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************FEATURE***************
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WITH A NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT THAT INCLUDES THE SELF-DECLARED NEOFASCIST PARTY, THE ROLE
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OF AGENCIES WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN PUSHING ITALIAN POLITICS TO THE RIGHT IS MORE
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NEWSWORTHY THAN EVER. "GLADIO" TELLS THE STORY OF NEARLY A HALF-CENTURY OF EFFORTS BY THE
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CIA, THE U.S. MILITARY, AND AT TIMES, THE WHITE HOUSE, TO FORESTALL A FEARED "COMMUNIST
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TAKEOVER."
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ROWSE REVEALS THE DETAILS OF THIS POLICY, INCLUDING UNDERCOVER PAYMENTS TO ITALIAN
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POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE USE OF FASCIST WAR CRIMINALS, NAZIS, AND
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MOBSTERS TO FORM AND LEAD UNDERGROUND PARAMILITARY GROUPS, U.S. LINKS TO A TERROR
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BOMBING CAMPAIGN, AND REVIEWS DISQUIETING QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. LINKS TO THE ASSASSINATION
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OF ALDO MORO.
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ARTHUR E. ROWSE'S EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE ORIGINS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
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DECADES-LONG COVERT U.S. EFFORT TO INFLUENCE ITALIAN POLITICS MARKS THE FIRST
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COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT "GLADIO" IN A U.S. PUBLICATION.
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ARTHUR E. ROWSE, FORMERLY ON THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST AND U.S. NEWS & WORLD
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REPORT IS AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEWS.
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************************************
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GLADIO: THE SECRET U.S. WAR TO SUBVERT ITALIAN DEMOCRACY
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by Arthur E. Rowse
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*************************************
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This January, Silvio Berlusconi rode onto the turbulent Italian political scene on a white charger. Voters had become
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disenchanted with long-time centrist leaders who were mired in massive corruption scandals. With crucial
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parliamentary elections only two months away and the likelihood that the left would win power for the first time since
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World War II, *1 the billionaire businessman entered the fray with a slate of right-wing candidates who had never held
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office. Helped by voter disgust and his own vast media and industrial holdings, Berlusconi's coalition won big, averting
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the anticipated leftist victory. His win lifted the right, including the neo-fascists, to new postwar heights. *2 Real change
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seemed unlikely, however, as Berlusconi repackaged the old politics with new names and slogans. Berlusconi himself
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was weaned on the system and owed much of his success to Bettino Craxi, a former Socialist prime minister who went
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on trial for corruption the day after the March election. It wasn't long before the right's clean hands were upstaged by
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arms raised in fascist salutes and cries of Il Duce.
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While Berlusconi's rapid ascent took most observers by surprise, the stage was set for it by nearly 50 years of U.S.
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interference in Italian politics. In the name of fighting communism, the U.S. helped generate a level of political turmoil
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that sometimes approached civil war. U.S. agents and their Italian surrogates took control of key government agencies,
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at times reducing Italian democracy to little more than a proving ground for the CIA's and the White House's
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aggressive tactics. The undercover campaign, known as Gladio, for a double-edged Roman sword, was officially
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acknowledged for the first time in 1990, when it was finally closed down.
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THE DIMENSIONS OF GLADIO
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The Italian people had received many signs over the years that the centrist parties the Christian Democrats and the
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Socialists were promoted and to some degree controlled by Washington. But it was only when the Italian government
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officially admitted it in 1990 that the ruling coalition began to crumble, ready to be picked apart two years later by
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corruption scandals. The startling story of Gladio, which continues to make headlines in Europe, has barely been
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mentioned in the U.S., where many of its darkest chapters remain secret.
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The program in Italy was aimed at the threat that communists might mount an insurrection or gain a share of political
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power through the ballot box. An insurrection was unlikely, however, since nearly all posts in the bureaucracy were
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filled after the war by solidly anticommunist veterans of Mussolini's forces, with Allied approval.
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During the war, most Americans considered themselves heroes who freed Western Europe from its brutal Nazi and
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fascist rulers. It wasn't long after the American landings on Italian soil, however, that the white hats got sullied. While
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some OSS agents worked with antifascists to help lay the basis for Italian democracy, many of those higher up the
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ladder conspired with backers of Mussolini or the former king to impede it. *3
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Although many European intelligence agencies have admitted participating, the CIA has denied any connection with
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Gladio. But enough information has emerged to show that the CIA sponsored and financed a large portion of the
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terrorism and disruption that plagued Italy for nearly half a century. Among other things, the U.S. government:
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Forged secret alliances with the Mafia and right-wing elements of the Vatican to prevent the left from playing any
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role in government;
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Recruited Mussolini's ex-police into paramilitary bands secretly financed and trained by the CIA, ostensibly to fight
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Soviets, but really to conduct terror attacks blamed on the left;
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Employed the gamut of psychological warfare tactics, including paying millions in slush funds to political parties,
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journalists, and other influential contacts to tilt parliamentary elections against the left;
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Created a secret service and a parallel government structure linked to the CIA whose assets attempted several times
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to overthrow the elected government; and
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Targeted Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who was later kidnapped and murdered under mysterious circumstances after
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offering to bring communists into the Cabinet.
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THE SECRET NATO COVER
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@TEMP = The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided international cover for Washington's postwar
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operations in Italy. A secret clause in the initial NATO agreement in 1949 required that before a nation could join, it
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must have already established a national security authority to fight communism through clandestine citizen cadres.
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This Stay Behind clause grew out of a secret committee set up at U.S. insistence in the Atlantic Pact, the forerunner of
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NATO. Each NATO member was also required to send delegates to semiannual meetings on the subject. *4
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U.S. authority for such moves flowed in a steady stream of presidential directives transmitted through the National
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Security Council (NSC). In December 1950, the council gave the armed forces carte blanche to use appropriate military
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force even if the communists merely gain participation in government by legal means or threaten to achieve control...or
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the government ceases to evidence a determination to oppose communist internal or external threats. *5
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The CIA helped the Italian police set up secret squadrons staffed in many cases with veterans of Mussolini's secret
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police. *6 The squadrons were trained for intensive espionage and counter-espionage, against communists and other
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perceived enemies of the status quo. The plan to use exceptional means was patterned after the highly militarized
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French intelligence service, the Suret Nationale, which was reportedly so tough on communists that many fled to other
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countries. *7
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The newly organized intelligence agency, SIFAR, began operations in September 1949, under the supervision of an
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undercover American, Carmel Offie, nicknamed godfather by the Italians. *8 Interior Minister Mario Scelba headed
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the operation. At the same time, Scelba was directing a brutal repression, murdering hundreds of workers and peasants
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who sought improved conditions after the war. *9
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OPERATION DEMAGNETIZE
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With the Italian secret service under control, the Americans then expanded it under the name Operation Demagnetize
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and tied it to an existing network of cadre in northern Italy. In 1951, the Italian secret service formally agreed to set up
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a clandestine organization within the military to coordinate with the northern cadres. In 1952, SIFAR received secret
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orders from Washington to adopt a series of political, paramilitary and psychological operations destined to diminish the
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power of the Italian Communist Party, its material resources, and its influence on government. This priority objective
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must be attained by all means. 10
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Operation Demagnetize marked the institutional hardening of Gladio. A State Department historian characterized it as
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the strategy of stabilization, *11 although it could be more accurately described as one of destabilization. From the
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start, the offensive was secretly directed and funded by the U.S. government. In 1956, the arrangement was formalized
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in a written agreement, using the name Gladio for the first time. According to 1956 documents uncovered in Italy in
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1990, Gladio was divided into independent cells coordinated from a CIA camp in Sardinia. These special forces included
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40 main groups. Ten specialized in sabotage, six each in espionage, propaganda, evasion and escape tactics, and 12 in
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guerrilla activities. Another division handled the training of agents and commandos. These special forces had access to
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underground arms caches, which included hand guns, grenades, high-tech explosives, daggers, 60-millimeter mortars,
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57-millimeter machine guns and precision rifles. *12
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In 1956, Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo was named to head SIFAR on the recommendation of U.S. Ambassador Claire
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Boothe Luce, the avidly anticommunist wife of the publisher of Time magazine. *13 A key player in Gladio was now in
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place. In 1962, the CIA helped place De Lorenzo at the head of the national police (carabinieri), while he retained
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effective control of the secret service.
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The general brought with him 17 lieutenants to begin purging insufficiently right-wing officers. It was the first step to a
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right-wing coup attempt, with U.S. military attach Vernon Walters in the vanguard. In a memo to De Lorenzo the same
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year, Walters suggested types of intervention aimed at provoking a national crisis, including blocking a center-left
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coalition, creating schisms among the socialists, and funding forces favorable to the status quo.14
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Meanwhile, according to CIA files found in Rome in 1984, CIA station chief William Harvey began to recruit action
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teams based on a list of 2,000 men capable of throwing bombs, conducting attacks, and accompanying these actions with
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indispensable propaganda. 15 These teams had a chance to practice their skills in 1963 as part of an anti-union
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offensive. U.S.-trained gladiators dressed as police and civilians attacked construction workers peacefully demonstrating
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in Rome, leaving some 200 wounded and a large section of the city in shambles. The link to Gladio was made in later
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testimony by a former general in the secret service.16
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SIFAR Lt. Col. Renzo Rocca was also training a civil militia composed of ex-soldiers, parachutists and members of
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Junio Valerio Black Prince Borghese's paramilitary organization, Decima MAS (Tenth Torpedo Boat Squadron), for the
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pending coup.17 President Antonio Segni reportedly knew of the plan, which was to conclude with the assassination of
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Prime Minister Aldo Moro, under fire for not being tough enough with the communists.18
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The long-planned takeover, known later as Plan Solo, fizzled in March 1964, when the key carabinieri involved
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remained in their barracks. As a subsequent inquiry moved to question Rocca about the coup attempt, he apparently
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killed himself, possibly to fulfill Gladio's oath of silence. After officials determined that state secrets were involved,
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three hamstrung inquiries failed to determine the guilty parties.19
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THE STRATEGY OF TENSION
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Despite the failure of Plan Solo, the CIA and the Italian right had largely succeeded in creating the clandestine
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structures envisioned in Operation Demagnetize. Now the plotters turned their attention to a renewed offensive against
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the left.
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To win intellectual support, the secret services set up a conference in Rome at the luxurious Parco dei Principi hotel in
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May 1965, for a study of revolutionary war. The choice of words was inadvertently revealing, since the conveners and
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invited participants were planning a real revolution, not just warning of an imaginary communist takeover. The
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meeting was essentially a reunion of fascists, right-wing journalists, and military personnel. The strategy of tension
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that emerged was designed to disrupt normality with terror attacks in order to create chaos and provoke a frightened
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public into accepting still more authoritarian government. *20
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Several graduates of this exercise had long records of anticommunist actions and would later be implicated in some of
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Italy's worst massacres. One was journalist and secret agent Guido Giannettini. Four years earlier, he had conducted a
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seminar at the U.S. Naval Academy on The Techniques and Prospects of a Coup d'Etat in Europe. Another was notorious
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fascist Stefano Delle Chiaie, who had reportedly been recruited as a secret agent in 1960. He had organized his own
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armed band known as Avanguardia Nationale (AN), whose members had begun training in terror tactics in preparation
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for Plan Solo. *21
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General De Lorenzo, whose SIFAR had now become SID, soon enlisted these and other confidants in a new Gladio
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project. They planned to create a secret parallel force alongside sensitive government offices to neutralize subversive
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elements not yet purified. Known as the Parallel SID, its tentacles reached into nearly every key institution of the
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Italian state. Gen.Vito Miceli, who later headed SID, said he set up the separate structure at the request of the
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Americans and NATO. 22
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FRATERNAL BONDS
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Two ancient, mysterious, international fraternities kept the loosely-linked Gladio programs from flying apart. The
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Knights of Malta played a formative role after the war (see box), but the order of Freemasonry and its most notorious
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lodge in Italy, known as Propaganda Due (pronounced doo-ay ), or P-2, was far more influential. In the late 1960s, its
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Most Venerable Master was Licio Gelli, a Knight of Malta who fought for Franco with Mussolini's Black Shirts. At the
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end of World War II, Gelli faced execution by Italian partisans for his Nazi collaboration, but escaped by joining the
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U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. *23 In the 1950s, he was recruited by SIFAR.
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After some years of self-imposed exile in Argentine fascist circles,24 he saw his calling in Italy as a Mason. Quickly
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rising to its top post, he began fraternizing in 1969 with Gen. Alexander Haig, then assistant to Henry Kissinger,
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President Nixon's national security chief. Gelli became the main intermediary between the CIA and SID's De Lorenzo,
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also a Mason and Knight. Gelli's first order from the White House was reportedly to recruit 400 more top Italian and
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NATO officials.25
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To help ferret out dissidents, Gelli and De Lorenzo began compiling personal dossiers on thousands of people, including
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legislators and clerics. *26 Within a few years, scandal erupted when an inquiry found 157,000 such files in SID, all
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available to the Ministers of Defense and Interior. *27 Parliament ordered 34,000 files burned, but by then the CIA had
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obtained duplicates for its archives. *28
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Provocateurs on the Right
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In 1968, the Americans started formal commando training for the gladiators at the clandestine Sardinian NATO base.
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Within a few years, 4,000 graduates had been placed in strategic posts. At least 139 arms caches, including some at
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carabinieri barracks, were at their disposal. *29 To induce young men to join such a risky venture, the CIA paid high
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salaries and promised that if they were killed, their children would be educated at U.S. expense. *30
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Tensions began to reach critical mass that same year. While dissidents took to the streets all over the world, in Italy,
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takeovers of universities and strikes for higher wages and pensions were overshadowed by a series of bloody political
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crimes. The number of terrorist acts reached 147 in 1968, rising to 398 the next year, and to an incredible peak of 2,498
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in 1978 before tapering off, largely because of a new law encouraging informers ( penitenti ). *31 Until 1974, the
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indiscriminate bombers of the right constituted the main force behind political violence.
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The first major explosion occurred in 1969 in Milan's Piazza Fontana; it killed 18 people and injured 90. In this and
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numerous other massacres, anarchists proved handy scapegoats for fascist provocateurs seeking to blame the left.
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Responding to a phone tip after the Milan massacre, police arrested 150 alleged anarchists and even put some on trial.
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But two years later, new evidence led to the indictment of several neofascists and SID officers. Three innocent
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anarchists were convicted, but later absolved, while those responsible for the attack emerged unpunished by Italian
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justice. *32
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Conclusive Gladio links to political violence were found after a plane exploded in flight near Venice in November 1973.
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Venetian judge Carlo Mastelloni determined that the Argo-16 aircraft was used to shuttle trainees and munitions
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between the U.S. base in Sardinia and Gladio sites in northeast Italy.33 The apogee of right-wing terror came in 1974
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with two massacres. One, a bombing at an antifascist rally in Brescia, killed eight and injured 102. The other was an
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explosion on the Italicus train near Bologna, killing 12 and wounding 105. At this point, President Giovanni Leone, with
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little exaggeration, summed up the situation: With 10,000 armed civilians running around, as usual, I'm president of
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shit. *34
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At Brescia, the initial call to police also blamed anarchists, but the malefactor later turned out to be a secret agent in
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the Parallel SID. *35 A similar connection was also alleged in the Italicus case. Two fascists who were eventually
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convicted were members of a clandestine police group called the Black Dragons, according to the left-wing paper, Lotta
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Continua. *36 Their sentences were also overturned. Although in these and other cases, many leftists were arrested
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and tried, fascists or neofascists were often the culprits, in league with Gladio groups and the Italian secret services.
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Reflecting the degree to which these forces controlled the government through the Parallel SID, nearly all the rightists
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implicated in these atrocities were later freed.
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By 1974, right-wing terror began to be answered by the armed left, which favored carefully targeted hit-and-run attacks
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over the right's indiscriminate bombings. For the next six years, leftist militants, especially the Red Brigades,
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responded with a vengeance, accounting for far more acts of political violence than the right. *37 For several years,
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Italy plunged into a virtual civil war.
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PLOTTING COUPS D'ETAT
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Meanwhile, groups of right-wingers were busy planning more takeovers of the elected government, with the active
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encouragement of U.S. officials. A seminal document was the 1970 132-page order on stability operations in host
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countries, published as Supplement B of the U.S. Army's Field Manual 30-31. Taking its cue from earlier NSC and CIA
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papers, the manual explained that if a country is not sufficiently anticommunist, serious attention must be given to
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possible modifications of the structure. If that country does not react with adequate vigor, the document continues,
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groups acting under U.S. Army intelligence control should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions according to
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the nature of the case. *38
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With such incendiary suggestions and thousands of U.S.-trained guerrillas ready, the fascists again attempted to take
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over the government by force in 1970. This time, the instigator was the Black Prince Borghese. Fifty men under the
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command of Stefano Delle Chiaie seized the Interior Ministry in Rome after being let in at night by an aide to political
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police head Federico D'Amato. But the operation was aborted when Borghese received a mysterious phone call later
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attributed to General Vito Miceli, the military intelligence chief. The plotters were not arrested; instead, they left with
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180 stolen machine guns. *39
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News of the attack remained secret until an informer tipped the press three months later. By then, the culprits had
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escaped to Spain. Although the ringleaders were convicted in 1975, the verdict was overturned on appeal. All but one of
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the machine guns were returned earlier. *40
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It was in this atmosphere that the U.S. decided to make another all-out effort to block the communists from gaining
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strength in the 1972 elections. According to the Pike Report, the CIA disbursed $10 million to 21 candidates, mostly
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Christian Democrats. *41 That amount did not include $800,000 that Ambassador Graham Martin, going around the
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CIA, obtained through Henry Kissinger at the White House for General Miceli. *42 Miceli would later face charges for
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the Borghese coup attempt but, fitting the pattern, he was cleared.
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Police foiled another attempted coup that same year. They found hit lists and other documents exposing some 20
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subversive groups forming the Parallel SID structure. Roberto Cavallaro, a fascist trade unionist, was implicated, as
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were highly placed generals, who said they got approval from NATO and U.S. officials. In later testimony, Cavallaro said
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the group was set up to restore order after any trouble arose. When these troubles do not erupt [by themselves], he
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said, they are contrived by the far right. Gen. Miceli was arrested, but the courts eventually freed him, declaring that
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there had been no insurrection. *43
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Still another right-wing attempt to overthrow the government was set for 1974, reportedly with the imprimatur of both
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the CIA and NATO. Its leader was Edgardo Sogno, one of Italy's most decorated resistance fighters, who had formed a
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Gladio-style group after the war. Sogno, who had gained many influential American friends while working at the Italian
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embassy in Washington during the 1960s, was later arrested, but he, too, was eventually cleared. *44
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GLADIO UNRAVELS
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A triple murder at Peteano near Venice in May 1972 turned out to be pivotal in exposing Gladio. The crime occurred
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when three carabinieri, in response to an anonymous phone call, went to check out a suspicious car. When one of them
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opened the hood, all three were blown to bits by a boobytrap bomb. *45 An anonymous call two days later implicated the
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Red Brigades, the most active of the left's revolutionary groups. The police immediately rounded up 200 alleged
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communists, thieves and pimps for questioning, but no charges were brought. Ten years later, a courageous Venetian
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magistrate, Felice Casson, reopened the long-dormant case only to learn that there had been no police investigation at
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the scene. Despite receiving a false analysis from a secret service bomb expert and confronting numerous obstructions
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and delays, the judge traced the explosives to a militant outfit called New Order and to one of its active members,
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Vincenzo Vinciguerra. He promptly confessed and was sentenced to life, the only right-wing bomber ever locked up. *46
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Vinciguerra refused to implicate others, but described the coverup:
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"The carabinieri, the Ministry of Interior, the Customs and Excise police, the civilian
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and military secret services all knew the truth behind the attack, that I was
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responsible and all this within 20 days. So they decided, for totally political reasons,
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to cover it up. *47"
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As for his motive, the fascist true believer Vinciguerra said his misdeed was an act of revolt against the manipulation of
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neofascism since 1945 by the whole Gladio-based parallel structure. *48
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Casson eventually found enough incriminating evidence to implicate the highest officials of the land. In what was the
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first such request to an Italian president, Casson demanded explanations from President Francesco Cossiga. But Casson
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didn't stop there; he also demanded that other officials come clean. In October 1990, under pressure from Casson,
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Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti ended 30 years of denials and described Gladio in detail. He added that all prime
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ministers had been aware of Gladio, though some later denied it. *49
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Suddenly, Italians saw clues to many mysteries, including the unexplained death of Pope John Paul I in 1978. Author
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David Yallop lists Gelli as a suspect in that case, saying that he, for all practical purposes, ran Italy at the time. *50
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MEMENTO MORO
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Perhaps the most shocking political crime of the 1970s was the kidnapping and murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro
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and five of his aides in 1978. The abduction occurred as Moro was on his way to submit a plan to strengthen Italian
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political stability by bringing communists into the government.
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Earlier versions of the plan had sent U.S. officials into a tizzy. Four years before his death, on a visit to the U.S. as
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foreign minister, Moro was reportedly read the riot act by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and later by an unnamed
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intelligence official. In testimony during the inquiry into his murder, Moro's widow summed up their ominous words:
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You must abandon your policy of bringing all the political forces in your country into direct collaboration...or you will
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pay dearly for it. *51
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Moro was so shaken by the threats, according to an aide, that he became ill the next day and cut short his U.S. visit,
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saying he was through with politics. *52 But U.S. pressure continued; Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) issued a
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similar warning two years later in an interview in Italy. *53 Shortly before his kidnapping, Moro wrote an article
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replying to his U.S. critics, but decided not to publish it. *54
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While being held captive for 55 days, Moro pleaded repeatedly with his fellow Christian Democrats to accept a ransom
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offer to exchange imprisoned Red Brigade members for his freedom. But they refused, to the delight of Allied officials
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who wanted the Italians to play hardball. In a letter found later, Moro predicted: My death will fall like a curse on all
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Christian Democrats, and it will initiate a disastrous and unstoppable collapse of all the party apparatus. *55
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During Moro's captivity, police unbelievably claimed to have questioned millions of people and searched thousands of
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dwellings. But the initial judge investigating the case, Luciano Infelisi, said he had no police at his disposal. I ran the
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investigation with a single typist, without even a telephone in the room. He added that he received no useful
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information from the secret services during the time. *56 Other investigating magistrates suggested in 1985 that one
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reason for the inaction was that all the key officers involved were members of P-2 and were therefore acting at the
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behest of Gelli and the CIA. *57
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Although the government eventually arrested and convicted several Red Brigade members, many in the press and
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parliament continue to ask whether SID arranged the kidnapping after receiving orders from higher up. Suspicions
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naturally turned toward the U.S., particularly Henry Kissinger, though he denied any role in the crime. In Gladio and
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the Mafia, Washington had the perfect apparatus for doing such a deed without leaving a trace.
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PENETRATING THE RED BRIGADES
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That the Red Brigades had been thoroughly infiltrated for years by both the CIA and the Italian secret services is no
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longer contested. The purpose of the operation was to encourage violence from extremist sectors of the left in order to
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discredit the left as a whole. The Red Brigades were a perfect foil. With unflinching radicalism, they considered the
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Italian Communist Party too moderate and Moro's opening too compromising.
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The Red Brigades worked closely with the Hyperion Language School in Paris, with some members not realizing it had
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CIA ties. The school had been founded by three pseudo-revolutionary Italians, one of whom, Corrado Simioni, had
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worked for the CIA at Radio Free Europe. *58 Another, Duccio Berio, has admitted passing information about Italian
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leftist groups to SID. *59 Hyperion opened an office in Italy shortly before the kidnapping and closed it a few months
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later. An Italian police report said Hyperion may be the most important CIA office in Europe. *60 Mario Moretti, one of
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those who handled arms deals and the Paris connection for the Red Brigades, managed to avoid arrest in the Moro case
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for three years even though he personally handled the kidnapping. *61
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Venice magistrate Carlo Mastelloni concluded in 1984 that the Red Brigades had for years received arms from the PLO.
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*62 Mastelloni wrote that the de facto secret service level accord between the USA and the PLO was considered relevant
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to the present investigation into the ... relationship between the Red Brigades organization and the PLO. *63 One
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Gladio scholar, Phillip Willan, concludes that the arms deal between the PLO and the Red Brigades formed part of the
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secret accord between the PLO and the CIA. *64 His research indicates that the alleged deal between the CIA and the
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PLO occurred in 1976, a year after the U.S. promised Israel that it would have no political contacts with the PLO.
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At the time of the Moro kidnapping, several leaders of the Brigades were in prison, having been turned in by a double
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agent after they kidnapped a judge. According to journalist Gianni Cipriani, one of those arrested was carrying phone
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numbers and personal notes leading to a high official of SID, who had boasted openly of having agents inside the Red
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Brigades. Other intriguing finds included the discovery in the Brigade offices of a printing press which had previously
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belonged to SID and ballistics tests showing more than half of the 92 bullets at the kidnapping scene were similar to
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those in Gladio stocks. *65
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Several people have noted the unlikelihood of the Red Brigades pulling off such a smooth, military-style kidnapping in
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the center of Rome. Alberto Franceschini, a jailed member of the Brigades, said, I never thought my comrades outside
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had the capacity to carry out a complex military operation. ... We remembered ourselves as an organization formed by
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inexperienced young lads. *66 Two days after the crime, one secret service officer told the press that the perpetrators
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appeared to have had special commando training. *67
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When letters written by Moro were found later in a Red Brigades site in Milan, investigators hoped they would reveal
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key evidence. But Francesco Biscioni, who studied Moro's responses to his captors' questions, concluded that important
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sections had been excised when they were transcribed. Nonetheless, in one uncensored passage, Moro worried about how
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Andreotti's smooth relationships with his colleagues of the CIA would affect his fate. *68
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The two people with the most knowledge of Moro's letters were murdered. The Carabiniere general in charge of
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anti-terrorism, Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa, was transferred to Sicily and killed Mafia-style in 1982, a few months after
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|
raising questions about the missing letters. *69 Maverick journalist Mino Pecorelli was assassinated on a Rome street
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|
in 1979 just a month after reporting that he had obtained a list of 56 fascists betrayed to the police by Gelli. *70 Thomas
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Buscetta, a Mafia informer under witness protection in the U.S., accused Andreotti of ordering both killings for fear of
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being exposed. *71 But an inquiry by his political peers last year found no reason to prosecute the prime minister.
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Della Chiesa and Pecorelli were only two of numerous witnesses and potential witnesses murdered before they could be
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questioned by judges untainted by links to Gladio. *72 President Cossiga, the interior minister when Moro died, told
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BBC: Aldo Moro's death still weighs heavily on the Christian Democrats as does the decision I came to, which turned
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my hair white, to practically sacrifice Moro to save the Republic. *73
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THE BOLOGNA TRAIN STATION BOMBING
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A huge explosion at the Bologna train station two years after Moro's death may have whitened the hair of many Italians
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|
not just for the grisly toll of 85 killed and more than 200 injured but for the official inaction that followed. Although the
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investigating magistrates suspected neofascists, they were unable to issue credible arrest warrants for more than two
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|
years because of false data from the secret services. By that time, all but one of the five chief suspects, two of whom
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|
had ties to SID, had skipped the country. *74 The T4 explosive found at the scene matched the Gladio material used in
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Brescia, Peteano and other bombings, according to expert testimony before Judge Mastelloni. *75
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|
In the trial, the judges cited the strategy of tension and its ties to foreign powers. They also found the secret military
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|
and civilian structure tied into neofascist groups, P-2, and the secret services. *76 In short, they found the CIA and
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|
Gladio.
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But their efforts to exact justice for the Bologna bombing came to nothing when, in 1990, the court of appeals acquitted
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all the alleged brains. P-2 head Gelli went free, as did two secret service chiefs whose perjury convictions were
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|
overturned. Four gladiators convicted of participating in an armed group also won appeals. That left Peteano as the only
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|
major bombing case with a conviction of the actual bomber, thanks to Vinciguerra's confession.
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The sorry judicial record in these monstrous crimes showed how completely the Gladio network enveloped the army,
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police, secret services and the top courts. Thanks to P-2, with its 963 well-placed brothers, *77 the collusion also
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|
extended into the top levels of media and business.
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FRUITS OF GLADIO
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By the early 1980s, however, court data revealed enough CIA fingerprints to provoke strong anti-U.S. sentiment. In
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1981, the offices of three U.S. firms in Rome were bombed. In 1982, the Red Brigades kidnapped James L. Dozier, a
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|
U.S. general attached to NATO, calling him a Yankee hangman. *78 He was freed after five weeks by police
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|
commandos, reportedly with the help of the CIA's Mafia connections. *79 But damage to the U.S. image has been
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|
remarkably constrained considering what the U.S. did to Italian society and government for 50 years in the name of
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|
anticommunism.
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|
Moro's final prediction came true. Instead of bolstering the center parties, Gladio, helped by the corruption scandals,
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|
destroyed them. Instead of destroying the leftists, Gladio revelations helped them win control of major cities while
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|
retaining one-third of parliament. By the early 1980s, the Red Brigades were wiped out, but the major sources of
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|
right-wing terrorism the Mafia and the neofascists remained active.80
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|
The end results lead some to question the whole rationale of U.S. involvement in Italy, particularly in regard to the
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|
communist menace. According to Phillip Willan, who wrote the definitive book on Italian terrorism:
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|
"The U.S. has consistently refused to recognize the Italian Communist Party's
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|
increasingly wholehearted commitment to the principles of Western democracy and
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|
its validity as an alternative to the generally corrupt and incompetent political
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|
parties that have governed Italy since the war. Had it done so, much of the
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|
bloodshed resulting from the strategy of tension might have been avoided. *81"
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Willan goes on to ask whether U.S. and Italian intelligence officials may have deliberately over-emphasized the
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|
communist threat in order to give themselves greater power and greater leeway for their own maneuvers. *82
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THE LESSONS OF GLADIO
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|
As long as the U.S. public remains ignorant of this dark chapter in U.S. foreign relations, the agencies responsible for it
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|
will face little pressure to correct their ways. The end of the Cold War brought wholesale changes in other nations, but
|
|
it changed little in Washington. In an ironic twist, confessed CIA mole Aldrich Ames has raised the basic question of
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|
whether the U.S. needs tens of thousands of agents working around the world primarily in and against friendly
|
|
countries. The U.S., he adds, still awaits a real national debate on the means and ends and costs of our national security
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|
policies. *83
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|
The new government in Italy touts itself as a revolution of the disenfranchised, a clean break from the past. But the
|
|
fascists are back and gaining ground. The anti-Mafia party has been rejected, and the big cartels have tightened their
|
|
grip on the economy. With P-2 brother Berlusconi continuing to trade on the Cold War fear of communists, the Gladio
|
|
perpetrators still unpunished, and experts in Washington raising fears of more terrorism, *84 it looks like business as
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|
usual in Italy.
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*************************
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Gladio's Roots
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The policies that would evolve into Gladio began nduring World War II, when U.S. anticommunist nphobias combined
|
|
with geopolitical fears of a victorious USSR to create a holy war against the left. An ends justify the means atmosphere
|
|
within the U.S. government and particularly within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), fostered the creation of Stay
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|
Behind programs throughout Western Europe, ostensibly as the first line of defense in case the Soviets invaded.
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|
|
But the main worry was internal. The Americans' great fear for Italy was that communist partisans fighting in the
|
|
north would join with organized labor to bring the left to power. The OSS and its successors were apparently prepared to
|
|
use any measures to forestall that event, including political assassination, terrorism, and alliances with organized
|
|
crime. According to one OSS memo to Washington, the U.S. seemed to support a monarchist plan to use fascist killers
|
|
to commit acts of terror and blame the left. *1 U.S. involvement in Italian politics began in 1942, when the OSS
|
|
successfully pressured the Justice Department to release imprisoned mobster Charles Lucky Luciano. In return for
|
|
early freedom, Luciano agreed to make contacts with Mafia pals to ease the way for the U.S. invasion of Sicily in 1943.2
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|
|
The Luciano deal forged a long-standing alliance between the U.S. and the international Cosa Nostra. It also set a
|
|
pattern of cooperation between U.S. intelligence agencies and international criminal organizations involved in drugs and
|
|
arms traffic. The deal's godfather was Earl Brennan, OSS chief for Italy. Before the war, he had served in the U.S.
|
|
Embassy, using his diplomatic cover to establish contacts with Mussolini's secret police and leading fascists. *3
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|
|
The Catholic Church also cooperated. U.S. ties to the Vatican were already substantial; one of the strongest links was a
|
|
secret fraternity, the Rome-based Sovereign Military Order of Malta, which dates back to the First Crusade. OSS head
|
|
William Wild Bill Donovan was a member. So were other top U.S. officials, including Myron Taylor, U.S. envoy to the
|
|
Vatican from 1939 to 1950, and William Casey, an OSS operative who rose to CIA chief under Reagan. OSS Italy chief
|
|
Brennan had contacts as early as 1942 with Vatican Under-Secretary of State Gian Battista Montini, who became Pope
|
|
Paul VI in 1963.4
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|
|
|
Among the notable OSS operatives was James Jesus Angleton, the legendary, paranoid, future CIA
|
|
counter-intelligence chief. Angleton built on family and business connections in Italy to lay the basis of Gladio by
|
|
forming and financing a clandestine network of right-wing Italians who shared his fierce gung-ho style. *5 The
|
|
paramilitary groups were filled with devout anticommunists ready to wage war on the left. He also helped notorious
|
|
Nazi/fascist mass-murderers such as Junio Valerio Black Prince Borghese elude justice at war's end. *6
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|
|
|
U.S. officials were worried that the communists and socialists would join forces after the fighting. The communist
|
|
takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 added to their fears. As a result, the U.S. cooked up a variety of plans to
|
|
manipulate Italian politics. Angleton, who by late 1948 had been promoted to special assistant to CIA director Admiral
|
|
Roscoe Hillenkoetter, used the Vatican's 20,000 Civic Committees to conduct psychological warfare against communist
|
|
influences, particularly in the unions. *7
|
|
|
|
The newly formed National Security Council (NSC) also joined the fray: If the Communist Party wins the [1948]
|
|
election, the NSC advised, such aggression should immediately be countered by steps to extend the strategic disposition
|
|
of U.S. armed forces in Italy. *8 The Communists did not win that pivotal election (nor any subsequent ones). But that
|
|
didn't stop the U.S. from trying to destroy the left. The total cost to American taxpayers for such activities and various
|
|
aid programs was $4 billion from the end of the war to 1953. *9 And that was just the beginning of the U.S. assault on
|
|
Italian sovereignty.
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|