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Article: 571 of sgi.talk.ratical
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From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
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Subject: How the CIA turned `being directed by the NSC' into `getting approval'
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Keywords: the compartmentalized "need to know" security lid locks up the govn't
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Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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Date: Fri, 10 Apr 1992 18:01:36 GMT
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Lines: 573
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. . . Control of a good share of what the Pentagon is doing is
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more important to the CIA than control over the government of
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Jordan or Syria. . . .
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When the CIA wants to do something for which it does not have
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prior approval and for which it does not have legal sanction, it
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works from the bottom, using all of its guile with security and
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"need to know"--a euphemism for "keep the scheme away from anyone
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at any level of government who might stand in its way." Hand and
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Lansdale, among others, were almost always able to line up enough
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support in the right places to make it possible for the CIA to get
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a favorable reading from the "Forty Committee" on any subject,
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legal or not. In fact, this is the great weakness of such a
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committee. Rather than working to control the agency it works the
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other way. The procedure makes it possible for the agency to win
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approval from a lesser echelon of the NSC intrastructure, and then,
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by clamping on a security id, it makes others believe that the CIA
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had orders from the NSC or perhaps even from the President, when in
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fact it did not.
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the following appeared in the 7/75 issue of "Genesis:"
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_____________________________________________________________________
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How the CIA Controls President Ford
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By L. Fletcher Prouty
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reprinted here with permission of the author
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In this monstrous U.S. government today, it's not so much what
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comes down from the top that matters as what you can get away with
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from the bottom or from the middle--the least scrutinized level.
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(Contrary to the current CIA propaganda as preached by William
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Colby, Ray Cline, Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee, who say,
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incorrectly, "What the Agency does is ordered by the President.")
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As with the Mafia, crime is a cinch if you know the cops and the
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courts have been paid off. With the Central Intelligence Agency,
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anything goes when you have a respected boss to sanctify and bless
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your activities and to shield them from outside eyes.
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Such a boss in the CIA was old Allen Dulles, who ran the Agency
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like a mother superior running a whorehouse. He knew the girls
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were happy, busy, and well fed, but he wasn't quite sure what they
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were doing. His favorites, all through the years of his prime as
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Director of Central Intelligence, were such stellar performers as
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Frank Wisner, Dick Bissell, George Doole, Sheffield Edwards, Dick
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Helms, Red White, Tracy Barnes, Desmond Fitzgerald, Joe Alsop, Ted
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Shannon, Ed Lansdale and countless others. They were the great
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operators. He just made it possible for them to do anything they
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came up with.
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When Wisner and Richard Nixon came up with the idea of mounting
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a major rebellion in Indonesia in 1958, Dulles saw that they got
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the means and the wherewithal. When General Cabell and his Air
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Force friends plugged the U-2 project for Kelly Johnson of
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Lockheed, Dulles tossed it into the lap of Dick Bissell. When Dick
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Helms and Des Fitzgerald figured they could play fun and games in
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Tibet, Dulles talked to Tom Gates, then Secretary of Defense, and
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the next we knew CIA agents were spiriting the Dalai Lama out of
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Lhasa, CIA undercover aircraft were clandestinely dropping tons of
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arms, ammunitions, and supplies deep into Tibet and other planes
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were reaching as far as northwestern China to Koko Nor.
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While he peddled the hard-won National Intelligence Estimates to
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all top offices and sprinkled holy water over the pates of our
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leaders, Dulles dropped off minor miracles along the way to
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titillate those in high places. If you win the heart of the queen
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and convert her to your faith, you can control the king. This
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works for the Jesuits. It worked well for the CIA. Allen Dulles
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was no casual student and practitioner of the ancient art of
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religion. He was an expert in the art of mind-control. He learned
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how to operate his disciples and his Agency in the ways of the
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cloth.
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But for every Saint and every Sinner in the fold there must be
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an order of monks, and the Agency has always been the haven for
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hundreds of faceless, nameless minions whose only satisfaction was
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the job well done and the furtherance of the cause. One of the
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most remarkable--and surely the best--of these was an agent named
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Frank Hand.
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In my book, "The Secret Team," written during 1971 and 1972, I
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mentioned that the most important agent in the CIA was an almost
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unknown individual who spent most of his time in the Pentagon. At
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that time I did not reveal his name; but a small item in a recent
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obituary column stated that:
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"Frank Hand, 61, a former senior official of the CIA, died in
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Marshall, Minn. . . . (he was) a graduate of Harvard Law
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School. He had served with the CIA from 1950 until
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retirement in 1971."
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After a life devoted to quiet, effective, skillful performance
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of one of the most important jobs in the worldwide structure of
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that unparalleled agency, all that the CIA would publicly say of
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Frank Hand was that he was a "senior official."
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Ask Dick Helms, Ed Lansdale, Bob McNamara, Tom Gates or Allen
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Dulles or John Foster Dulles, if they were with us today, and they
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all would tell us stories about Frank Hand. They would do more to
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characterize the nature and the sources of power which make use of
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and control the CIA than has ever been told before. He was that
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superior operative who made big things work unobtrusively.
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You might have been one of the grass-green McNamara "whiz kids,"
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lost in the maze of the Pentagon Puzzle Palace, who came upon a
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short, Hobbit-like, pleasant man who knew the Pentagon so well that
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you got the feeling he was brought in with the original load of
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concrete. Thousands of career men to this day will never realize
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that Frank Hand was a "Senior Official" of the CIA and not one of
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their civilian cohorts. To my knowledge he never worked anywhere
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else. I was there in 1955 and he was there. I left in December
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1963, and he was at my farewell party. He must have spent some of
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his time at the agency; but it must have been before 1955. If he
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had a dollar for every trip he made in those busy years between the
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Pentagon and the CIA he would have died a very wealthy man. He
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popularized the Agency term "across the river" and the "Acme
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Plumbers" nickname for agents of the CIA. (A term later to be
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confused by Colson and John Ehrlichman, among others, with the use
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of the term "White House Plumbers" of Watergate fame. Someone knew
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that Hunt, McCord, the Cubans, Haig, Butterfield and others all had
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CIA backgrounds and connections and therefore were "Plumbers."
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Only the insiders knew about the real "Acme Plumbers.")
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Frank was as much at home with Allen Dulles as he was with the
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famous old supersleuth, General Graves B. Erskine, and as he was
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with Helms, Colby, or Fitzgerald. Ian Fleming may have popularized
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the spy and the undercover agent as a flashing James Bond type;
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but in the reality of today's world the great ones are more in the
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mold of Frank Hand and "The Spy Who Came In From The Cold."
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There has long existed a "golden key" group of agency and
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agency-related supermen. They came from the CIA, the Pentagon, the
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Department of State, the White House and other places in government
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or from the outside. They have kept themselves inconspicuous and
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they meet in the evening away from their offices. They are the men
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who open the doors of big government to industry-banking law and to
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the multinational corporate centers of greed and power. Their
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strength lies in their common awareness of the ways in which real
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power is generated in the government, the real power that controls
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activities of the government. In many instances this is the power
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of being able to keep something from happening, rather than to make
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it happen. For example, if the President is murdered, real power
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involves the control of government operations sufficient to make
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any investigation ineffective and to assure that the government
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will do nothing even if the investigation should turn up something.
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Real power is the ability to keep the government bureaucracy from
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going into action when the price of petroleum and wheat is doubled
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or tripled by avaricious international monopolies.
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Some of these "gold key" members have surfaced and have accepted
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publicity, as did Des Fitzgerald, Allen Dulles, Tracy Barnes and
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others. Frank never did. He was so anonymous that even his
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friends could not find him.
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The Agency covered for Frank Hand as it did for few others. The
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James Bonds of this world may be the idols of the Intelligence
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coterie; but if you are a Bill Colby, Dick Helms, or Allen Dulles,
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you know the real value of an indispensable agent. Frank was their
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man in the Pentagon, and the Pentagon was always the indispensable
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prime target of the CIA. When the chips are down, the CIA could
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care less about overturning "Communism" in Cuba or Chile. What
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really matters is its relative power in the U.S. Government.
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Control of a good share of what the Pentagon is doing is more
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important to the CIA than control over the government of Jordan or
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Syria.
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Once, when the CIA wanted to move a squadron (twenty-five) of
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helicopters from Laos to South Vietnam, long before the troubles
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there had become a war, I turned down the request from the Deputy
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Director of Central Intelligence in the name of the Secretary of
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Defense for no other reason than the fact that I did not find that
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project on the approved list of the National Security Council's
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"Forty Committee" (then called the 5412/2 committee). That meant
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the agency had neither been directed by the National Security
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Council to move those helicopters into Vietnam, nor had it received
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authorization for such a tactical movement. In other words, the
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planned intervention into South Vietnam with a squadron of
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helicopters would at that time have been unlawful as an
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intervention into the internal affairs of another country.
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This denial then, in 1960, effectively blocked the CIA from
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being able to move heavy war-making equipment into Vietnam. The
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helicopters were actually U.S. Marine Corps property on "loan" from
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Okinawa to the CIA for clandestine operations in Laos.
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At that time my immediate superior was General Graves Erskine,
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the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special (Clandestine)
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Operations, and the man then responsible for all military support
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of clandestine operations of the CIA. Also at that time, Frank
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Hand, "worked for" Erskine. Of course, this was a cover
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assignment--"cover slot" as it was known to us and to the CIA.
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Frank had a regular office in the Pentagon.
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No sooner had the CIA request been turned down than someone near
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the top of the agency called Frank and told him about it. In his
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smiling and friendly way he came into my office, carrying two cups
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of coffee, and began some talk about music, travel, or golf. Then,
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as was his practice, he would get the subject around to his point
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with such a comment as, "Fletch, who do you suppose took a call
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here about the choppers in Laos?" and we would be off.
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The special ability he possessed was best evidenced by the
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process he would set in motion once he discovered a problem that
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affected the ambitions of the agency. He would talk about the
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choppers with Erskine. Then he would drop in to see the Chief of
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Naval Operations and perhaps the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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He would talk with some of the other civilian Assistant
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Secretaries. In other words, he would go from office to office
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like a bee spreading pollen, titillating only the most senior
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officers and civilian officials with the most "highly sensitive"
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tidbits about the CIA's plans for Vietnam. In this manner he would
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find out what the real thinking in the Pentagon might be, and where
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there might be real opposition to such an idea--such as in the
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Marine Corps, which knew it would never get compensation for those
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expensive helicopters and for the loss of time of all their support
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people. He would also find out where there would be support, as
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with the ever-eager U.S. Army Special Forces, most of whose senior
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officers had been with the CIA.
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Then he would drop out of the picture for awhile to travel back
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to the old CIA headquarters, on the hill that overlooks what is now
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the Watergate complex, for a long talk with Allen Dulles or the
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Deputy Director, General Cabell. On matters involving the
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clandestine services he would also stop by the old headquarters
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buildings, that lined the reflecting pool near the Lincoln
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Memorial, to talk with Dick Helms, Desmond Fitzgerald, and other
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operators. Within a day or two he would have them fully briefed on
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the steps to be taken in order to win over the Defense Department;
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or failing that, how to overpower and outmaneuver the Pentagon in
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the Department of State and the White House.
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The foregoing is a "case study" on the important subject of how
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the CIA really operates and what it believes is its top priority.
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The propaganda being spread around today by the CIA and its
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propagandists that, "What the CIA does is ordered by the
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President," is totally untrue in all but .00001 percent of actual
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historical cases. It is much more factual to say that, "What the
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CIA does is to find ways to initiate major foreign policy moves
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without having the President find out--or at least without
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discovery until it is too late."
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"It is in precisely that manner that the CIA today works around,
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beneath and behind the White House to effect policies that could
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influence the survival of the nation and the world. "Gold Key"
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operatives are, at this very moment, carrying out CIA game plans
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entirely outside the power of President Ford's ability to affect
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their activities. He is totally without knowledge of most of them,
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and therefore powerless to stop or alter them.
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In the case of the helicopters, Frank Hand was able to convince
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Allen Dulles that the disapproval from the Secretary of Defense,
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via my office, was real and that the Secretary would, at that time,
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be unlikely to change his mind. Frank also could report that the
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position of other top-level assistants was so cool to stepping up
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the hardware *involvement* of the military in Vietnam, in 1960,
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that none of them would likely attempt to persuade the Secretary to
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change his policy of limited involvement.
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Fortified with the information gleaned by Frank Hand, Allen
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Dulles would have two primary options: drop the idea of moving
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helicopters into Vietnam, or bypass the Secretary of Defense for
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the time being by going to the White House for support. In 1960
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this was a crucial decision. The huge attempt to support a
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rebellion in Indonesia had failed utterly, the U-2 operations had
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been curtailed because of the Gary Powers incident, the far-
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reaching operations into Tibet had come to a halt by Presidential
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directive and anti-Castro activities were limited to minor forays.
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And at that time the large-scale (large for CIA) war in Laos had
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become such a disaster that the CIA wanted no more of it. Dick
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Bissell, the chief of the Clandestine Services, had written strong,
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personal letters to Tom Gates, the Secretary of Defense, wondering
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openly what to do about the 50,000 or more miserable Laotian Meo
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tribesmen the CIA had moved into the battle zones of Laos and then
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had deserted with no plans for their protection, resupply, care or
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feeding. The CIA badly wanted to be relieved of the war that they
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had started and then found they could not handle. They wanted to
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transfer and thus preserve the agency's assets, including the
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helicopters, to the bigger prospects in Vietnam.
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So, in 1960, if Allen Dulles dropped the idea of moving his
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assets from Laos, he would not only have lost those helicopters
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back to the Marine Corps but he would have seriously jeopardized
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the CIA's undercover leadership role in the development of the war
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in Vietnam, which it had been fanning since 1954.
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This was a crucial decision for both the CIA and for those who
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wished to contain the agency. If those who wished to put the CIA
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genie back in the bottle had been able at that time to prevent the
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move of those CIA assets into Vietnam, Dulles would have had to
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disband them: helicopters, B-26 bombers from the Indonesian
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fiasco, tens of thousands of rifles and other weapons, C-46, C-54
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and other Air America-supported heavy transport aircraft, U-2
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operations over Indochina, radar and other clandestine equipment,
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C-130's specially modified for deep Tibetan operations, and much
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more. From the point of view of the CIA, the helicopters were
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simply the tip of the iceberg, and the decision was its most
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important in that decade.
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Typically, in his unwitting Mother Superior-style, which
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included bulldog tenacity, Dulles chose the route to the White
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House. Here again he could rely strongly on Frank Hand. Working
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with Hand in Erskine's office was the CIA's other best agent, Major
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General Edward G. Lansdale, who had long served in the CIA. Like
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Hand, he had unequalled contacts in the Department of State and in
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the White House. In support of Dulles, they contacted their
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friends there and began a subtle and powerful move destined to
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prepare the way for what would appear to be a decision by President
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Eisenhower. This was an important feature of the "case study":
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The *apparent* Presidential decision.
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When the CIA wants to do something for which it does not have
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prior approval and for which it does not have legal sanction, it
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works from the bottom, using all of its guile with security and
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"need to know"--a euphemism for "keep the scheme away from anyone
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at any level of government who might stand in its way." Hand and
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Lansdale, among others, were almost always able to line up enough
|
||
support in the right places to make it possible for the CIA to get
|
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a favorable reading from the "Forty Committee" on any subject,
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legal or not. In fact, this is the great weakness of such a
|
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committee. Rather than working to control the agency it works the
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other way. The procedure makes it possible for the agency to win
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approval from a lesser echelon of the NSC intrastructure, and then,
|
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by clamping on a security id, it makes others believe that the CIA
|
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had orders from the NSC or perhaps even from the President, when in
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fact it did not.
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Thus it was that, about two weeks from the day that I received
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that first call requesting the movement of the squadron of
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helicopters, received word from General Erskine that he had been
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"officially" informed that the White House (Forty Committee) had
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approved the secret operation. The helicopters were moved into
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Vietnam. They were the first of thousands.
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The great significance of this incident is to point out how the
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CIA works powerfully, deftly, and with great assurance at any level
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of our government to get anything it wants done. But the anecdote
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shows only the surface coating of the application of the CIA
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apparatus.
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One year earlier, in 1959, Frank Hand had directed a Boston
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banker to my office. At that time I worked in the Directorate of
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Plans in Air Force headquarters and my work was top secret. Few of
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my contemporaries in the Pentagon knew that I was in charge of a
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global U.S. Air Force system created for the dual purpose of
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providing Air Force support for the CIA and for protecting the best
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interests of the USAF while performing that task. My door was
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labeled simply, "Team B"; yet that Boston banker knocked and
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entered with assurance. Somehow he knew what my work was and he
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knew that I might be able to help him.
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In 1959 there were very few helicopters in all of the services,
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and military procurement of those expensive machines was at an
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all-time low. The Bell Helicopter Company was all but out of
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business, and its parent company, Bell Aerospace Corp., was having
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trouble keeping it financially afloat. Meanwhile, the shrewd Royal
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Little, President of the Providence-based Textron Company, had a
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good cash position and could well afford the acquisition of a
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loser. Textron and the First National Bank of Boston got together
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to talk helicopters. Neither one knew a thing about them. But men
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in First Boston were close to the CIA, and they learned that the
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CIA was operating helicopters in Laos. What they needed to know
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now was, "What would be the future of the military helicopter, and
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would the use of helicopters in South East Asia escalate if given a
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little boost--such as moving a squadron from Laos to Vietnam?" The
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CIA could tell them about that, and Frank Hand would be the man who
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could get them to the right people in the Pentagon.
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The banker from Boston phrased his questions as though he
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believed that the helicopters in Laos were somehow operating under
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the Air Force, and then went on to ask about their tactical
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significance and about the possible increase of helicopter
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utilization for that kind of warfare. This was at a time when not
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even newspapers had reported anything like the operation of such
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large and expensive aircraft in that remote war. We had a rather
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thorough discussion and then he left. He called me several times
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after that and visited my office a month or two later.
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As the record will show, Textron did acquire the Bell Helicopter
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Company and the CIA did step up use of helicopters to the extent
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that one of the CIA's own proprietary companies, Asia Aeronautics
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Inc., had more than four thousand men on each of two bases where
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helicopters were maintained. Most of those men were involved in
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their maintenance--Bell Helicopters, no less!
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Orders for Bel Helicopters for use in Vietnam exceeded $600-
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million. Anyone wanting to know more about how the U.S. got so
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heavily ($200-billion and the loss of 58,000 American lives)
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involved in Indochina need look no further. This was the pattern
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and the plan.
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At the present time, when the White House, the House, and the
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Senate are all investigating the CIA, it is important to understand
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the CIA and to put it all in the proper perspective. It is not the
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President who instructs the CIA concerning what it will do. And in
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||
many cases it is *not* even the Director of Central Intelligence
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who instructs the CIA. The CIA is a great, monstrous machine with
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||
tremendous and terrible power. It can be set in motion from the
|
||
outside like a programmer setting a computer in operation, and then
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it covers up what it is doing when men like Frank Hand--the real
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||
movers--put grease on the correct gears. And in a majority of
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||
cases, the power behind it all is big business, big banks, big law
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firms and big money. The agency exists to be used by them.
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Let no one misunderstand what I mean. It was President Lyndon
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||
B. Johnson who on more than one occasion said that the CIA was
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"operating a damn Murder Inc. in the Carribean." In other words,
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he knew it was doing this--and he was the President! This
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||
knowledge has been recently confirmed by Defense Secretary James
|
||
Schlesinger (who is a former head of the CIA) and others by their
|
||
admission that they told the agency to end all "terminations." But
|
||
Lyndon Johnson was powerless to do anything about it. This is an
|
||
astounding admission from a President, the very man from whom, the
|
||
CIA says, it always gets its instructions.
|
||
The present concern over "domestic surveillance" and such other
|
||
lean tidbits--most important to you and me as they are--is not
|
||
important to the CIA. It can easily dispense with a James Angleton
|
||
or even a Helms or a Colby (just look at the list of CIA bigwigs
|
||
who have been fired--Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, Dick Bissell, Dick
|
||
Helms, and now perhaps Colby); but the great machine will live on
|
||
while Congress digs away at the Golden Apples tossed casually aside
|
||
by the CIA--the supreme Aphrodite of them all. Notice that the
|
||
agency cares little about giving away "secrets" in the form of
|
||
cleverly written insider books such as those by Victor Marchetti
|
||
and Philip Agee. The CIA just makes it look as though it cared
|
||
with some high-class window dressing. Actually the real harm to
|
||
the American public from those books is to make people believe that
|
||
certain carefully selected propaganda is true.
|
||
In the story of Frank Hand we come much closer to seeing exactly
|
||
how the CIA operates to control this government and other foreign
|
||
governments. It is still operating that way. Today it is
|
||
President Ford who is the unwitting accessory.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
* * * * * * * *
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
the following is taken from an article Fletcher Prouty wrote
|
||
for the February 1986 issue of "Freedom" magazine, entitled,
|
||
"Why Vietnam? The Selection and Preparation of the
|
||
Battlefield For America's Entry into the Indochina War," Part
|
||
7 in a Series on the Central Intelligence Agency. i include
|
||
it to amplify on the curious visit Colonel Prouty received in
|
||
1959 from the vice president of the First National Bank of
|
||
Boston and how it demonstrates that
|
||
|
||
There was only one way that vice president of the First
|
||
National Bank of Boston could have come directly to my
|
||
office in the Pentagon. The CIA had sent him there.
|
||
This is one of the most important "truly confidential"
|
||
roles of the agency. The CIA is the best friend of the top
|
||
executives of America's biggest businesses, and it works for
|
||
them at home and abroad. It is always successful in the
|
||
highest echelons of government and finance. . . .
|
||
Translated into everyday terms, Casey's CIA, as was Allen
|
||
Dulles' CIA, is one of the true bastions of power as a
|
||
servant of the American and transnational business and
|
||
financial community.
|
||
|
||
--ratitor
|
||
|
||
|
||
______________________________________________________________________
|
||
| |
|
||
| Helicopters in Vietnam |
|
||
| |
|
||
| Toward the end of World War II, a small number of |
|
||
| helicopters made their appearance in military operations. |
|
||
| During the costly battle for Okinawa, in the summer of 1945, |
|
||
| General Joseph Stilwell--famed for his role as commander in |
|
||
| the China-Burma-India theater of the war--began to use an |
|
||
| early model of the Sikorsky helicopter as a"command car." |
|
||
| During the early 1950s, the Korean War gave the |
|
||
| helicopter industry a much needed boost and several models |
|
||
| were used there. After the Korean War, the use of |
|
||
| helicopters in all services was severely curtailed by high |
|
||
| costs of procurement and by the enormous amounts of time and |
|
||
| money required to keep them in operation. By 1959 almost |
|
||
| all helicopter manufacturers were broke, or at least on very |
|
||
| hard times. This included the Bell Helicopter Company in |
|
||
| Buffalo, New York. |
|
||
| The helicopters used on operational missions into Laos, |
|
||
| mentioned in this article, were the only military |
|
||
| helicopters anywhere in the world getting regular and |
|
||
| frequent tactical use. However, their very existence in |
|
||
| Thailand and their employment in Laos were secrets. They |
|
||
| had been moved from Okinawa to Thailand and were supported |
|
||
| by my office in the Pentagon. |
|
||
| One day, in 1959, a man entered my office to discuss |
|
||
| helicopters. |
|
||
| Because of the nature of the work my office was doing, |
|
||
| this was an infrequent event. Outside the door of the |
|
||
| office there was a small blue card that read: |
|
||
| |
|
||
| Air Force Plans |
|
||
| "Team B" |
|
||
| Chief--Lt. Col. L. F. Prouty |
|
||
| |
|
||
| That card by the door drew little attention, and it was |
|
||
| meant to be that way. Then how did this civilian visitor |
|
||
| from the outside world know that "Team B" was the place he |
|
||
| wanted to visit--for business purposes? |
|
||
| He introduced himself as a vice president of the First |
|
||
| National Bank of Boston. He said he was interested in the |
|
||
| tactical utilization of helicopters. Somehow he had been |
|
||
| directed to "Team B." "Team B" had been established in 1955 |
|
||
| to provide "military support of the clandestine activities |
|
||
| of the CIA." The use of helicopters in Laos was a |
|
||
| clandestine operation of the CIA. |
|
||
| My visitor knew quite a bit about the helicopters in |
|
||
| Thailand. He wanted to know if this utilization of large |
|
||
| helicopters on tactical missions was a harbinger of more |
|
||
| helicopters or was it simply a make-work project? Then he |
|
||
| got to the reason for his visit. |
|
||
| He said that the Textron Company of Providence, Rhode |
|
||
| Island, was a major customer of his bank. Textron was in a |
|
||
| good cash position and the bank was advising them to |
|
||
| diversify and acquire a marginally viable company for tax |
|
||
| purposes and with an eye to future value. |
|
||
| To the First National Bank of Boston the helicopter |
|
||
| business and specifically the Bell Helicopter Company in |
|
||
| Buffalo appeared to be a prime prospect on both counts. |
|
||
| Textron was interested. The only problem was the market. |
|
||
| Would there ever be an interest in and a need for |
|
||
| helicopters by the military, meaning in big numbers? The |
|
||
| Laotian operation was the only show in town. |
|
||
| Because of the role being played by my office in support |
|
||
| of the use of helicopters in Southeast Asia, I already knew |
|
||
| the Bell people well both in Washington, D.C., and Buffalo. |
|
||
| I knew Bill Gesel, the president of Bell Helicopter. I knew |
|
||
| they were competent, but in trouble for lack of orders. |
|
||
| I described the helicopter as a useful vehicle of limited |
|
||
| potential, but rather well suited for covert operations. In |
|
||
| simple terms, the helicopter was too costly for the regular |
|
||
| military budget, but, as a rule, covert operations had money |
|
||
| to burn. That was the kind of money helicopters needed. |
|
||
| Because of the trend of covert operations in Southeast Asia, |
|
||
| I believed the demand for helicopters would increase. |
|
||
| As events later transpired, the First National Bank of |
|
||
| Boston, of which this man was a vice president, was |
|
||
| instrumental in getting Textron to acquire the Bell |
|
||
| Helicopter Company. This was the beginning of the Textron |
|
||
| acquisition of Bell and of the great success Bell had in |
|
||
| selling helicopters for use in Indochina. As we all know |
|
||
| now, the Bell "Huey" helicopter was the unsung hero of the |
|
||
| struggle in Vietnam. Thousands were used there. |
|
||
| On one occasion, while I was at lunch at the Army and |
|
||
| Navy Club in Washington, Bill Gesel, still president of |
|
||
| Bell, came by my table and pulled a check out of his pocket |
|
||
| that was in the range of nine figures--hundreds of millions |
|
||
| of dollars. Needless to say, Bell was doing well. Textron |
|
||
| was doing well. The First National Bank of Boston had |
|
||
| earned its fees and, as a result, the remains of hundreds of |
|
||
| Hueys are scattered all over the countryside of Vietnam. |
|
||
| The Huey had become the famous "gun ship" of that war. |
|
||
| There was only one way that vice president of the First |
|
||
| National Bank of Boston could have come directly to my |
|
||
| office in the Pentagon. The CIA had sent him there. |
|
||
| This is one of the most important "truly confidential" |
|
||
| roles of the agency. The CIA is the best friend of the top |
|
||
| executives of America's biggest businesses, and it works for |
|
||
| them at home and abroad. It is always successful in the |
|
||
| highest echelons of government and finance. |
|
||
| This is the way things were more than 25 years ago. You |
|
||
| may be assured these successes have not diminished under the |
|
||
| current director of central intelligence, William J. Casey, |
|
||
| a true friend of business. |
|
||
| During a speech, delivered in December 1979 before an |
|
||
| American Bar Association workshop on "Law, Intelligence and |
|
||
| National Security," Casey said that he would like to see the |
|
||
| CIA be a place "in the United States government to |
|
||
| systematically look at the economic opportunities and |
|
||
| threats in a long-term perspective, . . . [to] recommend, or |
|
||
| act on the use of economic leverage, either offensively or |
|
||
| defensively for strategic purposes." |
|
||
| Translated into everyday terms, Casey's CIA, as was Allen |
|
||
| Dulles' CIA, is one of the true bastions of power as a |
|
||
| servant of the American and transnational business and |
|
||
| financial community. |
|
||
| |
|
||
|____________________________________________________________________|
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
--
|
||
daveus rattus
|
||
|
||
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
|
||
|
||
KOYAANISQATSI
|
||
|
||
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
|
||
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
|
||
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
|
||
i |