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298 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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LIBERTYGATE
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It has been twenty-two years since the military forces of
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the State of Israel attacked the U.S.S. Liberty. It has
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been 43 years since Hitler's atrocities.
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If Congress can spend our money chasing senile Nazis, after
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all these years, it's about time they spend a little money
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investigating the Liberty coverup.
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The only way it will ever happen is if YOU write your
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representatives and insist on a full investigation.
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------------------------------------------------------------
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The following article appeared in *Defense Electronics*,
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October 1981.
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------------------------------------------------------------
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Editor's Note: This article is printed by *Defense
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Electronics* as an example of a direct attack on U.S. forces
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by a nation that has access to advanced western military
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equipment, and which is an ally. In light of the Libyan-U.S.
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air clash in August and the loss of advanced equipment in
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Iran, the danger of western technology being used against
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U.S. forces by a hostile Third World nation is apparent.
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This article is presented in unabridged form and represents
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only the views of its author.
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------------------------------------------------------------
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Part One
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Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Reveals Failure of C3
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By James M. Ennes, Jr., Deck Officer of the USS Liberty
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---------------------------------------------------------
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Fourteen years ago, the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli
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Warplanes and ships, resulting in the deaths of 34 Americans
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and the wounding of 171 others. The attack lasted 2 and 1/2
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hours and ended the Navy's program of dedicated electronic
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intelligence collection ships.
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---------------------------------------------------------
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Fourteen years ago, one of the most serious peacetime
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American naval disasters occurred, and perhaps the most
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serious since the sinking of the battleship *Maine* in 1898.
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But while every bright schoolchild remembers some details of
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the explosion that led to the Spanish-American War, hardly
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anyone can recall the attack on the USS Liberty in 1967,
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which cost the lives of 34 Americans, wounded 171 others,
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and brought a premature end to the Navy's program of
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dedicated electronic collection ships.
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The attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces on the
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fourth day of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War is not widely
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known because the facts are politically and diplomatically
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awkward. The truth about the attack includes evidence that
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this was a planned, carefully coordinated and deliberate
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attack by a friendly power upon a known American naval
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vessel, and a botched exercise of Command, Control, and
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Communications. But such knowledge is politically unwelcome
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in the United States, so the facts about the attack were
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witheld from the American people.
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In 1967, the US Navy operated a worldwide fleet of
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electronic intelligence collection ships under tasking from
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the Department of Defense. These consisted of United States
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Ships *Oxford*, *Georgetown*, and *Jamestown*, which
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operated on converted Liberty hulls; *Belmont* and
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*Liberty*, on Victory hulls; *Banner*, *Pueblo*, and *Palm
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Beach*, on converted 180-foot AKL hulls; and civilian-manned
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United States Naval Ships *Private Jose E. Valdez* and
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*Sergeant Joseph P. Muller*, on converted 338-foot T-AG
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hulls.
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In May 1967, as tension built rapidly toward what would soon
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become the "Six Day War," USS Liberty was diverted from her
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usual patrol area on the west coast of Africa to patrol a
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section of the Gaza Strip in the Eastern Mediterranean.
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The trip required 16 days of hard steaming, and when Liberty
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arrived at her assigned station, the war was four days old
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and almost over.
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I was Liberty's electronic materials officer. A 34-year-old
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former enlisted man, I took special pride in my Navy
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commission, my lieutenant's rank, and my specialty in
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cryptology. I was soon to be assigned officer of the deck
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for special sea detail and general quarters. And as the ship
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arrived on station 13 miles from the Israeli and Egyption
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coasts, I was to be officer of the deck for the forenoon
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watch.
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Throughout the Night
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The ship had been reconnoitered throughout the night by
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Israeli military aircraft. Well before midnight, Liberty's
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crytologic operators had detected fire control radar
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directed steadily at the ship by orbiting Israeli aircraft.
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But the supervisor on duty refused to believe that Israeli
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forces would direct fire control radar at an American ship,
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and so he insisted that the operators must have
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misinterpeted the signal. The signal went unreported.
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0700 Hours
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At about 0700, as I relieved the watch on the bridge, I was
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told that a "flying boxcar," later identified as an Israeli
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Nord 2501 Noratlas reconnaissance aircraft, had circled the
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ship from a distance at sunrise.
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I checked out colors, found them dirty and ragged after
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several days of high-speed steaming, and ordered them
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replaced. Two extra lookouts were stationed above the
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bridge, and I ordered them to keep an eye on the flag to
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assure that it never fouled.
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0900 Hours
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At 0900, the ship reached point "alfa," the northernmost
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point of our assigned patrol track. I turned south and
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slowed to five knots, and at that moment we were
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reconnoitered by a single jet aircraft. I immediately
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checked the flag and saw it clearly displayed in a good
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breeze. We were headed almost directly into a four-knot
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wind, giving us nine knots over the decks, which was more
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than enough to hold the flag aloft. For the next several
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hours, the wind increased steadily, reaching 12 knots over
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the deck before the ship came under attack.
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1000 Hours
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At about 1000, the ship was circled three times at low level
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by two armed Israeli Mirage jets, each carrying 18 rockets
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under each wing. One of the pilots was heard reporting by
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radio to Israeli headquarters that we were flying the
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American flag, but this was no news to the Israeli war room.
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Duty officers in the war room had identified the ship long
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before and had plotted her track on a large wall chart,
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along with her name, her top speed, and a reference to her
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intelligence mission. And according to several reports,
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Israel's immediate reaction to the ship's presence was to
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complain bitterly to the United States via the Central
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Intelligence Agency, demanding that the ship be moved.
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The United States made several serious, almost frantic
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attempts to move the ship. As the Liberty approached Gaza,
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff first sent a priority message
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ordering the ship to move 20 miles from the coast; the
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message was swamped by higher precedence traffic and was not
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processed until long after the crisis had ended. Hours
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later, a JCS duty officer phoned naval headquarters in
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London to relay an urgent JCS order to move the ship 100
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miles from the coast; the telephone call was ignored, and
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Liberty's copy of the confirming message was misrouted to
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the Philipines before being returned to the Pentagon, where
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it was again misrouted, this time to Fort Meade in Maryland,
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where it was lost.
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Eventually, at least six critical messages were lost,
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delayed, or otherwise mishandled. Any one of those messages
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might have saved Liberty. None reached the ship.
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During the next four hours, the ship was visited five more
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times by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft, usually flying at
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very low level, and always close enough that I could readily
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see the pilot. On one occasion, the captain was on the
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bridge when the Noratlas approached at masthead level,
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causing him to warn me of a posible bombing run; the
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aircraft passed overhead at such low level that the deck
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plating shook.
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The continued close surveillance was reassuring. Israel was
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an ally and, although several Arab states were then hostile
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toward the United States, Israel clearly dominated the sky,
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and we were comforted to be watched so closely, as this
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seemed to assure that there could be no mistakes.
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1400 Hours
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After being relieved of the watch at noon, I spent most of
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the noon hour on the bridge preparing for a general quarters
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drill scheduled for 1300. Finally, at 1400, all drills and
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bridge duties were completed, and I was preparing to go
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below after nearly seven hours on the bridge when three
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aircraft and three high-speed surface craft were
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simultaneously picked up on radar, all approaching the ship
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from starboard quarter.
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Moments later, the ship came under severe and continued
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attack, first by Israeli Mirage jets that momentarily
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knocked out our four puny 50-caliber machine guns and
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disabled all radio antennas, then by slower Israeli Mystere
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jets, which plastered the stack, gun mounts, open bridge,
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and superstructure with an inferno of napalm.
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When technicians jury-rigged an antenna in order to call for
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help, radiomen found the frequencies blocked by buzz saw
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signals from the jets. Radiomen worked on their hands and
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knees and held microphones close to the deck to escape smoke
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and heat from fires nearby, and in less than nine minutes,
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they broke through the jamming. The carrier *Saratoga*,
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operating about 500 miles away from the Sixth Fleet near
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Crete, was first to answer.
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On the bridge of the Saratoga, Captain Joseph Tully promptly
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turned his ship into the wind and relayed Liberty's message
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to the Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral William Martin,
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who was on the bridge of his flagship conducting maneuvering
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exercises. Because of the emergency, Captain Tully addressed
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the message directly to Admiral Martin with his personal
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callsign on the Primary Tactical Maneuvering Circuit
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(PRI-TAC), and then he duplicated the transmission by
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teletype and flashing light with information copies to naval
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headquarters in Washington and London.
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Admiral Martin immediately directed carriers *Saratoga* and
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*America* to launch aircraft to defend Liberty, but when the
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launch order was executed, only Saratoga launched. Except
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for some F-4 Phantoms that were eventually sent up to defend
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the fleet, *America* did not respond. She had, according to
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some reports, been authorized to relax from an alert posture
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that was imposed on much of the rest of the fleet. (The
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aircraft *America* did launch for air defense were thought
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by some to have been armed with nuclear weapons, since it
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was widely known that nuclear-armed weapons were in alert
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status, but it is now clear that no such aircraft were
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launched.)
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Captain Tully sent a flashing light query to Captain Donald
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Engen on the America, and got no reply. Moments later
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Saratoga's aircraft were recalled without explanation by
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Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis, who commanded the carrier task
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force.
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America, which had no appropiate conventional armament in
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position, started bringing up weapons from below decks,
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while Saratoga, which *was* prepared to defend Liberty was
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required to wait -- apparently for White House permission.
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Meanwhile, unobstructed by Sixth Fleet air power, the three
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Israeli torpedo boats arrived on schedule to finish the job.
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The target was already in flames after 25 to 30 minutes of
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aerial strafing and napalm bombardment by perhaps a dozen
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aircraft.
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The boats approached at high speed and fired torpedos from
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2,000 yards but, owing to a near collision between two boats
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at the moment of firing, the first shots went wild. One
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torpedo passed safely astern, where it missed by a bare 25
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yards. Another passed so close ahead of the ship that it
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vanished under the bow, "sounding like amotorboat" to Petty
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Officer Rick Aimetti, who stood, astonished, on the
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forecastle. And one torpedo made a direct hit on the ship's
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crytologic spaces, where it killed 25 men and momentarily
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trapped at least 50 more in the flooded compartment.
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to be continued..............
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From:
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ASSAULT ON LIBERTY
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By: James Ennes
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Available at most good libraries.
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Or from the National Educational Trust, (800) 368 5788
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...............
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If you are tired of "learning" about American foreign policy
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from what is effectively, Zionist controlled media, I highly
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recommend checking out the Washington Report. A free sample
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copy is available by calling the National Education Trust
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at:
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(800) 368 5788
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Tell 'em arf sent you.
|
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|
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You can also tune in to the Amateur Radio Forum (ARF)
|
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Thursday evening at 9:PM Chicago time, 3950 KHZ, LSB.
|
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arf
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u can als |