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<h2>fema-3</h2>
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<p>
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</p>
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<p>[PeaceNet forward from AML (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
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------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
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<p>/** mideast.forum: 216.5 **/
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** Written 8:11 pm Jan 17, 1991 by nlgclc in cdp:mideast.forum **
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An excellent book which deals with the REX 84 detention plan is:</p>
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<p>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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"Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver <span class="PERSON">North</span>,'' by Ben
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Bradlee Jr. (Donald I. fine, $21.95. 573 pp.)
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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Reviewed by Dennis M. Culnan Copyright 1990, Gannett News Service All
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Rights Reserved Short excerpt posted here under applicable copyright
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laws</p>
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<p>[Oliver] <span class="PERSON">North</span> managed to network himself into the highest levels of
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the CIA and power centers around the world. There he lied and
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boastfully ignored the constitutional process, Bradlee writes.</p>
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<p>Yet more terrifying is the plan hatched by <span class="PERSON">North</span> and other Reagan
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people in the Federal Emergency Manpower Agency (FEMA): A blueprint
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for the military takeover of the United States. The plan called for
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FEMA to become "emergency czar'' in the event of a national emergency
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such as nuclear war or an American invasion of a foreign nation. FEMA
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would also be a buffer between the president and his cabinet and other
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civilian agencies, and would have broad powers to appoint military
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commanders and run state and local governments. Finally, it would
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have the authority to order suspect aliens into concentration camps
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and seize their property.</p>
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<p>When then-Attorney General William French Smith got wind of the plan,
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he killed it. After Smith left the administration, <span class="PERSON">North</span> and his FEMA
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cronies came up with the Defense Resource Act, designed to suspendend
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the First Amendment by imposing censorship and banning strikes.</p>
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<p>Where was it all heading? The book's answer: "REX-84 Bravo, a
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National Security Decision Directive 52 that would become operative
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with the president's declaration of a state of national emergency
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concurrent with a mythical U.S. military invasion of an unspecified
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Central American country, presumably Nicaragua.''</p>
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<p>Bradlee writes that the Rex exercise was designed to test FEMA's
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readiness to assume authority over the Department of Defense, the
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National Guard in all 50 states, and "a number of state defense
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forces to be established by state legislatures.'' The military would
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then be "deputized,'' thus making an end run around federal law
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forbidding military involvement in domestic law enforcement.</p>
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<p>Rex, which ran concurrently with the first annual U.S. show of force
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in Honduras in April 1984, was also designed to test FEMA's ability to
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round up 400000 undocumented Central American aliens in the United
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States and its ability to distribute hundreds of tons of small arms to
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"state defense forces.''</p>
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<p>Incredibly, REX 84 was similar to a plan secretly adopted by Reagan
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while governor of California. His two top henchmen then were Edwin
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Meese, who recently resigned as U.S. attorney general, and Louis
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Guiffrida, the FEMA director in 1984.</p>
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<p>If the review makes you nervous, you should read the book!</p>
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<p>--Chip Berlet ** End of text from cdp:mideast.forum **</p>
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<p>--------------------------------END:REF3-----------------------------------
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###########################################################################
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--------------------------------REF4:FEMA----------------------------------</p>
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<p>[PeaceNet forward from AML (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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This is the front-page article of the Jan. 16 issue of "The
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Guardian," which describes some of the U.S. government's planning
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for martial law in the event of the Gulf war. This is truly a
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scary scenario that should concern all civil libertarians and
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patriots.
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------------------------------------------------------------------</p>
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<p>WILL GULF WAR LEAD TO REPRESSION AT HOME?
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by Paul DeRienzo and Bill Weinberg</p>
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<p>On August 2, 1990, as Saddam Hussein's army was consolidating control
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over Kuwait, President George Bush responded by signing two executive
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orders that were the first step toward martial law in the United
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States and suspending the Constitution.</p>
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<p>On the surface, Executive Orders 12722 and 12723, declaring a
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"national emergency," merely invoked laws that allowed Bush to freeze
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Iraqi assets in the United States.</p>
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<p>The International Emergency Executive Powers Act permits the president
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to freeze foreign assets after declaring a "national emergency," a
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move that has been made three times before -- against Panama in 1987,
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Nicaragua in 1985 and Iran in 1979.</p>
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<p>According to Professor Diana <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span>, of the Fletcher School of
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Diplomacy at Boston's Tufts University, when Bush declared a national
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emergency he "activated one part of a contingency national security
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emergency plan." That plan is made up of a series of laws passed since
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the presidency of Richard Nixon, which <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> says give the
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president "boundless" powers.</p>
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<p>According to <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span>, such laws as the Defense Industrial
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Revitalization and Disaster Relief Acts of 1983 "would permit the
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president to do anything from seizing the means of production, to
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conscripting a labor force, to relocating groups of citizens."</p>
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<p>
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<span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> says the net effect of invoking these laws would be the
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suspension of the Constitution.</p>
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<p>She adds that national emergency powers "permit the stationing of the
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military in cities and towns, closing off the U.S. borders, freezing
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all imports and exports, allocating all resources on a national
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security priority, monitoring and censoring the press, and warrantless
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searches and seizures."</p>
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<p>The measures would allow military authorities to proclaim martial law
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in the United States, asserts <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span>. She defines martial law as the
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"federal authority taking over for local authority when they are
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unable to maintain law and order or to assure a republican form of
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government."</p>
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<p>A report called "Post Attack Recovery Strategies," about rebuilding
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the country after a nuclear war, prepared by the right-wing Hudson
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Institute in 1980, defines martial law as dealing "with the control of
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civilians by their own military forces in time of emergency."</p>
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<p>The federal agency with the authority to organize and command the
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government's response to a national emergency is the Federal Emergency
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Management Agency (FEMA). This super-secret and elite agency was
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formed in 1979 under congressional measures that merged all federal
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powers dealing with civilian and military emergencies under one
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agency.</p>
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<p>FEMA has its roots in the World War I partnership between government
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and corporate leaders who helped mobilize the nation's industries to
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support the war effort. The idea of a central national response to
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large-scale emergencies was reintroduced in the early 1970s by Louis
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Giuffrida, a close associate of then-California Gov. Ronald Reagan and
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his chief aide Edwin Meese.</p>
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<p>Reagan appointed Giuffrida head of the California National Guard in
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1969. With Meese, Giuffrida organized "war-games" to prepare for
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"statewide martial law" in the event that Black nationalists and
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anti-war protesters "challenged the authority of the state." In 1981,
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Reagan as president moved Giuffrida up to the big leagues, appointing
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him director of FEMA.</p>
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<p>According to <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span>, however, it was the actions of George Bush in
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1976, while he was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
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(CIA), that provided the stimulus for centralization of vast powers in
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FEMA.</p>
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<p>Bush assembled a group of hawkish outsiders, called Team B, that
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released a report claiming the CIA ("Team A") had underestimated the
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dangers of Soviet nuclear attack. The report advised the development
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of elaborate plans for "civil defense" and post-nuclear government.
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Three years later, in 1979, FEMA was given ultimate responsibility for
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developing these plans.</p>
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<p>Aware of the bad publicity FEMA was getting because of its role in
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organizing for a post-nuclear world, Reagan's FEMA chief Giuffrida
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publicly argued that the 1865 Posse Comitatus Act prohibited the
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military from arresting civilians.</p>
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<p>However, <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> says that Congress eroded the act by giving the
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military reserves an exemption from Posse Comitatus and allowing them
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to arrest civilians. The National Guard, under the control of state
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governors in peace time, is also exempt from the act and can arrest
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civilians.</p>
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<p>FEMA Inspector General John Brinkerhoff has written a memo contending
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that the government doesn't need to suspend the Constitution to use
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the full range of powers Congress has given the agency. FEMA has
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prepared legislation to be introduced in Congress in the event of a
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national emergency that would give the agency sweeping powers. The
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right to "deputize" National Guard and police forces is included in
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the package. But <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> believes that actual martial law need not be
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declared publicly.</p>
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<p>Giuffrida has written that "Martial Rule comes into existence upon a
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determination (not a declaration) by the senior military commander
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that the civil government must be replaced because it is no longer
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functioning anyway." He adds that "Martial Rule is limited only by the
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principle of necessary force."</p>
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<p>According to <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span>, it is possible for the president to make
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declarations concerning a national emergency secretly in the form of a
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Natioanl Security Decision Directive. Most such directives are
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classified as so secret that <span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> says "researchers don't even
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know how many are enacted."</p>
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<p>DOMESTIC SPYING</p>
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<p>Throughout the 1980s, FEMA was prohibited from engaging in
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intelligence gathering. But on July 6, 1989, Bush signed Executive
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Order 12681, pronouncing that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate
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would "have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence,
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investigative, or national security work." Recent events indicate that
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domestic spying in response to the looming Middle East war is now
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under way.</p>
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<p>
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<span class="PERSON">Reynolds</span> reports that "the CIA is going to various campuses asking for
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information on Middle Eastern students. I'm sure that there are
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intelligence organizations monitoring peace demonstrations."
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According to the University of Connecticut student paper, the Daily
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Campus, CIA officials have recently met there to discuss talking with
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Middle Eastern students.</p>
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<p>The New York Times reports that the FBI has ordered its agents around
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the country to question Arab-American leaders and business people in
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search of information on potential Iraqi "terrorist" attacks in
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response to a Gulf war.</p>
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<p>A 1986 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) document entitled
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"Alien Terrorists and Other Undesirables: A Contingency Plan" outlines
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the potential round-up and incarceration in mass detainment camps of
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U.S. residents who are citizens of "terrorist" countries, chiefly in
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the Middle East. This plan echoed a 1984 FEMA nationwide "readiness
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exercise code-named REX-84 ALPHA, which included the rehearsal of
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joint operations with the INS to round up 40000 Central American
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refugees in the event of a U.S. invasion of the region. One of the 10
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military bases established as detainment camps by REX-84 ALPHA, Camp
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Krome, Fla., was designated a joint FEMA-Immigration service
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interrogation center.</p>
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<p>Recently, FEMA has been criticized in the media for inadequate
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response to the October, 1989 San Francisco earthquake. What the
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mainstream press has failed to cover is the agency's planned role in
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repressing domestic dissent in the event of an invasion abroad.</p>
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<p>Source: The Guardian, Jan 16 1991</p>
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<p>The Guardian is an independent radical news weekly. Subscriptions are
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available at $33.50 per year from The Guardian, 33 West 17th St., New
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York, NY 10011</p>
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<p>
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----------------------------END:REF4------------------------------------
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########################################################################
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----------------------------REF5:NSDD 145-------------------------------</p>
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<p>DATE OF UPLOAD: November 17, 1989
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ORIGIN OF UPLOAD: Omni Magazine
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CONTRIBUTED BY: Donald Goldberg</p>
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<p>========================================================
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PARANET INFORMATION SERVICE BBS
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========================================================
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Although this article does not deal directly with <span class="EVENT">UFOs</span>,
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ParaNet felt it important as an offering to our readers who
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depend so much upon communications as a way to stay informed.
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This article raises some interesting implications for the future
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of communications.</p>
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<p>
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THE NATIONAL GUARDS
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(C) 1987 OMNI MAGAZINE MAY 1987
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(Reprinted with permission and license to ParaNet Information
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Service and its affiliates.)</p>
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<p>By Donald Goldberg</p>
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<p>The mountains bend as the fjord and the sea beyond stretch
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out before the viewer's eyes. First over the water, then a sharp
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left turn, then a bank to the right between the peaks, and the
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secret naval base unfolds upon the screen.
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The scene is of a Soviet military installation on the Kola
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Peninsula in the icy Barents Sea, a place usually off-limits to
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the gaze of the Western world. It was captured by a small French
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satellite called SPOT Image, orbiting at an altitude of 517 miles
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above the hidden <span class="NORP">Russian</span> outpost. On each of several passes --
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made over a two-week period last fall -- the satellite's high-resolution lens took its pictures at a different angle; the
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images were then blended into a three-dimensional, computer-generated video. Buildings, docks, vessels, and details of the
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Artic landscape are all clearly visible.
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Half a world away and thousands of feet under the sea,
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sparkling-clear images are being made of the ocean floor. Using
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the latest bathymetric technology and state-of-the-art systems
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known as Seam Beam and Hydrochart, researchers are for the first
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time assembling detailed underwater maps of the continental
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shelves and the depths of the world's oceans. These scenes of
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the sea are as sophisticated as the photographs taken from the
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satellite.
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From the three-dimensional images taken far above the earth
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to the charts of the bottom of the oceans, these photographic
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systems have three things in common: They both rely on the
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latest technology to create accurate pictures never dreamed of
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even 25 years ago; they are being made widely available by
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commerical, nongovernmental enterprises; and the Pentagon is
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trying desperately to keep them from the general public.
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In 1985 the Navy classified the underwater charts, making
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them available only to approved researchers whose needs are
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evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under a 1984 law the military
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has been given a say in what cameras can be licensed to be used
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on American satellites; and officials have already announced they
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plan to limit the quality and resolution of photos made
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available. The National Security Agency (NSA) -- the secret arm
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of the Pentagon in charge of gathering electronic intelligence as
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well as protecting sensitive U.S. communications -- has defeated
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a move to keep it away from civilian and commercial computers and
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databases.
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That attitude has outraged those concerned with the
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military's increasing efforts to keep information not only from
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the public but from industry experts, scientists, and even other
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government officials as well. "That's like classifying a road
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map for fear of invasion," says Paul Wolff, assistant
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administrator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
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Administration, of the attempted restrictions.
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These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of
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scientists, researchers, the news media, and the public at large
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are a part of an alarming trend that has seen the military take
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an ever-increasing role in controlling the flow of information
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and communications through American society, a role traditionally
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-- and almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the
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approving gaze of the Reagan administration, Department of
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Defense (DoD) officials have quietly implemented a number of
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policies, decisions, and orders that give the military
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unprecedented control over both the content and public use of
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data and communications. For example:</p>
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<p>**The Pentagon has created a new category of "sensitive" but
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unclassified information that allows it to keep from public
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access huge quantities of data that were once widely accessible.
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**Defense Department officials have attempted to rewrite key laws
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that spell out when the president can and cannot appropriate
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private communications facilities.
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**The Pentagon has installed a system that enables it to seize
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control of the nation's entire communications network -- the
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phone system, data transmissions, and satellite transmissions of
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all kinds -- in the event of what it deems a "national
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emergency." As yet there is no single, universally agreed-upon
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definition of what constitutes such a state. Usually such an
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emergency is restricted to times of natural disaster, war, or
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when national security is specifically threatened. Now the
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military has attempted to redefine emergency.
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The point man in the Pentagon's onslaught on communications
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is Assistant Defense Secretary Donald C. Latham, a former NSA
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deputy chief. Latham now heads up an interagency committee in
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charge of writing and implementing many of the policies that have
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put the military in charge of the flow of civilian information
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and communication. He is also the architect of National Security
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Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145), signed by Defense Secretary
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Caspar Weinberger in 1984, which sets out the national policy on
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telecommunications and computer-systems security.
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First NSDD 145 set up a steering group of top-level
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administration officials. Their job is to recommend ways to
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protect information that is unclassified but has been designated
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sensitive. Such information is held not only by government
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agencies but by private companies as well. And last October the
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steering group issued a memorandum that defined sensitive
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information and gave federal agencies broad new powers to keep it
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from the public.
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According to Latham, this new category includes such data as
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all medical records on government databases -- from the files of
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the National Cancer Institute to information on every veteran who
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has ever applied for medical aid from the Veterans Administration
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-- and all the information on corporate and personal taxpayers in
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the Internal Revenue Service's computers. Even agricultural
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statistics, he argues, can be used by a foreign power against the
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United States.
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In his oversize yet Spartan Pentagon office, Latham cuts
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anything but an intimidating figure. Articulate and friendly, he
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could pass for a network anchorman or a television game show
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host. When asked how the government's new definition of
|
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sensitive information will be used, he defends the necessity for
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it and tries to put to rest concerns about a new restrictiveness.
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"The debate that somehow the DoD and NSA are going to
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monitor or get into private databases isn't the case at all,"
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Latham insists. "The definition is just a guideline, just an
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advisory. It does not give the DoD the right to go into private
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records."
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Yet the Defense Department invoked the NSDD 145 guidelines
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when it told the information industry it intends to restrict the
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sale of data that are now unclassified and publicly available
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from privately owned computer systems. The excuse if offered was
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that these data often include technical information that might be
|
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valuable to a foreign adversary like the Soviet Union.
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Mead Data Central -- which runs some of the nation's largest
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computer databases, such as Lexis and Nexis, and has nearly
|
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200000 users -- says it has already been approached by a team of
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agents from the Air Force and officials from the CIA and the FBI
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who asked for the names of subscribers and inquired what Mead
|
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officials might do if information restrictions were imposed. In
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response to government pressure, Mead Data Central in effect
|
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censured itself. It purged all unclassified government-supplied
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technical data from its system and completely dropped the
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National Technical Information System from its database rather
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than risk a confrontation.
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Representative Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat who chairs the
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House Government Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of
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the NSA's role in restricting civilian information. He notes
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that in 1985 the NSA -- under the authority granted by NSDD 145
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-- investigated a computer program that was widely used in both
|
|
local and federal elections in 1984. The computer system was
|
|
used to count more than one third of all votes cast in the United
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States. While probing the system's vulnerability to outside
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manipulation, the NSA obtained a detailed knowledge of that
|
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computer program. "In my view," Brooks says, "this is an
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unprecedented and ill-advised expansion of the military's
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influence in our society."
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There are other NSA critics. "The computer systems used by
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counties to collect and process votes have nothing to do with
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national security, and I'm really concerned about the NSA's
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involvement," says Democratic congressman Dan Glickman of Kansas,
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chairman of the House science and technology subcommittee
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|
concerned with computer security.
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Also, under NSDD 145 the Pentagon has issued an order,
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virtually unknown to all but a few industry executives, that
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affects commercial communications satellites. The policy was
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|
made official by Defense Secretary Weinberger in June of 1985 and
|
|
requires that all commercial satellite operators that carry such
|
|
unclassified government data traffic as routine Pentagon supply
|
|
information and payroll data (and that compete for lucrative
|
|
government contracts) install costly protective systems on all
|
|
satellites launched after 1990. The policy does not directly
|
|
affect the data over satellite channels, but it does make the NSA
|
|
privy to vital information about the essential signals needed to
|
|
operate a satellite. With this information it could take control
|
|
of any satellite it chooses.
|
|
Latham insists this, too, is a voluntary policy and that
|
|
only companies that wish to install protection will have their
|
|
systems evaluated by the NSA. He also says industry officials
|
|
are wholly behind the move, and argues that the protective
|
|
systems are necessary. With just a few thousand dollars' worth
|
|
of equipment, a disgruntled employee could interfere with a
|
|
satellite's control signals and disable or even wipe out a
|
|
hundred-million-dollar satellite carrying government information.
|
|
At best, his comments are misleading. First, the policy is
|
|
not voluntary. The NSA can cut off lucrative government
|
|
contracts to companies that do not comply with the plan. The
|
|
Pentagon alone spent more than a billion dollars leasing
|
|
commercial satellite channels last year; that's a powerful
|
|
incentive for business to cooperate.
|
|
Second, the industry's support is anything but total.
|
|
According to the minutes of one closed-door meeting between NSA
|
|
officials -- along with representatives of other federal agencies
|
|
-- and executives from AT&T, Comsat, GTE Sprint, and MCI, the
|
|
executives neither supported the move nor believed it was
|
|
necessary. The NSA defended the policy by arguing that a
|
|
satellite could be held for ransom if the command and control
|
|
links weren't protected. But experts at the meeting were
|
|
skeptical.
|
|
"Why is the threat limited to accessing the satellite rather
|
|
than destroying it with lasers or high-powered signals?" one
|
|
industry executive wanted to know.
|
|
Most of the officials present objected to the high cost of
|
|
protecting the satellites. According to a 1983 study made at the
|
|
request of the Pentagon, the protection demanded by the NSA could
|
|
add as much as $3 million to the price of a satellite and $1
|
|
million more to annual operating costs. Costs like these, they
|
|
argue, could cripple a company competing against less expensive
|
|
communications networks.
|
|
Americans get much of their information through forms of
|
|
electronic communications, from the telephone, television and
|
|
radio, and information printed in many newspapers. Banks send
|
|
important financial data, businesses their spreadsheets, and
|
|
stockbrokers their investment portfolios, all over the same
|
|
channels, from satellite signals to computer hookups carried on
|
|
long distance telephone lines. To make sure that the federal
|
|
government helped to promote and protect the efficient use of
|
|
this advancing technology, Congress passed the massive
|
|
Communications Act of of 1934. It outlined the role and laws of
|
|
the communications structure in the United States.
|
|
The powers of the president are set out in Section 606 of
|
|
that law; basically it states that he has the authority to take
|
|
control of any communications facilities that he believes
|
|
"essential to the national defense." In the language of the
|
|
trade this is known as a 606 emergency.
|
|
There have been a number of attempts in recent years by
|
|
Defense Department officials to redefine what qualifies as a 606
|
|
emergency and make it easier for the military to take over
|
|
national communications.
|
|
In 1981 the Senate considered amendments to the 1934 act
|
|
that would allow the president, on Defense Department
|
|
recommendation, to require any communications company to provide
|
|
services, facilities, or equipment "to promote the national
|
|
defense and security or the emergency preparedness of the
|
|
nation," even in peacetime and without a declared state of
|
|
emergency. The general language had been drafted by Defense
|
|
Department officials. (The bill failed to pass the House for
|
|
unrelated reasons.)
|
|
"I think it is quite clear that they have snuck in there
|
|
some powers that are dangerous for us as a company and for the
|
|
public at large," said MCI vice president Kenneth Cox before the
|
|
Senate vote.
|
|
Since President Reagan took office, the Pentagon has stepped
|
|
up its efforts to rewrite the definition of national emergency
|
|
and give the military expanded powers in the United States. "The
|
|
declaration of 'emergency' has always been vague," says one
|
|
former administration official who left the government in 1982
|
|
after ten years in top policy posts. "Different presidents have
|
|
invoked it differently. This administration would declare a
|
|
convenient 'emergency.'" In other words, what is a nuisance to
|
|
one administration might qualify as a burgeoning crisis to
|
|
another. For example, the Reagan administration might decide
|
|
that a series of protests on or near military bases constituted a
|
|
national emergency.
|
|
Should the Pentagon ever be given the green light, its base
|
|
for taking over the nation's communications system would be a
|
|
nondescript yellow brick building within the maze of high rises,
|
|
government buildings, and apartment complexes that make up the
|
|
Washington suburb of Arlington, Virginia. Headquartered in a
|
|
dusty and aging structure surrounded by a barbed-wire fence is an
|
|
obscure branch of the military known as the Defense
|
|
Communications Agency (DCA). It does not have the spit and
|
|
polish of the National Security Agency or the dozens of other
|
|
government facilities that make up the nation's capital. But its
|
|
lack of shine belies its critical mission: to make sure all of
|
|
America's far-flung military units can communicate with one
|
|
another. It is in certain ways the nerve center of our nation's
|
|
defense system.
|
|
On the second floor of the DCA's four-story headquarters is
|
|
a new addition called the National Coordinating Center (NCC).
|
|
Operated by the Pentagon, it is virtually unknown outside of a
|
|
handful of industry and government officials. The NCC is staffed
|
|
around the clock by representatives of a dozen of the nation's
|
|
largest commercial communications companies -- the so-called
|
|
"common carriers" -- including AT&T, MCI, GTE, Comsat, and ITT.
|
|
Also on hand are officials from the State Department, the CIA,
|
|
the Federal Aviation Administration, and a number of other
|
|
federal agencies. During a 606 emergency the Pentagon can order
|
|
the companies that make up the National Coordinating Center to
|
|
turn over their satellite, fiberoptic, and land-line facilities
|
|
to the government.
|
|
On a long corridor in the front of the building is a series
|
|
of offices, each outfitted with a private phone, a telex machine,
|
|
and a combination safe. It's known as "logo row" because each
|
|
office is occupied by an employee from one of the companies that
|
|
staff the NCC and because their corporate logos hand on the wall
|
|
outside. Each employee is on permanent standby, ready to
|
|
activate his company's system should the Pentagon require it.
|
|
The National Coordinating Center's mission is as grand as
|
|
its title is obscure: to make available to the Defense
|
|
Department all the facilities of the civilian communications
|
|
network in this country -- the phone lines, the long-distance
|
|
satellite hookups, the data transmission lines -- in times of
|
|
national emergency. If war breaks out and communications to a
|
|
key military base are cut, the Pentagon wants to make sure that
|
|
an alternate link can be set up as fast as possible. Company
|
|
employees assigned to the center are on call 24 hours a day; they
|
|
wear beepers outside the office, and when on vacation they must
|
|
be replaced by qualified colleagues.
|
|
The center formally opened on New Year's Day, 1984, the same
|
|
day Ma Bell's monopoly over the telephone network of the entire
|
|
United States was finally broken. The timing was no coincidence.
|
|
Pentagon officials had argued for years along with AT&T against
|
|
the divestiture of Ma Bell, on grounds of national security.
|
|
Defense Secretary Weinberger personally urged the attorney
|
|
general to block the lawsuit that resulted in the breakup, as had
|
|
his predecessor, Harold Brown. The reason was that rather than
|
|
construct its own communications network, the Pentagon had come
|
|
to rely extensively on the phone company. After the breakup the
|
|
dependence continued. The Pentagon still used commercial
|
|
companies to carry more than 90 percent of its communications
|
|
within the continental United States.
|
|
The 1984 divestiture put an end to AT&T's monopoly over the
|
|
nation's telephone service and increased the Pentagon's obsession
|
|
with having its own nerve center. Now the brass had to contend
|
|
with several competing companies to acquire phone lines, and
|
|
communications was more than a matter of running a line from one
|
|
telephone to another. Satellites, microwave towers, fiberoptics,
|
|
and other technological breakthroughs never dreamed of by
|
|
Alexander Graham Bell were in extensive use, and not just for
|
|
phone conversations. Digital data streams for computers flowed
|
|
on the same networks.
|
|
These facts were not lost on the Defense Department or the
|
|
White House. According to documents obtained by Omni, beginning
|
|
on December 14, 1982, a number of secret meetings were held
|
|
between high-level administration officials and executives of the
|
|
commercial communications companies whose employees would later
|
|
staff the National Coordinating Center. The meetings, which
|
|
continued over the next three years, were held at the White
|
|
House, the State Department, the Strategic Air Command (SAC)
|
|
headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and at the
|
|
<span class="PERSON">North</span> American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado
|
|
Springs.
|
|
The industry officials attending constituted the National
|
|
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee -- called <span class="ORG">NSTAC</span>
|
|
(pronounced N-stack) -- set up by President Reagan to address
|
|
those same problems that worried the Pentagon. It was at these
|
|
secret meetings, according to the minutes, that the idea of a
|
|
communications watch center for national emergencies -- the NCC
|
|
-- was born. Along with it came a whole set of plans that would
|
|
allow the military to take over commercial communications
|
|
"assets" -- everything from ground stations and satellite dishes
|
|
to fiberoptic cables -- across the country.
|
|
At a 1983 Federal Communications Commission meeting, a
|
|
ranking Defense Department official offered the following
|
|
explanation for the founding of the National Coordinating Center:
|
|
"We are looking at trying to make communications endurable for a
|
|
protracted conflict." The phrase protracted conflict is a
|
|
military euphemism for nuclear war.
|
|
But could the NCC survive even the first volley in such a
|
|
conflict?
|
|
Not likely. It's located within a mile of the Pentagon,
|
|
itself an obvious early target of a Soviet nuclear barrage (or a
|
|
conventional strike, for that matter). And the Kremlin
|
|
undoubtedly knows its location and importance, and presumably has
|
|
included it on its priority target list. In sum, according to
|
|
one Pentagon official, "The NCC itself is not viewed as a
|
|
survivable facility."
|
|
Furthermore, the NCC's "Implementation Plan," obtained by
|
|
Omni, lists four phases of emergencies and how the center should
|
|
respond to each. The first, Phase 0, is Peacetime, for which
|
|
there would be little to do outside of a handful of routine tasks
|
|
and exercises. Phase 1 is Pre Attack, in which alternate NCC
|
|
sites are alerted. Phase 2 is Post Attack, in which other NCC
|
|
locations are instructed to take over the center's functions.
|
|
Phase 3 is known as Last Ditch, and in this phase whatever
|
|
facility survives becomes the de facto NCC.
|
|
So far there is no alternate National Coordinating Center to
|
|
which NCC officials could retreat to survive an attack.
|
|
According to NCC deputy director William Belford, no physical
|
|
sites have yet been chosen for a substitute NCC, and even whether
|
|
the NCC itself will survive a nuclear attack is still under
|
|
study.
|
|
Of what use is a communications center that is not expected
|
|
to outlast even the first shots of a war and has no backup?
|
|
The answer appears to be that because of the Pentagon's
|
|
concerns about the AT&T divestiture and the disruptive effects it
|
|
might have on national security, the NCC was to serve as the
|
|
military's peacetime communications center.
|
|
The center is a powerful and unprecedented tool to assume
|
|
control over the nation's vast communications and information
|
|
network. For years the Pentagon has been studying how to take
|
|
over the common carriers' facilities. That research was prepared
|
|
by <span class="ORG">NSTAC</span> at the DoD's request and is contained in a series of
|
|
internal Pentagon documents obtained by Omni. Collectively this
|
|
series is known as the Satellite Survivability Report. Completed
|
|
in 1984, it is the only detailed analysis to date of the
|
|
vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite network. It was
|
|
begun as a way of examining how to protect the network of
|
|
communications facilities from attack and how to keep it intact
|
|
for the DoD.
|
|
A major part of the report also contains an analysis of how
|
|
to make commercial satellites "interoperable" with Defense
|
|
Department systems. While the report notes that current
|
|
technical differences such as varying frequencies make it
|
|
difficult for the Pentagon to use commercial satellites, it
|
|
recommends ways to resolve those problems. Much of the report is
|
|
a veritable blueprint for the government on how to take over
|
|
satellites in orbit above the United States. This information,
|
|
plus NSDD 145's demand that satellite operators tell the NSA how
|
|
their satellites are controlled, guarantees the military ample
|
|
knowledge about operating commercial satellites.
|
|
The Pentagon now has an unprecedented access to the civilian
|
|
communications network: commercial databases, computer networks,
|
|
electronic links, telephone lines. All it needs is the legal
|
|
authority to use them. Then it could totally dominate the flow
|
|
of all information in the United States. As one high-ranking
|
|
White House communications official put it: "Whoever controls
|
|
communications, controls the country." His remark was made after
|
|
our State Department could not communicate directly with our
|
|
embassy in Manila during the anti-Marcos revolution last year.
|
|
To get through, the State Department had to relay all its
|
|
messages through the Philippine government.
|
|
Government officials have offered all kinds of scenarios to
|
|
justify the National Coordinating Center, the Satellite
|
|
Survivability Report, new domains of authority for the Pentagon
|
|
and the NSA, and the creation of top-level government steering
|
|
groups to think of even more policies for the military. Most can
|
|
be reduced to the rationale that inspired NSDD 145: that our
|
|
enemies (presumably the Soviets) have to be prevented from
|
|
getting too much information from unclassified sources. And the
|
|
only way to do that is to step in and take control of those
|
|
sources.
|
|
Remarkably, the communications industry as a whole has not
|
|
been concerned about the overall scope of the Pentagon's threat
|
|
to its freedom of operation. Most protests have been to
|
|
individual government actions. For example, a media coalition
|
|
that includes the Radio-Television Society of Newspaper Editors,
|
|
and the Turner Broadcasting System has been lobbying that before
|
|
the government can restrict the use of satellites, it must
|
|
demonstrate why such restrictions protect against a "threat to
|
|
distinct and compelling national security and foreign policy
|
|
interests." But the whole policy of restrictiveness has not been
|
|
examined. That may change sometime this year, when the Office of
|
|
Technology Assessment issues a report on how the Pentagon's
|
|
policy will affect communications in the United States. In the
|
|
meantime the military keeps trying to encroach on national
|
|
communications.
|
|
While it may seem unlikely that the Pentagon will ever get
|
|
total control of our information and communications systems, the
|
|
truth is that it can happen all too easily. The official
|
|
mechanisms are already in place; and few barriers remain to
|
|
guarantee that what we hear, see, and read will come to us
|
|
courtesy of our being members of a free and open society and not
|
|
courtesy of the Pentagon.</p>
|
|
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