@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM>
|
||
Date: 13 Dec 91 <data type="time" timezone="GMT">23:08:26</data>
|
||
Sender: news@jethro.Corp.Sun.COM
|
||
Lines: 523
|
||
Article: "Crimes of Patriots," by Jonathan Kwitny
|
||
Date: 23 Jan 90 <data type="time" timezone="GMT">22:55:31</data>
|
||
By popular email demand: more Conspiracy basics, reproduced out of
|
||
further boredom from MOTHER JONES, Aug/Sept 1987.
|
||
Says MoJo:
|
||
Jonathan Kwitny is an investigative reporter for the WALL STREET
|
||
JOURNAL. This article is adapted from his book, THE CRIMES OF PATRIOTS:
|
||
A TRUE TALE OF DOPE, DIRTY MONEY, AND THE CIA (W.W. Norton & Co.).
|
||
Congressional hearings provide us with daily glimpses into a shadowy
|
||
world of arms dealers, middlemen, retired military officers, and spooks.
|
||
The details of secret arms shipments to Iran and money transfers to the
|
||
contras have provoked expressions of shock and outrage about the
|
||
"privatization" of foreign policy and the president's obsession with
|
||
covert activity, as if these were inventions of the Reagan
|
||
administration. They weren't.
|
||
The need, cited by the past eight presidents, to pursue a perpetual and
|
||
largely secret global war against an ever-expanding Soviet empire has
|
||
justified gross violations of American law for 40 years. What is new in
|
||
1987 is that a window suddenly has been opened on this shadow world
|
||
before the spooks who inhabit it could completely take over.
|
||
What we are seeing today is not an aberration; the aberration is only
|
||
that we are seeing it, and what we are seeing is still not most of it.
|
||
To fight their perpetual war, successive administrations have required
|
||
an army of men who live in a world of spying and secrecy. Wrapping
|
||
themselves in a cloak of patriotism, they have carried out unlawful acts
|
||
of violence against civilians in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many
|
||
soldiers in this shadow army also have stretched the cloak of patriotism
|
||
to cover criminal enterprises that turn a hefty profit. Indeed, "the
|
||
enterprise" that has been the focus of this summer's hearings, run by
|
||
Maj. Gen. Richard Secord and his partner, Albert Hakim, is now the
|
||
subject of a criminal investigation.
|
||
The subject of this story is another example of such an enterprise: the
|
||
Nugan Hand Bank -- a mammoth drug-financing, money laundering, tax-
|
||
evading, investor-fraud operation based in Sydney, Australia. Its
|
||
global operations, spanning six continents, involved enough U.S.
|
||
generals, admirals, CIA directors, and spooks to run a small war. Not
|
||
surprisingly, their activities brought them into contact with men of
|
||
similar military and intelligence backgrounds now facing possible
|
||
indictment for their roles in the Iran-contra affair.
|
||
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
|
||
Crimes of Patriots
|
||
by
|
||
Jonathan Kwitny
|
||
The cold war strayed into Lithgow, Australia, one Sunday morning in a
|
||
Mercedes Benz. Sgt. Neville Brown of the Lithgow Police recorded the
|
||
time as 4 A.M., January 27, 1980. "I was patrolling the Great Western
|
||
Highway south of Bowenfels with Constable First Class Cross," Sergeant
|
||
Brown said. "We saw a 1977 Mercedes sedan parked on the south side of
|
||
the old highway known as '40 Bends.'" It was now three months later,
|
||
and Sergeant Brown was testifying on the first day of a week-long
|
||
inquest at the Lithgow courthouse. Lithgow, a settlement about 90 miles
|
||
inland of Sydney, had been of little previous significance to Western
|
||
Civilization. Consequently, Sergeant Brown was unused to the reporters
|
||
in the courtroom and the television cameras outside. But he maintained
|
||
his official poise under the stern questioning of the big-city lawyers.
|
||
The two officers approached the unfamiliar Mercedes stranded on the old
|
||
two-lane road. "A male person was sitting slumped over toward the
|
||
center of the vehicle," Brown testified. "A .30-caliber rifle was held
|
||
by him, the butt resting in the passenger-side floor well. His left
|
||
hand held the barrel, three or four inches from the muzzle and near the
|
||
right side of his head. His right rested on the trigger."
|
||
Frank Nugan, the autopsy concluded, died of a single gunshot wound.
|
||
Given the moat of undisturbed gore that surrounded his body, there
|
||
seemed to be no way that someone else could have gotten into his car,
|
||
killed him, and left. The facts all pointed to suicide -- a scenario the
|
||
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency would be able to live with. Other
|
||
aspects of Sergeant Brown's testimony, however, were much more
|
||
disturbing to the CIA and others.
|
||
For example, a typed list was found in Nugan's briefcase, containing
|
||
scores of names of prominent Australian political, sports, and business
|
||
personalities. Next to the names were handwritten dollar amounts,
|
||
mostly five- and six-figure sums. Were they the names of debtors?
|
||
Creditors? No one knew yet.
|
||
Sergeant Brown also testified that a calling card was in the wallet
|
||
found in Nugan's right rear pocket. It bore the name of William E.
|
||
Colby, a former CIA director and now a private consultant. Written on
|
||
the back of the card was "what could have been the projected movements
|
||
of someone or other," Brown testified: "From Jan. 27 to Feb. 8, Hong
|
||
Kong at the Mandarin Hotel. 29th Feb.-8th March, Singapore." William
|
||
Colby was in those places at roughly those times.
|
||
Probably the most sensational testimony at the inquest came from Michael
|
||
Hand, Nugan's American partner. Hand identified himself to the court as
|
||
chair-man, chief executive, and <data type="percent" unit="%">50%</data> shareholder of Nugan Hand
|
||
Ltd., "the major operating company of a worldwide group of companies
|
||
with offices throughout the world." Most people still referred to the
|
||
company by the name of its most prominent subsidiary, the Nugan Hand
|
||
Bank.
|
||
Hand's exploits had little to do with banking. A highly decorated
|
||
member of the Green Berets in Vietnam, he went on to become a contract
|
||
agent for the CIA in Vietnam and Laos, training hill tribesmen for
|
||
combat and working closely with the CIA's Air America to see that the
|
||
tribesmen were supplied. Bill Colby had run the program. In 1967 Hand
|
||
migrated to Australia.
|
||
How Michael Hand, just coming off active duty as a U.S. intelligence
|
||
operative in Southeast Asia, happened to hook up with Frank Nugan -- a
|
||
local lawyer and playboy heir to a modest food-processing fortune -- is
|
||
still a mystery. Asked under oath at the inquest, Hand said he couldn't
|
||
remember.
|
||
Although Hand's CIA ties had helped lure the reporters to the courtroom,
|
||
thousands of people were interested in his testimony for other reasons.
|
||
They, or their families or their companies, had money invested with
|
||
Nugan Hand. For weeks now, the bank's officers had stalled off
|
||
inquiries from the panicky investors. Finally, from the witness stand,
|
||
Hand let loose the bad news: the company would not be able to pay its
|
||
depositors. Even "secured" deposits would not be paid, since the bonds
|
||
"securing" them were phony. Indeed, Nugan Hand couldn't even pay its
|
||
rent. "The company is insolvent," said Hand.
|
||
Nugan Hand's unpayable claims amounted to some $50000000. Many more
|
||
lost deposits never were claimed for one simple reason: the money had
|
||
been illegal to begin with -- tax cheating or dope payments or the
|
||
wealth of a few Third World potentates. Not money the losers would want
|
||
to account for in open court. The grand total easily could have been in
|
||
the hundreds of millions of dollars.
|
||
One might expect that the police, faced with the mysterious death of the
|
||
head of a large international bank, would take steps to seal off his
|
||
house and office. In the days after Frank Nugan's death, however, the
|
||
police stayed conveniently away, while the company's files were packed
|
||
in cartons, sorted, or fed to a shredder. Present for the ransacking
|
||
was a team of former U.S. military operatives in Southeast Asia, led by
|
||
CIA veteran Michael Hand, and including the president of the Nugan Hand
|
||
Bank, Rear Adm. Earl F. ("Buddy") Yates, and the mysterious puppetmaster
|
||
of Nugan Hand, Maurice ("Bernie") Houghton.
|
||
Prior to becoming president of Nugan Hand Bank in 1977, Admiral Yates, A
|
||
Legion of Honor winner in Vietnam, commanded the aircraft carrier USS
|
||
JOHN F. KENNEDY and served as chief of staff for plans and policy of the
|
||
U.S. Pacific Command. He retired from active service in 1974. Though
|
||
Nugan Hand's main offices were in Sydney and Hong Kong, and though its
|
||
official address was the Cayman Islands (because of the weak regulatory
|
||
laws there), Admiral Yates lived in Virginia Beach, Virginia -- an easy
|
||
hop from Washington, D.C., where he helped maintain a Nugan Hand office.
|
||
Bernie Houghton, a fleshy, gray-haired Texan, had been a camp follower
|
||
of America's Asian wars, always as a civilian, after a few years in the
|
||
Army Air Corps in World War II. He had been to Korea and Vietnam and
|
||
had made a living buying and selling war surplus and supplying the
|
||
"recreational" needs of GIs. Houghton arrived in Australia in January
|
||
1967, eight months before Michael Hand, where he opened the Bourbon and
|
||
Beefsteak Restaurant, the Texas Tavern, and Harpoon Harry's. All three
|
||
establishments, on the seamy side of Sydney, catered to U.S. troops on
|
||
leave from Vietnam.
|
||
Though ostensibly occupied only as a hony-tonk bar impresario, Houghton
|
||
displayed a smooth working relationship with high-ranking military
|
||
officers and CIA and U.S. embassy personnel. Houghton's international
|
||
travels were facilitated whenever he was needed by Australia's secret
|
||
scrutiny agency, ASIO, which also gave him security clearance in 1969.
|
||
Other high-level retired Pentagon and CIA officials associated with
|
||
Nugan Hand included three-star Gen. LeRoy J. Manor, former chief of
|
||
staff for the entire U.S. Pacific Command, who headed the bank's
|
||
Philippine operation; Gen. Edwin Black, former high-ranking intelligence
|
||
official and assistant Army chief of staff for the Pacific, who headed
|
||
the bank's Hawaii office; Gen. Erle Cocke, Jr., former national
|
||
commander of the American Legion, whose consulting office served as
|
||
Nugan Hand's Washington office; Walter McDonald, former deputy director
|
||
of the CIA, who devoted most of his consulting business to Nugan Hand;
|
||
and several top former CIA field men. William Colby, former director of
|
||
the CIA, was the bank's lawyer on a variety of matters.
|
||
Perhaps Nugan Hand Bank's most brazen fraud was the theft of at least $5000000
|
||
, maybe more than $10000000, from American civilian and
|
||
military personnel in Saudi Arabia. The man in charge of Nugan Hand's
|
||
Saudi operations was Bernie Houghton, the barkeep with high-level ties
|
||
to U.S. and Australian intelligence.
|
||
It was 1979, the year of OPEC's highest oil prices ever, and Saudi
|
||
Arabia was awash with money. Whole new cities were planned, and
|
||
thousands of American professionals and managers were arriving to
|
||
supervise the hundreds of thousands of newly arriving Asian laborers.
|
||
To get their services, Saudi Arabia had to offer much higher salaries
|
||
than either the Americans or the Asians could earn back home. Most of
|
||
the Americans were going over for a couple of years, braced to suffer
|
||
the isolated, liquorless, sexless Muslim austerity in exchange for the
|
||
big nest eggs they would have when they returned home.
|
||
When they got to Saudi Arabia they faced a problem, however. Every week
|
||
or two they got paid in cash, American or Saudi. And because Muslim law
|
||
forbids the paying or collecting of interest, there were no banks in the
|
||
Western sense of the word. So what to do with all that money?
|
||
A claim letter from Tom Rahill, an American working Dhahran, Saudi
|
||
Arabia, described how the operation worked: "Mr. Houghton's
|
||
representatives would visit Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company)
|
||
construction camps in Saudi Arabia shortly after each payday. We
|
||
'investors' would turn over Saudi riyals to be converted at the
|
||
prevailing dollar exchange rate, and receive a Nugan Hand dollar
|
||
certificate...The moneys, we were told, were to be deposited in the
|
||
Nugan Hand Hong Kong branch for investments in various 'secured'
|
||
government bonds." Another claim letter, from a group of 70 American
|
||
workers in Saudi Arabia (who among them lost $1500000), says that
|
||
was their understanding as well.
|
||
According to investors, Aramco, Bechtel, and other large U.S. concerns
|
||
boosted the Nugan Hand connection by letting salesmen hold meetings on
|
||
company property and use company bulletin boards. Bernie Houghton "only
|
||
worked in cash," says Linda Geyer, who, along with her husband, a
|
||
plumber on a large construction project, invested and lost $41481 with
|
||
Nugan Hand. "One time he had to have two briefcases." Others remember
|
||
Houghton actually toting away the loot in big plastic bags, slung over
|
||
his shoulder like some reverse Santa Claus.
|
||
By his own admission, Houghton hauled off the intended savings not only
|
||
of private-contract American employees, but also of U.S. Air Force
|
||
personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the record shows that
|
||
Houghton quickly made contact with two colonels he'd known from Vietnam
|
||
War days. One of them, R. Marshall Inglebeck, "showed Mr. Houghton
|
||
around, introduced him, and explained that Mr. Houghton was a banker
|
||
looking for business for Nugan Hand Bank," according to Australian
|
||
investigators. The other was Col. Billy Prim, who served on Admiral
|
||
Yate's staff at the Pacific Command in Vietnam days and introduced
|
||
Houghton to Yates back then. It was at Colonel Prim's house in Hawaii
|
||
that Bernie Houghton would meet Maj. Gen. Richard Secord.
|
||
After word of Nugan Hand's collapse reached the Saudi press in 1980,
|
||
Houghton and some of his banking staff fled the country, several aboard
|
||
the last plane out before the Saudi police came searching for them.
|
||
Depositors say that when they went to the old Nugan Hand office after
|
||
that, they found it occupied and guarded by U.S. Air Force personnel,
|
||
who assured them that everything would be straightened out.
|
||
The claim letter from the 70 investors who lost $1500000 says, "We
|
||
were greatly influenced by the number of retired admirals, generals, and
|
||
colonels working for Nugan Hand."
|
||
One of the bigger mysteries surrounding Nugan Hand, the answer to which
|
||
may be almost self-evident, concerns its branch in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
|
||
(Indeed, Australian investigators reported that the idea for a Chiang
|
||
Mai branch was suggested to Michael Hand by Murray Stewart Riley, a
|
||
major Australian-U.S. drug trafficker now in prison in Australia.)
|
||
Chiang Mai is the colorful market center for the hill people of
|
||
northwest Thailand. Like few other cities on earth, it is known for one
|
||
thing. More than Detroit is known for cars, or Newcastle for coal, or
|
||
Cognac for brandy, Chiang Mai is known for dope. It is the last outpost
|
||
of civilization before one enters the law-unto-itself opium-growing
|
||
world of the Golden Triangle.
|
||
If it seems strange for a legitimate merchant bank to open an office in
|
||
Chiang Mai, consider this: the Chiang Mai Nugan Hand office was lodged
|
||
on the same floor, in what appears to be the same office suite, as the
|
||
United States Drug Enforcement Agency office. The offices shared a
|
||
common entrance and an internal connecting door between work areas. The
|
||
DEA receptionist answered Nugan Hand's phone and took messages when the
|
||
bank's representatives were out.
|
||
The DEA has provided no explanation for how this came about. Its
|
||
spokespeople in Washington have professed ignorance of the situation,
|
||
and DEA agents in the field have been prevented by the superiors from
|
||
discussing it with reporters.
|
||
The Drug Enforcement Agency has a history of working with the CIA at
|
||
home and abroad; with drug money corrupting the politics of many
|
||
countries, the two agencies' affairs are often intertwined. Was that
|
||
the case with the Nugan Hand office in Chiang Mai?
|
||
It was, according to Neil Evans, an Australian whom Michael Hand chose
|
||
as the bank's chief representative in town. In recent years Evans has
|
||
made daring statements to Australian investigators and television, and
|
||
to the CBS EVENING NEWS in the United States. Among other things, he
|
||
has said that Nugan Hand was an intermediary between the CIA and various
|
||
drug rings.
|
||
Much that Evans says appears kooky. He claims to have attended
|
||
important intelligence meetings in Hong Kong and Australia that he
|
||
probably didn't attend, though the meetings may have occurred. But much
|
||
else that he has said has proven to be true.
|
||
In Chiang Mai he was surrounded by people with long backgrounds in U.S.
|
||
intelligence who were working for Nugan Hand. They included Thais who
|
||
until recently had been working in professional or executive jobs at
|
||
U.S. bases or with a CIA airline, and Billy and Gordon Young, sons of
|
||
missionaries, who worked for the CIA during the Vietnam War and who now
|
||
have ties to a SOLDIER OF FORTUNE magazine project. And some very
|
||
wealthy people whom Evans claims to have taken deposits from agree they
|
||
talked often to him and were urged to make deposits.
|
||
There is little doubt that many millions of dollars in deposits from
|
||
numerous Thai citizens were taken out of Thailand; Nugan Hand's
|
||
surviving records establish that. The only question is: Who were the
|
||
depositors?
|
||
When this reporter went to Chiang Mai with a list of local citizens whom
|
||
Evans said he had taken drug money from, the DEA agents on the scene at
|
||
first were eager to make a deal: the list, in exchange for whatever
|
||
nonconfidential information the agents could share about the people on
|
||
it. The agents, all new since Nugan Hand days, went on about how
|
||
curious they had been since they'd arrived in town and heard stories
|
||
about the bank that used to operate across the reception room; they
|
||
wanted to hear more.
|
||
Suddenly a phone call came from an embassy official in Bangkok who
|
||
earlier had impeded my progress in every way possible (such as by
|
||
postponing issuance of standard credentials). The official ordered the
|
||
DEA agents not to talk to me. And that was that.
|
||
The U.S. government stonewalling on the Nugan Hand issue continued all
|
||
the way to Washington. At the Hong Kong office of U.S. Customs, the one
|
||
federal agency that acknowledges it looked even briefly into Nugan Hand,
|
||
senior investigator James Wilkie agreed to an interview. I was waved in
|
||
to find Wilkie seated behind a desk next to a shredding machine and a
|
||
large carton of papers bearing a red horizontal strip, outlining the
|
||
white letters C-L-A-S-S-I-F-I-E-D.
|
||
Wilkie was calmly feeding the documents into the shredder as he spoke,
|
||
taking each batch of shreddings out and putting them through a second
|
||
time.
|
||
"We can't comment on anything that's under investigation or might be
|
||
under investigation," he said.
|
||
Was Nugan Hand under investigation?
|
||
"There wasn't an investigation. We did make some inquiries. We can't
|
||
comment."
|
||
I asked what was being shredded.
|
||
"It's none of your business what's being shredded," Wilkie replied.
|
||
And that, as far as the American voter and taxpayer is concerned, may be
|
||
the whole problem.
|
||
From the time of Frank Nugan's death in 1980, through four wide-sweeping
|
||
investigations commissioned by the Australian government, the Nugan Hand
|
||
Bank scandal has rocked Australian politics and dominated its press. To
|
||
date, the investigations have revealed widespread dealings by Nugan Hand
|
||
with international heroin syndicates and evidence of mammoth fraud
|
||
against U.S. and foreign citizens. But many questions about the bank's
|
||
operations remain unanswered.
|
||
The law in Australia, and in most other countries where Nugan Hand
|
||
dealt, restricts the export of money. Michael Hand himself boasted that
|
||
Nugan Hand moved $1000000000 a year through its seemingly magical
|
||
windows. How could the Australian security agencies have let an
|
||
operation of that size break the exchange laws with impunity for so many
|
||
years -- unless, of course, the Australian agencies were cooperating
|
||
with the bank, or had been told that Nugan Hand had a powerful
|
||
government sanction from abroad?
|
||
The U.S. military officers who worked for Nugan Hand told Australian
|
||
investigators they were unaware of the bank's illicit activities. They
|
||
said they had been duped just like the depositors. [Ack! -jpg] But
|
||
could that level of stupidity be ascribed to high officials who only
|
||
recently were responsible for supervising BILLIONS of dollars in U.S.
|
||
taxpayer funds -- hundreds of thousands of troops and whole fleets of
|
||
aircraft and aircraft carriers -- who specialized in, of all things,
|
||
intelligence?
|
||
Or was it more likely that these men, at least most of them, weren't
|
||
thieves, and that there was some political motive behind their work?
|
||
The presence of former U.S. military and intelligence officers in Nugan
|
||
Hand's executive ranks raises obvious questions about the role of the
|
||
U.S. government. But the CIA, the FBI, and the U.S. Customs Service,
|
||
all of whom have information on Nugan Hand, have refused to release what
|
||
they know to Australian investigators. When an Australian newspaper,
|
||
the NATIONAL TIMES, petitioned the FBI for information on Nugan Hand
|
||
under the Freedom of Information Act, the newspaper was told that it
|
||
could only see 71 of some 151 pages of material in FBI files. When
|
||
these papers arrived they resembled a collection of Rorschach tests,
|
||
with page after page blacked out in heavy ink and bearing the notation
|
||
"B-1," indicating that disclosure would endanger U.S. "national defense
|
||
or foreign policy."
|
||
The fragmentary records left by Nugan Hand and the testimony of some
|
||
peripheral characters in this case suggest there was a political side to
|
||
much of the bank's business -- from negotiations with the Sultan of
|
||
Brunei about ways to protect the sultan's wealth in case of political
|
||
upheaval, to lengthy reports from Nugan Hand's Thai representative
|
||
describing Vietnamese troop movements and battle tactics in Cambodia.
|
||
Australia's Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking released a four-volume
|
||
report on Nugan Hand to Parliament in 1983, which determined that Nugan
|
||
Hand had participated in two U.S. government covert operations; the
|
||
sale of an electronic spy ship to Iran and weapons shipments to southern
|
||
Africa, probably to U.S.-backed forces in Angola.
|
||
Both the Iranian and African operations involved Edwin Wilson, a career
|
||
CIA officer, purportedly retired, who was then working as a civilian on
|
||
the staff of a supersecret Navy intelligence operation called Task Force
|
||
157. In 1983, Wilson began serving a 52-year sentence in federal prison
|
||
for supplying tons of plastic explosives, assassination gear, high-tech
|
||
weapons, and trained personnel to Libya. He is also the main link
|
||
between Nugan Hand and key figures in the Iran-contra affair.
|
||
The crowd around Edwin Wilson at the time of Frank Nugan's death in 1980
|
||
included Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, then involved in U.S. military sales
|
||
for the Pentagon worldwide; Thomas Clines, a high-ranking CIA official
|
||
who went on to run a business founded with Wilson money; Ted Shackley,
|
||
deputy chief of the CIA's clandestine services division until his ties
|
||
to Edwin Wilson led to his resignation; and Rafael ("Chi Chi") Quintero,
|
||
a Bay of Pigs veteran who was hired by Wilson in 1976 for an aborted
|
||
plot to assassinate a political opponent of Col. Muammar Qaddafi.
|
||
(Quintero says he backed out when he found out the assassinations were
|
||
not authorized by the CIA.)
|
||
All of these men would later resurface as players in the Iran-contra
|
||
mission: Richard Secord as the man who ran the operation for the White
|
||
House; Thomas Clines as Secord's chief aide; Ted Shackley as a
|
||
consultant to a company that subsequently was used to fund the contras;
|
||
and Chi Chi Quintero as one of the men who supervised the distribution
|
||
of arms shipments to the contras in Central America.
|
||
The 1983 Australian Joint Task Force report listed them all as people
|
||
whose "background is relevant to a proper understanding of the
|
||
activities of the Nugan Hand group and people associated with that
|
||
group." The ties between Wilson and his associates, on the one hand,
|
||
Nugan Hand, on the other, were many:
|
||
* Shortly after Ted Shackley retired from the CIA and went on to a
|
||
career in private business, he began meeting with Michael Hand, the
|
||
former Green Beret and CIA contract agent turned banker. Surviving
|
||
correspondence between the two men indicates that their relationship
|
||
was well established and friendly.
|
||
* Richard Secord told Australian investigators that he had met Bernie
|
||
Houghton in 1972 at the home of Colonel Prim. The task force
|
||
reported that they saw each other occasionally and socially in
|
||
Washington, D.C., Saudi Arabia, and the Netherlands throughout the
|
||
middle and late 1970s.
|
||
* In 1979 Secord introduced Houghton to Thomas Clines. The two men
|
||
then met repeatedly with Ted Shackley in Washington, which eventually
|
||
led to a deal to sell Philippine jeeps to Egypt. (About a year
|
||
later, in June, 1980, when criminal investigations into Nugan Hand
|
||
were getting under way in Australia, Thomas Clines traveled all the
|
||
way to Sydney to accompany Bernie Houghton on his hasty flight out of
|
||
Australia.)
|
||
* Bernie Houghton met repeatedly with Edwin Wilson during this period.
|
||
About the time of Frank Nugan's death, in January 1980, Thomas Clines
|
||
and Chi Chi Quintero dropped by Wilson's Geneva office. There they
|
||
found a travel bag full of documents left by Bernie Houghton.
|
||
According to task force witnesses, Richard Secord's name was
|
||
mentioned as they searched the bag and removed one document. "We've
|
||
got to keep Dick's name out of this," said Clines.
|
||
Several of the men associated with Edwin Wilson came close to federal
|
||
indictment in 1982 in a deal that brought in $71000000 in Defense
|
||
Department fees for delivering military equipment to Egypt. The
|
||
shipments were made by Clines's company and were overseen by Secord at
|
||
the Pentagon. According to Wilson, his bookkeeper-girlfriend, and a
|
||
female companion of Clines, profits were to be shared by Secord, Clines,
|
||
Shackley, Wilson, and another Pentagon official, Erich von Marbod. And
|
||
memos from Wilson's lawyer at the time -- first unearthed by Peter Maas
|
||
for his book MANHUNT -- say the profits were to be shared among a
|
||
corporation, apparently controlled by Wilson, and four U.S. citizens.
|
||
But federal prosecutors decided the word of these witnesses might fail
|
||
against the denials of senior Pentagon officials. Besides, the careers
|
||
of Secord and von Marbod seemed -- at least until the Iran-contra affair
|
||
-- to have been effectively derailed. Both had resigned from their
|
||
posts. So instead of indicting the individuals, the prosecutors
|
||
indicted only Clines's company, without saying who, besides Clines and
|
||
an Egyptian partner, were thought to be the other investors. (Secord,
|
||
Shackley, and von Marbod denied involvement in the company.)
|
||
Clines, on behalf of his company, pleaded guilty to submitting $8000000
|
||
in false expense vouchers to the Pentagon, and he and his
|
||
partner agreed to pay more than $3000000 in fines and reimbursements.
|
||
That, however, did not dissuade Richard Secord from hiring Clines as his
|
||
deputy in the Iran-contra operation.
|
||
Edwin Wilson, the man who unites all these figures, is the only one who
|
||
went to jail, along with a former assistant, Douglas Schlachter.
|
||
Schlachter agreed to testify about Wilson's dealings, served a brief
|
||
prison term, and then went into the federal witness protection program.
|
||
He also led the Australian Joint Task Force to information about Nugan
|
||
Hand's involvement in the two covert deals in Iran and Southern Africa.
|
||
Schlachter remembered meeting Secord's friend Bernie Houghton in
|
||
Wilson's Washington office with two career CIA officers around the time
|
||
of the spy ship sale. Immigration records show that Houghton then
|
||
traveled to Iran, in March 1975, apparently for the only time in his
|
||
life. And, according to the task force report, he was accompanied by "a
|
||
senior serving member of the U.S. Armed Forces." Immigration records
|
||
also show that Wilson traveled to Iran twice in subsequent months, once
|
||
stopping over first in Sydney. At the time of the spy ship sale, in
|
||
1975, the U.S. military program in Iran was being run by General Secord.
|
||
The Pentagon's reply to all this is simple and straightforward: "Any
|
||
sort of a sale of that sort would have been under the auspices of Naval
|
||
Intelligence Command, and, of course, their activities are classified,"
|
||
a spokesman says. And he won't comment further.
|
||
By 1975, Michael Hand was bored with banking. He told friends he wanted
|
||
to leave his desk and neckties behind for new challenges. He talked of
|
||
places where combat, which he dearly loved to reminisce about, was still
|
||
going on. He left Australia to go fight "communism" in Africa.
|
||
From South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Michael Hand telephoned
|
||
and telexed Nugan Hand's Sydney office with long lists of weapons
|
||
ranging from handguns to machine guns and mortars. A Nugan Hand staffer
|
||
was dispatched from Sydney to discuss these needs directly with Hand.
|
||
The timing of these activities coincides exactly with the CIA's raising
|
||
of arms and men on the black market for covert intervention in Angola's
|
||
civil war.
|
||
Meanwhile, Bernie Houghton held a series of meetings with Edwin Wilson
|
||
at Wilson's Washington office. Wilson then placed Nugan Hand's order
|
||
for 10000000 of rounds of ammunition and 3000 weapons. The weapons
|
||
were believed to have been shipped from Boston to a phony destination in
|
||
Portugal. (False documentation filed in Portugal was also used in the
|
||
Iran-contra arms shipments.) Ultimately, according to the task force
|
||
report, the shipment was probably received by Michael Hand in southern
|
||
Africa and then shipped to CIA- supported fighters in Angola.
|
||
The final judgment rendered by the task force shows some naivete about
|
||
how the CIA has actually conducted covert operations over the years.
|
||
"All things taken into account," the task force report states, "the
|
||
operation is considered likely to have been carried out as a result of
|
||
private entrepreneurial activity as opposed to one officially sanctioned
|
||
and executed by U.S. intelligence authorities."
|
||
For those who haven't paid much attention to CIA style over the years,
|
||
perhaps the main problem in understanding Nugan Hand has been this
|
||
seemingly analytical choice between "private entrepreneurial activity"
|
||
on the one hand and "officially sanctioned" activity on the other. In
|
||
fact, as the Iran-Contra operation clearly shows, the two have never
|
||
been clearly distinguished. In phrasing the choice, one may
|
||
inadvertently rule out what is really the most likely explanation.
|
||
It is possible, in fact customary, for a CIA-related business to be both
|
||
private and for-profit, and yet also have a close, mutually beneficial
|
||
relationship with the agency. The men running such a business are
|
||
employed exactly as if it were a private concern -- which it is. But
|
||
they may have been steered to their jobs by the CIA, and they never
|
||
forget the need to exchange favors.
|
||
According to Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer who coauthored a
|
||
best-selling book on the agency whose accuracy has never been
|
||
questioned, Nugan Hand seems to fall in the category of an independent
|
||
organization, closely allied with the CIA. "It doesn't seem to be a
|
||
proprietary in the full sense of the word, that is, owned and controlled
|
||
by the agency, nor does it seem to be a simple front organization. It
|
||
seems to be more of an independent organization with former CIA people
|
||
connected with it, and they're in business to make money, but because of
|
||
their close personal relationship with the agency, they will do favors
|
||
for the agency." These favors might include laundering money and
|
||
providing cover for agents, or for any highly secret activity the agency
|
||
is involved in but doesn't want to be connected to. The agency, in
|
||
turn, might use its influence to throw business the company's way, or to
|
||
offer the company protection from criminal investigation.
|
||
CIA men on covert missions do not identify themselves as such. But
|
||
those exposed to the culture of spying learn how to interpret the word
|
||
of members of the spying community, whether active or retired. They
|
||
know, as any Mafia member does, that the business of the organization
|
||
cannot always be identified by an official seal. But it can be
|
||
recognized nonetheless.
|
||
It is in this sense that one must judge what Nugan Hand was, and what
|
||
moral responsibility the United States government has for what Nugan
|
||
Hand did.
|
||
No one has been convicted of a crime for the Nugan Hand Bank's
|
||
activities. Frank Nugan died in his Mercedes -- although gossipy
|
||
newspapers, consumed by the scandal, would occasionally report that he'd
|
||
been spotted in far-flung places. Suspicion grew so wild that in
|
||
February 1981 Australian officials ordered Nugan's body exhumed, just to
|
||
put everyone's mind at ease. Michael Hand fled Australia in June 1980,
|
||
with a false passport and a fake beard, accompanied by another former
|
||
U.S. intelligence operative. His whereabouts are still unknown. Bernie
|
||
Houghton disappeared at roughly the same time (accompanied by Thomas
|
||
Clines). But unlike Hand, Houghton had done most of his stealing
|
||
outside Australia. Once it was clear that the investigations were
|
||
rather toothless, he returned there in October 1981, again as a barkeep,
|
||
with a few years of part-time banking in his past. Admiral Yates,
|
||
General Manor, and the other retired military officers stayed beyond the
|
||
reach of Australian authorities and have never testified under oath.
|
||
The legitimate security interests of the United States certainly require
|
||
a large and efficient intelligence operation. [snort -jpg] But the
|
||
people and organizations that make up what is called the intelligence
|
||
community in the U.S. government have gone far beyond the gathering of
|
||
intelligence. In many cases, the word *intelligence* has been used as a
|
||
cover for covert and unconstitutional acts of war and civil crime.
|
||
The public, here and abroad, knows it, and respect for law itself is
|
||
dissipated. Dope peddlers and weapons smugglers almost universally
|
||
claim to be working for the CIA, and many can prove they really are.
|
||
The connections have prevented prosecution even in cases where the
|
||
crimes themselves were never authorized, and law enforcement is confused
|
||
and corrupted.
|
||
When agents of the United States steal, when they get involved in drug
|
||
deals, how far should the patriotic cloak be granted by national policy
|
||
stretch to cover them? Does it cover an agent who lines his pockets in
|
||
side deals while working in the name of national security? What acts
|
||
lie beyond a presidential directive to do "whatever is necessary"? When
|
||
has license been granted, and when has it simply been taken?
|
||
What the Nugan Hand affair should have established, and what the Contra-
|
||
gate scandal makes even clearer, is that the license to commit crimes in
|
||
the name of national security has been granted too often and too
|
||
lightly. Without a recognition of this central fact, scandal will follow
|
||
scandal. The nation's moral capital will continue to be squandered. And
|
||
the country's real, legitimate security interests will be seriously and
|
||
repeatedly damaged by the twisted values of self-appointed "patriots."
|
||
</conspiracyFile> |