textfiles-politics/regexConsp/castro.xml

<xml><p></p>

<p>    CUBA, CASTRO, and the UNITED STATES</p>

<p>     or</p>

<p>    How One Man With A Cigar</p>

<p>   Dominated American Foreign Policy</p>

<p>
   In 1959, a rebel, Fidel Castro, overthrew the reign of </p>

<p>Fulgencia Batista in Cuba; a small island 90 miles off the </p>

<p>Florida coast.  There have been many coups and changes of </p>

<p>government in the world since then.  Few if any have had the </p>

<p>effect on Americans and American foreign policy as this one.</p>

<p>  In 1952, Sergeant Fulgencia Batista staged a successful </p>

<p>bloodless coup in Cuba . </p>

<p>  Batista never really had any cooperation and rarely </p>

<p>garnered much support. His reign was marked by continual </p>

<p>dissension.</p>

<p>  After waiting to see if Batista would be seriously opposed, </p>

<p>Washington recognized his government.  Batista had already </p>

<p>broken ties with the Soviet Union and became an ally to the </p>

<p>U.S. throughout the cold war.  He was continually friendly and </p>

<p>helpful to American business interest. But he failed to bring </p>

<p>democracy to Cuba or secure the broad popular support that </p>

<p>might have legitimized his rape of the 1940 Constitution.</p>

<p>  As the people of Cuba grew increasingly dissatisfied with </p>

<p>his gangster style politics, the tiny rebellions that had </p>

<p>sprouted began to grow.  Meanwhile the U.S. government was </p>

<p>aware of and shared the distaste for a regime increasingly </p>

<p>nauseating to most public opinion. It became clear that Batista </p>

<p>regime was an odious type of government.  It killed its own </p>

<p>citizens, it stifled dissent. (1)</p>

<p>  At this time Fidel Castro appeared as leader of the growing </p>

<p>rebellion.  Educated in America he was a proponent of the </p>

<p>Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He conducted a brilliant guerilla </p>

<p>campaign from the hills of Cuba against Batista. On January </p>

<p>1959, he prevailed and overthrew the Batista government.</p>

<p>  Castro promised to restore democracy in Cuba, a feat </p>

<p>
Batista had failed to accomplish. This promise was looked </p>

<p>upon benevolently but watchfully by Washington.  Castro was </p>

<p>believed to be too much in the hands of the people to stretch </p>

<p>the rules of politics very far. The U.S. government supported </p>

<p>Castro's coup. It professed to not know about Castro's </p>

<p>Communist leanings.  Perhaps this was due to the ramifications </p>

<p>of Senator Joe McCarty's discredited anti-Communist diatribes.</p>

<p>  It seemed as if the reciprocal economic interests of the </p>

<p>U.S. and  Cuba would exert a stabilizing effect on Cuban </p>

<p>politics. Cuba had been economically bound to find a market for </p>

<p>its #1 crop, sugar.  The U.S. had been buying it at prices much </p>

<p>higher than market price. For this it received a guaranteed </p>

<p>flow of sugar. (2)</p>

<p>  Early on however developments clouded the hope for peaceful </p>

<p>relations.  According to American Ambassador to Cuba, Phillip </p>

<p>Bonsal, "From the very beginning of his rule Castro and his </p>

<p>sycophants bitterly and sweepingly attacked the relations of </p>

<p>the United States government with Batista and his regime".(3) </p>

<p>He accused us of supplying arms to Batista to help overthrow </p>

<p>Castro's revolution and of harboring war criminals for a </p>

<p>resurgence effort against him.  For the most part these were </p>

<p>not true: the U.S. put a trade embargo on Batista in 1957 </p>

<p>stopping the U.S. shipment of arms to Cuba. (4) However, his </p>

<p>last accusation seems to have been prescient.</p>

<p>  With the advent of Castro the history of U.S.- Cuban </p>

<p>relations was subjected to a revision of an intensity and </p>

<p>cynicism which left earlier efforts in the shade.  This </p>

<p>downfall took two roads in the eyes of Washington: Castro's </p>

<p>incessant campaign of slander against the U.S. and Castro's </p>

<p>wholesale nationalization of American properties.</p>

<p>
  These actions and the U.S. reaction to them set the stage </p>

<p>for what was to become the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the end of </p>

<p>U.S.- Cuban relations.</p>

<p>  Castro promised the Cuban people that he would bring land </p>

<p>reform to Cuba.  When he took power, the bulk of the nations </p>

<p>wealth and land was in the hands of a small minority.  The huge </p>

<p>plots of land were to be taken from the monopolistic owners and </p>

<p>distributed evenly among the people.  Compensation was to be </p>

<p>paid to the former owners. According to Phillip Bonsal, " </p>

<p>Nothing Castro said, nothing stated in the agrarian reform </p>

<p>statute Castro signed in 1958, and nothing in  the law that was </p>

<p>promulgated in the Official Gazzette of June 3, 1959, warranted </p>

<p>the belief that in two years a wholesale conversion of Cuban </p>

<p>agricultural land to state ownership would take place".(5) Such </p>

<p>a notion then would have been inconsistent with many of the </p>

<p>Castro pronouncements, including the theory of a peasant </p>

<p>revolution and the pledges to the landless throughout the </p>

<p>nation. Today most of the people who expected to become </p>

<p>independent farmers or members of cooperatives in the operation </p>

<p>of which they would  have had a voice are now laborers on the </p>

<p>state payroll. (6) </p>

<p>  After secretly drawing up his Land Reform Law, Castro used </p>

<p>it to form the National Institute of Agrarian Reform  (INRA) </p>

<p>with broad and ill defined powers. Through the INRA Castro </p>

<p>methodically seized all American holdings in Cuba. He promised </p>

<p>compensation but frequently never gave it.  He conducted </p>

<p>investigations into company affairs, holding control over them </p>

<p>in the meantime, and then never divulging the results or giving </p>

<p>back the control. (7)</p>

<p>  These seizures were protested.  On January 11 Ambassador </p>

<p>
Bonsal delivered a note to Havana protesting the Cuban </p>

<p>government seizure of U.S. citizens property.  The note was </p>

<p>rejected the same night as a U.S. attempt to keep economic </p>

<p>control over Cuba. (8)</p>

<p>  As this continued Castro was engineering a brilliant </p>

<p>propaganda campaign aimed at accusing the U.S. of "conspiring </p>

<p>with the counter revolutionaries against the Castro regime"(9).  </p>

<p>Castro's ability to whip the masses into a frenzy with wispy </p>

<p>fallacies about American "imperialist" actions against Cuba was </p>

<p>his main asset.  He constantly found events which he could work </p>

<p>the "ol Castro magic " on, as Nixon said , to turn it into </p>

<p>another of the long list of grievances, real or imagined, that </p>

<p>Cuba had suffered.</p>

<p>  Throughout Castro's rule there had been numerous minor </p>

<p>attacks and disturbances in Cuba. Always without any </p>

<p>investigation whatsoever, Castro would blatantly and publicly </p>

<p>blame the U.S..  </p>

<p>  Castro continually called for hearings at the Organization </p>

<p>of American States and the United Nations to hear charges </p>

<p>against the U.S. of "overt aggression".  These charges were </p>

<p>always denied by the councils. (10)</p>

<p>  Two events that provided fuel for the Castro propaganda </p>

<p>furnace stand out.  These are the "bombing" of Havana on </p>

<p>October 21 and the explosion of the French munitions ship La </p>

<p>Coubre on March 4, 1960.(11)</p>

<p>  On the evening of October 21 the former captain of the </p>

<p>rebel air force, Captain Dian-Lanz, flew over Havana and </p>

<p>dropped a quantity of virulently anti-Castro leaflets. This was </p>

<p>an American failure to prevent international flights in </p>

<p>violation of American law. Untroubled by any considerations of </p>

<p>
truth or good faith, the Cuban authorities distorted the </p>

<p>facts of the matter and accused the U.S. of a responsibility </p>

<p>going way beyond negligence. Castro, not two days later, </p>

<p>elaborated a bombing thesis, complete with "witnesses", and </p>

<p>launched a propaganda campaign against the U.S. Ambassador </p>

<p>Bonsal said, "This incident was so welcome to Castro for his </p>

<p>purposes that I was not surprised when, at a later date, a </p>

<p>somewhat similar flight was actually engineered by Cuban secret </p>

<p>agents in Florida."(12)</p>

<p>   This outburst constituted "the beginning of the end " in </p>

<p>U.S.- Cuban relations. President Eisenhower stated ,"Castro's </p>

<p>performance on October 26 on the "bombing" of Havana spelled </p>

<p>the end of my hope for rational relations between Cuba and the </p>

<p>U.S."(13)</p>

<p>  Up until 1960 the U.S. had followed a policy of non </p>

<p>intervention in Cuba.  It  had endured the slander and seizure </p>

<p>of lands, still hoping to maintain relations.  This ended, </p>

<p>when, on March 4, the French munitions ship La Coubre arrived </p>

<p>at Havana laden with arms and munitions for the Cuban </p>

<p>government. It promptly blew up with serious loss of life. (14)</p>

<p>  Castro and his authorities wasted no time venomously </p>

<p>denouncing the U.S. for an overt act of sabotage.  Some </p>

<p>observers concluded that the disaster was due to the careless </p>

<p>way the Cubans unloaded the cargo. (15) Sabotage was possible </p>

<p>but it was preposterous to blame the U.S. without even a </p>

<p>pretense of an investigation.  </p>

<p>  Castro's reaction to the La Coubre explosion may have been </p>

<p>what tipped the scales in favor of Washington's abandonment of </p>

<p>the non intervention policy.  This, the continued slander, and </p>

<p>the fact that the Embassy had had no reply from the Cuban </p>

<p>
government to its representations regarding the cases of </p>

<p>Americans victimized by the continuing abuses of the INRA.</p>

<p>  The American posture of moderation was beginning to become, </p>

<p>in the face of Castro's insulting and aggressive behavior, a </p>

<p>political liability. (16)</p>

<p>  The new American policy, not announced as such, but </p>

<p>implicit in the the actions of the United States government was </p>

<p>one of overthrowing Castro by all means available to the U.S. </p>

<p>short of open employment of American armed forces in Cuba.</p>

<p>  It was at this time that the controversial decision was </p>

<p>taken to allow the CIA to begin recruiting and training of </p>

<p>ex-Cuban exiles for anti-Castro military service. (17)</p>

<p>  Shortly after this decision, following in quick steps, </p>

<p>aggressive policies both on the side of Cuba and the U.S. led </p>

<p>to the eventual finale in the actual invasion of Cuba by the </p>

<p>U.S!</p>

<p>  In June 1960 the U.S. started a series of economic </p>

<p>aggressions toward Cuba aimed at accelerating their downfall.</p>

<p>  The first of these measures was the advice of the U.S. to </p>

<p>the oil refineries in Cuba to refuse to handle the crude </p>

<p>petroleum that the Cubans were receiving from the Soviet Union.  </p>

<p>The companies such as Shell and Standard Oil had been buying </p>

<p>crude from their own plants in Venezuela at a high cost.  The </p>

<p>Cuban government demanded that the refineries process the crude </p>

<p>they were receiving from Russia at a much cheaper price. These </p>

<p>refineries refused at the U.S. advice stating that there were </p>

<p>no provisions in the law saying that they must accept the </p>

<p>Soviet product and that the low grade Russian crude would </p>

<p>damage the machinery.  The claim about the law may have been </p>

<p>true but  the charge that the cheaper Soviet 

crude damaging the </p>

<p>machines seems to be an excuse to cover up the attempted </p>

<p>economic strangulation of Cuba. (The crude worked just fine as </p>

<p>is soon to be shown)</p>

<p>  Upon receiving the refusal Che Gueverra, the newly </p>

<p>appointed head of the National Bank,and known anti-American, </p>

<p>seized all three major oil company refineries and began </p>

<p>producing all the Soviet crude,not just the 50% they had </p>

<p>earlier bargained for.  This was a big victory and a stepping </p>

<p>stone towards increasing the soon to be controversial alliance </p>

<p>with Russia.</p>

<p>  On July 6, a week after the intervention of the refineries, </p>

<p>President Eisenhower announced that the balance of Cuba's 1960 </p>

<p>sugar quota for the supply of sugar to the U.S. was to be </p>

<p>suspended. (18).  This action was regarded as a reprisal to </p>

<p>the intervention of the refineries. It seems obvious that it </p>

<p>was a major element in the calculated overthrow of Castro.</p>

<p>  In addition to being an act of destroying the U.S. record </p>

<p>for statesmanship in Latin America, this forced Cuba into </p>

<p>Russia's arms and vice-versa.</p>

<p>  The immediate loss to Cuba was 900,000 tons of sugar </p>

<p>unsold.  This was valued at about $100,000,000.(19) Had the </p>

<p>Russians not come to the rescue it would have been a serious </p>

<p>blow to Cuba.  But come to the rescue they did, cementing the </p>

<p>Soviet-Cuban bond and granting Castro a present he could have </p>

<p>never given himself. As Ernest Hemingway put it,"I just hope to </p>

<p>Christ that the United States doesn't cut the sugar quota. That </p>

<p>will really tear it.  It will make Cuba a gift to the </p>

<p>Russians." (20) And now the gift had been made.</p>

<p>  Castro had announced earlier in a speech that action </p>

<p>against the sugar quota would cost Americans in Cuba "down to </p>

<p>
the nails in their shoes" (21) Castro did his best to carry </p>

<p>that out.  In a decree made as the Law of Nationalization, he </p>

<p>authorized expropriation of American property at Che Gueverra's </p>

<p>discretion.  The compensation scheme was such that under </p>

<p>current U.S. - Cuban trade relations it was worthless and </p>

<p>therefore confiscation without compensation.</p>

<p>  The Soviet Unions assumption of responsibility of Cuba's </p>

<p>economic welfare gave the Russians a politico-military stake in </p>

<p>Cuba. Increased arms shipments from the U.S.S.R and </p>

<p>Czechoslovakia enabled Castro to rapidly strengthen and expand </p>

<p>his forces.  On top of this Cuba now had Russian military </p>

<p>support.  On July 9, three days after President Eisenhowers </p>

<p>sugar proclamation, Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev announced, </p>

<p>"The U.S.S.R is raising its voice and extending a helpful hand </p>

<p>to the people of Cuba.....Speaking figuratively in case of </p>

<p>necessity Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with </p>

<p>rocket fire. (22) Castro took this to mean direct commitment </p>

<p>made by Russia to protect the Cuban revolution in case of U.S. </p>

<p>attack.  The final act of the U.S. in the field of economic </p>

<p>aggression against Cuba came on October 19, 1960, in the form </p>

<p>of a trade embargo on all goods except medicine and medical </p>

<p>supplies. Even these were to be banned within a few months. </p>

<p>Other than causing the revolutionaries some inconvenience, all </p>

<p>the embargo accomplished  was to give Castro a godsend. For the </p>

<p>past 25 years Castro has blamed the shortages, rationings, </p>

<p>breakdowns and even some of the unfavorable weather conditions </p>

<p>on the U.S. blockade.</p>

<p>  On January 6, 1961, Castro formally broke relations with </p>

<p>the United States and ordered the staff of the U.S. embassy to </p>

<p>leave.  Immediately after the break in relations he ordered </p>

<p>
full scale mobilization of his armed forces to repel an </p>

<p>invasion from the United States, which he correctly asserted </p>

<p>was imminent.  For at this time the Washington administration, </p>

<p>under new President-elect Kennedy was gearing up for the Cuban </p>

<p>exile invasion of Cuba.  The fact that this secret was ill kept </p>

<p>led to increased arms being shipped to Cuba by Russia in late </p>

<p>1960.</p>

<p>  President Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower-Nixon </p>

<p>administration the operation that became the Bay of Pigs </p>

<p>expedition.  The plan was ill conceived and a fiasco.</p>

<p>  Both Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger describe the </p>

<p>President as the victim of a process set in motion before his </p>

<p>inauguration and which he, in the first few weeks of his </p>

<p>administration, was unable to arrest in spite of his </p>

<p>misgivings.  Mr. Schlesinger writes -"Kennedy saw the project </p>

<p>in the patios of the bureaucracy as a contingency plan.  He did </p>

<p>not yet realize how contingency planning could generate its own </p>

<p>reality." (23)</p>

<p>  The fact is that Kennedy had promised to pursue a more </p>

<p>successful policy towards Cuba.  I fail to see how the proposed </p>

<p>invasion could be looked upon as successful.  The plan he </p>

<p>inherited called for 1500 patriots to seize control over their </p>

<p>seven million fellow citizens from over 100,000 well trained, </p>

<p>well armed Castroite militia!</p>

<p>  As if the plan wasn't doomed from the start, the </p>

<p>information the CIA had gathered about the strength of the </p>

<p>uprising in Cuba was outrageously misleading.  If we had won, </p>

<p>it still would have taken prolonged U.S. intervention to make </p>

<p>it work.  This along with Kennedys decision to rule out </p>

<p>American forces or even American officers or experts, whose </p>

<p>
participation was planned, doomed the whole affair.</p>

<p>  Additionally these impromptu ground rules were not relayed </p>

<p>to the exiles by the CIA, who were expecting massive U.S. </p>

<p>military backing!</p>

<p>  The exiles had their own problems; guns didn't work, ships </p>

<p>sank, codes for communication were wrong, the ammunition was </p>

<p>the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, did.  As could </p>

<p>be imagined the anti-Castro opposition achieved not one of its </p>

<p>permanent goals.  Upon landing at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, </p>

<p>1961, the mission marked a landmark failure in U.S. foreign </p>

<p>politics.  By April 20, only three days later, Castro's forces </p>

<p>had completely destroyed any semblance of the mission: they </p>

<p>killed 300 and captured the remaining 1,200!</p>

<p>  Many people since then have chastised Kennedy for his </p>

<p>decision to pull U.S. military forces.  I feel that his only </p>

<p>mistake was in going ahead in the first place, although, as </p>

<p>stated earlier, it seems as if he may not have had much choice.</p>

<p>  I feel Kennedy showed surer instincts in this matter than </p>

<p>his advisors who pleaded with him not to pull U.S. forces.  For </p>

<p>if the expedition had succeeded due to American armed forces </p>

<p>rather than the strength of the exile forces and the anti- </p>

<p>Castro movement within Cuba, the post Castro government would </p>

<p>have been totally unviable: it would have taken constant </p>

<p>American help to shore it up.  In this matter I share the </p>

<p>opinion of `ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, who has written "The </p>

<p>Bay of Pigs operation was a tragic experience for the Cubans </p>

<p>who took part, but its failure was a fortunate (if mortifying) </p>

<p>experience for the U.S., which otherwise might have been </p>

<p>saddled with indefinite occupation of the island.</p>

<p>  Beyond its immediately damaging effects, the Bay of Pigs </p>

<p>
fiasco has shown itself to have far reaching consequences.</p>

<p>  Washington's failure to achieve its goal in Cuba provided </p>

<p>the catalyst for Russia to seek an advantage and install </p>

<p>nuclear missiles in Cuba.  The resulting "missile crisis" in </p>

<p>1962 was the closest we have been to thermonuclear war.</p>

<p>  America's gain may have been America's loss.  A successful </p>

<p>Bay of Pigs may have brought the United States one advantage.  </p>

<p>The strain on American political and military assets resulting </p>

<p>from the need to keep the lid on in Cuba might have lid on Cuba </p>

<p>might have led the President of the United States to resist, </p>

<p>rather than to enthusiastically embrace, the advice he received </p>

<p>in 1964 and 1965 to make a massive commitment of American air </p>

<p>power, ground forces, and prestige in Vietnam.</p>

<p>  Cuban troops have been a major presence as Soviet </p>

<p>surrogates all over the world, notably in Angola.</p>

<p>  The threat of exportation of Castro's revolution permeates </p>

<p>U.S.-Central and South American policy. (Witness the invasion </p>

<p>of Grenada.)</p>

<p>  This fear still dominates todays headlines. For years the </p>

<p>U.S. has urged support for government of El Salvador and the </p>

<p>right wing Contras in Nicaragua.  The major concern underlying </p>

<p>American policy in the area is Castro's influence.  The fear of </p>

<p>a Castro influenced regime in South and Central America had </p>

<p>such control of American foreign policy as to almost topple the </p>

<p>Presidency in the recent Iran - Contra affair.  As a result the </p>

<p>U.S. government has once again faced a crisis which threatens </p>

<p>to destroy its credibility in foreign affairs.  All because of </p>

<p>one man with a cigar.</p>

<p>  In concluding I would like to state my own feelings on the </p>

<p>
whole affair as they formed in researching the topic.  To </p>

<p>start, all the information I could gather was one-sided.  All </p>

<p>the sources were American written, and encompassed an American </p>

<p>point of view.  In light of this knowledge, and with the </p>

<p>advantage of hindsight, I have formulated my own opinion of </p>

<p>this affair and how it might have been more productively </p>

<p>handled.  American intervention should have been held to a </p>

<p>minimum.  In an atmosphere of concentration on purely Cuban </p>

<p>issues, opposition to Castro's personal dictatorship could be </p>

<p>expected to grow.  Admittedly, even justified American </p>

<p>retaliation would have led to Cuban counterretaliation and so </p>

<p>on with the prospect that step by step the same end result </p>

<p>would have been attained as was in fact achieved.  But the </p>

<p>process would have lasted far longer; measured American </p>

<p>responses might have appeared well deserved to an increasing </p>

<p>number of Cubans, thus strengthening Cuban opposition to the </p>

<p>regime instead of, as was the case, greatly stimulating </p>

<p>revolutionary fervor, leaving the Russians no choice but to </p>

<p>give massive support to the Revolution and fortifying the </p>

<p>belief among anti-Castro Cubans that the United States was </p>

<p>rapidly moving to liberate them.  The economic pressures </p>

<p>available to the United States were not apt to bring Castro to </p>

<p>his knees, since the Soviets were capable of meeting Cuban </p>

<p>requirements in such matters as oil and sugar.  I believe the </p>

<p>Cuban government would have been doomed by its own </p>

<p>disorganization and incompetence and by the growing </p>

<p>disaffection of an increasing number of the Cuban people.  Left </p>

<p>to its own devices, the Castro regime would have withered on </p>

<p>the vine. </p>

<p>ammunition was </p>

<p>the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, di
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