mirror of
https://github.com/nhammer514/textfiles-politics.git
synced 2024-12-24 23:09:37 -05:00
356 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
356 lines
18 KiB
Plaintext
Foresight Background
|
|
No. 4, Rev. 0
|
|
Copyright 1989 The Foresight Institute.
|
|
All rights reserved by the author.
|
|
Box 61058, Palo Alto, CA 94306 USA
|
|
|
|
|
|
by Arthur Kantrowitz
|
|
|
|
Dartmouth College
|
|
|
|
"The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of
|
|
a democracy should be the weapon of openness."
|
|
|
|
--Niels Bohr
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
|
|
What is the "weapon of openness" and why is it the best weapon of a
|
|
democracy? Openness here means public access to the information needed
|
|
for the making of public decisions. Increased public access (i.e. less
|
|
secrecy) also gives information to adversaries, thereby increasing
|
|
their strength. The "weapon of openness" is the net contribution that
|
|
increased openness (i.e. less secrecy) makes to the survival of a
|
|
society. Bohr believed that the gain in strength from openness in a
|
|
democracy exceeded the gains of its adversaries, and thus openness was
|
|
a weapon.
|
|
|
|
This is made plausible by a Darwinian argument. Open societies evolved
|
|
as fittest to survive and to reproduce themselves in an international
|
|
jungle. Thus the strength of the weapon of openness has been tested
|
|
and proven in battle and in imitation. Technology developed most
|
|
vigorously in precisely those times, i.e. the industrial revolution,
|
|
and precisely those places, western Europe and America, where the
|
|
greatest openness existed. Gorbachev's glasnost is recognition that
|
|
this correlation is alive and well today.
|
|
|
|
Let us note immediately that secrecy and surprise are clearly
|
|
essential weapons of war and that even countries like the U.S., which
|
|
justifiably prided itself on its openness, have made great and
|
|
frequently successful efforts to use secrecy as a wartime weapon.
|
|
Bohr's phrase was coined following WWII when his primary concern was
|
|
with living with nuclear weapons. This paper is concerned with the
|
|
impact of secrecy vs. openness policy on the development of military
|
|
technology in a long duration peacetime rivalry.
|
|
|
|
Let us also immediately note that publication is the route to all
|
|
rewards in academic science and technology. When publication is
|
|
denied, the culture changes toward the standard hierarchical culture
|
|
where rewards are dependent on finding favor with superiors. Reward
|
|
through publication has been remarkably successful in stimulating
|
|
independent thinking. However, in assessing openness vs. secrecy
|
|
policy it must be borne in mind that research workers (including the
|
|
present author) start with strong biases favoring openness.
|
|
|
|
In contrast, secrecy insiders come from a culture where access to
|
|
deeper secrets conveys higher status. Those who "get ahead" in the
|
|
culture of secrecy understand its uses for personal advancement.
|
|
Knowledge is power, and for many insiders access to classified
|
|
information is the chief source of their power. It is not surprising
|
|
that secrecy insiders see the publication of technological information
|
|
as endangering national security. On the other hand, to what degree
|
|
can we accept insiders' assurances that operations not subject to
|
|
public scrutiny or to free marketplace control will strengthen our
|
|
democracy?
|
|
|
|
My own experience relates only to secrecy in technology. Therefore I
|
|
will not discuss such secrets as submarine positions (which seem
|
|
perfectly justifiable to me in the sense that they clearly add to our
|
|
strength) or activities which are kept secret to avoid the
|
|
difficulties of explaining policy choices to the public (which seem
|
|
disastrously divisive to me).
|
|
|
|
First, we offer some clues to understanding the historical military
|
|
strength of openness in long duration competition with secrecy.
|
|
|
|
Second, we suggest a procedure for the utilization of more openness to
|
|
increase our strength.
|
|
|
|
The Strength of Openness
|
|
|
|
An important source of support for secrecy in technology is the
|
|
ancient confusion between magic and science. In many communications
|
|
addressed to laymen the terms are used almost interchangeably. Magic
|
|
depends on secrecy to create its illusions while science depends on
|
|
openness for its progress. A major part of the educated public and the
|
|
media have not adequately understood this profound difference between
|
|
magic and science. This important failure in our educational system is
|
|
one source of the lack of general appreciation of the power of
|
|
openness as a source of military strength. A more general
|
|
understanding of the power of openness would bolster our faith that
|
|
open societies would continue to be fittest to survive.
|
|
|
|
Openness is necessary for the processes of trial and the elimination
|
|
of error, Sir Karl Popper's beautiful description of the mechanism of
|
|
progress in science. Let's try to understand what happens to each of
|
|
these processes in a secret project and perhaps we can shed some light
|
|
on how the peacetime military was able to justly acquire its
|
|
reputation for resistance to novelty.
|
|
|
|
Trial in Popper's language means receptivity to the unexpected
|
|
conjecture. There is the tradition of the young outsider challenging
|
|
the conventional wisdom. However in real life it is always difficult
|
|
for really new ideas to be heard. Such a victory is almost impossible
|
|
in a hierarchical structure. The usual way a new idea can be heard is
|
|
for it to be sold first outside the hierarchy. When the project is
|
|
secret this is much more difficult, whether the inventor is inside or
|
|
outside the project.
|
|
|
|
Impediments to the elimination of errors will determine the pace of
|
|
progress in science as they do in many other matters. It is important
|
|
here to distinguish between two types of error which I will call
|
|
ordinary and cherished errors. Ordinary errors can be corrected
|
|
without embarrassment to powerful people. The elimination of errors
|
|
which are cherished by powerful people for prestige, political, or
|
|
financial reasons is an adversary process. In open science this
|
|
adversary process is conducted in open meetings or in scientific
|
|
journals. In a secret project it almost inevitably becomes a political
|
|
battle and the outcome depends on political strength, although the
|
|
rhetoric will usually employ much scientific jargon.
|
|
|
|
Advances in technology incorporate a planning process in addition to
|
|
the trial and elimination of error which is basic to all life. When
|
|
the planned advance is small the planning can be dominant, in the
|
|
sense that little new knowledge is required and no significant errors
|
|
must be anticipated. When the planned advance is large it will usually
|
|
involve research and invention, and the processes of trial and the
|
|
elimination of error discussed above will determine the rate of
|
|
progress. In these cases the advantages of openness will be especially
|
|
important. The familiar disappointments in meeting schedules and
|
|
budgets are frequently related to the fact that, in selling new
|
|
programs, the importance of these unpredictable processes is not
|
|
sufficiently emphasized. More openness would reduce these
|
|
disappointments.
|
|
|
|
Trial and the elimination of error is essential to significant
|
|
progress in military technology, and thus both aspects of the process
|
|
by which significant progress is made in military technology are
|
|
sharply decelerated when secrecy is widespread in peacetime. Openness
|
|
accelerates progress. In peacetime military technology, openness is a
|
|
weapon. It is one clue to the survival of open societies in an
|
|
international jungle.
|
|
|
|
Secrecy as an Instrument of Corruption
|
|
|
|
The other side of the coin is the weakness which secrecy fosters as an
|
|
instrument of corruption. This is well illustrated in Reagan's 1982
|
|
Executive Order #12356 on National Security (alarmingly tightening
|
|
secrecy) which states {Sec. 1.6(a)};
|
|
|
|
In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal
|
|
violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent
|
|
embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; to restrain
|
|
competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that
|
|
does not require protection in the interest of national security.
|
|
|
|
This section orders criminals not to conceal their crimes and the
|
|
inefficient not to conceal their inefficiency. But beyond that it
|
|
provides an abbreviated guide to the crucial roles of secrecy in the
|
|
processes whereby power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
|
|
absolutely. Corruption by secrecy is an important clue to the strength
|
|
of openness.
|
|
|
|
One of the most important impacts of corruption from secrecy is on the
|
|
making of major technical decisions. Any federally sponsored project
|
|
and especially a project so hotly contested as the Strategic Defense
|
|
Initiative must always keep all its constituencies in mind when making
|
|
such decisions. Thus the leadership must ask itself whether its
|
|
continual search for allies will be served by making a purely
|
|
technical decision one way or the other. (A purely technical decision
|
|
might determine whether money flows to Ohio or to Texas. Worse yet,
|
|
revealing technical weaknesses could impact the project budget.)
|
|
|
|
When this search for allies occurs in an unclassified project,
|
|
technical criticisms, which will come from the scientific community
|
|
outside the project, must be considered. Consideration of these
|
|
criticisms can improve the decision making process dramatically by
|
|
bringing a measure of the power of the scientific method to the making
|
|
of major technical decisions.
|
|
|
|
In a classified project, the vested interests which grow around a
|
|
decision can frequently prevent the questioning of authority necessary
|
|
for the elimination of error. Peacetime classified projects have a
|
|
very bad record of rejecting imaginative suggestions which frequently
|
|
are very threatening to the existing political power structure.
|
|
|
|
When technical information is classified, public technical criticism
|
|
will inevitably degrade to a media contest between competing
|
|
authorities and, in the competition for attention, it will never be
|
|
clear whether politics or science is speaking. We then lose both the
|
|
power of science and the credibility of democratic process.
|
|
|
|
Corruption is a progressive disease. It diffuses from person to person
|
|
across society by direct observations of its efficacy and its safety.
|
|
The efficacy of the abuse of secrecy for interagency rivalry and for
|
|
personal advancement is well illustrated by the array of abuses listed
|
|
in Sec. 1.6(a). The safety of the abuse of secrecy for the abuser is
|
|
dependent upon the enforcement of the Section. As abuses spread and
|
|
become the norm, enforcibility declines and corruption diffuses more
|
|
rapidly.
|
|
|
|
However, diffusive processes take time to spread through an
|
|
organization, and this makes it possible for secrecy to make a
|
|
significant contribution to national strength during a crisis. When a
|
|
new organization is created to respond to an emergency, as for example
|
|
the scientific organizations created at the start of WWII, the
|
|
behavior norms of the group recruited may not tolerate the abuse of
|
|
secrecy for personal advancement or interagency rivalry. In such
|
|
cases, and for a short time, secrecy may be an effective tactic. The
|
|
general belief that there is strength in secrecy rests partially on
|
|
its short-term successes. If we had entered WWII with a well-developed
|
|
secrecy system and the corruption which would have developed with
|
|
time, I am convinced that the results would have been quite different.
|
|
|
|
Secrecy Exacerbates Divisiveness: the SDI Example
|
|
|
|
Reagan's Executive Order, previously referred to, provides another
|
|
clue to the power of openness. The preamble states;
|
|
|
|
It [this order] recognizes that it is essential that the public be
|
|
informed concerning the activities of its Government, but that the
|
|
interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain
|
|
information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be
|
|
protected against unauthorized disclosure.
|
|
|
|
The tension in this statement is not resolved in the order. It may be
|
|
informative to attempt a resolution by considering a concrete example,
|
|
namely the Strategic Defense Initiative. SDI symbolizes one of the
|
|
conflicts, clearly exacerbated by secrecy, which currently divide us.
|
|
|
|
I would assert that there are unilateral steps toward openness which
|
|
we could take, and which would leave us more unified and stronger,
|
|
even if no reciprocal steps were taken by the Soviets. I propose that
|
|
we start unclassified research programs designed to provide scientific
|
|
information needed for making public policy. If these programs are
|
|
uncoupled from classified programs, their emphases would not
|
|
compromise classified information. Their purpose would be to provide a
|
|
knowledge base for public policy discussions. These programs would not
|
|
reveal the decisions taken secretly, but a public knowledge base would
|
|
reduce the debilitating divisiveness fostered by secrecy.
|
|
|
|
The Strategic Defense Initiative provides a classic example of
|
|
debilitating divisiveness. Countermeasures to SDI are deeply
|
|
classified. The deadly game of countermeasures and
|
|
countercountermeasures will probably determine whether SDI is
|
|
successful or a large-scale Maginot Line. At the present time,
|
|
classification of the countermeasure area trivializes the public
|
|
debate to a media battle between opposed authorities offering
|
|
conflicting interpretations of secret information.
|
|
|
|
An example of this game is decoying vs. discrimination. If the offense
|
|
can proliferate a multitude of decoys which cannot be discriminated
|
|
from warheads by the defense, SDI will not succeed. Knowing a decoy
|
|
design would of course make it easier for an adversary to discriminate
|
|
it from a warhead. It is therefore very important that such designs be
|
|
carefully guarded. On the other hand, maintaining secrecy over the
|
|
scientific and engineering research basic to the
|
|
decoying-discrimination technology would, for the reasons discussed
|
|
earlier, make it much more difficult to provide assurance to the
|
|
public that all avenues had been explored. Indeed, a substantial part
|
|
of the criticism of the feasibility of SDI turns on the possibility
|
|
that an adversary would invent a countermeasure for which we would be
|
|
unprepared.
|
|
|
|
The Cryptography Case: Uncoupled Open Programs
|
|
|
|
We can learn something about the efficiency of secret vs. open
|
|
programs in peacetime from the objections raised by Adm. Bobby R.
|
|
Inman, former director of the National Security Agency, to open
|
|
programs in cryptography. NSA, which is a very large and very secret
|
|
agency, claimed that open programs conducted by a handful of
|
|
matheticians around the world, who had no access to NSA secrets, would
|
|
reveal to other countries that their codes were insecure and that such
|
|
research might lead to codes that even NSA could not break. These
|
|
objections exhibit NSA's assessment that the best secret efforts, that
|
|
other countries could mount, would miss techniques which would be
|
|
revealed by even a small open uncoupled program. If this is true for
|
|
other countries is it not possible that it also applies to us?
|
|
|
|
Inman (1985) asserted that "There is an overlap between technical
|
|
information and national security which inevitably produces tension.
|
|
This tension results from the scientists' desire for unrestrained
|
|
research and publication on the one hand, and the Federal Government's
|
|
need to protect certain information from potential foreign adversaries
|
|
who might use that information against this nation.
|
|
|
|
I would assert that uncoupled open programs (UOP) in cryptography make
|
|
America stronger. They provide early warning of the capabilities an
|
|
adversary might have in breaking our codes. There are many instances
|
|
where secret bureaucracies have disastrously overestimated the
|
|
invulnerability of their codes. In this case I see no tension between
|
|
the national interest and openness. The cryptographers have provided a
|
|
fine case study in strengthening the weapon of openness.
|
|
|
|
Consider then the value of starting unclassified, relatively cheap,
|
|
academic research programs uncoupled from the classified programs.
|
|
These UOP could provide the more solid information on countermeasures
|
|
needed for an informed political decision on SDI, just as the open
|
|
cryptography research has taught us something about the security of
|
|
our codes. If indeed SDI's critics are right about the opportunities
|
|
for the invention of countermeasures, then the UOP would provide an
|
|
opportunity to make a conclusive case. On the other hand if the open
|
|
programs exhibited that SDI could deal with all the countermeasures
|
|
suggested and retain its effectiveness, its case would be
|
|
strengthened.
|
|
|
|
These open programs would indeed be shared with the world. They would
|
|
strengthen the U.S. even if there were no response from the USSR by
|
|
reducing corruption by secrecy, by improving our decision making, and
|
|
by reducing our divisiveness. Undertaking such programs would exhibit
|
|
our commitment to strengthening the weapon of openness. Making that
|
|
commitment would enable democratic control of military technology.
|
|
More openness, reducing suspicions in areas where Americans are
|
|
divided, will do more to increase our military strength by unifying
|
|
the country and its allies than it could possibly do to increase the
|
|
military strength of its enemies.
|
|
|
|
The Weapon of Openness and the Future
|
|
|
|
Bohr's phrase which was the keynote of this article was invented in an
|
|
effort to adapt to the demands for social change required to live with
|
|
advancing military technology. Unfortunately Bohr's effort, to
|
|
persuade FDR and Churchhill of the desirability of more openness in
|
|
living with nuclear weapons, was a complete failure. There can be no
|
|
doubt that the future will bring even more rapid rates of progress in
|
|
science-based technology. Let's just mention three possibilities,
|
|
noting that these are only foreseeable developments and that there
|
|
will be surprises which, if the past is any guide, will be still more
|
|
important.
|
|
|
|
Artificial Intelligence is advancing, driven by its enormous economic
|
|
potential and its challenge in understanding brain function.
|
|
|
|
Molecular biology and genetic engineering are creating powers beyond
|
|
our ability to forecast limits.
|
|
|
|
Feynman some years ago wrote a paper entitled "There's Plenty of Room
|
|
at the Bottom" pointing out that miniaturization could aspire to the
|
|
huge advances possible with the controlled assembly of individual
|
|
atoms. When the possibility of the construction of assemblers which
|
|
could reproduce themselves was added by Eric Drexler in his book
|
|
Engines of Creation, a very large expansion of the opportunities in
|
|
atomic scale assembly were opened up. This pursuit, today known as
|
|
nanotechnology, will also be driven by the enormous advantages it
|
|
affords for health and for human welfare.
|
|
|
|
But each of these has possible military uses comparable in impact to
|
|
that of nuclear weapons. With the aid of the openness provided by
|
|
satellites and arms control treaties, we have been able to live with
|
|
nuclear weapons. We will need much more openness to live with the
|
|
science-based technologies that lie ahead.
|
|
|
|
Dr. Kantrowitz is a professor at the Thayer School of Engineering at
|
|
Dartmouth, and former Chairman of Avco-Everett Research Lab. He
|
|
serves as an Advisor to the Foresight Institute.
|