mirror of
https://github.com/nhammer514/textfiles-politics.git
synced 2024-10-01 01:15:38 -04:00
199 lines
12 KiB
HTML
199 lines
12 KiB
HTML
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
|
|
<head>
|
|
<title>hopp</title>
|
|
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../CSSstyle.css"/>
|
|
<!--Fill in your link line for CSS and JS in the XSLT here! -->
|
|
</head>
|
|
<body>
|
|
<h1 id="title-index">Politics-Conspiracies-Project</h1>
|
|
<nav id="menu">
|
|
<a href="../index.html">
|
|
<div class="button">Home</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../fulltext2.html">
|
|
<div class="button">Fulltext</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../analysis.html">
|
|
<div class="button">Analysis</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../gallery.html">
|
|
<div class="button">Gallery</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../methods.html">
|
|
<div class="button">Methods</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../about.html">
|
|
<div class="button">About</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
<a href="../GitHub.html">
|
|
<div class="button">GitHub <img alt="github icon"
|
|
src="https://logos-download.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/GitHub_logo.png"
|
|
width="15"/>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</a>
|
|
</nav>
|
|
<h2>hopp</h2>
|
|
<p>NEW FBI ATTEMPTS AT SECURE COMMUNICATION</p>
|
|
<p>COPYRIGHT (C) 1991 BY FULL DISCLOSURE. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.</p>
|
|
<p>The FBI has spent many millions of dollars attempting to obtain secure
|
|
communications by various voice encryption methods, with limited success.</p>
|
|
<p>The GAO Report of March 8, 1988, "FBI Voice Privacy, Cost, Status, and
|
|
Future Direction'' provides much insight into the difficulties the FBI has
|
|
had establishing a secure communications system.</p>
|
|
<p>The FBI's original estimate for establishing a digial voice protection system
|
|
was $79.3 million.</p>
|
|
<p>The March 8th report indicates that "[b]ecause the FBI's estimated savings
|
|
cited in the table are very preliminary and are not supported by formal field
|
|
surveys or other documentation, we continue to believe that the $204.4
|
|
million and the latest $205.8 million estimate for the nationwide voice
|
|
privacy program appear to be unrealistic.''</p>
|
|
<p>A big part of the major cost overrun was a lack of technological review of
|
|
what they were getting into.</p>
|
|
<p>"Our Feburary 1987 report explains that the technological impact of range
|
|
loss on the DVP system was one factor that increased the FBI cost estimates
|
|
from $79.3 million to $204.4 million. In the report, we say that 'the FBI
|
|
recognized in its 1979 to 1981 research that the communications range of DVP
|
|
technology was less than the range of the old, unsecure system, but it did
|
|
not consider the impact of this reduction.' The FBI says that this statement
|
|
is 'totally in error because we did recognize range loss and did consider its
|
|
impact.</p>
|
|
<p>"In a follow-up discussion, a key FBI official who is knowledgable about the
|
|
voice privacy cost estimate process told us that the FBI did not consider
|
|
range loss in the $79.3 million estimate and emphasized that an engineering
|
|
consultant firm developed the estimate as part of a comparison of analog
|
|
versus digital voice privacy technologies. According to this official, range
|
|
loss was not serious considered until the FBI prepared the $132.4 million
|
|
estimate. The FBI says that its methodology for developing the $132.4 million
|
|
estimate included doubled the number of repeaters to compensate for the DVP
|
|
range loss.</p>
|
|
<p>However, a 1984 from the Deputy Assistant Director, Technical Services
|
|
Division, the following range loss problems were described: "The Motorola
|
|
DVP/DES [Data Encryption Standard] system has a loss in range as a penalty
|
|
for the effectiveness of the digital voice privacy. Experience in the six
|
|
cities has demonstrated that to equal the existing geographic coverage, there
|
|
is an 80%-100% increase in so called fixed station equipment (e.g. repeaters,
|
|
cross band sites, and backbone equipment).''</p>
|
|
<p>Much of the FBI's difficults seems to be from a lack of proper management.
|
|
According to the GAO report, "[d]uring our review, we could not find any
|
|
evidence that a long range plan for the nationwide DVP program had been
|
|
prepared, and FBI officials confirmed that a written plan did not exist. The
|
|
FBI contends that it was not feasable to prepare a formal plan for the DVP
|
|
program, within time and manpower constraints. In follow-up discussions about
|
|
their response to our report, FBI official emphasized that DVP is a threat
|
|
driven system and told us that it was a management decision to go full speed
|
|
ahead rather than plan.</p>
|
|
<p>Now, the FBI is trying to solve the problem with frequency hopping radios.
|
|
According to Daniel Miller, Contracting Officer for the FBI, 45 PH-26
|
|
(portable frequency hopping radios) and 20 MH-26 (mobile frequency hopping
|
|
radios) along with numerous accessories, including 2 repeaters were purchased
|
|
on September 24, 1990.</p>
|
|
<p>These radios are not FCC approved radio equipment and the FBI has a
|
|
sole-source contract for them with Transcrypt International, Inc., 1440
|
|
Buckingham Dr, Lincoln, NE 68506, Phone: (402) 483-2961, Fax: (402) 435-6780,
|
|
Telex: 466146.</p>
|
|
<p>According to Transcrypt's brochure, "encryption insures that no outside
|
|
party can understand radio transmissions, an encrypted radio signal has a
|
|
very distinctive sound; and with the right equipment, it can be jammed,
|
|
intercepted, or the source located.''</p>
|
|
<p>Transcrypt refused to provide Full Disclosure with pricing information and
|
|
that information was not available from the Government by press time. The
|
|
going rate for this type of equipment, however is said to be approximately
|
|
$10000 per radio. Transcrypt will only sell the radio within the United
|
|
States to law enforcement agencies.</p>
|
|
<p>Even though their brochure claims that both the public and private sectors
|
|
outside the United States have the need for this type of secure
|
|
communications (no mention is made that the private sector within the United
|
|
States has such needs), a company spokesman seemed skeptical that the State
|
|
Department would approve the radios for export.</p>
|
|
<p>The idea behind frequency hopping radios is that rather than transmitting
|
|
constantly on one frequency, the frequency is changed many times per second
|
|
in a pseudo-random fashion. These radios switch from 12 to 50 times per
|
|
second, between any channels in a programmable window of the 148-174Mhz band.
|
|
The window size is programmable between 100Khz and 1.6Mhz. Therefore, if the
|
|
window size was set to 1.6Mhz and the window was located at 165.000mhz, the
|
|
transmissions would occur only on frequencys between 165.000mhz and
|
|
166.600mhz.</p>
|
|
<p>Therefore, with a standard scanner one would not notice the existence of such
|
|
transmission, nor be able to pin point them. Monitoring one of the
|
|
frequencies it used in its hopping sequence would result only in a burst of
|
|
noise 1/12 to 1/50 of a second in duration.</p>
|
|
<p>Another brochure from Transcrypt quotes from Communications Africa a claim
|
|
that "there are very few countries in which the equipment and expertise are
|
|
available to try to break these systems.''</p>
|
|
<p>Finally, the FBI has a solution to is desire for secure communications or
|
|
does it? The first glimpse to a line of attack is in the same brochure that
|
|
quotes from Communications Africa. It explains how other (in use) frequencies
|
|
in an urban environment gives the transmissions extra cover. Any kind of
|
|
transmission made in an urban environment gets extra cover from all the other
|
|
surrounding transmissions.</p>
|
|
<p>The fact that the transmissions need or gain from having "cover'' indicates
|
|
that they are not invisible.</p>
|
|
<p>Technical sources suggested the following as a method of detecting use of
|
|
frequency hopping radios in the area. Hook a cable ready TV set to an
|
|
appropriate antenna and tune it to the federal band (160-172mhz). Cable
|
|
channels G, H and I. Each channel will display a 5mhz spectrum of the federal
|
|
band. The complete frequency range of the radio would be cable channels A
|
|
through I and 7.</p>
|
|
<p>The sources indicated that operation of a frequency hopping radio in the area
|
|
will show a distinct pattern on the screen. To test this theory, Full
|
|
Disclosure hooked up a low power programable RF oscillator to switch
|
|
frequencies 15 times per second in the 160mhz range and powering the unit on
|
|
showed a distinct change (unique unsynchronized horizontal lines) in the
|
|
display on a TV set tuned to that frequency.</p>
|
|
<p>Because of the narrow window the units use, after locating the frequency of
|
|
the window, jamming the unit could be accomplished with a wide bandwidth
|
|
transmitter. (1.6mhz isn't real wide, compared to a 5mhz video transmitter).
|
|
If a little used portion of the VHF band was selected for operation by the
|
|
frequency hopping radios, jamming could be accomplished with little
|
|
interference to other transmissions. </p>
|
|
<p>There is some dispute over the effectiveness of using a spectrum analyzer to
|
|
spot the use of frequency hopping radios. One technical source aptly pointed
|
|
out "why worry about whether a spectrum analyzer works when a $100 TV set
|
|
does?''</p>
|
|
<p>As with any new surveillance technology, there is a gap between its
|
|
introduction and the availablity of countermeasures. Unlike spread spectrum
|
|
radios that switch frequencies over the entire RF spectrum, frequency hopping
|
|
radios operate in a very small window making detection, jamming, and
|
|
direction finding a much simpler task.</p>
|
|
<p>The following are selected specifications for the PH-26 and MH-26 radios.
|
|
Figures in ()'s are for the MH-26 when different.</p>
|
|
<p>Frequency Programming Range: 148-174MHz. Frequency stability: .0005%.
|
|
Frequency spacing: 5, 6.25, 12.5, 15, 25 or 30KHz. Transmitter: Power Output:
|
|
1 or 5 watts (30 watts). Modulation: FM. Receiver: Sensitivity 12 db. Sinad:
|
|
.25uv. Selectivity @30Khz: 70 db. Audio Output: 500mw (5 watts). Frequency
|
|
Agil Mode: Number of channels: 4096. Frequency series: Pseudorandom (PR).
|
|
Dwell time: 20 to 100 milliseconds. Synchronization: Continuous digital.</p>
|
|
<p>The above is reprinted from Full Disclosure Newspaper. Subscribe today and
|
|
get interesting articles like the above, plus more... pictures, graphics,
|
|
advertisement, and more articles. Full Disclosure is your source for
|
|
information on the leading edge of surveillance technology. Print the
|
|
following form, or supply the information on a plain piece of paper:</p>
|
|
<p>Please start my subscription to Full Disclosure for:</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] Sample issue, $2.00</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] 12 issue subscription, $18.00</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] 24 issue subscription, $29.95
|
|
With 24 issue susbcription include free one of the following:
|
|
[ ] Directory of Electronic Surveillance Equipment Suppliers
|
|
[ ] Citizen's Guide on How to Use the Freedom of Info/Privacy Acts
|
|
[ ] Maximizing PC Performance</p>
|
|
<p>Also available separately:</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] Directory of Electronic Surveillance Equipment Suppliers, $6.00</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] Citizen's Guide on How to Use the Freedom of Info/Privacy Acts, $5.00</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] Maximizing PC Performance, $6.00</p>
|
|
<p> Illinois residences, add 6.5% sales tax on above 3 items.</p>
|
|
<p>Enclosed is payment in the form of:</p>
|
|
<p>[ ] Check/Money order, [ ] Visa, [ ] Mastercard</p>
|
|
<p>Card no:___________________________________ Exp date:_______</p>
|
|
<p>Signature:__________________________________________________</p>
|
|
<p>Phone:______________________________________________________
|
|
(required for credit card orders)</p>
|
|
<p>My name/address:</p>
|
|
<p>Name:_______________________________________________________</p>
|
|
<p>Street:_____________________________________________________</p>
|
|
<p>City/State/Zip:_____________________________________________</p>
|
|
<p>Return to: Full Disclosure, Box 903, Libertyville, Illinois 60048
|
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
</body>
|
|
</html>
|