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<conspiracyFile>SUBJECT: FEMA GULAG
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SECRET CONCENTRATION CAMPS
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The September issue of THE OSTRICH reprinted a story from the
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CBA BULLETIN which listed the following principal civilian concentra-
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tion camps established in GULAG USA under the =Rex '84= program:
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Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas; Ft. Drum, New York; Ft. Indian Gap, Penn-
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sylvania; Camp A. P. Hill, Virginia; Oakdale, California; Eglin
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Air Force Base, Florida; Vendenberg AFB, California; Ft. Mc Coy,
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Wisconsin; Ft. Benning, Georgia; Ft. Huachuca, Arizona; Camp
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Krome, Florida. The February OSTRICH printed a map of the expanding
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Gulag. Alhough this listing and map stirred considerable interest,
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the report was not new. For at least 20 years, knowledgeable Patriots
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have been warning of these sinister plots to incarcerate dissidents
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opposing plans of the =Elitist Syndicate= for a totalitarian
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=New World Order=. Indeed, the plot was recognized with the insidious
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encroachment of "regionalism" back in the 1960's. As early as 1968,
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the "greatest land steal in history" leading to global corporate
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socialism, was in a ="Master Land Plan"= for the United States
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by =Executive Orders= involving water resource regions,
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population movement and control, pollution control, zoning
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and land use, navigation and environmental bills, etc. Indeed,
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the real undercover aim of the so-called "Environmental Rennaissance"
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has been the abolition of private property.
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All prelude to the total grab of the =World Conservation Bank=,
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as THE OSTRICH has been reporting. The map on this page and
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the list of executive orders available for imposition of an "emergency"
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are from 1970s files of the late Gen. =P. A. Del Valle's= ALERT,
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sent us by =Merritt Newby=, editor of the now defunct AMERICAN
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CHALLENGE.
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=Wake up Americans!= The Bushoviks have approved =Gorbachev's=
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imposition of "Emergency" to suppress unrest. =Henry Kissinger=
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and his clients hardly missed a day's profits in their deals with
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the butchers of Tiananmen Sqaure. Are you next?
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<div>
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SUBJECT: Executive Orders
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APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
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The following =Executive Orders=, now recorded in the Federal
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Register, and therefore accepted by Congress as the law of the
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land, can be put into effect at any time an emergency is declared:
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10995--All communications media seized by the Federal Government.
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10997--Seizure of all electrical power, fuels, including
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gasoline and minerals.
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10998--Seizure of all food resources, farms and farm equipment.
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10999--Seizure of all kinds of transportation, including your
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personal car, and control of all highways and seaports.
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11000--Seizure of all civilians for work under Federal supervision.
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11001--Federal takeover of all health, education and welfare.
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11002--Postmaster General empowered to register every man, woman
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and child in the U.S.A.
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11003--Seizure of all aircraft and airports by the Federal
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Government.
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11004--Housing and Finance authority may shift population from
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one locality to another. Complete integration.
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11005--Seizure of railroads, inland waterways, and storage facilities.
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11051--The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning authorized
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to put Executive Orders into effect in "times of increased
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international tension or financial crisis". He is also to
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perform such additional functions as the President
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may direct.
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<div>
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A Dangerous Fact Not Generally Known
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<div>
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THESE EXECUTIVE ORDERS GROSSLY AND FLAGRANTLY VIOLATE ARTICLE
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4 SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. "THE
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UNITED STATES SHALL GUARANTEE TO EVERY STATE IN THIS UNION A
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REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AND SHALL PROTECT EACH OF THEM
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AGAINST INVASION; AND ON APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATURE, OR OF THE
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EXECUTIVE (WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT BE CONVENED) AGAINST
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE." "REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT A REPRESENTATIVE
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REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT!"
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When Government gets out of hand and can no longer be controlled
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by the people, short of violent overthrow as in 1776, there are
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two sources of power which are used by the dictatorial government
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to keep the people in line: the Police Power and the Power of the
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Purse (through which the necessities of life can be withheld).
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And both of these powers are no longer balanced between the three
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Federal Branches, and between the Federal and the State and
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local Governments. These powers have been taken over, with the
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permission of the Federal Legislature and the State Governments,
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by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government and all attempts
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to reclaim that lost power have been defeated.
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Stated simply: the dictatorial power of the Executive rests primarily
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on three basis: Executive Order 11490, Executive Order 11647, and
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the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System which is operated
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through the new and all-powerful Office of Management and
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Budget.
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E. O. 11490 is a compilation of some 23 previous Executive Orders,
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signed by Nixon on Oct. 28, 1969, and outlining emergency functions
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which are to be performed by some 28 Executive Departments and
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Agencies whenever the President of the United States declares
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a national emergency (as in defiance of an impeachment edict,
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for example). Under the terms of E. O. 11490, the President
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can declare that a national emergency exists and the Executive
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Branch can:
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* Take over all communications media
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* Seize all sources of power
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* Take charge of all food resources
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* Control all highways and seaports
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* Seize all railroads, inland waterways, airports, storage facilities
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* Commandeer all civilians to work under federal supervision
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* Control all activities relating to health, education, and welfare
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* Shift any segment of the population from one locality to another
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* Take over farms, ranches, timberized properties
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* Regulate the amount of your own money you may withdraw from
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your bank, or savings and loan institution
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All of these and many more items are listed in 32 pages incorporating
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nearly 200000 words, providing and absolute bureaucratic
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dictatorship whenever the President gives the word.
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--> Executive Order 11647 provides the regional and local mechanisms
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--> and manpower for carrying out the provisions of E. O. 11490.
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--> Signed by Richard Nixon on Feb. 10, 1972, this Order sets up Ten
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--> Federal Regional Councils to govern Ten Federal Regions made up
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--> of the fifty still existing States of the Union.
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<div>
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Don sez:
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*Check out this book for the inside scoop on the "secret" Constitution.*
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SUBJECT: - "The Proposed Constitutional Model" Pages 595-621
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Book Title - The Emerging Constitution
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Author - Rexford G. Tugwell
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Publisher - Harpers Magazine Press,Harper and Row
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Dewey Decimal - 342.73 T915E
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ISBN - <data type="ISBN">0-06-128225-10</data>
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Note Chapter 14
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<div>
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The 10 Federal Regions
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<div>
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REGION I: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
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Island, Vermont.
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Regional Capitol: Boston
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REGION II: New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Virgin Island.
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Regional Capitol: New York City
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REGION III: Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
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Virginia, District of Columbia.
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Regional Capitol: Philadelphia
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REGION IV: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi,
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North Carolina, Tennessee.
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Regional Capitol: Atlanta
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REGION V: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin.
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Regional Capitol: Chicago
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REGION VI: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas.
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Regional Capitol: Dallas-Fort Worth
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REGION VII: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska.
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Regional Capitol: Kansas City
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REGION VIII: Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
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Utah, Wyoming.
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Regional Capitol: Denver
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REGION IX: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada.
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Regional Capitol: San Fransisco
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REGION X: Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Idaho.
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Regional Capitol: Seattle
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Supplementing these Then Regions, each of the States is, or is to
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be, divided into subregions, so that Federal Executive control
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is provided over every community.
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Then, controlling the bedgeting and the programming at every
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level is that politico-economic system known as PPBS.
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The President need not wait for some emergency such as an impeachment
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ouster. He can declare a National Emergency at any time, and freeze
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everything, just as he has already frozen wages and prices. And
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the Congress, and the States, are powerless to prevent such an
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Executive Dictatorship, unless Congress moves to revoke these
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extraordinary powers before the Chief Executive moves to invoke
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them.
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THESE EXECUTIVE ORDERS GROSSLY AND FLAGRANTLY VIOLATE THE INTENT AND
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PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 4 SECTION 3. THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THIS
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SECTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES FOR FORMING A
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REGIONAL STATE OUT OF A GROUP OF STATES! FURTHER, THESE EXECUTIVE
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ORDERS GROSSLY AND FLAGRANTLY VIOLATE THE 9TH AND 10TH
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AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION!
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By Proclaiming and Putting Into Effect Executive Order No. 11490,
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the President would put the United States under TOTAL MARTIAL LAW
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AND MILITARY DICTATORSHIP! The Guns Of The American People Would
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Be Forcibly Taken!
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<div>END:REF1<div>MORE--(40%)
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<div>
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<div>REF2:FEMA<div>
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Bushie-Tail used the Gulf War Show to greatly expand the powers of the
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presidency. During this shell game event, the Executive Orders signed
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into "law" continued Bushie's methodical and detailed program to bury
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any residual traces of the constitutional rights and protections of U.S.
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citizens. The Bill of Rights--[almost too late to] use 'em or lose 'em:
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The record of Bush's fast and loose approach to
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constitutionally guaranteed civil rights is a history of
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the erosion of liberty and the consolidation of an imperial
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executive.
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<div>
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From "Covert Action Information Bulletin," Number 37, Summer, 1991 (see
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bottom 2 pages for subscription & back issues info on this quarterly):
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Domestic Consequences of the Gulf War
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Diana Reynolds
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Reprinted with permission of CAIB. Copyright 1991
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Diana Reynolds is a Research Associate at the Edward R. Murrow Center,
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Fletcher School for Public Policy, Tufts University. She is also an
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Assistant Professor of Politics at Broadford College and a Lecturer at
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Merrimack College.
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A war, even the most victorious, is a national misfortune.
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--Helmuth Von Moltke, Prussian field marshall
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George Bush put the United States on the road to its second war in
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two years by declaring a national emergency on August 21990. In
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response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush issued two Executive
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Orders (12722 and 12723) which restricted trade and travel with Iraq
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and froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets within the U.S. and those in the
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possession of U.S. persons abroad. At least 15 other executive orders
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followed these initial restrictions and enabled the President to
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mobilize the country's human and productive resources for war. Under
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the national emergency, Bush was able unilaterally to break his 1991
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budget agreement with Congress which had frozen defense spending, to
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entrench further the U.S. economy in the mire of the military-
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industrial complex, to override environmental protection regulations,
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and to make free enterprise and civil liberties conditional upon an
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executive determination of national security interests.
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The State of Emergency
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In time of war a president's power derives from both constitutional
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and statutory sources. Under Article II, Section 2 of the
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Constitution, he is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Although
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Congress alone retains the right to declare war, this power has become
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increasingly meaningless in the face of a succession of unilateral
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decisions by the executive to mount invasions.
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The president's statutory authority, granted by Congress and
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expanded by it under the 1988 National Emergencies Act (50 USC sec.
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1601), confers special powers in time of war or national emergency.
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He can invoke those special powers simply by declaring a national
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emergency. First, however, he must specify the legal provisions under
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which he proposes that he, or other officers, will act. Congress may
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end a national emergency by enacting a joint resolution. Once invoked
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by the president, emergency powers are directed by the National
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Security Council and administered, where appropriate, under the
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general umbrella of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).[1]
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There is no requirement that Congress be consulted before an emergency
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is declared or findings signed. The only restriction on Bush is that
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he must inform Congress in a "timely" fashion--he being the sole
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arbiter of timeliness.
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Ultimately, the president's perception of the severity of a
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particular threat to national security and the integrity of his
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appointed officers determine the nature of any state of emergency.
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For this reason, those who were aware of the modern development of
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presidential emergency powers were apprehensive about the domestic
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ramifications of any national emergency declared by George Bush. In
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light of Bush's record (see "Bush Chips Away at Constitution" Box
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below) and present performance, their fears appear well-founded.
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The War at Home
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It is too early to know all of the emergency powers, executive
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orders and findings issued under classified National Security
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Directives[2] implemented by Bush in the name of the Gulf War. In
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addition to the emergency powers necessary to the direct mobilization
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of active and reserve armed forces of the United States, there are
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some 120 additional emergency powers that can be used in a national
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emergency or state of war (declared or undeclared by Congress). The
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"Federal Register" records some 15 Executive Orders (EO) signed by
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Bush from August 21990 to February 141991. (See "Bush's Executive
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Orders" box, below)
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It may take many years before most of the executive findings and
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use of powers come to light, if indeed they ever do. But evidence is
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emerging that at least some of Bush's emergency powers were activated
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in secret. Although only five of the 15 EOs that were published were
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directed at non-military personnel, the costs directly attributable to
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the exercise of the authorities conferred by the declaration of
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national emergency from August 2, 1990 to February 1, 1991 for non-
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military activities are estimated at approximately $1300000000.
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According to a February 11, 1991 letter from Bush to congressional
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leaders reporting on the "National Emergency With Respect to Iraq,"
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these costs represent wage and salary costs for the Departments of
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Treasury, State, Agriculture, and Transportation, U.S. Customs,
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Federal Reserve Board, and the National Security Council.[3]
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The fact that $1300000000 was spent in non-military salaries alone
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in this six month period suggests an unusual amount of government
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resources utilized to direct the national emergency state. In
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contrast, government salaries for one year of the state of emergency
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with Iran[4] cost only $430000.
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<div>
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Bush Chips Away at Constitution
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George Bush, perhaps more than any other individual in
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U.S. history, has expanded the emergency powers of
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presidency. In 1976, as Director of Central Intelligence,
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he convened Team B, a group of rabidly anti-communist
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intellectuals and former government officials to reevaluate
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CIA inhouse intelligence estimates on Soviet military
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strength. The resulting report recommended draconian civil
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defense measures which led to President Ford's Executive
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Order 11921 authorizing plans to establish government
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control of the means of production, distribution, energy
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sources, wages and salaries, credit and the flow of money
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in U.S. financial institutions in a national emergency.[1]
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As Vice President, Bush headed the Task Force on
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Combatting Terrorism, that recommended: extended and
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flexible emergency presidential powers to combat terrorism;
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restrictions on congressional oversight in counter-
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terrorist planning; and curbing press coverage of
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terrorist incidents.[2] The report gave rise to the Anti-
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Terrorism Act of 1986, that granted the President clear-cut
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authority to respond to terrorism with all appropriate
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means including deadly force. It authorized the
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Immigration and Naturalization Service to control and
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remove not only alien terrorists but potential terrorist
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aliens and those "who are likely to be supportive of
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terrorist activity within the U.S."[3] The bill superceded
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the War Powers Act by imposing no time limit on the
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President's use of force in a terrorist situation, and
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lifted the requirement that the President consult Congress
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before sanctioning deadly force.
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From 1982 to 1988, Bush led the Defense Mobilization
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Planning Systems Agency (DMPSA), a secret government
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organization, and spent more than $3000000000 upgrading
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command, control, and communications in FEMA's continuity
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of government infrastructures. Continuity of Government
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(COG) was ostensibly created to assure government
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functioning during war, especially nuclear war. The Agency
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was so secret that even many members of the Pentagon were
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unaware of its existence and most of its work was done
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without congressional oversight.
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Project 908, as the DMPSA was sometimes called, was
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similar to its parent agency FEMA in that it came under
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investigation for mismanagement and contract
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irregularities.[4] During this same period, FEMA had been
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fraught with scandals including emergency planning with a
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distinctly anti-constitutional flavor. The agency would
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have sidestepped Congress and other federal agencies and
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put the President and FEMA directly in charge of the U.S.
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planning for martial rule. Under this state, the executive
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would take upon itself powers far beyond those necessary to
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address national emergency contingencies.[5]
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Bush's "anything goes" anti-drug strategy, announced
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on September 6, 1989, suggested that executive emergency
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powers be used: to oust those suspected of associating
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with drug users or sellers from public and private housing;
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to mobilize the National Guard and U.S. military to fight
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drugs in the continental U.S.; to confiscate private
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property belonging to drug users, and to incarcerate first
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time offenders in work camps.[6]
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The record of Bush's fast and loose approach to
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constitutionally guaranteed civil rights is a history of
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the erosion of liberty and the consolidation of an imperial
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executive.
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1. Executive Order 11921, "Emergency preparedness Functions,
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June 11, 1976. Federal Register, vol. 41, no. 116. The
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report was attacked by such notables as Ray Cline, the
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CIA's former Deputy Director, retired CIA intelligence
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|
analyst Arthur Macy Cox, and the former head of the U.S.
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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke for
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blatantly manipulating CIA intelligence to achieve the
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political ends of Team B's rightwing members. See Cline,
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quoted in "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet
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Intentions," Mary Marder, "Washington Post," January 2,
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1977; Arthur Macy Cox, "Why the U.S. Since 1977 Has
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Been Mis-perceiving Soviet Military Strength," "New York
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Times," October 20, 1980; Paul Warnke, "George Bush and
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Team B," "New York Times," September 24, 1988.
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2. George Bush, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task
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Force On Combatting Terrorism" (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
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Government Printing Office), February 1986.
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3. Robert J. Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Investigations
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Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Alien
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Border Control Committee" (Washington, DC), October 1,
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1988.
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4. Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," "U.S. News
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& World Report," August 7, 1989.
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5. See: Diana Reynolds, "FEMA and the NSC: The Rise of the
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National Security State," "CAIB," Number 33 (Winter 1990);
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Keenan Peck, "The Take-Charge Gang," "The Progressive,"
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May 1985; Jack Anderson, "FEMA Wants to Lead Economic
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War," "Washington Post," January 10, 1985.
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6. These Presidential powers were authorized by the Anti-
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Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690: 100th
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Congress. See also: Diana Reynolds, "The Golden Lie,"
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"The Humanist," September/October 1990; Michael Isikoff,
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"Is This Determination or Using a Howitzer to Kill a
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|
Fly?" "Washington Post National Weekly," August 27-,
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September 2, 1990; Bernard Weintraub, "Bush Considers
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Calling Guard To Fight Drug Violence in Capital," "New
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York Times," March 21, 1989.
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|
|
<div>
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Even those Executive Orders which have been made public tend to
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raise as many questions as they answer about what actions were
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considered and actually implemented. On January 8, 1991, Bush signed
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Executive Order 12742, National Security Industrial Responsiveness,
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which ordered the rapid mobilization of resources such as food,
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energy, construction materials and civil transportation to meet
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national security requirements. There was, however, no mention in
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this or any other EO of the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER)
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plan administered under FEMA. This plan, which had been activated
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during World War II and the Korean War, permits the federal government
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during a state of emergency to bring into government certain
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unidentified individuals. On January 7, 1991 the "Wall Street Journal
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Europe" reported that industry and government officials were studying
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a plan which would permit the federal government to "borrow" as many
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as 50 oil company executives and put them to work streamlining the
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|
flow of energy in case of a prolonged engagement or disruption of
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supply. Antitrust waivers were also being pursued and oil companies
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were engaged in emergency preparedness exercises with the Department
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of Energy.[5]
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Wasting the Environment
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|
In one case the use of secret powers was discovered by a watchdog
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|
group and revealed in the press. In August 1990, correspondence
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passed between Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
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Production and Logistics and Michael Deland, Chair of the White House
|
|
Council on Environmental Quality. The letters responded to
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presidential and National Security Council directives to deal with
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increased industrial production and logistics arising from the
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situation in the Middle East. The communications revealed that the
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Pentagon had found it necessary to request emergency waivers to U.S.
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environmental restrictions.[6]
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The agreement to waive the National Environmental Policy Act (1970)
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|
came in August. Because of it, the Pentagon was allowed to test new
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weapons in the western U.S., increase production of materiel and
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|
launch new activities at military bases without the complex public
|
|
review normally required. The information on the waiver was
|
|
eventually released by the Boston-based National Toxic Campaign Fund
|
|
(NTCF), an environmental group which investigates pollution on the
|
|
nation's military bases. It was not until January 30, 1991, five
|
|
months after it went into effect, that the "New York Times," acting
|
|
on the NTCF information, reported that the White House had bypassed
|
|
the usual legal requirement for environmental impact statements on
|
|
Pentagon projects.[7] So far, no specific executive order or
|
|
presidential finding authorizing this waiver has been discovered.
|
|
Other environmental waivers could also have been enacted without
|
|
the public being informed. Under a state of national emergency, U.S.
|
|
warships can be exempted from international conventions on
|
|
pollution[8] and public vessels can be allowed to dispose of
|
|
potentially infectious medical wastes into the oceans.[9] The
|
|
President can also suspend any of the statutory provisions regarding
|
|
the production, testing, transportation, deployment, and disposal of
|
|
chemical and biological warfare agents (50 USC sec. 1515). He could
|
|
also defer destruction of up to <data type="percent" unit="%">10%</data> of lethal chemical agents
|
|
and munitions that existed on November 8, 1985.[10]
|
|
One Executive Order which was made public dealt with "Chemical and
|
|
Biological Weapons Proliferation." Signed by Bush on November 16,
|
|
1990, EO 12735 leaves the impression that Bush is ordering an
|
|
increased effort to end the proliferation of chemical and biological
|
|
weapons. The order states that these weapons "constitute a threat to
|
|
national security and foreign policy" and declares a national
|
|
emergency to deal with the threat. To confront this threat, Bush
|
|
ordered international negotiations, the imposition of controls,
|
|
licenses, and sanctions against foreign persons and countries for
|
|
proliferation. Conveniently, the order grants the Secretaries of
|
|
State and the Treasury the power to exempt the U.S. military.
|
|
In February of 1991, the Omnibus Export Amendments Act was passed
|
|
by Congress compatible with EO 12735. It imposed sanctions on
|
|
countries and companies developing or using chemical or biological
|
|
weapons. Bush signed the law, although he had rejected the identical
|
|
measure the year before because it did not give him the executive
|
|
power to waive all sanctions if he thought the national interest
|
|
required it.[11] The new bill, however, met Bush's requirements.
|
|
<div>
|
|
|
|
BUSH'S EXECUTIVE ORDERS
|
|
|
|
* EO 12722 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
|
|
Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 2, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12723 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property," Aug. 2,
|
|
1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12724 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and
|
|
Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 9, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12725 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property and
|
|
Prohibiting Transactions With Kuwait," Aug. 9, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12727 "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed
|
|
Forces to Active Duty," Aug. 22, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12728 "Delegating the President's Authority To
|
|
Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion,
|
|
Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces,"
|
|
Aug. 22, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12733 "Authorizing the Extension of the Period of
|
|
Active Duty of Personnel of the Selected Reserve of the
|
|
Armed Forces," Nov. 13, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12734 "National Emergency Construction Authority," Nov.
|
|
14, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12735 "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,"
|
|
Nov. 16, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12738 "Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related
|
|
Functions and Arms Export Control," Dec. 14, 1990.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12742 "National Security Industrial Responsiveness,"
|
|
Jan. 8, 1991.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12743 "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces
|
|
to Active Duty," Jan. 18, 1991.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12744 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace
|
|
and Adjacent Waters as a Combat Zone," Jan. 21, 1991.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12750 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace
|
|
and Adjacent Waters as the Persian Gulf Desert Shield
|
|
Area," Feb. 14, 1991.
|
|
|
|
* EO 12751 "Health Care Services for Operation Desert
|
|
Storm," Feb. 14, 1991.
|
|
|
|
<div>
|
|
Going Off Budget
|
|
Although some of the powers which Bush assumed in order to conduct
|
|
the Gulf War were taken openly, they received little public discussion
|
|
or reporting by the media.
|
|
In October, when the winds of the Gulf War were merely a breeze,
|
|
Bush used his executive emergency powers to extend his budget
|
|
authority. This action made the 1991 fiscal budget agreement between
|
|
Congress and the President one of the first U.S. casualties of the
|
|
war. While on one hand the deal froze arms spending through 1996, it
|
|
also allowed Bush to put the cost of the Gulf War "off budget." Thus,
|
|
using its emergency powers, the Bush administration could:
|
|
* incur a deficit which exceeds congressional budget authority;
|
|
* prevent Congress from raising a point of order over the
|
|
excessive spending;[12]
|
|
* waive the requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit
|
|
estimates to Congress prior to deployment of a major defense
|
|
acquisition system;
|
|
* and exempt the Pentagon from congressional restrictions on
|
|
hiring private contractors.[13]
|
|
While there is no published evidence on which powers Bush actually
|
|
invoked, the administration was able to push through the 1990 Omnibus
|
|
Reconciliation Act. This legislation put a cap on domestic spending,
|
|
created a record $300000000000 deficit, and undermined the Gramm-
|
|
Rudman-Hollings Act intended to reduce the federal deficit. Although
|
|
Congress agreed to pay for the war through supplemental appropriations
|
|
and approved a $42200000000 supplemental bill and a $4800000000
|
|
companion "dire emergency supplemental appropriation,"[14] it
|
|
specified that the supplemental budget should not be used to finance
|
|
costs the Pentagon would normally experience.[15]
|
|
Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan administration,
|
|
believes that the Pentagon has already violated the spirit of the 1990
|
|
Omnibus Reconciliation Act. It switched funding for the Patriot,
|
|
Tomahawk, Hellfire and HARM missiles from its regular budget to the
|
|
supplemental budget; added normal wear and tear of equipment to
|
|
supplemental appropriations; and made supplemental requests which
|
|
ignore a planned 25% reduction in the armed forces by 1995.[16]
|
|
The Cost In Liberty Lost
|
|
Under emergency circumstances, using 50 USC sec. 1811, the
|
|
President could direct the Attorney General to authorize electronic
|
|
surveillance of aliens and American citizens in order to obtain
|
|
foreign intelligence information without a court order.[17] No
|
|
Executive Order has been published which activates emergency powers to
|
|
wiretap or to engage in counter-terrorist activity. Nonetheless,
|
|
there is substantial evidence that such activities have taken place.
|
|
According to the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, the
|
|
FBI launched an anti-terrorist campaign which included a broad sweep
|
|
of Arab-Americans. Starting in August, the FBI questioned, detained,
|
|
and harassed Arab-Americans in California, New York, Ohio,
|
|
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado.[18]
|
|
A CIA agent asked the University of Connecticut for a list of all
|
|
foreign students at the institution, along with their country of
|
|
origin, major field of study, and the names of their academic
|
|
advisers. He was particularly interested in students from the Middle
|
|
East and explained that the Agency intended to open a file on each of
|
|
the students. Anti-war groups have also reported several break-ins of
|
|
their offices and many suspected electronic surveillance of their
|
|
telephones.[19]
|
|
Pool of Disinformation
|
|
Emergency powers to control the means of communications in the U.S.
|
|
in the name of national security were never formally declared. There
|
|
was no need for Bush to do so since most of the media voluntarily and
|
|
even eagerly cooperated in their own censorship. Reporters covering
|
|
the Coalition forces in the Gulf region operated under restrictions
|
|
imposed by the U.S. military. They were, among other things, barred
|
|
from traveling without a military escort, limited in their forays into
|
|
the field to small escorted groups called "pools," and required to
|
|
submit all reports and film to military censors for clearance. Some
|
|
reporters complained that the rules limited their ability to gather
|
|
information independently, thereby obstructing informed and objective
|
|
reporting.[20]
|
|
Three Pentagon press officials in the Gulf region admitted to James
|
|
LeMoyne of the "New York Times" that they spent significant time
|
|
analyzing reporters' stories in order to shape the coverage in the
|
|
Pentagon's favor. In the early days of the deployment, Pentagon press
|
|
officers warned reporters who asked hard questions that they were seen
|
|
as "anti-military" and that their requests for interviews with senior
|
|
commanders and visits to the field were in jeopardy. The military
|
|
often staged events solely for the cameras and would stop televised
|
|
interviews in progress when it did not like what was being portrayed.
|
|
Although filed soon after the beginning of the war, a lawsuit
|
|
challenging the constitutionality of press restrictions was not heard
|
|
until after the war ended. It was then dismissed when the judge ruled
|
|
that since the war had ended, the issues raised had become moot. The
|
|
legal status of the restrictions--initially tested during the U.S.
|
|
invasions of Grenada and Panama--remains unsettled.
|
|
A National Misfortune
|
|
It will be years before researchers and journalists are able to
|
|
ferret through the maze of government documents and give a full
|
|
appraisal of the impact of the President's emergency powers on
|
|
domestic affairs. It is likely, however, that with a post-war
|
|
presidential approval rating exceeding <data type="percent" unit="%">75%</data>, the domestic
|
|
casualties will continue to mount with few objections. Paradoxically,
|
|
even though the U.S. public put pressure on Bush to send relief for
|
|
the 500000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees, it is unlikely the same outcry
|
|
will be heard for the 37000000 Americans without health insurance,
|
|
the 32000000 living in poverty, or the country's five million hungry
|
|
children. The U.S. may even help rebuild Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilian
|
|
infrastructures it destroyed during the war while leaving its own
|
|
education system in decay, domestic transportation infrastructures
|
|
crumbling, and inner city war zones uninhabitable. And, while the
|
|
U.S. assists Kuwait in cleaning up its environmental disaster, it will
|
|
increase pollution at home. Indeed, as the long-dead Prussian field
|
|
marshal prophesied, "a war, even the most victorious, is a national
|
|
misfortune."
|
|
FOOTNOTES:
|
|
1. The administrative guideline was established under Reagan in Executive
|
|
Order 12656, November 181988, "Federal Register," vol. 23, no. 266.
|
|
2. For instance, National Security Council policy papers or National
|
|
Security Directives (NSD) or National Security Decision Directives
|
|
(NSDD) have today evolved into a network of shadowy, wide-ranging and
|
|
potent executive powers. These are secret instruments, maintained in
|
|
a top security classified state and are not shared with Congress. For
|
|
an excellent discussion see: Harold C. Relyea, The Coming of Secret
|
|
Law, "Government Information Quarterly," Vol. 5, November 1988; see
|
|
also: Eve Pell, "The Backbone of Hidden Government," "The Nation,"
|
|
June 191990.
|
|
3. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the National Emergency
|
|
With Respect to Iraq," February, 11, 1991, "Weekly Compilation of
|
|
Presidential Documents: Administration of George Bush," (Washington,
|
|
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 158-61.
|
|
4. The U.S. now has states of emergency with Iran, Iraq and Syria.
|
|
5. Allanna Sullivan, "U.S. Oil Concerns Confident Of Riding Out Short Gulf
|
|
War," "Wall Street Journal Europe," January 7, 1991.
|
|
6. Colin McMillan, Letter to Michael Deland, Chairman, Council on
|
|
Environmental Quality (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the
|
|
President), August 24, 1990; Michael R. Deland, Letter to Colin
|
|
McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
|
|
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense), August 291990.
|
|
7. Keith Schneider, "Pentagon Wins Waiver Of Environmental Rule," "New York
|
|
Times," January 30, 1991.
|
|
8. 33 U.S. Code (USC) sec. 1902 9(b).
|
|
9. 33 USC sec. 2503 l(b).
|
|
10. 50 USC sec. 1521(b) (3)(A).
|
|
ll. Adam Clymer, "New Bill Mandates Sanctions On Makers of Chemical Arms,"
|
|
"New York Times," February 22, 1991.
|
|
12. 31 USC O10005 (f); 2 USC O632 (i), 6419 (d), 907a (b); and Public
|
|
Law 101-508, Title X999, sec. 13101.
|
|
13. 10 USC sec. 2434/2461 9F.
|
|
14. When the Pentagon expected the war to last months and oil prices to
|
|
skyrocket, it projected the incremental cost of deploying and
|
|
redeploying the forces and waging war at about $70000000000. The
|
|
administration sought and received $56000000000 in pledges from allies
|
|
such as Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. Although the military's
|
|
estimates of casualties and the war's duration were highly inflated,
|
|
today their budget estimates remain at around $70000000000 even though
|
|
the Congressional Budget office estimates that cost at only $40
|
|
billion, $16000000000 less than allied pledges.
|
|
15. Michael Kamish, "After The War: At Home, An Unconquered Recession,"
|
|
"Boston Globe," March 6, 1991; Peter Passell, "The Big Spoils From a
|
|
Bargain War," "New York Times," March 3, 1991; and Alan Abelson, "A
|
|
War Dividend For The Defense Industry?" "Barron's," March 18, 1991.
|
|
16. Lawrence Korb, "The Pentagon's Creative Budgetry Is Out of Line,"
|
|
"International Herald Tribune," April 5, 199l.
|
|
17. Many of the powers against aliens are automatically invoked during a
|
|
national emergency or state of war. Under the Alien Enemies Act (50
|
|
USC sec. 21), the President can issue an order to apprehend, restrain,
|
|
secure and remove all subjects of a hostile nation over 13 years old.
|
|
Other statutes conferring special powers on the President with regard
|
|
to aliens that may be exercised in times of war or emergencies but are
|
|
not confined to such circumstances, are: exclusion of all or certain
|
|
classes of aliens from entry into the U.S. when their entry may be
|
|
"detrimental to the interests of the United States" (8 USC sec. 1182(f));
|
|
imposition of travel restrictions on aliens within the U.S. (8 USC sec.
|
|
1185); and requiring aliens to be fingerprinted (8 USC sec. 1302).
|
|
18. Ann Talamas, "FBI Targets Arab-Americans," "CAIB," Spring 1991, p. 4.
|
|
19. "Anti-Repression Project Bulletin" (New York: Center for
|
|
Constitutional Rights), January 23, 1991.
|
|
20. James DeParle, "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News
|
|
Censorship," "New York Times," May 5, 1991.
|
|
21. James LeMoyne, "A Correspondent's Tale: Pentagon's Strategy for the
|
|
Press: Good News or No News," "New York Times," February 17, 1991.
|
|
<div>
|
|
Covert Action INFORMATION BULLETIN
|
|
Back Issues
|
|
No. 1 (July 1978): Agee on CIA; Cuban exile trial; consumer research-Jamaica.*
|
|
No. 2 (Oct. 1978): How CIA recruits diplomats; researching undercover
|
|
officers; double agent in CIA.*
|
|
No. 3 (Jan. 1979): CIA attacks CAIB; secret supp. to Army field manual;
|
|
spying on host countries.*
|
|
No. 4 (Apr.-May 1979): U.S. spies in Italian services; CIA in Spain; CIA
|
|
recruiting for Africa; subversive academics; Angola.*
|
|
No. 5 (July-Aug. 1979): U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia; CIA in
|
|
Denmark, Sweden, Grenada.*
|
|
No. 6 (Oct. 1979): U.S. in Caribbean; Cuban exile terrorists; CIA plans
|
|
for Nicaragua; CIA's secret "Perspectives for Intelligence."*
|
|
No. 7 (Dec. 1979-Jan. 1980): Media destabilization in Jamaica; Robert
|
|
Moss; CIA budget; media operations; UNITA; Iran.*
|
|
No. 8 (Mar.-Apr. 1980): Attacks on Agee; U.S. intelligence legislation;
|
|
CAIB statement to Congress; Zimbabwe; Northern Ireland.
|
|
No. 9 (June 1980): NSA in Norway; Glomar Explorer; mind control; NSA.
|
|
No. 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980): Caribbean; destabilization in Jamaica; Guyana;
|
|
Grenada bombing; "The Spike"; deep cover manual.
|
|
No. 11 (Dec. 1980): Rightwing terrorism; South Korea; KCIA; Portugal;
|
|
Guyana; Caribbean; AFIO; NSA interview.
|
|
No. 12 (Apr. 1981): U.S. in Salvador and Guatemala; New Right; William
|
|
Casey; CIA in Mozambique; mail surveillance.*
|
|
No. 13 (July-Aug. 1981): South Africa documents; Namibia; mercenaries;
|
|
the Klan; Globe Aero; Angola; Mozambique; BOSS; Central America;
|
|
Max Hugel; mail surveillance.
|
|
No. 14-15 (Oct. 1981): Complete index to nos. 1-12; review of intelligence
|
|
legislation; CAIB plans; extended Naming Names.
|
|
No. 16 (Mar. 1982): Green Beret torture in Salvador; Argentine death squads;
|
|
CIA media ops; Seychelles; Angola; Mozambique; the Klan; Nugan Hand.*
|
|
No. 17 (Summer 1982): CBW History; Cuban dengue epidemic; Scott Barnes
|
|
and yellow rain lies; mystery death in Bangkok.*
|
|
No. 18 (Winter 1983): CIA & religion; "secret" war in Nicaragua; Opus Dei;
|
|
Miskitos; evangelicals-Guatemala; Summer Inst. of Linguistics; World
|
|
Medical Relief; CIA & BOSS; torture S. Africa; Vietnam defoliation.*
|
|
No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983): CIA & media; history of disinformation;
|
|
"plot" against Pope; Grenada airport; Georgie Anne Geyer.
|
|
No. 20 (Winter 1984): Invasion of Grenada; war in Nicaragua; Ft. Huachuca;
|
|
Israel and South Korea in Central America; KAL flight 007.
|
|
No. 21 (Spring 1984): N.Y. Times and the Salvador election; Time and
|
|
Newsweek in distortions; Accuracy in Media; Nicaragua.
|
|
No. 22 (Fall 1984): Mercenaries & terrorism; Soldier of Fortune; "privatizing"
|
|
the war in Nicaragua; U.S.-South African terrorism; Italian fascists.
|
|
No. 23 (Spring 1985): Special issue on "plot" to kill the Pope and the
|
|
"Bulgarian Connection"; CIA ties to Turkish and Italian neofascists.
|
|
No. 24 (Summer 1985): State repression, infiltrators, provocateurs;
|
|
sanctuary movement; American Indian Movement; Leonard Peltier;
|
|
NASSCO strike; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Moon, and Moss; Tetra Tech.
|
|
No. 25 (Winter 1986): U.S., Nazis, and the Vatican; Knights of Malta;
|
|
Greek civil war and Eleni; WACL and Nicaragua; torture.
|
|
No. 26 (Summer 1986): U.S. state terrorism; Vernon Walters; Libya bombing;
|
|
contra agents; Israel and South Africa; Duarte; media in Costa
|
|
Rica; democracy in Nicaragua; plus complete index to nos. 13-25.*
|
|
No. 27 (Spring 1987): Special: Religious Right; New York Times and Pope
|
|
Plot; Carlucci; Southern Air Transport; Michael Ledeen.*
|
|
No. 28 (Summer 1987): Special: CIA and drugs: S.E. Asia, Afghanistan,
|
|
Central America; Nugan Hand; MKULTRA in Canada; Delta Force;
|
|
special section on AIDS theories and CBW.*
|
|
No. 29 (Winter 1988): Special issue on Pacific: Philippines, Fiji, New
|
|
Zealand, Belau, Kanaky, Vanuatu; atom testing; media on Nicaragua;
|
|
Reader's Digest; CIA in Cuba, Tibet; Agee on "Veil;" more on AIDS.*
|
|
No. 30 (Summer 1989): Special: Middle East: The intifada, Israeli arms
|
|
sales; Israel in Africa; disinformation and Libya; CIA's William
|
|
Buckley; the Afghan arms pipeline and contra lobby.
|
|
No. 31 (Winter 1989): Special issue on domestic surveillance. The FBI; CIA
|
|
on campus; Office of Public Diplomacy; Lexington Prison; Puerto Rico.
|
|
No. 32 (Summer 1989): Tenth Year Anniversary Issue: The Best of CAIB.
|
|
Includes articles from our earliest issues, Naming Names, CIA at home,
|
|
abroad, and in the media. Ten-year perspective by Philip Agee.
|
|
No. 33 (Winter 1990): The Bush Issue: CIA agents for Bush; Terrorism Task
|
|
Force; El Salvador and Nicaragua intervention; Republicans and Nazis.
|
|
No. 34 (Summer 1990): Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr; Nicaraguan
|
|
elections; South African death squads; U.S. and Pol Pot; Pan Am
|
|
Flight 103; Noriega and the CIA; Council for National Policy.
|
|
No. 35 (Fall 1990): Special: Eastern Europe; Analysis-Persian Gulf and
|
|
Cuba; massacres in Indonesia; CIA and Banks; Iran-contra
|
|
No. 36 (Spring 1991): Racism & Nat. Security: FBI v. Arab-Americans & Black
|
|
Officials; Special: Destabilizing Africa: Chad, Uganda, S. Africa,
|
|
Angola, Mozambique, Zaire; Haiti; Panama; Gulf War; COINTELPRO "art."
|
|
No. 37 (Summer 1990): Special: Gulf War: Media; U.N.; Libya; Iran;
|
|
Domestic costs; North Korea Next? Illegal Arms Deals.
|
|
* Available in Photocopy only
|
|
Subscriptions (4 issues/year) (check one)
|
|
<div>$17 one year <div>$32 two years U.S.
|
|
<div>$22 one year <div>$42 two years Canada/Mexico
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|
<div>$27 one year <div>$52 two years Latin America/Europe
|
|
<div>$29 one year <div>$56 two years Other
|
|
$5 per year addition charge for institutions
|
|
Books, etc.
|
|
$25 "Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa," Ray, et al.
|
|
$10 "Deadly Deceits: 25 Years in CIA," McGehee
|
|
$8 "Secret Contenders: CIA and Cold War," Beck
|
|
$6.50 "White Paper/Whitewash," Agee/Poelchau
|
|
$10 "On The Run," Agee
|
|
$1 "No CIA" buttons (additionals $.50)
|
|
BACK ISSUES: Circle above, or list below. $6 per copy in U.S.
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|
Airmail: Canada/Mexico add $2; other countries add $4.
|
|
CAIB, P.O. Box 34583, Washington, DC 20043
|
|
--
|
|
daveus rattus
|
|
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
|
|
KOYAANISQATSI
|
|
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
|
|
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
|
|
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
|
|
KOYAANISQATSI
|
|
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
|
|
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
|
|
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
|
|
[PeaceNet forward from AML (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
|
|
<div>
|
|
/** mideast.forum: 216.5 **/
|
|
** Written 8:11 pm Jan 17, 1991 by nlgclc in cdp:mideast.forum **
|
|
An excellent book which deals with the REX 84 detention plan is:
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
``Guts and Glory: The Rise and Fall of Oliver North,'' by Ben
|
|
Bradlee Jr. (Donald I. Fine, $21.95. 573 pp.)
|
|
<div>
|
|
Reviewed by Dennis M. Culnan Copyright 1990, Gannett News Service All
|
|
Rights Reserved Short excerpt posted here under applicable copyright
|
|
laws
|
|
[Oliver] North managed to network himself into the highest levels of
|
|
the CIA and power centers around the world. There he lied and
|
|
boastfully ignored the constitutional process, Bradlee writes.
|
|
Yet more terrifying is the plan hatched by North and other Reagan
|
|
people in the Federal Emergency Manpower Agency (FEMA): A blueprint
|
|
for the military takeover of the United States. The plan called for
|
|
FEMA to become ``emergency czar'' in the event of a national emergency
|
|
such as nuclear war or an American invasion of a foreign nation. FEMA
|
|
would also be a buffer between the president and his cabinet and other
|
|
civilian agencies, and would have broad powers to appoint military
|
|
commanders and run state and local governments. Finally, it would
|
|
have the authority to order suspect aliens into concentration camps
|
|
and seize their property.
|
|
When then-Attorney General William French Smith got wind of the plan,
|
|
he killed it. After Smith left the administration, North and his FEMA
|
|
cronies came up with the Defense Resource Act, designed to suspendend
|
|
the First Amendment by imposing censorship and banning strikes.
|
|
Where was it all heading? The book's answer: ``REX-84 Bravo, a
|
|
National Security Decision Directive 52 that would become operative
|
|
with the president's declaration of a state of national emergency
|
|
concurrent with a mythical U.S. military invasion of an unspecified
|
|
Central American country, presumably Nicaragua.''
|
|
Bradlee writes that the Rex exercise was designed to test FEMA's
|
|
readiness to assume authority over the Department of Defense, the
|
|
National Guard in all 50 states, and ``a number of state defense
|
|
forces to be established by state legislatures.'' The military would
|
|
then be ``deputized,'' thus making an end run around federal law
|
|
forbidding military involvement in domestic law enforcement.
|
|
Rex, which ran concurrently with the first annual U.S. show of force
|
|
in Honduras in April 1984, was also designed to test FEMA's ability to
|
|
round up 400000 undocumented Central American aliens in the United
|
|
States and its ability to distribute hundreds of tons of small arms to
|
|
``state defense forces.''
|
|
Incredibly, REX 84 was similar to a plan secretly adopted by Reagan
|
|
while governor of California. His two top henchmen then were Edwin
|
|
Meese, who recently resigned as U.S. attorney general, and Louis
|
|
Guiffrida, the FEMA director in 1984.
|
|
If the review makes you nervous, you should read the book!
|
|
--Chip Berlet ** End of text from cdp:mideast.forum **
|
|
<div>END:REF3<div>
|
|
<div>
|
|
<div>REF4:FEMA<div>
|
|
[PeaceNet forward from AML (ACTIV-L) -- see bottom for more info]
|
|
<div>
|
|
This is the front-page article of the Jan. 16 issue of "The
|
|
Guardian," which describes some of the U.S. government's planning
|
|
for martial law in the event of the Gulf war. This is truly a
|
|
scary scenario that should concern all civil libertarians and
|
|
patriots.
|
|
<div>
|
|
WILL GULF WAR LEAD TO REPRESSION AT HOME?
|
|
by Paul DeRienzo and Bill Weinberg
|
|
On August 2, 1990, as Saddam Hussein's army was consolidating control
|
|
over Kuwait, President George Bush responded by signing two executive
|
|
orders that were the first step toward martial law in the United
|
|
States and suspending the Constitution.
|
|
On the surface, Executive Orders 12722 and 12723, declaring a
|
|
"national emergency," merely invoked laws that allowed Bush to freeze
|
|
Iraqi assets in the United States.
|
|
The International Emergency Executive Powers Act permits the president
|
|
to freeze foreign assets after declaring a "national emergency," a
|
|
move that has been made three times before -- against Panama in 1987,
|
|
Nicaragua in 1985 and Iran in 1979.
|
|
According to Professor Diana Reynolds, of the Fletcher School of
|
|
Diplomacy at Boston's Tufts University, when Bush declared a national
|
|
emergency he "activated one part of a contingency national security
|
|
emergency plan." That plan is made up of a series of laws passed since
|
|
the presidency of Richard Nixon, which Reynolds says give the
|
|
president "boundless" powers.
|
|
According to Reynolds, such laws as the Defense Industrial
|
|
Revitalization and Disaster Relief Acts of 1983 "would permit the
|
|
president to do anything from seizing the means of production, to
|
|
conscripting a labor force, to relocating groups of citizens."
|
|
Reynolds says the net effect of invoking these laws would be the
|
|
suspension of the Constitution.
|
|
She adds that national emergency powers "permit the stationing of the
|
|
military in cities and towns, closing off the U.S. borders, freezing
|
|
all imports and exports, allocating all resources on a national
|
|
security priority, monitoring and censoring the press, and warrantless
|
|
searches and seizures."
|
|
The measures would allow military authorities to proclaim martial law
|
|
in the United States, asserts Reynolds. She defines martial law as the
|
|
"federal authority taking over for local authority when they are
|
|
unable to maintain law and order or to assure a republican form of
|
|
government."
|
|
A report called "Post Attack Recovery Strategies," about rebuilding
|
|
the country after a nuclear war, prepared by the right-wing Hudson
|
|
Institute in 1980, defines martial law as dealing "with the control of
|
|
civilians by their own military forces in time of emergency."
|
|
The federal agency with the authority to organize and command the
|
|
government's response to a national emergency is the Federal Emergency
|
|
Management Agency (FEMA). This super-secret and elite agency was
|
|
formed in 1979 under congressional measures that merged all federal
|
|
powers dealing with civilian and military emergencies under one
|
|
agency.
|
|
FEMA has its roots in the World War I partnership between government
|
|
and corporate leaders who helped mobilize the nation's industries to
|
|
support the war effort. The idea of a central national response to
|
|
large-scale emergencies was reintroduced in the early 1970s by Louis
|
|
Giuffrida, a close associate of then-California Gov. Ronald Reagan and
|
|
his chief aide Edwin Meese.
|
|
Reagan appointed Giuffrida head of the California National Guard in
|
|
1969. With Meese, Giuffrida organized "war-games" to prepare for
|
|
"statewide martial law" in the event that Black nationalists and
|
|
anti-war protesters "challenged the authority of the state." In 1981,
|
|
Reagan as president moved Giuffrida up to the big leagues, appointing
|
|
him director of FEMA.
|
|
According to Reynolds, however, it was the actions of George Bush in
|
|
1976, while he was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
|
|
(CIA), that provided the stimulus for centralization of vast powers in
|
|
FEMA.
|
|
Bush assembled a group of hawkish outsiders, called Team B, that
|
|
released a report claiming the CIA ("Team A") had underestimated the
|
|
dangers of Soviet nuclear attack. The report advised the development
|
|
of elaborate plans for "civil defense" and post-nuclear government.
|
|
Three years later, in 1979, FEMA was given ultimate responsibility for
|
|
developing these plans.
|
|
Aware of the bad publicity FEMA was getting because of its role in
|
|
organizing for a post-nuclear world, Reagan's FEMA chief Giuffrida
|
|
publicly argued that the 1865 Posse Comitatus Act prohibited the
|
|
military from arresting civilians.
|
|
However, Reynolds says that Congress eroded the act by giving the
|
|
military reserves an exemption from Posse Comitatus and allowing them
|
|
to arrest civilians. The National Guard, under the control of state
|
|
governors in peace time, is also exempt from the act and can arrest
|
|
civilians.
|
|
FEMA Inspector General John Brinkerhoff has written a memo contending
|
|
that the government doesn't need to suspend the Constitution to use
|
|
the full range of powers Congress has given the agency. FEMA has
|
|
prepared legislation to be introduced in Congress in the event of a
|
|
national emergency that would give the agency sweeping powers. The
|
|
right to "deputize" National Guard and police forces is included in
|
|
the package. But Reynolds believes that actual martial law need not be
|
|
declared publicly.
|
|
Giuffrida has written that "Martial Rule comes into existence upon a
|
|
determination (not a declaration) by the senior military commander
|
|
that the civil government must be replaced because it is no longer
|
|
functioning anyway." He adds that "Martial Rule is limited only by the
|
|
principle of necessary force."
|
|
According to Reynolds, it is possible for the president to make
|
|
declarations concerning a national emergency secretly in the form of a
|
|
Natioanl Security Decision Directive. Most such directives are
|
|
classified as so secret that Reynolds says "researchers don't even
|
|
know how many are enacted."
|
|
DOMESTIC SPYING
|
|
Throughout the 1980s, FEMA was prohibited from engaging in
|
|
intelligence gathering. But on July 6, 1989, Bush signed Executive
|
|
Order 12681, pronouncing that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate
|
|
would "have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence,
|
|
investigative, or national security work." Recent events indicate that
|
|
domestic spying in response to the looming Middle East war is now
|
|
under way.
|
|
Reynolds reports that "the CIA is going to various campuses asking for
|
|
information on Middle Eastern students. I'm sure that there are
|
|
intelligence organizations monitoring peace demonstrations."
|
|
According to the University of Connecticut student paper, the Daily
|
|
Campus, CIA officials have recently met there to discuss talking with
|
|
Middle Eastern students.
|
|
The New York Times reports that the FBI has ordered its agents around
|
|
the country to question Arab-American leaders and business people in
|
|
search of information on potential Iraqi "terrorist" attacks in
|
|
response to a Gulf war.
|
|
A 1986 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) document entitled
|
|
"Alien Terrorists and Other Undesirables: A Contingency Plan" outlines
|
|
the potential round-up and incarceration in mass detainment camps of
|
|
U.S. residents who are citizens of "terrorist" countries, chiefly in
|
|
the Middle East. This plan echoed a 1984 FEMA nationwide "readiness
|
|
exercise code-named REX-84 ALPHA, which included the rehearsal of
|
|
joint operations with the INS to round up 40000 Central American
|
|
refugees in the event of a U.S. invasion of the region. One of the 10
|
|
military bases established as detainment camps by REX-84 ALPHA, Camp
|
|
Krome, Fla., was designated a joint FEMA-Immigration service
|
|
interrogation center.
|
|
Recently, FEMA has been criticized in the media for inadequate
|
|
response to the October, 1989 San Francisco earthquake. What the
|
|
mainstream press has failed to cover is the agency's planned role in
|
|
repressing domestic dissent in the event of an invasion abroad.
|
|
Source: The Guardian, Jan 16 1991
|
|
The Guardian is an independent radical news weekly. Subscriptions are
|
|
available at $33.50 per year from The Guardian, 33 West 17th St., New
|
|
York, NY 10011
|
|
<div>END:REF4<div>
|
|
<div>
|
|
<div>REF5:NSDD 145<div>
|
|
DATE OF UPLOAD: November 17, 1989
|
|
ORIGIN OF UPLOAD: Omni Magazine
|
|
CONTRIBUTED BY: Donald Goldberg
|
|
<div>
|
|
PARANET INFORMATION SERVICE BBS
|
|
<div>
|
|
Although this article does not deal directly with UFOs,
|
|
ParaNet felt it important as an offering to our readers who
|
|
depend so much upon communications as a way to stay informed.
|
|
This article raises some interesting implications for the future
|
|
of communications.
|
|
THE NATIONAL GUARDS
|
|
(C) 1987 OMNI MAGAZINE MAY 1987
|
|
(Reprinted with permission and license to ParaNet Information
|
|
Service and its affiliates.)
|
|
By Donald Goldberg
|
|
The mountains bend as the fjord and the sea beyond stretch
|
|
out before the viewer's eyes. First over the water, then a sharp
|
|
left turn, then a bank to the right between the peaks, and the
|
|
secret naval base unfolds upon the screen.
|
|
The scene is of a Soviet military installation on the Kola
|
|
Peninsula in the icy Barents Sea, a place usually off-limits to
|
|
the gaze of the Western world. It was captured by a small French
|
|
satellite called SPOT Image, orbiting at an altitude of 517 miles
|
|
above the hidden Russian outpost. On each of several passes --
|
|
made over a two-week period last fall -- the satellite's high-
|
|
resolution lens took its pictures at a different angle; the
|
|
images were then blended into a three-dimensional, computer-
|
|
generated video. Buildings, docks, vessels, and details of the
|
|
Artic landscape are all clearly visible.
|
|
Half a world away and thousands of feet under the sea,
|
|
sparkling-clear images are being made of the ocean floor. Using
|
|
the latest bathymetric technology and state-of-the-art systems
|
|
known as Seam Beam and Hydrochart, researchers are for the first
|
|
time assembling detailed underwater maps of the continental
|
|
shelves and the depths of the world's oceans. These scenes of
|
|
the sea are as sophisticated as the photographs taken from the
|
|
satellite.
|
|
From the three-dimensional images taken far above the earth
|
|
to the charts of the bottom of the oceans, these photographic
|
|
systems have three things in common: They both rely on the
|
|
latest technology to create accurate pictures never dreamed of
|
|
even 25 years ago; they are being made widely available by
|
|
commerical, nongovernmental enterprises; and the Pentagon is
|
|
trying desperately to keep them from the general public.
|
|
In 1985 the Navy classified the underwater charts, making
|
|
them available only to approved researchers whose needs are
|
|
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under a 1984 law the military
|
|
has been given a say in what cameras can be licensed to be used
|
|
on American satellites; and officials have already announced they
|
|
plan to limit the quality and resolution of photos made
|
|
available. The National Security Agency (NSA) -- the secret arm
|
|
of the Pentagon in charge of gathering electronic intelligence as
|
|
well as protecting sensitive U.S. communications -- has defeated
|
|
a move to keep it away from civilian and commercial computers and
|
|
databases.
|
|
That attitude has outraged those concerned with the
|
|
military's increasing efforts to keep information not only from
|
|
the public but from industry experts, scientists, and even other
|
|
government officials as well. "That's like classifying a road
|
|
map for fear of invasion," says Paul Wolff, assistant
|
|
administrator for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
|
|
Administration, of the attempted restrictions.
|
|
These attempts to keep unclassified data out of the hands of
|
|
scientists, researchers, the news media, and the public at large
|
|
are a part of an alarming trend that has seen the military take
|
|
an ever-increasing role in controlling the flow of information
|
|
and communications through American society, a role traditionally
|
|
-- and almost exclusively -- left to civilians. Under the
|
|
approving gaze of the Reagan administration, Department of
|
|
Defense (DoD) officials have quietly implemented a number of
|
|
policies, decisions, and orders that give the military
|
|
unprecedented control over both the content and public use of
|
|
data and communications. For example:
|
|
**The Pentagon has created a new category of "sensitive" but
|
|
unclassified information that allows it to keep from public
|
|
access huge quantities of data that were once widely accessible.
|
|
**Defense Department officials have attempted to rewrite key laws
|
|
that spell out when the president can and cannot appropriate
|
|
private communications facilities.
|
|
**The Pentagon has installed a system that enables it to seize
|
|
control of the nation's entire communications network -- the
|
|
phone system, data transmissions, and satellite transmissions of
|
|
all kinds -- in the event of what it deems a "national
|
|
emergency." As yet there is no single, universally agreed-upon
|
|
definition of what constitutes such a state. Usually such an
|
|
emergency is restricted to times of natural disaster, war, or
|
|
when national security is specifically threatened. Now the
|
|
military has attempted to redefine emergency.
|
|
The point man in the Pentagon's onslaught on communications
|
|
is Assistant Defense Secretary Donald C. Latham, a former NSA
|
|
deputy chief. Latham now heads up an interagency committee in
|
|
charge of writing and implementing many of the policies that have
|
|
put the military in charge of the flow of civilian information
|
|
and communication. He is also the architect of National Security
|
|
Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145), signed by Defense Secretary
|
|
Caspar Weinberger in 1984, which sets out the national policy on
|
|
telecommunications and computer-systems security.
|
|
First NSDD 145 set up a steering group of top-level
|
|
administration officials. Their job is to recommend ways to
|
|
protect information that is unclassified but has been designated
|
|
sensitive. Such information is held not only by government
|
|
agencies but by private companies as well. And last October the
|
|
steering group issued a memorandum that defined sensitive
|
|
information and gave federal agencies broad new powers to keep it
|
|
from the public.
|
|
According to Latham, this new category includes such data as
|
|
all medical records on government databases -- from the files of
|
|
the National Cancer Institute to information on every veteran who
|
|
has ever applied for medical aid from the Veterans Administration
|
|
-- and all the information on corporate and personal taxpayers in
|
|
the Internal Revenue Service's computers. Even agricultural
|
|
statistics, he argues, can be used by a foreign power against the
|
|
United States.
|
|
In his oversize yet Spartan Pentagon office, Latham cuts
|
|
anything but an intimidating figure. Articulate and friendly, he
|
|
could pass for a network anchorman or a television game show
|
|
host. When asked how the government's new definition of
|
|
sensitive information will be used, he defends the necessity for
|
|
it and tries to put to rest concerns about a new restrictiveness.
|
|
"The debate that somehow the DoD and NSA are going to
|
|
monitor or get into private databases isn't the case at all,"
|
|
Latham insists. "The definition is just a guideline, just an
|
|
advisory. It does not give the DoD the right to go into private
|
|
records."
|
|
Yet the Defense Department invoked the NSDD 145 guidelines
|
|
when it told the information industry it intends to restrict the
|
|
sale of data that are now unclassified and publicly available
|
|
from privately owned computer systems. The excuse if offered was
|
|
that these data often include technical information that might be
|
|
valuable to a foreign adversary like the Soviet Union.
|
|
Mead Data Central -- which runs some of the nation's largest
|
|
computer databases, such as Lexis and Nexis, and has nearly
|
|
200000 users -- says it has already been approached by a team of
|
|
agents from the Air Force and officials from the CIA and the FBI
|
|
who asked for the names of subscribers and inquired what Mead
|
|
officials might do if information restrictions were imposed. In
|
|
response to government pressure, Mead Data Central in effect
|
|
censured itself. It purged all unclassified government-supplied
|
|
technical data from its system and completely dropped the
|
|
National Technical Information System from its database rather
|
|
than risk a confrontation.
|
|
Representative Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat who chairs the
|
|
House Government Operations Committee, is an outspoken critic of
|
|
the NSA's role in restricting civilian information. He notes
|
|
that in 1985 the NSA -- under the authority granted by NSDD 145
|
|
-- investigated a computer program that was widely used in both
|
|
local and federal elections in 1984. The computer system was
|
|
used to count more than one third of all votes cast in the United
|
|
States. While probing the system's vulnerability to outside
|
|
manipulation, the NSA obtained a detailed knowledge of that
|
|
computer program. "In my view," Brooks says, "this is an
|
|
unprecedented and ill-advised expansion of the military's
|
|
influence in our society."
|
|
There are other NSA critics. "The computer systems used by
|
|
counties to collect and process votes have nothing to do with
|
|
national security, and I'm really concerned about the NSA's
|
|
involvement," says Democratic congressman Dan Glickman of Kansas,
|
|
chairman of the House science and technology subcommittee
|
|
concerned with computer security.
|
|
Also, under NSDD 145 the Pentagon has issued an order,
|
|
virtually unknown to all but a few industry executives, that
|
|
affects commercial communications satellites. The policy was
|
|
made official by Defense Secretary Weinberger in June of 1985 and
|
|
requires that all commercial satellite operators that carry such
|
|
unclassified government data traffic as routine Pentagon supply
|
|
information and payroll data (and that compete for lucrative
|
|
government contracts) install costly protective systems on all
|
|
satellites launched after 1990. The policy does not directly
|
|
affect the data over satellite channels, but it does make the NSA
|
|
privy to vital information about the essential signals needed to
|
|
operate a satellite. With this information it could take control
|
|
of any satellite it chooses.
|
|
Latham insists this, too, is a voluntary policy and that
|
|
only companies that wish to install protection will have their
|
|
systems evaluated by the NSA. He also says industry officials
|
|
are wholly behind the move, and argues that the protective
|
|
systems are necessary. With just a few thousand dollars' worth
|
|
of equipment, a disgruntled employee could interfere with a
|
|
satellite's control signals and disable or even wipe out a
|
|
hundred-million-dollar satellite carrying government information.
|
|
At best, his comments are misleading. First, the policy is
|
|
not voluntary. The NSA can cut off lucrative government
|
|
contracts to companies that do not comply with the plan. The
|
|
Pentagon alone spent more than a billion dollars leasing
|
|
commercial satellite channels last year; that's a powerful
|
|
incentive for business to cooperate.
|
|
Second, the industry's support is anything but total.
|
|
According to the minutes of one closed-door meeting between NSA
|
|
officials -- along with representatives of other federal agencies
|
|
-- and executives from AT&T, Comsat, GTE Sprint, and MCI, the
|
|
executives neither supported the move nor believed it was
|
|
necessary. The NSA defended the policy by arguing that a
|
|
satellite could be held for ransom if the command and control
|
|
links weren't protected. But experts at the meeting were
|
|
skeptical.
|
|
"Why is the threat limited to accessing the satellite rather
|
|
than destroying it with lasers or high-powered signals?" one
|
|
industry executive wanted to know.
|
|
Most of the officials present objected to the high cost of
|
|
protecting the satellites. According to a 1983 study made at the
|
|
request of the Pentagon, the protection demanded by the NSA could
|
|
add as much as $3000000 to the price of a satellite and $1000000
|
|
more to annual operating costs. Costs like these, they
|
|
argue, could cripple a company competing against less expensive
|
|
communications networks.
|
|
Americans get much of their information through forms of
|
|
electronic communications, from the telephone, television and
|
|
radio, and information printed in many newspapers. Banks send
|
|
important financial data, businesses their spreadsheets, and
|
|
stockbrokers their investment portfolios, all over the same
|
|
channels, from satellite signals to computer hookups carried on
|
|
long distance telephone lines. To make sure that the federal
|
|
government helped to promote and protect the efficient use of
|
|
this advancing technology, Congress passed the massive
|
|
Communications Act of of 1934. It outlined the role and laws of
|
|
the communications structure in the United States.
|
|
The powers of the president are set out in Section 606 of
|
|
that law; basically it states that he has the authority to take
|
|
control of any communications facilities that he believes
|
|
"essential to the national defense." In the language of the
|
|
trade this is known as a 606 emergency.
|
|
There have been a number of attempts in recent years by
|
|
Defense Department officials to redefine what qualifies as a 606
|
|
emergency and make it easier for the military to take over
|
|
national communications.
|
|
In 1981 the Senate considered amendments to the 1934 act
|
|
that would allow the president, on Defense Department
|
|
recommendation, to require any communications company to provide
|
|
services, facilities, or equipment "to promote the national
|
|
defense and security or the emergency preparedness of the
|
|
nation," even in peacetime and without a declared state of
|
|
emergency. The general language had been drafted by Defense
|
|
Department officials. (The bill failed to pass the House for
|
|
unrelated reasons.)
|
|
"I think it is quite clear that they have snuck in there
|
|
some powers that are dangerous for us as a company and for the
|
|
public at large," said MCI vice president Kenneth Cox before the
|
|
Senate vote.
|
|
Since President Reagan took office, the Pentagon has stepped
|
|
up its efforts to rewrite the definition of national emergency
|
|
and give the military expanded powers in the United States. "The
|
|
declaration of 'emergency' has always been vague," says one
|
|
former administration official who left the government in 1982
|
|
after ten years in top policy posts. "Different presidents have
|
|
invoked it differently. This administration would declare a
|
|
convenient 'emergency.'" In other words, what is a nuisance to
|
|
one administration might qualify as a burgeoning crisis to
|
|
another. For example, the Reagan administration might decide
|
|
that a series of protests on or near military bases constituted a
|
|
national emergency.
|
|
Should the Pentagon ever be given the green light, its base
|
|
for taking over the nation's communications system would be a
|
|
nondescript yellow brick building within the maze of high rises,
|
|
government buildings, and apartment complexes that make up the
|
|
Washington suburb of Arlington, Virginia. Headquartered in a
|
|
dusty and aging structure surrounded by a barbed-wire fence is an
|
|
obscure branch of the military known as the Defense
|
|
Communications Agency (DCA). It does not have the spit and
|
|
polish of the National Security Agency or the dozens of other
|
|
government facilities that make up the nation's capital. But its
|
|
lack of shine belies its critical mission: to make sure all of
|
|
America's far-flung military units can communicate with one
|
|
another. It is in certain ways the nerve center of our nation's
|
|
defense system.
|
|
On the second floor of the DCA's four-story headquarters is
|
|
a new addition called the National Coordinating Center (NCC).
|
|
Operated by the Pentagon, it is virtually unknown outside of a
|
|
handful of industry and government officials. The NCC is staffed
|
|
around the clock by representatives of a dozen of the nation's
|
|
largest commercial communications companies -- the so-called
|
|
"common carriers" -- including AT&T, MCI, GTE, Comsat, and ITT.
|
|
Also on hand are officials from the State Department, the CIA,
|
|
the Federal Aviation Administration, and a number of other
|
|
federal agencies. During a 606 emergency the Pentagon can order
|
|
the companies that make up the National Coordinating Center to
|
|
turn over their satellite, fiberoptic, and land-line facilities
|
|
to the government.
|
|
On a long corridor in the front of the building is a series
|
|
of offices, each outfitted with a private phone, a telex machine,
|
|
and a combination safe. It's known as "logo row" because each
|
|
office is occupied by an employee from one of the companies that
|
|
staff the NCC and because their corporate logos hand on the wall
|
|
outside. Each employee is on permanent standby, ready to
|
|
activate his company's system should the Pentagon require it.
|
|
The National Coordinating Center's mission is as grand as
|
|
its title is obscure: to make available to the Defense
|
|
Department all the facilities of the civilian communications
|
|
network in this country -- the phone lines, the long-distance
|
|
satellite hookups, the data transmission lines -- in times of
|
|
national emergency. If war breaks out and communications to a
|
|
key military base are cut, the Pentagon wants to make sure that
|
|
an alternate link can be set up as fast as possible. Company
|
|
employees assigned to the center are on call 24 hours a day; they
|
|
wear beepers outside the office, and when on vacation they must
|
|
be replaced by qualified colleagues.
|
|
The center formally opened on New Year's Day, 1984, the same
|
|
day Ma Bell's monopoly over the telephone network of the entire
|
|
United States was finally broken. The timing was no coincidence.
|
|
Pentagon officials had argued for years along with AT&T against
|
|
the divestiture of Ma Bell, on grounds of national security.
|
|
Defense Secretary Weinberger personally urged the attorney
|
|
general to block the lawsuit that resulted in the breakup, as had
|
|
his predecessor, Harold Brown. The reason was that rather than
|
|
construct its own communications network, the Pentagon had come
|
|
to rely extensively on the phone company. After the breakup the
|
|
dependence continued. The Pentagon still used commercial
|
|
companies to carry more than <data type="percent" unit="%">90%</data> of its communications
|
|
within the continental United States.
|
|
The 1984 divestiture put an end to AT&T's monopoly over the
|
|
nation's telephone service and increased the Pentagon's obsession
|
|
with having its own nerve center. Now the brass had to contend
|
|
with several competing companies to acquire phone lines, and
|
|
communications was more than a matter of running a line from one
|
|
telephone to another. Satellites, microwave towers, fiberoptics,
|
|
and other technological breakthroughs never dreamed of by
|
|
Alexander Graham Bell were in extensive use, and not just for
|
|
phone conversations. Digital data streams for computers flowed
|
|
on the same networks.
|
|
These facts were not lost on the Defense Department or the
|
|
White House. According to documents obtained by Omni, beginning
|
|
on December 14, 1982, a number of secret meetings were held
|
|
between high-level administration officials and executives of the
|
|
commercial communications companies whose employees would later
|
|
staff the National Coordinating Center. The meetings, which
|
|
continued over the next three years, were held at the White
|
|
House, the State Department, the Strategic Air Command (SAC)
|
|
headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and at the
|
|
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in Colorado
|
|
Springs.
|
|
The industry officials attending constituted the National
|
|
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee -- called NSTAC
|
|
(pronounced N-stack) -- set up by President Reagan to address
|
|
those same problems that worried the Pentagon. It was at these
|
|
secret meetings, according to the minutes, that the idea of a
|
|
communications watch center for national emergencies -- the NCC
|
|
-- was born. Along with it came a whole set of plans that would
|
|
allow the military to take over commercial communications
|
|
"assets" -- everything from ground stations and satellite dishes
|
|
to fiberoptic cables -- across the country.
|
|
At a 1983 Federal Communications Commission meeting, a
|
|
ranking Defense Department official offered the following
|
|
explanation for the founding of the National Coordinating Center:
|
|
"We are looking at trying to make communications endurable for a
|
|
protracted conflict." The phrase protracted conflict is a
|
|
military euphemism for nuclear war.
|
|
But could the NCC survive even the first volley in such a
|
|
conflict?
|
|
Not likely. It's located within a mile of the Pentagon,
|
|
itself an obvious early target of a Soviet nuclear barrage (or a
|
|
conventional strike, for that matter). And the Kremlin
|
|
undoubtedly knows its location and importance, and presumably has
|
|
included it on its priority target list. In sum, according to
|
|
one Pentagon official, "The NCC itself is not viewed as a
|
|
survivable facility."
|
|
Furthermore, the NCC's "Implementation Plan," obtained by
|
|
Omni, lists four phases of emergencies and how the center should
|
|
respond to each. The first, Phase 0, is Peacetime, for which
|
|
there would be little to do outside of a handful of routine tasks
|
|
and exercises. Phase 1 is Pre Attack, in which alternate NCC
|
|
sites are alerted. Phase 2 is Post Attack, in which other NCC
|
|
locations are instructed to take over the center's functions.
|
|
Phase 3 is known as Last Ditch, and in this phase whatever
|
|
facility survives becomes the de facto NCC.
|
|
So far there is no alternate National Coordinating Center to
|
|
which NCC officials could retreat to survive an attack.
|
|
According to NCC deputy director William Belford, no physical
|
|
sites have yet been chosen for a substitute NCC, and even whether
|
|
the NCC itself will survive a nuclear attack is still under
|
|
study.
|
|
Of what use is a communications center that is not expected
|
|
to outlast even the first shots of a war and has no backup?
|
|
The answer appears to be that because of the Pentagon's
|
|
concerns about the AT&T divestiture and the disruptive effects it
|
|
might have on national security, the NCC was to serve as the
|
|
military's peacetime communications center.
|
|
The center is a powerful and unprecedented tool to assume
|
|
control over the nation's vast communications and information
|
|
network. For years the Pentagon has been studying how to take
|
|
over the common carriers' facilities. That research was prepared
|
|
by NSTAC at the DoD's request and is contained in a series of
|
|
internal Pentagon documents obtained by Omni. Collectively this
|
|
series is known as the Satellite Survivability Report. Completed
|
|
in 1984, it is the only detailed analysis to date of the
|
|
vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite network. It was
|
|
begun as a way of examining how to protect the network of
|
|
communications facilities from attack and how to keep it intact
|
|
for the DoD.
|
|
A major part of the report also contains an analysis of how
|
|
to make commercial satellites "interoperable" with Defense
|
|
Department systems. While the report notes that current
|
|
technical differences such as varying frequencies make it
|
|
difficult for the Pentagon to use commercial satellites, it
|
|
recommends ways to resolve those problems. Much of the report is
|
|
a veritable blueprint for the government on how to take over
|
|
satellites in orbit above the United States. This information,
|
|
plus NSDD 145's demand that satellite operators tell the NSA how
|
|
their satellites are controlled, guarantees the military ample
|
|
knowledge about operating commercial satellites.
|
|
The Pentagon now has an unprecedented access to the civilian
|
|
communications network: commercial databases, computer networks,
|
|
electronic links, telephone lines. All it needs is the legal
|
|
authority to use them. Then it could totally dominate the flow
|
|
of all information in the United States. As one high-ranking
|
|
White House communications official put it: "Whoever controls
|
|
communications, controls the country." His remark was made after
|
|
our State Department could not communicate directly with our
|
|
embassy in Manila during the anti-Marcos revolution last year.
|
|
To get through, the State Department had to relay all its
|
|
messages through the Philippine government.
|
|
Government officials have offered all kinds of scenarios to
|
|
justify the National Coordinating Center, the Satellite
|
|
Survivability Report, new domains of authority for the Pentagon
|
|
and the NSA, and the creation of top-level government steering
|
|
groups to think of even more policies for the military. Most can
|
|
be reduced to the rationale that inspired NSDD 145: that our
|
|
enemies (presumably the Soviets) have to be prevented from
|
|
getting too much information from unclassified sources. And the
|
|
only way to do that is to step in and take control of those
|
|
sources.
|
|
Remarkably, the communications industry as a whole has not
|
|
been concerned about the overall scope of the Pentagon's threat
|
|
to its freedom of operation. Most protests have been to
|
|
individual government actions. For example, a media coalition
|
|
that includes the Radio-Television Society of Newspaper Editors,
|
|
and the Turner Broadcasting System has been lobbying that before
|
|
the government can restrict the use of satellites, it must
|
|
demonstrate why such restrictions protect against a "threat to
|
|
distinct and compelling national security and foreign policy
|
|
interests." But the whole policy of restrictiveness has not been
|
|
examined. That may change sometime this year, when the Office of
|
|
Technology Assessment issues a report on how the Pentagon's
|
|
policy will affect communications in the United States. In the
|
|
meantime the military keeps trying to encroach on national
|
|
communications.
|
|
While it may seem unlikely that the Pentagon will ever get
|
|
total control of our information and communications systems, the
|
|
truth is that it can happen all too easily. The official
|
|
mechanisms are already in place; and few barriers remain to
|
|
guarantee that what we hear, see, and read will come to us
|
|
courtesy of our being members of a free and open society and not
|
|
courtesy of the Pentagon.
|
|
<div>
|
|
Psi-Tech and alien brain-wave research -- Whats going on at Los Alamos?</conspiracyFile> |