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EX-CIA OFFICIAL SPEAKS OUT
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By Greg Kaza
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This article is reprinted from Full Disclosure. Copyright (c) 1986
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Capitol Information Association. All rights reserved. Permission is hereby
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granted to reprint this article providing this message is included in its
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entirety. Full Disclosure, Box 8275, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107. $15/yr.
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Full Disclosure: I'd like to start out by talking about your well-known book,
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`The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.' What edition is that in today?
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Marchetti: The latest edition came out last summer. Its the Laurel edition,
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Dell paperback.
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FD: Its gone through a couple of printings?
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Marchetti: Yes. It was originally published by Alfred Knopf in hardback and
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by Dell in paperback. That was in 1974 with Knopf and 1975 with Dell. Then a
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few years later we got some more of the deletions back from the government,
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so Dell put out a second printing. That would have been about 1979. Then
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recently, during the summer of 1983, we got back a few more deletions and
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that's the current edition that is available in good bookstores (laughs) in
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Dell paperback, the Laurel edition.
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Originally the CIA asked for 340 deletions. We got about half of those back
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in negotiations prior to the trial. We later won the trial, they were
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supposed to give everything back but it was overturned at the appellate
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level. The Supreme Court did not hear the case, so the appellate decision
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stood. We got back 170 of those deletions in negotiations during the trial
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period. A few years later when the second paperback edition came out there
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were another 24 deletions given back. The last time, in 1983, when the the
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third edition of the paperback edition was published, there were another 35
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given back. So there are still 110 deletions in the book out of an original
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340.
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As for the trial, the CIA sued in early 1972 to have the right to review and
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censor the book. They won that case. It was upheld at the appellate court in
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Richmond some months later, and again the Supreme Court did not hear the
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case. Two years later we sued the CIA on the grounds that they had been
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arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in making deletions and were in
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violation of the injunction they had won in 1972. We went before Judge Albert
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V. Bryan Jr., and in that case, he decided in our favor. Bryan was the same
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fourth district judge in Alexandria who heard the original case. He said that
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there was nothing in the book that was harmful to national security or that
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was logically classifiable. Bryan said the CIA was being capricious and
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arbitrary. They appealed, and a few months later down in Richmond the
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appellate court for the fourth district decided in the government's favor,
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and overturned Bryan's decision. Again, the Supreme Court did not hear the
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case. It chose not to hear it, and the appellate court's decision stood.
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By this time, we had grown weary of the legal process. The book was published
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with blank spaces except for those items that had been given back in
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negotiations. Those items were printed in bold face type to show the kind of
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stuff the CIA was trying to cut out. In all subsequent editions, the
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additional material is highlighted to show what it is they were trying to cut
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out.
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Of course the CIA's position is that only they know what is a secret. They
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don't make the national security argument because that is too untenable these
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days. They say that they have a right to classify anything that they want to,
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and only they know what is classifiable. They are establishing a precedent,
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and have established a precedent in this case that has been used subsequently
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against ex-CIA people like Frank Snepp and John Stockwell and others, and in
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particular against Ralph McGee. They've also used it against (laughing), its
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kind of ironic, two former CIA directors, one of whom was William Colby.
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Colby was the guy behind my case when he was director. In fact, he was sued
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by the CIA and had to pay a fine of I think, about $30,000 for putting
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something in that they wanted out about the Glomar Explorer. He thought they
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were just being, as I would say, ``arbitrary and capricious,'' so he put it
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in anyway, was sued, and had to pay a fine. Admiral Stansfield Turner was
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another who, like Colby when he was director, was the great defender of
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keeping everything secret and only allowing the CIA to reveal anything. When
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Turner got around to writing his book he had the same problems with them and
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is very bitter about it and has said so. His book just recently came out and
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he's been on a lot of TV shows saying, ``Hells bells, I was director and I
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know what is classified and what isn't but these guys are ridiculous,
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bureaucratic,'' and all of these accusations you hear. It is ironic because
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even the former directors of the CIA have been burned by the very precedents
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that they helped to establish.
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FD: What are the prospects for the remaining censored sections of your book
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eventually becoming declassified so that they are available to the American
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people?
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Marchetti: If I have a publisher, and am willing to go back at the CIA every
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year or two years forcing a review, little by little, everything would come
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out eventually. I can't imagine anything they would delete. There might be a
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few items that the CIA would hold onto for principle's sake. Everything that
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is in that book, whether it was deleted or not, has leaked out in one way or
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another, has become known to the public in one form or another since then. So
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you know its really a big joke.
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FD: Looking back on it, what effect did the publication of the `The CIA and
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the Cult of Intelligence' have on your life?
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Marchetti: It had a tremendous effect on my life. The book put me in a
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position where I would forever be persona non grata with the bureaucracy in
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the federal government, which means, that I cannot get a job anywhere, a job
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that is, specific to my background and talents. Particularly if the company
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has any form of government relationship, any kind of government contract.
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That stops the discussions right there. But even companies that are not
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directly allied with the government tend to be very skittish because I was so
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controversial and they just don't feel the need to get into this. I have had
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one job since leaving the CIA other than writing, consulting and things like
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that, and that was with an independent courier company which did no business
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with the government, was privately owned, and really didn't care what the
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government thought. They ran their own business and they hired me as their
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friend. But every other job offered to me always evaporates, because even
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those individuals involved in hiring who say they want to hire me and think
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the government was wrong always finish saying, ``Business is business. There
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are some people here who do not want to get involved in any controversial
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case.'' Through allies or former employees somebody always goes out of their
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way to make it difficult for me, so I never have any other choice but to
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continue to be a freelance writer, lecturer, consultant, etcetera, and even
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in that area I am frequently penalized because of who I worked for.
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FD: The government views you as a troublemaker or whistleblower?
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Marchetti: As a whistleblower, and, I guess, troublemaker. In the
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intelligence community, as one who violated the code.
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FD: The unspoken code?
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Marchetti: Right. And this has been the fate of all those CIA whistleblowers.
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They've all had it hard. Frank Snepp, Stockwell, McGee, and others, have all
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suffered the same fate. Whistleblowers in general, like Fitzgerald in the
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Department of Defense, who exposed problems with the C-5A, overruns, have
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also suffered the same kind of fate. But since they were not dealing in the
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magical area of national security they have found that they have some leeway
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and have been able to, in many other cases, find some other jobs. In some
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cases the government was even forced to hire them back. Usually the
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government puts them in an office somewhere in a corner, pays them $50,000 a
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year, and ignores them. Which drives them crazy of course, but thats the
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government's way of punishing anybody from the inside who exposes all of
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these problems to the American public.
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FD: Phillip Agee explains in his book the efforts of the CIA to undermine his
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writing of `Inside The Company' both before and after publication. Have you
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run into similar problems with extralegal CIA harassment?
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Marchetti: Yes. I was under surveillance. Letters were opened. I am sure our
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house was burglarized. General harassment of all sorts, and the CIA has
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admitted to some of these things. One or two cases, because the Church
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Committee found out. For example, the CIA admitted to working with the IRS to
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try and give me a bad time. The Church Committee exposed that and they had to
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drop it. They've admitted to certain other activities like the surveillance
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and such, but the CIA will not release to me any documents under the Freedom
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of Information Act. They won't release it all -- any documents under FOIA,
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period.
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FD: About your time with the CIA?
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Marchetti: No, about my case. I only want the information on me after leaving
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the agency and they just refuse to do it. They've told me through friends
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``You can sue until you're blue in the face but you're not going to get
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this'' because they know exactly what would happen. It would be a terrible
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embarrassment to the CIA if all of the extralegal and illegal activities they
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took became public.
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The most interesting thing they did in my case was an attempt at entrapment,
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by putting people in my path in the hopes that I would deal with these
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people, who in at least one case turned out to be an undercover CIA operator
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who was, if I had dealt with him, it would have appeared that I was moving to
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deal with the Soviet KGB. The CIA did things of that nature. They had people
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come to me and offer to finance projects if I would go to France, live there,
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and write a book there without any censorship. Switzerland and Germany were
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also mentioned. The CIA used a variety of techniques of that sort. I turned
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down all of them because my theory is that the CIA should be exposed to a
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certain degree in the hope that Congress could conduct some investigation out
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of which would come some reform. I was playing the game at home and that is
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the way I was going to play. Play it by the rules, whatever handicap that
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meant. Which in the end was a tremendous handicap.
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But it did work out in the sense that my book did get published. The CIA drew
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a lot of attention to it through their attempts to prevent it from being
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written and their attempts at censorship, which simply increased the appetite
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of the public, media, and Congress, to see what they were trying to hide and
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why. All of this was happening at a time when other events were occurring.
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Ellsberg's Pentagon Papers had come out about the same time I announced I was
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doing my book. Some big stories were broken by investigative journalists. All
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of these things together, my book was part of it, did lead ultimately to
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congressional investigations of the CIA. I spent a lot of time behind the
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scenes on the Hill with senators and congressman lobbying for these
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investigations and they finally did come to pass.
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It took awhile. President Ford tried to sweep everything under the rug by
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creating the Rockefeller Commission, which admitted to a few CIA mistakes but
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swept everything under the rug. It didn't wash publicly. By this time, the
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public didn't buy the government's lying. So we ultimately did have the Pike
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Committee, which the CIA and the White House did manage to sabotage. But the
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big one was the Church Committee in the Senate which conducted a pretty broad
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investigation and brought out a lot of information on the CIA. The result of
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that investigation was that the CIA did have to admit to a lot of wrongdoing
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and did have to make certain reforms. Not as much as I would have liked. I
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think everything has gone back to where it was and maybe even worse than what
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it was, but at least there was a temporary halt to the CIA's free reign of
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hiding behind secrecy and getting away with everything, up to and including
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murder. There were some changes and I think they were all for the better.
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FD: So instead of some of the more harsher critics of the CIA who would want
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to see it abolished you would want to reform it?
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Marchetti: Yes. Its one of these things where you can't throw out the baby
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with the bathwater. The CIA does do some very good and valuable and
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worthwhile and legal things. Particularly in the collection of information
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throughout the world, and in the analysis of events around the world. All of
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this is a legitimate activity, and what the CIA was really intended to do in
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the beginning when they were set up. My main complaint is that over the years
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those legitimate activities have to a great extent been reduced in
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importance, and certain clandestine activities, particularly the covert
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action, have come to the fore. Covert action is essentially the intervention
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in the internal affairs of other governments in order to manipulate events,
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using everything from propaganda, disinformation, political action, economic
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action, all the way down to the really dirty stuff like para-military
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activity. This activity, there was too much of it. It was being done for the
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wrong reasons, and it was counterproductive. It was in this area where the
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CIA was really violating U.S. law and the intent of the U.S. Constitution,
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and for that matter, I think, the wishes of Congress and the American people.
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This was the area that needed to be thoroughly investigated and reformed. My
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suggestion was that the CIA should be split into two organizations. One, the
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good CIA so to speak, would collect and analyze information. The other part,
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in the dirty tricks business, would be very small and very tightly controlled
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by Congress and the White House, and if possible, some kind of a public board
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so that it didn't get out of control.
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My theory is, and I've proved it over and over again along with other people,
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is that the basic reason for secrecy is not to keep the enemy from knowing
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what you're doing. He knows what you're doing because he's the target of it,
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and he's not stupid. The reason for the CIA to hide behind secrecy is to keep
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the public, and in particular the American public, from knowing what they're
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doing. This is done so that the President can deny that we were responsible
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for sabotaging some place over in Lebanon where a lot of people were killed.
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So that the President can deny period. Here is a good example: President
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Eisenhower denied we were involved in attempts to overthrow the Indonesian
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government in 1958 until the CIA guys got caught and the Indonesians produced
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them. He looked like a fool. So did the N.Y. Times and everybody else who
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believed him. That is the real reason for secrecy.
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There is a second reason for secrecy. That is that if the public doesn't know
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what you are doing you can lie to them because they don't know what the truth
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is. This is a very bad part of the CIA because this is where you get not only
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propaganda on the American people but actually disinformation, which is to
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say lies and falsehoods, peddled to the American public as the truth and
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which they accept as gospel. That's wrong. It's not only wrong, its a lie and
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it allows the government and those certain elements of the government that
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can hide behind secrecy to get away with things that nobody knows about. If
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you carefully analyze all of these issues that keep coming up in Congress
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over the CIA, this is always what is at the heart of it: That the CIA lied
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about it, or that the CIA misrepresented something, or the White House did
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it, because the CIA and the White House work hand in glove. The CIA is not a
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power unto itself. It is an instrument of power. A tool. A very powerful tool
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which has an influence on whoever is manipulating it. But basically the CIA
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is controlled by the White House, the inner circle of government, the inner
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circle of the establishment in general. The CIA is doing what these people
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want done so these people are appreciative and protective of them, and they
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in turn make suggestions or even go off on their own sometimes and operate
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deep cover for the CIA. So it develops into a self-feeding circle.
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FD: Spreading disinformation is done through the newsmedia.
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Marchetti: Yes. Its done through the newsmedia. The fallacy is that the CIA
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says the real reason they do this is to con the Soviets. Now I'll give you
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some examples. One was a fellow by the name of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.
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FD: Penkovsky Papers?
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Marchetti: Yes. I wrote about that in `The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.
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The Penkovsky Papers was a phony story. We wrote the book in the CIA. Now,
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who in the hell are we kidding? The Soviets? Do we think for one minute that
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the Soviets, who among other things captured Penkovsky, interrogated him, and
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executed him, do you think for one minute they believe he kept a diary like
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that? How could he have possibly have done it under the circumstances? The
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whole thing is ludicrous. So we're not fooling the Soviets. What we're doing
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is fooling the American people and pumping up the CIA. The British are
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notorious for this kind of thing. They're always putting out phony
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autobiographies and biographies on their spies and their activities which are
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just outright lies. They're done really to maintain the myth of English
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secret intelligence so that they will continue to get money to continue to
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operate. Thats the real reason. The ostensible reason is that we were trying
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to confuse the Soviets. Well that's bullshit because they're not confused.
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One of the ones I think is really great is `Khruschev Remembers.' If anybody
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in his right mind believes that Nikita Khruschev sat down, and dictated his
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memoirs, and somebody -- Strobe Talbot sneaked out of the Soviet Union with
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them they're crazy. That story is a lie. That book was a joint operation
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between the CIA and the KGB. Both of them were doing it for the exact same
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reasons. They both wanted to influence their own publics. We did it our way
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by pretending that Khruschev had done all of this stuff and we had lucked out
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and somehow gotten a book out of it. The Soviets did it because they could
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not in their system allow Khruschev to write his memoirs. Thats just against
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everything that the Communist system stands for. But they did need him to
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speak out on certain issues. Brezhnev particularly needed him to
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short-circuit some of the initiatives of the right wing, the Stalinist wing
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of the party. Of course the KGB was not going to allow the book to be
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published in the Soviet Union. The stuff got out so that it could be
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published by the Americans. That doesn't mean that the KGB didn't let copies
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slip into the Soviet Union and let it go all around. The Soviets achieved
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their purpose too.
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This is one of the most fantastic cases, I think, in intelligence history.
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Two rival governments cooperated with each other on a secret operation to
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dupe their respective publics. I always wanted to go into much greater length
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on this but I just never got around to it. Suffice it to say that TIME
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magazine threatened to cancel a two-page magazine article they were doing on
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me and my book if I didn't cut a brief mention of this episode out of the
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book.
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FD: How was this operation initially set up?
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Marchetti: I don't know all of the ins and outs of it. I imagine what
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happened is that it probably started with somebody in the Soviet Politburo
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going to Khruschev and saying, ``Hey, behind the scenes we're having lots of
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trouble with the right-wing Stalinist types. They're giving Brehznev a bad
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time and they're trying to undercut all of the changes you made and all of
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the changes Brehznev has made and wants to make. Its pretty hard to deal with
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it so we've got an idea. Since you're retired and living here in your dacha
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why don't you just sit back and dictate your memoirs. And of course the KGB
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will review them and make sure you don't say anything you shouldn't say and
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so on and so forth. Then we will get in touch with our counterparts, and see
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to it that this information gets out to the West, which will publish it, and
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then it will get back to the Soviet Union in a variety of forms. It will get
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back in summaries broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Liberty, and
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copies of the book will come back in, articles written about it will be
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smuggled in, and this in turn will be a big influence on the intelligentsia
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and the party leaders and it will undercut Suslov and the right wingers.''
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Khruschev said okay. The KGB then went to the CIA and explained things to
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them and the CIA said, Well that sounds good, we'll get some friends of ours
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here, the TIME magazine bureau in Moscow, Jerry Schecter would later have a
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job in the White House as a press officer. We'll get people like Strobe
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Talbot, who is working at the bureau there, we'll get these guys to act as
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the go-betweens. They'll come and see you for the memoirs and everyone will
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play dumb. You give them two suitcases full of tapes (laughs) or something
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like that and let them get out of the Soviet Union. Which is exactly what
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happened.
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Strobe brought all of this stuff back to Washington and then TIME-LIFE began
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to process it and put a book together. They wouldn't let anybody hear the
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tapes, they didn't show anybody anything. A lot of people were very
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suspicious. You know you can tell this to the public or anybody else who
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doesn't have the least brains in their head about how the Soviet Union
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operates and get away with it. But anybody who knows the least bit about the
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Soviet Union knows the whole thing is impossible. A former Soviet premier
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cannot sit in his dacha and make these tapes and then give them to a U.S.
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newspaperman and let him walk out of the country with them. That cannot be
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done in a closed society, a police state, like the Soviet Union.
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The book was eventually published but before it was published there was
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another little interesting affair. Strobe Talbot went to Helsinki with the
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manuscript, where he was met by the KGB who took it back to Leningrad, looked
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at it, and then it was finally published by TIME-LIFE. None of that has ever
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been explained in my book. A couple of other journalists have made references
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to this episode but never went into it. It's an open secret in the press
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corps here in Washington and New York, but nobody ever wrote a real big story
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for a lot of reasons, because I guess it's just the kind of story that it's
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difficult for them to get their hooks into. I knew people who were then in
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the White House and State Department who were very suspicious of it because
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they thought the KGB...
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FD: Had duped TIME?
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Marchetti: Exactly. Once they learned this was a deal they quieted down and
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ceased their objections and complaints, and even alibied and lied afterwards
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as part of the bigger game. Victor Lewis, who was apparently instrumental in
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all of these negotiations, later fit into one little footnote to this story
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that I've often wondered about. Lewis is (was)... After all of this happened
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and when the little furor that existed here in official Washington began
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dying down, Victor Lewis went to Tel Aviv for medical treatment. He came into
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the country very quietly but somebody spotted him and grabbed him and said,
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``What are you doing here in Israel?'' ``Well I'm here for medical treatment,
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'' Lewis said. They said, ``What?! You're here in Israel for medical
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treatment?'' He said, ``Yes.'' They said, ``Well whats the problem?'' ``I've
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got lumbago, a back problem, and they can't fix it in the Soviet Union. but
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there's a great Jewish doctor here I knew in the Soviet Union and I came to
|
||
see him.'' That sounds like the craziest story you ever wanted to hear. But
|
||
then another individual appeared in Israel at the same time and some reporter
|
||
spotted him. He happened to be Richard Helms, then-director of the CIA. He
|
||
asked Helms what he was doing in Israel, and he had some kind of a lame
|
||
excuse which started people wondering whether this was the payoff. Helms
|
||
acting for the CIA, TIME-LIFE, and the U.S. government, and Lewis acting for
|
||
the KGB, Politburo, and the Soviet government. Its really a fascinating
|
||
story. I wrote about briefly in the book and it was very short. You'll find
|
||
it if you look through the book in the section we're talking about.
|
||
Publications and things like that. When I wrote those few paragraphs there
|
||
wasn't much further I could go, because there was a lot of speculation and
|
||
analysis.
|
||
|
||
Around the time my book came out, TIME magazine decided that they would do a
|
||
two-page spread in their news section and give it a boost. Suddenly I started
|
||
getting calls from Jerry Schecter and Strobe Talbot about cutting that part
|
||
out. I said I would not cut it out unless they could look me in the eye and
|
||
say I was wrong. If it wasn't true I would take the book and cut the material
|
||
out. But neither of them chose to do that. Right before the article appeared
|
||
in TIME I got a call from one of the editors telling me that some people
|
||
wanted to kill the article. I asked why and he said one of the reasons is
|
||
what you had to say about TIME magazine being involved in the Khruschev
|
||
Remembers book. I asked him, ``Thats it?'' I had talked to Jerry and Strobe
|
||
and this was their backstab. This editor asked me if I could find somebody
|
||
who could trump the people who were trying to have the article killed.
|
||
Somebody who could verify my credentials in telling the story. I said why
|
||
don't you call Richard Helms, who by that time had been eased out of office
|
||
by Kissinger and Nixon, and was now an ambassador in Teheran. So this editor
|
||
called Helms to verify my credentials (laughing) and Helms said, ``Yeah, he's
|
||
a good guy. He just got pissed off and wanted to change the CIA.'' So the
|
||
article ran in TIME. I think you're one of the very few people I've explained
|
||
this story to in depth.
|
||
|
||
FD: Did this operation have a name?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: It probably did but I was already out of the agency and I don't
|
||
know what it was. But I do know it was a very sensitive activity and that
|
||
people very high up in the White House and State Department who you would
|
||
have thought would have been aware of it were not aware of it. But then
|
||
subsequently they were clearly taken into a room and talked to in discussions
|
||
and were no longer critics and doubters and in fact became defenders of it.
|
||
|
||
FD: Let me make sure I am clear about the CIA's motivation...
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: The CIA's motivation was that here we have a former Soviet premier
|
||
talking out about the events of his career and revealing some pretty
|
||
interesting things about his thinking and the thinking of others. All of
|
||
which shows that the Soviet Union is run by a very small little clique. A
|
||
very small Byzantine-like clique. There is a strong tendency to stick with
|
||
Stalinisn and turn to Stalinism but some of the cooler heads, the more
|
||
moderate types, are trying to make changes. Its good stuff from the CIA's
|
||
point of view and from the U.S. government's point of view. This is what
|
||
we're dealing with. This is our primary rival. Look at how they are. And
|
||
Khruschev had to dictate these things in secrecy and they had to be smuggled
|
||
out of the Soviet Union.
|
||
|
||
Things like this are very subtle in their consistency. It's not a black and
|
||
white thing on the surface. You might say, ``Well, what's wrong with that?''
|
||
What's wrong with that is that it is a lie. The truth would have been much
|
||
more effective. Nikita Khruschev was approached by the KGB and Soviet
|
||
Politburo to dictate his memoirs, which he did under their supervision, which
|
||
means we don't know if he is telling the whole story or the complete truth
|
||
because they had an opportunity to edit it. The Russians were so anxious to
|
||
get this information out so that it could come back to the Soviet Union for
|
||
two reasons. The first was to build international pressure. The second was to
|
||
build up internal pressure against the Stalinists. They were so anxious that
|
||
they were willing to make a deal with the CIA, and give us this material. So
|
||
that we could then prepare a book. Which we did. Thats the kind of a
|
||
government we are dealing with here. These are the kinds of people they are
|
||
and the kind of lies they live.
|
||
|
||
FD: Let's turn to world affairs for a moment. One of the events of recent
|
||
years that has always puzzled me is United States support for the Vanaaka
|
||
Party in what was once the New Hebrides Islands. In the late '70s, before the
|
||
New Hebrides achieved independence, there were basically two factions
|
||
fighting between themselves to see who would maintain control when the
|
||
colonial powers left. The British and the French had governed the New
|
||
Hebrides under a concept known as the condominium, and before independence,
|
||
the British and the labor movement in Australia threw their support behind
|
||
the ubiquitous socialist faction, in this case, the Vanaaka Party. The French
|
||
offered some behind-the-scenes support to the second faction, which was
|
||
basically pro-free market and pro-West. The U.S. under Jimmy Carter went
|
||
along with the British. Do you have any idea why this might have been done?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: Offhand, I don't. The CIA has learned over the years that you
|
||
sometimes cannot support the people you would prefer to support, because they
|
||
just do not have the popular power to gain control or maintain control
|
||
without a revolution and things of that sort. The classic example is West
|
||
Berlin. Back in the '50s we were contesting with the Russians for influence
|
||
in Berlin. This was at a time when the Russians and East Germans were putting
|
||
tremendous pressure on to have West Berlin go almost voluntarily into the
|
||
Soviet bloc. The United States was struggling mightily to keep West Berlin
|
||
free. At that point in time the strong power in West Germany were the
|
||
Christian Democrats under Konrad Adenauer, and these were the people that we
|
||
were supporting.
|
||
|
||
The Christian Democrats, however, just did not have the wherewithal to save
|
||
West Berlin. The situation was such that the Social Democrats were the ones
|
||
who could save West Berlin. Not getting into all of the whys and wherefores
|
||
and policy positions, the Social Democrats also had a very charismatic person
|
||
named Willy Brandt. So by backing Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats,
|
||
instead of putting all of our eggs in the Christian Democratic Party basket,
|
||
Brandt and the Social Democrats were able to maintain a free West Berlin and
|
||
we were able to achieve our goal. There were some people in the CIA who
|
||
thought this was terrible, we were not being ideologically pure, and one of
|
||
them happens to be E. Howard Hunt, who actually considered Willy Brandt a KGB
|
||
spy. So there are times when you have to, I guess you would call it, choose
|
||
the lesser of two evils.
|
||
|
||
It might have been a miscalculated gamble. I don't have all of the facts, but
|
||
maybe the thinking was that if we left the pro-West faction in power we may
|
||
end up with a goddamned civil war.
|
||
|
||
FD: In retrospect, the Carter administration's decision seems even more
|
||
tragic and mistaken. Since coming to power the Vanaaka Party has consolidated
|
||
power in the new country, now known as Vanuatu, and established diplomatic
|
||
relations with governments like Cuba and Vietnam. Socialist Vanuatu has now
|
||
come to serve as a beacon of sorts for other independence movements in that
|
||
part of the world, such as the Kanaks in New Caledonia, who have subsequently
|
||
adopted socialism as their ideology. When I asked Jimmy Carter about this
|
||
during an interview recently he said he was sorry, but he did not remember
|
||
the episode. Is it possible that this may have been an incompetent blunder on
|
||
the part of the U.S. government? That somebody didn't do their homework, and
|
||
as a result those responsible for the decision didn't have all of the facts?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: Absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. Its not the kind of an issue that
|
||
draws the most attention in Washington. As you just pointed out, Jimmy Carter
|
||
doesn't even remember it. I'm sure that decision was made pretty far down the
|
||
line. If Carter ever had to make a decision he probably doesn't even remember
|
||
it because it was probably staffed down because it was considered so
|
||
inconsequential at the time by Carter and everyone involved. They considered
|
||
it so inconsequential that they don't even remember it. It's something they
|
||
signed off on. My guess from what you have told me is that it was a mistake.
|
||
|
||
FD: You mentioned E. Howard Hunt earlier. I understand that you wrote an
|
||
article for a Washington-based publication about the assassination of John F.
|
||
Kennedy and Hunt sued the publication, charging libel. Could you give us some
|
||
background on this matter?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: The article was written in the summer of 1978 and published by
|
||
SPOTLIGHT, a weekly newspaper that advertises itself as `The Voice of the
|
||
American Populist Party.' At the time I wrote the article for SPOTLIGHT the
|
||
House Select Committee on Assassinations was getting ready to hold its
|
||
hearings reviewing the Kennedy and King assassinations. I had picked up some
|
||
information around town that a memo had recently been uncovered in the CIA,
|
||
and that the CIA was concerned about it. I believe the memo was from James
|
||
Angleton, who at the time was chief of counterintelligence for Richard Helms.
|
||
I forget the exact date, but this memo was something like six years old,
|
||
while Helms was still in office as director.
|
||
|
||
The memo said that at some point in time the CIA was going to have to deal
|
||
with the fact that Hunt was in Dallas the day of the Kennedy assassination or
|
||
words to that effect. There was some other information in it, such as did you
|
||
know anything about it, he wasn't doing anything for me, and back and forth.
|
||
I had that piece of information, along with information that the House Select
|
||
Committee was going to come out with tapes that indicated there was more than
|
||
one shooter during the Kennedy assassination and that the FBI, or at least
|
||
certain people in the FBI, believed these tapes to be accurate and had always
|
||
believed that there was more than one shooter.
|
||
|
||
I was in contact with the House Select Committee, and they were probing real
|
||
deeply into things and they were very suspicious of the Kennedy
|
||
assassination. There were some other reporters working on the story at the
|
||
time, one in particular who has a tremendous reputation, and he felt there
|
||
was something to it. So we rushed into print at SPOTLIGHT with a story
|
||
saying, based on everything we put together, that we had this information,
|
||
and we tried to predict what was going to happen. In essence we said whats
|
||
going to happen is that the committee is going to unearth some new
|
||
information that there was more than one shooter and probably come up with
|
||
this memo, this internal CIA memorandum, and there will be some other things.
|
||
Then the CIA will conduct a limited hangout, and will admit to some error or
|
||
mistake, but then sweep everything else under the rug, and in the process
|
||
they may let a few people dangle in the wind like E. Howard Hunt, Frank
|
||
Sturgis, Jerry Hemming, and other people who have been mentioned in the past
|
||
as being involved in something related to the Kennedy assassination. It was
|
||
that kind of speculative piece.
|
||
|
||
What happened is that about a week after my article appeared in SPOTLIGHT the
|
||
Wilmington News-Journal published an article by Joe Trento. This was a longer
|
||
and more far-ranging article, in which he discussed the memo too but in
|
||
greater detail. A couple of weeks after that Hunt informed SPOTLIGHT that he
|
||
wanted a retraction. I checked with my sources and said I don't think we
|
||
should retract. I said we should do a follow-up article. Now by this time
|
||
some CIA guy was caught stealing pictures in the committee, some spy, so
|
||
things were really hot and heavy at the time. There was a lot of expectation
|
||
that the committee was going to do something, some really good work to bring
|
||
their investigation around. So I said to SPOTLIGHT let's do a follow-up
|
||
piece, but the publisher chickened out and said, nah, what we'll do is tell
|
||
Hunt we'll give him equal space. He can say whatever he wants to in the same
|
||
amount of space.
|
||
|
||
Hunt ignored the offer. A couple of months later Hunt comes to town for
|
||
secret hearings with the committee, and was heard in executive session. Hunt
|
||
was suing the publisher of the book `Coup D'Etat in America,' and deposed me
|
||
in relation to that case, and then he brought in, he tried to slip in, this
|
||
SPOTLIGHT article. I was under instructions from my lawyer not to comment. My
|
||
lawyer would have me refuse to answer on the grounds of journalistic
|
||
privilege, and also on the grounds of my relationship with the CIA. My lawyer
|
||
had on his own gone to the CIA before I gave my deposition and asked them
|
||
about this, and they said to tell me to just hide behind my injunction. I
|
||
told my lawyer I don't understand it, and he told me all that the CIA said is
|
||
that they hate Hunt more than they hate you and they're not going to give
|
||
Hunt any help. So that's what I did, and that was the end of it. We thought.
|
||
|
||
Two years after it ran Hunt finally sued SPOTLIGHT over my article. SPOTLIGHT
|
||
thought it was such a joke, all things considered, that they really didn't
|
||
pay any attention. I never even went to the trial. I never even submitted an
|
||
affidavit. I was not deposed or anything. The Hunt people didn't even try to
|
||
call me as a witness or anything. I was left out of everything. Hunt ended up
|
||
winning a judgment for $650,000. Now SPOTLIGHT got worried. They appealed and
|
||
the Florida Appellate Court overturned the decision on certain technical
|
||
grounds, and sent it back for retrial. The retrial finally occurred earlier
|
||
this year. When it came time for the retrial, which we had close to a year to
|
||
prepare for, SPOTLIGHT got serious, and went out and hired themselves a good
|
||
lawyer, Mark Lane, who is something of an expert on the Kennedy
|
||
assassination. They got me to become involved in everything, and we ended up
|
||
going down there and just beating Hunt's pants off. The jury came in, I
|
||
think, within several hours with a verdict in our favor. The interesting
|
||
thing was the jury said we were clearly not guilty of libel and actual
|
||
malice, but they were now suspicious of Hunt and everything he invoked
|
||
because we brought out a lot of stuff on Hunt.
|
||
|
||
Hunt lost, and was ordered to pay our court costs in addition to everything
|
||
else. He has subsequently filed an appeal and that's where its at now. It's
|
||
up for appeal. I imagine it will probably be another six months to a year
|
||
before we hear anything further on it. Based on everything I have seen, Hunt
|
||
doesn't have a leg to stand on because the deeper he gets into this the more
|
||
he runs the risk of exposing himself. We had just all kinds of material on
|
||
Hunt. We had a deposition from Joe Trento saying, yes, he saw the internal
|
||
CIA memo. We produced one witness in deposition, Marita Lorenz, who was
|
||
Castro's lover at one point, and she said that Hunt was taking her and people
|
||
like Sturgis and Jerry Hemmings and others and running guns into Dallas.
|
||
Lorenz said that a couple of days before the assassination Hunt met them in
|
||
Dallas and made a payoff. What they all were doing, whether it was connected
|
||
to the assassination, we don't know.
|
||
|
||
I think if Hunt keeps pursuing this, all that he's doing is setting the stage
|
||
for more and more people to come forward and say bad things about him, and
|
||
raise more evidence that he was in Dallas that day and that he must have been
|
||
involved in something. If it wasn't the assassination it must have been some
|
||
kind of diversionary activity or maybe it was something unrelated to the
|
||
assassination and the wires just got crossed and it was a coincidence at the
|
||
time.
|
||
|
||
One of the key points in the mind of the jury as far as we`ve been able to
|
||
tell at SPOTLIGHT is that Hunt to this day still cannot come up with an alibi
|
||
for where he was the day of the assassination. Hunt comes up with the
|
||
weakest, phoniest stories that he can't corroborate. Some guy who was drunk
|
||
came out of a bar and waved at him. His story doesn't match with that guy's
|
||
story. Hunt says he can produce his children to testify he was in Washington.
|
||
None of his children appeared at the trial. It's a very, very strange thing.
|
||
Hunt clearly was, in my mind, not in Washington doing what he says he was
|
||
doing Nov. 22, 1963. He was certainly not at work that day at the CIA. This
|
||
subject has come up before, whether he was on sick leave, an annual leave, or
|
||
where the hell he was. Hunt just cannot come up with a good alibi.
|
||
|
||
Hunt has gone before committees. The Rockefeller Committee, I believe he was
|
||
before the Church Committee, and before the House Select Committee. Nobody
|
||
will give Hunt a clean bill of health. They always weasel words. Their
|
||
comment on Hunt is always some sort of a way that can be interpreted anyway
|
||
that you want. You can say this indicates the committee looked into it and
|
||
they feel he wasn't involved. Or you can look at it and say the committee
|
||
looked into it and they have a lot of doubts about Hunt, and they're just
|
||
being very careful about what they are saying. Hunt himself will not tell you
|
||
what happened before these committees. He says that his testimony is
|
||
classified information. Well, if the testimony vindicates Hunt and provides
|
||
him with an alibi then why can't he tell us? The mystery remains.
|
||
|
||
FD: Do you believe it possible that the CIA knows where Hunt was Nov. 22,
|
||
1963, but just do not want to release that information?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: That's my guess. I think that subsequently, by now, the CIA may
|
||
not have known where Hunt was at the time, and they may not have even
|
||
realized what he was up to until years after and years later when his name
|
||
started to be commonly mentioned in connection with the assassination. I
|
||
think by now the CIA probably knows where Hunt was and what he was doing or
|
||
have some very strong feelings about that, and they're not too happy about
|
||
it. But whatever it was, and is, that Hunt was involved in, it seems to be,
|
||
or would appear, that he was in or around Dallas about the time of the
|
||
assassination, involved in some kind of clandestine activity. It may have
|
||
been an illegal clandestine activity, even something the CIA was unaware of.
|
||
The CIA acts very strangely about this. The CIA will not give Hunt any help.
|
||
He got no help at all from the CIA in the preparation of his case against us
|
||
or in the presentation of his case. They just left him out there. Hunt
|
||
managed to scrounge up a couple of his CIA friends who on their own were
|
||
willing to give some help, but caved in right away. One guy didn't testify.
|
||
Another guy gave a stupid deposition in the middle of the night to us
|
||
(laughs) which wasn't worth the paper it was written on.
|
||
|
||
Helms gave a deposition which said nothing. No way would he go out on a limb
|
||
for Hunt. In my own mind, I have a feeling that the CIA knows where Hunt was
|
||
and what he was doing, and while they're not going to prosecute him for a lot
|
||
of reasons, they're involved in the cover-up themselves and don't want to
|
||
bring any embarrassment upon the agency. On the other hand, they feel if he
|
||
screws around and gets his own mit in the ringer, that's his own fault, and
|
||
we can cover our ass. Hunt, for his own part, apparently feels he has some
|
||
sort of pressure on the CIA that while it might not be strong enough to bring
|
||
them forward to defend him before any committee or in a court of law, its at
|
||
least strong enough for them not to take any overt action against him. So it
|
||
seems to me to be some kind of double graymail. Hunt's graymailing the CIA on
|
||
one hand and they're graymailing him on the other hand. Its a very, very
|
||
strange thing.
|
||
|
||
FD: Did Jerry Hemmings give a deposition? I understand he is still in prison.
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: I think Jerry might still be in. He asked not to give a deposition
|
||
or be called as a witness unless it was absolutely necessary, because he was
|
||
either coming toward the end of his term, or he was up for parole. He
|
||
preferred not to get involved. This was pretty much the attitude of another
|
||
individual who was mentioned, but I was left with the feeling that if push
|
||
really came to shove, these people could be brought forward. Now what they
|
||
know, or whether they were going to risk perjury, which is a pretty big
|
||
gamble when you`re dealing with Mark Lane, particularly on this subject. He's
|
||
not only a brilliant lawyer, but this is a subject he has a lot of background
|
||
in.
|
||
|
||
FD: Did Gordon Novel fit into this at all?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: No.
|
||
|
||
FD: You mentioned that it is possible the CIA is withholding information on
|
||
Hunt's whereabouts Nov. 22, 1963. The CIA has been accused many times in the
|
||
past of engaging in a cover-up of the JFK assassination. Do you believe they
|
||
are still covering up in a lot of ways?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: Oh yeah, I think so, I'd think not only they and the FBI, I think
|
||
everybody is covering up.
|
||
|
||
FD: Are they covering up necessarily to just keep the American people in the
|
||
dark about the episode, or cover-up because of their own guilt and complicity?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: I think its both. I think it all started with when it happened. I
|
||
don't think anybody was really sure in Washington who was behind the
|
||
assassination. I think they were very fearful that if they didn't come up
|
||
with a lone nut theory, and in this case a lone nut who was removed from the
|
||
scene in a matter of days, that the American people might panic. They might
|
||
lose their faith in the government. They might lose their faith in the
|
||
institutions. They might begin to point fingers at all kinds of people. The
|
||
Russians. The Cubans. Other elements of our society like the right wing and
|
||
organized crime and so on. I think there was a consensus in the minds of the
|
||
establishmentarians in our government which was that we should put this to
|
||
bed as quickly and as quietly as possible. We'll make a hero out of Kennedy
|
||
and let's forget about it. And then of course they did have to have a Warren
|
||
Commission, a blue-ribbon panel which would have the right people on it and
|
||
then we'll lay the thing to rest officially. Which is essentially what
|
||
happened. They didn't hear a lot of evidence. They ignored evidence. Evidence
|
||
was hidden. Evidence was destroyed. I think it was pretty much clear that
|
||
nobody was being absolutely forthcoming.
|
||
|
||
The former head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, even said he would lie to the
|
||
people about anything he considered to pertain to national security. Dulles
|
||
said he would lie to the people if he had to. I think the Kennedy
|
||
assassination was laid to rest by the establishment and it became just a
|
||
suspicion in the minds of the people. Then came the revelations. I think by
|
||
now everybody involved was deeply involved in the coverup, that that maybe
|
||
became even more paramount than the question of who did kill Kennedy and why.
|
||
To admit that we covered up from the very begining, and that we've been
|
||
covering up ever since, I think, would be more devastating than it would have
|
||
been a few years ago to say O.K., we've looked into it, and figured it out,
|
||
it was CIA renegades, or whoever was responsible for murdering Kennedy. I
|
||
think by now there are just too many people that feel they may have started
|
||
out originally for the most noble of motives but they cannot adjust to it. We
|
||
saw it with the Watergate affair, and see it every day in life. Once somebody
|
||
starts lying and covering up it just snowballs. It just keeps going on and on
|
||
and on and on. It keeps getting harder and harder and harder to determine the
|
||
truth. I think it's pretty difficult for somebody in 1985 to come forward and
|
||
say, yes, I was part of a cover-up, 22 years ago. What he's saying is that
|
||
I've lived a lie all of my life. I don't think we're ever going to get the
|
||
answer, frankly. I don't think we're every going to get the answer to the
|
||
story.
|
||
|
||
FD: You're pessimistic about the American people discovering the real truth
|
||
about the JFK assassination?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: This is not to say that 50 years from now that some historian may
|
||
get access to some material when everybody is dead and buried, and might be
|
||
able to put together a pretty accurate story. But even then, with all of the
|
||
time that has gone by, the myth will have been established. You have those
|
||
people that will say, ``Ugh. Conspiracy theorists,'' while other people will
|
||
say, ``I never believe the government.'' But it will have no effect.
|
||
|
||
FD: So you believe it will only be time that will reveal the full truth about
|
||
the JFK assassination? The truth won't be revealed because of another big
|
||
government scandal like Watergate, or a president who is committed to seeing
|
||
that the case is solved?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: One of the presidents who might have unearthed all this, actually
|
||
a potential president was Bobby Kennedy, but he got rubbed out.
|
||
|
||
FD: Bobby Kennedy made a statement three days before he was murdered that he
|
||
felt only the office of the presidency could get at the truth.
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: I'm not sure if thats possible. I wonder in my own mind if, let's
|
||
say, Teddy Kennedy would be elected president. I wonder if he, one, would
|
||
have the courage to reopen the case at this point in time knowing everything
|
||
he knows about it probably. And two, if he had the courage, would he have the
|
||
muscle to be able to resolve it completely and fully to the satisfaction of
|
||
everyone? I think there are those things in life you either resolve at the
|
||
time or never. After awhile, as the years pass by, it becomes more and more
|
||
difficult until it is impossible.
|
||
|
||
FD: The American people are told that they choose their leaders and run the
|
||
government. Is this true, or is it the invisible state within a state, the
|
||
intelligence community?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: I don't think the intelligence community, although it is an
|
||
invisible arm of the government, runs it. I think the people who run the
|
||
country are the same people who usually run things not only here but all over
|
||
the world. The powerful economic interests, whether they are bankers, or
|
||
industrialists, or whatever. The real solid inner core of the establishment.
|
||
These are the movers and shakers, but they don't have absolute power. They
|
||
may not want a certain person to get nominated by a certain party. In some
|
||
cases they may not even be able to stop them from getting to power or using
|
||
it. Generally speaking, they have more influence on the government than the
|
||
other people do. Its manifested itself in all sorts of ways. There are all of
|
||
these forces at work.
|
||
|
||
FD: One last question: PSI. Both the CIA and the KGB had a great interest in
|
||
this area. One of the things I know the CIA did, attempt to recruit KGB
|
||
agents in the afterlife. Are you familiar with this?
|
||
|
||
Marchetti: I do know there was great interest in this whole area of
|
||
parapsychology, for whatever benefit may have been achieved. Not only the
|
||
CIA, but the Pentagon was involved, and for that matter, the KGB. Everybody
|
||
has apparently examined it. There were a lot of stories floating around the
|
||
CIA that they had tried to contact old agents like Penkovsky, who had been
|
||
captured and killed, executed by the Soviet Union, in the hope that they
|
||
could derive additional information. To my knowledge none of this stuff
|
||
really worked.
|
||
|
||
FD: Thank you, Victor Marchetti.
|
||
|
||
could derive additional information. To my knowledge none of this stuff
|
||
really worked.
|
||
|
||
FD: Tha |