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201 lines
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201 lines
9.8 KiB
Plaintext
FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN WARS
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By RICHARD M. EBELING
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When the Founding Fathers wrote and then defended the case for
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passage of the Constitution in 1787-1788, they did so with a
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strong belief in the natural rights of man, rights that Thomas
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Jefferson had so eloquently expressed in the Declaration of
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Independence in 1776. But their idealism was tempered with
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stark realism, based on historical knowledge and personal
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experience, about both human nature and the nature of
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governments.
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The separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers
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was considered essential if the human inclination toward
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political abuse of power was to be prevented. "No political
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truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
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with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty,"
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stated James Madison in The Federalist Papers, "than that
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. . . [t]he accumulation of all power, legislative, executive
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and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
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many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
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justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
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Division of power and responsibilities, therefore, was seen as
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an essential--though neither a perfect nor guaranteed--tool to
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assure that the freedom and property of individuals would not
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become political plunder to be devoured by either majorities
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or minorities.
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Issues concerning war and peace and individual liberty were of
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deep concern to the Founding Fathers for the same reason. When
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the matter came up at the convention as to which branch of
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government would have the authority to "make war,"
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disagreement arose. Pierce Butler of South Carolina wanted
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that power to reside in the President who, he said, "will have
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all the requisite qualities." James Madison and Elbridge Gerry
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of Massachusetts were for "leaving to the Executive the power
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to repel sudden attacks" but proposed changing the wording to
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"declare" rather than "make war," and then only with the
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approval of both Houses of Congress. Oliver Ellsworth of
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Connecticut agreed, saying that "It should be more easy to get
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out of war than into it." And George Mason of Virginia also
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was "against giving the power of war to the Executive, because
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[he was] not safely to be trusted with it." Mason "was for
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clogging rather than facilitating war."
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Thus, in the final, ratified Constitution, the Congress, in
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Article I, Section 8, was given the sole authority, "To
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Declare War," while the President, in Article II, Section 2,
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was made "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
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United States, and the Militia of the several States, when
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called into the actual service of the United States." Civilian
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authority over the military was established, with
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Constitutionally divided power over its application in war:
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Congress declared war, and the President oversaw its
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execution.
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The Founding Fathers possessed no misconceptions about the
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potentially aggressive nature of governments toward their
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neighbors. John Jay, in The Federalist Papers, insightfully
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enumerated the various motives, rationales and passions that
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had led nations down the road to war through the ages.
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But neither did they have any illusions that Americans could
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be any less susceptible to similar motives and passions. The
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Constitution, through a division of powers, was meant to put
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procedural hurdles and delays in the way before the passions
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of the moment could result in declarations of war and the
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initiation of hostilities against other nations.
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Yet, in spite of these Constitutional restraints, the United
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States has participated in four foreign wars in the 20th
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century--two World Wars, the Korean "police action" and the
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Vietnam conflict--and in three of these, the United States was
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neither directly attacked nor threatened by a foreign enemy.
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Why, then, did we intervene?
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The answer lies in the ideology of the welfare state. First in
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the years preceding World War I, and then again in the 1930s,
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American intellectuals and politicians undertook grand
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experiments in social engineering. The Progressive Era of
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Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and the New Deal days
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of Franklin D. Roosevelt, were the crucial decades for the
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implementation of the politics of government intervention and
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economic regulation. It was the duty and responsibility of the
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state to manage, oversee and control the social and economic
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affairs of the citizenry.
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The social engineers believed that people left alone to manage
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their own affairs invariably went astray, with the result
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being poverty, economic exploitation and social decay.
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Enlightened leadership, under wise government, would provide
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the population with the economic prosperity and social harmony
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that the governmental policy-makers knew, in their hearts,
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that they had the knowledge and expertise to provide. The
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good wanted state power so they could benefit their fellow
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men.
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And what was good for Americans at home, surely would be no
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less beneficial for the masses of people across the oceans.
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Was not Europe a caldron of political intrigue and corruption?
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Were not the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America
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suffering in squalor and ignorance, the victims of tribal
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despots and imperialist exploitors--easy prey to that even
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greater threat of communist propaganda and revolution?
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America's first crusade was in 1917, when Woodrow Wilson,
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insisting that the United States had the moral duty to take
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the lead and "make the world safe for democracy," had asked
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for, and got, a declaration of war from Congress. Americans,
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however, were repulsed in the years following World War I,
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when instead of democracy, they saw that all that came out of
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our participation in that noble crusade had been communism in
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Russia, fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and imperialist
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spoils for the victorious European allies.
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But World War II seemed to offer the opportunity for a second
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chance. The American "arsenal of democracy" would free the
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world of Hitler and Imperial Japan and then pursue an
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international course of permanent foreign intervention to
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create "a better world." What the world got was the Cold War,
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with the Soviet Union gaining an Eastern European empire, and
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with China being lost behind what became known as the
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communist "Bamboo Curtain."
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America's rewards were global commitments that required
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hundreds of thousands of American soldiers permanently
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stationed in Europe; two bloody wars in Asia that cost the
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lives of over a hundred thousand Americans; a huge defense
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budget that siphoned off hundreds of billions of dollars from
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the private sector for four decades; and even more tens of
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billions of dollars in military and foreign aid to any
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government, in any part of the world, no matter how corrupt,
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just as long as it declared itself "anti-communist." And as
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one of the founders of Human Events, Felix Morley, pointed out
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in his book, Freedom and Federalism, in the heyday of
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Keynesian economics in the 1950s and 1960s, defense spending
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became a tool for "priming the pump" and guaranteeing "full
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employment" through government expenditures.
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But communism is now dying under the weight of its own
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political corruption and economic failures. And the European
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and Asian countries that benefited from decades of being on
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the American defense and foreign aid dole have decided they
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want to grow up and manage their own affairs.
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But rather than be delighted that the Cold War Welfare State
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can finally be ended, American political and foreign policy
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makers are petrified. The global social engineers in
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Washington are suddenly faced with a world that doesn't want
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to be under the tutelage of American paternalism and
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dominance. They are busy scrambling for some way to "keep
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America in Europe," maintain Washington's political control
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and influence over international affairs and guarantee that
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America will remain "in harm's way," potentially drawn into
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numerous controversies and conflicts around the world.
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If it is undesirable for the United States government to
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intervene in the economic and social affairs of its citizenry
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--as the advocate of individual freedom steadfastly believes
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--then it is equally undesirable for the United States
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government to intervene in the internal affairs of other
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nations, or the conflicts that sometimes arise among nations.
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The first duty of the American government is to protect the
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life, liberty and property of the citizens of the United
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States from foreign aggressors. Once a government sets itself
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the task of trying to rectify the errors and choices of its
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own citizens, it soon begins sliding down a slippery slope in
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which the end result is state supervision and regulation of
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all of its citizens' activities, and all in the name of a
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higher "social good."
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Just as our neighbors often do things of which we do not
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approve, or which we do not consider good or wise, so do other
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nations. But to follow the path of attempting to set the world
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straight can lead to nothing but perpetual intervention and
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war in the name of world peace and global welfare. And these
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have been precisely the results of America's global crusade to
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save the world since 1945.
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The end of communism, and the economic growth of Europe and
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Asia, give us a new opportunity to foreswear the global
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welfare state, free ourselves from foreign political and
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military entanglements, and follow George Washington's wise
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advice of free commercial relationships with all, but foreign
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alliances and intrigues with none.
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Professor Ebeling is the Ludwig von Mises Professor of
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Economics at Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Michigan, and also
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serves as vice-president of academic affairs of The Future of
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Freedom Foundation, P.O. Box 9752, Denver, CO 80209.
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------------------------------------------------------------
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From the November 1990 issue of FREEDOM DAILY,
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Copyright (c) 1990, The Future of Freedom Foundation,
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PO Box 9752, Denver, Colorado 80209, 303-777-3588.
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Permission granted to reprint; please give appropriate credit
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and send one copy of reprinted material to the Foundation.
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