textfiles-politics/pythonCode/personTestingOutput/fema-3.xml

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[PeaceNet forward from <ent type='ORG'>AML</ent> (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
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/** mideast.forum: 216.5 **/
** Written 8:11 pm Jan 17, 1991 by nlgclc in cdp:mideast.forum **
An excellent book which deals with the <ent type='ORG'>REX</ent> 84 detention plan is:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
"Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver <ent type='PERSON'>North</ent>,'' by Ben
<ent type='PERSON'>Bradlee</ent> Jr. (<ent type='PERSON'>Donald</ent> I. fine, $21.95. 573 pp.)
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Reviewed by Dennis M. Culnan Copyright 1990, Gannett News Service All
Rights Reserved Short excerpt posted here under applicable copyright
laws

[Oliver] <ent type='PERSON'>North</ent> managed to network himself into the highest levels of
the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> and power centers around the world. There he lied and
boastfully ignored the constitutional process, <ent type='PERSON'>Bradlee</ent> writes.

Yet more terrifying is the plan hatched by <ent type='PERSON'>North</ent> and other Reagan
people in <ent type='ORG'>the Federal Emergency Manpower Agency</ent> (<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>): A blueprint
for the military takeover of <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. The plan called for
<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> to become "emergency czar'' in the event of a national emergency
such as nuclear war or an <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> invasion of a foreign nation. <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>
would also be a buffer between the president and his cabinet and other
civilian agencies, and would have broad powers to appoint military
commanders and run state and local governments. Finally, it would
have the authority to order suspect aliens into concentration camps
and seize their property.

When then-Attorney General <ent type='PERSON'>William <ent type='NORP'>French</ent> <ent type='PERSON'>Smith</ent></ent> got wind of the plan,
he killed it. After <ent type='PERSON'>Smith</ent> left the administration, <ent type='PERSON'>North</ent> and his <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>
cronies came up with the <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Resource Act, designed to suspendend
the First Amendment by imposing censorship and banning strikes.

Where was it all heading? The book's answer: "<ent type='ORG'>REX</ent>-84 Bravo, a
<ent type='ORG'>National Security Decision Directive</ent> 52 that would become operative
with the president's declaration of a state of national emergency
concurrent with a mythical U.S. military invasion of an unspecified
Central <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> country, presumably <ent type='GPE'>Nicaragua</ent>.''

<ent type='PERSON'>Bradlee</ent> writes that the <ent type='ORG'>Rex</ent> exercise was designed to test FEMA's
readiness to assume authority over <ent type='ORG'>the Department</ent> of <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent>, the
<ent type='ORG'>National Guard</ent> in all 50 states, and "a number of state defense
forces to be established by state legislatures.'' The military would
then be "deputized,'' thus making an end run around federal law
forbidding military involvement in domestic law enforcement.

<ent type='ORG'>Rex</ent>, which ran concurrently with the first annual U.S. show of force
in <ent type='GPE'>Honduras</ent> in April 1984, was also designed to test FEMA's ability to
round up 400000 undocumented Central <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> aliens in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent>
States and its ability to distribute hundreds of tons of small arms to
"state defense forces.''

Incredibly, <ent type='ORG'>REX</ent> 84 was similar to a plan secretly adopted by Reagan
while governor of <ent type='GPE'>California</ent>. His two top henchmen then were Edwin
<ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>, who recently resigned as U.S. attorney general, and Louis
Guiffrida, the <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> director in 1984.

If the review makes you nervous, you should read the book!

--<ent type='PERSON'>Chip Berlet</ent> ** End of text from cdp:mideast.forum **

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[PeaceNet forward from <ent type='ORG'>AML</ent> (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
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This is the front-page article of the Jan. 16 issue of "The
Guardian," which describes some of the U.S. government's planning
for martial law in the event of <ent type='EVENT'>the Gulf war</ent>. This is truly a
scary scenario that should concern all civil libertarians and
patriots.
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WILL GULF WAR LEAD TO REPRESSION AT HOME?
by Paul DeRienzo and <ent type='PERSON'>Bill Weinberg</ent>

On August 2, 1990, as <ent type='PERSON'>Saddam Hussein</ent>'s army was consolidating control
over <ent type='GPE'>Kuwait</ent>, President <ent type='PERSON'>George Bush</ent> responded by signing two executive
orders that were the first step toward martial law in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent>
States and suspending the Constitution.

On the surface, Executive Orders 12722 and 12723, declaring a
"national emergency," merely invoked laws that allowed <ent type='PERSON'>Bush</ent> to freeze
<ent type='NORP'>Iraqi</ent> assets in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States.

<ent type='ORG'>The International Emergency Executive Powers Act</ent> permits the president
to freeze foreign assets after declaring a "national emergency," a
move that has been made three times before -- against <ent type='GPE'>Panama</ent> in 1987,
<ent type='GPE'>Nicaragua</ent> in 1985 and <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent> in 1979.

According to Professor <ent type='PERSON'>Diana</ent> <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent>, of <ent type='ORG'>the Fletcher School</ent> of
Diplomacy at Boston's <ent type='ORG'>Tufts University</ent>, when <ent type='PERSON'>Bush</ent> declared a national
emergency he "activated one part of a contingency national security
emergency plan." That plan is made up of a series of laws passed since
the presidency of <ent type='PERSON'>Richard Nixon</ent>, which <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> says give the
president "boundless" powers.

According to <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent>, such laws as the <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Industrial
Revitalization and Disaster Relief Acts of 1983 "would permit the
president to do anything from seizing the means of production, to
conscripting a labor force, to relocating groups of citizens."

<ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> says the net effect of invoking these laws would be the
suspension of the Constitution.

She adds that national emergency powers "permit the stationing of the
military in cities and towns, closing off the U.S. borders, freezing
all imports and exports, allocating all resources on a national
security priority, monitoring and censoring the press, and warrantless
searches and seizures."

The measures would allow military authorities to proclaim martial law
in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States, asserts <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent>. She defines martial law as the
"federal authority taking over for local authority when they are
unable to maintain law and order or to assure a <ent type='NORP'>republican</ent> form of
government."

A report called "<ent type='ORG'>Post Attack Recovery Strategies</ent>," about rebuilding
the country after a nuclear war, prepared by the right-wing Hudson
Institute in 1980, defines martial law as dealing "with the control of
civilians by their own military forces in time of emergency."

The federal agency with the authority to organize and command the
government's response to a national emergency is the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>). This super-secret and elite agency was
formed in 1979 under congressional measures that merged all federal
powers dealing with civilian and military emergencies under one
agency.

<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> has its roots in <ent type='EVENT'>the World War</ent> I partnership between government
and corporate leaders who helped mobilize the nation's industries to
support the war effort. The idea of a central national response to
large-scale emergencies was reintroduced in the early 1970s by Louis
<ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent>, a close associate of then-<ent type='GPE'>California</ent> Gov. Ronald Reagan and
his chief aide <ent type='PERSON'>Edwin Meese</ent>.

Reagan appointed <ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent> head of the <ent type='GPE'>California</ent> <ent type='ORG'>National Guard</ent> in
1969. With <ent type='PERSON'>Meese</ent>, <ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent> organized "war-games" to prepare for
"statewide martial law" in the event that Black nationalists and
anti-war protesters "challenged the authority of the state." In 1981,
Reagan as president moved <ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent> up to the big leagues, appointing
him director of <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>.

According to <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent>, however, it was the actions of <ent type='PERSON'>George Bush</ent> in
1976, while he was the director of <ent type='ORG'>the Central Intelligence Agency</ent>
(<ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>), that provided the stimulus for centralization of vast powers in
<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>.

<ent type='PERSON'>Bush</ent> assembled a group of hawkish outsiders, called Team B, that
released a report claiming the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> ("Team A") had underestimated the
dangers of <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> nuclear attack. The report advised the development
of elaborate plans for "civil defense" and post-nuclear government.
Three years later, in 1979, <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> was given ultimate responsibility for
developing these plans.

Aware of the bad publicity <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> was getting because of its role in
organizing for a post-nuclear world, Reagan's <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> chief <ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent>
publicly argued that the 1865 Posse Comitatus Act prohibited the
military from arresting civilians.

However, <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> says that <ent type='ORG'>Congress</ent> eroded the act by giving the
military reserves an exemption from Posse Comitatus and allowing them
to arrest civilians. <ent type='ORG'>The National Guard</ent>, under the control of state
governors in peace time, is also exempt from the act and can arrest
civilians.

<ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> Inspector General <ent type='PERSON'>John Brinkerhoff</ent> has written a memo contending
that the government doesn't need to suspend the Constitution to use
the full range of powers <ent type='ORG'>Congress</ent> has given the agency. <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> has
prepared legislation to be introduced in <ent type='ORG'>Congress</ent> in the event of a
national emergency that would give the agency sweeping powers. The
right to "deputize" <ent type='ORG'>National Guard</ent> and police forces is included in
the package. But <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> believes that actual martial law need not be
declared publicly.

<ent type='PERSON'>Giuffrida</ent> has written that "Martial Rule comes into existence upon a
determination (not a declaration) by the senior military commander
that the civil government must be replaced because it is no longer
functioning anyway." He adds that "Martial Rule is limited only by the
principle of necessary force."

According to <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent>, it is possible for the president to make
declarations concerning a national emergency secretly in the form of a
Natioanl Security Decision Directive. Most such directives are
classified as so secret that <ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> says "researchers don't even
know how many are enacted."

DOMESTIC SPYING

Throughout the 1980s, <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> was prohibited from engaging in
intelligence gathering. But on July 6, 1989, <ent type='PERSON'>Bush</ent> signed Executive
Order 12681, pronouncing that FEMA's <ent type='ORG'>National Preparedness Directorate</ent>
would "have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence,
investigative, or national security work." Recent events indicate that
domestic spying in response to the looming <ent type='LOC'>Middle East</ent> war is now
under way.

<ent type='PERSON'>Reynolds</ent> reports that "the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> is going to various campuses asking for
information on <ent type='LOC'>Middle East</ent>ern students. I'm sure that there are
intelligence organizations monitoring peace demonstrations."
According to <ent type='ORG'>the University</ent> of Connecticut student paper, the Daily
Campus, <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> officials have recently met there to discuss talking with
<ent type='LOC'>Middle East</ent>ern students.

<ent type='ORG'>The New York</ent> Times reports that the <ent type='ORG'>FBI</ent> has ordered its agents around
the country to question Arab-<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> leaders and business people in
search of information on potential <ent type='NORP'>Iraqi</ent> "terrorist" attacks in
response to a <ent type='EVENT'>Gulf war</ent>.

A 1986 <ent type='ORG'>Immigration and Naturalization Service</ent> (<ent type='ORG'>INS</ent>) document entitled
"Alien Terrorists and Other Undesirables: A Contingency Plan" outlines
the potential round-up and incarceration in mass detainment camps of
U.S. residents who are citizens of "terrorist" countries, chiefly in
the <ent type='LOC'>Middle East</ent>. This plan echoed a 1984 <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> nationwide "readiness
exercise code-named <ent type='ORG'>REX</ent>-84 ALPHA, which included the rehearsal of
joint operations with the <ent type='ORG'>INS</ent> to round up 40000 Central <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>
refugees in the event of a U.S. invasion of the region. One of the 10
military bases established as detainment camps by <ent type='ORG'>REX</ent>-84 ALPHA, Camp
Krome, <ent type='GPE'>Fla</ent>., was designated a joint <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent>-Immigration service
interrogation center.

Recently, <ent type='ORG'>FEMA</ent> has been criticized in the media for inadequate
response to the October, 1989 <ent type='GPE'>San Francisco</ent> earthquake. What the
mainstream press has failed to cover is the agency's planned role in
repressing domestic dissent in the event of an invasion abroad.

Source: The Guardian, Jan 16 1991

The Guardian is an independent radical news weekly. Subscriptions are
available at $33.50 per year from The Guardian, 33 West 17th St., New
York, NY 10011


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----------------------------<ent type='ORG'>REF</ent>5:<ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145-------------------------------

DATE OF <ent type='ORG'>UPLOAD</ent>: November 17, 1989
ORIGIN OF <ent type='ORG'>UPLOAD</ent>: <ent type='ORG'>Omni Magazine</ent>
CONTRIBUTED BY: <ent type='PERSON'>Donald</ent> Goldberg

========================================================
PARANET INFORMATION SERVICE BBS
========================================================
Although this article does not deal directly with <ent type='EVENT'>UFOs</ent>,
ParaNet felt it important as an offering to our readers who
depend so much upon communications as a way to stay informed.
This article raises some interesting implications for the future
of communications.


<ent type='ORG'>THE NATIONAL GUARDS</ent>
(C) 1987 <ent type='ORG'>OMNI</ent> MAGAZINE MAY 1987
(Reprinted with permission and license to ParaNet Information
Service and its affiliates.)

By <ent type='PERSON'>Donald</ent> Goldberg

The mountains bend as the fjord and the sea beyond stretch
out before the viewer's eyes. First over the water, then a sharp
left turn, then a bank to the right between the peaks, and the
secret naval base unfolds upon the screen.
The scene is of a <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> military installation on the Kola
Peninsula in the icy <ent type='LOC'>Barents Sea</ent>, a place usually off-limits to
the gaze of the <ent type='NORP'>Western</ent> world. It was captured by a small <ent type='NORP'>French</ent>
satellite called SPOT Image, orbiting at an altitude of 517 miles
above the hidden <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent> outpost. On each of several passes --
made over a two-week period last fall -- the satellite's high-resolution lens took its pictures at a different angle; the
images were then blended into a three-dimensional, computer-generated video. Buildings, docks, vessels, and details of the
Artic landscape are all clearly visible.
Half a world away and thousands of feet under the sea,
sparkling-clear images are being made of the ocean floor. Using
the latest bathymetric technology and state-of-the-art systems
known as <ent type='ORG'>Seam Beam</ent> and <ent type='NORP'>Hydrochart</ent>, researchers are for the first
time assembling detailed underwater maps of the continental
shelves and the depths of the world's oceans. These scenes of
the sea are as sophisticated as the photographs taken from the
satellite.
From the three-dimensional images taken far above the earth
to the charts of the bottom of the oceans, these photographic
systems have three things in common: They both rely on the
latest technology to create accurate pictures never dreamed of
even 25 years ago; they are being made widely available by
commerical, nongovernmental enterprises; and the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> is
trying desperately to keep them from the general public.
In 1985 the <ent type='ORG'>Navy</ent> classified the underwater charts, making
them available only to approved researchers whose needs are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under a 1984 law the military
has been given a say in what cameras can be licensed to be used
on <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> satellites; and officials have already announced they
plan to limit the quality and resolution of photos made
available. <ent type='ORG'>The National Security Agency</ent> (<ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>) -- the secret arm
of the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> in charge of gathering electronic intelligence as
well as protecting sensitive U.S. communications -- has defeated
a move to keep it away from civilian and commercial computers and
databases.
That attitude has outraged those concerned with the
military's increasing efforts to keep information not only from
the public but from industry experts, scientists, and even other
government officials as well. "That's like classifying a road
map for fear of invasion," says <ent type='PERSON'>Paul Wolff</ent>, assistant
administrator for <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, of the attempted restrictions.
These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of
scientists, researchers, the news media, and the public at large
are a part of an alarming trend that has seen the military take
an ever-increasing role in controlling the flow of information
and communications through <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> society, a role traditionally
-- and almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the
approving gaze of the Reagan administration, Department of
<ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> (DoD) officials have quietly implemented a number of
policies, decisions, and orders that give the military
unprecedented control over both the content and public use of
data and communications. For example:

**The <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> has created a new category of "sensitive" but
unclassified information that allows it to keep from public
access huge quantities of data that were once widely accessible.
**<ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent> officials have attempted to rewrite key laws
that spell out when the president can and cannot appropriate
private communications facilities.
**The <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> has installed a system that enables it to seize
control of the nation's entire communications network -- the
phone system, data transmissions, and satellite transmissions of
all kinds -- in the event of what it deems a "national
emergency." As yet there is no single, universally agreed-upon
definition of what constitutes such a state. Usually such an
emergency is restricted to times of natural disaster, war, or
when national security is specifically threatened. Now the
military has attempted to redefine emergency.
The point man in the Pentagon's onslaught on communications
is Assistant <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Secretary <ent type='PERSON'>Donald</ent> C. <ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent>, a former <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>
deputy chief. <ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent> now heads up an interagency committee in
charge of writing and implementing many of the policies that have
put the military in charge of the flow of civilian information
and communication. He is also the architect of National Security
Decision Directive 145 (<ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145), signed by <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Secretary
<ent type='PERSON'>Caspar Weinberger</ent> in 1984, which sets out the national policy on
telecommunications and computer-systems security.
First <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145 set up a steering group of top-level
administration officials. Their job is to recommend ways to
protect information that is unclassified but has been designated
sensitive. Such information is held not only by government
agencies but by private companies as well. And last October the
steering group issued a memorandum that defined sensitive
information and gave federal agencies broad new powers to keep it
from the public.
According to <ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent>, this new category includes such data as
all medical records on government databases -- from the files of
<ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Cancer Institute to information on every veteran who
has ever applied for medical aid from <ent type='ORG'>the Veterans Administration</ent>
-- and all the information on corporate and personal taxpayers in
<ent type='ORG'>the Internal Revenue Service</ent>'s computers. Even agricultural
statistics, he argues, can be used by a foreign power against the
United States.
In his oversize yet Spartan <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> office, <ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent> cuts
anything but an intimidating figure. <ent type='ORG'>Articulate</ent> and friendly, he
could pass for a network anchorman or a television game show
host. When asked how the government's new definition of
sensitive information will be used, he defends the necessity for
it and tries to put to rest concerns about a new restrictiveness.
"The debate that somehow the DoD and <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> are going to
monitor or get into private databases isn't the case at all,"
<ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent> insists. "The definition is just a guideline, just an
advisory. It does not give the DoD the right to go into private
records."
Yet the <ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent> invoked the <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145 guidelines
when it told the information industry it intends to restrict the
sale of data that are now unclassified and publicly available
from privately owned computer systems. The excuse if offered was
that these data often include technical information that might be
valuable to a foreign adversary like the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> Union.
<ent type='ORG'>Mead Data Central</ent> -- which runs some of the nation's largest
computer databases, such as <ent type='PERSON'>Lexis</ent> and <ent type='ORG'>Nexis</ent>, and has nearly
200000 users -- says it has already been approached by a team of
agents from <ent type='ORG'>the Air Force</ent> and officials from the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> and the <ent type='ORG'>FBI</ent>
who asked for the names of subscribers and inquired what <ent type='PERSON'>Mead</ent>
officials might do if information restrictions were imposed. In
response to government pressure, <ent type='ORG'>Mead Data Central</ent> in effect
censured itself. It purged all unclassified government-supplied
technical data from its system and completely dropped the
National Technical Information System from its database rather
than risk a confrontation.
Representative <ent type='PERSON'>Jack Brooks</ent>, a <ent type='GPE'>Texas</ent> <ent type='NORP'>Democrat</ent> who chairs the
<ent type='ORG'>House</ent> Government Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of
the NSA's role in restricting civilian information. He notes
that in 1985 the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> -- under the authority granted by <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145
-- investigated a computer program that was widely used in both
local and federal elections in 1984. The computer system was
used to count more than one third of all votes cast in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent>
States. While probing the system's vulnerability to outside
manipulation, the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> obtained a detailed knowledge of that
computer program. "In my view," <ent type='ORG'>Brooks</ent> says, "this is an
unprecedented and ill-advised expansion of the military's
influence in our society."
There are other <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> critics. "The computer systems used by
counties to collect and process votes have nothing to do with
national security, and I'm really concerned about the NSA's
involvement," says <ent type='NORP'>Democrat</ent>ic congressman <ent type='PERSON'>Dan Glickman</ent> of <ent type='GPE'>Kansas</ent>,
chairman of the <ent type='ORG'>House</ent> science and technology subcommittee
concerned with computer security.
Also, under <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145 the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> has issued an order,
virtually unknown to all but a few industry executives, that
affects commercial communications satellites. The policy was
made official by <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Secretary <ent type='PERSON'>Weinberger</ent> in June of 1985 and
requires that all commercial satellite operators that carry such
unclassified government data traffic as routine <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> supply
information and payroll data (and that compete for lucrative
government contracts) install costly protective systems on all
satellites launched after 1990. The policy does not directly
affect the data over satellite channels, but it does make the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>
privy to vital information about the essential signals needed to
operate a satellite. With this information it could take control
of any satellite it chooses.
<ent type='PERSON'>Latham</ent> insists this, too, is a voluntary policy and that
only companies that wish to install protection will have their
systems evaluated by the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>. He also says industry officials
are wholly behind the move, and argues that the protective
systems are necessary. With just a few thousand dollars' worth
of equipment, a disgruntled employee could interfere with a
satellite's control signals and disable or even wipe out a
hundred-million-dollar satellite carrying government information.
At best, his comments are misleading. First, the policy is
not voluntary. The <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> can cut off lucrative government
contracts to companies that do not comply with the plan. The
<ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> alone spent more than a billion dollars leasing
commercial satellite channels last year; that's a powerful
incentive for business to cooperate.
Second, the industry's support is anything but total.
According to the minutes of one closed-door meeting between <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>
officials -- along with representatives of other federal agencies
-- and executives from AT&amp;T, <ent type='ORG'>Comsat</ent>, <ent type='ORG'>GTE Sprint</ent>, and <ent type='ORG'>MCI</ent>, the
executives neither supported the move nor believed it was
necessary. The <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> defended the policy by arguing that a
satellite could be held for ransom if the command and control
links weren't protected. But experts at the meeting were
skeptical.
"Why is the threat limited to accessing the satellite rather
than destroying it with lasers or high-powered signals?" one
industry executive wanted to know.
Most of the officials present objected to the high cost of
protecting the satellites. According to a 1983 study made at the
request of the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>, the protection demanded by the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> could
add as much as $3 million to the price of a satellite and $1
million more to annual operating costs. Costs like these, they
argue, could cripple a company competing against less expensive
communications networks.
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent>s get much of their information through forms of
electronic communications, from the telephone, television and
radio, and information printed in many newspapers. Banks send
important financial data, businesses their spreadsheets, and
stockbrokers their investment portfolios, all over the same
channels, from satellite signals to computer hookups carried on
long distance telephone lines. To make sure that the federal
government helped to promote and protect the efficient use of
this advancing technology, <ent type='ORG'>Congress</ent> passed the massive
Communications Act of of 1934. It outlined the role and laws of
the communications structure in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States.
The powers of the president are set out in Section 606 of
that law; basically it states that he has the authority to take
control of any communications facilities that he believes
"essential to the national defense." In the language of the
trade this is known as a 606 emergency.
There have been a number of attempts in recent years by
<ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent> officials to redefine what qualifies as a 606
emergency and make it easier for the military to take over
national communications.
In 1981 the Senate considered amendments to the 1934 act
that would allow the president, on <ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent>
recommendation, to require any communications company to provide
services, facilities, or equipment "to promote the national
defense and security or the emergency preparedness of the
nation," even in peacetime and without a declared state of
emergency. The general language had been drafted by <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent>
Department officials. (The bill failed to pass the <ent type='ORG'>House</ent> for
unrelated reasons.)
"I think it is quite clear that they have snuck in there
some powers that are dangerous for us as a company and for the
public at large," said <ent type='ORG'>MCI</ent> vice president <ent type='PERSON'>Kenneth Cox</ent> before the
Senate vote.
Since President Reagan took office, the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> has stepped
up its efforts to rewrite the definition of national emergency
and give the military expanded powers in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. "The
declaration of 'emergency' has always been vague," says one
former administration official who left the government in 1982
after ten years in top policy posts. "Different presidents have
invoked it differently. This administration would declare a
convenient 'emergency.'" In other words, what is a nuisance to
one administration might qualify as a burgeoning crisis to
another. For example, the Reagan administration might decide
that a series of protests on or near military bases constituted a
national emergency.
Should the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> ever be given the green light, its base
for taking over the nation's communications system would be a
nondescript yellow brick building within the maze of high rises,
government buildings, and apartment complexes that make up the
<ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> suburb of <ent type='GPE'>Arlington</ent>, Virginia. Headquartered in a
dusty and aging structure surrounded by a barbed-wire fence is an
obscure branch of the military known as the <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent>
Communications Agency (<ent type='ORG'>DCA</ent>). It does not have the spit and
polish of <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Security Agency or the dozens of other
government facilities that make up the nation's capital. But its
lack of shine belies its critical mission: to make sure all of
America's far-flung military units can communicate with one
another. It is in certain ways the nerve center of our nation's
defense system.
On the second floor of the DCA's four-story headquarters is
a new addition called <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Coordinating Center (<ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>).
Operated by the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>, it is virtually unknown outside of a
handful of industry and government officials. The <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> is staffed
around the clock by representatives of a dozen of the nation's
largest commercial communications companies -- the so-called
"common carriers" -- including AT&amp;T, <ent type='ORG'>MCI</ent>, <ent type='ORG'>GTE</ent>, <ent type='ORG'>Comsat</ent>, and <ent type='ORG'>ITT</ent>.
Also on hand are officials from the State Department, the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>,
<ent type='ORG'>the Federal Aviation Administration</ent>, and a number of other
federal agencies. During a 606 emergency the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> can order
the companies that make up <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Coordinating Center to
turn over their satellite, fiberoptic, and land-line facilities
to the government.
On a long corridor in the front of the building is a series
of offices, each outfitted with a private phone, a telex machine,
and a combination safe. It's known as "logo row" because each
office is occupied by an employee from one of the companies that
staff the <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> and because their corporate logos hand on the wall
outside. Each employee is on permanent standby, ready to
activate his company's system should the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> require it.
<ent type='ORG'>The National</ent> Coordinating Center's mission is as grand as
its title is obscure: to make available to the <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent>
Department all the facilities of the civilian communications
network in this country -- the phone lines, the long-distance
satellite hookups, the data transmission lines -- in times of
national emergency. If war breaks out and communications to a
key military base are cut, the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> wants to make sure that
an alternate link can be set up as fast as possible. <ent type='ORG'>Company</ent>
employees assigned to the center are on call 24 hours a day; they
wear beepers outside the office, and when on vacation they must
be replaced by qualified colleagues.
The center formally opened on <ent type='EVENT'>New Year</ent>'s Day, 1984, the same
day Ma Bell's monopoly over the telephone network of the entire
United States was finally broken. The timing was no coincidence.
<ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> officials had argued for years along with AT&amp;T against
the divestiture of Ma Bell, on grounds of national security.
<ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Secretary <ent type='PERSON'>Weinberger</ent> personally urged the attorney
general to block the lawsuit that resulted in the breakup, as had
his predecessor, <ent type='PERSON'>Harold Brown</ent>. The reason was that rather than
construct its own communications network, the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> had come
to rely extensively on the phone company. After the breakup the
dependence continued. The <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> still used commercial
companies to carry more than 90 percent of its communications
within the continental United States.
The 1984 divestiture put an end to AT&amp;T's monopoly over the
nation's telephone service and increased the Pentagon's obsession
with having its own nerve center. Now the brass had to contend
with several competing companies to acquire phone lines, and
communications was more than a matter of running a line from one
telephone to another. Satellites, microwave towers, fiberoptics,
and other technological breakthroughs never dreamed of by
<ent type='PERSON'>Alexander Graham Bell</ent> were in extensive use, and not just for
phone conversations. <ent type='ORG'>Digital</ent> data streams for computers flowed
on the same networks.
These facts were not lost on the <ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent> or the
White <ent type='ORG'>House</ent>. According to documents obtained by <ent type='ORG'>Omni</ent>, beginning
on December 14, 1982, a number of secret meetings were held
between high-level administration officials and executives of the
commercial communications companies whose employees would later
staff <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Coordinating Center. The meetings, which
continued over the next three years, were held at the White
<ent type='ORG'>House</ent>, the State Department, <ent type='ORG'>the Strategic Air</ent> Command (<ent type='ORG'>SAC</ent>)
headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in <ent type='GPE'>Nebraska</ent>, and at the
<ent type='PERSON'>North</ent> <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> Aerospace <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent> Command (<ent type='ORG'>NORAD</ent>) in Colorado
Springs.
The industry officials attending constituted <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent>
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee -- called <ent type='ORG'>NSTAC</ent>
(pronounced N-stack) -- set up by President Reagan to address
those same problems that worried the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>. It was at these
secret meetings, according to the minutes, that the idea of a
communications watch center for national emergencies -- the <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>
-- was born. Along with it came a whole set of plans that would
allow the military to take over commercial communications
"assets" -- everything from ground stations and satellite dishes
to fiberoptic cables -- across the country.
At a 1983 <ent type='ORG'>Federal Communications Commission</ent> meeting, a
ranking <ent type='ORG'>Defense Department</ent> official offered the following
explanation for the founding of <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Coordinating Center:
"We are looking at trying to make communications endurable for a
protracted conflict." The phrase protracted conflict is a
military euphemism for nuclear war.
But could the <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> survive even the first volley in such a
conflict?
Not likely. It's located within a mile of the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>,
itself an obvious early target of a <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> nuclear barrage (or a
conventional strike, for that matter). And the <ent type='ORG'>Kremlin</ent>
undoubtedly knows its location and importance, and presumably has
included it on its priority target list. In sum, according to
one <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> official, "The <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> itself is not viewed as a
survivable facility."
Furthermore, the NCC's "Implementation Plan," obtained by
<ent type='ORG'>Omni</ent>, lists four phases of emergencies and how the center should
respond to each. The first, Phase 0, is Peacetime, for which
there would be little to do outside of a handful of routine tasks
and exercises. Phase 1 is Pre Attack, in which alternate <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>
sites are alerted. Phase 2 is Post Attack, in which other <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>
locations are instructed to take over the center's functions.
Phase 3 is known as Last Ditch, and in this phase whatever
facility survives becomes the de facto <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>.
So far there is no alternate National Coordinating Center to
which <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> officials could retreat to survive an attack.
According to <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> deputy director <ent type='PERSON'>William Belford</ent>, no physical
sites have yet been chosen for a substitute <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent>, and even whether
the <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> itself will survive a nuclear attack is still under
study.
Of what use is a communications center that is not expected
to outlast even the first shots of a war and has no backup?
The answer appears to be that because of the Pentagon's
concerns about the AT&amp;T divestiture and the disruptive effects it
might have on national security, the <ent type='ORG'>NCC</ent> was to serve as the
military's peacetime communications center.
The center is a powerful and unprecedented tool to assume
control over the nation's vast communications and information
network. For years the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> has been studying how to take
over the common carriers' facilities. That research was prepared
by <ent type='ORG'>NSTAC</ent> at the DoD's request and is contained in a series of
internal <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> documents obtained by <ent type='ORG'>Omni</ent>. Collectively this
series is known as <ent type='ORG'>the Satellite Survivability Report</ent>. Completed
in 1984, it is the only detailed analysis to date of the
vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite network. It was
begun as a way of examining how to protect the network of
communications facilities from attack and how to keep it intact
for the DoD.
A major part of the report also contains an analysis of how
to make commercial satellites "interoperable" with <ent type='ORG'>Defense</ent>
Department systems. While the report notes that current
technical differences such as varying frequencies make it
difficult for the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> to use commercial satellites, it
recommends ways to resolve those problems. Much of the report is
a veritable blueprint for the government on how to take over
satellites in orbit above <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. This information,
plus <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145's demand that satellite operators tell the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent> how
their satellites are controlled, guarantees the military ample
knowledge about operating commercial satellites.
The <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> now has an unprecedented access to the civilian
communications network: commercial databases, computer networks,
electronic links, telephone lines. All it needs is the legal
authority to use them. Then it could totally dominate the flow
of all information in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. As one high-ranking
White <ent type='ORG'>House</ent> communications official put it: "Whoever controls
communications, controls the country." His remark was made after
our State Department could not communicate directly with our
embassy in <ent type='GPE'>Manila</ent> during the anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Marcos</ent> revolution last year.
To get through, the State Department had to relay all its
messages through the <ent type='NORP'>Philippine</ent> government.
Government officials have offered all kinds of scenarios to
justify <ent type='ORG'>the National</ent> Coordinating Center, the Satellite
Survivability Report, new domains of authority for the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>
and the <ent type='ORG'>NSA</ent>, and the creation of top-level government steering
groups to think of even more policies for the military. Most can
be reduced to the rationale that inspired <ent type='ORG'>NSDD</ent> 145: that our
enemies (presumably the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>s) have to be prevented from
getting too much information from unclassified sources. And the
only way to do that is to step in and take control of those
sources.
Remarkably, the communications industry as a whole has not
been concerned about the overall scope of the Pentagon's threat
to its freedom of operation. Most protests have been to
individual government actions. For example, a media coalition
that includes the Radio-Television Society of Newspaper Editors,
and <ent type='ORG'>the Turner Broadcasting System</ent> has been lobbying that before
the government can restrict the use of satellites, it must
demonstrate why such restrictions protect against a "threat to
distinct and compelling national security and foreign policy
interests." But the whole policy of restrictiveness has not been
examined. That may change sometime this year, when <ent type='ORG'>the Office</ent> of
Technology Assessment issues a report on how the Pentagon's
policy will affect communications in <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States. In the
meantime the military keeps trying to encroach on national
communications.
While it may seem unlikely that the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent> will ever get
total control of our information and communications systems, the
truth is that it can happen all too easily. The official
mechanisms are already in place; and few barriers remain to
guarantee that what we hear, see, and read will come to us
courtesy of our being members of a free and open society and not
courtesy of the <ent type='ORG'>Pentagon</ent>.

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Psi-Tech and alien brain-wave research -- Whats going on at <ent type='GPE'>Los Alamos</ent>?
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