textfiles-politics/pythonCode/personTestingOutput/ins-rich.xml

<xml><p>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Wrong Number BBS * ParaNet<special>sm</special> Pi * (201) 451-3063 24 hrs. 14.4 HST
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

FILE NAME: INS-RICH.TXT



SOFTWARE TO DIE FOR

<ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> Lawyer <ent type='PERSON'>Elliot Richardson</ent> Talks About Murder and the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>

by

<ent type='PERSON'>James Ridgeway</ent>

[from "MOVING TARGET" in the September 24, 1991
issue of the "Village Voice:"]


<ent type='GPE'>WASHINGTON</ent>--"It is far worse than <ent type='EVENT'>Watergate</ent>," says Elliot
<ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent>, the former attorney general who stood up to President
<ent type='PERSON'>Richard Nixon</ent> during that <ent type='NORP'>Republican</ent> scandal. "For Christ's sake,
this October Surprise business we are talking about is [built from]
truly horrible things ... I don't know whether it's true or not.
[But] there are a number of elements in the situation that are hard
to account for."
Convinced that freelance journalist <ent type='PERSON'>Danny Casolaro</ent>, who claimed
to have uncovered a sprawling conspiracy linking the October
Surprise and the <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent>-contra scandal to a contract dispute between
the Justice Department and a software company named <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>, was
murdered in a <ent type='GPE'>West Virginia</ent> hotel last month, <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent> has asked
the Justice Department to open a federal investigation into his
death. But even though <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent>, who is Inslaw's attorney, has
made both informal and direct personal pleas to acting attorney
general <ent type='PERSON'>William</ent> P. Barr for a full investigation, he has so far
received no reply.
And that's not the first time that <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent> has been ignored by
the Justice Department. <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent> wrote former attorney general
<ent type='PERSON'>Dick Thornberg</ent> in 1989 seeking an independent counsel in the <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>
case; <ent type='PERSON'>Thornberg</ent> never replied.
"I have never understood why ... I mean, I was attorney
general when <ent type='PERSON'>Thornberg</ent> was a U.S. attorney. I appointed him
chairman of a committee of U.S. attorneys, newly formed for the
first time. I am a responsible former public official. I am not a
wild-eyed nut."
So why didn't <ent type='PERSON'>Thornberg</ent> respond to Richardson's letter?
"You tell me. I would have responded to a responsible lawyer
whether I ever met him or not." When asked if he thought the lack
of a reply was insulting, <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent> said, "Certainly. Let's say
it's not easily explained, OK?
"The key thing about the death of <ent type='PERSON'>Casolaro</ent>," <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent>
continues, is that "although others were seeking to delineate . . .
the 'octopus' [Casolaro's term for the wide-ranging conspiracy], he
was the only one who told people who have no reason to misrepresent
what he said that he had hard evidence, and was on the point of
getting conclusive evidence. No one else made that claim. ... He
told four people, one at a time. The idea that he committed suicide
with a razor blade under these circumstances seems highly
implausible."
The investigation of Casolaro's death is still in the hands of
the <ent type='GPE'>West Virginia</ent> authorities, who ruled it a likely suicide August
14. But it is already apparent that there is more than meets the
eye to both the freelancer's "suicide" and the <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> case--and that
sealing a 10-year-old cover-up isn't necessarily the only
conceivable motive.
"This is a case in which any one of a number of potential
defendants would have every reason to commit murder," says
<ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent>, "and in which the litigants have every reason to fear
for their lives."

THE ORIGINS of the dispute over <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>, at least, are clearly
understood. A former analyst with <ent type='ORG'>the National Security Agency</ent> and
onetime contract employee of the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> (where he prepared analyses of
the foreign press), <ent type='PERSON'>Bill Hamilton</ent> founded <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> in the early 1970s
with his wife, <ent type='PERSON'>Nancy</ent>. <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> was initially begun with grants from
the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration;
when <ent type='ORG'>Congress</ent> killed <ent type='ORG'>LEAA</ent> in 1980, the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> transformed <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>
into a for-profit firm and continued to do business with Justice on
a contract basis. Today, they are business partners with <ent type='ORG'>IBM</ent>.
By that time they had developed a software package called Promis
that enabled law enforcement agencies to-keep up-to-the-minute tabs
on cases as they wound their way through the courts. It was
designed for district attorneys in large cities, and had been
installed on a pilot basis in two large U.S. attorneys' offices.
With Promis, a U.S. attorney could sit before a computer screen and
quickly find where any particular case stood, locate defendants and
witnesses, track every motion, and even follow an ongoing
investigation from its history down to the detective's most recent
report. As computers became smaller, increasing efficiency and
speed, the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> modified Promis, adding new functions and
making it speedier and more flexible.
In 1982, <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> signed a $10 million contract to install Promis
in U.S. attorney offices across the country. At first Justice
balked at paying fees for what it argued was public domain software
that had been developed under <ent type='ORG'>LEAA</ent> grants, but on advice of its own
counsel, the department ultimately agreed to pay for the
proprietary, enhanced version of Promis--whenever it was used.
Despite this agreement, the Justice Department's contracting
officer steadfastly refused to pay <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> for the use of Promis, and
by 1985 it had withheld nearly $2 million from the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>. At
that point <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> sought refuge in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
proceeded to sue Justice. In January 1988 <ent type='ORG'>the Bankruptcy Court</ent>
awarded <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> $6.8 million in damages plus counsel fees. Justice
appealed that ruling, but in November 1989 the federal district
court for <ent type='ORG'>the District</ent> of <ent type='GPE'>Columbia</ent> upheld <ent type='ORG'>the Bankruptcy Court</ent>'s
findings. Nevertheless, last spring the U.S. Court of <ent type='ORG'>Appeals</ent> ruled
that the case had been tried in the wrong courts for the past
several years, and must be retried; <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> is appealing to the
Supreme Court, and if that fails, the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> will file a new,
expanded suit.
While on this level the <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> affair appears to be a fairly
typical contract dispute, in fact the case has been marked from the
beginning with extraordinary behind-the-scenes politicking to wrest
control of Promis from <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>. First, the Justice Department
refused to recognize <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> as the rightful owner of the software it
had developed; then the chair of <ent type='ORG'>Hadron Inc</ent>., a software outfit
controlled by a friend of then-attorney general <ent type='PERSON'>Edwin Meese</ent>, tried
to buy the program from <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>. When <ent type='PERSON'>Hamilton</ent> refused, Hadron's
chair told him, "We have ways of making you sell."
Next, a venture capital firm, citing high-level Reagan
administration connections, tried to inveigle the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> into
signing over their voting rights on <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> stock. When the Justice
Department's refusal to pay fees forced the company into Chapter 11,
Justice officials didn't let up. They tried to force <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> into a
Chapter 7 liquidation, which would have finished off the company
completely. And when that didn't work, Justice officials encouraged
a <ent type='GPE'>Pennsylvania</ent> computer company to launch its own hostile takeover
bid.
Why such a fuss over computer software? In its court filings
<ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> alleges it is a victim of a conspiracy by <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> and his
friends, who stole Promis to make money. Chief among Meese's
cronies in the affair was <ent type='PERSON'>Earl Brian</ent>, currently chair of embattled
Infotech, Inc., which has large holdings in the bankrupt Financial
News Network and <ent type='ORG'>United Press International</ent>--not to mention <ent type='ORG'>Hadron</ent>,
the company that tried to buy Promis from <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>.
A combat surgeon in <ent type='GPE'>Vietnam</ent>, <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> was appointed secretary of
California's Department of Health and Welfare in 1970 by then-governor Ronald Reagan. When Reagan moved to <ent type='ORG'>the White House</ent>--with
<ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> as his counsel--<ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> served as the unpaid chair of a task
force on health care cost reduction; <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> also served along with
<ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> as a member of a "pro-competition" committee in the White
House. <ent type='PERSON'>Edwin Thomas</ent>, another longtime <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> associate who had
worked for <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> at <ent type='ORG'>the University</ent> of San Diego Law School and a
member of Reagan's <ent type='GPE'>California</ent> cabinet, joined them on the Reagan
transition team in 1980. The relationships between these three
<ent type='GPE'>California</ent>ns first created a stir when <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> went before the Senate
to be confirmed as attorney general in 1984.
An investigation by an independent counsel revealed a suspicious
series of events. Early in 1981, <ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent> lent Mrs. Ursula <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>
$15000; at the time, <ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent> was working directly for <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> as
assistant counsel to the president. Before he made the loan, <ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent>
discussed Brian's Infotech (then operating under the name of <ent type='ORG'>Biotech</ent>
Capital Corp.) with Mrs. <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>, and despite the fact that the
<ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>s were hard up for cash, she promptly took the money <ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent> had
loaned her and bought <ent type='ORG'>Biotech</ent> shares for her two children. <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>,
who knew about the loan, did not report it on his financial
disclosure forms.
Then, in July 1981, <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> loaned <ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent> $100000. In addition,
<ent type='PERSON'>Thomas</ent> made calls to <ent type='ORG'>the Small Business Administration</ent> on behalf of
a loan application from a <ent type='ORG'>Biotech</ent> subsidiary; the <ent type='ORG'>SBA</ent> eventually
granted the loan. No wrongdoing was ever adjudged in any of this.
In its court briefs, <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> cites the assertions of various
Justice officials connecting <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>, <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent>, and <ent type='ORG'>Hadron</ent>, Inc., with
the harassment of the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>' company. One whistleblower even
called a senator to warn that, once <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> was made attorney general,
he would award a friend with a "massive sweetheart contract" to
install Promis in every litigation office of the Justice Department.
After <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent> was named AG, the chief investigator of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Ronald LeGrand, called <ent type='PERSON'>Hamilton</ent> to pass on a
warning. He said that an unnamed senior official at Justice--whom
LeGrand had known for years and trusted--had told LeGrand that the
<ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> case was "a lot dirtier for <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent> of Justice than
<ent type='EVENT'>Watergate</ent> was, both in its breadth and its depth."
Up to this point, the <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> case still appears to be little more
than a contract dispute with overtones of political corruption. But
it doesn't stop there. As it turns out, there is considerable
reason to suspect that while Promis may have been meant as a plum
for one of Meese's cronies, it may also have played a role in an
international espionage operation conducted by the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>. And that's
where the case really begins to get interesting.

ACCORDING TO THE HAMILTONS, a high government official, nearly
speechless in his disgust, dropped by to tell them he had discovered
that the theft of Promis had actually begun with the military. The
<ent type='NORP'>British</ent> and U.S. navies needed a software program to conduct their
zone defense against <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> submarines in the <ent type='PERSON'>North</ent> Atlantic,
according to their informant. All <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> subs leave from the same
base near the <ent type='LOC'>Arctic</ent> circle, where they are easily detected, and
have to run a gauntlet of listening devices in the deep waters
between <ent type='GPE'>Iceland</ent> and <ent type='GPE'>Ireland</ent> before they break out into the open
ocean. With the help of painstakingly accurate maps of the
seafloor, the <ent type='NORP'>Russians</ent> have long been able to run through the
intricate twists and turns of the deep marine trenches near <ent type='GPE'>Iceland</ent>
at such speeds that they are usually able to lose their trackers.
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> and <ent type='NORP'>British</ent> subs needed a computer program that would allow
them to follow every move of a <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> sub and project its course and
position; they tried everything available, but no software could
follow all the variables quickly enough. Out of curiosity, they ran
a test with Promis--and it worked. So they simply appropriated the
program.
That, according to the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>' source, is how the theft got
started. But there is actually much more evidence to support
another theory of how and why the government started playing games
with Promis.
Several different former intelligence agents have told the
<ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> about various foreign countries that suddenly started
using versions of Promis in the mid-1980s, ranging from <ent type='GPE'>Iraq</ent> to
<ent type='GPE'>South Korea</ent>. These governments could use the program not only to
track criminals but for complex covert operations and to identify
"undesirables"--like revolutionaries. They suggest that the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>
obtained copies of the Promis software from the Justice Department
and sold it to various police and intelligence agencies overseas;
once installed, Promis actually became a high-tech bug, storing
secrets of the unsuspecting host government, including intimate
details of its internal police operations and intelligence service.
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> agencies could then penetrate and read the software.
"It was highly adaptable to tracking information of the kind that
intelligence agencies like to track," <ent type='PERSON'>Richardson</ent> says, "and the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>
adapted it to that purpose. Then, relying on <ent type='PERSON'>Earl Brian</ent>, [they]
started peddling it to foreign intelligence agencies."
The <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> got the barest inkling of the intelligence
implications for the first time last year. On November 5 their
daughter <ent type='PERSON'>Patty</ent>, who is a regional sales manager for <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>, got a
call from <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent> of Communications in the Canadian federal
government. They told her that Promis was widely used in <ent type='GPE'>Canada</ent>--it
had been installed in 900 different locations--and he wondered
whether she would help fill out a questionnaire about using the
software in both English and <ent type='NORP'>French</ent>.
This was all news to <ent type='PERSON'>Patty</ent>, since <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> had never sold Promis to
anyone in <ent type='GPE'>Canada</ent>. Playing dumb, the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> filled out the
questionnaire. Then, on a business trip to <ent type='GPE'>Montreal</ent> in January,
<ent type='PERSON'>Patty</ent> dropped in on <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent> of Communications for a chat.
She asked the officials about the questionnaire and where Promis was
being used. The Canadians checked their codes and told her it was
on line with <ent type='ORG'>the Royal</ent> Canadian Mounted Police and with an agency
they did not know.
Then <ent type='PERSON'>Patty</ent> made an unannounced visit to the responsible official
at Mountie HQ, who promptly denied all knowledge of Promis, and
dismissed <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent> of Communications as a bunch of "kooks."
When <ent type='PERSON'>Patty</ent> returned to <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>, <ent type='PERSON'>Bill Hamilton</ent> tried to, find out
where the Canadians had gotten Promis, but suddenly everything had
changed: <ent type='ORG'>The Department</ent> of Communications begged forgiveness for
their error, saying it wasn't the <ent type='LOC'>Mounties</ent> at all but the
international development office that was using Promis. When
<ent type='PERSON'>Hamilton</ent> told them the software had never been sold to anybody in
<ent type='GPE'>Canada</ent>, they backtracked, apologized once again, and said that, in
fact, no one was using it.
That's when Michael J. Riconosciuto, a researcher and self-described arms expert, came forward. Riconosciuto had first called
<ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> out of the blue in the spring of 1990, and he has continued
to do so from pay phones around the West. He claimed to have worked
as research director for a joint venture between the <ent type='ORG'>Wackenhut</ent>
Corporation, the big security outfit, and the <ent type='ORG'>Cabazon</ent> <ent type='NORP'>Indians</ent>, who
have a reservation at Indio, <ent type='GPE'>California</ent>. The joint venture
supposedly manufactured military material, such things as night-vision goggles, machine guns, fuel air explosives, and biological
and chemical weapons for foreign governments, including those in the
Middle East and <ent type='LOC'>Central America</ent>, and for covert operations of one
sort or another. The contras were to be a prime market. The
<ent type='ORG'>Cabazon</ent> tribe enjoyed quasi-sovereign status, allowing the arms
manufacturers to operate outside stringent restrictions on the
manufacture of armaments in the rest of <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. As an
added sweetener, the <ent type='NORP'>Indians</ent> could take advantage of minority set-aside contracts.
Riconosciuto claims, in an affidavit given to <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>, to have
made modifications on Promis software provided him by <ent type='PERSON'>Earl Brian</ent> for
both the Canadian <ent type='LOC'>Mounties</ent> and the Canadian Security and
Intelligence Service. <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent>, he says, was the man who had sold the
software to the Canadians. Riconosciuto is currently in prison in
<ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> state awaiting trial on drug charges, and his statement
would be of dubious value--except that many of the details do check
out independently. For one thing, <ent type='ORG'>the San Francisco Chronicle</ent> ran a
series of articles on the <ent type='ORG'>Cabazon</ent> <ent type='NORP'>Indians</ent> last week that seemed to
bear out the claims about weapons manufacturing on the reservation.

BY THIS <ent type='ORG'>TIME</ent> the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> were pretty sure Promis had been pirated
abroad, and they began to hear stories of Promis cropping up in all
sorts of foreign countries. Ari Ben-Menashe, a former <ent type='NORP'>Israeli</ent>
intelligence asset, provided an affidavit that says that in December
1982 <ent type='PERSON'>Rafael Eitan</ent>, the <ent type='NORP'>Israeli</ent> government's counterterrorism
adviser, told him he had obtained Promis from <ent type='PERSON'>Earl Brian</ent> and Robert
McFarlane, then Reagan's national security adviser. In 1987 Ben-Menashe said he was at a meeting in <ent type='GPE'>Israel</ent> where <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> said he owned
Promis. Ben-Menashe said he had been assigned to stop a sale of
chemical weapons by <ent type='NORP'>Chilean</ent> arms dealer <ent type='PERSON'>Carlos Cardoen</ent> to <ent type='GPE'>Iraq</ent>.
"Mr. <ent type='PERSON'>Carlos Cardoen</ent> ... stated to me that he brokered a deal
between Dr. <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> and a representative of <ent type='GPE'>Iraq</ent>i ... military
intelligence for the use of Promis," he recalled.
Richard Babayan, an <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent>ian arms dealer, said in an affidavit
that during 1987 he met a member of <ent type='GPE'>Iraq</ent>i intelligence who told him
<ent type='GPE'>Iraq</ent> had acquired Promis from <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> on the recommendation of the
<ent type='NORP'>Libyan</ent> government. He went on to say he was told by an official of
<ent type='ORG'>the Korea Development Corporation</ent>, which he said was a front for the
<ent type='NORP'>Korean</ent> <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> that <ent type='PERSON'>Brian</ent> had sold Promis to the <ent type='NORP'>Korean</ent>s as well.
The <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent> also continue to get tips about Promis popping up
all over <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. Although it formally denies using the
program, high Justice Department officials have told the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>
that <ent type='ORG'>FBI</ent> officials had admitted the software in their field offices
is a renamed version of Promis.
The possibility of Promis being employed as an espionage tool is
given further credence by the curiously disinterested attitude of
government in getting to the bottom of the <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> mess. <ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent>
itself has been unable to obtain subpoena power from the courts
except for a brief period last spring, but those subpoenas were
frustrated when the <ent type='ORG'>Appeals</ent> court threw out the case just as the
deadline for Justice to turn over the documents approached. Senator
<ent type='PERSON'>Sam Nunn</ent>'s Senate Permanent Investigations subcommittee conducted an
investigation, but received little cooperation from Justice.
<ent type='GPE'>Texas</ent> congressman <ent type='PERSON'>Jack Brooks</ent>'s judiciary committee has been
looking into the affair for the last two years, but only issued
subpoenas last July. <ent type='ORG'>Brooks</ent> is believed to have interviewed <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>
and his friends. According to the <ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>, the files of the
Justice Department's chief litigating attorney on the case have
disappeared.

UNLIKE THE MURKY October Surprise scandal or the compromised
congressional investigations into <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent>-contra, the facts in the
<ent type='ORG'>Inslaw</ent> case are clear. <ent type='ORG'>Emerging</ent> from a low-level bankruptcy court,
they paint a virtually indisputable case of corporate theft,
political corruption, and the very real possibility of international
espionage. The issue goes straight to <ent type='ORG'>the White House</ent> and involves
officials at the highest levels of the Justice Department in what
appears to be a deliberate campaign of intimidation, theft, and
corruption. By now, that ought to have led to a serious
congressional investigation.
Unlike <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent>-contra, no one in this case has pleaded national
security as a defense, though that's likely before it's over. But
in a sense, it is already too late for that. The facts are too
well-delineated. If the opinions of two judges are correct, this
case ought to result in criminal indictments of past and present
Justice officials.
As <ent type='PERSON'>Elliot Richardson</ent> says, "Why in the world would this one group
of informers ever have come together and cooked up all this stuff?
How did they keep it consistent from day to day among themselves as
to who told what to whom? There is a hell of a load of stuff
they've told to various people, including staffers, journalists, the
<ent type='PERSON'>Hamiltons</ent>, me. The picture they paint is relatively coherent and
consistent ... and then you add the stonewalling by <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent>
of Justice. I have never understood why."

--
daveus rattus

yer friendly neighborhood ratman

KOYAANISQATSI

ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from <ent type='EVENT'>the Hopi Language</ent>) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.

</p></xml>