mirror of
https://github.com/nhammer514/textfiles-politics.git
synced 2024-10-01 01:15:38 -04:00
385 lines
22 KiB
XML
385 lines
22 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
|
|
<xml>
|
|
<div class="article">
|
|
<p>CUBA, <ent type='PERSON'>CASTRO</ent>, and the UNITED STATES
|
|
or How One Man With A Cigar Dominated American Foreign Policy</p>
|
|
<p> In 1959, a rebel, Fidel Castro, overthrew the reign of
|
|
Fulgencia Batista in Cuba; a small island 90 miles off the
|
|
Florida coast. There have been many coups and changes of
|
|
government in the world since then. Few if any have had the
|
|
effect on Americans and American foreign policy as this one.</p>
|
|
<p>In 1952, Sergeant Fulgencia Batista staged a successful
|
|
bloodless coup in Cuba . </p>
|
|
<p>Batista never really had any cooperation and rarely
|
|
garnered much support. His reign was marked by continual
|
|
dissension.
|
|
</p>
|
|
<p> After waiting to see if Batista would be seriously opposed,
|
|
Washington recognized his government. Batista had already
|
|
broken ties with the Soviet Union and became an ally to the
|
|
U.S. throughout the cold war. He was continually friendly and
|
|
helpful to American business interest. But he failed to bring
|
|
democracy to Cuba or secure the broad popular support that
|
|
might have legitimized his rape of the 1940 Constitution.</p>
|
|
<p>As the people of Cuba grew increasingly dissatisfied with
|
|
his gangster style politics, the tiny rebellions that had
|
|
sprouted began to grow. Meanwhile the U.S. government was
|
|
aware of and shared the distaste for a regime increasingly
|
|
nauseating to most public opinion. It became clear that Batista
|
|
regime was an odious type of government. It killed its own
|
|
citizens, it stifled dissent. (1)</p>
|
|
<p> At this time Fidel Castro appeared as leader of the growing
|
|
rebellion. Educated in America he was a proponent of the
|
|
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He conducted a brilliant guerilla
|
|
campaign from the hills of Cuba against Batista. On January
|
|
1959, he prevailed and overthrew the Batista government.</p>
|
|
<p>Castro promised to restore democracy in Cuba, a feat
|
|
Batista had failed to accomplish. This promise was looked
|
|
upon benevolently but watchfully by Washington. Castro was
|
|
believed to be too much in the hands of the people to stretch
|
|
the rules of politics very far. The U.S. government supported
|
|
Castro's coup. It professed to not know about Castro's
|
|
Communist leanings. Perhaps this was due to the ramifications
|
|
of Senator Joe McCarty's discredited anti-Communist diatribes.</p>
|
|
<p>It seemed as if the reciprocal economic interests of the
|
|
U.S. and Cuba would exert a stabilizing effect on <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
politics. Cuba had been economically bound to find a market for
|
|
its #1 crop, sugar. The U.S. had been buying it at prices much
|
|
higher than market price. For this it received a guaranteed
|
|
flow of sugar. (2)</p>
|
|
<p>Early on however developments clouded the hope for peaceful
|
|
relations. According to American Ambassador to Cuba, Phillip
|
|
Bonsal, "From the very beginning of his rule Castro and his
|
|
sycophants bitterly and sweepingly attacked the relations of
|
|
the United States government with Batista and his regime".(3)
|
|
He accused us of supplying arms to Batista to help overthrow
|
|
Castro's revolution and of harboring war criminals for a
|
|
resurgence effort against him. For the most part these were
|
|
not true: the U.S. put a trade embargo on Batista in 1957
|
|
stopping the U.S. shipment of arms to Cuba. (4) However, his
|
|
last accusation seems to have been prescient.</p>
|
|
<p>With the advent of Castro the history of U.S.- <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
relations was subjected to a revision of an intensity and
|
|
cynicism which left earlier efforts in the shade. This
|
|
downfall took two roads in the eyes of Washington: Castro's
|
|
incessant campaign of slander against the U.S. and Castro's
|
|
wholesale nationalization of American properties.</p>
|
|
<p>These actions and the U.S. reaction to them set the stage
|
|
for what was to become the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the end of
|
|
U.S.- <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> relations.</p>
|
|
<p>Castro promised the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> people that he would bring land
|
|
reform to Cuba. When he took power, the bulk of the nations
|
|
wealth and land was in the hands of a small minority. The huge
|
|
plots of land were to be taken from the monopolistic owners and
|
|
distributed evenly among the people. Compensation was to be
|
|
paid to the former owners. According to Phillip Bonsal, "
|
|
Nothing Castro said, nothing stated in the agrarian reform
|
|
statute Castro signed in 1958, and nothing in the law that was
|
|
promulgated in the Official Gazzette of June 3, 1959, warranted
|
|
the belief that in two years a wholesale conversion of <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
agricultural land to state ownership would take place".(5) Such
|
|
a notion then would have been inconsistent with many of the
|
|
Castro pronouncements, including the theory of a peasant
|
|
revolution and the pledges to the landless throughout the
|
|
nation. Today most of the people who expected to become
|
|
independent farmers or members of cooperatives in the operation
|
|
of which they would have had a voice are now laborers on the
|
|
state payroll. (6) </p>
|
|
<p>After secretly drawing up his Land Reform Law, Castro used
|
|
it to form the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (<ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent>)
|
|
with broad and ill defined powers. Through the <ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent> Castro
|
|
methodically seized all American holdings in Cuba. He promised
|
|
compensation but frequently never gave it. He conducted
|
|
investigations into company affairs, holding control over them
|
|
in the meantime, and then never divulging the results or giving
|
|
back the control. (7)</p>
|
|
<p>These seizures were protested. On January 11 Ambassador
|
|
Bonsal delivered a note to Havana protesting the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
government seizure of U.S. citizens property. The note was
|
|
rejected the same night as a U.S. attempt to keep economic
|
|
control over Cuba. (8)</p>
|
|
<p>As this continued Castro was engineering a brilliant
|
|
propaganda campaign aimed at accusing the U.S. of "conspiring
|
|
with the counter revolutionaries against the Castro regime"(9).
|
|
Castro's ability to whip the masses into a frenzy with wispy
|
|
fallacies about American "imperialist" actions against Cuba was
|
|
his main asset. He constantly found events which he could work
|
|
the "ol Castro magic " on, as Nixon said , to turn it into
|
|
another of the long list of grievances, real or imagined, that
|
|
Cuba had suffered.</p>
|
|
<p>Throughout Castro's rule there had been numerous minor
|
|
attacks and disturbances in Cuba. Always without any
|
|
investigation whatsoever, Castro would blatantly and publicly
|
|
blame the U.S.. </p>
|
|
<p>Castro continually called for hearings at the Organization
|
|
of American States and the United Nations to hear charges
|
|
against the U.S. of "overt aggression". These charges were
|
|
always denied by the councils. (10)</p>
|
|
<p>Two events that provided fuel for the Castro propaganda
|
|
furnace stand out. These are the "bombing" of Havana on
|
|
October 21 and the explosion of the French munitions ship La
|
|
Coubre on March 4, 1960.(11)</p>
|
|
<p>On the evening of October 21 the former captain of the
|
|
rebel air force, Captain Dian-Lanz, flew over Havana and
|
|
dropped a quantity of virulently anti-Castro leaflets. This was
|
|
an American failure to prevent international flights in
|
|
violation of American law. Untroubled by any considerations of
|
|
truth or good faith, the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> authorities distorted the
|
|
facts of the matter and accused the U.S. of a responsibility
|
|
going way beyond negligence. Castro, not two days later,
|
|
elaborated a bombing thesis, complete with "witnesses", and
|
|
launched a propaganda campaign against the U.S. Ambassador
|
|
Bonsal said, "This incident was so welcome to Castro for his
|
|
purposes that I was not surprised when, at a later date, a
|
|
somewhat similar flight was actually engineered by <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> secret
|
|
agents in Florida."(12)</p>
|
|
<p> This outburst constituted "the beginning of the end " in
|
|
U.S.- <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> relations. President Eisenhower stated ,"Castro's
|
|
performance on October 26 on the "bombing" of Havana spelled
|
|
the end of my hope for rational relations between Cuba and the
|
|
U.S."(13)</p>
|
|
<p>Up until 1960 the U.S. had followed a policy of non
|
|
intervention in Cuba. It had endured the slander and seizure
|
|
of lands, still hoping to maintain relations. This ended,
|
|
when, on March 4, the French munitions ship La Coubre arrived
|
|
at Havana laden with arms and munitions for the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
government. It promptly blew up with serious loss of life. (14)</p>
|
|
<p>Castro and his authorities wasted no time venomously
|
|
denouncing the U.S. for an overt act of sabotage. Some
|
|
observers concluded that the disaster was due to the careless
|
|
way the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>s unloaded the cargo. (15) Sabotage was possible
|
|
but it was preposterous to blame the U.S. without even a
|
|
pretense of an investigation. </p>
|
|
<p>Castro's reaction to the La Coubre explosion may have been
|
|
what tipped the scales in favor of Washington's abandonment of
|
|
the non intervention policy. This, the continued slander, and
|
|
the fact that the Embassy had had no reply from the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
government to its representations regarding the cases of
|
|
Americans victimized by the continuing abuses of the <ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent>.</p>
|
|
<p>The American posture of moderation was beginning to become,
|
|
in the face of Castro's insulting and aggressive behavior, a
|
|
political liability. (16)</p>
|
|
<p>The new American policy, not announced as such, but
|
|
implicit in the the actions of the United States government was
|
|
one of overthrowing Castro by all means available to the U.S.
|
|
short of open employment of American armed forces in Cuba.</p>
|
|
<p>It was at this time that the controversial decision was
|
|
taken to allow the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> to begin recruiting and training of
|
|
ex-<ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> exiles for anti-Castro military service. (17)</p>
|
|
<p>Shortly after this decision, following in quick steps,
|
|
aggressive policies both on the side of Cuba and the U.S. led
|
|
to the eventual finale in the actual invasion of Cuba by the
|
|
U.S!</p>
|
|
<p>In June 1960 the U.S. started a series of economic
|
|
aggressions toward Cuba aimed at accelerating their downfall.</p>
|
|
<p>The first of these measures was the advice of the U.S. to
|
|
the oil refineries in Cuba to refuse to handle the crude
|
|
petroleum that the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>s were receiving from the Soviet Union.
|
|
The companies such as Shell and Standard Oil had been buying
|
|
crude from their own plants in Venezuela at a high cost. The
|
|
<ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> government demanded that the refineries process the crude
|
|
they were receiving from Russia at a much cheaper price. These
|
|
refineries refused at the U.S. advice stating that there were
|
|
no provisions in the law saying that they must accept the
|
|
Soviet product and that the low grade <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent> crude would
|
|
damage the machinery. The claim about the law may have been
|
|
true but the charge that the cheaper Soviet
|
|
crude damaging the
|
|
machines seems to be an excuse to cover up the attempted
|
|
economic strangulation of Cuba. (The crude worked just fine as
|
|
is soon to be shown)</p>
|
|
<p>Upon receiving the refusal Che Gueverra, the newly
|
|
appointed head of the National Bank,and known anti-American,
|
|
seized all three major oil company refineries and began
|
|
producing all the Soviet crude,not just the 50% they had
|
|
earlier bargained for. This was a big victory and a stepping
|
|
stone towards increasing the soon to be controversial alliance
|
|
with Russia.</p>
|
|
<p>On July 6, a week after the intervention of the refineries,
|
|
President Eisenhower announced that the balance of Cuba's 1960
|
|
sugar quota for the supply of sugar to the U.S. was to be
|
|
suspended. (18). This action was regarded as a reprisal to
|
|
the intervention of the refineries. It seems obvious that it
|
|
was a major element in the calculated overthrow of Castro.</p>
|
|
<p>In addition to being an act of destroying the U.S. record
|
|
for statesmanship in Latin America, this forced Cuba into
|
|
Russia's arms and vice-versa.</p>
|
|
<p>The immediate loss to Cuba was 900000 tons of sugar
|
|
unsold. This was valued at about $100000000.(19) Had the
|
|
<ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent>s not come to the rescue it would have been a serious
|
|
blow to Cuba. But come to the rescue they did, cementing the
|
|
Soviet-<ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> bond and granting Castro a present he could have
|
|
never given himself. As Ernest Hemingway put it,"I just hope to
|
|
Christ that the United States doesn't cut the sugar quota. That
|
|
will really tear it. It will make Cuba a gift to the
|
|
<ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent>s." (20) And now the gift had been made.</p>
|
|
<p>Castro had announced earlier in a speech that action
|
|
against the sugar quota would cost Americans in Cuba "down to
|
|
the nails in their shoes" (21) Castro did his best to carry
|
|
that out. In a decree made as the Law of Nationalization, he
|
|
authorized expropriation of American property at Che Gueverra's
|
|
discretion. The compensation scheme was such that under
|
|
current U.S. - <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> trade relations it was worthless and
|
|
therefore confiscation without compensation.</p>
|
|
<p>The Soviet Unions assumption of responsibility of Cuba's
|
|
economic welfare gave the <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent>s a politico-military stake in
|
|
Cuba. Increased arms shipments from the U.S.S.R and
|
|
Czechoslovakia enabled Castro to rapidly strengthen and expand
|
|
his forces. On top of this Cuba now had <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent> military
|
|
support. On July 9, three days after President Eisenhowers
|
|
sugar proclamation, Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev announced,
|
|
"The U.S.S.R is raising its voice and extending a helpful hand
|
|
to the people of Cuba.....Speaking figuratively in case of
|
|
necessity Soviet artillerymen can support the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> people with
|
|
rocket fire. (22) Castro took this to mean direct commitment
|
|
made by Russia to protect the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> revolution in case of U.S.
|
|
attack. The final act of the U.S. in the field of economic
|
|
aggression against Cuba came on October 19, 1960, in the form
|
|
of a trade embargo on all goods except medicine and medical
|
|
supplies. Even these were to be banned within a few months.
|
|
Other than causing the revolutionaries some inconvenience, all
|
|
the embargo accomplished was to give Castro a godsend. For the
|
|
past 25 years Castro has blamed the shortages, rationings,
|
|
breakdowns and even some of the unfavorable weather conditions
|
|
on the U.S. blockade.</p>
|
|
<p>On January 6, 1961, Castro formally broke relations with
|
|
the United States and ordered the staff of the U.S. embassy to
|
|
leave. Immediately after the break in relations he ordered
|
|
full scale mobilization of his armed forces to repel an
|
|
invasion from the United States, which he correctly asserted
|
|
was imminent. For at this time the Washington administration,
|
|
under new President-elect Kennedy was gearing up for the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
exile invasion of Cuba. The fact that this secret was ill kept
|
|
led to increased arms being shipped to Cuba by Russia in late
|
|
1960.</p>
|
|
<p>President Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower-Nixon
|
|
administration the operation that became the Bay of Pigs
|
|
expedition. The plan was ill conceived and a fiasco.</p>
|
|
<p>Both Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger describe the
|
|
President as the victim of a process set in motion before his
|
|
inauguration and which he, in the first few weeks of his
|
|
administration, was unable to arrest in spite of his
|
|
misgivings. Mr. Schlesinger writes -"Kennedy saw the project
|
|
in the patios of the bureaucracy as a contingency plan. He did
|
|
not yet realize how contingency planning could generate its own
|
|
reality." (23)</p>
|
|
<p>The fact is that Kennedy had promised to pursue a more
|
|
successful policy towards Cuba. I fail to see how the proposed
|
|
invasion could be looked upon as successful. The plan he
|
|
inherited called for 1500 patriots to seize control over their
|
|
seven million fellow citizens from over 100000 well trained,
|
|
well armed Castroite militia!</p>
|
|
<p>As if the plan wasn't doomed from the start, the
|
|
information the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> had gathered about the strength of the
|
|
uprising in Cuba was outrageously misleading. If we had won,
|
|
it still would have taken prolonged U.S. intervention to make
|
|
it work. This along with Kennedys decision to rule out
|
|
American forces or even American officers or experts, whose
|
|
participation was planned, doomed the whole affair.</p>
|
|
<p>Additionally these impromptu ground rules were not relayed
|
|
to the exiles by the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>, who were expecting massive U.S.
|
|
military backing!</p>
|
|
<p>The exiles had their own problems; guns didn't work, ships
|
|
sank, codes for communication were wrong, the ammunition was
|
|
the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, did. As could
|
|
be imagined the anti-Castro opposition achieved not one of its
|
|
permanent goals. Upon landing at the Bay of Pigs on April 17,
|
|
1961, the mission marked a landmark failure in U.S. foreign
|
|
politics. By April 20, only three days later, Castro's forces
|
|
had completely destroyed any semblance of the mission: they
|
|
killed 300 and captured the remaining 1200!</p>
|
|
<p>Many people since then have chastised Kennedy for his
|
|
decision to pull U.S. military forces. I feel that his only
|
|
mistake was in going ahead in the first place, although, as
|
|
stated earlier, it seems as if he may not have had much choice.</p>
|
|
<p>I feel Kennedy showed surer instincts in this matter than
|
|
his advisors who pleaded with him not to pull U.S. forces. For
|
|
if the expedition had succeeded due to American armed forces
|
|
rather than the strength of the exile forces and the anti-Castro movement within Cuba, the post Castro government would
|
|
have been totally unviable: it would have taken constant
|
|
American help to shore it up. In this matter I share the
|
|
opinion of 'ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, who has written "The
|
|
Bay of Pigs operation was a tragic experience for the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>s
|
|
who took part, but its failure was a fortunate (if mortifying)
|
|
experience for the U.S., which otherwise might have been
|
|
saddled with indefinite occupation of the island.</p>
|
|
<p>Beyond its immediately damaging effects, the Bay of Pigs
|
|
fiasco has shown itself to have far reaching consequences.</p>
|
|
<p>Washington's failure to achieve its goal in Cuba provided
|
|
the catalyst for Russia to seek an advantage and install
|
|
nuclear missiles in Cuba. The resulting "missile crisis" in
|
|
1962 was the closest we have been to thermonuclear war.</p>
|
|
<p>America's gain may have been America's loss. A successful
|
|
Bay of Pigs may have brought the United States one advantage.
|
|
The strain on American political and military assets resulting
|
|
from the need to keep the lid on in Cuba might have lid on Cuba
|
|
might have led the President of the United States to resist,
|
|
rather than to enthusiastically embrace, the advice he received
|
|
in 1964 and 1965 to make a massive commitment of American air
|
|
power, ground forces, and prestige in Vietnam.</p>
|
|
<p><ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> troops have been a major presence as Soviet
|
|
surrogates all over the world, notably in Angola.</p>
|
|
<p>The threat of exportation of Castro's revolution permeates
|
|
U.S.-Central and South American policy. (Witness the invasion
|
|
of Grenada.)</p>
|
|
<p>This fear still dominates todays headlines. For years the
|
|
U.S. has urged support for government of El Salvador and the
|
|
right wing Contras in Nicaragua. The major concern underlying
|
|
American policy in the area is Castro's influence. The fear of
|
|
a Castro influenced regime in South and Central America had
|
|
such control of American foreign policy as to almost topple the
|
|
Presidency in the recent Iran - Contra affair. As a result the
|
|
U.S. government has once again faced a crisis which threatens
|
|
to destroy its credibility in foreign affairs. All because of
|
|
one man with a cigar.</p>
|
|
<p>In concluding I would like to state my own feelings on the
|
|
whole affair as they formed in researching the topic. To
|
|
start, all the information I could gather was one-sided. All
|
|
the sources were American written, and encompassed an American
|
|
point of view. In light of this knowledge, and with the
|
|
advantage of hindsight, I have formulated my own opinion of
|
|
this affair and how it might have been more productively
|
|
handled. American intervention should have been held to a
|
|
minimum. In an atmosphere of concentration on purely <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
issues, opposition to Castro's personal dictatorship could be
|
|
expected to grow. Admittedly, even justified American
|
|
retaliation would have led to <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> counterretaliation and so
|
|
on with the prospect that step by step the same end result
|
|
would have been attained as was in fact achieved. But the
|
|
process would have lasted far longer; measured American
|
|
responses might have appeared well deserved to an increasing
|
|
number of <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>s, thus strengthening <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> opposition to the
|
|
regime instead of, as was the case, greatly stimulating
|
|
revolutionary fervor, leaving the <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent>s no choice but to
|
|
give massive support to the Revolution and fortifying the
|
|
belief among anti-Castro <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>s that the United States was
|
|
rapidly moving to liberate them. The economic pressures
|
|
available to the United States were not apt to bring Castro to
|
|
his knees, since the Soviets were capable of meeting <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent>
|
|
requirements in such matters as oil and sugar. I believe the
|
|
<ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> government would have been doomed by its own
|
|
disorganization and incompetence and by the growing
|
|
disaffection of an increasing number of the <ent type='NORP'>Cuban</ent> people. Left
|
|
to its own devices, the Castro regime would have withered on
|
|
the vine.
|
|
ammunition was
|
|
the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, di
|
|
Downloaded from Just Say Yes. 2 lines, More than 1500 files online!
|
|
Do you write? Give us a call! 415-922-2008 CASFA </p>
|
|
<p> Another file downloaded from: NIRVANAnet(tm)</p>
|
|
<p> & the Temple of the Screaming Electron 415-935-5845
|
|
Just Say Yes 415-922-1613
|
|
Rat Head 415-524-3649
|
|
Cheez Whiz 408-363-9766
|
|
Reality Check 415-474-2602
|
|
</p>
|
|
<p>
|
|
Specializing in conversations, obscure information, high explosives,
|
|
arcane knowledge, political extremism, diversive sexuality,
|
|
insane speculation, and wild rumours. ALL-TEXT BBS SYSTEMS.</p>
|
|
<p>Full access for first-time callers. We don't want to know who you are,
|
|
where you live, or what your phone number is. We are not Big Brother.</p>
|
|
<p> "Raw Data for Raw Nerves"</p>
|
|
</div>
|
|
</xml>
|