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849 lines
47 KiB
Plaintext
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The following is the text of a speach about the Gulf War not given by
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former CIA agent Phil Agee. The reason Agee wasn't able to give the
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speech is because Bush and his CIA buddies have deemed that what Agee
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has to say is too dangerous for the American public to know about.
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The text of Agee's speech, taken from Z magazine and posted recently
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by Bill Mills is included below so that anyone who wishes to know what
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this former CIA-agent has to say can do so, in accordance with the
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right of Freedom of Speech in the Constitution so revered, we are
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told, by those who would burn it rather than respect it, and who would
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censor "dangerous" speech such as that below. Whether you read it, all
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of it, is, now, a matter of free choice.
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[Errors corrected since prev. post listed at end]
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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PRODUCING THE PROPER CRISIS a speech by Philip Agee, formerly of the CIA.
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From Z magazine, Oct. 1990
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On the eve of Philip Agee's 20-city tour to campuses and community
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groups throughout the U.S. the Nicaraguan foreign ministry revoked his
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Nicaraguan passport preventing him from traveling freely. Jean Caiani
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of Speak Out!, who organized his tour, is helping coordinate a
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national campaign to regain his original passport which was revoked in
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1979 on the grounds that Agee's writings and speaking pose "a serious
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threat to the national security of the United States." Following is
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the speech that Agee planned to give at his scheduled engagements.
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Sooner or later it had to happen: the fundamental transformation of
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U.S. military forces was really only a matter of time. Transformation,
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in this sense, from a national defense force to an international
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mercenary army for hire. With a U.S national debt of $3 trillion, some
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$800 billion owned by foreigners, The United States sooner or later
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would have to find, or produce, the proper crisis - one that would
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enable the president to hire out the armed forces, like a national
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export, in order to avoid conversion of the economy from military to
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civilian purposes. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, encouraged, it seems, by
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the Bush administration, is the necessary crisis.
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Not long after the invasion, I watched on Spanish television Bush's
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call to arms, when he said "our way of life" is at stake. For days
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afterwards I kept watching and reading for news of the tens of
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millions of people in this country, who would take to the streets in
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joy, in celebration that their days of poverty, homelessness,
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illiteracy and uncared-for illness might soon end. What I saw instead,
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like most of you, was the Bush "way of life" - fishing, boating, and
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golfing on the coast of Maine like any respectable member of the
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Eastern elite. Bush's military machismo of recent weeks reminded me of
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what General Noriega said about Bush a couple of years ago, before
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Bush decided to smash Panamanian nationalism for the foreseeable
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future. You remember? Noriega told his deputy in the Panamanian
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Defense Forces, who later made it public, he said, "I've got George
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Bush - by the balls."
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When I read that, I thought, how interesting - one of those rare
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statements that contain two revelations. Back in the 1970s, when he
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was director of the CIA, Bush tried to get a criminal indictment
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against me for revelations I was making about CIA operations and
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personnel. But he couldn't get it, I discovered later in documents I
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received under the Freedom of Information Act. The reason was that in
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the early 1970s the CIA had committed crimes against me while I was in
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Europe writing my first book. If they indicted and prosecuted me, I
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would learn the details of those crimes, whatever they were:
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conspiracy to assassination, kidnapping, a drug plant. So they couldn't
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indict because the CIA under Bush, and before him under William Colby,
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said the details had to stay secret. So what did Bush do? He prevailed
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on President Ford to send Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, to
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Britain where I was living, to get them to take action. A few weeks
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after Kissinger's secret trip a Cambridge policeman arrived at my door
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with a deportation notice. After living in Britain nearly five years,
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I had suddenly become a threat to the security of the realm. During
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the next two years I was not only expelled from Britain, but also from
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France, Holland, West Germany, and Italy - all under U.S. pressure.
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For two years I didn't know where I was living, and my two sons, then
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teenagers, attended four different schools in four different
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countries.
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The latest is the government's attempt to prevent me from speaking in
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the U.S now. Where this will end, we still don't know.
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How many of you have friends or relatives right now in Saudi Arabia or
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the Persian Gulf area? I wonder how they feel, so close to giving
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their lives to protect a feudal kingdom where women are stoned to
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death for adultery, where a thief is punished by having his hand
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amputated, where women can't drive cars or swim in the same pool as
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men? Where bibles are forbidden and no religion save Islam is allowed?
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Where Amnesty International reports that torture is routine, and that
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last year 111 people were executed, 16 of them political prisoners,
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all but one by public beheading. And not by clean cut, with a
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guillotine, but with that long curved sword that witnesses say
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requires various chops. Not that Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait before the
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invasion, are any different in terms of political repression than any
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number of U.S.-supported allies. But to give your life for those
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corrupt, cruel, family dictatorships? Bush says we're "stopping
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aggression." If that were true, the first thing U.S. forces would have
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done after landing, they would have dethroned the Gulf emirs, sheiks,
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and kings, who every day are carrying out the worst aggression against
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their own people, especially women. Mainstream media haven't quite
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said it yet, as far as I know, but the evidence is mounting that
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George Bush and his entourage wanted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
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encouraged it, and then refused to prevent it when they could have.
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I'll get back to Bush later, but first, a quick review of what brought
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on this crisis. Does the name Cox bring anything special to mind? Sir
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Percy Cox?
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In a historical sense this is the man responsible for today's Gulf
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crisis. Sir Percy Cox was the British High Commissioner in Baghdad
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after World War I who in 1922 drew the lines in the sand establishing
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for the first time national borders between Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and
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Saudi Arabia. And in each of these new states the British helped set
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up and consolidate ruling monarchies through which British banks,
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commercial firms, and petroleum companies could obtain monopolies.
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Kuwait, however, had for centuries belonged to the Basra province of
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the Ottoman Empire. Iraq and the Iraqis never recognized Sir Percy's
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borders. He had drawn those lines, as historians have confirmed, in
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order deliberately to deprive Iraq of a viable seaport on the Persian
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Gulf. The British wanted no threat from Iraq to their dominance in the
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Gulf where they had converted no less than ten sheikdoms, including
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Kuwait, into colonies. The divide and rule principle, so
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well-practiced in this country since the beginning. In 1958 the
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British-installed monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in a military coup.
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Three years later, in 1961, Britain granted independence to Kuwait,
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and the Iraqi military government massed troops on the Kuwaiti border
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threatening to take the territory by force. Immediately the British
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dispatched troops, and Iraq backed down, still refusing to recognize
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the border. Similar Iraqi threats occurred in 1973 and 1976.
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This history, Saddam Hussein's justification for annexing Kuwait, is
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in the books for anyone to see. But weeks went by as I waited and
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wondered why the International Herald Tribune, which publishes major
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articles from the Washington Post, New York Times and wire services,
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failed to carry the background. Finally, a month after the invasion,
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the Herald Tribune carried a Washington Post article on the historical
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context written by Glenn Frankel. I've yet to find this history in
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Time or Newsweek. Time, in fact, went so far as to say that Iraq's
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claims to Kuwait were "without any historical basis." Hardly
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surprising, since giving exposure to the Iraqi side might weaken the
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campaign to Hitlerize Saddam Hussein. Also absent from current accounts
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is the CIA's role in the early 1970s to foment and support armed
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Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. The Agency, in league with the Shah of
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Iran, provided $16 million in arms and other supplies to the Kurds,
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leading to Iraqi capitulation to the Shah in 1975 over control of the
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Shat al Arab. This is the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates, that
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separates the two countries inland from the Gulf and is Iraq's only
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access to Basra, its upriver port. Five years later, in 1980, Iraq
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invaded Iran to redress the CIA-assisted humiliation of 1975, and to
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regain control of the estuary, beginning the eight year war that cost
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a million lives.
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Apart from Iraq's historical claims on Kuwait and its need for access
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to the sea, two related disputes came to a head just before the
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invasion. First was the price of oil. OPEC had set the price at $18
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per barrel in 1986, together with production quotas to maintain that
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price. But Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had long exceeded their
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quotas, driving the price down to around $13 in June. Iraq, saddled
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with a $70 billion debt from the war with Iran, was losing billions of
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dollars in oil revenues which normally account for 95 precent of its
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exports. Meanwhile, industrialized oil consumers like the United
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States were enjoying the best price in 40 years, in inflation-adjusted
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dollars. Iraq's other claim against Kuwait was theft. While Iraq was
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occupied with Iran during the war, Kuwait began pumping from Iraq's
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vast Rumaila field that dips into the disputed border area. Iraq
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demanded payment for oil taken from this field as well as forgiveness
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of Kuwaiti loans to Iraq during the war with Iran. Then in July, Iraq
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massed troops on the Kuwaiti border while OPEC ministers met in
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Geneva. That pressure brought Kuwait and the Emirates to agree to
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honor quotas and OPEC set a new target price of $21, although Iraq had
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insisted on $25 per barrel. After that Hussein increased his troops on
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the border from 30,000 to 100,000. On August 1, Kuwaiti and Iraqi
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negotiators, meeting in Saudi Arabia, failed to reach agreement over
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the loans, oil thefts, and access to the sea for Iraq. The next night
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Iraq invaded. Revelations since then, together with a review of events
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prior to the invasion, strongly suggest that U.S. policy was to
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encourage Hussein to invade and, when invasion was imminent, to do
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nothing to discourage him. Consider the following.
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During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the U.S. sided with Iraq and
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continued this policy right up to August 2, the day of the invasion.
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In April, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, John
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Kelly, testified before Congress that the United States had no
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commitment to defend Kuwait. On July 25, with Iraqi troops massed on
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the Kuwait border, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met
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with Hussein. Minutes of the meeting were given by the Iraqis to the
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Washington Post in mid-August.
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According to these minutes, which have not been disputed by the State
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Department, the Ambassador told Hussein that Secretary of State James
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Baker had instructed her to emphasize to Hussein that the U.S. has "no
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opinion" on Iraqi-Kuwait border disputes. She then asked him, in light
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of Iraqi troop movements, what his intentions were with respect to
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Kuwait. Hussein replied that Kuwait's actions amounted to "an economic
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war" and "military action against us." He said he hoped for a peaceful
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solution, but if not, he said, "it will be natural that Iraq will not
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accept death..." A clearer statement of his intentions would be hard
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to imagine, and hardly a promise not to invade. The Ambassador gave no
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warning from Baker or Bush that the U.S. would oppose an Iraqi
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takeover of Kuwait. On the contrary she said, "I have a direct
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instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq." On
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the same day Assistant Secretary of State Kelly killed a planned Voice
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of America broadcast that would have warned Iraq that the U.S. was
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"strongly committed" to the defense of its friends in the Gulf, which
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included, of course, Kuwait. During the week between the Ambassador's
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meeting with Hussein and the invasion, the Bush administration forbade
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any warning to Hussein against invasion, or to the thousands of people
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who might become hostages. The Ambassador returned to Washington as
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previously scheduled for consultations. Assistant Secretary Kelly, two
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days before the invasion, again testified publicly before Congress to
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the effect that the U.S. had no commitment to defend Kuwait. And,
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according to press reports and Senator Boren, who heads the Senate
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Intelligence Committee, the CIA had predicted the invasion some four
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days before it happened.
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Put these events together, and add the total absence of any public or
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private warning by Bush to Hussein not to invade, together with no
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U.S. effort to create international opposition while there was time.
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Assuming the U.S. was not indifferent to an invasion, one has to ask
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whether Bush administration policy was in effect to encourage Hussein
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to create a world crisis. After all, Iraq had chemical weapons and had
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already used them against Iran and against Kurds inside Iraq. He was
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know to be within two to five years of possessing nuclear weapons. He
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had completely upset the power balance in the Middle East by creating
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an army one million strong. He aspired to leadership of the Arab world
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against Israel, and he threatened all the so-called moderate, i.e.,
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feudal regimes, not just Kuwait. And with Kuwait's oil he would
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control 20 percent of the world's reserves, a concentration in radical
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nationalist hands that would be equal, perhaps to the Soviet Union,
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Iraq's main arms supplier. Saddam Hussein, then, was the perfect
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subject to allow enough rein to create a crisis, and he was even more
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perfect for post-invasion media demonization, a la Qaddafi, Ortega,
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and Noriega.
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Why would Bush seek a world crisis? The first suggestion came, for me
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at least, when he uttered those words about "our way of life" being at
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stake. They brought to mind Harry Truman's speech in 1950 that broke
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Congressional resistance to Cold War militarism and began 40 years of
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Pentagon dominance of the U.S. economy. It's worth recalling Truman's
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speech because Bush is trying to use the Gulf crisis, as Truman used
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the Korean War, to justify what some call military Keynesianism as a
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solution for U.S. economic prqoblems. This is, using enormous military
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expenditures to prevent or rectify economic slumps and depressions,
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while reducing as much as possible spending on civilian and social
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programs. Exactly what Reagan and Bush did, for example, in the early
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and mid-1980s.
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In 1950 the Truman administration adopted a program to vastly expand
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the U.S and West European military services under a National Security
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Council document called NSC-68. This document was Top Secret for 25
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years and, by error, it was released in 1975 and published. The
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purpose of military expansion under NSC-68 was to reverse the economic
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slide that began with the end of World War II wherein during five
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years the U.S. GNP had declined 20 percent and unemployment had risen
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from 700,000 to 4.7 million. U.S. exports, despite the subsidy program
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known as the Marshall Plan, were inadequate to sustain the economy,
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and remilitarization of Western Europe would allow transfer of
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dollars, under so-called defense support grants, that would in turn
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generate European imports from the U.S. As NSC-68 put the situation in
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early 1950: "the United States and other free nations will within a
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period of a few years at most experience a decline in economic
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activity of serious proportions unless more positive governmental
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programs are developed..."
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The solution adopted was expansion of the military. But support in
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Congress and the public at large was lacking for a variety of reasons,
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not least the increased taxes the programs would require. So Truman's
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State Department, under Dean Acheson, set out to sell the so-called
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Communist Threat as justification, through a fear campaign in the
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media that would create a permanent war atmosphere. But a domestic
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media campaign was not enough. A real crisis was needed, and it came
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in Korea. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, in their history of the 1945-55
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period, "The Limits of Power", show that the Truman administration
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manipulated this crisis to overcome resistance to military build-up
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and a review of those events show striking parallels to the Persian
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Gulf crisis of 1990. Korea at the end of World War II had been divided
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north-south along the 38th parallel by the U.S. and the Soviets. Five
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years of on-again, off-again conflict continued: first between
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revolutionary forces in the south and U.S. occupation forces, then
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between the respective states established first between the U.S. in
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the south, then by the Soviets in the north. Both states threatened to
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reunify the country by force, and border incursions with heavy
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fighting by military forces were common. In June 1950, communist North
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Korean military forces moved across the border toward Seoul, the South
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Korean capital. At the time, the North Korean move was called "naked
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aggression", but I.F. Stone made a convincing case, in his "Hidden
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History of the Korean War", that the invasion was provoked by South
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Korea and Taiwan, another U.S. client regime.
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For a month South Korean forces retreated, practically without
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fighting, in effect inviting the North Koreans to follow them south.
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Meanwhile Truman rushed in U.S. military forces under a United Nations
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command, and he made a dramatic appeal to Congress to for an
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additional $10 billion, beyond requirements for Korea, for U.S. and
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European military expansion. Congress refused. Truman then made a
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fateful decision. In September 1950, about three months after the
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conflict began, U.S., South Korean, and token forces from other
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countries, under the United Nations banner, began to push back the
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North Koreans. Within three weeks the North Koreans had been pushed
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north to the border, the 38th parallel, in defeat. That would have
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been the end of the matter, at least the military action, if the U.S.
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had accepted a Soviet UN resolution for a cease-fire and UN-supervised
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country-wide elections. Truman, however, needed to prolong the crisis
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in order to overcome congressional and public resistance to his plans
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for U.S. and European rearmament. Although the UN resolution under
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which U.S. forces were fighting called only for "repelling" aggression
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from the north, Truman had another plan. In early October U.S. and
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South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel heading north, and
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rapidly advanced toward the Yalu River, North Korea's border with
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China where only the year before the communists had defeated the
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U.S.-backed Kuomintang regime. The Chinese communist government
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threatened to intervene, but Truman had decided to overthrow the
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communist government in North Korea and unite the country under the
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anti-communist South Korean dictatorship. As predicted, the Chinese
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entered the war in November and forced the U.S. and its allies to
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retreat once again southward. The following month, with the media full
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of stories and pictures of American soldiers retreating through snow
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and ice before hordes of advancing Chinese troops, Truman went on
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national radio, declared a state of national emergency, and said what
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Bush's remarks about "our way of life" at stake recalled. Truman
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mustered all the hype and emotion he could, and said: "Our homes, our
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nation, all the things that we believe in, are in great danger. This
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danger has been created by the rulers of the Soviet Union." He also
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called again for massive increases in military spending for U.S. and
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European forces, apart from needs in Korea.
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Of course, there was no threat of war with the Soviet Union at all.
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Truman attributed the Korean situation to the Russians in order to
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create emotional hysteria, a false threat, and to get the leverage
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over Congress needed for approval of the huge amounts of money that
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Congress had refused. As we know, Truman's deceit worked. Congress
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went along in its so-called bi-partisan spirit, like the sheep in the
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same offices today. The U.S. military budget more than tripled from
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$13 billion in 1950 to $44 billion in 1952, while U.S. military forces
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doubled to 3.6 million. The Korean War continued for three more years,
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after it could have ended, with the final casualty count in the
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millions, including 34,000 U.S. dead and more than 100,000 wounded.
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But in the United States, Korea made the permanent war economy a
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reality, and we have lived with it for 40 years.
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What are the parallels with the current Gulf crisis? First, Korea in
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June 1950 was already a crisis of borders and unification demands
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simply waiting for escalation. Second, less than six months before the
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war began Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly placed South Korea
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outside the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, just as Assistant
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Secretary Kelly denied any U.S. defense commitment to Kuwait. Third,
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the U.S. obtained quick UN justification for a massive military
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intervention, but only for repelling the North Koreans, not for
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conquest of that country. Similarly, the UN resolutions call for
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defense of Saudi Arabia, not for military conquest of Iraq - contrary
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to the war mongers who daily suggest that the U.S. may be "forced" to
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attack Iraq, presumably without UN sanction or declaration of war by
|
||
Congress. Fourth, both crises came at a time of U.S. economic weakness
|
||
with a recession or even worse downturn threatening ahead. Fifth, and
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||
we will probably see this with the Gulf, the Korean crisis was
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||
deliberately prolonged in order to establish military expenditures as
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the motor of the U.S. economy. Proceeding in the same manner now would
|
||
be an adjustment to allow continuation of what began in 1950. NSC-68
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required a significant expansion of CIA operations around the world in
|
||
order to fight the secret political Cold War - a war against socialist
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economic programs, against communist parties, against left social
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democrats, against neutralism, against disarmament, against relaxation
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of tensions, and against the peace offensive then being waged by the
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Soviet Union.
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In Western Europe, through a vast network of political action and
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propaganda operations, the CIA was called upon to create in the
|
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public mind the specter of imminent Soviet invasion combined with the
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intention of the European left to enslave the population under Soviet
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dominion. By 1953, as a result of NSC-68, the CIA had major covert
|
||
action programs underway in 48 countries, consisting of propaganda,
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||
paramilitary, and political action operations - such as buying
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elections and subsidizing political parties. The bureaucracy grew
|
||
accordingly: in mid-1949 the covert action arm of the CIA had about
|
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300 employees and seven overseas field stations. Three years later
|
||
there were 2,800 employees and 47 field stations. In the same period
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the covert action budget grew from $4.7 million to $82 million.
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||
By the mid-1950s the name for the "enemy" was no longer just the
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Soviet Union. The wider concept of "International Communism" better
|
||
expressed the global view of secret conspiracies run from Moscow to
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||
undermine the U.S. and its allies. One previously secret document from
|
||
1955 outlines the CIA's tasks: "Create and exploit problems for
|
||
International Communism. Discredit International Communism and reduce
|
||
the strength of its parties and organization. Reduce international
|
||
Communist control over any area of the world... specifically such
|
||
operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda,
|
||
political action, economic warfare, preventive direct action,
|
||
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, escape and invasion and
|
||
evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups,
|
||
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas
|
||
and refugee liberation groups, support of indigenous and
|
||
anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world;
|
||
deception plans and all compatible activities necessary to accomplish
|
||
the foregoing."
|
||
|
||
Another document on CIA operations from the same period said, in
|
||
extracts: "Hitherto accepted norms of human conduct do not apply...
|
||
long-standing American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered...
|
||
we must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more
|
||
clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used
|
||
against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made
|
||
acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant
|
||
philosophy." And so, from the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, the CIA
|
||
organized sabotage and propaganda operations against every country of
|
||
Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. They tried to foment
|
||
rebellion and to hinder those countries' effort to rebuild from the
|
||
devastation of World War II. Though unsuccessful against the Soviet
|
||
Union, these operations had some successes in other countries, notably
|
||
East Germany. This was the easiest target because, as one former CIA
|
||
officer wrote, before the wall went up in 1961 all an infiltrator
|
||
needed was good documents and a railway ticket.
|
||
|
||
From about 1949, the CIA organized sabotage operations against targets
|
||
in East Germany in order to slow reconstruction and economic recovery.
|
||
The purpose was to create a high contrast between West Germany, then
|
||
receiving billions of U.S. dollars for reconstruction, and the "other
|
||
Germany" under Soviet control. William Blum, in his excellent history
|
||
of the CIA, lists an astonishing range of destruction: "through
|
||
explosives, arson, short circuiting, and other methods, they damaged
|
||
power stations, shipyards, a dam, canals, docks, public buildings,
|
||
petrol stations, shops, outdoor stands, a radio station, public
|
||
transformation... derailed freight trains... blew up road and railway
|
||
bridges used special acid to damage vital factory machinery... killed
|
||
7,000 cows... added soap to powdered milk destined for East German
|
||
schools," and much, much more. These activities were worldwide, and
|
||
not only directed against Soviet-supported governments.
|
||
|
||
During 40 years, as the east-west military standoff stabilized, the
|
||
CIA was a principle weapon in waging the north-south dimension of the
|
||
Cold War. It did so through operations intended to destroy
|
||
nationalist, reformist, and liberation movements of the so-called
|
||
Third World, through political repression (torture and death squads),
|
||
and by the overthrow of democratically elected civilian governments,
|
||
replacing them with military dictatorships. The Agency also organized
|
||
paramilitary forces to overthrow governments, with the contra
|
||
operation in Nicaragua only a recent example. This north-south
|
||
dimension of the Cold War was over control of natural resources,
|
||
labor, and markets and it continues today, as always. Anyone who
|
||
thinks the Cold War ended should think again: the east-west dimension
|
||
may have ended with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, but
|
||
the north-south dimension, which is where the fighting really took
|
||
place, as in Vietnam, is still on. The current Persian Gulf crisis is
|
||
the latest episode, and it provides the Bush administration with the
|
||
pretext to institutionalize the north-south dimension under the
|
||
euphemism of a "new international order," as he calls it. The means
|
||
will be a continuation of U.S. militarism within the context, if they
|
||
are successful, of a new multi-lateral, international framework.
|
||
Already James Baker has been testing the winds with proposals for a
|
||
NATO-style alliance in the Gulf, an idea that William Safire aptly
|
||
dubbed GULFO.
|
||
|
||
The goal in seeking and obtaining the current stops short, I believe,
|
||
of a shooting war. After all, a war with Iraq will not be a matter of
|
||
days or even weeks. Public opinion in the U.S. will turn against Bush
|
||
if young Americans in large numbers start coming back in body bags.
|
||
And Gulf petroleum facilities are likely to be destroyed in the
|
||
process of saving them, a catastrophe for the world economy.
|
||
Nevertheless, press accounts describe how the CIA and U.S. special
|
||
forces are organizing and arming guerrillas, said to be Kuwaitis, for
|
||
attacking Iraqi forces. These operations provide the capability for
|
||
just the right provocation, an act that would cause Hussein to order
|
||
defensive action that would then justify an all-out attack.
|
||
|
||
Such provocations have been staged in the past. In 1964, CIA
|
||
paramilitary forces working in tandem with the U.S. Navy provoked the
|
||
Tonkin Gulf incidents, according to historians who now question
|
||
whether the incidents, said to be North Vietnamese attacks on U.S.
|
||
ships, even happened. But Lyndon Johnson used the events as a pretext
|
||
to begin bombing North Vietnam and to get a blank check resolution
|
||
from Congress to send combat troops and escalate the war.
|
||
|
||
I think the purpose is not a shooting war but a crisis that can be
|
||
maintained as long as possible, far after the Iraqi-Kuwait problem is
|
||
resolved. This will prolong the international threat - remember Truman
|
||
in 1950 - and allow Bush to prevent cuts in the military budget, to
|
||
avoid any peace dividend, and prevent conversion of the economy to
|
||
peaceful, human-oriented purposes. After all, when you count all U.S.
|
||
defense-related expenses, they add up to more than double the official
|
||
figure of 26 percent of the national budget for defense - some experts
|
||
say two-thirds of the budget goes for defense in one way or another.
|
||
|
||
The so-called national security state of the past 40 years has meant
|
||
enormous riches, and power, for those who are in the game. It has also
|
||
meant population control - control of the people of this and many
|
||
other countries. Bush and his team, and those they represent, will do
|
||
whatever is necessary to keep the game going. Elitist control of the
|
||
U.S. rests on this game. If anyone doubts this, recall that from the
|
||
very beginning of this crisis, projections were coming out on costs,
|
||
implying that Desert Shield would last for more than a year, perhaps
|
||
that large U.S. forces would stay permanently in the Gulf. Just
|
||
imagine the joy this crisis has brought to U.S. military industries
|
||
that only months ago were quaking over their survival in a post-Cold
|
||
War world. Not six weeks passed after the Iraqi invasion before the
|
||
Pentagon proposed the largest arms sale in history: $21 billion worth
|
||
of hardware for defense of the Saudi Arabian throne. Very clever when
|
||
you do the sums. With an increase in price of $15 per barrel, which
|
||
had already happened, Saudi Arabia stands to earn more than $40
|
||
billion extra dollars during the 14 months from the invasion to the
|
||
end of the next U.S. fiscal year. Pentagon calculations of Desert
|
||
Shield costs come to $18 billion for the same 14 months. Even if the
|
||
Saudis paid all that, which they won't because of other contributors,
|
||
they would have more than $20 billion in windfall income left over.
|
||
O.K., bring that money to the States through weapon sales. That, I
|
||
suppose, is why the Saudi Arms sale instantly became known as the
|
||
Defense Industry Relief Act of 1990.
|
||
|
||
As for the price of oil, everyone knows that when it gets above $25-30
|
||
a barrel it becomes counter-productive for the Saudis and the Husseins
|
||
and other producers. Alternative energy sources become attractive and
|
||
conservation again becomes fashionable. Saddam Hussein accepted $21 in
|
||
July, and even if, with control of Kuwait, he had been able to get the
|
||
price up to $25, that would have been manageable for the United States
|
||
and other industrial economies. Instead, because of this crisis, it's
|
||
gone over $35 a barrel and even up to $40, threatening now to provoke
|
||
a world depression. With talk of peaceful solutions, like Bush's
|
||
speech to the UN General Assembly, they will coax the price down, but
|
||
not before Bush and others in the oil industry increase their already
|
||
considerable fortunes.
|
||
|
||
Ah, but the issue, we're told, is not the price of oil, or
|
||
preservation of the feudal Gulf regimes. It's principle. Naked
|
||
aggression cannot be allowed, and no one can profit from it. This is
|
||
why young American lives may be sacrificed. Same as Truman said in
|
||
1950, to justify dying for what was then, and for many tears
|
||
afterwards, one of the world's nastiest police states. When I read
|
||
that Bush was putting out that line, I nearly choked.
|
||
|
||
When George Bush attacks Saddam Hussein for "naked aggression", he
|
||
must think the world has no knowledge of United States history - no
|
||
memory at all. One thing we should never forget is that a nation's
|
||
foreign policy is a product of its domestic system. We should look to
|
||
our domestic system for the reasons why Bush and his entourage need
|
||
this crisis to prevent dismantling the national security state.
|
||
|
||
First, we know that the domestic system in this country is in crisis,
|
||
and that throughout history foreign crises have been manufactured,
|
||
provoked, and used to divert attention from domestic troubles - a way
|
||
of rallying people around the flag in support of the government of the
|
||
day. How convenient now for deflecting attention from the S&L scandal,
|
||
for example, to be paid not by the crooks but by ordinary, honest
|
||
people.
|
||
|
||
Second, we know that the system is not fair, that about one in three
|
||
people are economically deprived, either in absolute poverty or so
|
||
close that they have no relief from want. We also know that one in
|
||
three Americans are illiterate, either totally or to the degree that
|
||
they cannot function in a society based on the written word. We also
|
||
know that one in three Americans does not register to vote, and of
|
||
those who register 20 percent don't vote. This means we elect a
|
||
president with about 25 percent or slightly less of the potential
|
||
votes. The reasons why people don't vote are complex, but not the least
|
||
of them is that people know their vote doesn't count.
|
||
|
||
Third, we know that during the past ten years these domestic problems
|
||
have gotten even worse thanks to the Reagan-Bush policy of
|
||
transferring wealth from the middle and poor classes to the wealthy,
|
||
while cutting back on social programs. Add to this the usual litany of
|
||
crises: education, health care, environment, racism, women's rights,
|
||
homophobia, the infrastructure, productivity, research, and inability
|
||
to compete in the international marketplace, and you get a nation not
|
||
only in crisis, but in decline as well. In certain senses that might
|
||
not be so bad, if it stimulates, as in the Soviet Union, public debate
|
||
on the reasons. But the picture suggests that continuation of foreign
|
||
threats and crises is a good way to avoid fundamental reappraisal of
|
||
the domestic system, starting where such a debate ought to start, with
|
||
the rules of the game as laid down in the constitution.
|
||
|
||
What can we do? Lots. On the Gulf crisis, it's getting out the
|
||
information on what's behind it, and organizing people to act against
|
||
this intervention and possible war. Through many existing
|
||
organizations, such as Pledge of Resistance, there must be a way to
|
||
develop opposition that will make itself heard and seen on the streets
|
||
of cities across the country. We should pressure Congress and the
|
||
media for answers to the old question: During that week between
|
||
Ambassador Glaspie's meeting with Hussein, "What did George know, when
|
||
did he know it, and why didn't he act publicly and privately to stop
|
||
the invasion before it happened?" In getting the answer to that
|
||
question, we should show how the mainstream media, in failing to do
|
||
so, have performed their usual cheerleading role as the government's
|
||
information ministry.
|
||
|
||
The point on the information side is to show the truth, reject the
|
||
hypocrisy, and raise the domestic political cost to Bush and every
|
||
political robot who has gone along with him. At every point along the
|
||
way we must not be intimidated by those voices that will surely say:
|
||
"You are helping that brute Saddam Hussein." We are not helping
|
||
Hussein, although some may be. Rather we are against a senseless
|
||
destructive war based on greed and racism. We are for a peaceful,
|
||
negotiated, diplomatic solution that could include resolution of other
|
||
territorial disputes in the region.
|
||
|
||
We are against militarist intervention and against a crisis that will
|
||
allow continuing militarism in the United States. We are for
|
||
conversion of the U.S. and indeed the world economy to peaceful,
|
||
people-oriented purposes. In the long run, we reject one-party elitist
|
||
government, and we demand a new constitution, real democracy, with
|
||
popular participation in decision-making. In short, we want our own
|
||
glasnost and restructuring here in the United States. If popular
|
||
movements can bring it to the Soviet Union, that monolithic tyranny,
|
||
why can't we here in the United States?
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Corrections I made from last post:
|
||
|
||
-- "Assuming the U.S. was not indifferent to an invasion, one has to act"
|
||
Was changed to "..one has to ask"
|
||
|
||
-- The two paragraphs starting with "Why would Bush seek a world crisis?"
|
||
needed to be "filled", i.e., new-lines inserted.
|
||
|
||
-- "Truman attributed the Korean situation to the RUssians in order to
|
||
create emotinal hysteria, a false, threat, and to get the leverage..."
|
||
The comma after "false" was deleted.
|
||
|
||
-- "In Western Europe, through a vast network of political action and
|
||
propaganda operations, the CIA was called upon the create in the
|
||
public mind, the specter of imminent Soviet invasion combined with the
|
||
intention of the European left to enslave the population under
|
||
Soviet..." Was changed to "..CIA was called upon to create..." and the
|
||
comma after "mind" was deleted.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Please join the campaign to help Phil Agee regain his passport; don't
|
||
let Bush decide for us what's too "dangerous" for us to hear (namely
|
||
dirty deeds committed by the CIA, as only a former agent can reveal)
|
||
-Harel
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Speak Out!
|
||
Dear Friends: San Francisco, CA
|
||
|
||
Speak Out! is organizing a national campaign on behalf of Philip Agee,
|
||
former CIA officer and internationally recognized author, lecturer, and
|
||
foreign policy critic.
|
||
|
||
On September 22, the Chamorro government revoked Philip Agee's
|
||
Nicaraguan passport. The impetus for this action in all likelihood came
|
||
from the U.S. State Department. The revocation came on the eve of his
|
||
trip to the U.S. to begin a 20-city speaking tour.
|
||
|
||
This is merely the latest in an on-going effort to silence Agee and to
|
||
prevent him from traveling freely to and from the U.S.
|
||
|
||
We are appealing to Philip's supporters to help us circulate this
|
||
information as widely as possible. The government must not be allowed
|
||
to limit U.S. citizens' right to travel and speak freely. If they
|
||
succeed in this campaign against Philip Agee there will be ramifications
|
||
for all of us.
|
||
|
||
We invite you to join Noam Chomsky, Margaret Randall, Ramsey Clark,
|
||
Michael Parenti, Holly Sklar and many others in sending a brief
|
||
statement of protest to:
|
||
|
||
Secretary of State James Baker
|
||
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
|
||
Washington, DC 20520
|
||
|
||
and
|
||
|
||
Judge Gerhard Gesell
|
||
U.S. COURT HOUSE
|
||
Third and Constitution NW
|
||
Washington, DC 20001
|
||
|
||
Please also send a copy to us at:
|
||
|
||
Speak Out! 2215-R Market Street, #520,
|
||
San Francisco, CA 94114
|
||
(415) 864-4451
|
||
|
||
Agee and Speak Out! staff thank you in advance for any
|
||
assistance you can provide in spreading the word.
|
||
|
||
In solidarity,
|
||
|
||
Jean Caiani
|
||
Speak Out! Coordinator
|
||
|
||
##################################################################
|
||
Statement from Agee
|
||
##################################################################
|
||
|
||
Following is an excerpted statement from Philip Agee in Madrid, Spain.
|
||
It is from a speech he intended to give during his U.S. speaking tour.
|
||
|
||
|
||
GREETINGS TO ALL OF YOU:
|
||
|
||
I'm very sorry I'm not able to be with you tonight. I am not with you
|
||
because the U.S. government, including the Federal Courts, has once
|
||
again taken measures to prevent exercise of a citizen's First Amendment
|
||
rights. Not that this is so unusual in a national security state. For
|
||
me it's familiar, the latest such action in nearly 20 years of efforts
|
||
to prevent my speaking, above all to people in the United States.
|
||
|
||
Two weeks ago I heard indirectly that my Nicaraguan passport, with which
|
||
I have travelled for years, was revoked by the Chamorro government. I
|
||
checked with friends in Managua, who confirmed the action.
|
||
|
||
Without a passport I am unable to travel to the United States because I
|
||
could not return to my wife and work in Spain where a valid passport is
|
||
required for entry. For almost four years I have been trying
|
||
unsuccessfully to get a U.S. passport but the State Department, at the
|
||
CIA's urging, has refused.
|
||
|
||
In June my lawyers filed suit in the District Court in Washington
|
||
demanding a court order requiring the State Department either to issue a
|
||
passport or to re-open a hearing that in its first phase, three years
|
||
ago, was conducted in clear and open violation of the Department's own
|
||
regulations.
|
||
|
||
Those regulations give me the right to "confrontation and
|
||
cross-examination" of William Webster, the CIA Director and only witness
|
||
against me. The State Department refused to produce Webster despite a
|
||
ruling by its Board of Appellate Review that it do so. Ultimate
|
||
resolution, perhaps in the Supreme Court, is no doubt years away. By
|
||
such delay the government wins its case de facto, without any legal
|
||
decision.
|
||
|
||
After revocation of my Nicaraguan passport, my lawyers asked Judge
|
||
Gerhard Gesell, who is presiding my case, for an emergency order
|
||
requiring issuance of a passport so that I could fulfill agreements to
|
||
speak in the U.S. during October and November, to attend hearings on my
|
||
case in his court, to participate in any re-opened State Department
|
||
passport hearing, and to visit my family. He refused, knowing full well
|
||
that without the passport I could not return to Spain.
|
||
|
||
Gesell refuses me the possibility to attend sessions on my case in his
|
||
court, or any re-opened State Department passport hearing that he might
|
||
order, let alone speaking at this meeting tonight. For this and his
|
||
past prejudice in a suit I brought under the FOIA ten years ago, I call
|
||
on him to disqualify himself from my case. And I ask you to support me
|
||
by demanding also that he either reconsider, and issue the order for the
|
||
passport, or quit the case.
|
||
|
||
The object of this exercise is education: to show how the federal court
|
||
system is the most undemocratic institution we have. Nobody elects
|
||
those judges, who are political appointees for life, and they answer to
|
||
no one. The result finds judges masking political decisions in pompous
|
||
legalese with total immunity from public reaction. But we should not
|
||
take such hypocrisy quietly.
|
||
|
||
However serious my problems are, they are certainly mild compared with
|
||
others. I urge you to support political prisoners like Leonard Peltier
|
||
of the American Indian Movement, and the many others deprived of
|
||
constitutional rights thanks to the racism and prejudice in what passes
|
||
for U.S. justice.
|
||
|
||
I regret that I cannot be with you. I thank you for whatever support
|
||
you can give to help me regain my right to come and go from the United
|
||
States, and to be with you on another occasion.
|
||
|
||
Best Wishes,
|
||
|
||
Philip Agee
|
||
|
||
##################################################################
|
||
|
||
PHILIP AGEE DEFENSE CAMPAIGN
|
||
|
||
On October 1, Speakout! launched a national campaign on behalf of one of
|
||
our speakers, Philip Agee. Agee was the first CIA officer to go public
|
||
in protest of the Agency's policies and remains its most controversial
|
||
critic since its founding in 1947. For fifteen years Agee has been a
|
||
leading American activist against CIA support of torture, political
|
||
assassinations, death squads, and destabilization of democratic
|
||
governments around the world. His bestselling book Inside the Company:
|
||
CIA Diary, was the first uncensored expose of CIA activities written by
|
||
one of its own. So that American citizens might know what crimes their
|
||
government is committing in their name, Agee has paid and is still
|
||
paying a high price: his freedom to travel and speak freely.
|
||
|
||
In 1979, Agee's U.S. passport was revoked for "national security"
|
||
reasons. He applied for the return of his passport in 1987. His
|
||
application was denied six months later by Secretary of State George
|
||
Shultz, alleging that Agee's activities (writing and speaking), "are
|
||
continuing to cause serious damage to the national security and foreign
|
||
policy of the United States." No evidence has ever been presented to
|
||
substantiate this charge however, and the US government has never
|
||
charged Agee with any crime.
|
||
|
||
Despite on-going efforts to stop him, Agee has traveled freely on an
|
||
honorary Nicaraguan passport he received in 1983. Twice a year he has
|
||
been touring the United States, speaking about CIA activity to overflow
|
||
crowds on hundreds of college campuses. In addition to his talks, he
|
||
always meets with students and community organizers to listen to and
|
||
advise them, explaining how to become involved in the CIA-Off Campus
|
||
Movement and linking them with other activists in the area.
|
||
|
||
He travels with dozens of books, journals, periodicals, and pamphlets,
|
||
encouraging and guiding his audiences to read and to think critically.
|
||
As a result of his most recent tour, book sales in the spring of 1990
|
||
totalled $10,000. His visits have been so successful that dozens of
|
||
CIA-Off Campus committees now exist and a national student newspaper
|
||
(Campus Watch) to monitor CIA activities on campuses enjoys a wide
|
||
circulation. As a result of his exposes, CIA recruitment has been
|
||
banned from many campuses. As Christine Kelley of Student Action Union
|
||
(national student organization) says, "If you want to get the CIA off
|
||
your campus, bring Phil Agee on."
|
||
|
||
On September 22, 1990, the eve of a Agee's 20-city US tour organized by
|
||
Speakout!, the Chamorro government revoked Agee's Nicaraguan passport,
|
||
evidently in response to pressure from the US State Department. This is
|
||
just the latest action in nearly 20 years of harassment and efforts to
|
||
silence him. State Department pressure has also prevented him from
|
||
obtaining a passport from any other country.
|
||
|
||
After revocation of his passport, Agee's lawyers asked Judge Gerhart
|
||
Gesell, who is presiding his case, for an emergency order requiring
|
||
issuance of a passport so that he could fulfill agreements to speak at
|
||
meetings scheduled in October and November, attend hearings on his case
|
||
in court, and visit his family. Judge Gesell refused, knowing full well
|
||
that without a passport Agee would be unable to return to his wife and
|
||
work in Spain.
|
||
|
||
Speakout! protests this violation of Philip Agee's first amendment
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rights and believes that as an American citizen, he is entitled to
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||
travel freely and to express dissent. It is unconstitutional for the US
|
||
government to suboordinate the rights of its citizens to some undefined
|
||
national security concern. Speakout! will work to ensure that Philip
|
||
Agee's voice continues to be heard in the United States.
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||
|
||
Following the successful campaigns to stop the deportation of South
|
||
African exile Dennis Brutus and feminist Margaret Randall under the
|
||
Reagan Administration, Speakout! has launched a campaign to Agee regain
|
||
his passport. We are already receiving some radio and newspaper
|
||
coverage, and have mailed support packets to individuals and
|
||
organizations encouraging them to write protest letters to Judge Gesell.
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||
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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Subject: video on Agee speech
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To: Multiple recipients of list ACTIV-L <ACTIV-L@UMCVMB>
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||
/** pn.publiceye: 18.6 **/
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** Written 7:23 pm Jan 29, 1991 by nlgclc in cdp:pn.publiceye **
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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To order a videotape of Philip Agee speaking on the Middle East and
|
||
the Gulf Crisis, send $10 (US) to:
|
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Jean Caiani
|
||
SPEAK OUT
|
||
2215-R Market Street, #520
|
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San Francisco, CA 94114
|
||
|
||
(415) 864-4561
|
||
|
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Make checks payable to: Philip Agee Defense Campaign
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||
|
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** End of text from cdp:pn.publiceye **
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