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Article: 468 of sgi.talk.ratical
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From: dave@ratmandu.esd.sgi.com (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
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Subject: memorandum by J.E. Hoover on 11/29/63 re: his meeting with LBJ
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Keywords: J.E. Hoover's FBI "spoon fed" the Warren Comission its data
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Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1992 19:29:31 GMT
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Lines: 577
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Summary: The second half of this post includes the copy of a memorandum
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written by J. Edgar Hoover immediately after he met w/LBJ in
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the Oval Office seven days after President Kennedy had been
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murdered. The first half analyzes some of the more remarkable
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details of this memo.
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In 1963, John Edgar Hoover and Lyndon Baines Johnson knew each other
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very well. They had lived across the street from each other for the
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past 19 years. A professional bureaucrat of formidable talents, a 29-
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year-old Hoover was appointed director of the Bureau of Investigation
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in 1924 (Hoover added "Federal" to the title in 1935) by then Attorney
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General Harlan F. Stone to clean up a corrupt organization. During
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WWII, President Roosevelt expanded the FBI's reach charging Hoover with
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investigations of Nazi and Communist activities in the U.S. The Cold
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War gave the Bureau new power and Hoover new glory. Hoover's dossiers
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continued to grow as well as his command of Congress, his manipulation
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and intimidation of the press, and his stature in the country. Hoover
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supplied Joe McCarthy with a great deal of the ammunition which enabled
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McCarthy to sustain his "crusade" far longer than would have been
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possible without Hoover's connivance.
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When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General in 1961, Hoover's
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entrenched power-structures suffered a two-year, 10-month setback.
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Long before 1961, Hoover had created a direct channel of communication
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with whoever was the current occupant of the Oval Office--bypassing the
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actual chain of command which went from the President, through the
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Attorney General, to Director of the FBI.
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When LBJ assumed the Presidency, Hoover's direct link into the White
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House was re-established. Johnson's official relationship with Hoover
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was enhanced by personal friendship as well. "As majority leader [in
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the Senate], Johnson already had neen receiving a steady stream of
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reports and dossiers from the Director . . . which he prized both as
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a means of controlling difficult senators and as a gratification of
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earthier instincts. For President Johnson, secrets were in themselves
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perquisites of power . . . No chief executive praised the Director so
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warmly. In an executive order exempting Hoover, then sixty nine, from
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compulsory retirement at seventy, Johnson hailed him as `a quiet,
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humble and magnificent public servant . . . a hero to millions of
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citizens and an anathema to all evil men. . . . The nation cannot
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afford to lose you . . . No other American, now or in our past, has
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served the cause of justice so faithfully and so well' ("Johnson Hails
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Hoover Service, Waives Compulsory Retirement," NYT, May 9, 1964)."
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-- from "The Age of Surveillance, The Aims and Methods of America's
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Political Intelligence System," by Frank Donner, (c) 1980, Knopf.
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The following memorandum, written by Hoover immediately after his
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meeting with President Johnson, just seven days after the assassination
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of President Kennedy, is a remarkable document to say the least. There
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is much information imparted in the memo regarding just how fluid and
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unstable the cover story about who killed JFK still was shaping up to be
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at that time. By analyzing the discrepancies between the story Hoover
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briefed Johnson about on November 29th, and what the final cover story
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handed down by the Warren Commission would claim almost a year later,
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we can better appreciate the degree to which the final "official report"
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was sculpted to fit the constraints the Commission was forced to adhere
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to, regardless of the actual facts of the assassination.
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This document is what is known in bureaucracy-speak as a "memo for the
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record." It was a customary practice in the upper levels of the
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bureaucracy in the days before electronic technology in Washington, D.C.
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An official of high rank would usually return to her or his office
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after such a meeting and dictate a memorandum of as many details of the
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discussion as could be remembered. It was a way of recording one's own
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professional dealings for future reference.
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Hoover starts out recounting that Johnson brings up "the proposed group"
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--what will become the Warren Commission--to study the report Hoover is
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trying to complete by the end of the same day. This has been initiated
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by Johnson to prevent an independent investigation by Congress of the
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assassination (Reagan tried to do the same thing with the Tower
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Commission). Johnson would publically announce the creation of the
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Warren Commission later that same day. This was a critical move by
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Johnson: by appointing the Warren Commission, they effectively bottled
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up Bobby Kennedy, they bottled up the Senate, and they bottled up Texas.
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The Tower Commission didn't succeed in pre-empting an investigation by
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Congress. In the end, the Warren Commission didn't either, but it did
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keep the cork in place, preventing any other "official" examination, for
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well over another decade.
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It is interesting to note that of all the people listed at the bottom of
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page one, retired General Lauris Norstad (who had been head of the NATO
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forces at SHAPE headquarters in Europe before his retirement) was the
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only one who somehow succeeded in not serving on this Presidential
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Commission. Earl Warren did NOT want the job and had sent a memo ahead
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to the Oval Office, before he answered LBJ's summons, stating he would
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not participate in such a commission. But when push came to shove,
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Johnson's formidable powers of persuasion turned Warren's `no' into a
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`yes.' Apparently, even such focused persuasion could not win Norstad's
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agreement.
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The six topic bullets at the bottom of page one are file listings. This
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is important for anyone ever finding themself searching for documents
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from the government through Freedom Of Information Act requests. This
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type of listing is very useful beccause it lets one know that these
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files exist, and that one might be able to find documents using this
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method which one might not find (or even know about) any other way.
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In the middle of the first paragraph on page 3, Hoover relates how the
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Dallas police didn't even make a move to stop Ruby. This is a pretty
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heavy line by Hoover. He implies the Dallas cops must have somehow
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been in collusion to silence Oswald from living to stand trial. But
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the implication is never fleshed out.
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The second half of page three contains some of the most enlightening
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statements of the whole memo. Hoover tells Johnson three shots were
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fired. Johnson asks "if any were fired at him." This question goes
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a long way towards explaining the duress under which he served as
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president. LBJ had heard bullets flying overhead--he had been that
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close to the action. It was completely out of keeping with the
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standard security procedures the Secret Service employed to have any
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such parade appearance be attended by *both* the president and the
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vice president. Johnson heard the sounds of those guns very clearly
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and the message they conveyed. He lived out the rest of his public
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life always aware of their possible return. Not long before he died,
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LBJ was interviewed by his friend and writer Leo Janos. In the July,
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1973 issue of "The Atlantic Monthly," Janos relates that LBJ told him:
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1. "that the assassination in Dallas had been part of a conspiracy;
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2. "I never believed that Oswald acted alone . . .;
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3. "we had been operating a damned Murder Inc. in the Carribean."
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The presence of the vice president 2 cars behind the president in the
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parade in Dallas was a fundamental breach of the level of security
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normally adhered to by the Secret Service. He took the experience back
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with him to the White House and never forgot its meaning. He could
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just as easily be snuffed out if he ever got out of line.
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Then there follows a most curious and confused explanation by Hoover of
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the three shots fired: "the President was hit by the first and third
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bullets and the second hit the Governor". Obviously Hoover did not yet
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know about the injury suffered by James Tague. Tague's face was nicked
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by a bullet fragment (or a fragment from the curb it hit) which missed
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the limousene entirely and struck the curb at his feet, approximately
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160 feet past the location of the president's car. This shot would end
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up having to be one of "the three bullets fired" in the official story.
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Johnson then explicitly asks again "were they aimed at the President."
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It would appear that LBJ needed repeated assurance by Hoover that no one
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had intended to shoot him. Hoover then says a mouthful when he states
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"I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could fire
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those three shots in three seconds." Apparently they did not yet
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understand the implications of the Zapruder film (or perhaps they were
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confident they would be successful in never allowing the public to gain
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any kind of access to it) and that it would be used as a clock.
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Probably the most confused statements Hoover recounts making are when
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he describes for Johnson's benefit how Connally was hit: "I explained
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that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was fired and
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in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if Connally had
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not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by the second
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shot. I said yes." All we can conclude about this muddled explanation
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is that Hoover was doing his best to explain things that he himself did
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not understand or appreciate the complexity of.
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Hoover goes on to claim they found the gun and three shells on the fifth
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floor. As you can see at this point, the number of variations on what
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would become the official cover story are quite numerous. All of the
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the facts of the assassination were working against them. They had
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a story all worked out--3 seconds, 3 shots, fifth floor--and yet they
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didn't know the facts.
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Fletcher Prouty commented on this issue to me while we were discussing
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this memo recently. "It reminds me so much of when the U-2 was lost and
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the guys from NASA began to explain the U-2 flight until a couple of
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days later when somebody told them, `hey--it wasn't a NASA flight, we
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can't do it that way.' And they began to change the cover story. But
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then Kruschev said, `Look, I've got the pilot, I know the story.' The
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U-2 boys used to work across the hall from me--I'd see them coming and
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going--oh they were shattered, because their cover story had been
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totally wrong. So Hoover is in the same kind of a box here--he is
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trying to explain something that is nothing but a cover story, and
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almost everytime he turns around, he finds there's another hole in it."
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Near the end Johnson extolls the virtues of his relationship to Hoover
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stating "I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother and personal
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friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to his family;
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that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town." Pretty
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laudatory words which substantiate the unusally close rapport these two
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men had. Then Hoover writes that Johnson tells him "he would not embroil
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me in a jurisdictional dispute. . . " This was the reference to Bobby
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Kennedy and the pre-empting of any other legitimate, independent and
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official investigation that would NOT be under the control of the FBI.
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They would see to it that there would not be the kind of "rash of
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investigations" Hoover said at the beginning of this meeting "would be a
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three-ring circus."
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It is a known fact that in his later years Hoover's meglomania
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approached epic proportions. He had various reasons why he did not want
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any independent investigation which would *not* be dependent upon his
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agency for the collection of data and use of his investigative staff.
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Johnson was feeling quite vulnerable in these first days and was
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very dependent on Hoover to tell him what to do concerning how to
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consolidate his position and "reassure" the nation the assassination
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was not political in any way, but rather the random occurence of a lone
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sick mind. That was the only approach to take if they wanted to avoid
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having to deal with why Kennedy had been killed. By de-politicizing
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the assassination, they were able to ignore the basic question of why.
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This memorandum shows that the people in the federal government who were
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responsible for creating the Warren Commission, and giving it only a
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very selected and specific set of "data" by which they reached the
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conclusions that became the official report, that they did not start
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with the final cover story--they created it later because even Hoover
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and Johnson didn't know about it a week after the event. They were still
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making things up a week later. It goes back to the old truth that it's a
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big mistake to overestimate the abilities and knowledge of people--even
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in high office. They can make pretty stupid mistakes and then when they
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have to recant their stories, you are left with the kind of contrivance
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we know as the Warren Report.
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--ratitor
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--
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daveus rattus
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yer friendly neighborhood ratman
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KOYAANISQATSI
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ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language) n. 1. crazy life. 2. life
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in turmoil. 3. life out of balance. 4. life disintegrating.
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5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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WASHINGTON __, D.C.
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1:39 p.m. November 29, 1963
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
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MR. BELMONT
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MR. MOHR
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MR. CONRAD
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MR. DE LOACH
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MR. EVANS
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MR. ROSEN
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MR. SULLIVAN
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The President called and asked if I am familiar with the proposed
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group they are trying to get to study my report - two from the House,
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two from the Senate, two from the courts, and a couple of outsiders. I
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replied that I had not heard of that but had seen reports from the
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Senate Investigating Committee.
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The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file and my
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report. I told him I thought it would be very bad to have a rash of
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investigations. He then indicated the only way to stop it is to
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appoint a high-level committee to evaluate my report and tell the House
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and Senate not to go ahead with the investigation. I stated that would
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be a three-ring circus.
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The President then asked what I think about Allen Dulles, and I
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replied that he is a good man. He then asked about John McCloy, and I
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stated I am not as enthusiastic about McCloy, that he is a good man but
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I am not so certain as to the matter of publicity he might want. The
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President then mentioned General (Lauris) Norstad, and I said he is a
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good man. He said in the House he might try (Hale) Boggs and (Gerald
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R.) Ford and in the Senate (Richard B.) Russell and (John Sherman)
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Cooper. I asked him about Cooper and he indicated Cooper of Kentucky
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whom he described as a judicial man, stating he would not want (Jacob
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K.) Javits. I agreed on this point. He then reiterated Ford of
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Michigan, and I indicated I know of him but do not know him and had
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never seen him except on television the other day and that he handled
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himself well on television. I indicated that I do know Boggs.
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Johnson, President Lyndon B.
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Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
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Presidential Commission on Assassination
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of President John F. Kennedy
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Security - Presidential
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Presidential Conferences
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Presidential Travel Security
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Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
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Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
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The President then mentioned that (Walter) Jenkins had told him that
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I have designated Mr. DeLoach to work with them as he had on the Hill.
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He indicated they appreciated that and just wanted to tell me they
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consider Mr. DeLoach as high class as I do, and that they salute me for
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knowing how to pick good men.
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I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation
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wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week
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as an angle in Mexico is giving trouble - the matter of Oswald's getting
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$6500 from the Cuban Embassy and coming back to this country with it;
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that we are not able to prove that fact; that we have information he
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was there on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New Orleans
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on that date; that a story came in changing the date to September 28
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and he was in Mexico on the 28th. I related that the police have again
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arrested Duran, a member of the Cuban Embassy; that they will hold her
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two or three days; will confront her with the original informant; and
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will also try a lie detector test on her.
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The President then inquired if I pay any attention to the lie
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detector test. I answered that I would not pay 100% attention to them;
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that it was only a psychological asset in investigation; that I would
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not want to be a part of sending a man to the chair on a lie detector
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test. I explained that we have used them in bank investigations and a
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person will confess before the lie detector test is finished, more or
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less fearful it will show him guilty. I said the lie detector test has
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this psychological advantage. I further stated that it is a misnomer to
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call it a lie detector since the evaluation of the chart made by the
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machine is made by a human being and any human being is apt to make the
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wrong interpretation.
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I stated, if Oswald had lived and had take a lie detector test, this
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with the evidence we have would have added that much strength to the
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case; that these is no question he is the man.
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I also told him that Rubenstein down there has offered to take a lie
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detector test but his lawyer must be consulted first; that I doubt the
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lawyer will allow him to do so; that he has a West Coast lawyer
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somewhat like the Edward Bennett Williams type and almost as much of a
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shyster.
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The President asked if we have any relationship between the two
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(Oswald and Rubenstein) as yet. I replied that at the present time we have
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- 2 -
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Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
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Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
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not; that there was a story that the fellow had been in Rubenstein's
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nightclub but it has not been confirmed. I told the President that
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Rubenstein is a very seedy character, had a bad record - street brawls,
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fights, etc.; that in Dallas, if a fellow came into his nightclub and
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could not pay his bill completely, Rubenstein would beat him up and
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throw him out; that he did not drink or smoke; that he was an
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egomaniac; that he likes to be in the limelight; knew all of the
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police officers in the white light district; let them come in and get
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food and liquor, etc.; and that is how I think he got into police
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headquarters. I said if they ever made any move, the pictures did not
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show it even when they saw him approach and he got right up to Oswald
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and pressed the pistol against Oswald's stomach; that neither officer
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on either side made any effort to grab Rubenstein - not until after the
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pistol was fired. I said, secondly, the chief of police admits he moved
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Oswald in the morning as a convenience and at the request of motion
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picture people who wanted daylight. I said insofar as tying Rubenstein
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and Oswald together, we have not yet done so; that there are a number
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of stories which tied Oswald to the Civil Liberties Union in New York in
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which he applied for membership and to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
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which is pro-Castro, directed by communists, and financed to some extent
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by the Castro Government.
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The President asked how many shots were fired, and I told him three.
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He then asked if any were fired at him. I said no, that three shots
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were fired at the President and we have them. I stated that our
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ballistic experts were able to prove the shots were fired by this gun;
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that the President was hit by the first and third bullets and the second
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hit the Governor; that there were three shots; that one complete
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bullet rolled out of the President's head; that it tore a large part of
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the President's head off; that in trying to massage his heart on the
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way into the hospital they loosened the bullet which fell on the
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stretcher and we have that.
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He then asked were they aimed at the President. I replied they were
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aimed at the President, no question about that.
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I further advised him that we have also tested the fact you could
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fire those three shots in three seconds. I explained that there is a
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story out that there must have been more than one man to fire several
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shots but we have proven it could be done by one man.
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The President then asked how it happened that Connally was hit. I
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explained that Connally turned to the President when the first shot was
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fired and in that turning he got hit. The President then asked, if
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Connally had not been in his seat, would the President have been hit by
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the second shot. I said yes.
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- 3 -
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Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
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Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
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I related that on the fifth floor of the building where we found the
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gun and the wrapping paper we found three empty shells that had been
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fired and one that had not been fired. that he had four but didn't fire
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the fourth; then threw the gun aside; went down the steps; was seen
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by a police officer; the manager told the officer that Oswald was all
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right, worked there; they let him go; he got on a bus; went to his
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home and got a jacket; then came back downtown, walking; the police
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officer who was killed stopped him, not knowing who he was; and he
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fired and killed the police officer.
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The President asked if we can prove that and I answered yes.
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I further related that Oswald then walked another two blocks; went
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to the theater; the woman selling tickets was so suspicious - said he
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was carrying a gun when he went into the theater - that she notified the
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police; the police and our man went in and located Oswald. I told him
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they had quite a struggle with Oswald but that he was subdued and shown
|
||
out and taken to police headquarters.
|
||
|
||
I advised the President that apparently Oswald had come down the
|
||
steps from the fifth floor; that apparently the elevator was not used.
|
||
|
||
The President then indicated our conclusions are: (1) he is the one
|
||
who did it; (2) after the President was hit, Governor Connally was hit;
|
||
(3) the President would have been hit three times except for the fact
|
||
that Governor Connally turned after the first shot and was hit by the
|
||
second; (4) whether he was connected with the Cuban operation with
|
||
money we are trying to nail down. I told him that is what we are trying
|
||
to nail down; that we have copies of the correspondence; that none of
|
||
the letters dealt with any indication of violence or assassination;
|
||
that they were dealing with a visa to go back to Russia.
|
||
|
||
I advised the President that his wife had been very hostile, would
|
||
not cooperate and speaks only Russian; that yesterday she said , if we
|
||
could give assurance she would be allowed to remain in the country, she
|
||
would cooperate; and that I told our agents to give that assurance and
|
||
sent a Russian-speaking agent to Dallas last night to interview her. I
|
||
said I do not know whether or not she has any information but we would
|
||
learn what we could.
|
||
|
||
The President asked how Oswald had access to the fifth floor of the
|
||
building. I replied that he had access to all floors. The President
|
||
asked where was his office and I stated he did not have any particular
|
||
place; that he
|
||
|
||
|
||
- 4 -
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
|
||
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
|
||
|
||
|
||
was not situated in any particular place; that he was just a general
|
||
packer of requisitions that came in for books from Dallas schools; that
|
||
he would have had proper access to the fifth and sixth floors whereas
|
||
usually the employees were down on lower floors. The President then
|
||
inquired if anybody saw him on the fifth floor, and I stated he was seen
|
||
by one of the workmen before the assassination.
|
||
|
||
The President then asked if we got a picture taken of him shooting
|
||
the gun and I said no. He asked what was the picture sold for $25,000,
|
||
and I advised him this was a picture of the parade showing Mrs. Kennedy
|
||
crawling out of the back seat; that there was no Secret Service Agent
|
||
on the back of the car; that in the past they have added steps on the
|
||
back of the car and usually had an agent on either side standing on the
|
||
bumper; that I did not know why this was not done - that the President
|
||
may have requested it; that the bubble top was not up but I understand
|
||
the bubble top was not worth anything because it was made entirely of
|
||
plastic; that I had learned much to my surprise that the Secret Service
|
||
does not have any armored cars.
|
||
|
||
The President asked if I have a bulletproof car and I told him I
|
||
most certainly have. I told him we use it here for my own use and,
|
||
whenever we have any raids, we make use of the bulletproof car on them.
|
||
I explained that it is a limousine which has been armorplated and that
|
||
it looks exactly like any other car. I stated I think the President
|
||
ought to have a bulletproof car; that from all I understand the Secret
|
||
Service has had two cars with metal plates underneath the car to take
|
||
care of hand grenades or bombs thrown out on the street. I said this is
|
||
European; that there have been several such attempts on DeGaulle's
|
||
life; but they do not do that in this country; that all assassinations
|
||
have been with guns; and for that reason I think very definitely the
|
||
President ought to always ride in a bulletproof car; that it certainly
|
||
would prevent anything like this ever happening again; but that I do
|
||
not mean a sniper could not snipe him from a window if he were exposed.
|
||
|
||
The President asked if I meant on his ranch he should be in a
|
||
bulletproof car. I said I would think so; that the little car we rode
|
||
around in when I was at the ranch should be bulletproofed; that it
|
||
ought to be done very quietly. I told him we have four bulletproof cars
|
||
in the Bureau: one on the West Coast, one in New York and two here. I
|
||
said this could be done quietly without publicity and without pictures
|
||
taken of it if handled properly and I think he should have one on his
|
||
ranch.
|
||
|
||
|
||
- 5 -
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, November 29, 1963
|
||
Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Rosen, Sullivan
|
||
|
||
|
||
The President then asked if I think all the entrances should be
|
||
guarded. I replied by all means, that he had almost to be in the
|
||
capacity of a so-called prisoner because without that security anything
|
||
could be done. I told him lots of phone calls had been received over
|
||
the last four or five days about threats on his life; that I talked to
|
||
the Attorney General about the funeral procession from the White House
|
||
to the Cathedral; that I was opposed to it. The President remarked
|
||
that the Secret Service told them not to but the family wanted to do it.
|
||
I stated that was what the Attorney General told me but I was very much
|
||
opposed to it. I further related that I saw the procession from the
|
||
Capitol to the White House on Pennsylvania and, while they had police
|
||
standing on the curbs, when the parade came, the police turned around
|
||
and looked at the parade.
|
||
|
||
The President then stated he is going to take every precaution he
|
||
can; that he wants to talk to me; and asked if I would put down my
|
||
thoughts. He stated I was more than head of the FBI - I was his brother
|
||
and personal friend; that he knew I did not want anything to happen to
|
||
his family; that he has more confidence in me than anybody in town;
|
||
that he would not embroil me in a jurisdictional dispute; but that he
|
||
did want to have my thoughts on the matter to advocate as his own
|
||
opinion.
|
||
|
||
I stated I would be glad to do this for him and that I would do
|
||
anything I can. The President expressed his appreciation.
|
||
|
||
Very truly yours,
|
||
|
||
[signed J. E. H.]
|
||
|
||
John Edgar Hoover
|
||
Director
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
- 6 -
|
||
|
||
|