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+<xml>
+
+<p> "How The <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> Are Bugging <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>"
+-------------------------------------</p>
+
+<p> By Sen. <ent type='PERSON'>Daniel Patrick</ent> Moynihan</p>
+
+<p> From <ent type='ORG'>Popular Mechanics</ent>, April 1987</p>
+
+<p> <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> agents may be listening to your personal telephone
+conversations. If you're involved in the government, in the
+defense industry or in sensitive scientific activity, there
+is a good chance they are. </p>
+
+<p> In fact, a recent unclassified <ent type='ORG'>Senate</ent> <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent>
+Committee report on counterintelligence indicates more than
+half of all telephone calls in <ent type='GPE'>the United States</ent> made over
+any distance are vulnerable to interception. Every <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>n
+has a right to know this. </p>
+
+<p> You should also know that the <ent type='PERSON'>Reagan</ent> administration has
+recognized this threat for a long time now, but so far, the
+bureaucratic response has been piecemeal, and at times
+reluctant. </p>
+
+<p> Consider this as background: In 1975, when I was named
+permanent U.S. representative to the <ent type='ORG'>United Nations</ent>, Vice
+President <ent type='PERSON'>Nelson Rockefeller</ent> summoned me to his office in the
+Old Executive Office Building. There was something urgent he
+had to tell me. The first thing I must know about the United
+Nations, he said, is that the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> would be listening to
+every call I made from our mission and from the ambassador's
+suite in the Waldorf Towers. I thought this a very deep
+secret, and treated it as such. Only later did I learn that
+<ent type='ORG'>Rockefeller</ent> had publicly reported this intelligence breach to
+the president in June 1975. The <ent type='ORG'>Rockefeller</ent> "Report to the
+President on <ent type='ORG'>CIA</ent> Activities Within <ent type='GPE'>the United States</ent>" notes: </p>
+
+<p> "We believe these countries (communist bloc) can monitor
+and record thousands of private telephone conversations.
+<ent type='GPE'>America</ent>ns have the right to be uneasy if not seriously
+disturbed at the real possibility that their personal and
+business activities, which they discuss freely over the
+telephone, could be recorded and analyzed by agents of
+foreign powers." </p>
+
+<p> The <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> conduct this eavesdropping from their
+"diplomatic" facilities in <ent type='GPE'>New York City</ent>; <ent type='LOC'>Glen Cove</ent>, Long
+Island; <ent type='GPE'>San Francisco</ent>; and <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>. By some estimates,
+they have been doing so since 1958. President <ent type='PERSON'>Reagan</ent> knows
+this well. He sat on the <ent type='ORG'>Rockefeller</ent> Commission and signed
+its final report concluding that such covert activities
+existed. </p>
+
+<p> If we had any doubts about this eavesdropping effort,
+<ent type='PERSON'>Arkady Schevchenko</ent> dispelled them when he came over in 1975
+and subsequently defected in 1978. As you will recall,
+<ent type='PERSON'>Schevchenko</ent> was, at the time, the second-ranking <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> at
+the <ent type='ORG'>United Nations</ent> and an up-and-comer in the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent>
+hierarchy. He describes the listening operation in <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>
+City in his book "Breaking With <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>": "The rooftops at
+<ent type='LOC'>Glen Cove</ent>, the apartment building in <ent type='GPE'>Riverdale</ent>, and the
+Mission are bristled with antennas for listening to <ent type='GPE'>America</ent>n
+conversations." </p>
+
+<p> But we have to worry about more than just parabolic dish
+antennas tucked behind the curtains in the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> "apartment"
+building in <ent type='GPE'>Riverdale</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>. </p>
+
+<p> There are also those <ent type='NORP'>Russian</ent> trawlers that travel up and
+down our coast. They are fishing, but fishing for what?
+Communications. And now the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have taken their
+eavesdropping a step further and have built two new classes
+of AGI, or <ent type='ORG'>Auxiliary Gathering Intelligence</ent>, vessels. From
+the hull up, these new vessels are floating antennas, I
+suppose. </p>
+
+<p> Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> listening
+complex in <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>, just outside of <ent type='GPE'>Havana</ent>. This
+facility is the largest such <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> listening facility
+outside its national territory. According to the president,
+it "has grown by more than 60 percent in size and capability
+during the past decade." </p>
+
+<p> <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent> allows instant communications with <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>, and is
+manned by 2100 <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> technicians. 2100! </p>
+
+<p> By comparison, our Department of State numbers some 4400
+Foreign Service Officers - total. </p>
+
+<p> Again, to cite the recent <ent type='ORG'><ent type='ORG'>Senate</ent> <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent> Committee</ent>
+report: "The massive <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> surveillance efforts from <ent type='GPE'>Cuba</ent>
+and elsewhere demonstrate ... that the <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> intelligence
+payoff from the interception of unsecured communications is
+immense." <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent> specialists are not prone to
+exaggeration, they do not last long that way. You can be
+assured that "massive" and "immense" are not subtle words as
+used in this context. </p>
+
+<p> There are, however, two things you should know. </p>
+
+<p> First, our most secret government messages are now
+protected from interception or are scrambled, and all
+classified message and data communications are secure. In
+addition, protected communications zones are being
+established in <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent>, <ent type='GPE'>San Francisco</ent> and <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> by
+rerouting most government circuits and by encrypting
+microwave links which continue to be vulnerable to intercept.
+But there are still communications links which carry
+unclassified, but sensitive, information that we need to
+protect. </p>
+
+<p> Second, it is a truism in the intelligence field that
+while bits of information may be unclassified, in aggregate
+they can present a classified whole. The <ent type='ORG'>Senate</ent> <ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent>
+Committee informs us, "Due to inherent human weakness,
+government and contractor officials, at all levels,
+inevitable fail to follow strict security rules ... Security
+briefings and penalties were simply not adequate to prevent
+discussion of classified information on open lines." If the
+<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> CAN piece it together, you must assume they WILL
+given the resources they invest toward this effort. </p>
+
+<p> But the intelligence community needs no reminder that we
+are up against a determined and crafty opponent. In 1983, for
+example, a delegation of <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> scientists were invited to
+tour a <ent type='ORG'>Grumman</ent> plant on <ent type='GPE'>Long Island</ent>. No cameras. No notes.
+All secure, right? Wrong. The delegation had attached
+adhesive tape to the soles of their shoes to gather metal
+fragments from the plant floor for further study at home. The
+<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> are pretty good at metallurgy - probably the best in
+the world - and we don't need to help them any further. </p>
+
+<p> But concern is not always translated into budgetary
+action, at least not in the realm of communications security.
+Let us take a look at the technical problem confronting us. </p>
+
+<p> As you know, there are two basic ways voice can be
+transmitted over telephone media: digital and analog. <ent type='ORG'>Analog</ent>
+refers to voice waves which are modulated (amplified) up to a
+very high frequency (HF). That is, they are increased in
+speed from hundreds of cycles per second to thousands of
+cycles per second. This facilitates their passage over
+distance. </p>
+
+<p> Nevertheless, because analog radio waves diminish rapidly
+over distance, it's necessary to periodically amplify, or
+boost, the signal either at a microwave relay tower repeater
+or satellite transponder. (Actually, the signals are
+diminished in frequency to voice quality and then brought
+back up to high frequency.) </p>
+
+<p> <ent type='ORG'>Digital</ent> transmissions are voice or data vibration signals
+which are converted into a series of on-and-off pulses, zeros
+and ones, as in a computer. Like analog telephone calls,
+digital calls go through a process of modulation and
+demodulation. </p>
+
+<p> For the purposes of this discussion, we need only
+remember two things about analog and digital telephony. </p>
+
+<p> First, analog telephony is fast being replaced by digital
+telephony because it better translates computer language.
+But, more importantly, after a high initial overhaul cost,
+it's possible to send thousands of digital calls (bundles)
+over a single conduit. Therefore, as we expand our digital
+capacity, we must ensure that both our analog and digital
+communications are protected from <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> eavesdropping. </p>
+
+<p> Second, sending bundles over a single conduit is the base
+block at which we introduce the encryption I am talking
+about. </p>
+
+<p> When you place a long-distance telephone call from point
+A to point B, there are three communications paths, or
+circuits, over which your call might travel: microwave,
+satellite or cable. </p>
+
+<p> <ent type='ORG'>Cable</ent> is the most secure. However, it is the least
+practical and economical method for bulk transmission over
+long distances. As a result, 90 percent of our long-distance
+telephone traffic is sent by microwave or satellite, and that
+which is in the air can be readily intercepted. </p>
+
+<p> As your signal travels along the cable from your home to
+the local switching station and then on to a long-haul
+switching station, it is combined (stacked and bundled might
+better describe the process) with as many as 1200 other
+signals trying to get to the same region of the country. </p>
+
+<p> This system of stacking and bundling signals is called
+multiplexing and it's how the telecommunications industry
+gets around the problem of 7 million <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent>ers all trying
+to call their senator at the same time on the same copper
+wire or radio frequency. </p>
+
+<p> If you use a common carrier, that is, if you have not
+rented a dedicated channel from a telecommunications company,
+a computer at the long-haul switching station will select the
+first available route to establish a circuit over which your
+call signals may travel. </p>
+
+<p> Therefore, calls that the caller believes to be on less
+vulnerable circuits may be automatically switched to more
+vulnerable ones. All this takes place in 1 to 3 seconds. </p>
+
+<p> So let's follow your call as it goes by either microwave
+or satellite. </p>
+
+<p> If your call goes via microwave, it will be relayed
+across the country as a radio wave in about 25-mile intervals
+from tower to tower (watch for the towers the next time you
+drive on an interstate route) until it eventually reaches a
+distant switching station where it is unlinked from the other
+signals, passed over cable to your friend's telephone, and
+converted back into voice. </p>
+
+<p> The problem with this system: Along these microwave paths
+there is what we call "spill". This measures about 12.5
+meters in width and the full 25 miles between towers. This is
+where the microwave signal is most at risk. Using a well-aimed parabolic dish antenna (located, let's say, on the top
+of <ent type='LOC'>Mount Alto</ent>, one of the highest hills in <ent type='GPE'>the District</ent> of
+Columbia, and the site of the new <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> embassy) you can
+intercept this signal and pull it in. And that is just what
+the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> are doing. </p>
+
+<p> My solution: Throw the bastards out if they are listening
+to our microwave signals. Nothing technical about it. On
+three occasions I have introduced legislation requiring the
+president to do just that, unless in doing so, he might
+compromise an intelligence source. On June 7, 1985, this
+measure was adopted by the <ent type='ORG'>Senate</ent> as Title VII to the Foreign
+Relations Authorization Bill, but it was dropped in
+conference with <ent type='ORG'>the House</ent> of Representatives at the urging of
+the administration. </p>
+
+<p> Nevertheless, I think the administration accepted the
+simple logic behind the proposal when at the end of October,
+55 <ent type='NORP'>Soviet</ent> diplomats were ordered to leave the country,
+including, The <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> Times tells us, "operatives for
+intercepting communications." Now, let's not let the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent>
+just replace one agent with another. </p>
+
+<p> The process is much the same for a satellite telephone
+call. Today, approximately eight telecommunications carriers
+offer satellite service using something like 25 satellites.
+Let's suppose your signal has traveled to a long-haul
+switching station and all microwave paths are filled. The
+carrier's computer searches for an alternative path to send
+the signal and picks out a satellite connection. At the
+ground station, your call is sent by a transponder up to a
+satellite and then down again to a distant ground station. </p>
+
+<p> Using an array of satellite dishes at <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent>, the
+<ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> can seize these signals from the sky just as a
+backyard satellite dish can pull in television (and
+telephone) signals. High speed computers then sort through
+the calls and identify topics and numbers of particular
+interest. And if the information provided is real time
+intelligence, the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have the ability to transmit it
+instantaneously to <ent type='GPE'>Moscow</ent>. And yes, the <ent type='NORP'>Soviets</ent> have the
+range at <ent type='PERSON'>Lourdes</ent> to grasp our satellite transmissions as they
+travel from <ent type='GPE'>New York</ent> to <ent type='GPE'>Los Angeles</ent> or <ent type='GPE'>Washington</ent> to <ent type='GPE'>Omaha</ent>. </p>
+
+<p> Here, too, there is a solution: <ent type='ORG'>Develop</ent> and procure
+cryptographic hardware for use at the common-carrier long-haul switching stations. This hardware will encrypt the
+multiplexed telephone signals (that is, approximately 1200
+calls at a time) before they are transmitted as radio waves
+from ground station to ground station, a technique analogous
+to the cable networks scrambling their signals. This can be
+done for under $1 billion. If we start by encrypting just
+those unclassified signals we categorize as sensitive, those
+having greatest impact on the national defense or foreign
+relations of the U.S. government, it would cost us about half
+as much. It would cost us so much more not to do so. </p>
+
+<p> Communications security has no constituency. There is no
+tangible product and the public can never really be sure that
+we have done anything. But National Security Decision
+Directive 145 says it is a national policy and the national
+responsibility to offer assistance to the private sector in
+protecting communications. It's time to make communications
+security (ComSec in the lingo) a true national security
+priority supported with resources as well as rhetoric. This
+was certainly the conclusion of the comprehensive
+<ent type='ORG'>Intelligence</ent> Committee report. </p>
+
+<p> I agree, and have suggested a way to get on with it. If
+someone has a better idea - if you have another idea - I
+would be happy to know it. The important thing is that we
+stop this massive leak of sensitive information and protect
+your privacy.</p>
+
+</xml>