textfiles-politics/pythonCode/personTestingOutput/moynihan.xml

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<p> "How The <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> Are Bugging <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>"
-------------------------------------</p>

<p> By Sen. <ent type='PERSON'>Daniel Patrick</ent> Moynihan</p>

<p> From <ent type='ORG'>Popular Mechanics</ent>, April 1987</p>

<p> <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> agents may be listening to your personal telephone
conversations. If you're involved in the government, in the
defense industry or in sensitive scientific activity, there
is a good chance they are. </p>

<p> In fact, a recent unclassified Senate <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent>
Committee report on counterintelligence indicates more than
half of all telephone calls in the United States made over
any distance are vulnerable to interception. Every <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>n
has a right to know this. </p>

<p> You should also know that the Reagan administration has
recognized this threat for a long time now, but so far, the
bureaucratic response has been piecemeal, and at times
reluctant. </p>

<p> Consider this as background: In 1975, when I was named
permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, Vice
President Nelson <ent type='PERSON'>Rockefeller</ent> summoned me to his office in the
Old Executive Office Building. There was something urgent he
had to tell me. The first thing I must know about the United
Nations, he said, is that the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> would be listening to
every call I made from our mission and from the ambassador's
suite in the Waldorf Towers. I thought this a very deep
secret, and treated it as such. Only later did I learn that
<ent type='PERSON'>Rockefeller</ent> had publicly reported this intelligence breach to
the president in June 1975. The <ent type='PERSON'>Rockefeller</ent> "Report to the
President on <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> Activities Within the United States" notes: </p>

<p> "We believe these countries (communist bloc) can monitor
and record thousands of private telephone conversations.
<ent type='GPE'>America</ent>ns have the right to be uneasy if not seriously
disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and
business activities, which they discuss freely over the
telephone, could be recorded and analyzed by agents of
foreign powers." </p>

<p> The <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> conduct this eavesdropping from their
"diplomatic" facilities in <ent type='GPE'>New York City</ent>; <ent type='LOC'>Glen Cove</ent>, Long
Island; <ent type='GPE'>San Francisco</ent>; and <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>. By some estimates,
they have been doing so since 1958. President Reagan knows
this well. He sat on the <ent type='PERSON'>Rockefeller</ent> Commission and signed
its final report concluding that such covert activities
existed. </p>

<p> If we had any doubts about this eavesdropping effort,
<ent type='PERSON'>Arkady Schevchenko</ent> dispelled them when he came over in 1975
and subsequently defected in 1978. As you will recall,
<ent type='PERSON'>Schevchenko</ent> was, at the time, the second-ranking <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> at
the United Nations and an up-and-comer in the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>
hierarchy. He describes the listening operation in <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>
City in his book "Breaking With <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>": "The rooftops at
<ent type='LOC'>Glen Cove</ent>, the apartment building in <ent type='GPE'>Riverdale</ent>, and the
Mission are bristled with antennas for listening to <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>n
conversations." </p>

<p> But we have to worry about more than just parabolic dish
antennas tucked behind the curtains in the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> "apartment"
building in <ent type='GPE'>Riverdale</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>. </p>

<p> There are also those <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent> trawlers that travel up and
down our coast. They are fishing, but fishing for what?
Communications. And now the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have taken their
eavesdropping a step further and have built two new classes
of AGI, or <ent type='ORG'>Auxiliary Gathering Intelligence</ent>, vessels. From
the hull up, these new vessels are floating antennas, I
suppose. </p>

<p> Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> listening
complex in <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>, just outside of <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent>. This
facility is the largest such <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> listening facility
outside its national territory. According to the president,
it "has grown by more than 60 percent in size and capability
during the past decade." </p>

<p> <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent> allows instant communications with <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>, and is
manned by 2100 <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> technicians. 2100! </p>

<p> By comparison, our Department of State numbers some 4400
Foreign Service Officers - total. </p>

<p> Again, to cite the recent Senate <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence Committee</ent>
report: "The massive <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> surveillance efforts from <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>
and elsewhere demonstrate ... that the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> intelligence
payoff from the interception of unsecured communications is
immense." <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent> specialists are not prone to
exaggeration, they do not last long that way. You can be
assured that "massive" and "immense" are not subtle words as
used in this context. </p>

<p> There are, however, two things you should know. </p>

<p> First, our most secret government messages are now
protected from interception or are scrambled, and all
classified message and data communications are secure. In
addition, protected communications zones are being
established in <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>San Francisco</ent> and <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> by
rerouting most government circuits and by encrypting
microwave links which continue to be vulnerable to intercept.
But there are still communications links which carry
unclassified, but sensitive, information that we need to
protect. </p>

<p> Second, it is a truism in the intelligence field that
while bits of information may be unclassified, in aggregate
they can present a classified whole. The Senate <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent>
Committee informs us, "Due to inherent human weakness,
government and contractor officials, at all levels,
inevitable fail to follow strict security rules ... Security
briefings and penalties were simply not adequate to prevent
discussion of classified information on open lines." If the
<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> CAN piece it together, you must assume they WILL
given the resources they invest toward this effort. </p>

<p> But the intelligence community needs no reminder that we
are up against a determined and crafty opponent. In 1983, for
example, a delegation of <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> scientists were invited to
tour a <ent type='ORG'>Grumman</ent> plant on <ent type='GPE'>Long Island</ent>. No cameras. No notes.
All secure, right? Wrong. The delegation had attached
adhesive tape to the soles of their shoes to gather metal
fragments from the plant floor for further study at home. The
<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> are pretty good at metallurgy - probably the best in
the world - and we don't need to help them any further. </p>

<p> But concern is not always translated into budgetary
action, at least not in the realm of communications security.
Let us take a look at the technical problem confronting us. </p>

<p> As you know, there are two basic ways voice can be
transmitted over telephone media: digital and analog. <ent type='ORG'>Analog</ent>
refers to voice waves which are modulated (amplified) up to a
very high frequency (HF). That is, they are increased in
speed from hundreds of cycles per second to thousands of
cycles per second. This facilitates their passage over
distance. </p>

<p> Nevertheless, because analog radio waves diminish rapidly
over distance, it's necessary to periodically amplify, or
boost, the signal either at a microwave relay tower repeater
or satellite transponder. (Actually, the signals are
diminished in frequency to voice quality and then brought
back up to high frequency.) </p>

<p> <ent type='ORG'>Digital</ent> transmissions are voice or data vibration signals
which are converted into a series of on-and-off pulses, zeros
and ones, as in a computer. Like analog telephone calls,
digital calls go through a process of modulation and
demodulation. </p>

<p> For the purposes of this discussion, we need only
remember two things about analog and digital telephony. </p>

<p> First, analog telephony is fast being replaced by digital
telephony because it better translates computer language.
But, more importantly, after a high initial overhaul cost,
it's possible to send thousands of digital calls (bundles)
over a single conduit. Therefore, as we expand our digital
capacity, we must ensure that both our analog and digital
communications are protected from <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> eavesdropping. </p>

<p> Second, sending bundles over a single conduit is the base
block at which we introduce the encryption I am talking
about. </p>

<p> When you place a long-distance telephone call from point
A to point B, there are three communications paths, or
circuits, over which your call might travel: microwave,
satellite or cable. </p>

<p> <ent type='ORG'>Cable</ent> is the most secure. However, it is the least
practical and economical method for bulk transmission over
long distances. As a result, 90 percent of our long-distance
telephone traffic is sent by microwave or satellite, and that
which is in the air can be readily intercepted. </p>

<p> As your signal travels along the cable from your home to
the local switching station and then on to a long-haul
switching station, it is combined (stacked and bundled might
better describe the process) with as many as 1200 other
signals trying to get to the same region of the country. </p>

<p> This system of stacking and bundling signals is called
multiplexing and it's how the telecommunications industry
gets around the problem of 7 million <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>ers all trying
to call their senator at the same time on the same copper
wire or radio frequency. </p>

<p> If you use a common carrier, that is, if you have not
rented a dedicated channel from a telecommunications company,
a computer at the long-haul switching station will select the
first available route to establish a circuit over which your
call signals may travel. </p>

<p> Therefore, calls that the caller believes to be on less
vulnerable circuits may be automatically switched to more
vulnerable ones. All this takes place in 1 to 3 seconds. </p>

<p> So let's follow your call as it goes by either microwave
or satellite. </p>

<p> If your call goes via microwave, it will be relayed
across the country as a radio wave in about 25-mile intervals
from tower to tower (watch for the towers the next time you
drive on an interstate route) until it eventually reaches a
distant switching station where it is unlinked from the other
signals, passed over cable to your friend's telephone, and
converted back into voice. </p>

<p> The problem with this system: Along these microwave paths
there is what we call "spill". This measures about 12.5
meters in width and the full 25 miles between towers. This is
where the microwave signal is most at risk. Using a well-aimed parabolic dish antenna (located, let's say, on the top
of <ent type='LOC'>Mount Alto</ent>, one of the highest hills in <ent type='GPE'>the District</ent> of
<ent type='GPE'>Columbia</ent>, and the site of the new <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> embassy) you can
intercept this signal and pull it in. And that is just what
the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> are doing. </p>

<p> My solution: Throw the bastards out if they are listening
to our microwave signals. Nothing technical about it. On
three occasions I have introduced legislation requiring the
president to do just that, unless in doing so, he might
compromise an intelligence source. On June 7, 1985, this
measure was adopted by the Senate as Title VII to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Bill, but it was dropped in
conference with <ent type='ORG'>the House</ent> of Representatives at the urging of
the administration. </p>

<p> Nevertheless, I think the administration accepted the
simple logic behind the proposal when at the end of October,
55 <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> diplomats were ordered to leave the country,
including, The <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> Times tells us, "operatives for
intercepting communications." Now, let's not let the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent>
just replace one agent with another. </p>

<p> The process is much the same for a satellite telephone
call. Today, approximately eight telecommunications carriers
offer satellite service using something like 25 satellites.
Let's suppose your signal has traveled to a long-haul
switching station and all microwave paths are filled. The
carrier's computer searches for an alternative path to send
the signal and picks out a satellite connection. At the
ground station, your call is sent by a transponder up to a
satellite and then down again to a distant ground station. </p>

<p> Using an array of satellite dishes at <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent>, the
<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> can seize these signals from the sky just as a
backyard satellite dish can pull in television (and
telephone) signals. High speed computers then sort through
the calls and identify topics and numbers of particular
interest. And if the information provided is real time
intelligence, the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have the ability to transmit it
instantaneously to <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>. And yes, the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have the
range at <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent> to grasp our satellite transmissions as they
travel from <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> to <ent type='GPE'>Los Angeles</ent> or <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> to <ent type='GPE'>Omaha</ent>. </p>

<p> Here, too, there is a solution: <ent type='ORG'>Develop</ent> and procure
cryptographic hardware for use at the common-carrier long-haul switching stations. This hardware will encrypt the
multiplexed telephone signals (that is, approximately 1200
calls at a time) before they are transmitted as radio waves
from ground station to ground station, a technique analogous
to the cable networks scrambling their signals. This can be
done for under $1 billion. If we start by encrypting just
those unclassified signals we categorize as sensitive, those
having greatest impact on the national defense or foreign
relations of the U.S. government, it would cost us about half
as much. It would cost us so much more not to do so. </p>

<p> Communications security has no constituency. There is no
tangible product and the public can never really be sure that
we have done anything. But National Security Decision
Directive 145 says it is a national policy and the national
responsibility to offer assistance to the private sector in
protecting communications. It's time to make communications
security (ComSec in the lingo) a true national security
priority supported with resources as well as rhetoric. This
was certainly the conclusion of the comprehensive
<ent type='ORG'>Intelligence Committee</ent> report. </p>

<p> I agree, and have suggested a way to get on with it. If
someone has a better idea - if you have another idea - I
would be happy to know it. The important thing is that we
stop this massive leak of sensitive information and protect
your privacy.</p>

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