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Article: 561 of sgi.talk.ratical
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From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
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Subject: "The Sabotaging of the American Presidency" -- the U-2 debacle
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Keywords: G. Powers' 5/1/60 U-2 flight deliberatly dashed Ike's hopes 4 peace
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Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 1992 15:25:32 GMT
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Lines: 1012
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i include this as access to more of the history that has been "classified"
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and hence stolen from all of us just as the truth about the assassinations
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has been. stone's inclusion of ike's farewell address is right to the
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point. fletcher prouty has written quite a bit about the U-2 downing and
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how it was a harbinger of the kinds of overt moves the national security
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establishment wud make as it carried out the political assassinations of
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the 60s and beyond, and its own increasingly brazen bid for absolute power.
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* * * * * * *
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The pictures Khrushchev showed to the public and to newsmen gave
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away the ruse. The industrial installations and the rows of
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aircraft exhibited were tiny dots on regular film, and even with
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the best enlargement, they would never have met Dr. Cline's
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criterion of twelve inches from 30,000 feet.
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This is a crucial point. The U-2 incident was a clever and
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sinister deception. Its perpetrators intended for the Russians to
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find the U-2 and to think Powers was doing a spy's work. Yet,
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these perpetrators were far enough up in Government circles to know
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that it was the technology of the camera which must not be given away.
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President Eisenhower looked forward to visiting the Soviet Union during
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May of 1960, along with increasing the level of dialogue with Premier
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Krushchev regarding implementation of a genuine halt to the arms race.
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His Crusade for Peace was intended to reach a new level of understanding
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ushered in with the planned meeting in Paris on May 16, followed by a
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tour of Russia many expected to be a resounding success for both sides.
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Charles Bohlen (Russian ambassador from 4/53 to 12/56) recalls, "I was
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certainly enthusiastic about Eisenhower's scheduled trip to the Soviet
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Union. Eisenhower was not only a President, he was also a war hero.
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The Russians would have loved him." ["Witness to History," p.462]
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But despite all the effort and planning the President of the United
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States was pinning his forty-five years of government service on the
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successful outcome of, he found himself outmatched by a very tight-knit
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group of people operating within the newly-birthed powers of the National
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Security State complex. When, in his farewell address, he spoke of
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"guard[ing] against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
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sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex", he was not
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describing some abstract concept about what might lie ahead--he was
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going as far as he dared in speaking publicly about his own painful
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experiences. When he stated "the potential for the disastrous rise of
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misplaced power exists and will persist" he was alluding to his own
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ordeal of crushed hopes for a better world for all.
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The urgency of these words--to take nothing for granted, to call for an
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alert and knowledgeable citizenry as the only protection against an
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unwarranted and unaccountable exercising of power, "to compel the proper
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meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with
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our peaceful methods and goals"--these words were spoken by a man who,
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although Commander-In-Chief, and "leader of the free world," was not
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truly the one deciding what agendas the United States would pursue and
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who would benefit by those agendas.
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Regarding the following article's discussion of the U-2 overflight on May
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1, 1960--in direct contravention to President Eisenhower's express orders
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banning all such flights before his summit conference with Kruschev on May
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16--the following sums up the essence of the the misuse of constitutional
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powers in the executive branch of our federal government via the rubric
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of "*assumption* of authorization":
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Here is the most astonishing piece of evidence about the misuse
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of Presidential authority to come to light, including the Nixon
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tapes. The powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee was asking
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the Director of Central Intelligence where he got his authority for
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this infamous flight, and all Allen Dulles could reply was, "Well,
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we had a group." Then, when Senator Gore asked if Dulles knew
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whether the men in that group hat the proper authority to issue
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such orders, all that the Director of the CIA could say was, "I
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assume that he did." There is the whole crux of the U-2 flight,
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the breakup of the summit conference, the chance for peace.
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Because actual authorization could be bypassed by the
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*assumption* of authorization, and this has become standard
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procedure, illegal acts like the U-2 incident can be committed by
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those whose motives are to undermine the power and the process of
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the elected Government. . . .
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In this ominous byplay, we see the shadow of hands behind the
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scenes. If Eisenhower did not order the flight, who did? If
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Dulles didn't know whether the men whom he said authorized the
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flight had that authority, who knew? If someone had the inside
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knowledge to get away with launching an unauthorized flight, who
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was it? And if those people knew that the cameras must be
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protected, who were they? By the time you answer those questions,
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even by the time you ask them, you can draw the strings tightly
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around that very small group who actually did operate the U-2's in
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1960. There were only three or four men able to do those things,
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and their names are in the Pentagon telephone book of 1960. I will
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not name names as it is not my intention to jeopardize these men's
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lives.
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the following appeared in the January, 1978 issue of "Gallery."
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_______________________________________________________________________
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THE SABOTAGING OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
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by L. Fletcher Prouty
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reprinted here by permission of the author
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In 1960, the Secret Team, terrified that President Eisenhower
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was coming to terms with the USSR, resolved that there must be
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no peace. A surefire plan was needed to destruct the upcoming
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summit conference. What better way to show American bad faith
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than by arranging for a US "spy" plane to be forced down over
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the USSR on the Russian's most important national holiday.
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More than one-third of all the Federal Taxes you and I pay goes
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into something called "Defense"; yet, we have almost no defense at
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all. We do have some offense, though, and that offense is supposed
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to operate on a "fail-safe" system. How safe is fail-safe? What
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happens when fail-safe fails?
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Within the chambers of Government there are channels.
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Underground, moles burrow from agency to agency and in and out of
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the White House. They are master bureaucrats who know their way
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around blindfolded. While Congress and the President work at
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controlling the Government by manipulating the Budget, these
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bureaucrats benefit from what our tax money buys.
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Nixon, Johnson, Kennedy, and Eisenhower had their power as
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President jerked out from under them by these underground forces.
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Nixon was the victim of a piece of tape on a Watergate door;
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Johnson lost to the runaway madness of the Vietnam War; Kennedy
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was wiped out by the hired guns of Dallas; and Eisenhower was
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broken down by a secret team who launched an unauthorized U-2
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flight.
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The power of the Presidency is elusive and Presidents are never
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sure when they really have it. Momentous acts, presumably carried
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out with Presidential knowledge and approval, can in fact be
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committed without the President's authorization. In many cases,
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the *presumption* of authorization is standard operating procedure
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for action.
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After a lifetime of Government service, President Eisenhower
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went to bed on the night of April 30th, 1960 secure in the belief
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that he, Macmillan of Britain, DeGaulle of France, and Khrushchev
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of the USSR would meet in Paris on May 16th in a summit conference
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that would seal agreements for peace throughout the world.
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Eisenhower was believed to be a powerful world figure whose
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dedication to this Crusade for Peace would succeed. But as he
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slept, fail-safe failed.
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Three or four moles in the Pentagon, doing the bidding of their
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masters, flashed coded signals across the world to send out a lone
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U-2 plane on one of the longest and most impossible missions ever
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attempted by a U-2--a 3,900-mile journey from Peshawar, Pakistan
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across the Soviet Union to Bodo, on the northern tip of Norway.
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These men's actions neatly bypassed the entire ultra-secret system
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and launched a plane that had been rigged to come down in the heart
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of the USSR on one of its most important holidays, May Day. Thus
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were destroyed the summit conference and Eisenhower's Crusade for
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Peace.
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New information, including recently obtained Congressional
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testimony, has come to light that uncovers details of this
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monstrous scheme.
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In 1944 when General Dwight D. Eisenhower threw the armada of the
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West against the Nazi stronghold on the French beaches of Normandy,
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even Hitler's army could not stop the onslaught.
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But in 1960 when President Eisenhower launched his Crusade for
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Peace to bring about a lasting detente with the Soviet Union, one
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U-2 airplane, one pilot, and the invisible enemy shattered his
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dream. That U-2, flown into the USSR on May 1, 1960 by Francis
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Gary Powers was not on a spy mission as had been alleged. It was
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launched for the sole purpose of destroying whatever chance there
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was for peace. It was the weapon of the war lovers--the missile of
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the industrial complex.
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Ike learned what other world leaders have learned: it is easier
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to wage war than to make peace. In war the enemy is visible, and
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he is usually on the other side.
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For years the U-2 and everything about its clandestine
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operations for the CIA had been cloaked in a mantle of such secrecy
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that very few people knew anything about the plane or its missions.
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When the U-2 was lost over the USSR and then claimed by Khrushchev
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to have been shot down, few people knew what was true and what was
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not. The whole world was caught off guard. It was not difficult
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to believe the contrived NASA-CIA cover story that a plane had been
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lost while on an upper-atmosphere research flight. However, that
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cover story was a lie--twice over!
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During the past few years, information about this very special
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flight has begun to trickle down from various sources, and the
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muddy waters are becoming clearer. Some of the facts surrounding
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the U-2 incident, coincidental or otherwise, are shocking.
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On September 24, 1959 secret aircraft came to a belly landing on
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a tiny Japanese glider field near Atsugi.[1] That airplane was a
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CIA, civilian-piloted U-2 spy plane. On May 1, 1960 that same U-2,
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serial number 360, having been rebuilt at the famous "skunk works"
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at Lockheed, flew over the USSR and landed at Sverdlovsk, changing
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the course of history.
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Recently, the top secret transcripts of the May 1960 hearings
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held before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate
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became available. These transcripts had been obscured by an
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ambiguous title: "Hearings Regarding Summit Conference of May
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1960." Neither the title nor the index page give any clues to the
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casual researcher that the transcripts might have anything to do
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with the U-2 incident.
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These hearings took place right after the U-2 went down, before
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Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of that plane, went on trial in
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Moscow. In other words, they took place before we had learned the
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Soviet side of the story and before Powers came back from prison.
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Few people even knew about these super-secret hearings.
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Those in attendance were, in addition to the full Committee and
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their staff: Allen W. Dulles, then the Director of Central
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Intelligence (DCI) and his Deputy, General S. Warner, and Ed Enck,
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all from the CIA and the U-2 program. Interestingly, the
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ostensible director of the U-2 program, Richard Bissell, was not
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there. Representing the Secretary of State was William B.
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Macomber; representing the Secretary of Defense was a Navy man,
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Captain L. Patrick Gray, the man whom Richard Nixon appointed to
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head the FBI, and later of Watergate fame. Although there were a
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large number of Air Force officers operating the U-2 program, not a
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single Air Force man was there.
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A few months after the release of the transcripts in 1975, an
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obscure but authoritative journal, "Military Affairs," published
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for the American Military Institute by the history department at
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Kansas State University, appeared with the paper, "A Fragile
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Detente: The U-2 Incident Re-examined," by James A. Nathan, a
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member of the history department at the University of Delaware.
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This scholarly treatise might have gone unnoticed, except for the
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fact that the editor of "Military Affairs" received an angry letter
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from Francis Gary Powers dated February 6, 1976. In it Powers
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stated: "Normally I do not comment on articles written about the
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U-2 incident," but the usually taciturn Powers wrote a rambling,
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fourteen-page letter. Perhaps someone wrote it for him. That
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letter is remarkable; the Nathan article is remarkable; the
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee document, all 195 pages, is
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astounding; and the whole U-2 affair is unmatched in recent
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history. It is one of those keystone events that shaped the course
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of our lives for years afterward.
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Contrary to all reports, that U-2 was not on a spy mission. It
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was not even flown by a spy. Powers' identification papers--and he
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was loaded with them--proved to his captors that he was a pilot
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working for the U.S. Air Force. He carried no CIA documents. With
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his Air Force ID and his uniform, military-type pressure suit,
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there was no evidence to indicate he was a spy. He looked like any
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other Air Force pilot. Why then was he promptly labeled a spy?
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What was Powers doing over the heart of the Soviet Union on May
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Day, and just before the most important summit conference of all?
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In 1960 the directive NSC 10/2, published by the National
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Security Council (NSC) required that any clandestine operation must
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be operated so that if it failed or was compromised in any way,
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this country would be able to plausibly deny the existence of the
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operation. In CIA jargon, the plane and the pilot had to be
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"sterilized." The CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD) had
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spent millions of dollars sterilizing aircraft and equipment used
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in clandestine operations, so that anyone who might uncover an
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operation would be unable, under reasonable circumstances, to trace
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it positively to its true origin. Why then did Powers carry ID,
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and why did this U-2 carry so many identifying marks and decals?
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I was the properly designated military officer in the Pentagon
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for a period of nine years--including 1960--responsible for exactly
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this function of supporting the clandestine activities for the CIA.
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Under my direction many aircraft, many items of equipment, and many
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personnel were properly sterilized and "sheep-dipped" prior to use
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in secret missions. The U-2's were no exception. As a matter of
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fact, the entire U-2 program was supposed to have been made sterile
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from production on up. I must say I knew the CIA to be meticulous
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about deniability. On regular clandestine overflights to China
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Tibet, Indonesia, Burma, and other places, they did their best to
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conform with and obey the NSC directive. The identifying evidence
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included in Powers' flight violated the NSC mandate. If this was a
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spy mission, the violation was clearly planned to wreck the
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upcoming summit conference.
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It was normal DOD-CIA practice that pilots engaged in
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clandestine operations don pressure suits which contained no
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identification of any kind prior to takeoff. In the process, the
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pilot was required to strip, and all identity and personal items
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were removed by the officials in charge of that flight.
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Not only was this standard procedure a matter of great care, but
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in important cases, two or three aircraft and two or three pilots
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would be readied for each flight. The pilots would not know which
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plane they might fly, and no pilot would know his mission until the
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final briefing.
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Powers' U-2 had been flown from Turkey to Peshawar, Pakistan on
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April 30, 1960 just a few hours before Powers took off for the
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USSR. He had been flown to Pakistan by transport and given only
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two and a half hours' warning before the flight. He has written:
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"I did not see the plane at close range."
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For some unaccountable reason Powers took off on this, the
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longest USSR overflight ever planned, and in the seat pack of his
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parachute was every identification imaginable. If Powers was
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supposed to play the role of a spy, then in accordance with the
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script that has historically been passed down, he would be
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nameless, faceless, a man without a country. He was none of those
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things. Why not? And who saw to it that he was none of these
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things?
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Powers had in his kit one of the old World War II silk "escape-
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and-evasion" flags. On the margin of this flag was written, among
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other things, "I am an American. I need food, shelter. I will not
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harm you. You will be rewarded." Does a spy carry such identity?
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And how about the cover story that he was a military pilot who
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unaccountably got lost and flew over the Soviet border? If he
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hadn't intended to fly over a "hostile" country in peacetime, then
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why the escape-and-evasion kit? None of the official stories made
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the slightest bit of sense.
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Yet, as soon as the news of Powers' discovery in the USSR became
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known, he was declared by both the Soviets and the Americans to be
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a spy. He was tried as a spy.
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What was even more incriminating was the fact that Powers had
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his DOD identification card listing him as a member of the Air
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Force. He had forty-eight gold coins, four expensive watches,
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seven gold rings, and a pocketful of paper currency of many
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nations, including the USA and USSR. Powers had nineteen other
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forms of identity, including his Social Security card, 230-30-0321,
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a Lodge card, his USAF medical card, a driver's license, and two
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copies of his instrument cards, earned by all Air Force pilots for
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weather-flying qualifications.
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During the Senate hearings, Allen Dulles said: "He [Powers] was
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given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have
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publicized and which are normally a standard procedure and selected
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on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in
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Korea." What experience was Dulles talking about? Military? CIA?
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Certainly Dulles knew that true spies are nameless.
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On top of this, Dulles told the Senators: "He [Powers] would
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acknowledge that he was working for the CIA. This was to make it
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clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services
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and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission." At
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another point in the hearings, Senator Fulbright said to Dulles:
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"You made a point of being very careful to have these planes
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disassociated from the military force. *I mean you saw that the
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pilot was*." [author's emphasis]
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Dulles replied: "That is correct. We made every effort to
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disassociate this so that any incident that might occur would not
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rub off on the Defense establishment or the Air Force."
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That is an out and out lie! A case can be made that Allen
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Dulles, like President Eisenhower, did not know that the U-2 flight
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had gone out. This ordeal with the Senate Committee may have been
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thrust upon him by those who had the power to send out the U-2
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flight without the knowledge of the proper authorities. As an
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indication of Mr. Dulles' confusion before the Committee, when
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Fulbright asked him another question, Dulles replied: "Yes, which
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lie . . .," then quickly corrected his goof by saying: "Which page
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. . . ?" He knew he had been telling lies all day long.
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Allen Dulles didn't know the facts. It is true that uniformed
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military personnel on *military* missions are given identity and an
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escape-and-evasion kit. Military personnel are always in uniform,
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and there are Geneva Convention agreements which govern their care.
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Powers was in a USAF military-type flying suit. His ID said he was
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an Air Force pilot.
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In sworn testimony Allen Dulles contradicted himself and lied
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frequently to Senators Fulbright, Green, Mansfield, Gore, Wiley,
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Carlson, and Lausche. Dulles could not have it both ways. A spy
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is a spy, or he is not a spy.
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As the hearings progressed it became even clearer that Dulles
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was uninformed about this critical U-2 operation. Considering his
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position as Director of the CIA, this ignorance is astounding.
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That he should lie, however, is not astounding. In 1964, Dulles
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told the Warren Commission that he would expect J. Edgar Hoover to
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lie about Lee Harvey Oswald's possible connection to the FBI and
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that he, himself, would lie to anyone about the CIA, its
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operations, and its agents. When pressed, he conceded that he
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"might tell the truth to the President."
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Dulles knew what he was talking about; he was lying like mad to
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these Senators in May 1960. He had to!
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How did Dulles expect "to make it clear [to the Soviets] that
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Powers was not working for any branch of the armed services" if he
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knew Powers had all the ID with him? It seems that Allen Dulles
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might well have been set up for these lies. He didn't know Powers
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had gone with that ID, and it may well be that Dulles did not even
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know about the flight until it was done.
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It is not hard to prove that Powers was neither a spy nor a lost
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military pilot. Now, was the U-2 on a spy mission?
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At 5:36 A.M. Moscow time, on May first, the unnumbered U-2
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penetrated the border of the Soviet Union at a point fifteen miles
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southeast of the remote town of Kirovabad in the Tajik Republic and
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proceeded into Soviet territory. It continued for 1,343 miles to
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the vicinity of Sverdlovsk. There it landed shortly after nine
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o'clock in the morning. The questions remain: Why did it come
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down? Was it shot down?
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Khrushchev reported that the U-2 had penetrated Soviet territory
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at an altitude of 20,000 meters (65,000 feet) and that the plane
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was "brought down by a rocket . . . when it was at an altitude of
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20,000 meters." During his trial in Moscow in August 1960, Powers
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steadfastly maintained that he had been flying at 68,000 feet. In
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his February 1976 letter Powers still held to 68,000 feet as the
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altitude at which he said he was shot down. It is important to
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note that on May 31, 1960, "Aviation Week," the authoritative
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aviation source, reported that the U-2 could fly above 100,000
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feet. Despite Dulles' denials, "Aviation Week" was correct. That
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very special engine could push the U-2 above 100,000 feet. The
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latest model, the U-2R, is being flown even now. It is much
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|
larger, has about the same configuration, and does a superb job of
|
|
peacetime clandestine reconnaissance.
|
|
During his testimony Dulles told about U-2 operations: "They
|
|
[the Soviets] have gone through four years of frustrations in
|
|
having the knowledge that since 1956 they could be overflown with
|
|
impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such
|
|
flights, and that their ground-to-air capability was inadequate."
|
|
Dulles sounded as if he, too, could not believe one had gone down.
|
|
"It was only after he [Khrushchev] boasted, *and we believed
|
|
falsely*, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May first
|
|
by a ground-to-air missile, while the plane was flying at altitude,
|
|
that he has allowed his people to have even an inkling of the
|
|
capability which we have possessed."
|
|
Here Dulles denies Khrushchev's claim to have brought the U-2
|
|
down with a missile. Later during the same testimony, Dulles was
|
|
even more explicit: "The question of course arises as to what
|
|
actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the
|
|
heart of Russia." Dulles went on: "Our best judgment is that it
|
|
did not happen as claimed by the Soviets; that is, we believe that
|
|
it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000
|
|
feet [recall he had earlier said 80,000] by the Russians. We
|
|
believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude
|
|
by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction."
|
|
The Senators were concerned about this part of Dulles' story.
|
|
Senator Aiken of Vermont asked: "Your best theory is that
|
|
something forced him down to an altitude where he came within range
|
|
of either the Soviet fighters or guns on the ground?"
|
|
Dulles replied: "That is our best theory. . . . It is obvious
|
|
to us that the plane was not hit. If the plane had been hit by a
|
|
ground-to-air missile, in our belief, it would have disintegrated."
|
|
If that plane had been hit at 68,000 or 80,000 feet, it is highly
|
|
unlikely that Powers would have come out alive. If he had been
|
|
blasted out of that plane without life-support gear, or with that
|
|
gear damaged, he could not have survived the fall. Powers
|
|
contradicts Dulles' story by saying he rode the plane down for a
|
|
long time and then bailed out. Dulles, however, was categorical;
|
|
the plane was not hit.
|
|
Yet in 1976, sixteen years after this incident, Powers still
|
|
claimed: "I have from the first stated that I was shot down, even
|
|
to the Russians. I will only say that I was flying above 68,000
|
|
feet, the 68,000 feet being the altitude I told the Russians was
|
|
the maximum for the U-2." [Note how he is backing off of that
|
|
68,000-foot story.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| CARTER AND THE SECRET TEAM |
|
|
| |
|
|
| The U-2 testimony provides a record of how a Committee of |
|
|
| the Senate listened to a lot of lies and never did anything |
|
|
| about them. This is what President Carter faces. The secret |
|
|
| team is there. It will be up to Carter to show who is boss. |
|
|
| According to a highly placed source, his first test with the |
|
|
| secret team is at hand. |
|
|
| President Carter has recently obtained the long-hidden CIA |
|
|
| files on the Kennedy assassination at the cost of firing the |
|
|
| Deputy Director and the top-echelon, clandestine services staff |
|
|
| of the CIA. What they contain is so earth-shaking that it will |
|
|
| not only totally reverse the old Warren Commission fable of the |
|
|
| single assassin, but will threaten Carter's own administration |
|
|
| and perhaps his life. |
|
|
| A top-level, high-powered cabal planned and paid for the |
|
|
| liquidation of John Kennedy and has retained much of that |
|
|
| power. It has engineered the massive coverup of that murder |
|
|
| which persists to this day. That power center can strike |
|
|
| again, today and any time. |
|
|
| Carter's biggest problem today is what to do about this |
|
|
| explosive information, how to break it to the world, and how to |
|
|
| help Admiral Stansfield Turner in the CIA. Turner's finger is |
|
|
| in the dike, but he is all alone. An able man, he has shaken |
|
|
| up the agency and has fired many of the old clan; but that |
|
|
| leaves a vacuum from which he can learn little. Turner has no |
|
|
| one who really knows how the Agency works and where all of its |
|
|
| most clandestine operatives are. The old clan won't tell. |
|
|
| The generation-long cellularization in the Agency has |
|
|
| produced an octopus which no one can tame. The loss of Ted |
|
|
| Sorensen and the apparent inability to get former Deputy |
|
|
| Director Lyman Kirkpatrick on board has done irreparable damage |
|
|
| to the Carter team. Carter must get that experience. His |
|
|
| team, especially Brown, Vance, Schlesinger, and Califano all |
|
|
| have had a lot to do with the Agency, but none of them, |
|
|
| including its former Director Schlesinger, really know it. |
|
|
| Carter must find a way to get Kirkpatrick on board, or someone |
|
|
| his equal, if such a person exists. If you are going into the |
|
|
| catacombs, you had better go with an experienced mole. |
|
|
| Meanwhile, watch for an explosion in the JFK murder story |
|
|
| and for its tremendous impact on the Carter Presidency. The |
|
|
| greatest danger will come if Carter cannot get this story out |
|
|
| to the public. If he is forced to bottle it up, as the CIA has |
|
|
| been doing, it will consume him. |
|
|
|_______________________________________________________________________|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In another vital part of the testimony, Dulles reports: "We
|
|
have photographed various [Soviet] fighter planes vainly attempting
|
|
to intercept the U-2." Thus by Dulles' own sworn statement, the
|
|
best Soviet fighters with their airborne rockets could not bring
|
|
the U-2 down when at altitude.
|
|
In the "Military Affairs" article, J.A. Nathan discusses the
|
|
possibility of a flame-out; yet in the Powers letter, Powers
|
|
ignores the idea of a flame-out and denies he ran out of fuel. If
|
|
fighters and missiles couldn't reach him, if he didn't flame-out or
|
|
run out of fuel, then why did Powers come down?
|
|
The question of flight altitude is very important. The U-2 was
|
|
designed, developed, and purchased because it could fly higher than
|
|
any Soviet aircraft and could fly above the combat ceiling for
|
|
Soviet missiles. Dulles said the plane could fly at "fifteen
|
|
miles," about 80,000 feet altitude. Actually, it could fly above
|
|
100,000 feet. Therefore, if the plane was at 80,000 feet or
|
|
higher, it could not be hit. Dulles told the Senate Committee that
|
|
the plane was not hit; Eisenhower says Powers radioed a flame-out;
|
|
the Soviets say they shot it down; and Powers repeats the same
|
|
thing in court and in his 1976 letter. Dulles knew; the U.S. Air
|
|
Force--General Kenneth Bergquist and his National Reconnaissance
|
|
Office (NRO) staff knew; Lockheed knew; and the whole U-2 program
|
|
operational staff knew. The U-2 could not be shot down at 80,000
|
|
feet and higher. Only three weeks earlier, on April 9, 1960, a U-2
|
|
had flown on a similar operational flight over Russia. It flew
|
|
high and was not hit.
|
|
Thus, the first indisputable fact is that the plane was not shot
|
|
down at 80,000 feet. But our second fact is that it did come down
|
|
and did not disintegrate, as Dulles said it would have done if hit.
|
|
Let's look at Eisenhower's flame-out idea in "Waging Peace:"
|
|
|
|
When the U-2 was being designed it was known that it would
|
|
have a very special engine with titanium buckets, i.e.,
|
|
compressor blades. That big J-75 was a very special engine.
|
|
It ran well, at high altitude, with military specification
|
|
MIL-F-25524A fuel, and it carried the plane on many a
|
|
successful mission. But the U-2 had been plagued with
|
|
flame-outs (like a blow-torch popping out) and at that
|
|
extreme altitude there is no way in the world a pilot could
|
|
restart the engine. There is so little oxygen up there that
|
|
it simply will not support combustion. So when the engine
|
|
goes out the pilot must let the big "glider" float down and
|
|
hope that no one will notice him while he gets low enough,
|
|
into more dense air with more oxygen, to rekindle the engine.
|
|
Coming down to lower altitude made the U-2 vulnerable to
|
|
fighter aircraft and to rockets and sometimes the engine
|
|
would not restart anyway, and the pilot would have to bail
|
|
out or make the best landing he could. This is what Powers
|
|
may have had to do. He says he bailed out, but many pilots I
|
|
know who are familiar with that harrowing experience, made
|
|
critical by the thin air at high altitude, have questions
|
|
about his account of how he managed to do it. The chances
|
|
are that after his flame-out he may have ridden that plane to
|
|
the ground where he was then captured after a typical U-2
|
|
belly landing.
|
|
Witnesses who were in Sverdlovsk that day have reported,
|
|
for whatever it is worth, that Soviet MIG's were flying
|
|
around like bees around honey. They would have been
|
|
scrambled to make sure the U-2 landed and did not relight and
|
|
climb back to the safety of high altitude.
|
|
|
|
Powers disputes the Eisenhower note about his flame-out
|
|
broadcast while over the central USSR. In his 1976 letter he says:
|
|
"It would have been impossible to make an engine flame-out
|
|
transmission, as all U-2's at that time were equipped with only
|
|
standard Air Force UHF sets. They were far from capable of
|
|
transmitting the necessary 1,200 nautical miles."
|
|
This is the kind of goof that makes me believe the letter from
|
|
Powers was a bureaucratic attempt at coverup by continuing the lies
|
|
of 1960. The U-2 had a very good U.S. Air Force ARC-34 radio with
|
|
twenty pre-set channels. And it had the radio-frequency
|
|
information card. (Powers' letter plays games with geography.
|
|
Sverdlovsk is 1,200 miles from Pakistan, but it is no more than 700
|
|
miles from CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) ground listening
|
|
posts in Turkey and Iran. Powerful devices are there to listen to
|
|
the daily air traffic of Soviet planes. Also, the huge U-2 support
|
|
program was equipped with high-altitude EC-121 aircraft. These
|
|
aircraft kept in constant touch with the U-2 during its flight. It
|
|
is impossible to believe that a signal transmitted by Powers could
|
|
not be picked up by ground or air listening posts. The CIA, the
|
|
U.S. Air Force, NASA, NSA, NRO, and Lockheed, to name a few, have
|
|
available the most advanced technicians. Through my own long-
|
|
standing work with the CIA, I know of electronic techniques that
|
|
could have informed the CIA not only of a U-2 flame-out, but also
|
|
if Powers' heartbeat had flipped.)
|
|
The flame-out is simply a logical explanation for Powers'
|
|
descent from his invulnerable 80,000-foot perch. And, it is
|
|
consistent with Eisenhower's and Dulles' statements.
|
|
When work with the special modification of the J-75 engine for
|
|
the U-2 began, it was realized that the U-2 would be operating in a
|
|
hostile environment. At very high altitude the engine can't
|
|
breathe, and it needs help. It must have some air-mass intake to
|
|
support combustion. During experiments, it was discovered that a
|
|
trace of hydrogen introduced into the fuel-air mixture would
|
|
support combustion and would virtually assure reliable operation of
|
|
the burner at very high altitudes. Only those very close to the
|
|
operation knew that the U-2 engine needed and had this hydrogen
|
|
capability. Thus, the U.S. Air Force had an elaborate, ultra-
|
|
secret program, directed from the aeronautical center at Dayton,
|
|
Ohio, which provided cryogenic (super-cold) liquified hydrogen to
|
|
the U-2 program all around the world, just before each planned
|
|
mission.
|
|
|
|
_________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| [photograph of the hulks of four U-2 planes with their |
|
|
| wings propped up enclosed by a fence with people |
|
|
| walking by in a long line looking at the planes.] |
|
|
| |
|
|
| A rare photograph of four badly damaged U-2's on display in Peking |
|
|
| (photo obtained from Francis Gary Powers). In his letter of |
|
|
| February 6, 1976 Powers wrote: "I am enclosing a photograph which |
|
|
| shows the wreckage of four U-2's on display in Peking, China. All |
|
|
| of them were shot down by SA-2 missiles. All of them are damaged |
|
|
| to the same or lesser extent than my plane was damaged." |
|
|
| This is an amazing statement for what it says, and for what it |
|
|
| omits. What about the four pilots? Were they American? Were they |
|
|
| Chinese? Or, is Powers trying to have us believe these planes were |
|
|
| shot down when in reality they were drones with no pilots? |
|
|
| We know that if they had been flying at U-2 altitude and with all |
|
|
| systems "go," they would not have been shot down by SA-2's. Powers |
|
|
| did not include any additional information, but left the door to |
|
|
| other mysteries wide open. |
|
|
|_______________________________________________________________________|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Now we begin to find the Achilles heel of the entire U-2
|
|
program, and perhaps the single link that gave someone the power to
|
|
ensure the success or failure of any go-for-broke U-2 mission.
|
|
Here was a way to demolish the Eisenhower-Khrushchev peace talks.
|
|
Consider the scenario. A tiny group of top-level technicians
|
|
with access to this hydrogen lifeline is charged with the
|
|
responsibility of getting it to the Powers U-2. However, someone
|
|
has arranged for less than a full cannister to be installed in the
|
|
U-2 just before takeoff. The preflight check shows "Hydrogen-OK"
|
|
because the preflight inspection only shows that the cannister is
|
|
there, not how much hydrogen is in it. The pilot has no way of
|
|
knowing that there is not sufficient hydrogen in the cannister for
|
|
3,900 miles because there is no gauge on his instrument panel. So,
|
|
the 24,000-pound aircraft takes off, accelerates to 114 knots, and
|
|
begins the long climb to altitude. Everything appears to be
|
|
perfectly normal. The engine runs fine. All equipment functions.
|
|
Then, at precisely the predetermined time, the hydrogen runs out.
|
|
The plane is as high as it can fly because it must make the longest
|
|
flight it has ever made. At that great height, the pilot hears a
|
|
slight rumble, typical of a flame-out, and his engine goes dead.
|
|
One way or another, he lands.
|
|
Persuaded none too gently by the Soviets that the rumble was in
|
|
reality a near-miss rocket strike, he goes along with the story.
|
|
Why shouldn't he? It's plausible. He says he was shot down.
|
|
Allen Dulles, who knows better, says he was not hit. And there is
|
|
the case. Someone preplanned for that U-2 to come down by
|
|
arranging to starve it of hydrogen. That is when Powers radioed,
|
|
or the telemeter radioed, a flame-out.
|
|
There were certain upper-echelon officials in research and
|
|
development who knew about the U-2's special characteristics and
|
|
could easily have arranged for the flame-out to occur.
|
|
When it was discovered that the U-2 had not completed the trip
|
|
but had gone down, a group at NASA began the unpleasant task of
|
|
getting out the canned cover story to account for that flight. On
|
|
May 5, 1960 high-level experts working within the framework of an
|
|
approved scenario issued a story which had the U-2 taking off from
|
|
Turkey and crossing the Soviet border inadvertently. But then they
|
|
said other things that were very strange. They stated that the U-2
|
|
was a "plane chartered from Lockheed by NASA" and that it was being
|
|
flown at the time by "a Lockheed employee." Furthermore, they said
|
|
the plane was "marked with `NASA' and the black and gold NASA
|
|
seal," and that the pilot "had reported having oxygen
|
|
difficulties." These were all official U.S. Government statements.
|
|
They were flashed all over the world, even though other men in the
|
|
Government knew they were lies.
|
|
To those familiar with the intricacies of preparing cover
|
|
stories or canned lies, the above may not seem crucial. But here
|
|
were top-echelon officials putting out an important public release
|
|
affecting national policy matters, and they caught themselves in a
|
|
trap. Telling Khrushchev that the plane left from Turkey when
|
|
Khrushchev had the plane, the pilot, the navigation maps, and the
|
|
camera with all its film was just plain stupid. But the trouble
|
|
was not stupidity. That NASA cover-story team did not know what
|
|
some others hidden away in the Government did know--that the plane
|
|
had left from Pakistan, that it did not have "NASA" and the gold
|
|
seal painted on it, and that the Lockheed employee had Air Force
|
|
identification and orders from Dulles (according to Dulles) to
|
|
declare that he worked for the CIA. It became obvious that
|
|
President Eisenhower did not know those things either. It was not
|
|
in his interest to have approved the release of such lies.
|
|
Knowing that it might have to use the NASA cover story someday,
|
|
the CIA worked with that agency to provide a cover story.
|
|
Sometimes U-2's did fly for NASA. The CIA had even placed a high
|
|
official (who used to be in the CIA's ultra-secret air division) in
|
|
NASA at a high-level job to have him there for just such an
|
|
eventuality. But no one had told him the facts of the operation;
|
|
or if they had, he did not tell his NASA associates. Yet he worked
|
|
in NASA's public affairs department. The May fifth cover story was
|
|
so unbelievable that Khrushchev burst forth a day later with his
|
|
own story about having the pilot and the plane, and he demolished
|
|
the official lies of the U.S. Government.
|
|
Then came the challenge to Eisenhower. Did the President, who
|
|
had worked so hard and so long to prepare for the ultimate summit
|
|
conference and for his Crusade for Peace, direct that U-2 to
|
|
overfly the USSR on May Day--the day of its most important
|
|
celebration? The idea was absurd, and Khrushchev knew it. Later
|
|
Khrushchev gave Eisenhower every opportunity to admit that others
|
|
in the U.S. Government had sent out that flight to sabotage the
|
|
conference, stating that such an admission would salvage the
|
|
meeting.
|
|
At this point, chances for world peace hung tenuously between
|
|
the two men who liked and understood each other. Khrushchev said:
|
|
"These missions are sent to prevent peace." He was ready to accept
|
|
Eisenhower's innocence.
|
|
Khrushchev played the whole event with great patience. When he
|
|
first announced the downing of the plane, he gave out very little
|
|
information, waiting to see what our side would say. Then he
|
|
displayed pictures of a heap of metal which he claimed to be the
|
|
U-2, but was obviously some other junk. He kept drawing us out.
|
|
This was the period when some of the Government's media lackeys
|
|
groped for ways to cover up the episode. In a strange editorial in
|
|
its May 7, 1960 edition, "The New York Times" said that the U-2
|
|
flight was an "accidental violation," as several other border
|
|
crossings may have been. They challenged Khrushchev's statement
|
|
that the plane had no identification. The "Times" quoted NASA's
|
|
report saying the plane had "NASA" and the NASA black and gold seal
|
|
on it. Both NASA and the "Times" were wrong. The "Times" was
|
|
repeating NASA's lies. Next the "Times" said: "Khrushchev said
|
|
American militarists sent the plane, whereas it was just a NASA
|
|
flight." The "Times" must have known better by May seventh.
|
|
After everyone had been thoroughly taken in by Khrushchev's
|
|
traps and the U.S. Government's lies, the big news broke on May
|
|
eighth. The "Times," caught flat-footed, came out with a big
|
|
headline: "Russians Hold Downed Pilot as Spy." Who determined
|
|
that a man carrying a number of U.S. military identifications was a
|
|
spy?
|
|
At the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, Senator
|
|
Capehart asked Dulles: "Why did you have to admit that we were
|
|
spying?" This is the point. Who was covering what? Was the CIA
|
|
providing a cover story, "the Powers spy gambit," to hide the real
|
|
purpose of this flight?
|
|
The stark "Times" headline almost made it look as if it was the
|
|
Soviets' fault. Then they quoted Khrushchev saying: "I
|
|
deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and well," and
|
|
with amazement, Khrushchev added: "How many silly things they have
|
|
said." He picked up one point which had been in the cover stories.
|
|
NASA had intimated that most likely Powers' oxygen supply had
|
|
failed and that he had flown out over USSR territory unconscious on
|
|
automatic pilot. Khrushchev quickly replied: "The oxygen did not
|
|
fail." Then he pointed out that if the oxygen had failed, Powers
|
|
could not have performed as skillfully as he had. He had performed
|
|
perfectly until his engine failed, and the developed film from
|
|
Powers' cameras proved it. Miles of clear photos were in
|
|
Khrushchev's possession.
|
|
Here is one of the most unusual facets of this operation, a key
|
|
point which it has been possible to piece together from recently
|
|
discovered evidence. How could Khrushchev know Powers had
|
|
performed his mission skillfully as far as Sverdlovsk? Khrushchev
|
|
knew because he had the U-2's camera, the film, and the pictures.
|
|
These pictures clearly showed rows and rows of Soviet aircraft on a
|
|
military airfield and industrial installations. Khrushchev
|
|
declared that he had been able to accurately determine the actual
|
|
altitude of the U-2 from the results of that photography--65,600
|
|
feet. This immediately raises the basic question of why Powers
|
|
wasn't at his maximum and safest altitude, above 80,000 feet (a
|
|
point brought out by Allen Dulles' testimony.)
|
|
The camera the Russians recovered from Powers' U-2 was a
|
|
military-type, 73B, serial number 732400. With wide-angle
|
|
capability, it took pictures of a 125-mile-wide strip. The film
|
|
was twenty-four centimeters wide and two thousand meters long,
|
|
capable of shooting four thousand paired aerial pictures.
|
|
That camera was not the one routinely used by the CIA spy U-2's.
|
|
This U-2 had been doctored in Japan by someone who was willing to
|
|
give away the plane but unwilling to reveal the technology of the
|
|
newer U-2 camera. This was skillful deception from the inside.
|
|
Dr. Ray S. Cline, former Deputy Director of the CIA, wrote in
|
|
his book, "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," "The invention of the U-2
|
|
high-flying aircraft and the camera capable of taking pictures from
|
|
80,000 feet, pictures that would permit analysts to recognize
|
|
objects on the ground with dimensions as small as 12 inches . . .
|
|
this technical miracle revolutionized intelligence collection."[2]
|
|
The pictures Khrushchev showed to the public and to newsmen gave
|
|
away the ruse. The industrial installations and the rows of
|
|
aircraft exhibited were tiny dots on regular film, and even with
|
|
the best enlargement, they would never have met Dr. Cline's
|
|
criterion of twelve inches from 30,000 feet.
|
|
This is a crucial point. The U-2 incident was a clever and
|
|
sinister deception. Its perpetrators intended for the Russians to
|
|
find the U-2 and to think Powers was doing a spy's work. Yet,
|
|
these perpetrators were far enough up in Government circles to know
|
|
that it was the technology of the camera which must not be given
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|
away.
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|
Eventually, President Eisenhower took the blame for the whole
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|
thing, and his dream of a summit conference, trip to Moscow, and an
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|
around-the-world Crusade for Peace was shattered. Certainly he had
|
|
the U-2 double-cross in mind when he delivered his famous
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|
"military-industrial complex" speech at the end of his term of
|
|
office.
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|
Nixon played a significant role in all of this. All clandestine
|
|
activities must be directed by the National Security Council. The
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|
law requires that the NSC direct the CIA. To perform these most
|
|
sensitive activities quietly, the NSC established a small and very
|
|
powerful group for this purpose. That special group, 5412/2 as it
|
|
was known then (later the 303 committee and the 40 group), was
|
|
chaired by the Vice President. Its key members were the Secretary
|
|
of State and the Secretary of Defense, or their designated
|
|
representatives. In the spring of 1960, that group consisted of
|
|
Nixon, Christian Herter, and Thomas Gates. Since these were very
|
|
busy men, they generally appointed a key official to represent them
|
|
at meetings.
|
|
Here we get to the most important point of the entire U-2
|
|
fiasco. Who authorized it? Who sent it out?
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|
Late in the Senate hearings, Senator Gore got right to the
|
|
point.
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|
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Gore: You [Dulles] have told this Committee that you
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|
received this approval [for the Powers flight] or authority
|
|
after April ninth. [There had been a previous successful U-2
|
|
flight over the USSR on April 9, 1960.]
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|
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|
Dulles: That is my recollection.
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|
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|
Gore: . . . from whom did you receive this authorization,
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|
who were the parties, and was the President one of them?
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|
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|
Dulles: Well, we had a group.
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|
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|
Gore: Who?
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|
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|
Dulles: Well, I don't know that I should go into names, but
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|
there was someone in the Department of State, DOD, and
|
|
someone at the White House to keep general track of the
|
|
operations, and it was through that little group that we
|
|
received, after a flight was made, we were given a general
|
|
clearance to make another flight. [Dulles calls that crucial
|
|
NSC clearance which is required by law, a "general
|
|
clearance." Furthermore, Dulles does not mention the Vice
|
|
President, who had to be there.]
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|
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|
Gore: Well, if this hearing is to serve any useful purpose,
|
|
and I sure hope it will, it seems to me that it can only come
|
|
through learning of whatever error that was committed, if
|
|
committed, in order to avoid it in the future, and to improve
|
|
such techniques.
|
|
You told us you received your authorization from a group and
|
|
you have three agencies, the White House--I don't like to
|
|
refer to the White House--I would say the President, the
|
|
Office of the President, and the DOD, and one from the
|
|
Department of State. Is that your chain of command?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: My line of command, yes sir, so far as the policy of
|
|
flying or not flying was concerned.
|
|
|
|
Gore: Who designates these people from these three agencies?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: Well, there was no formalized delegation. This grew
|
|
up as the best method of handling this, and I just can't
|
|
answer that. I assume that they were properly authorized.
|
|
They always seemed to act with full authority. And I don't
|
|
know whether any formal designation was ever made or not.
|
|
[This is untrue, and in light of Watergate, it is a fantastic
|
|
statement. Who in hell is running things? Dulles *assumes*
|
|
they were authorized.]
|
|
|
|
Gore: Your authorization, your authority on this particular
|
|
flight stemmed from this group?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: That is correct.
|
|
|
|
Gore: You do not know, then, whether the man representing
|
|
the Office of the President was personally designated by the
|
|
President?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: I assume he was agreeable to the President.
|
|
|
|
Gore: I would, too, but do you of your personal knowledge,
|
|
do you know whether or not this man was personally selected
|
|
by the President, or by one of his assistants?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: I assume that he was, but have never questioned
|
|
that.
|
|
|
|
Gore: Do you know whether he personally reported to the
|
|
President?
|
|
|
|
Dulles: I assume that he did, but I never questioned him on
|
|
that . . .
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|
|
|
Gore: I would assume so too.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Here is the most astonishing piece of evidence about the misuse
|
|
of Presidential authority to come to light, including the Nixon
|
|
tapes. The powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee was asking
|
|
the Director of Central Intelligence where he got his authority for
|
|
this infamous flight, and all Allen Dulles could reply was, "Well,
|
|
we had a group." Then, when Senator Gore asked if Dulles knew
|
|
whether the men in that group hat the proper authority to issue
|
|
such orders, all that the Director of the CIA could say was, "I
|
|
assume that he did." There is the whole crux of the U-2 flight,
|
|
the breakup of the summit conference, the chance for peace.
|
|
Because actual authorization could be bypassed by the
|
|
*assumption* of authorization, and this has become standard
|
|
procedure, illegal acts like the U-2 incident can be committed by
|
|
those whose motives are to undermine the power and the process of
|
|
the elected Government.
|
|
Then, to sum up and to underscore this terrible fact, Senator
|
|
Gore repeated: "I was only asking you if you knew that he had
|
|
reported directly to the President with respect to the approval of
|
|
this particular program."
|
|
And Dulles replied: "No, I don't know that." What Dulles was
|
|
really saying was that he really didn't know who had sent out that
|
|
plane. It is fairly common practice to give some of these
|
|
approvals by telephone. But how did he know who was on the phone?
|
|
To verify this procedure I can tell you that I have been called
|
|
at night by a person who said he was the Chief of Staff of the U.S.
|
|
Air Force, General Thomas D. White. I was told by that voice to go
|
|
to Allen Dulles' home and follow the Director's orders. I went
|
|
there and was told that he had immediate need of an airplane for an
|
|
emergency in Tokyo. Upon receiving this order I had a plane turned
|
|
around in flight over the Pacific and returned to Tokyo, where it
|
|
was used for the clandestine mission. The mission was successful,
|
|
and I received a written commendation from the CIA.
|
|
The point is that we did this by telephone. I ordered the
|
|
action across the Pacific by telephone, and, as it happened, that
|
|
deft move prevented a coup d'etat in a distant country. Of course,
|
|
I knew General White's voice. But the fact remains that a
|
|
clandestine operation run as Dulles and Gore described it is
|
|
evidence of a very feeble method.
|
|
In this ominous byplay, we see the shadow of hands behind the
|
|
scenes. If Eisenhower did not order the flight, who did? If
|
|
Dulles didn't know whether the men whom he said authorized the
|
|
flight had that authority, who knew? If someone had the inside
|
|
knowledge to get away with launching an unauthorized flight, who
|
|
was it? And if those people knew that the cameras must be
|
|
protected, who were they? By the time you answer those questions,
|
|
even by the time you ask them, you can draw the strings tightly
|
|
around that very small group who actually did operate the U-2's in
|
|
1960. There were only three or four men able to do those things,
|
|
and their names are in the Pentagon telephone book of 1960. I will
|
|
not name names as it is not my intention to jeopardize these men's
|
|
lives.
|
|
Later in the hearings the Senators wanted to find out if any
|
|
orders had gone out suspending overflights because of the summit
|
|
conference schedule. Dulles waffled that question, so they asked
|
|
about prior events and learned that flights had been cancelled when
|
|
Khrushchev met with Eisenhower at Camp David.
|
|
Later on Gore said: "One of the big questions before the
|
|
country in millions of peoples' minds is why this flight was
|
|
undertaken so near the summit."
|
|
In reply to another question Dulles said: "I think the question
|
|
could be raised, if it was done without the President's knowledge,
|
|
as to *who was directing the ship of state*." [author's emphasis]
|
|
Now, there it is! This was a most crucial line. Allen Dulles
|
|
was beginning to have some grave doubts himself about the series of
|
|
events. His answer supports the notion that he too did not know
|
|
what really had taken place. Following is a first-hand experience
|
|
that will prove to even the greatest skeptic that the Director of
|
|
the CIA does not always know of clandestine activities undertaken
|
|
by his own organization.
|
|
I was with Dulles and Bissell the evening they found out that a
|
|
plane was missing over the Soviet Union. They knew nothing about
|
|
it, and they had told the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
|
|
and the President that not a single U.S. aircraft--military,
|
|
Government, or commercial--was missing, as the Soviets claimed.
|
|
Dulles called me to his house to meet with him and Bissell to see
|
|
if I could locate a missing plane. I went to the Pentagon Command
|
|
Center where I was later able to discover and confirm that a plane
|
|
carrying nine U.S. Air Force men on a CIA mission was shot down
|
|
over the USSR. It turned out to be *Allen Dulles' own CIA VIP
|
|
airplane!* He did not know about that, just as he did not know
|
|
about the Powers U-2.
|
|
During the first six months of 1960, I was the focal-point
|
|
officer assigned by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force to
|
|
provide special Air Force support to certain clandestine CIA
|
|
overflight operations. In April 1960, a member of the Chief's
|
|
Pentagon office staff was in Thailand overseeing a major series of
|
|
long-range overflights into Tibet and far northwestern China.
|
|
Later that spring, orders came down to stop those overflights. The
|
|
given reason was that the President wanted nothing to interfere
|
|
with the success of his forthcoming Paris summit conference.
|
|
Orders were sent from my office to ground the overflights.
|
|
These same orders applied to the U-2 program. We all took our
|
|
orders from the same authorities. The U-2's were supposed to have
|
|
been grounded along with the Tibetan overflights. So, when Allen
|
|
Dulles himself wonders who was directing the ship of state, it
|
|
becomes apparent that he did not know who was running the country!
|
|
The U-2 is nearly forgotten today, and there will perhaps never
|
|
be any further investigation of this crucial event. Eisenhower and
|
|
Khrushchev, both old warriors, might have pulled off a real peace
|
|
agreement. We shall never know. But we do know some things. Many
|
|
of the top-echelon men who were in the Pentagon during those
|
|
fateful days of spring 1960 are back there now in the Carter
|
|
Administration. Others are in top positions throughout Washington.
|
|
It may be that they know how easy it was to pull the rug out from
|
|
under Eisenhower, and they know how they could do the same thing
|
|
again today.
|
|
|
|
|
|
____________________
|
|
|
|
[1] At the foot of the northern slopes of Mt Fujiyama, near Tokyo, there
|
|
is an airfield called Atsugi. During the fire-bomb and A-bomb days
|
|
of World War II's finale over Japan, American bombers were ordered
|
|
to stay away from Atsugi. When the war ended, Atsugi was the sole
|
|
landing ground available for the transport planes that carried
|
|
occupation forces into and American POW's out of Japan. On the first
|
|
day of occupation, American pilots discovered that Atsugi was
|
|
actually a vast underground headquarters. A few years later during
|
|
the MacArthur dynasty, Atsugi became United States CIA headquarters
|
|
in the Far East.
|
|
|
|
[2] This camera was developed by a group working under Arthur Lundahl,
|
|
consisting of geniuses from American industry. Cline went on to
|
|
say, these miracles "were made possible by parallel development of
|
|
camera, lenses, and special films for high-altitude photography."
|
|
The Lundahl system employed eight reflectors and exposed eight
|
|
films through a single lens at the same time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
daveus rattus
|
|
|
|
yer friendly neighborhood ratman
|
|
|
|
KOYAANISQATSI
|
|
|
|
ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
|
|
in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
|
|
5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
|