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129 lines
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Plaintext
129 lines
6.5 KiB
Plaintext
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THE NEXT SOVIET "SPUTNIK":
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STRATEGIC RADIO-FREQUENCY ASSAULT WEAPONS
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=========================================
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by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
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May 26, 1987
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Soviet military technology is nearing the point of catching a
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Gramm-Rudmanized U.S, strategically flat-footed. The new Soviet
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weapons are fairly described as a "Sputnik of the 1980s"; they are
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radio-frequency assault weapons suited for use against both
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tactical and strategic targets. For a large portion of Soviet
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strategic targets these new assault weapons are as deadly as
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nuclear warheads.
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Back in 1982, when EIR was outlining the feasibility of what
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later became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), EIR
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was already looking at the possibility of such weapons becoming
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strategic weapons, although we proposed then that such weapons
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were a bit further down the road than SDI as such.
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When the Soviets falsely accused the U.S. of intending to use
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a space-based SDI system as a strategic assault capability against
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the Russian empire, the Soviets were admitting that their own
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version of "SDI," on which thay had been working since at least
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1962, included such a radio-frequency beam capability.
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Then, as a by-product of our research into certain crucial
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features of the physiology of human brain functions, during
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1983, we found ourselves in areas of what is called "optical
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biophysics," which led us to mapping out the possibility of
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devising radiofrequency technologies which could do a variety of
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desirable and also unpleasant things. Among the unpleasant effects
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possible, was the killing of badly behaving cancer tissue, or
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healthy persons, with a remarkable low wattage on the target area.
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Gradually, with the aid of various specialists we pieced
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together the critical features of the method, and learned enough
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to permit the design of such weapons. During 1986, we had the
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opportunity to test out the principle of such a weapon's design.
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What was astonishing to us was the relative ease with with such a
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weapon could be deployed. After this, we took Soviet threats to
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use such weapons very seriously.
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We consulted with both scientists and military professionals
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on both sides of the Atlantic. With scientists, we worked on
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related areas of technology, including our research into methods
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of biological research needed for mastering AIDS. With military
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specialists, we consulted on the new Soviet military options for
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attacks into Western Europe made feasible by use of such weapons
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for tactical operations and strategic assaults.
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The gist of the feasibility of anti-personnel radio-frequency
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weapons, is that all living processes are harmonically tuned to
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specific electromagnetic pulses. The DNA of the cell, for
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example, absorbs energy at specific lower frequencies, and emits
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coherent pulses, somewhat like laser action, one quantum at a
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time, within the ultraviolet spectrum. All aspects of living
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processes have characteristic, harmonically ordered tuning.
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This principle may be used for fundamental biological
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research into aspects of living processes otherwise not
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understood. It can be used to develop cures for such diseases as
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cancer or AIDS. It can also be used as the basis for design of
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extraordinarily efficient weapons, against unwanted hordes of
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insects, or persons. These weapons do not depend upon the much
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less efficient, lower-technology use of microwave weapons. Very
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low wattage per square meter on targets is sufficient.
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The Soviets began to reveal much more, as they disclosed
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more and more of the details of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's prewar
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mobilization program, "perestroika." They revealed much more
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by the kinds of concessions Marshal Ogarkov et al. permitted
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Premier Mikhail Gorbachov to offer as "bait" to the United
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States, in efforts to lure the U.S. government into a "Zero
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Option" agreement. Since we know--contrary to many wishful Western
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strategic analysts and others--that Moscow is determined to win a
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strategic confrontation with the United States a few years ahead,
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we had to focus on the kinds of decisive, almost irreversible
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advantages Moscow would gain from--say--a 1990 implementation of
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the proposed "Zero Option" agreements.
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Soviet radio-frequency weapons came prominently into focus in
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Soviet forward war-planning for the early 1990s.
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The crucial point is, that using the kinds of
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radio-frequency weapons we know could be produced, Soviet
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military intelligence service's Spetsnaz "special forces" troops,
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operating deep inside Western European territory, could use
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"hand-carry" weapons such as compact nuclear bombs and
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radio-frequency weapons to take out most of the approximately 250
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key strategic military and logistical targets we had earlier
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assumed were targets for Soviet missiles' warheads.
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Instead of a Soviet GSDD force's tank assault into Germany,
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we must expect a major role by Soviet Spetsnaz and other irregular
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forces behind allied lines, paving the way for an airborne
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assault, using Soviet tanks essentially for occupation forces,
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rather than forces of the initial assault. Compact nuclear
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bombs, in some cases, plus radio-frequency weapons, would make
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the difference. Soviet nuclear-missile arsenals would play a
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part in the assault, but a smaller portion than might be
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otherwise assumed.
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In this area of technology, the U.S. and its allies are
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potentially ahead, but only potentially.
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Coming issues of EIR will be devoted to unveiling more of
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this technology, in the same way we campaigned for adoption of
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what became SDI back in 1982.
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PROGRAM TO PUSH RADIO-FREQUENCY WEAPONS,
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AS WE PUSHED WHAT BECAME THE SDI
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========================================
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by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
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It is now urgent that we present the case for U.S. and allied
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development of radio-frequency weapons, in the manner we
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popularized the idea of what became SDI/TDI.
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1. Low-wattage radio-frequency pulses: Devices to kill or
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cure a living process.
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2. Obvious applications as weapons. (Some key secrets not
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mentioned openly)
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3. Soviet commitments to use of radio-frequency assault
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weapons as substitutes for some uses of missile-borne
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nuclear warheads. (Soviet statements directly and
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indirectly referencing this.)
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4. Role in cancer and AIDS research.
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5. Need to devise defenses against Soviet use of such
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weapons-systems.
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--30--
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