Going Off Budget Although some of the powers which Bush assumed in order to conduct the Gulf War were taken openly, they received little public discussion or reporting by the media. In October, when the winds of the Gulf War were merely a breeze, Bush used his executive emergency powers to extend his budget authority. This action made the 1991 fiscal budget agreement between Congress and the President one of the first U.S. casualties of the war. While on one hand the deal froze arms spending through 1996, it also allowed Bush to put the cost of the Gulf War "off budget." Thus, using its emergency powers, the Bush administration could: * incur a deficit which exceeds congressional budget authority; * prevent Congress from raising a point of order over the excessive spending;[12] * waive the requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit estimates to Congress prior to deployment of a major defense acquisition system; * and exempt the Pentagon from congressional restrictions on hiring private contractors.[13] While there is no published evidence on which powers Bush actually invoked, the administration was able to push through the 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. This legislation put a cap on domestic spending, created a record $300000000000 deficit, and undermined the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings Act intended to reduce the federal deficit. Although Congress agreed to pay for the war through supplemental appropriations and approved a $42200000000 supplemental bill and a $4800000000 companion "dire emergency supplemental appropriation,"[14] it specified that the supplemental budget should not be used to finance costs the Pentagon would normally experience.[15] Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan administration, believes that the Pentagon has already violated the spirit of the 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. It switched funding for the Patriot, Tomahawk, Hellfire and HARM missiles from its regular budget to the supplemental budget; added normal wear and tear of equipment to supplemental appropriations; and made supplemental requests which ignore a planned 25% reduction in the armed forces by 1995.[16] The Cost In Liberty Lost Under emergency circumstances, using 50 USC sec. 1811, the President could direct the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveillance of aliens and American citizens in order to obtain foreign intelligence information without a court order.[17] No Executive Order has been published which activates emergency powers to wiretap or to engage in counter-terrorist activity. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence that such activities have taken place. According to the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, the FBI launched an anti-terrorist campaign which included a broad sweep of Arab-Americans. Starting in August, the FBI questioned, detained, and harassed Arab-Americans in California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado.[18] A CIA agent asked the University of Connecticut for a list of all foreign students at the institution, along with their country of origin, major field of study, and the names of their academic advisers. He was particularly interested in students from the Middle East and explained that the Agency intended to open a file on each of the students. Anti-war groups have also reported several break-ins of their offices and many suspected electronic surveillance of their telephones.[19] Pool of Disinformation Emergency powers to control the means of communications in the U.S. in the name of national security were never formally declared. There was no need for Bush to do so since most of the media voluntarily and even eagerly cooperated in their own censorship. Reporters covering the Coalition forces in the Gulf region operated under restrictions imposed by the U.S. military. They were, among other things, barred from traveling without a military escort, limited in their forays into the field to small escorted groups called "pools," and required to submit all reports and film to military censors for clearance. Some reporters complained that the rules limited their ability to gather information independently, thereby obstructing informed and objective reporting.[20] Three Pentagon press officials in the Gulf region admitted to James LeMoyne of the "New York Times" that they spent significant time analyzing reporters' stories in order to shape the coverage in the Pentagon's favor. In the early days of the deployment, Pentagon press officers warned reporters who asked hard questions that they were seen as "anti-military" and that their requests for interviews with senior commanders and visits to the field were in jeopardy. The military often staged events solely for the cameras and would stop televised interviews in progress when it did not like what was being portrayed. Although filed soon after the beginning of the war, a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of press restrictions was not heard until after the war ended. It was then dismissed when the judge ruled that since the war had ended, the issues raised had become moot. The legal status of the restrictions--initially tested during the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama--remains unsettled. A National Misfortune It will be years before researchers and journalists are able to ferret through the maze of government documents and give a full appraisal of the impact of the President's emergency powers on domestic affairs. It is likely, however, that with a post-war presidential approval rating exceeding 75%, the domestic casualties will continue to mount with few objections. Paradoxically, even though the U.S. public put pressure on Bush to send relief for the 500000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees, it is unlikely the same outcry will be heard for the 37000000 Americans without health insurance, the 32000000 living in poverty, or the country's five million hungry children. The U.S. may even help rebuild Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilian infrastructures it destroyed during the war while leaving its own education system in decay, domestic transportation infrastructures crumbling, and inner city war zones uninhabitable. And, while the U.S. assists Kuwait in cleaning up its environmental disaster, it will increase pollution at home. Indeed, as the long-dead Prussian field marshal prophesied, "a war, even the most victorious, is a national misfortune." FOOTNOTES: 1. The administrative guideline was established under Reagan in Executive Order 12656, November 181988, "Federal Register," vol. 23, no. 266. 2. For instance, National Security Council policy papers or National Security Directives (NSD) or National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) have today evolved into a network of shadowy, wide-ranging and potent executive powers. These are secret instruments, maintained in a top security classified state and are not shared with Congress. For an excellent discussion see: Harold C. Relyea, The Coming of Secret Law, "Government Information Quarterly," Vol. 5, November 1988; see also: Eve Pell, "The Backbone of Hidden Government," "The Nation," June 191990. 3. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect to Iraq," February, 11, 1991, "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents: Administration of George Bush," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 158-61. 4. The U.S. now has states of emergency with Iran, Iraq and Syria. 5. Allanna Sullivan, "U.S. Oil Concerns Confident Of Riding Out Short Gulf War," "Wall Street Journal Europe," January 7, 1991. 6. Colin McMillan, Letter to Michael Deland, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President), August 24, 1990; Michael R. Deland, Letter to Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), August 291990. 7. Keith Schneider, "Pentagon Wins Waiver Of Environmental Rule," "New York Times," January 30, 1991. 8. 33 U.S. Code (USC) sec. 1902 9(b). 9. 33 USC sec. 2503 l(b). 10. 50 USC sec. 1521(b) (3)(A). ll. Adam Clymer, "New Bill Mandates Sanctions On Makers of Chemical Arms," "New York Times," February 22, 1991. 12. 31 USC O10005 (f); 2 USC O632 (i), 6419 (d), 907a (b); and Public Law 101-508, Title X999, sec. 13101. 13. 10 USC sec. 2434/2461 9F. 14. When the Pentagon expected the war to last months and oil prices to skyrocket, it projected the incremental cost of deploying and redeploying the forces and waging war at about $70000000000. The administration sought and received $56000000000 in pledges from allies such as Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. Although the military's estimates of casualties and the war's duration were highly inflated, today their budget estimates remain at around $70000000000 even though the Congressional Budget office estimates that cost at only $40 billion, $16000000000 less than allied pledges. 15. Michael Kamish, "After The War: At Home, An Unconquered Recession," "Boston Globe," March 6, 1991; Peter Passell, "The Big Spoils From a Bargain War," "New York Times," March 3, 1991; and Alan Abelson, "A War Dividend For The Defense Industry?" "Barron's," March 18, 1991. 16. Lawrence Korb, "The Pentagon's Creative Budgetry Is Out of Line," "International Herald Tribune," April 5, 199l. 17. Many of the powers against aliens are automatically invoked during a national emergency or state of war. Under the Alien Enemies Act (50 USC sec. 21), the President can issue an order to apprehend, restrain, secure and remove all subjects of a hostile nation over 13 years old. Other statutes conferring special powers on the President with regard to aliens that may be exercised in times of war or emergencies but are not confined to such circumstances, are: exclusion of all or certain classes of aliens from entry into the U.S. when their entry may be "detrimental to the interests of the United States" (8 USC sec. 1182(f)); imposition of travel restrictions on aliens within the U.S. (8 USC sec. 1185); and requiring aliens to be fingerprinted (8 USC sec. 1302). 18. Ann Talamas, "FBI Targets Arab-Americans," "CAIB," Spring 1991, p. 4. 19. "Anti-Repression Project Bulletin" (New York: Center for Constitutional Rights), January 23, 1991. 20. James DeParle, "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship," "New York Times," May 5, 1991. 21. James LeMoyne, "A Correspondent's Tale: Pentagon's Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News," "New York Times," February 17, 1991.