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478 lines
30 KiB
Plaintext
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Subject: the national guards (military consolidating control of info and comm)
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Keywords: we don't appreciate how quickly our society is being locked up.
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the U.S. military is the lens focusing the agendas of the corporate states
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of `murka. the following article is already four and a half YEARS old.
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this piece is staggering in its implications. the high-tech gulf war show
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provided us with just a hint of what is coming. you can be sure the progs
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described below have only become MUCH more endemic, *regardless* of the
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current "the cold war's over" mantra we are daily being subjected to. it
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certainly doesn't help to have a state press obediently parroting the latest
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official mythologies daily being dished up. so honestly, what's it going to
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take for people to stand up and put themselves on the line to stop this
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brand of spreading totalitarian democracy? their own complete enslavement?
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by that time it'll be just too damn late. (and people balk at the idea
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that Kennedy was killed by a military coup d'etat...) --ratitor
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excerpts from "THE NATIONAL GUARDS"
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(C) 1987 OMNI MAGAZINE, MAY 1987
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These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of
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scientists, researchers, the news media, and the public at large are a
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part of an alarming trend that has seen the military take an ever-
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increasing role in controlling the flow of information and
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communications through American society, a role traditionally -- and
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almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the approving gaze of
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the Reagan administration, Department of Defense (DoD) officials have
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quietly implemented a number of policies, decisions, and orders that
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give the military unprecedented control over both the content and
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public use of data and communications. . . .
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Mead Data Central -- which runs some of the nation's largest
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computer databases, such as Lexis and Nexis, and has nearly 200,000
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users -- says it has already been approached by a team of agents from
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the Air Force and officials from the CIA and the FBI who asked for the
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names of subscribers and inquired what Mead officials might do if
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information restrictions were imposed. In response to government
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pressure, Mead Data Central in effect censured itself. It purged all
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unclassified government-supplied technical data from its system and
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completely dropped the National Technical Information System from its
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database rather than risk a confrontation.
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Representative Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat who chairs the House
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Government Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of the NSA's
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role in restricting civilian information. He notes that in 1985 the
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NSA -- under the authority granted by NSDD 145 -- investigated a
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computer program that was widely used in both local and federal
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elections in 1984. The computer system was used to count more than one
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third of all votes cast in the United States. While probing the
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system's vulnerability to outside manipulation, the NSA obtained a
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detailed knowledge of that computer program. "In my view," Brooks
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says, "this is an unprecedented and ill-advised expansion of the
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military's influence in our society."
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========================================================
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ORIGIN: ParaNet Information Service BBS
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CONTRIBUTED TO PARANET BY: Donald Goldberg
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========================================================
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THE NATIONAL GUARDS
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(C) 1987 OMNI MAGAZINE, MAY 1987
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(Reprinted with permission and license to
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ParaNet Information Service and its affiliates.)
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By Donald Goldberg
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The mountains bend as the fjord and the sea beyond stretch out
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before the viewer's eyes. First over the water, then a sharp left
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turn, then a bank to the right between the peaks, and the secret naval
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base unfolds upon the screen.
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The scene is of a Soviet military installation on the Kola
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Peninsula in the icy Barents Sea, a place usually off-limits to the
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gaze of the Western world. It was captured by a small French satellite
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called SPOT Image, orbiting at an altitude of 517 miles above the
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hidden Russian outpost. On each of several passes -- made over a two-
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week period last fall -- the satellite's high-resolution lens took
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its pictures at a different angle; the images were then blended into a
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three-dimensional, computer-generated video. Buildings, docks,
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vessels, and details of the Arctic landscape are all clearly visible.
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Half a world away and thousands of feet under the sea, sparkling-
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clear images are being made of the ocean floor. Using the latest
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bathymetric technology and state-of-the-art systems known as Seam Beam
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and Hydrochart, researchers are for the first time assembling detailed
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underwater maps of the continental shelves and the depths of the
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world's oceans. These scenes of the sea are as sophisticated as the
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photographs taken from the satellite.
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From the three-dimensional images taken far above the earth to the
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charts of the bottom of the oceans, these photographic systems have
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three things in common: They both rely on the latest technology to
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create accurate pictures never dreamed of even 25 years ago; they are
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being made widely available by commercial, nongovernmental
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enterprises; and the Pentagon is trying desperately to keep them from
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the general public.
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In 1985 the Navy classified the underwater charts, making them
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available only to approved researchers whose needs are evaluated on a
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case-by-case basis. Under a 1984 law the military has been given a say
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in what cameras can be licensed to be used on American satellites; and
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officials have already announced they plan to limit the quality and
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resolution of photos made available. The National Security Agency
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(NSA) -- the secret arm of the Pentagon in charge of gathering
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electronic intelligence as well as protecting sensitive U.S.
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communications -- has defeated a move to keep it away from civilian
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and commercial computers and databases.
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That attitude has outraged those concerned with the military's
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increasing efforts to keep information not only from the public but
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from industry experts, scientists, and even other government officials
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as well. "That's like classifying a road map for fear of invasion,"
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says Paul Wolff, assistant administrator for the National Oceanic and
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Atmospheric Administration, of the attempted restrictions.
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These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of
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scientists, researchers, the news media, and the public at large are a
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part of an alarming trend that has seen the military take an ever-
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increasing role in controlling the flow of information and
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communications through American society, a role traditionally -- and
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almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the approving gaze of
|
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the Reagan administration, Department of Defense (DoD) officials have
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quietly implemented a number of policies, decisions, and orders that
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give the military unprecedented control over both the content and
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public use of data and communications. For example:
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* The Pentagon has created a new category of
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"sensitive" but unclassified information that allows
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it to keep from public access huge quantities of data
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that were once widely accessible.
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* Defense Department officials have attempted to
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rewrite key laws that spell out when the president can
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and cannot appropriate private communications
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facilities.
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* The Pentagon has installed a system that enables it
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to seize control of the nation's entire communications
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network -- the phone system, data transmissions, and
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satellite transmissions of all kinds -- in the event
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of what it deems a "national emergency." As yet there
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is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of
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what constitutes such a state. Usually such an
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emergency is restricted to times of natural disaster,
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war, or when national security is specifically
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threatened. Now the military has attempted to redefine
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emergency.
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The point man in the Pentagon's onslaught on communications is
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Assistant Defense Secretary Donald C. Latham, a former NSA deputy
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chief. Latham now heads up an interagency committee in charge of
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writing and implementing many of the policies that have put the
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military in charge of the flow of civilian information and
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communication. He is also the architect of National Security Decision
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Directive 145 (NSDD 145), signed by Defense Secretary Caspar
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Weinberger in 1984, which sets out the national policy on
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telecommunications and computer-systems security.
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First NSDD 145 set up a steering group of top-level administration
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officials. Their job is to recommend ways to protect information that
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is unclassified but has been designated sensitive. Such information
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is held not only by government agencies but by private companies as
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well. And last October the steering group issued a memorandum that
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defined sensitive information and gave federal agencies broad new
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powers to keep it from the public.
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According to Latham, this new category includes such data as all
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medical records on government databases -- from the files of the
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National Cancer Institute to information on every veteran who has ever
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applied for medical aid from the Veterans Administration -- and all
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the information on corporate and personal taxpayers in the Internal
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Revenue Service's computers. Even agricultural statistics, he argues,
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can be used by a foreign power against the United States.
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In his oversize yet Spartan Pentagon office, Latham cuts anything
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but an intimidating figure. Articulate and friendly, he could pass for
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a network anchorman or a television game show host. When asked how the
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government's new definition of sensitive information will be used, he
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defends the necessity for it and tries to put to rest concerns about a
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new restrictiveness.
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"The debate that somehow the DoD and NSA are going to monitor or
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get into private databases isn't the case at all," Latham insists.
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"The definition is just a guideline, just an advisory. It does not
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give the DoD the right to go into private records."
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Yet the Defense Department invoked the NSDD 145 guidelines when it
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told the information industry it intends to restrict the sale of data
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that are now unclassified and publicly available from privately owned
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computer systems. The excuse if offered was that these data often
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include technical information that might be valuable to a foreign
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adversary like the Soviet Union.
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Mead Data Central -- which runs some of the nation's largest
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computer databases, such as Lexis and Nexis, and has nearly 200,000
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users -- says it has already been approached by a team of agents from
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the Air Force and officials from the CIA and the FBI who asked for the
|
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names of subscribers and inquired what Mead officials might do if
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information restrictions were imposed. In response to government
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pressure, Mead Data Central in effect censured itself. It purged all
|
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unclassified government-supplied technical data from its system and
|
|
completely dropped the National Technical Information System from its
|
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database rather than risk a confrontation.
|
|
Representative Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat who chairs the House
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Government Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of the NSA's
|
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role in restricting civilian information. He notes that in 1985 the
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NSA -- under the authority granted by NSDD 145 -- investigated a
|
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computer program that was widely used in both local and federal
|
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elections in 1984. The computer system was used to count more than one
|
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third of all votes cast in the United States. While probing the
|
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system's vulnerability to outside manipulation, the NSA obtained a
|
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detailed knowledge of that computer program. "In my view," Brooks
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says, "this is an unprecedented and ill-advised expansion of the
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military's influence in our society."
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There are other NSA critics. "The computer systems used by counties
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to collect and process votes have nothing to do with national
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security, and I'm really concerned about the NSA's involvement," says
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Democratic congressman Dan Glickman of Kansas, chairman of the House
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science and technology subcommittee concerned with computer security.
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Also, under NSDD 145 the Pentagon has issued an order, virtually
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unknown to all but a few industry executives, that affects commercial
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communications satellites. The policy was made official by Defense
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Secretary Weinberger in June of 1985 and requires that all commercial
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satellite operators that carry such unclassified government data
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traffic as routine Pentagon supply information and payroll data (and
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that compete for lucrative government contracts) install costly
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protective systems on all satellites launched after 1990. The policy
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does not directly affect the data over satellite channels, but it does
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make the NSA privy to vital information about the essential signals
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needed to operate a satellite. With this information it could take
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control of any satellite it chooses.
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Latham insists this, too, is a voluntary policy and that only
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companies that wish to install protection will have their systems
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evaluated by the NSA. He also says industry officials are wholly
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behind the move, and argues that the protective systems are necessary.
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With just a few thousand dollars' worth of equipment, a disgruntled
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employee could interfere with a satellite's control signals and
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disable or even wipe out a hundred-million-dollar satellite carrying
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government information.
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At best, his comments are misleading. First, the policy is not
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voluntary. The NSA can cut off lucrative government contracts to
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companies that do not comply with the plan. The Pentagon alone spent
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more than a billion dollars leasing commercial satellite channels last
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year; that's a powerful incentive for business to cooperate.
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Second, the industry's support is anything but total. According to
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the minutes of one closed-door meeting between NSA officials -- along
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with representatives of other federal agencies -- and executives from
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AT&T, Comsat, GTE Sprint, and MCI, the executives neither supported
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the move nor believed it was necessary. The NSA defended the policy by
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arguing that a satellite could be held for ransom if the command and
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control links weren't protected. But experts at the meeting were
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skeptical.
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"Why is the threat limited to accessing the satellite rather than
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destroying it with lasers or high-powered signals?" one industry
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executive wanted to know.
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Most of the officials present objected to the high cost of
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protecting the satellites. According to a 1983 study made at the
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request of the Pentagon, the protection demanded by the NSA could add
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as much as $3 million to the price of a satellite and $1 million more
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to annual operating costs. Costs like these, they argue, could cripple
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a company competing against less expensive communications networks.
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Americans get much of their information through forms of electronic
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communications, from the telephone, television and radio, and
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information printed in many newspapers. Banks send important financial
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data, businesses their spreadsheets, and stockbrokers their investment
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portfolios, all over the same channels, from satellite signals to
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computer hookups carried on long distance telephone lines. To make
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sure that the federal government helped to promote and protect the
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efficient use of this advancing technology, Congress passed the
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massive Communications Act of of 1934. It outlined the role and laws
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of the communications structure in the United States.
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The powers of the president are set out in Section 606 of that law;
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basically it states that he has the authority to take control of any
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communications facilities that he believes "essential to the national
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defense." In the language of the trade this is known as a 606
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emergency.
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There have been a number of attempts in recent years by Defense
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Department officials to redefine what qualifies as a 606 emergency and
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make it easier for the military to take over national communications.
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In 1981 the Senate considered amendments to the 1934 act that would
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allow the president, on Defense Department recommendation, to require
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any communications company to provide services, facilities, or
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equipment "to promote the national defense and security or the
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emergency preparedness of the nation," even in peacetime and without a
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declared state of emergency. The general language had been drafted by
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Defense Department officials. (The bill failed to pass the House for
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unrelated reasons.)
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"I think it is quite clear that they have snuck in there some
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powers that are dangerous for us as a company and for the public at
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large," said MCI vice president Kenneth Cox before the Senate vote.
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Since President Reagan took office, the Pentagon has stepped up its
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efforts to rewrite the definition of national emergency and give the
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military expanded powers in the United States. "The declaration of
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'emergency' has always been vague," says one former administration
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official who left the government in 1982 after ten years in top policy
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posts. "Different presidents have invoked it differently. This
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administration would declare a convenient 'emergency.'" In other
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words, what is a nuisance to one administration might qualify as a
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burgeoning crisis to another. For example, the Reagan administration
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might decide that a series of protests on or near military bases
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constituted a national emergency.
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Should the Pentagon ever be given the green light, its base for
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taking over the nation's communications system would be a nondescript
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yellow brick building within the maze of high rises, government
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buildings, and apartment complexes that make up the Washington suburb
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of Arlington, Virginia. Headquartered in a dusty and aging structure
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surrounded by a barbed-wire fence is an obscure branch of the military
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known as the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). It does not have the
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spit and polish of the National Security Agency or the dozens of other
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government facilities that make up the nation's capital. But its lack
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of shine belies its critical mission: to make sure all of America's
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far-flung military units can communicate with one another. It is in
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certain ways the nerve center of our nation's defense system.
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On the second floor of the DCA's four-story headquarters is a new
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addition called the National Coordinating Center (NCC). Operated by
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the Pentagon, it is virtually unknown outside of a handful of industry
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and government officials. The NCC is staffed around the clock by
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representatives of a dozen of the nation's largest commercial
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communications companies -- the so-called "common carriers" --
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including AT&T, MCI, GTE, Comsat, and ITT. Also on hand are officials
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from the State Department, the CIA, the Federal Aviation
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Administration, and a number of other federal agencies. During a 606
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emergency the Pentagon can order the companies that make up the
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National Coordinating Center to turn over their satellite, fiberoptic,
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and land-line facilities to the government.
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On a long corridor in the front of the building is a series of
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offices, each outfitted with a private phone, a telex machine, and a
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combination safe. It's known as "logo row" because each office is
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occupied by an employee from one of the companies that staff the NCC
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and because their corporate logos hand on the wall outside. Each
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employee is on permanent standby, ready to activate his company's
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system should the Pentagon require it.
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The National Coordinating Center's mission is as grand as its title
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is obscure: to make available to the Defense Department all the
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facilities of the civilian communications network in this country --
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the phone lines, the long-distance satellite hookups, the data
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transmission lines -- in times of national emergency. If war breaks
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out and communications to a key military base are cut, the Pentagon
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wants to make sure that an alternate link can be set up as fast as
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possible. Company employees assigned to the center are on call 24
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hours a day; they wear beepers outside the office, and when on
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vacation they must be replaced by qualified colleagues.
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The center formally opened on New Year's Day, 1984, the same day Ma
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Bell's monopoly over the telephone network of the entire United States
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was finally broken. The timing was no coincidence. Pentagon officials
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had argued for years along with AT&T against the divestiture of Ma
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Bell, on grounds of national security. Defense Secretary Weinberger
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personally urged the attorney general to block the lawsuit that
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resulted in the breakup, as had his predecessor, Harold Brown. The
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reason was that rather than construct its own communications network,
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the Pentagon had come to rely extensively on the phone company. After
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the breakup the dependence continued. The Pentagon still used
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commercial companies to carry more than 90 percent of its
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communications within the continental United States.
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The 1984 divestiture put an end to AT&T's monopoly over the
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nation's telephone service and increased the Pentagon's obsession with
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having its own nerve center. Now the brass had to contend with several
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competing companies to acquire phone lines, and communications was
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more than a matter of running a line from one telephone to another.
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Satellites, microwave towers, fiberoptics, and other technological
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breakthroughs never dreamed of by Alexander Graham Bell were in
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extensive use, and not just for phone conversations. Digital data
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streams for computers flowed on the same networks.
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These facts were not lost on the Defense Department or the White
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House. According to documents obtained by "Omni," beginning on December
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14, 1982, a number of secret meetings were held between high-level
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administration officials and executives of the commercial
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communications companies whose employees would later staff the
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National Coordinating Center. The meetings, which continued over the
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next three years, were held at the White House, the State Department,
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the Strategic Air Command (SAC) headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base
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in Nebraska, and at the North American Aerospace Defense Command
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(NORAD) in Colorado Springs.
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The industry officials attending constituted the National Security
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Telecommunications Advisory Committee -- called NSTAC (pronounced N-
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stack) -- set up by President Reagan to address those same problems
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that worried the Pentagon. It was at these secret meetings, according
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to the minutes, that the idea of a communications watch center for
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national emergencies -- the NCC -- was born. Along with it came a
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whole set of plans that would allow the military to take over
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commercial communications "assets" -- everything from ground stations
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and satellite dishes to fiberoptic cables -- across the country.
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At a 1983 Federal Communications Commission meeting, a ranking
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Defense Department official offered the following explanation for the
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founding of the National Coordinating Center: "We are looking at
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trying to make communications endurable for a protracted conflict."
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The phrase protracted conflict is a military euphemism for nuclear
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war.
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But could the NCC survive even the first volley in such a conflict?
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Not likely. It's located within a mile of the Pentagon, itself an
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obvious early target of a Soviet nuclear barrage (or a conventional
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strike, for that matter). And the Kremlin undoubtedly knows its
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location and importance, and presumably has included it on its
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priority target list. In sum, according to one Pentagon official, "The
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NCC itself is not viewed as a survivable facility."
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Furthermore, the NCC's "Implementation Plan," obtained by "Omni,"
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lists four phases of emergencies and how the center should respond to
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each. The first, Phase 0, is Peacetime, for which there would be
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little to do outside of a handful of routine tasks and exercises.
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Phase 1 is Pre Attack, in which alternate NCC sites are alerted. Phase
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2 is Post Attack, in which other NCC locations are instructed to take
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over the center's functions. Phase 3 is known as Last Ditch, and in
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this phase whatever facility survives becomes the de facto NCC.
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So far there is no alternate National Coordinating Center to which
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NCC officials could retreat to survive an attack. According to NCC
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deputy director William Belford, no physical sites have yet been
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chosen for a substitute NCC, and even whether the NCC itself will
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survive a nuclear attack is still under study.
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Of what use is a communications center that is not expected to
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outlast even the first shots of a war and has no backup?
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The answer appears to be that because of the Pentagon's concerns
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about the AT&T divestiture and the disruptive effects it might have on
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national security, the NCC was to serve as the military's peacetime
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communications center.
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The center is a powerful and unprecedented tool to assume control
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over the nation's vast communications and information network. For
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years the Pentagon has been studying how to take over the common
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carriers' facilities. That research was prepared by NSTAC at the DoD's
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request and is contained in a series of internal Pentagon documents
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obtained by "Omni." Collectively this series is known as the Satellite
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Survivability Report. Completed in 1984, it is the only detailed
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analysis to date of the vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite
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network. It was begun as a way of examining how to protect the network
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of communications facilities from attack and how to keep it intact for
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the DoD.
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A major part of the report also contains an analysis of how to make
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commercial satellites "interoperable" with Defense Department systems.
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While the report notes that current technical differences such as
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varying frequencies make it difficult for the Pentagon to use
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commercial satellites, it recommends ways to resolve those problems.
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Much of the report is a veritable blueprint for the government on how
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to take over satellites in orbit above the United States. This
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information, plus NSDD 145's demand that satellite operators tell the
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NSA how their satellites are controlled, guarantees the military ample
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knowledge about operating commercial satellites.
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The Pentagon now has an unprecedented access to the civilian
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communications network: commercial databases, computer networks,
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electronic links, telephone lines. All it needs is the legal authority
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to use them. Then it could totally dominate the flow of all
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information in the United States. As one high-ranking White House
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communications official put it: "Whoever controls communications,
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controls the country." His remark was made after our State Department
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could not communicate directly with our embassy in Manila during the
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anti-Marcos revolution last year. To get through, the State
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Department had to relay all its messages through the Philippine
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government.
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Government officials have offered all kinds of scenarios to justify
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the National Coordinating Center, the Satellite Survivability Report,
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new domains of authority for the Pentagon and the NSA, and the
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creation of top-level government steering groups to think of even more
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policies for the military. Most can be reduced to the rationale that
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inspired NSDD 145: that our enemies (presumably the Soviets) have to
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be prevented from getting too much information from unclassified
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sources. And the only way to do that is to step in and take control of
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those sources.
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Remarkably, the communications industry as a whole has not been
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concerned about the overall scope of the Pentagon's threat to its
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freedom of operation. Most protests have been to individual government
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actions. For example, a media coalition that includes the Radio-
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Television Society of Newspaper Editors, and the Turner Broadcasting
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System has been lobbying that before the government can restrict the
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use of satellites, it must demonstrate why such restrictions protect
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against a "threat to distinct and compelling national security and
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foreign policy interests." But the whole policy of restrictiveness has
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not been examined. That may change sometime this year, when the Office
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of Technology Assessment issues a report on how the Pentagon's policy
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will affect communications in the United States. In the meantime the
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military keeps trying to encroach on national communications.
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While it may seem unlikely that the Pentagon will ever get total
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control of our information and communications systems, the truth is
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that it can happen all too easily. The official mechanisms are already
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in place; and few barriers remain to guarantee that what we hear, see,
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and read will come to us courtesy of our being members of a free and
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open society and not courtesy of the Pentagon.
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Black Crawling Systems @ V0iD Information Archives
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( 6 1 7 ) 4 8 2 - 6 3 5 6
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