textfiles-politics/pythonCode/personTestingOutput/castro.xml

<xml>
<p><ent type='GPE'>CUBA</ent>, <ent type='PERSON'>CASTRO</ent>, and <ent type='GPE'>the UNITED STATES</ent>
or How One Man With A Cigar Dominated <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> Foreign Policy</p>
<p> In 1959, a rebel, <ent type='PERSON'>Fidel Castro</ent>, overthrew the reign of
<ent type='PERSON'>Fulgencia Batista</ent> in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>; a small island 90 miles off the
<ent type='GPE'>Florida</ent> coast. There have been many coups and changes of
government in the world since then. Few if any have had the
effect on <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>s and <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> foreign policy as this one.</p>
<p>In 1952, Sergeant <ent type='PERSON'>Fulgencia Batista</ent> staged a successful
bloodless coup in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> . </p>
<p><ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> never really had any cooperation and rarely
garnered much support. His reign was marked by continual
dissension.
</p>
<p> After waiting to see if <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> would be seriously opposed,
<ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> recognized his government. <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> had already
broken ties with <ent type='GPE'>the Soviet Union</ent> and became an ally to the
U.S. throughout the cold war. He was continually friendly and
helpful to <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> business interest. But he failed to bring
democracy to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> or secure the broad popular support that
might have legitimized his rape of the 1940 Constitution.</p>
<p>As the people of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> grew increasingly dissatisfied with
his gangster style politics, the tiny rebellions that had
sprouted began to grow. Meanwhile the U.S. government was
aware of and shared the distaste for a regime increasingly
nauseating to most public opinion. It became clear that <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent>
regime was an odious type of government. It killed its own
citizens, it stifled dissent. (1)</p>
<p> At this time <ent type='PERSON'>Fidel Castro</ent> appeared as leader of the growing
rebellion. Educated in <ent type='GPE'>America</ent> he was a proponent of the
<ent type='NORP'>Marxist</ent>-<ent type='NORP'>Leninist</ent> philosophy. He conducted a brilliant guerilla
campaign from the hills of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> against <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent>. On January
1959, he prevailed and overthrew the <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> government.</p>
<p><ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> promised to restore democracy in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>, a feat
<ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> had failed to accomplish. This promise was looked
upon benevolently but watchfully by <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>. <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> was
believed to be too much in the hands of the people to stretch
the rules of politics very far. The U.S. government supported
Castro's coup. It professed to not know about Castro's
<ent type='NORP'>Communist</ent> leanings. Perhaps this was due to the ramifications
of Senator Joe McCarty's discredited anti-<ent type='NORP'>Communist</ent> diatribes.</p>
<p>It seemed as if the reciprocal economic interests of the
U.S. and <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> would exert a stabilizing effect on <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
politics. <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> had been economically bound to find a market for
its #1 crop, sugar. The U.S. had been buying it at prices much
higher than market price. For this it received a guaranteed
flow of sugar. (2)</p>
<p>Early on however developments clouded the hope for peaceful
relations. According to <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> Ambassador to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>, Phillip
<ent type='PERSON'>Bonsal</ent>, "From the very beginning of his rule <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> and his
sycophants bitterly and sweepingly attacked the relations of
<ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States government with <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> and his regime".(3)
He accused us of supplying arms to <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> to help overthrow
Castro's revolution and of harboring war criminals for a
resurgence effort against him. For the most part these were
not true: the U.S. put a trade embargo on <ent type='ORG'>Batista</ent> in 1957
stopping the U.S. shipment of arms to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. (4) However, his
last accusation seems to have been prescient.</p>
<p>With the advent of <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> the history of U.S.- <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
relations was subjected to a revision of an intensity and
cynicism which left earlier efforts in the shade. This
downfall took two roads in the eyes of <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>: Castro's
incessant campaign of slander against the U.S. and Castro's
wholesale nationalization of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> properties.</p>
<p>These actions and the U.S. reaction to them set the stage
for what was to become <ent type='ORG'>the Bay</ent> of Pigs fiasco and the end of
U.S.- <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n relations.</p>
<p><ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> promised the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n people that he would bring land
reform to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. When he took power, the bulk of the nations
wealth and land was in the hands of a small minority. The huge
plots of land were to be taken from the monopolistic owners and
distributed evenly among the people. Compensation was to be
paid to the former owners. According to <ent type='PERSON'>Phillip Bonsal</ent>, "
Nothing <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> said, nothing stated in the agrarian reform
statute <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> signed in 1958, and nothing in the law that was
promulgated in the Official Gazzette of June 3, 1959, warranted
the belief that in two years a wholesale conversion of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
agricultural land to state ownership would take place".(5) Such
a notion then would have been inconsistent with many of the
<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> pronouncements, including the theory of a peasant
revolution and the pledges to the landless throughout the
nation. Today most of the people who expected to become
independent farmers or members of <ent type='ORG'>cooperatives</ent> in the operation
of which they would have had a voice are now laborers on the
state payroll. (6) </p>
<p>After secretly drawing up his Land Reform Law, <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> used
it to form <ent type='ORG'>the National Institute</ent> of Agrarian Reform (<ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent>)
with broad and ill defined powers. Through the <ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent> <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent>
methodically seized all <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> holdings in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. He promised
compensation but frequently never gave it. He conducted
investigations into company affairs, holding control over them
in the meantime, and then never divulging the results or giving
back the control. (7)</p>
<p>These seizures were protested. On January 11 Ambassador
<ent type='PERSON'>Bonsal</ent> delivered a note to <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent> protesting the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
government seizure of U.S. citizens property. The note was
rejected the same night as a U.S. attempt to keep economic
control over <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. (8)</p>
<p>As this continued <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> was engineering a brilliant
propaganda campaign aimed at accusing the U.S. of "conspiring
with the counter revolutionaries against the <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> regime"(9).
Castro's ability to whip the masses into a frenzy with wispy
fallacies about <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> "imperialist" actions against <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> was
his main asset. He constantly found events which he could work
the "ol <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> magic " on, as <ent type='PERSON'>Nixon</ent> said , to turn it into
another of the long list of grievances, real or imagined, that
<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> had suffered.</p>
<p>Throughout Castro's rule there had been numerous minor
attacks and disturbances in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. Always without any
investigation whatsoever, <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> would blatantly and publicly
blame the U.S.. </p>
<p><ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> continually called for hearings at <ent type='ORG'>the Organization</ent>
of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> States and <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> Nations to hear charges
against the U.S. of "overt aggression". These charges were
always denied by the councils. (10)</p>
<p>Two events that provided fuel for the <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> propaganda
furnace stand out. These are the "bombing" of <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent> on
October 21 and the explosion of the <ent type='NORP'>French</ent> munitions ship La
Coubre on March 4, 1960.(11)</p>
<p>On the evening of October 21 the former captain of the
rebel air force, Captain Dian-Lanz, flew over <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent> and
dropped a quantity of virulently anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> leaflets. This was
an <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> failure to prevent international flights in
violation of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> law. <ent type='ORG'>Untroubled</ent> by any considerations of
truth or good faith, the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n authorities distorted the
facts of the matter and accused the U.S. of a responsibility
going way beyond negligence. <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent>, not two days later,
elaborated a bombing thesis, complete with "witnesses", and
launched a propaganda campaign against the U.S. Ambassador
<ent type='PERSON'>Bonsal</ent> said, "This incident was so welcome to <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> for his
purposes that I was not surprised when, at a later date, a
somewhat similar flight was actually engineered by <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n secret
agents in <ent type='GPE'>Florida</ent>."(12)</p>
<p> This outburst constituted "the beginning of the end " in
U.S.- <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n relations. President <ent type='PERSON'>Eisenhower</ent> stated ,"Castro's
performance on October 26 on the "bombing" of <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent> spelled
the end of my hope for rational relations between <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> and the
U.S."(13)</p>
<p>Up until 1960 the U.S. had followed a policy of non
intervention in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. It had endured the slander and seizure
of lands, still hoping to maintain relations. This ended,
when, on March 4, the <ent type='NORP'>French</ent> munitions ship La Coubre arrived
at <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent> laden with arms and munitions for the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
government. It promptly blew up with serious loss of life. (14)</p>
<p><ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> and his authorities wasted no time venomously
denouncing the U.S. for an overt act of sabotage. Some
observers concluded that the disaster was due to the careless
way the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>ns unloaded the cargo. (15) Sabotage was possible
but it was preposterous to blame the U.S. without even a
pretense of an investigation. </p>
<p>Castro's reaction to the La Coubre explosion may have been
what tipped the scales in favor of Washington's abandonment of
the non intervention policy. This, the continued slander, and
the fact that the <ent type='ORG'>Embassy</ent> had had no reply from the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
government to its representations regarding the cases of
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent>s victimized by the continuing abuses of the <ent type='ORG'>INRA</ent>.</p>
<p>The <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> posture of moderation was beginning to become,
in the face of Castro's insulting and aggressive behavior, a
political liability. (16)</p>
<p>The new <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> policy, not announced as such, but
implicit in the the actions of <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States government was
one of overthrowing <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> by all means available to the U.S.
short of open employment of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> armed forces in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>.</p>
<p>It was at this time that the controversial decision was
taken to allow the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> to begin recruiting and training of
ex-<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n exiles for anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> military service. (17)</p>
<p>Shortly after this decision, following in quick steps,
aggressive policies both on the side of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> and the U.S. led
to the eventual finale in the actual invasion of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> by the
U.S!</p>
<p>In June 1960 the U.S. started a series of economic
aggressions toward <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> aimed at accelerating their downfall.</p>
<p>The first of these measures was the advice of the U.S. to
the oil refineries in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> to refuse to handle the crude
petroleum that the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>ns were receiving from <ent type='GPE'>the Soviet Union</ent>.
The companies such as <ent type='ORG'>Shell</ent> and Standard Oil had been buying
crude from their own plants in <ent type='GPE'>Venezuela</ent> at a high cost. The
<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n government demanded that the refineries process the crude
they were receiving from <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent> at a much cheaper price. These
refineries refused at the U.S. advice stating that there were
no provisions in the law saying that they must accept the
<ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> product and that the low grade <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>n crude would
damage the machinery. The claim about the law may have been
true but the charge that the cheaper <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>
crude damaging the
machines seems to be an excuse to cover up the attempted
economic strangulation of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. (The crude worked just fine as
is soon to be shown)</p>
<p>Upon receiving the refusal <ent type='PERSON'>Che Gueverra</ent>, the newly
appointed head of <ent type='ORG'>the National Bank</ent>,and known anti-<ent type='NORP'>American</ent>,
seized all three major oil company refineries and began
producing all the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> crude,not just the 50% they had
earlier bargained for. This was a big victory and a stepping
stone towards increasing the soon to be controversial alliance
with <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>.</p>
<p>On July 6, a week after the intervention of the refineries,
President <ent type='PERSON'>Eisenhower</ent> announced that the balance of Cuba's 1960
sugar quota for the supply of sugar to the U.S. was to be
suspended. (18). This action was regarded as a reprisal to
the intervention of the refineries. It seems obvious that it
was a major element in the calculated overthrow of <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent>.</p>
<p>In addition to being an act of destroying the U.S. record
for statesmanship in Latin <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>, this forced <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> into
Russia's arms and vice-versa.</p>
<p>The immediate loss to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> was 900000 tons of sugar
unsold. This was valued at about $100000000.(19) Had the
<ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>ns not come to the rescue it would have been a serious
blow to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. But come to the rescue they did, cementing the
<ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>-<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n bond and granting <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> a present he could have
never given himself. As <ent type='PERSON'>Ernest Hemingway</ent> put it,"I just hope to
Christ that <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States doesn't cut the sugar quota. That
will really tear it. It will make <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> a gift to the
<ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>ns." (20) And now the gift had been made.</p>
<p><ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> had announced earlier in a speech that action
against the sugar quota would cost <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>s in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> "down to
the nails in their shoes" (21) <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> did his best to carry
that out. In a decree made as the Law of Nationalization, he
authorized expropriation of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> property at <ent type='PERSON'>Che Gueverra</ent>'s
discretion. The compensation scheme was such that under
current U.S. - <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n trade relations it was worthless and
therefore confiscation without compensation.</p>
<p>The <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> Unions assumption of responsibility of Cuba's
economic welfare gave the <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>ns a politico-military stake in
<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. Increased arms shipments from the U.S.S.R and
<ent type='GPE'>Czechoslovakia</ent> enabled <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> to rapidly strengthen and expand
his forces. On top of this <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> now had <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>n military
support. On July 9, three days after President <ent type='PERSON'>Eisenhower</ent>s
sugar proclamation, <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> Premier <ent type='PERSON'>Nikita Kruschev</ent> announced,
"The U.S.S.R is raising its voice and extending a helpful hand
to the people of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>.....Speaking figuratively in case of
necessity <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> artillerymen can support the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n people with
rocket fire. (22) <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> took this to mean direct commitment
made by <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent> to protect the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n revolution in case of U.S.
attack. The final act of the U.S. in the field of economic
aggression against <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> came on October 19, 1960, in the form
of a trade embargo on all goods except medicine and medical
supplies. Even these were to be banned within a few months.
Other than causing the revolutionaries some inconvenience, all
the embargo accomplished was to give <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> a godsend. For the
past 25 years <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> has blamed the shortages, rationings,
breakdowns and even some of the unfavorable weather conditions
on the U.S. blockade.</p>
<p>On January 6, 1961, <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> formally broke relations with
<ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States and ordered the staff of the U.S. embassy to
leave. Immediately after the break in relations he ordered
full scale mobilization of his armed forces to repel an
invasion from <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States, which he correctly asserted
was imminent. For at this time the <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> administration,
under new President-elect <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> was gearing up for the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
exile invasion of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. The fact that this secret was ill kept
led to increased arms being shipped to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> by <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent> in late
1960.</p>
<p>President <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> inherited from the <ent type='PERSON'>Eisenhower</ent>-<ent type='PERSON'>Nixon</ent>
administration the operation that became <ent type='ORG'>the Bay</ent> of Pigs
expedition. The plan was ill conceived and a fiasco.</p>
<p>Both <ent type='PERSON'>Theodore Sorensen</ent> and <ent type='PERSON'>Arthur Schlesinger</ent> describe the
President as the victim of a process set in motion before his
inauguration and which he, in the first few weeks of his
administration, was unable to arrest in spite of his
misgivings. Mr. <ent type='PERSON'>Schlesinger</ent> writes -"<ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> saw the project
in the patios of the bureaucracy as a contingency plan. He did
not yet realize how contingency planning could generate its own
reality." (23)</p>
<p>The fact is that <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> had promised to pursue a more
successful policy towards <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. I fail to see how the proposed
invasion could be looked upon as successful. The plan he
inherited called for 1500 patriots to seize control over their
seven million fellow citizens from over 100000 well trained,
well armed <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent>ite militia!</p>
<p>As if the plan wasn't doomed from the start, the
information the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> had gathered about the strength of the
uprising in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> was outrageously misleading. If we had won,
it still would have taken prolonged U.S. intervention to make
it work. This along with <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent>s decision to rule out
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> forces or even <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> officers or experts, whose
participation was planned, doomed the whole affair.</p>
<p>Additionally these impromptu ground rules were not relayed
to the exiles by the <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent>, who were expecting massive U.S.
military backing!</p>
<p>The exiles had their own problems; guns didn't work, ships
sank, codes for communication were wrong, the ammunition was
the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, did. As could
be imagined the anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> opposition achieved not one of its
permanent goals. Upon landing at <ent type='ORG'>the Bay</ent> of Pigs on April 17,
1961, the mission marked a landmark failure in U.S. foreign
politics. By April 20, only three days later, Castro's forces
had completely destroyed any semblance of the mission: they
killed 300 and captured the remaining 1200!</p>
<p>Many people since then have chastised <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> for his
decision to pull U.S. military forces. I feel that his only
mistake was in going ahead in the first place, although, as
stated earlier, it seems as if he may not have had much choice.</p>
<p>I feel <ent type='PERSON'>Kennedy</ent> showed surer instincts in this matter than
his advisors who pleaded with him not to pull U.S. forces. For
if the expedition had succeeded due to <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> armed forces
rather than the strength of the exile forces and the anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> movement within <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>, the post <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> government would
have been totally unviable: it would have taken constant
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> help to shore it up. In this matter I share the
opinion of 'ambassador <ent type='PERSON'>Ellis</ent> O. <ent type='PERSON'>Briggs</ent>, who has written "The
Bay of Pigs operation was a tragic experience for the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>ns
who took part, but its failure was a fortunate (if mortifying)
experience for the U.S., which otherwise might have been
saddled with indefinite occupation of the island.</p>
<p>Beyond its immediately damaging effects, <ent type='ORG'>the Bay</ent> of Pigs
fiasco has shown itself to have far reaching consequences.</p>
<p>Washington's failure to achieve its goal in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> provided
the catalyst for <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent> to seek an advantage and install
nuclear missiles in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>. The resulting "missile crisis" in
1962 was the closest we have been to thermonuclear war.</p>
<p>America's gain may have been America's loss. A successful
Bay of Pigs may have brought <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States one advantage.
The strain on <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> political and military assets resulting
from the need to keep the lid on in <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent> might have lid on <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>
might have led the President of <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States to resist,
rather than to enthusiastically embrace, the advice he received
in 1964 and 1965 to make a massive commitment of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> air
power, ground forces, and prestige in <ent type='GPE'>Vietnam</ent>.</p>
<p><ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n troops have been a major presence as <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>
surrogates all over the world, notably in <ent type='GPE'>Angola</ent>.</p>
<p>The threat of exportation of Castro's revolution permeates
U.S.-Central and <ent type='LOC'>South</ent> <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> policy. (Witness the invasion
of <ent type='GPE'>Grenada</ent>.)</p>
<p>This fear still dominates todays headlines. For years the
U.S. has urged support for government of El Salvador and the
right wing <ent type='NORP'>Contras</ent> in <ent type='GPE'>Nicaragua</ent>. The major concern underlying
<ent type='NORP'>American</ent> policy in the area is Castro's influence. The fear of
a <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> influenced regime in <ent type='LOC'>South</ent> and Central <ent type='GPE'>America</ent> had
such control of <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> foreign policy as to almost topple the
Presidency in the recent <ent type='GPE'>Iran</ent> - <ent type='NORP'>Contra</ent> affair. As a result the
U.S. government has once again faced a crisis which threatens
to destroy its credibility in foreign affairs. All because of
one man with a cigar.</p>
<p>In concluding I would like to state my own feelings on the
whole affair as they formed in researching the topic. To
start, all the information I could gather was one-sided. All
the sources were <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> written, and encompassed an <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>
point of view. In light of this knowledge, and with the
advantage of hindsight, I have formulated my own opinion of
this affair and how it might have been more productively
handled. <ent type='NORP'>American</ent> intervention should have been held to a
minimum. In an atmosphere of concentration on purely <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
issues, opposition to Castro's personal dictatorship could be
expected to grow. Admittedly, even justified <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>
retaliation would have led to <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n counterretaliation and so
on with the prospect that step by step the same end result
would have been attained as was in fact achieved. But the
process would have lasted far longer; measured <ent type='NORP'>American</ent>
responses might have appeared well deserved to an increasing
number of <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>ns, thus strengthening <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n opposition to the
regime instead of, as was the case, greatly stimulating
revolutionary fervor, leaving the <ent type='GPE'>Russia</ent>ns no choice but to
give massive support to the <ent type='EVENT'>Revolution</ent> and fortifying the
belief among anti-<ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>ns that <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States was
rapidly moving to liberate them. The economic pressures
available to <ent type='GPE'>the United</ent> States were not apt to bring <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> to
his knees, since the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>s were capable of meeting <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n
requirements in such matters as oil and sugar. I believe the
<ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n government would have been doomed by its own
disorganization and incompetence and by the growing
disaffection of an increasing number of the <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>n people. Left
to its own devices, the <ent type='PERSON'>Castro</ent> regime would have withered on
the vine.
ammunition was
the wrong kind - everything that could go wrong, di
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Do you write? Give us a call! 415-922-2008 CASFA </p>
<p> Another file downloaded from: NIRVANAnet(tm)</p>
<p> &amp; <ent type='ORG'>the Temple</ent> of the Screaming Electron 415-935-5845
Just Say Yes 415-922-1613
Rat Head 415-524-3649
<ent type='ORG'>Cheez Whiz</ent> 408-363-9766
Reality Check 415-474-2602
</p>
<p>
Specializing in conversations, obscure information, high explosives,
arcane knowledge, political extremism, diversive sexuality,
insane speculation, and wild rumours. ALL-TEXT BBS SYSTEMS.</p>
<p>Full access for first-time callers. We don't want to know who you are,
where you live, or what your phone number is. We are not Big Brother.</p>
<p> "Raw Data for Raw Nerves"</p>
</xml>