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<conspiracyFile>I N V I S I B L E C O N T R A C T S
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George Mercier
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FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES
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[Pages 435-477]
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[Certain conventions have been used in converting INVISIBLE CONTRACTS to an
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electronic medium. For an explanation of the conventions used, please download
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the file INCONHLP.ZIP for further illumination. Other background information as
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well is contained in INCONHLP.ZIP. It is advisable to EXIT this file right now
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and read the contents of INCONHLP.ZIP before proceeding with your study of this
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file.]
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Next, we turn now and address some Commercial debt instruments that just about
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everyone uses constantly. And when this Commercial paper is used and then
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recirculated by you, Federal Benefits are being quietly accepted by you and so
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now subtle contracts are in effect. As COMMERCIAL HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE, you
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and the King are experiencing mutual enrichment from each other. [577]
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[577]<div> If there are
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HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE, are there also HOLDERS NOT IN DUE COURSE? Certainly
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there are. The volume of Contract Law in this area is quite extensive, and in
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this brief Letter, only a brief profiling synopsis is appropriate.
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<div>[577]
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The King believes that the mere use of Federal Reserve Notes, those
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"circulating evidences of debt" [578]
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[578]<div> Federal
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Reserve Notes are debt obligations of the United States Government. See Title
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12, Section 411.
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<div>[578]
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that his Legal Tender Statutes [578]
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[579]<div> "United
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States coins and currency (including Federal Reserve Notes and circulating
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notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all
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debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not
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legal tender for debts."
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- Title 31, Section 5103 (September, 1982).
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<div>[579]
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have enhanced the value of as a co-endorser; and that the mere acceptance and
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beneficial use of those circulating Commercial equity instruments of debt,
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constitutes an attachment of Equity Jurisdiction sufficiently related to
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experiencing Commercial profit or gain in Interstate Commerce as to warrant the
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attachment of civil liability to his so-called Title 26. Remember, once you get
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rid of your political contracts to pay taxes (like National Citizenship),
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Federal Judges will then start examining the record to see if there are any
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Commercial benefits out there that you have been experiencing. Once you are a
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Citizen, Federal Judges will generally stop looking for other contracts; but
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once Citizenship is gone, then other normally quiescent Commercial nexuses that
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attach King's Equity Jurisdiction suddenly take upon themselves vibrant new
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importance. [580]
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[580]<div> So looking
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inversely at the entire King's Equity pie of taxing hooks that he has got into
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you, only a totally pure decontamination of yourself away from that
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multiplicitious array of political and Commercial benefits the King is
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offering, of all benefits up and down the entire adhesive line of largely
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invisible juristic contracts, will properly sever yourself away from the
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adhesive administrative mandates of Title 26.
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<div>[580]
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I have thought out this perspective that the King has on this subject matter
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over and over again, and based on an analysis of principles, rights,
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liabilities, and Cases that surface in Commercial Contract Law relating to
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Negotiable Instruments (as Federal Reserve Notes are Negotiable Instruments),
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and of the rights, liabilities and duties of HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE, and I have
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come to the conclusion that the King is basically correct. For example, bills,
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notes, and checks are also Negotiable Instruments, as well as Inland Bills of
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Exchange. Collectively, Negotiable Instruments differ somewhat from orthodox
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Commercial contracts for the reason that the American Jurisprudential law
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concerning them springs from several different and independent sources. Whereas
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the simple Law of Contracts had its origin in the Common Law of England, in
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contrast this Law of Negotiable Instruments arose largely out of the summary
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and chronologically abbreviated practices and international customs of
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merchants in Commerce. Those merchants formulated a body of rules and common
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practices relating to their trade which were gradually adapted into the Law of
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the Law by the English Courts. Bills of exchange and promissory notes, of which
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Federal Reserve Notes are a composite blend of, acquired early on the peculiar
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quality and nature among merchants in Commerce as being negotiable, i.e.,
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passable as Tender to different people. Negotiability was then defined to mean
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that if an instrument is negotiable in form and is in the hands of a HOLDER IN
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DUE COURSE, then possible personal defenses someone may later assert against
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the Holder are cut off of in the Holder's favor. This idea of negotiability is
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an intriguing one. It differs quite a bit from the conception of assignability
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underlying the transfer of CHOSES IN ACTION which are not negotiable.
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Furthermore, all factors considered, it is my opinion that the King is not only
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just basically correct, but that the King is also in a very strong position
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here, and that Federal Magistrates are not Star Chamber Chancellors when
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throwing out your civil tax defenses that ignore this invisible and adhesive
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attachment of King's Equity Jurisdiction, and the strong presumption of your
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entrance into King's Commerce that the acceptance and beneficial recirculation
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of Federal Reserve Notes necessarily infers. However, the seminal reason why
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the King is in such a strong position is only partially related to his SUB
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SILENTIO aggression against you; the largest reason is because you, by your own
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default, have accepted the benefits of this Commercial nexus Equity
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relationship with the King. The King is in a very strong position here under
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normal circumstances, so you can be perfectly right for 100 reasons in your
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Income Tax defense, and ignore this last tiny little area in your defense, and
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lose (assuming that your Case is adjudged on the substantive merits, and not on
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some technical distraction question).
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Under the Common Mercantile Law of Commercial Contract Law applicable to
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Negotiable Instruments, it has always been PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE [581]
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[581]<div> PRIMA FACIE
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EVIDENCE is moderately good and acceptable evidence, although not air tight,
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and stands as valid unless countermanded. On the other hand, CONCLUSIVE
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EVIDENCE is strong and very difficult to challenge, and is incontrovertible.
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<div>[581]
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that the mere issuance of the Negotiable Instrument itself constitutes the
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evidence of the receipt and enjoyment of Consideration. [582]
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[582]<div> Remember
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that Consideration is a benefit you enjoy. This PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
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is replicated over and over again in numerous books on Contract Law and
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Commercial Law. Our King did not invent this PRIMA FACIE Consideration
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Doctrine, as its seminal point of origin goes back into the Middle Ages in
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England, which is before our King even existed. [Citations deleted].
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<div>[582]
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This acceptance of Consideration Doctrine is of maximum importance to
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understand and appreciate in its placement into the contemporary Income Tax
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setting, as this Doctrine has been around for a very long time, and the King is
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only now using it for his own enrichment. Law books repeat over and over again
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that acceptable Consideration may be anything that will support a simple
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contract, and may even specifically include previously existing debt. This
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Consideration Doctrine survives the codification of the Law Merchant into the
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Negotiable Instruments Law, and also survives the later restatement of the
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N.I.L. into the Uniform Commercial Code.
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The Law of Commercial Contract applicable to the use and recirculation of
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Negotiable Instruments is quite old, just like King's Commerce itself.
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Commercial Paper was also used extensively by merchants in the Middle Ages, and
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the origin of our contemporary LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS was an unwritten
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Common Law applicable to merchants, called the Law Merchant. This Law Merchant
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was gradually assimilated as an appendage onto English Common Law, and
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subsequently became a part of our American Jurisprudence when the New England
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Colonies turned into states and adapted English Common Law. The Law Merchant is
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spoken of by English Judges with reference to Bills of Exchange and negotiable
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securities. It is neither more nor less than the common usages of merchants and
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traders in the different departments of trade, ratified by decisions of Courts
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of Law, which Courts later upon such usages being proved before them, readapted
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those merchant practices into the Common Law of England as settled law with a
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view to the interest of trade and the public convenience. Therefore, what was
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at one time mere custom in between merchants then became grafted upon, or
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incorporated onto, the Common Law, and may now be correctly said to form an
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overlapping part of the Common Law. When such general Commercial practices have
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been judicially ascertained and established, those Commercial practices become
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a part of the Law Merchant, which contemporary American courts of justice are
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bound to honor. In the early 1800's, many American states enacted their own
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statutes pertaining to Commercial paper, with the result being a lack of
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uniformity in both statutes, as well as the court decisions applying those
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statutes to different factual settings. Lawyers don't like lack of similarity,
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and so the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a
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bill to make the Law of Negotiable Instruments uniform from one state to the
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next. The draft of the bill was called the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, which
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when completed in 1896 was largely enacted into LEX by almost all the states.
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The contemporary Uniform Commercial Code repeals the N.I.L. in those states
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that have enacted the UCC; but the kicker is that old Law Merchant himself is
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still very much around, alive, enforceable, and kicking.
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And if the King has got you accepting the Consideration inherent in Negotiable
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Instruments that he is a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE to, and that his Legal Tender
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Statutes have enhanced the value, and additionally retains a distant Equity
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interest in, then the King has got an invisible contract on you and the King
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has you plump little turkeys exactly where he wants you: Ripe for a Federal
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plucking. So to correctly handle this beneficial "use of Federal Reserve Notes"
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creating a taxing liability story, we need to start out with the basic premise
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that the King is correct in his assertions, and so are judges in their
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reasoning; to believe otherwise is to be self damaging, as we have no time to
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waste with any error in our reasoning.
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If you are like most folks, the King has got you accepting his Consideration
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and financial benefits with your mere use of Federal Reserve Notes, because
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most folks want to use and want to experience the beneficial enjoyment that
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widespread acceptance and Commercial use of Federal Reserve Notes brings. But
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read those words over again carefully, as they also contain the Grand Key for
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getting out of this Equity Ace our King has neatly tucked up in his Royal
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Sleeve: The contract that is in effect whenever benefits, conditionally
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offered, were accepted by you. [583]
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[583]<div> Yes, the
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benefits that were accepted by you carried with them invisible hooks of
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reciprocity, so now, as uncomfortable as the hooks are, contracts are in
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effect, and Patriot arguments sounding in the Tort of unfairness are not
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relevant. <div>[583]
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Examining a profile slice of the tens of thousands of Cases out there
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addressing questions of Commercial Contract Law applicable to the annulment of
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the rights and duties of HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE of Commercial Paper (notes,
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bonds, securities, checks, equitable specialties in general, etc.), it is the
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STATE OF MIND of the parties at the time the Negotiable Instrument was
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accepted, that determines the subsequent rights and duties of HOLDERS IN DUE
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COURSE. HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE, so called, are in a special Status as it
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pertains to the use and recirculation of Commercial instruments. HOLDERS IN DUE
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COURSE are assumed to have taken the Negotiable Instrument (Federal Reserve
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Note) free of the defense of "Absence or Failure of Consideration," and
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additionally, are generally free of all other defenses as well. When the King
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is a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE of Federal Reserve Notes, then the King is immune to
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any defense we may assert against him, as he collects on an invisible contract
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created when his Commercial benefits were accepted by you. Do you see why it is
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not very wide to snicker at Federal Judges if you have not properly handled
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your defense line in this area of using Federal Reserve Notes? In some cases, a
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PERSON wants to be in this HOLDER IN DUE COURSE Status due to its protective
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nature, and in other circumstances, we don't want to be a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
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due to the liabilities involved. Generally speaking, subject to the condition
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that the PERSON accepted the Negotiable Instrument in good faith and for value,
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a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE occupies a protected position free from any personal
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defenses someone else may assert. But in dealing with the King on those Federal
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Reserve Notes, our declared Status as HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE or HOLDERS NOT IN
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DUE COURSE is not important: Because by filing Objections and Notice of
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Protest, etc., the King's Status as a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE is then
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automatically terminated, and getting the King off of that sovereign Status
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Throne of his is what's important.
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So merely filing a Notice of Protest and Notice of Defect will automatically
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deny the King his coveted and protected Status as being a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
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with Federal Reserve Notes, as that protective status applies to you. Remember
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that in our Pan Am jet leasing example, a PERSON must both want and then use a
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benefit provided by another party, prior to effectuating an attachment of
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Equity Jurisdiction strong enough to extract money from, in a judicial
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proceeding, out of the part in default.
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And in addition to outright Consideration, by your Commercial use and
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recirculation of Federal Reserve Notes, the King has you strapped into his debt
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as an "Automatically Transferred and Joint Obligation Debtor." Under a very
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large body of Roman Civil Law, and Jewish Commercial Law going back to Moses
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and the Talmud, there is a kind of an obligation in law whose source is not
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contract or promise in the classical sense, but due to a ripple effect of debt,
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an obligation can be automatically transferred down a line of notes passers and
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debtors. This Doctrine is elucidated quite well in Jewish Law, where this
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doctrine is formally known as SHIBUDA D'RABBI NATHAN (meaning the line of Rabbi
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Nathan). Under this liability dispersion model, debt ripples from one PERSON to
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another back up the line, without the appearance of any contract being readily
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apparent. Say that a PERSON "A" owes money to "B", and "B" owes money to "C".
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PERSON "C" can then recover from "A" an amount of money not exceeding the sum
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PERSON "B" owes to "C". [584]
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[584]<div> For a
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discussion on how the right of a first debtor to come and operate a liability
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against a second ripple debtor, back to the first debtor's creditor, see Rabbi
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Isaac Herzog, Chief Rabbi of Israel, in the Second Volume of MAIN INSTITUTES OF
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JEWISH LAW, entitled "The Law of Obligations" (1967).
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<div>[584]
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The reason why this debt liability being rippled back up the line a few person
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is called "Rabbi Nathan's Lien" is because this rule is generally attributed to
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Rabbi Nathan, a tannaitic sage (Babylonia and Palestine, in the Second
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Century), who first formulated it on the basis of a certain interpretation of a
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Mosaic text. Here in the contemporary United States, a very similar analogy is
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found operating both in Contract Law and in Tort Law, but for different
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reasons.
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1. Under Tort Law liability reasoning, persons who you never had any
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contract or contact with, are liable for damages they work on you. For example,
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be underneath an airplane when it crashes. Under the JOINT AND SEVERAL
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LIABILITY DOCTRINE, attorneys will sue the Federal Aviation Administration, the
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pilot, the local political jurisdiction that owns the airport, the contractor
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who built the airport, the airline, the airline's insurance company, the
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airline's airplane manufacturer, persons who supply parts to the airplane
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manufacturer, the pilot's mother, etc., without limit, right up the line.
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2. When a grievance is under Contract Law jurisprudence, generally,
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persons not a party to the contract are normally exempt from liability absent
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an interfering Tort the worked, somehow (called TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
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CONTRACT).
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But properly viewed at the conclusion of the grievance, this Rabbi Nathan's
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Lien is no more than just an asset seizure against debtor's assets held by
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third parties, and whether the underlying factual setting behind the Judgment
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was under Tort Law or Contract Law is now irrelevant, once the Judgment has
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been docketed, and that PERSON'S assets are now under attack. So when a
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judgment has been obtained against Party "B", and Party "C" owes "B" some
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money, then when Party "A" throws an action at "C", then that arrangement is no
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more than the equivalent of a directed wage garnishment that goes on every
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single day of the week, here in the United States. And just as this Liability
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Ripple Scenario goes on at such a quiet level with wage garnishments, so too
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does it carry on at a national level with you and I and our assets being
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pledged to pay off the National Debt of the United States.
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But our King is our adversary in Court, and his attorneys use partially twisted
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logic to quiet our exception from taxation arguments, and so their attitude is
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a simple "you pay." But important for the moment is your knowledge that your
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Commercial use and recirculation of Federal Reserve Notes is properly deemed a
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sufficient nexus to the King's Equity Jurisdiction as to effectuate an
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attachment of liability for the payment of the King's outstanding debt that he
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owes to the Federal Reserve Board, with the amount of your payment being
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measured by your net taxable income. Other personal assets are deemed
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collateral material as well, but the King's key to effectuate this liability is
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our Enfranchised Status, under contract. Since the Angle-Saxon Law Merchant
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wants to see Consideration, and Consideration is present when Federal Reserve
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Notes are recirculated in King's Commerce, a taxing liability does exist of and
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by itself under English Common Law. This Jewish Ripple Liability Model is
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supporting evidence to conclude that although we might not like our King, there
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is a very wide body of law out there in the world to support our King with his
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taxing justification theories. The Law is always justified, and this is just
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another layer of justification for the King to use as an excuse to raise
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revenue. This Ripple Effect Liability Law springs forth from several different
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seminal global points of pronouncement, and it does support the King in this
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very subtle attachment of taxing liability. So let's change the factual setting
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by correcting our Status, and stop snickering at the fat King, as he is only
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using common law (the national equivalent of wage garnishments) and ancient law
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(its longevity and long term universal acceptance means that it is well
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Principled and well founded) to support his excessive financial demands.
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Question: What if you don't want to accept the benefits of and use of Federal
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Reserve Notes?
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What if you are different? What if you have factual knowledge that the King
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only got this monopoly on American currency circulation (both gold and silver),
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not by free market acceptance and competitive universal respect and
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appreciation for benefits offered by his Legal Tender Statutes, which is the
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way all Commercial transactions should be based, but rather, through force,
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duress, coercion, penal statutes, naked physical duress, and literally out of
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the barrel of a gun: Because guns being drawn is exactly what two remaining
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private coin mints saw as United States Treasury Agents raided the last diehard
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private coin mints in California in the late 1800's, and physically destroyed
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them (but that intriguing Americana history following an act of Congress in
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1864 banning private coins as currency is another Letter). But dealing with
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Private Coin Mints out of the barrel of a gun is only half the story, as our
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King is usually quite thorough in whatever he decides to muscle in on. The King
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also dealt with the private circulation of Notes (both bank notes and private
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company notes that circulated just as if they were currency) through a series
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of penal statutes going back to the Civil War. [585]
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[585]<div> Starting
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with the LEGAL TENDER Laws in 1862, then the NATIONAL BANKING ACT in 1864, then
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the previously mentioned acts outlawing private coin circulation, then an act
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in 1865 imposed a 10% tax on state bank note issues. In VEAZIE BANK VS. FENNO
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[75 U.S. 533 (1869)], the Supreme Court ruled that a tax of 10% on state bank
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notes in circulation was held to be Constitutional, not only because it was a
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means of raising money, but that such a tax was an instrument to put out of
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business such a competitive circulation of those private notes, against notes
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issued by the King. The combined effect of those Civil War era penal statutes
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collectively was to monopolize the entire American currency supply under
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Federal jurisdiction (which is exactly what the King wanted). By these penal
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statutes, both privately circulated coins and paper notes were outlawed, and
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die hard private mints were later purchased by the King, and otherwise put out
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of business, permanently. And in the 1900's, under an administrative regulation
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promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the
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issuance, if even for brief promotional purposes, of publicly circulating
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private bank notes by member banks, is forbidden.
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<div>[585]
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After the Civil War, the King's enactment of currency monopoly statutes
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paralleled his Private Express Statutes in the sense that private postal
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companies previously competing with the King were ordered shut down and put out
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of business at gun point, [586]
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[586]<div> The Private
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Express Statutes remain today as Title 38, Sections 601 to 608; and Title 18,
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Sections 1693 to 1699.
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<div>[586]
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and our King sealed himself up a national postal monopoly. No more would be the
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days of the 1800's, when many banks and private companies issued and circulated
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their own widely accepted currency. Our King doesn't like competition, and he
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has this nasty habit of his to use penal statutes and his hired bouncers (the
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U.S. Marshals, as the King's Bouncers) to force people into relationships with
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him, against their will and over their objection, that they would never have
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voluntarily consummated on their own free will and volition.
|
||
[For example, here in Rochester, New York, some enterprising folks,
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||
seeing the escalating rise in postage prices going on in the early 1970's, and
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detecting that something just wasn't right here due to the wide percentage
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variance in cost and pricing, promptly went about setting up their own postal
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company in 1976. They concentrated on Rochester's Central Business District,
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and offering the lower prices that they did, quickly signed up law firms,
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banks, accountants, hotels, and the like. Several national magazines featured
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articles about them, [587]
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[587]<div> Exemplary
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would be Fred Ferretti in "Private Mail Delivery vs. The Letter of the Law,"
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NEW YORK TIMES, September 25, 1976.
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<div>[587]
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but the King's Agents in the Postal Service, smelling an inexpensive upstart on
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the block offering cheaper prices and accelerated delivery schedules, quickly
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threw a Restraining Order Petition at Rochester Postal Service in Federal
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District Court here. The Petition was granted, with justifying reference being
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||
made to the Private Express Statutes of the Civil War Era. On appeal, the
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Second Circuit in New York City went into a discussion on how the King's right
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to seal up a national postal monopoly under penal statutes has never been
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successfully challenged, and remains essentially airtight.] [588]
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[588]<div> UNITED
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STATES POSTAL SERVICE VS. BRENNAN, 574 F.2nd 712 (1978). There were no
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non-Commercial Status arguments made by the Brennans.
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||
<div>[588]
|
||
But for our purposes here in addressing the attachment of revenue Equity
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Jurisdiction by the acceptance and use of Federal Reserve Notes as a HOLDER IN
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DUE COURSE. What is important is that it is you, under the RATIFICATION
|
||
DOCTRINE, by your own silence and default, by your failure to object and to
|
||
object timely, it is by your silence that the King wins. Under this Doctrine,
|
||
your silence in the face of a proposition being made to you constitutes your
|
||
approval of the proposition, if synchronous with the silence you experienced a
|
||
benefit. Reason, logic, and common sense. Let us consider the application of
|
||
this RATIFICATION DOCTRINE as it hypothetically applies to a person acting in
|
||
the subordinated position of agency for another person. [589]
|
||
[589]<div> See
|
||
RATIFICATION BY AN UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL by Edwin Goddard in 2 Michigan Law
|
||
Review 25 (1903).
|
||
<div>[589]
|
||
When one such person, as agent, does an act on behalf of another person, but
|
||
without complete authority, the person for whom such act is done may afterwards
|
||
adopt the act as if it is done in his behalf, thereby giving the act the same
|
||
legal effect as if it had been originally fully authorized. This subsequent
|
||
retroactive consent, the effect of which relates back to the time of the
|
||
original act and places the Principle in the same position as if he had
|
||
originally authorized the act, is called RATIFICATION. [590]
|
||
[590]<div> See Notes,
|
||
AGENCY -- RATIFICATION in 1 Michigan Law Review 140 (1902).
|
||
<div>[590]
|
||
Under this hypothetical agency relationship, when a person finds that an act
|
||
has been done in his name or on his behalf, that person must either Ratify it,
|
||
or in the alternative, disaffirm it. [591]
|
||
[591]<div> See THE
|
||
EFFECT OF RATIFICATION AS BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE AND THE OTHER PARTY by Floyd
|
||
Mechem in 4 Michigan Law Review 269 (1905).
|
||
<div>[591]
|
||
But silence constitutes approval of the act. [592]
|
||
[592]<div> "Where a
|
||
contract has been made by one person in the name of another, of a kind that the
|
||
latter might lawfully make himself, and the only defect is the lack of
|
||
authority on the part of the person acting, the subsequent ratification of that
|
||
contract, while still in that condition, by the person on whose behalf it was
|
||
made and who is fully appraised of the facts, operates to cure the defect and
|
||
to establish the contract as his contract as though he had authorized it in the
|
||
first instance. From this time on, he is subject to all the obligations that
|
||
pertain to the transaction in the same manner and to the same extent that he
|
||
would be had the contract been made originally by him in person, or by his
|
||
express authority. The other party may demand and enforce on the part of the
|
||
principle the full performance of the contract entered into by his agent."
|
||
- Floyd Mechem in THE EFFECT OF RATIFICATION AS BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE
|
||
AND THE OTHER PARTY in 4 Michigan Law Review 269, at 269 (1905).
|
||
<div>[592]
|
||
RATIFICATION may be implied from any form of conduct inconsistent with
|
||
disavowal of the contract; therefore anything else, other than explicit and
|
||
blunt disavowal, is RATIFICATION -- if synchronous with the silence, benefits
|
||
offered conditionally were accepted. This is quite a strong Doctrine, but it
|
||
has to be this way under Natural Law, since benefits offered conditionally are
|
||
being accepted, invisible contracts are in effect, and failure to require the
|
||
party experiencing the benefits to act quickly and reject the benefits
|
||
constitutes a Tort on the other party. This RATIFICATION is analogous under
|
||
Contract Law to the acceptance of the contract's proposition (MUTUAL ASSENT),
|
||
and hence is irrevocable. [593]
|
||
[593]<div> The Law of
|
||
Contracts requires MUTUAL ASSENT to be an element present between the parties
|
||
when contracts are entered into. However, MUTUAL assent is quite different from
|
||
MENTAL assent:
|
||
"In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, 'We must look to
|
||
the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to
|
||
his secret and unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention
|
||
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts."
|
||
- LUCY AND LUCY VS. ZEHMER, 84 S.E.2nd 516, at 521 [Supreme Court of
|
||
Appeals of Virginia (1954)]. Folks who believe that MENTAL (INTELLECTUAL)
|
||
ASSENT is a necessary ingredient to the formation of contracts are in error. A
|
||
person can internally frown and repel a contract in the back of his mind, but
|
||
still be held to be bound by the contract due to his exterior movements in
|
||
accepting benefits. And as we shift over to discuss a PRINCIPLE OF NATURE
|
||
regulating the commencement of invisible contracts thrown at folks by Juristic
|
||
Institutions, nothing changes there, either. Protestors claiming to be exempt
|
||
from being attached to expectations of taxation reciprocity by reason of no
|
||
MENTAL ASSENT being present, are in error: Because your exterior manifestations
|
||
-- your failure to explicitly and bluntly reject juristic benefits -- overrules
|
||
whatever quiet reservations you may have about the reciprocity expectations
|
||
contained in the contract. The other party to the contract (here, the other
|
||
party is a Juristic Institution) has absolutely no reasonable basis to consider
|
||
the applicability of its contract with you by probing into the corners of your
|
||
mind and uncovering any latent reservations that may be there. Therefore, only
|
||
the act of coming out into the open and filing a blunt and explicit NOTICE OF
|
||
REJECTION OF BENEFITS, has any reasonable meaning; and Protestors claiming
|
||
unfairness because MENTAL ASSENT is tossed aside and ignored are not addressing
|
||
the full spectrum of factual elements that judges consider when presented with
|
||
a contract enforcement prosecution.
|
||
<div>[593]
|
||
And this is why filing an Objection, Notice of Defect and Rejection of Benefits
|
||
to the King, objecting to your involuntary use of Federal Reserve Notes,
|
||
carries no retroactive force or effect with it back into preceding years. [594]
|
||
[594]<div> Variations
|
||
on this RATIFICATION DOCTRINE surface all throughout the Law. It surfaces in
|
||
criminal prosecutions as an evidentiary law requiring that circumstances be
|
||
awarded priority over verbal communication or non-communication in proving
|
||
conspiracies (meaning that what you say or don't say is not important as what
|
||
you do). In Commercial contracts, PAROLE EVIDENCE is oral or verbal evidence,
|
||
and the PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE restrains a party to a contract from using
|
||
expectations and declarations from toning down the meat of a contract. (See UCC
|
||
2-202), since the lesser oral expectations were MERGED into the greater written
|
||
expectations. In the Uniform Commercial Code, the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE appears
|
||
in Section 2-610, which states that the repudiation of a contract must be
|
||
positive and unequivocal; and it appears again in 2-606(b), which states that
|
||
failure to make an effective (strong) rejection constitutes acceptance.
|
||
<div>[594]
|
||
It is a Principle of Law mentioned over and over again in Contract Law books
|
||
that silence can effect ratification in the context of a benefit assertion.
|
||
[595].
|
||
[595]<div> The
|
||
underlying Principles associated with the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE surface in
|
||
criminal prosecutions, as it is often very reasonable for Juries, too, to take
|
||
special Notice and freely draw inferences and conclusions from the Defendant's
|
||
silence. In some Trials, Judges have characterized that the effect of the
|
||
Defendant remaining silent would be like:
|
||
"... the sun... shining with full blaze on the open eye."
|
||
- STATE VS. CLEAVES, 59 Main 298, at 301 (1871).
|
||
<div>[595]
|
||
Remember that to really understand a doctrine, we need to examine it from
|
||
manifold trajectories; and in so viewing, from a Judge's perspective, what the
|
||
RATIFICATION DOCTRINE is trying to avoid, we find that to allow the annulment
|
||
of a contract on repudiation grounds on anything less than a firm and positive
|
||
"no," has the direct effect of working a Tort on the other party, since
|
||
benefits were transferred from one party to the next. [596]
|
||
[596]<div> For a recent
|
||
discussion on the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE in operation, see COMMONWEALTH EDISON
|
||
VS. DECKER COAL, 612 F.Supp. 978 (1985).
|
||
<div>[596]
|
||
The application of this RATIFICATION DOCTRINE is not restricted to favor the
|
||
Government in the evidentiary presumptions of consent that it creates, as the
|
||
Supreme Court holds this Doctrine to be binding on all persons dragged into its
|
||
machinery. [597]
|
||
[597]<div> I have seen
|
||
lower State Courts apply the Principle of RATIFICATION under Tort Law factual
|
||
settings. See PAGE VS. KEEVES [199 N.E. 131 (1935)], which held that a person
|
||
assisting another in the commission of a wrongful Tort act against another, or
|
||
with knowledge approving of such act after it is done, is liable in some manner
|
||
as if he had committed the same wrongful act, if done for his benefit [that's
|
||
right BENEFITS ACCEPTED] and he avails himself of its fruits. The word
|
||
RATIFICATION does not appear anywhere in the Case Opinion, but the Principle
|
||
does at page 135.
|
||
"The doctrine of liability by RATIFICATION in Tort Cases is abundantly
|
||
established. Indeed, this seems to have been the earliest form of it. By
|
||
whatever methods the act be adopted and approved, the principal becomes liable
|
||
for the Tort as though he had previously directed it. And it is not always
|
||
necessary that the approval shall look to the particular act. In the case of
|
||
master and servant, for example, if the approval establishes the relation, the
|
||
master becomes responsible for any Torts committed within its scope or which he
|
||
would have been responsible had the relation been regularly created...
|
||
"RATIFICATION in Tort Cases is a distinct gain to the other party,
|
||
giving him a remedy against the principal while not depriving him of its remedy
|
||
against the wrong-doer himself."
|
||
- THE EFFECT OF RATIFICATION AS BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE AND THE OTHER
|
||
PARTY by Floyd Mechem in 4 Michigan Law Review 269, at 270 (1905).
|
||
<div>[597]
|
||
The application of this RATIFICATION DOCTRINE in the area of the Citizenship
|
||
Contract does create an invisible contract, as the burden to prove that the
|
||
contract does not exist then falls on the individual, with the King not
|
||
required to prove or adduce anything. This Doctrine is held operational against
|
||
everyone indiscriminately as the Principle that it is, when the factual
|
||
circumstances warrant its provident application; this even includes drawing
|
||
inferences against the Congress itself. [598]
|
||
[598]<div> "The fact
|
||
that Congress has remained silent..."
|
||
- JAMES VS. UNITED STATES, 366 U.S. 213, at 220 (1961). The Supreme
|
||
Court has ruled that when the Congress remains silent on something, then the
|
||
Judiciary sets the limits -- as silence by the Congress is very significant and
|
||
presumptuous. Speaking about the INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAXATION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
|
||
binding on both Federal and State Juristic Institutions [that I mentioned at
|
||
the end of CITIZENSHIP]:
|
||
"Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be implied...
|
||
or enlarge it beyond the point where, Congress being silent, the Court would
|
||
set its limits."
|
||
- HELVERING VS. GERHARDT, 304 U.S. 405, at 411 [footnote #1] (1937).
|
||
Yes, even the Congress of the United States is held to be accountable for its
|
||
silence. In footnote number 1 to GRAVES VS. NEW YORK [306 U.S. 466 (1939)], the
|
||
Supreme Court holds the silence of the Congress in areas of regulating Commerce
|
||
as determinative of federal policy. In WESTERN LIVE STOCK VS. BUREAU OF REVENUE
|
||
[303 U.S. 250 (1937)], the Supreme Court discusses the implications of
|
||
Congressional silence in the field of state taxation of Interstate Commerce and
|
||
its instrumentalities. Yes, SILENCE is suggestive of intentions in some
|
||
instances, and everyone without exception (even the Congress of the United
|
||
States) is held accountable and responsible, at one time or another, for
|
||
inferences drawn from their silence. ... Even Heavenly Father uses this
|
||
PRINCIPLE OF NATURE in the continuation of benefits and duties originating
|
||
under Celestial Covenants by Saints, as silence by Saints individually is
|
||
deemed to be an automatic extension of the Covenant (only the explicit
|
||
disavowal of the Covenant can terminate the Covenant, while silencer retains
|
||
the operation of the Covenant in effect).
|
||
<div>[598]
|
||
There is an old Roman saying that "... He who remains silent certainly does not
|
||
speak, but nevertheless it is true that he does not deny." [599]
|
||
[599]<div> See Roscoe
|
||
Pound in READINGS IN ROMAN LAW, Second Edition, at pages 25 to 26.
|
||
<div>[599]
|
||
The situation expressed by that legal truism has been the source of some blurry
|
||
confusion in our Law of Contracts. Though acceptance of an Offer is usually
|
||
made by spoken or written words, quite often the Offer may call for act or
|
||
authorization requiring some other mode of acceptance. As the Offeror is the
|
||
"Czar of his Offer," such acts, when induced by the Offeree, constitute the
|
||
acceptance. [600]
|
||
[600]<div> "The
|
||
orthodox doctrine of the law of contracts, particularly the OFFER and
|
||
ACCEPTANCE machinery, could not be more familiar to most lawyers. We are long
|
||
indebted to Professor Hohfeld, who has enabled us to express the legal effect
|
||
of an Offer as creating a power of acceptance [see W. Hohfeld in FUNDAMENTAL
|
||
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923); and also Corbin in LEGAL ANALYSIS AND TERMINOLOGY, 29
|
||
Yale Law Journal 163 (1919)]. Where an Offer is extended by an Offeror, he
|
||
permits the Offeree to exercise a power of acceptance that subjects the Offeror
|
||
to the legal relation called contract. The Offeror is said to be under a
|
||
correlative liability, because exercise of the power of acceptance by the
|
||
Offeree creates a right-duty relationship. "After discussing the anatomy of
|
||
Offers, the first year law student is concerned with the exercise of the power
|
||
of acceptance. At once he is confronted with learning how the power may be
|
||
exercised:
|
||
"... almost the first question to ask about an offer is: What
|
||
particular kind of acceptance did this Offer call for; and especially: Was it
|
||
for a promise or was it for an act."
|
||
- Llewellyn in OUR CASE LAW OF CONTRACT: OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE - PART
|
||
II, in 48 Yale Law Journal 779, at 780 (1939). "Understanding his exploration
|
||
in this fundamental area is the principle that the Offeror is master of his
|
||
Offer. He creates the Offer and may require the power of acceptance to be
|
||
exercised in any manner he deems necessary or desirable. To emphasize this
|
||
principle, students are typically confronted with a hypothetical Offer that
|
||
requires the Offeree to don an UNCLE SAM costume, climb a greased flagpole,
|
||
and, upon reaching the gold dome at the top, whistle Yankee Doodle twice. The
|
||
effect on the impressionable first year student is significant. He will never
|
||
forget that the Offeror is master of his Offer, and he will often justify his
|
||
position through the use of even more outlandish hypotheticals. Of course, he
|
||
is obliged to use hypotheticals, just as his teacher was, since no recorded
|
||
case makes the point so clearly."
|
||
- John Murray in CONTRACTS: NEW DESIGN FOR THE AGREEMENT PROCESS, 53
|
||
Cornell Law Review 785, at 785 (1968). Mr. Murray is correct, there is no
|
||
RECORDED CASE that makes the point so clearly, but by the time you have
|
||
finished this Letter, you will see numerous UNRECORDED CASES of contract Offers
|
||
by the King that are very structurally similar to climbing a greased flagpole
|
||
by the magnitude of the King's leverage involved, since the game starts out
|
||
with the cards being so heavily stacked against us, as our own ignorance and
|
||
silence work against us greatly.
|
||
<div>[600]
|
||
In such cases of negotiated commercial contracts, now there is something here
|
||
explicit by which to judge the intention of the parties; but as we shift over
|
||
to invisible juristic contracts, where the mere passive conduct of the Offeree
|
||
(you and me) is claimed to be an acceptance of benefits by Government, now the
|
||
question is more difficult -- as some of the requisite indicia applicable to
|
||
Laws governing commercial contracts has to be laid aside; like Mutual Assent.
|
||
[601]
|
||
[601]<div> The problems
|
||
associated with RATIFICATION have been the subject of controversy by
|
||
commentators.
|
||
"If a person whom I have not authorized to act as my agent has made in
|
||
my name with a third person a contract composed of mutual promises, and if the
|
||
third person, who originally believed in the authority of the assumed agent,
|
||
has withdrawn from the transaction and has communicated his withdrawal to the
|
||
assumed agent or to me, can I, nevertheless, thereafter, promptly upon learning
|
||
of the contract, ratify the contract and hold the third person? In short, by
|
||
ratifying an unauthorized bilateral contract can I hold the adverse party,
|
||
although he has already withdrawn from the contract? ...The questions
|
||
underlying the problem go to the very foundation of the DOCTRINE OF
|
||
RATIFICATION."
|
||
- Eugene Wambaugh in A PROBLEM AS TO RATIFICATION in 9 Harvard Law
|
||
Review 60, at 60 (1895).
|
||
<div>[601]
|
||
However, rather than Patriots fighting an area of grey where there is some DE
|
||
MINIMIS merit to the Government's position, it might be best to simply accept
|
||
the application of the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE, accept the fact that invisible
|
||
contracts are in effect by your silent passive benefit acceptance and refusal
|
||
to explicitly disavow and reject benefits, as generally held by Judges - but
|
||
then turn around and walk away from the contract for other reasons, like
|
||
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION. [602]
|
||
[602]<div> For
|
||
commentary, see Notes, SILENCE AS ACCEPTANCE IN THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, 33
|
||
Harvard Law Review 595 (1919). The many commercial contract cases cited and
|
||
quoted therein should be distinguished from juristic contracts.
|
||
<div>[602]
|
||
So the assertion by the King of his Status as a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE (and
|
||
therefore normally protected from any defense that you may throw at him via a
|
||
Federal Judge in an Income Tax grievance) then becomes meaningless: If you
|
||
first Notice the King out and Object with a Rejection of Benefits, and have so
|
||
Objected timely. Failure to serve a Notice of Defect on the King is fatal, as
|
||
without that Objection by you, the King retains his protective HOLDER IN DUE
|
||
COURSE Status, and with that Status you have absolutely no substantive defense
|
||
to assert against him.
|
||
Question: How do you Object?
|
||
In Objecting to Federal Reserve Notes, we need to be mindful of the fact that
|
||
Federal Judges normally do not take Judicial Notice of the Federal Reserve Note
|
||
equity attachment question. By the end of this Letter, you will see the larger
|
||
and more important invisible contracts to be dealt with, if a pure and correct
|
||
severance of yourself away from the adhesive siphon of the Bolshevik Income Tax
|
||
is to be perfected. Primarily, they search the record for the political
|
||
contract of Citizenship, and when Citizenship is found, generally they stop
|
||
right there and then. However, if dealing with a Denizen or some type of
|
||
non-resident alien, Federal Judges then shift their attention over to finding
|
||
some Commercial benefits that were accepted, in order to justify the extraction
|
||
of Income Taxes out of the poor fellow's pockets, acting Ministerially as
|
||
enforcement agents the way they do. So although Federal Judges find it
|
||
unnecessary to take Notice of your acceptance of Federal Reserve Notes at the
|
||
present time, when all other political and Commercial contracts have been
|
||
correctly severed, this one remaining Commercial contract is going to be an
|
||
item that needs to be wrestled with, in advance of its apparent necessity.
|
||
So if three years from now the IRS throws a prosecution at you, and you argue
|
||
non-attachment of liability to Title 26, so called, based on a pure severance
|
||
of Equity, then how will you prove what your STATE OF MIND was in 1986, as it
|
||
pertains to the Federal Reserve Note use and recirculation question? Remember
|
||
that the claimed STATE OF MIND of a Party is an affirmative defense. The person
|
||
asserting the defense has the burden to prove its merit, and reasonably so. The
|
||
King does not have to prove that you entered into the acceptance and beneficial
|
||
use of Federal Reserve Notes with profitable expectations in your mind. Such a
|
||
positive, beneficial, and Commercial Federal Reserve Note use assumption is
|
||
automatically inferred by the Commercial nature of those Notes and the "Public
|
||
Notice" Status of the King's Title 26 statutes, and so you have to prove the
|
||
opposite. How are you going to prove what your STATE OF MIND was in 1986? Are
|
||
you going to subpoena your wife into the Courtroom and ask her to tell the
|
||
Court what you said three years earlier in 1986?
|
||
"Oh, yes. I remember. Hank said that he didn't like using them things."
|
||
Well that is not much, and that is not the kind of an Objection, Notice of
|
||
Protest, and document STATE OF MIND that the Supreme Court will respect. So
|
||
what we need to do in order to Object timely, is to file a specific Objection
|
||
with the Secretary of the Treasury, and simply tell him what your STATE OF MIND
|
||
is at the present time; and synchronously record that document in a Public
|
||
Place. Documents written by individuals are often very strong pieces of
|
||
evidence to prove a person's STATE OF MIND, and will, under some circumstances,
|
||
directly overrule another person's first-person oral testimony on grounds
|
||
relating to the PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE (most often such circumstances surface in
|
||
Probate proceedings in Surrogate's Court when a Will or its Codicil is being
|
||
contested). If the IRS has a prosecution in gestation against you at the
|
||
present time here in 1985, and the IRS is moving against you in some manner for
|
||
the years, say, 1982 and 1983, then filing this Notice of Protest and Objection
|
||
will have no retroactive effect. Filing this Objection at the present time
|
||
merely documents your STATE OF MIND at the present time, and so if the IRS
|
||
moves against you in three years, this preventative step you take at the
|
||
present time is interesting prosecution annulment material. [603]
|
||
[603]<div> One should
|
||
not necessarily feel too depressed over having failed to perform a positive act
|
||
at some point in the past; a correct understanding of handling factual settings
|
||
is acquired experientially, and so although knowledge frequently does come too
|
||
late...
|
||
"Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely
|
||
because it comes too late."
|
||
- ROSE VS. MITCHELL, 443 U.S. 545, at 575 (1978).
|
||
<div>[603]
|
||
Since the King's Attorney will present some old bank account that you had
|
||
gotten rid of years earlier, and will conveniently not show your recessions to
|
||
the Judge at the time the Summons is signed, none of this Status correction
|
||
material will likely deflect the original initiation of a prosecution itself.
|
||
In your Objection and Notice of Protest, we might want to mention that you are
|
||
using Federal Reserve Notes for minimum survival purposes only, and that even
|
||
this use is reluctant, because in a previous day and in a previous era, the
|
||
King used his police powers to seal a monopoly on currency instruments, and so
|
||
now you have no choice in selecting between different currency instruments to
|
||
use -- and the involuntary adhesive attachment of Title 26 civil liability that
|
||
occurs while you are being backed into such a corner, occurs against your will
|
||
and over your objection. Your STATE OF MIND is not one of beneficial acceptance
|
||
and enjoyment of Federal Reserve Notes, but one of a forced DE MINIMIS
|
||
coercion. You are not using Federal Reserve Notes for Commercial profit or
|
||
gain, but such use is out of practical necessity since the King has physically
|
||
removed all currency competitors from the marketplace under his penal statutes
|
||
and literally by physical duress; and so now your use of Federal Reserve Notes
|
||
is by lack of alternatives to select from, not freedom of choice. By such
|
||
monopoly tactics, the King is engaging in unfair Trade Practices, which if you
|
||
or I did the identical same thing, we would be incarcerated for it under
|
||
numerous Racketeering and Sherman Anti-Trust criminal statutes. Yet the FORCED
|
||
monopoly of a currency serves no beneficial public interest, [604]
|
||
[604]<div> Mere
|
||
declarations by the Congress that their creation of a uniform national benefit
|
||
constitutes a benefit, does not in fact reverse facts that the damages
|
||
associated with Congressionally originated money exceed the benefits. The
|
||
Congress once declared their attitude that their currency monopoly is a benefit
|
||
for us out here in the Countryside:
|
||
"In order to provide for the safer and more effective operation of a
|
||
National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System, to preserve for the
|
||
people the full benefits of the currency provided for by the Congress through
|
||
the National Banking System and the Federal Reserve System..."
|
||
- Title 12, Section 95 (March, 19833). Federal Judges are cognizant of
|
||
the declaration of Congress that the issuance of a currency by the Congress is
|
||
considered to be a benefit; but declarations do not change previous factual
|
||
experiences. <div>[604]
|
||
and is actually an instrumentality to work MAGNUM damages on us all after the
|
||
King replaces his initial hard currency later on with a paper currency (which
|
||
has now happened). Remember that Federal Judges see important benefits in
|
||
everything the King does, and there are legitimate benefits in having a uniform
|
||
national currency to pursue Commercial enrichment with -- when those benefits
|
||
were sought after voluntarily. [605]
|
||
[605]<div> In VEAZIE
|
||
BANK VS. FENNO, 75 U.S. 533 (1869), the Supreme Court ruled that it was the
|
||
Constitutional right of Congress to provide a currency for the whole Country;
|
||
that this might be done by coin, United States notes, or notes of national
|
||
banks; and that it cannot be questioned that Congress may Constitutionally
|
||
secure the BENEFIT of such a currency to the people by appropriate legislation.
|
||
<div>[605]
|
||
Judges perceive of those benefits as being related to the Legal Tender status
|
||
of the King's Currency, among other things. What Federal Judges do not see
|
||
collectively is that those FRN's possess only those benefits that any widely
|
||
accepted circulating currency would also offer, and are the same benefits that
|
||
privately circulating notes and coins did in fact offer here in the United
|
||
States prior to the Civil War. The King is not entitled to demand taxation
|
||
reciprocity by merely replacing benefits originating from private mints with
|
||
benefits originating from the Congress under the cloak, cover, and duress of
|
||
penal statutes. So by enacting that succession of penal monopoly statutes that
|
||
shut down competitors, the King has transferred the origin of currency benefits
|
||
away from private mints and banks, over to himself. A forced uniform national
|
||
currency serves only the private financial enrichment objectives of the King by
|
||
getting everyone into Interstate Commerce, among other things, and also serves
|
||
the objectives of Special Interest Groups who very much want to see the King
|
||
circulate paper currency expressly for the purpose of perfecting our
|
||
enscrewment -- if it were not so, the King would not have had to use penal
|
||
statutes and armed stormtroopers in the 1800's to enforce the acceptance of his
|
||
currency monopoly LEX. If a single national currency medium did in fact serve
|
||
everyone's best interest, if everyone wanted to use the King's paper money,
|
||
then why did the King have to resort to the display of physical force when
|
||
initiating such a currency monopoly by police powers intervention in the
|
||
1800's, and now unilaterally use that monopoly to administratively coerce
|
||
people into contractual situations they did not otherwise want or enter into?
|
||
Therefore, you do not accept any Consideration the King is handing you when
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes circulate into your possession (and remember that the
|
||
King's Legal Tender Statutes have very much enhanced the market value of
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes). And that such use of Federal Reserve Notes is occurring
|
||
against your will and over your objection and Protest, for, INTER ALIA, want of
|
||
alternatives, and with the reason why there are no alternatives is due to
|
||
Federal monopoly penal statutes forbidding such alternatives, and that such a
|
||
monopoly is an unfair restraint of trade (unfair because it is unnecessary)
|
||
anyone else gets incarcerated for.
|
||
Remember that in dealing with Federal Judges, you need to "hit the nail right
|
||
on the head," and by rejecting Federal benefits, and then explaining your
|
||
rejection through chronologically sequential presentations of facts and of
|
||
reasoned legal arguments; when that has been done, then where once there was a
|
||
Courtroom hurricane of unbridled retortional ensnortment by Federal Judges,
|
||
designed to rub in, in no uncertain terms, their strong philosophical
|
||
disapproval of Tax Protestors -- now suddenly in contrast, everything changes
|
||
over to a quiescent environment. [606]
|
||
[606]<div> "Quiescent"
|
||
means that the environment is at rest, but only for a certain amount of time.
|
||
<div>[606]
|
||
Additional objections along the lines that Warburg and his Gremlin brothers in
|
||
crime, the Rothschilds, through their ownership of the Federal Reserve System,
|
||
are third party beneficial interest holders, and that use of the police powers
|
||
for the private enrichment of a Special Interest Group is unlawful, since under
|
||
Supreme Court rulings, when the King enters into Commercial activity, his
|
||
Status descends to the same level as other merchants, [607]
|
||
[607]<div> "Governments
|
||
descent to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character
|
||
of a mere private citizen [where commercial instruments are concerned]." - BANK
|
||
OF U.S. VS. PLANTERS BANK, 22 U.S. 904 (1829). "When governments enter the
|
||
world of commerce, it is subject to the same burdens as any private firm." -
|
||
UNITED STATES VS. BURR, 309 U.S. 242 (1939). And the King is very much into
|
||
Commerce when his Legal Tender Statutes and equity co-endorser statutes [Title
|
||
12, Section 411] enhance the value of those negotiable Federal Reserve Notes.
|
||
<div>[607]
|
||
and that any other American merchant who pulled off such a gun barrel monopoly
|
||
grab would be incarcerated for doing so. Numerous Contract Law books provide a
|
||
rich abundance of defenses to assert against Negotiable Instruments. [608]
|
||
[608]<div> Exemplary
|
||
would be, perhaps, the three volume set of TREATISE ON RECESSION OF CONTRACTS
|
||
AND CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS by Henry Black (Vernon Law Book
|
||
Company, Kansas City, Missouri); And the huge voluminous set of CORBIN ON
|
||
CONTRACTS by Arthur Corbin, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota;
|
||
Another is the 18 volume set of writings of Sam Williston entitled A TREATISE
|
||
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, published by Baker, Voorhis & Company, Mount Kisco,
|
||
New York (1961).
|
||
<div>[608]
|
||
Numerous defenses to assert in your Objection and Notice of Protest against the
|
||
use of Federal Reserve Notes attaching liability to Title 26 due to their
|
||
Status as circulating Commercial Negotiable Instruments involve both Real [609]
|
||
[609]<div> Real
|
||
defenses include those defenses that arise out of the fact that no liability
|
||
was created in the first place by your involuntary use of Federal Reserve
|
||
Notes. <div>[609]
|
||
and Personal Defenses. [610]
|
||
[610]<div> Personal
|
||
defenses are those defenses which arise out of the relationship of the parties
|
||
to each other.
|
||
<div>[610]
|
||
Some of the defenses you could claim include undue influence, [611]
|
||
[611]<div> Undue
|
||
influence is generally understood to be the power which one person wrongfully
|
||
exercises over another in attempting to control and influence the action of
|
||
such other person. Both CIRCUMSTANTIAL as well as DIRECT EVIDENCE is acceptable
|
||
for proving undue influence (which, like all other defenses are affirmative
|
||
defenses, and the burden falls on you to assert your position well).
|
||
<div>[611]
|
||
absence or failure of Consideration, [612]
|
||
[612]<div> Remember
|
||
that Consideration is a benefit, and mere issuance of the Note itself has
|
||
always been PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE that Consideration (a benefit) was accepted by
|
||
the Holder (you). Your placing the King on "Prior Notice" that benefits are
|
||
being declined and waived, and that infirmities are present, is your attack on
|
||
Consideration.
|
||
<div>[612]
|
||
moral fraud, [613]
|
||
[613]<div> Either fraud
|
||
PER SE or in the alternative, FRAUD IN THE FACTUM can be either Personal or a
|
||
Real Defense, depending upon the factual setting (which we will now alter to
|
||
favor ourselves). Law books are generally reluctant to define the contours of
|
||
just what fraud is, since no sooner do the contours of fraud get settled, then
|
||
some scheming crook stretches those contours by figuring out new ways to pull
|
||
something off. But if you can get a recognizance of fraud, then what is
|
||
absolutely certain is the consequence of such fraud: As it vitiates anything
|
||
and everything that it enters into. But fraud is an affirmative defense, and
|
||
properly so, and the burden is on you to prove that such fraud exists.
|
||
<div>[613]
|
||
necessity, unilateral adhesion contract made in restraint of trade, [614]
|
||
[614]<div> Commercial
|
||
bargains made by people are generally deemed to be null and void if made in
|
||
conflict of Public Policy, i.e., prostitution, gambling, usury, etc. The King's
|
||
monopoly grab on a single national currency is very much contemporary national
|
||
Public Policy, so arguing this line in a Contract Law Jurisprudential setting
|
||
is going to be difficult, unless the correct pleading of the Money Issue is
|
||
presented. <div>[614]
|
||
economic duress, [615]
|
||
[615]<div> Duress does
|
||
not need to be directly experienced by the party claiming it as a defense, as
|
||
duress used by one of the Holders, with the secondary effect of the duress
|
||
operating only indirectly against you, is quite sufficient as a defense.
|
||
<div>[615]
|
||
and the like.
|
||
Some of those Objections and statements are milktoast, and will later fall
|
||
apart and collapse under attack by the King's Attorneys in adversary
|
||
proceedings, and properly so. Reason: The Use and recirculation of Commercial
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes necessarily involves a Contract Law factual setting, and
|
||
so our arguments along the lines of the King's basic unfairness in sealing up
|
||
his national currency monopoly, etc., are only peripheral arguments; only
|
||
direct coercion in the use of Federal Reserve Notes is strong enough to strip
|
||
the King of his Status of a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. And unfairness arguments
|
||
sounding in the Tort of third party Special Interest Group penal statute
|
||
sponsorship and of Congressional intrigue in 1913, even though very accurate
|
||
factually, are way off base, if we are going into the Supreme Court under a
|
||
factual setting calling for Contractual Law settlement reasoning.
|
||
But for us right now, which Objection reason that we stated, either stands or
|
||
falls when under attack later, is not important. And what is important is
|
||
denying the King his protective Status as a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE against you
|
||
(if the King is a HOLDER IN DUE COURSE, the Principle is that we have no
|
||
defenses to assert against him), by filing your NOTICE OF PROTEST and related
|
||
corrigendum (meaning filed in an interlocutory state in contemplation of
|
||
secondary enhancement or error correction at a later time). But some of those
|
||
arguments we listed will survive, as the naked facts surrounding the forceful
|
||
acquisition of the King's monopoly on national currency are quite authentic,
|
||
and elements can be raised to take the factual setting out of Contract Law and
|
||
into Tort Law where, at least as a point of beginning, those arguments then
|
||
become relevant [however, those arguments probably won't even be addressed for
|
||
other reasons]. So we are exactly on line in some areas (assuming the Case was
|
||
properly plead by referring to the Supreme Court rulings on the declension in
|
||
Status the King experiences when the King engages in Commercial activity).
|
||
[616]
|
||
[616]<div> "When
|
||
governments enter the world of commerce, it is subject to the same burdens as
|
||
any private firm."
|
||
- UNITED STATES VS. BURR, 309 U.S. 242 (1939).
|
||
<div>[616]
|
||
So the final analysis is not important right now. Getting a general Notice of
|
||
Protest documenting the situational infirmities to the other party; invoking
|
||
Tort Law to govern the factual setting surrounding your involuntary use of
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes; and stating that there has been a FAILURE OF
|
||
CONSIDERATION; as your STATE OF MIND is what is important, and the detailed
|
||
judicial affirmation or rejection of your specific Protest reasons can occur
|
||
later in adversary proceedings. Failure to object is fatal, and failure to
|
||
object timely is equally as fatal, as you have no right to ask the Judiciary to
|
||
help you weasel out of the terms of contracts you originally intended to
|
||
benefit from (which is necessarily inferred when no timely Objection was filed
|
||
on your part). If we have corrected our Status, we filed our Objections timely,
|
||
and we still lose, and the reasons why we lose on this issue have their seminal
|
||
point of origin in the King's police power tactics in the 1800's, then it would
|
||
then be time to consider dealing with the King on the same terms the King's
|
||
Treasury Agents dealt with the two remaining die-hard California Coin Mints:
|
||
Out of the barrel of a gun. [617]
|
||
[617]<div> "And honest
|
||
Men would be expos'd a ready Prey to Villains, if they were never allow'd to
|
||
make use of Violence in Resisting their Attacks."
|
||
- THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS, by Samuel de Puffendorf [Translated
|
||
from the French by Basil Kennett (1729)].
|
||
<div>[617]
|
||
With the prosecution of Individuals, whose status is near lily white, being
|
||
sandbagged at low administrative and judicial levels, then such an aggressive
|
||
retortional atmosphere of confrontation is quite unlikely to occur. But until
|
||
those circumstances do happen, then let's not badmouth the Judiciary, because
|
||
as for the past and present, PRINCIPLES OF NATURE rule in the corridors of the
|
||
United States Supreme Court, to the extent that they are able to apply such
|
||
majestic Principles to such pathetic factual settings they are frequently
|
||
presented with -- with petitioners and criminal Defendants who are not entitled
|
||
to prevail under any circumstances, as contracts are in effect.
|
||
Subject to these following qualifications, the filing of this Objection on the
|
||
involuntary use of Federal Reserve Notes will arrest the movement of the King's
|
||
Agents in a civil prosecution against you on this particular adhesive
|
||
attachment of King's Equity Jurisdiction. But the most interesting reason why
|
||
you now reluctantly use Federal Reserve Notes is yet to come; and it is the one
|
||
reason the King's Attorneys will never be able to tear apart and get judicially
|
||
annulled [it will be sandbagged before it gets annulled]. And it is the one
|
||
reason why even an otherwise reluctant Supreme Court might just respect this
|
||
Objection, regardless of how irritating it may be for some imps nestled in the
|
||
Judiciary, since the effect of this one last Objection automatically vitiates
|
||
the most solemn written contracts ever sealed.
|
||
Your Objection might want to contain the following:
|
||
1. An historical overview of the gun barrel and penal statute factual
|
||
setting surrounding the acquisition of a national currency monopoly by the
|
||
King, with the authorities for your statements being cited;
|
||
2. Stating in all of your Objections and Notices of Defects, that your
|
||
occasional use of Federal Reserve Notes is involuntary, and transpires because
|
||
you are seeking to avoid being incarcerated as an accessory to the criminal
|
||
circulation of illegal currency under Federal statutes.
|
||
That's right. That is the real reason why you now reluctantly use Federal
|
||
Reserve Notes: Not because you want to, and not necessarily because of what
|
||
some Treasury Agents did in California in the 1800's, but because if you now
|
||
started using your own currency instruments here today in 1985, then the King
|
||
will incarcerate you for doing so; and therefore we have no choice but to use
|
||
the King's designated currency against our Will and over our Objection. [618]
|
||
[618]<div> Is the King
|
||
really interested in using penal statutes to enforce a currency monopoly, down
|
||
to the present day? Yes, he very much is, and those who deal in that currency
|
||
which the King has seen fit to declare illegal in his kingdom will find
|
||
themselves dealing with the King's Agents at gun point. ...Being in the United
|
||
States felt good to the Braselton Family, who came over here from Manchester,
|
||
England in the 1880's. They settled down in rural Georgia, a remote 52 miles
|
||
northeast of Atlanta. This was 52 miles from nowhere, in the middle of nowhere.
|
||
This was an enterprising family with commercial enrichment being a natural
|
||
family attribute. The elder Mr. Braselton borrowed $2000 and started in
|
||
business with his brother at the age of 8 [a great deal of money for those days
|
||
when SILVER DOLLARS circulated and $1500 bought a nice house]. Soon, a farming
|
||
supply store opened up, followed by a succession of other stores and business
|
||
interests. What was first a single building was now a row of buildings lining
|
||
both sides of a street, and surrounded by neighborhoods of residents. House of
|
||
Braselton essentially grew into a town unto itself. Today, among the visible
|
||
merchant establishments, there are the BRASELTON BANKING COMPANY, the BRASELTON
|
||
SUPER MARKET, the BRASELTON FLEA MARKET, the BRASELTON FURNITURE AND APPLIANCE
|
||
STORE, the BRASELTON MONUMENT COMPANY, and the BRASELTON SERVICE STATION. The
|
||
State of Georgia granted their hamlet political status as a town, and named it
|
||
the TOWN OF BRASELTON. After building up a bank and virtually all of the supply
|
||
stores in town, the Braselton Family then built a high school for the town's
|
||
residents. There is no police department in Braselton, there is no fire
|
||
department and no social services -- and, not surprisingly, being no benefits,
|
||
there are no taxes to be concerned with. No, looters and Tory Aristocrats never
|
||
did succeed in gaining a foothold in Braselton. Over the years from 1880 down
|
||
to the present day, the Braselton stores have had their trials and reversals:
|
||
They have had an intermittent fire, and in 1920 a tornado leveled many
|
||
buildings, but the family always rebuilt. The Mayor of Braselton has always
|
||
been a Braselton, and the family enterprises are managed by a family
|
||
triumvirate, affectionately called THE 3-B's [see the ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
|
||
("Three Braseltons of Braselton Business Partners Over 50 Years"), (May 31,
|
||
1939)]. Today, when I visited Braselton, only a handful of coins and coupons
|
||
["Coupon Check"] mounted on a picture frame remain as reminiscent icons of the
|
||
grand days of the 1800's, when anyone could issue their own currency without
|
||
fear of being incarcerated. The history and lore of Braselton, Georgia is
|
||
written and mounted on several walls in the BRASELTON BROTHERS HARDWARE STORE.
|
||
Walking into that store, one gets a feeling of power relationships, as
|
||
photographs from Presidents, Governors, and Senators, and other Braselton
|
||
Family Members hang in open view. With such a display of high powered
|
||
acquaintances, I almost felt as if I was in David Rockefeller's office in the
|
||
Chase Manhattan Bank -- but there the feeling of similarity stops. In the
|
||
BRASELTON HARDWARE STORE, one feels a sweet and pleasant spirit permeating the
|
||
store, as if one great American family resides here. In David Rockefeller's
|
||
office, also adorned with photographs of powerful acquaintances, the spirit in
|
||
the air is one of an icy demon chill. Once while travelling up in an elevator
|
||
in the Chase Manhattan Bank, my knees started to rattle when passing the 17th
|
||
Floor, where His Excellency used to maintain his nest. The idea came to me, as
|
||
I tried to stop the shivers, that the Astral High Command was holding an
|
||
important conference, and that the demons were planning to pull off something
|
||
grand. Being primarily in the farming supply business, the Braselton Family
|
||
developed a Credit System based on TRADE CERTIFICATES to handle the seasonal
|
||
nature of surrounding farmers coming in to trade crops for supplies. For store
|
||
employees and local residents, the Braseltons had their own coins minted, and
|
||
dollar equivalency coupons printed to be used as currency. Copper and nickel
|
||
based coins were minted in numerous equivalency denominations under $1.00; the
|
||
paper coupons ["Coupon Checks"] were similar to those coupon issued by movie
|
||
theaters and carnivals, and were available in coupon books. The issuance and
|
||
circulation of coins and currency by THE 3-B's was not only illegal, it was
|
||
criminal, but in a friendly small town in Georgia composed of class people, who
|
||
concerned themselves with technical banking statutes in Washington? Over the
|
||
years since the 1880's, while foreign wars came and went, the Braselton Family
|
||
enterprises prospered and grew independent of the King -- but eventually the
|
||
party would be over. As is always the case, one little goof messes up the soup
|
||
for everyone else, and the Braselton's turn came in the early 1950's. ...One
|
||
day in the early 1950's, a Braselton minted coin found its way into a gas
|
||
station in Atlanta. In turn it was passed on to a bank, who could not redeem it
|
||
into currency they are comfortable with. So the bank called the United States
|
||
Secret Service to report this heinous criminal outrage being commercially
|
||
orchestrated right up State Highway 53 in Braselton. From out of their offices
|
||
in the Atlanta Federal Building descended a troop of Federal Agents on
|
||
Braselton [they always like to put on a big show], and THE 3-B's surrendered
|
||
immediately. THE 3-B's would have surrendered on a phone call, but agents for
|
||
the King earn their pay IN TERROREM, and like to use a show force to make a
|
||
STATEMENT. The King's Agents brought with them guns and a slice of LEX from
|
||
Title 18 ["Crimes"], so now the private minting of Braselton coins and currency
|
||
coupons was over with. In time, the Braseltons also disbanded the farmer's
|
||
TRADE CERTIFICATES for other reasons. QUESTION: Will the King use his guns to
|
||
prevent you from circulating your own currency? Yes, he will.
|
||
<div>[618]
|
||
Your entrance into that closed, private domain of Interstate Commerce, by the
|
||
use and recirculation of Federal Reserve Notes (the King's Money), is
|
||
involuntary by reason of pure physical coercion. Remember that the character of
|
||
every act you do, and every prospective act you avoid doing, depends upon the
|
||
documented background circumstances behind which the act is either done or
|
||
avoided, [619]
|
||
[619]<div> "The
|
||
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done."
|
||
- UNITED STATES VS. SCHENCK, 249 U.S. 47, at 52 (1918).
|
||
<div>[619]
|
||
and your ability to document and prove your STATE OF MIND is absolutely
|
||
mandatory as a point of beginning: So let's not snicker at Judges as they toss
|
||
out arguments based merely upon some recollected memory reconstructions from
|
||
out of the past. If you claim that your involvement with the King in his closed
|
||
private domain of Interstate Commerce occurred by reason of physical coercion,
|
||
then the first question a Federal Judge will be asking himself is:
|
||
Who coerced you, when did this coercion take place, and what were the
|
||
background circumstances surrounding the coercion?
|
||
What the Judge will then do is to make an assessment of the overall legitimacy
|
||
of your claims. Talking about the naked aggression of Treasury Agents in
|
||
California in the 1800's is one interesting story out of the past, but talking
|
||
about a direct operation of coercion on you today in the 1980's is even better.
|
||
Remember that lightly claiming duress and coercion is one easy thing to do, but
|
||
proving such coercion is another. Absent a presentation of the King's monopoly
|
||
acquisition tactics, of his snuffing out currency (coins, bank notes, and
|
||
private paper) competitors in the 1800's, and of his contemporary eagerness to
|
||
incarcerate competitors and private currency lone wolves, absent such factual
|
||
background material your claims of duress and coercion to invalidate the
|
||
Contract Law jurisprudential setting of Federal Reserve Notes, as it applies to
|
||
you, are possible candidates to fall apart and collapse before the Judiciary.
|
||
So tell the Court about the currency history of the King, and his acquisition
|
||
of a currency monopoly out of a barrel of a gun, and then cite exactly, and
|
||
then quite directly, the verbatim wording of the Federal statutes that
|
||
criminalizes your acquisition and recirculation of any other Currency
|
||
Instrument other than the King's specified Legal Tender for the extinguishment
|
||
of your private debts, in order to prove your STATE OF MIND. [620]
|
||
[620]<div> One of the
|
||
statutory devices used by the King to grab for himself the currency circulating
|
||
around the United States was to make it a criminal act for someone to
|
||
countersign or deliver to any association, company, or person, any circulating
|
||
notes not expressly allowed by the King:
|
||
"...That it shall be unlawful for any officer acting under the
|
||
provisions of this act to countersign or deliver to any association, or to any
|
||
other company or person, any circulating notes contemplated by this act, except
|
||
as herein before provided, and in accordance with the true intent and meaning
|
||
of this act. Any officer who shall violate the provisions of this section shall
|
||
be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
|
||
punished by fine not exceeding double the amount so countersigned and
|
||
delivered, and imprisonment not less than one year and not exceeding fifteen
|
||
years, at the discretion of this court in which he shall be tried."
|
||
- 13 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE 107, Chapter 106, Section 27
|
||
["National Banking Act"], 38th Congress, First Session (1864). Introduced into
|
||
the Senate by John Sherman and the House by Samuel Hooper, the Rothschild
|
||
Gremlins had done their payoffs very well, as both this NATIONAL BANKING ACT
|
||
and the COINAGE ACT OF 1873 were the products of intrigue by Gremlins that
|
||
originated in Europe. By the time the 1940's came around, 13 U.S. STATUTES AT
|
||
LARGE had been changed slightly and placed into Title 12, Section 581
|
||
["Unauthorized Issue of Circulating Notes"], with the threatened incarceration
|
||
retained. In June of 1948, the Congress repealed Title 12, Section 581, and so
|
||
today the King retains his monopoly on circulating instruments by a combination
|
||
of administrative LEX prohibiting banking associations from issuing currency,
|
||
and also by prohibiting anyone anywhere from circulating their own coins:
|
||
"Whoever makes, issues, circulates, or pays out any note, check,
|
||
memorandum, token, or other obligation for a less sum than $1.00, intended to
|
||
circulate as money or be received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United
|
||
States, shall be fined not more than $10000 or imprisoned not more than one
|
||
year, or both."
|
||
- Title 18, Section 336 ["Issuance of Circulating Obligations
|
||
of less than $1".] Since all transactions subject to sales taxes in the United
|
||
States are denominated in cents (even the purchase of jet aircraft),
|
||
restraining a discharge in part prevents the discharge in whole. A person
|
||
precluded from discharging his debts, except by overpayment, is a person
|
||
experiencing a hard juristic Tort created by the King.
|
||
<div>[620]
|
||
The reason why it is to your advantage to talk about these historical aspects
|
||
and give a Federal Judge a long chronicled history of the King's gun barrel
|
||
muscle tactics you are objecting to, is because their Federal Benchbook is
|
||
silent on it (except for numerous 1800's Case quotations), and so very few
|
||
Federal Judges actually know anything about the currency history of the United
|
||
States, and when Judges have been confronted with accurate presentations of
|
||
historical facts, they can and will rule against Government and reverse
|
||
themselves publicly in Opinions, [621]
|
||
[621]<div> Such as
|
||
happened with OWEN VS. THE CITY OF INDEPENDENCE [445 U.S. 622 (1979)], which
|
||
correctly reversed 500 years of Common Law policy that favored municipal Tort
|
||
immunization.
|
||
<div>[621]
|
||
and also quietly in post-Opinion regrets. [622]
|
||
[622]<div> When the
|
||
manuscript to Paul Blakewell's book entitled WHAT ARE WE USING FOR MONEY? [New
|
||
York: Van Nostrand, 1952] was sent to retired Supreme Court Justice Owen
|
||
Roberts (who had voted with the majority in the Gold Clause Cases [NORMAN VS.
|
||
BALTIMORE and three other Cases starting at 294 U.S. 240 (1934)]), Judge
|
||
Roberts sent a letter back to Paul Blakewell stating:
|
||
"Of course, I ought not to be quoted concerning a decision of the Court
|
||
when I was a member of it, but I am inclined to think that had I known the
|
||
history you describe, I would have been of a different opinion than the one
|
||
expressed."
|
||
- Quoted from David Fargo in WILL GOLD CLAUSES RETURN?, in 8
|
||
Reason Magazine 72, at 103 (June, 1976).
|
||
<div>[622]
|
||
So giving Federal Judges a more factually detailed presentation of history,
|
||
than is carefully given to them in those Government Seminars of theirs,
|
||
operates to your advantage. Your use of Federal Reserve Notes, under objection
|
||
to avoid incarceration, is the kind of a documented coercion factual setting
|
||
that is going to give the Supreme Court something to think about, if the
|
||
grievance ever gets to them. This involuntary entrance into King's Commerce by
|
||
reason of threat of incarceration severs this civil attachment of Equity
|
||
Jurisdiction that is otherwise airtight for those folks not Objecting
|
||
substantively and timely [because benefits were rejected and there is now a
|
||
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION], and completes our efforts to convert the basic
|
||
Contract Law factual setting that the use of Commercial Federal Reserve Notes
|
||
necessarily mandates, somewhat over into Tort Law (so our unfairness arguments
|
||
then can become relevant). [623]
|
||
[623]<div> Even though
|
||
Judges may deal with tax enforcement proceedings whose only evidence is the
|
||
acceptance and recirculation of Federal Reserve Notes on the civil side of
|
||
their courtroom, you are not free of incarceration by merely getting rid of
|
||
your Enfranchisements, licenses, and bank accounts that evidences the
|
||
acceptance of Federal benefits -- benefit acceptance that creates invisible
|
||
contracts. The IRS specializes in 2039 Summons and DISCOVERY enforcement moves
|
||
to perfect incarceration through civil contempt proceedings, and the mere
|
||
absence of a bank account will not protect you from being cited for Contempt of
|
||
Court and the encagement that follows.
|
||
<div>[623]
|
||
That documented involuntary behavior to avoid incarceration is the one magic
|
||
liability--vitiating line that Judges never deviate from, and that
|
||
incarceration threat is the kind of an Objection that Judges want to hear, and
|
||
that is the kind of an Objection that the Supreme Court will respect. But as
|
||
always, it is the waiver and rejection of Royal benefits that is the most
|
||
important item to address; and the King's Legal Tender Statutes have very much
|
||
enhanced the market value and general Commercial attractiveness of those
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes, so as viewed from the perspective of a Federal Judge,
|
||
when you accepted and then recirculated Federal Reserve Notes, you have
|
||
accepted a Federal benefit. [624]
|
||
[624]<div> Yes,
|
||
benefits accepted are also the invisible contract into state tax courts:
|
||
"The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
|
||
anything [some type of a juristic benefit] for which it can ask return."
|
||
- STATE OF WISCONSIN VS. J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, 311 U.S. 435, at 444
|
||
(1940). <div>[624]
|
||
So the King has the requisite standing jurisdiction to use his police powers to
|
||
seal up monopolies on currency and postal services: But when he threatens to
|
||
cause those penal statutes to operate against you, the King can then forget
|
||
about the assertion of any adhesive revenue enhancement Equity Jurisdiction on
|
||
us, if you will but so much as Object substantively and timely so as to trigger
|
||
Consideration Failure.
|
||
You should remember that filing such an Objection, say next year in 1986, will
|
||
only assist you in a future prosecution. If the IRS is going after you today
|
||
for 1981 to 1985, then your failure to Object timely was fatal on your part, as
|
||
this Federal Reserve Note Objection carries no retroactive force with it.
|
||
Remember that the King's throwing a prosecution against you is an adversary
|
||
proceeding. If the King's Attorneys make the assertion that you had accepted
|
||
and use Federal Reserve Notes (with the long history of Consideration Law to
|
||
support the King in this area going back into English history and the Medieval
|
||
Ages), and you retort by saying that you didn't want to use Federal Reserve
|
||
Notes without being able to explain exactly how and why your use was
|
||
involuntary, then the Federal Judge has no choice but to rule against you, as
|
||
in that setting the preponderance of the evidence favors the King. So the King
|
||
wins by your own half-baked minimum efforts and default in proving your
|
||
assertion. But if you do cite authorities, quote the King's criminal statutes
|
||
verbatim, and prove everything, then there is not a Federal Judge in the entire
|
||
United States who could rightfully hold that your use of Federal Reserve Notes
|
||
is voluntary for Commercial gain, and that an adhesive attachment of revenue
|
||
Equity Jurisdiction attaches for this reason (and that specifically includes
|
||
the Supreme Court). The King may have numerous other Equity hooks into you
|
||
depending on your individual circumstances, but he will be restrained from
|
||
using this one hook against you.
|
||
[As I said in the Armen Condo Letter, in a criminal prosecution
|
||
setting, it is a general policy custom that the Judiciary requires a much
|
||
higher evidentiary standard of knowledge of wrongdoing and of Commercial
|
||
enrichment experienced in the closed private domain of King's Commerce; but as
|
||
you should see by now, through a strict technical reading of Title 26, no bank
|
||
accounts are ever needed to perfect a 7203 prosecution. By its own statutory
|
||
wording, either your documented involvement in Interstate Commerce, over the
|
||
minimum liability threshold level, or your Citizenship Contract, attaches all
|
||
civil and criminal liability the King thinks he needs. But Federal Judges do
|
||
not necessarily think like the King thinks, and in a criminal prosecution for
|
||
Title 26 infractions, the Judiciary, by custom, would like to see a higher
|
||
level of administrative and merchant status than the mere use and recirculation
|
||
of Federal Reserve Notes infers. That higher evidentiary standard that Federal
|
||
Judges hold was all that I meant in the Armen Condo Letter. And since the
|
||
Federal Judge had Armen Condo's bank account contracts in front of him, the
|
||
Constitution then became irrelevant in Armen's RESTRAINING ORDER defense. So,
|
||
generally, what the Federal Bench wants to see is some type of a contract
|
||
before they will consent to a criminal prosecution for Title 26 penal
|
||
infractions. There are exceptions where such instruments of CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
|
||
like bank accounts are not pursued that much, but those exceptions do not apply
|
||
to you or me. To my knowledge, no one in the United States has ever been
|
||
incarcerated at any time for any penal infraction of Title 26, with the only
|
||
evidence being acceptance and beneficial use of Federal Reserve Notes in
|
||
Interstate Commerce. Evidence of the acceptance and beneficial use of Federal
|
||
Reserve Notes is quite frequently adduced into criminal prosecutions by the
|
||
King's Attorneys in the Public Show Trial, but only a collaborating secondary
|
||
evidence behind serious contracts the IRS quietly gave the Judge in his
|
||
Chambers before the prosecution even started. This Equity hook the King has up
|
||
his Royal sleeve (use of Federal Reserve Notes) is generally applicable against
|
||
you as PRIMA FACIE primary evidence only in the lower evidentiary standards of
|
||
a free wheeling civil arena.]
|
||
So important for us is the filing of the Objection and Notice of Protest, and
|
||
filing the objections timely. And each of these Objections should be separate
|
||
and distinct from each other (Admiralty/Birth Certificate, Equity/Social
|
||
Security, Commercial/HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE, etc.). What happens if the Supreme
|
||
Court rules some day of in the future that King's Revenue Equity Jurisdiction
|
||
still attaches to involuntary users of Federal Reserve Notes? We will then have
|
||
to acquire our rights from our contemporary King the same way Ben Franklin and
|
||
George Washington acquired their rights: Out of the barrel of a gun. [625]
|
||
[625]<div> Writing to
|
||
the French inhabitants of Louisiana, after the American War of Independence was
|
||
over with, Thomas Paine made the following observation on the sometimes
|
||
necessary use of aggression to obtain rights:
|
||
"We obtained our rights by calmly understanding principles, and by the
|
||
successful event of a long, obstinate, and expensive war. But it is not
|
||
incumbent on us to fight the battles of the world for the world's profit."
|
||
- THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, by David Wheeler, Page 173
|
||
[Vincent Parke & Company, New York City (1908)]
|
||
<div>[625]
|
||
We always want to take a moment and examine ourselves in known impending
|
||
grievances from the viewpoint of our adversary, in order to see things like a
|
||
judge; and when dealing with an attack on the acceptance and recirculation of
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes, an argument will likely be advanced to try and discredit
|
||
your objection:
|
||
Your adversary will argue that Federal Law, not State Law of the UCC governs
|
||
your attack on Federal Reserve Notes. Their arguments are based on numerous
|
||
federal court rulings -- one of which is when the Supreme Court once ruled
|
||
[626]
|
||
[626]<div> CLEARFIELD
|
||
TRUST VS. UNITED STATES, 318 U.S. 363 (1942).
|
||
<div>[626]
|
||
that the rights, duties, and liabilities of the United States on Commercial
|
||
paper are issues that are to be governed exclusively by federal law, and not
|
||
governed by state law. Therefore, your adversaries will argue that your
|
||
reliance on the UCC, which are a collection of state statutes, as a source of
|
||
authority, is ill-founded and that you are not entitled to prevail. This
|
||
argument does not concern us at all, since in reading CLEARFIELD TRUST, the
|
||
reason why the Supreme Court wants federal Commercial paper to be governed by
|
||
Federal Law and not State Law is because they do not want the Federal
|
||
Government subject to 50 different rules and restrictions proprietary to each
|
||
state:
|
||
"But reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate federal
|
||
rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of Commercial paper by the
|
||
United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance
|
||
to payout will commonly occur in several states. The application of state law,
|
||
even without the conflict of laws rules of forum, would subject the rights and
|
||
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
|
||
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries
|
||
of the laws of the several states." [627]
|
||
[627]<div> CLEARFIELD
|
||
TRUST, id., 318 U.S. at 367.
|
||
<div>[627]
|
||
Since the Uniform Commercial Code is just that, i.e., UNIFORM throughout all of
|
||
the states except one (Louisiana), having the issuance and Commercial use of
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes subject to this uniform code, in the absence of any
|
||
federal law to the contrary, is most appropriate. Subjecting the rights and
|
||
duties of the United States and it's pet corporation, the Federal Reserve, to
|
||
the uniform rules of the UCC to fill in missing gaps in Federal Commercial
|
||
Laws, offers to expose the United States to no exception uncertainty. Although
|
||
there very much is a Federal Law Merchant, [628]
|
||
[628]<div> "... the
|
||
federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of SWIFT
|
||
VS. TYSON, 16 Peter 1, represented general commercial law rather than a choice
|
||
of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right..."
|
||
- CLEARFIELD TRUST, id., 318 U.S. at 367.
|
||
<div>[628]
|
||
State Law is silent on the matter; [629]
|
||
[629]<div> In
|
||
explaining why state law governed a federal commercial paper question:
|
||
"While [the] New York statute... is not controlling... [there is] no
|
||
conflict with any state or federal policy..."
|
||
- ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY VS. UNITED STATES, 313 U.S. 289, at 297
|
||
(1940). <div>[629]
|
||
and so now that leaves Federal Judges making the law. [630]
|
||
[630]<div> "In the
|
||
absence of an applicable Act of Congress, it is for the federal courts to
|
||
fashion the governing rule of law, according to their own standards..."
|
||
- CLEARFIELD TRUST, id., 318 U.S. at 367.
|
||
<div>[630]
|
||
Remember that the PRINCIPLES OF NATURE the UCC codifies into sequential
|
||
statutes is merely the old Law Merchant of our Fathers, and that our Fathers
|
||
merely codified reason, logic, and common sense; and the Uniform Commercial
|
||
Code, even though it is state law, is merely cited to both fill pronouncement
|
||
voids in the Federal Law Merchant, and as simply the best pronouncement of
|
||
PRINCIPLES OF NATURE denominated to apply to Commercial factual settings.
|
||
The Principle we invoke when coming to grips with these Federal Reserve Notes
|
||
is merely common sense: That a person we are trying to avoid doing business
|
||
with (the King) loses his expectation of our conformance to his statutes, when
|
||
we place him on our PRIOR NOTICE that Defects are present in the paper he is
|
||
circulating, and that we are not accepting the benefits otherwise inuring to
|
||
the Holders and Recirculators of his Federal Reserve Notes, by reason of
|
||
involuntary use. Everything in this Letter is all inter-related to some extent;
|
||
earlier, I discussed the RATIFICATION DOCTRINE, by which Judges hold that
|
||
silence on your part, in the context of an assertion being made against you,
|
||
constitutes your acceptance of the proposition that you are silent on (and for
|
||
good reasons: Because benefits are being accepted by you). This Notice of
|
||
Defect reverses that state of silence, and the King is forced to experience a
|
||
declension in his coveted status of expecting a perfect non-defense case
|
||
against you, based on your terminating the acceptance of the benefits of the
|
||
use and recirculation of Federal Reserve Notes. The UCC largely codified all of
|
||
this since merchants have it out with each other all the time on this very
|
||
question with Negotiable Instruments, and as such the UCC gave every possible
|
||
thing and every party nice proprietary names and labels so that attorneys and
|
||
judges can all deal with these factual settings with everyone speaking the same
|
||
vocabulary. So, if the UCC is technically non-applicable to Federal Reserve
|
||
Notes, then we don't really care, as the UCC is no more than codifying Nature,
|
||
as Principles operate transparent to changes in factual settings. If we are
|
||
Objecting to a thing, like a Note, then the Maker has lost his expectation of
|
||
not having any grievances to deal with on that thing (Note); and that is only
|
||
common sense. And we cite the UCC as the best codified pronouncement of that
|
||
Doctrine, and we encourage our adversaries to find any federal statute
|
||
inconsistent with the UCC's pronouncements. [631]
|
||
[631]<div> Nowhere in
|
||
Federal statutes does there exist specific language to the effect that
|
||
INDIVIDUALS using Federal Reserve Notes are PERSONS attached to the
|
||
administrative mandates of Title 26. The reason why we concern ourselves with
|
||
this state of affairs is largely of a judicial origin, as Federal Judges are
|
||
free to take Judicial Notice of such Supreme Court Cases like EMILY DE GANAY
|
||
VS. LEDERER, [250 U.S. 376 (1919)], which held that French Citizens and
|
||
residents are liable to pay American Income Taxes by reason of their Commercial
|
||
activities taking place over here. However, when we probe for the real bottom
|
||
line at a deeper level, the real reason liability exists lies in an operation
|
||
of contract. In 1925, the Supreme Court declared that there are two different
|
||
types of invisible contracts ("implied contracts"). [The Supreme Court did not
|
||
CREATE something new here, as they merely declared in writing what had always
|
||
been the structure of Nature in this area of contracts.] One type of contract
|
||
recognized exists because of the practical factual elements that arise between
|
||
two parties, and there is a structure in the factual background where there has
|
||
been an exchange of Consideration. Another type are implied contracts that
|
||
exist as a matter of express declared Law [see HENRY MERRITT VS. UNITED STATES,
|
||
267 U.S. 338, at 341 (1925)].
|
||
"It is important to remain aware of the distinctions between contracts
|
||
implied in fact and contracts implied in law. In the former, the Court
|
||
determines from the circumstances that the parties have indicated their assent
|
||
to the contract. In the latter, however, the law creates an obligation "for
|
||
reasons of justice, without any expression of assent and sometimes even against
|
||
a clear expression of dissent."
|
||
- FREEDMAN VS. BENEFICIAL CORPORATION, 406 F.Supp. 917, at 923
|
||
[Footnote #10] (1975); quoting from 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Section 18 and 19
|
||
(1963). Since no explicit statutes exist to adhesively bind recirculators of
|
||
Federal Reserve Notes to Title 26, this USE OF FEDERAL RESERVE NOTES contract
|
||
is a contract arising from the factual elements of a commercial relational
|
||
nature existing between the two parties (as Federal benefits were accepted in
|
||
the context of some Judicially declared Commercial reciprocity being expected
|
||
back in return). Contracts to pay Federal Income Taxes as a matter of
|
||
pronounced Law are contracts like Citizenship, where some junior LEX statutes
|
||
do exist that explicitly spell out Title 26 liability to such identified
|
||
PERSONS in no uncertain terms.
|
||
<div>[631]
|
||
As you well know, Mr. May, it is a PRINCIPLE OF NATURE that an ounce of
|
||
prevention is worth ten tons of labor exerted later on in patching up. And
|
||
merely preparing your multiple objections now, in writing, will spare a person
|
||
from substantial expenses in depositions and the like later, as the collection
|
||
of evidence, is, generally speaking, an expensive and time-consuming process.
|
||
With rare exception, all of the Patriot lawsuits I have examined never involved
|
||
any form of Depositions or Interrogatories being take on the Defendant (and the
|
||
Patriot wonders why he loses). All of that is neatly avoided by a few
|
||
preventative steps.
|
||
</conspiracyFile> |